Guest Column: Why Animals Now?

MARIANNE DEKOVEN

Dying Puppy

MYRTLE WILSON, TOM BUCHANAN'S WORKING-CLASS LOVER IN F. Scott Fitzgerald's *The Great Gatsby*, wants "one of those police dogs" as an ornament "for the apartment," because "they are nice to have" (27). Tom, Myrtle, and our narrator, Nick Carraway, have just arrived at Penn Station and gotten into a taxi, in the novel's second chapter. Myrtle boarded the train in Queens, site of her home in the Eliotic "valley of ashes," joining Nick and Tom on the rail commute from their respective class-bound Long Island Eggs, upper East and nouveau West, into the city that is "built with a wish out of non-olfactory money" (69).

At Myrtle's urgent request, they stop the taxi for a shady, seedy man—"a gray old man who bore an absurd resemblance to John D. Rockefeller"—carrying a basketful of what Nick calls "recent puppies of an indeterminate breed." Tom says, of the puppy the man offers to Myrtle, "That's no police dog." The John D. Rockefeller lookalike backpedals: "No, it's not exactly a po*lice* dog. . . . It's more of an Airedale." Nick, who likens the puppy's fur to a "brown washrag," allows that "undoubtedly there was an Airedale concerned in it somewhere, though its feet were startlingly white." Myrtle wants the puppy anyway—she "think[s] it's cute." When the puppy seller asks for ten dollars, Tom, who knows the value of a commodity, says, "Here's your money. Go and buy ten more dogs with it." Myrtle asks the old man, "Is it a boy or a girl?" "That dog? That dog's a boy," he answers. Tom says, "decisively," "It's a bitch" (27–28). This ironic treatment of the puppy undercuts, in advance, the possible sentimentality of its fate.

Myrtle receives the unnamed puppy into her lap "with rapture" (28). It accompanies the three to the apartment Tom keeps for Myrtle

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https://doi.org/10.1632/pmla.2009.124.2.361 Published online by Cambridge University Press

on the Upper West Side, a Manhattan home of new money and mongrel human breeds (the Upper East Side, like East Egg, is for purebreds). At the apartment, Myrtle's first act is to send "a reluctant elevator-boy" to get "a box full of straw and some milk, to which he added on his own initiative a tin of large, hard dog biscuits—one of which decomposed apathetically in the saucer of milk all afternoon" (29). Presumably the puppy touches neither the biscuit nor the milk. Myrtle's only subsequent relation to the puppy is to "flounce" over to it, kiss it "with ecstasy" (32), and decide it needs a fancy collar (37).

During the party, which ends abruptly when Tom breaks Myrtle's nose because she insists on repeating Daisy's name, this puppy, neglected, steadily declines in a way that suggests its possible or probable death: "The little dog was sitting on the table looking with blind eyes through the smoke, and from time to time groaning faintly" (37). The blind eyes connect to the novel's central theme of occluded, distorted vision. Along with the smoke, they also connect to the mightily symbolic eyes of Dr. T. J. Eckleburg, which "brood on over" the smoky valley of ashes but are, of course, literally blind (23). The puppy's intermittent groaning suggests that its decline involves suffering.

Tom's nose-breaking blow to Myrtle's face extends the violence Fitzgerald associates with Tom in introducing him to the novel. In the introductory sequence, Nick describes him as having "a cruel body" (7), and Fitzgerald associates Tom with the racist fear of "nonwhite" immigrants and people of African descent pervasive in the 1920s. Tom cites enthusiastically "'The Rise of the Colored Empires' by this man Goddard" (13; he is referring to the 1920 best seller *The Rising Tide of Color against White World-Supremacy,* by Lothrop Stoddard). Police dogs, German shepherds, were used extensively by the Germans in World War I and would come to be intimately associated with Nazi violence against mongrel humans.[1] Tom and Nick, and Fitzgerald himself, are linked through their anti-Semitism, apparent in the novel's characterization of the gangster Meyer Wolfsheim as "a small, flat-nosed Jew . . . with two fine growths of hair which luxuriated in either nostril" (69–70; he represents an olfactory kind of money), and through their racism and their class snobbery in general. A product of the cosmopolitan mobility of New York, which supports the rise of lower classes, darker races, and sexualized femininity, the dying puppy gathers the giant themes of the novel.

