In suggesting that analytical philosophy be considered a language, I do not mean to deny that it has any substance, but only that the substance can properly be compared with that of Thomism. In place of some coherent, comprehensive system of thought we find a set of problems that changes considerably over time, together with a wide range of rival solutions to them. Should Catholic philosophers want to object that all the proposed solutions to a given problem appear to share certain assumptions, such an objection, far from being contrary to the "rules" of analytical philosophy, might even be considered a classic analytical move. (I seem to recall Wittgenstein's making it again and again.) As one need not share analytical philosophers' answers, neither need one support their framing of the problems. One must, however, be prepared to offer reasons why the problems might more fruitfully be framed in a different way. It would not suffice to report that Thomas framed them differently—no appeals to authority allowed; one would need to present a philosophical (vs. purely historical) explanation of why he did.

In sum, the missionary work Haldane envisions seems to me less daunting than his own description might suggest. Learning to communicate with the natives, mercifully, does not require going native.

Christopher Martin

One of the most engaging aspects of Haldane's writings is the way he manages to put across deeply-held personal views in a cool and detached style—a feat he achieves superlatively in "Thomism and the Future of Catholic Philosophy". I should like to imitate him in this, as in much else, but find I cannot so. This paper will be more personal in style.

I am a British philosopher, trained in analytic techniques and styles at Oxford, and I work in a Scottish university. I should like to endorse all Haldane's points and recommendations whole-heartedly, but pessimism keeps on creeping in; and when I look at the situation of Americo-British philosophy in general I have doubts about the extent to which Haldane's programme can be carried out.

First, Haldane endorses as positive the development of a tendency of "analytical Thomists". Well, if anyone belongs to this school, I suppose I do (at a lowish level). Even when reading St Thomas I find myself objecting to some thesis of his "But what would

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it be like for so-and-so *not* to be the case?", thus endorsing *pro tanto* the "Contrast Theory of Meaning". Another reaction to a thesis of Thomas is that of seeking a counter-example. If tricks of the trade like this make an analytical philosopher, then I am one.

It may be objected that tricks like these *are* trivial, and fail to make any kind of philosopher, let alone one of a definite school. I think I would maintain that tricks like these mean at least that if I am a philosopher at all I am an analytical philosopher; while my list