We can access these themes through myriad portals in the novel, however, without recourse to the puppy. Does Fitzgerald supply this puppy, then, as a form of symbolic excess? one more item on Myrtle's (like Gatsby's) far-too-long list of useless things to buy? Myrtle's version of Gatsby's cascade of shirts? I would argue, rather, that the puppy has an intermediate status, between superfluous commodity in the doomed nexus of 1920s high-life consumerism and meaningfully living being. Because it is a nonhuman animal, the puppy is other, and it can serve to make working-class Myrtle more clearly other by association. But because it is a companion animal, it is an irreducible amalgam of self and other and can both problematize Myrtle's otherness and invoke Gatsby's own intermediate, indeterminate self-other status. It is the baby Myrtle will never have with Tom, yet it is also—as a mongrel of negligible birth, like Myrtle and like Gatsby, James Gatz, himself—opposite to Daisy's precious, legitimate Buchanan baby. The puppy appears in the novel as the result of impulse buying. Its primary functions are to let Myrtle put a garish collar on her shopping list and to sum up Myrtle's valley-of-ashes world by declining toward death. The plight of the puppy draws us toward sentiment, but Fitzgerald's subtlety and irony push us away.[2]

Dead Dogs

Literature is replete with meaning-laden animals like Fitzgerald's puppy. The weight

https://doi.org/10.1632/pmla.2009.124.2.361 Published online by Cambridge University Press

they bear is often heavy—Aesop's and other animal fables, Kafka, and a great deal of children's literature come immediately to mind. It is important, however, to avoid a reductive, ahistorical approach that lumps all literary animals together. All literary representations of animals no more form a unified or even meaningful category than do those of women or the working class. While there are political reasons to invoke such reductive, essentializing categories, those reasons should lead only to initial moments of recognition that serve as prologues to more careful critical analysis.

This stricture points to an important mode of, and motivation for, burgeoning critical work on nonhuman animals. The term *nonhuman* itself is ideologically loaded: only from the point of view of the human are other animals nonhuman. Donna Haraway uses "critters" to designate all animals including humans (*When Species Meet*). *Nonhuman* is not an inevitable descriptor. There are many other ways to designate the beings in question: by species, habitat, ecological niche, relation to predation (predator or prey), type of nourishment (carnivore, herbivore, omnivore). *Nonwhite*, *non-European*, and *non-Western* are parallel to *nonhuman* and reveal what is at stake in using it. Indeed, many critics and theorists who work in animal and animality studies[3] are motivated by the parallels between animals and subjugated humans.

Analyzing the uses of animal representation can clarify modes of human subjugation that ideology might otherwise obscure. A primary approach to the study of animal representation takes as its object the ways in which literary animals are used to reinforce the denigration of subjugated people or to point toward greater human equality. This approach can be motivated by a concern for human oppression or a simultaneous concern for all animal suffering and mistreatment, human and nonhuman. I have worked in this mode, analyzing, for example, the stark animal imagery some African American writers have used to grab and shake the reader. In the opening scene of Richard Wright's *Native Son*, the repulsive description of the rat Bigger must kill makes it clear that the rat is Bigger's double (3–4). In Toni Morrison's *Beloved*, Sethe kills her daughter so that Schoolteacher cannot count up the baby's "animal characteristics" (193), as he did to Sethe, and Paul D is forced to wear a bit (69), while the rooster named "Mister" seems to mock him (72).

The analogy between cruelty to animals and cruelty to humans is also addressed directly in polemical works. For example, Carol J. Adams's *The Sexual Politics of Meat* and *The Pornography of Meat* and, more recently, Brian Luke's *Brutal: Manhood and the Exploitation of Animals* make the case that the objectification of and violence against animals parallel and undergird the objectification of and violence against women. The link between women and other animals is powerful in general, not just in the cultural imaginary.[4] As Carol J. Adams and Josephine Donovan note in their introduction to *Animals and Women,* "[T]oday, it is estimated, 70 to 80 percent of animal rights movement adherents are women" (5). Almost all the authors of New Age books extolling the virtues of animals are women; these works constitute a sizable subcategory of contemporary animal literature.[5] Much of the work on animal rights, most notably by Peter Singer, Tom Regan (*Case* and *Empty Cages*), and, more recently, Cass Sunstein and Martha Nussbaum, sees animals as on an ethical continuum with humans. In animal rights discourses, primates, companion species (dogs, cats, horses), domesticated human food animals such as cows and pigs, and other intelligent mammals and birds have the same rights as mentally challenged or immature humans.[6]

These discourses specify which animals the term *animal* refers to—this is one of the strengths of animal-rights-based analysis. Much discussion of "the animal" or "animality" or even "animals" does not specify,

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preferring the all-inclusive term, yet seems to have mammals and birds in mind, and sometimes reptiles and insects, but generally not crustaceans or even fish, and certainly not bacteria, viruses, or single-celled organisms.[7] The failure to specify leaves many theoretical discussions of the animal and animality open to the accusation of overgeneralizing from a small group of intelligent, culture- and affect-bearing, communicating animals.

A similar problem occurs when animal studies appears to overlook the violence of animals. Violence is of course inherent in predation. A significant proportion of popular animal culture, especially animal television, still focuses on "the kill"—typically a big cat killing a large prey mammal (the camera can move back and forth between the cat stalking and the prey animal unheedingly grazing)—on male-on-male breeding and territorial violence, on whether the dominant male will eat the offspring of other males or even eat his own offspring, or on other modes of animal violence.[8] These spectacles perpetuate the sensationalist approach to animal violence, supporting the narrow Darwinism that interprets survival of the fittest literally. Most current popular animal representation, however, has switched gears to focus on rescuing endangered species and on showing how intelligent, resourceful, beautiful, loving, and spiritually powerful many animals are. The hugely popular film *March of the Penguins* is a characteristic instance of this new focus. The change in emphasis reflects a massive shift in how we see other animals, which, I would guess, is partly a result of the frighteningly rapid destruction of species and their habitats.

Another central motivation for the study of literary animals is, of course, animal advocacy. Many literary, theoretical, and critical texts of the animal kind are motivated by a desire to mitigate cruelty to animals.[9] Anna Sewell's 1907 classic *Black Beauty* was motivated by, and significantly inspired, anticruelty activism. It is considered the *Uncle Tom's Cabin* of the anticruelty movement. In contemporary fiction, J. M. Coetzee's *Disgrace* and his *Elizabeth Costello*, which is an expansion of his Tanner lectures, published as *The Lives of Animals*, contain some of the most powerful, important, and widely discussed animal representations in current critical circulation. Coetzee's stature, the centrality of animals to these great works, and the profundity of Coetzee's treatment of core issues in animal studies have made these texts, especially *Disgrace*, touchstones for current literary animal and animality studies. *Disgrace* shuns sentiment, yet its treatment of animal figures is so devastating, profound, and revelatory that it has become unavoidable, I would argue, in contemporary literary animal studies. It gets at the heart of what is at stake for many of us in doing this work.

In *The Lives of Animals*, Elizabeth Costello makes a strong argument for vegetarianism (Coetzee is a vegetarian) and against the inhumane practices of factory farming, which she, like Charles Patterson in *Eternal Treblinka*, compares controversially to the Holocaust. Costello asserts that all living creatures are "full of being," which means that they "live as a body-soul . . . an embodied soul" (77–78). David Lurie, the protagonist of *Disgrace*, begins with the Cartesian view of animals as mere machines whose souls, if they have any, die with them. His enlightenment concerning the "full being" of animals constitutes and marks the central ethical narrative of the novel.[10]

Elizabeth Costello, in Coetzee's eponymous novel, says she is a vegetarian because she wants to save her soul (89). David Lurie saves his soul by coming into meaningful contact with other animals, especially with the unwanted dogs he is helping euthanize. These dogs, like Fitzgerald's puppy, are superfluous, pure excess. There is no room for them in the volatile, impoverished society of rural postapartheid South Africa. They are strays, or they have been given up by owners

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who for various reasons can no longer keep them. They must be "put down"—there are no resources to shelter and sustain them.

David Lurie is disgraced as a literature professor when he forces himself sexually on an undergraduate student in one of his courses. Some read this as rape, others do not, but her accusation of unwanted sex, which Lurie ultimately sees is true, and his refusal to confess and repent in a ready-made scenario lead to his self-banishment. Serving out a sentence, imposed by himself and his daughter, of initially reluctant repentance and community service, Lurie volunteers at the shelter where the euthanizing takes place. He holds the dogs while Bev Shaw, the shamanic woman who runs the shelter, gives the lethal injections. At first, he feels utterly inadequate to the task of comforting the dogs in their last moments of life. But after his ethical-spiritual transformation from arrogant traditional humanist and sexual predator to humble human animal who has lost everything he thought was meaningful, he is able to see himself and his condition in these dogs, and he does his best.

In what I would argue is the most important scene in the novel, Lurie, who has taken it on himself to dispose of the bodies of the euthanized dogs, acts on behalf of their dignity even in death. In the following scene, Lurie takes the dead dogs to the hospital incinerator for the first time early on a Monday morning to make sure they are not dishonored, to see that the disgrace of dying, which we all suffer, is not compounded by being left Sunday night "on the dump with the rest of the weekend's scourings. . . . He is not prepared to inflict such dishonour upon them" (144). We are given the almost unbearable details of the events that lead Lurie to take an active role in the disposal of the dead dogs:

> On his first Monday he had left it to them [the hospital workmen] to do the incinerating. Rigor mortis had stiffened the corpses overnight. The dead legs caught in the bars of the trolley, and when the trolley came back from its trip to the furnace, the dog would as often as not come riding back too, blackened and grinning, smelling of singed fur, its plastic covering burnt away. After a while the workmen began to beat the bags with the backs of their shovels before loading them, to break the rigid limbs. It was then that he intervened and took over the job himself. (144–45)

Earlier and earlier on Monday mornings, he "loads them [the dead dogs], one at a time, on to the feeder trolley, cranks the mechanism that hauls the trolley through the steel gate into the flames, pulls the lever to empty it of its contents, and cranks it back, while the workmen whose job this normally is stand by and watch" (144).

Coetzee's thematic emphasis in this sequence falls on the practical valuelessness, the gratuitousness, and therefore the ethical force of Lurie's self-imposed preservation of the dead dogs' honor. Lurie is doing nothing for the dogs—they are dead. He is serving his own idea of the proper relation to the death of "a body-soul" "full of being"—because he now greatly identifies with the dogs, he is fulfilling his idea of dignity in his own death. He is acting on his belief that we should all, all of us animals, be escorted properly out of the life that has ended. He will take responsibility for these beings with souls for whom no one else will take responsibility.[11]

In the description of the dead dogs as they come out of the incinerator "blackened and grinning, smelling of singed fur" and in the workmen's beating and breaking of the rigid limbs with the backs of their shovels, Coetzee invokes torture, lynching, and systematized, technologized mass murder (the conveyer belt)—in general, horrific death. I do not argue that the dogs somehow become human or humanized in this sequence or that the scene works primarily by suggesting human violence and genocide, although that is an important part of its representational power. These dogs remain dogs—they do not become humans—

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and that is the point. We picture them not fitting properly onto the conveyer belt; we can almost smell their singed fur, imagine the rictus of the canine "grin," and see four limbs being broken, not two.[12] It is because these dogs are pure excess, animals whose use value and exchange value add up to zero, and because at the same time they exist only as a result of interaction with humans that they make such a powerful ethical demand.

San Diego Zoo

Anthropomorphism is the charge generally leveled against people who see communication, emotion, culture, or intelligence and thought in other animals. It is, I hope and believe, steadily being supplanted by research that shows many species of animals to have affect and sometimes high intelligence, complex culture, and extensive means of communication.[13] The strictures against sentimentality that forbid empathy for other animals and that often accompany charges of anthropomorphism are also more and more being replaced by an awareness of the intricate and massive interdependence between humans and other animals.[14] Those strictures—which forbid acknowledgment not just that animals suffer and that their suffering matters but also that many are aware of the world, themselves, other animals, and us—are part of the same instrumental rationality that has repudiated the sentimental as a sign of weakness, of inferiority, and of emotionalism, a sign of being "irrational" and "unscientific." But animals are everywhere around us. Suddenly or eventually, one can experience a shift in perspective, and these animals become visible apart from our myriad learned projections onto them. Moreover, they return the gaze of the knowing looker, just as Derrida suggests in "The Animal That Therefore I Am."[15]

I experienced a sudden, epiphanic shift in perspective at the San Diego Zoo.[16] The MLA convention was in San Diego that year; I was playing hooky. Already interested in animals, I knew the San Diego Zoo would hold riches for me in some way or other—I suppose I was doing research of a sort, taking the zoo as my "archive." As I walked from one carefully planned environment to another, focusing as intently as I could on their variegated inhabitants, I became aware of something going on other than my one-way gaze. I was making eye contact with a lot of the animals—they were returning my gaze, just as Derrida theorized. At first I thought I must have been imagining it. At some level of skeptical, Freud-informed rationality I still think I was seeing what I needed to see: I badly wanted something like this to happen, and so I "saw" it. But in fact I hadn't expected this to happen, at least not consciously; rather, I hoped that I would observe something that I didn't already know, something that would help explain my newly urgent interest in animals. In other words, something that was just about myself. A few hours into my day-long sojourn at the zoo, I realized that I was not just seeing something as the result of close observation. This experience was visceral: I felt powerfully a two-way interaction with the animals. These were animals whose lives were structured around being watched, gazed at, by humans. Why wouldn't they return the gaze? Why wouldn't they be interested in the humans who were so interested in them?

Feminism and Posthuman Animals

It is no coincidence, I would argue, that Fitzgerald's puppy is linked to Myrtle Wilson, doomed despite her vitality, and Coetzee's dogs to Bev Shaw, avatar of an animal-based spirituality. The linkage between animals and women, for better (Bev) and for worse (Myrtle), is historically and currently pervasive (Adams and Donovan). My own involvement in posthuman animality studies emerges in part from that pervasive cultural linkage. Women and animals go together. The mode

https://doi.org/10.1632/pmla.2009.124.2.361 Published online by Cambridge University Press

of animality studies that interests me is also premised on the current posthuman conjuncture, moving beyond human-only and only-human paradigms.

A brief feminist backward glance will be helpful here. In the 1980s, focusing on twentieth-century avant-gardes and formally innovative modernism and using poststructuralist work by Julia Kristeva, Luce Irigaray, Jacques Derrida, Roland Barthes, and Jacques Lacan, I and other feminist theorists and critics argued that what we then called "the feminine," which was the antidote to phallogocentric, hierarchical cultures and politics, was lodged in preoedipal, semiotic (in Kristeva's usage), experimental writing, in writerly writing, or in text rather than work (in Barthes's terms), *écriture féminine* for the feminist theorists. Unleashing this writing fully into culture would bring about the revolution that the 1960s had failed to deliver. This feminist revolution of the word, as we know, did not occur. Feminine *jouissance* shared the fate of the other 1960s-inspired utopian ideologies.

In more recent work, many of us moved chronologically forward from the early-twentieth-century avant-gardes and modernism to post-1960s postmodernism. For me, and for some other theorists of the postmodern, most notably Fredric Jameson, the shift from modern to postmodern that took place in the course of the long 1960s was primarily a shift from utopian to postutopian structures of feeling. Utopian master narratives, as Jean-François Lyotard influentially calls them—narratives of total liberation, justice, equality, and harmony, such as the revolution of *écriture féminine*—have been discredited and have at the same time dissolved. Feminism has become feminisms: we are on the ground now, and the situation on the ground is complex. We live in a hybrid, indeterminate set of interlocking relations, in constant flux.

One of those relations, important to postmodern feminist discourses, has to do with humans and other animals. To the extent that current animal or animality studies emerges from thinking with and through other animals, it meshes with many kinds of academic, political, and popular discourses. There is no inevitable or necessary connection between animal studies and any particular theoretical or political position. However, most work in animal studies is motivated either by direct advocacy for animals or by the connection of animals with other subjects of political advocacy: gender, race, class, ethnicity, sexuality, postcoloniality, and disability all provide their own angles of approach. Feminist postutopianism finds a home in animal or animality studies.

The turn toward animals is also based on a more broadly generalizing premise: the idea, or conviction, that the human species is destroying, and perhaps has irretrievably destroyed, the planet. There is no need to rehearse the evidence for this premise here—we know the facts about global warming; the already-existing alteration of normal weather patterns, promising continuous disaster; the disruption of ecological systems that support all life on earth; and the accelerating destruction of species and their habitats. At the same time, we are aware of the past century plus of mass intrahuman slaughter, continuing unabated to the present moment. I think that many have turned away from our own species in dismay at what it has wrought and turned toward other animals as a locus both of the other who calls us to ethics and of many of the things that, in our various modes of ethics, we value: purity of affect, unselfish altruism, absence of genocide and infrequency of random, ummotivated violence, and connection to what is for us a source of powerful spiritual experience.

I think this posthumanist view of animals goes a long way toward accounting for the wide proliferation of academic animality studies and also for the burgeoning presence of nonhuman animals in all modes and at all levels of cultural production. This turn away from homo sapiens and toward other animals does not mean a 180-degree turning of

https://doi.org/10.1632/pmla.2009.124.2.361 Published online by Cambridge University Press

the back. It means that we humans can give up the burden of our solipsism and our reign over the planet and take our place among the animals in a posthuman conjuncture.[17]

Notes

1. In *Maus*, Art Spiegelman draws German shepherds in a Nazi concentration camp realistically—they are the only animals that represent themselves rather than an ethnic, national, or religious category of humans.

2. Mr. McKee's photograph titles—"Beauty and the Beast . . . Loneliness . . . Old Grocery Horse . . . Brook'n Bridge . . ." (38; ellipses in orig.)—point toward the kind of sentimentality Fitzgerald rejects.

3. There is disagreement in the field over terminology. In general, those primarily motivated by animal advocacy and by the human-animal relation favor *animal studies*, while theorists of the posthuman, who want to move beyond the human-animal distinction, often prefer *animality studies*.

4. For a complementary perspective, which links women and animals as positive cultural presences, see Donovan and Adams.

5. There is a growing popular genre of books about close human relations with nonhuman animals, books that frequently emphasize or suggest the spiritual dimension of this connection. Authors of some of these books include, at the higher end, Joanna Burger, Marjorie Garber, Vicki Hearne, Caroline Knapp, and Elizabeth Marshall Thomas. We also have the fruits of the apostate psychoanalyst Jeffrey Moussaieff Masson's sentimental animal-book industry. Then we arrive at religiously orthodox books such as Kim Meeder's *Hope Rising*, which includes the following on its copyright page: "Unless otherwise indicated, Scripture quotations are from: *Holy Bible*, New Living Translation." The Masson phenomenon is a notable exception to the predominance of women authors in this genre (Melanie Sue Bowles, Dawn Bauman Brunke, Diana L. Guerrero, Kristin von Kreisler, Susan Chernak McElroy, Mary Lou Randour, Rita M. Reynolds, Niki Behrikis Shanahan, Kim Sheridan, Sherry Hansen Steiger, and Cheryl Renee' Webb are just some of the best-known authors).

6. In a major victory for animal-rights activism, "Spain's parliament recently passed a resolution granting legal rights to apes" (Cohen).

7. Judith Roof discusses the symbolic, meaning-making role of the single-celled organism in Freud's psychoanalysis. Freud's version of the "protista," according to Roof, is almost entirely anthropomorphic. See Serres, including Wolfe's introduction, for a suggestive treatment of this issue.

8. Yann Martel's novel *Life of Pi* counters this preoccupation with animal violence: at the center of its narrative, a boy and an enormous tiger coexist on a long ocean journey in a tiny lifeboat.

9. For an excellent recent collection of animal-advocacy criticism, see Rothfels.

10. In *When Species Meet*, Donna Haraway makes a distinction between Elizabeth Costello's ethical absolutism in *The Lives of Animals*, which Haraway rejects, and David Lurie's more pragmatic ethics of the possible in *Disgrace* (81).

11. Haraway says of responsibility, which she writes as "response-ability," "The animals in the labs, including the oncomice, have face; they are somebody as well as something, just as we humans are both subject and object all the time" (*When Species Meet* 76).

12. In *Beloved*, when Paul D rejects Sethe, he tells her she has two feet, not four, implying that she behaved like an animal, in a purely negative sense, when she killed her baby (165). Ironically, of course, Sethe performed this unbearable act to save her baby daughter from being considered an animal by Schoolteacher, as Sethe herself had been.

13. Temple Grandin gives an excellent synthetic discussion of the shift in the valence of anthropomorphism (14–15). The work of the primatologist-ethologist Frans de Waal is also extremely helpful on this topic (*Ape* and *Good Natured*).

14. This copresence is the central subject of Haraway's *When Species Meet*.

15. "Since so long ago, can we say that the animal has been looking at us?" (372).

16. For a forcefully argued negative view of zoos as permitting only reification and spectacularization of animals, see Malamud. In this issue, Nigel Rothfels argues that zoo spectatorship, despite its obvious spectacularization of animals, can also open interconnections between humans and other species. The San Diego Zoo is one of the most progressive zoos in the world, featuring large, open habitats in which various species coexist and sponsoring extensive educational, conservation, and habitat-protection programs.

17. See Scully. By "turn toward animals" I am not referring to the kind of repudiation of specific people and embrace of specific companion animals epitomized in Leona Helmsley's willing of her estate to a particular dog and to dog charities in general instead of to her human offspring (Strom; Goode). See Calarco; Haraway, *Simians* and *When Species Meet*; and Wolfe, *Animal Rights* and *Zoontologies* for powerful discussions of posthumanism. Haraway's work on the cyborg has helped me think about figures that blur and reimagine the human-animal divide (*Simians*).

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https://doi.org/10.1632/pmla.2009.124.2.361 Published online by Cambridge University Press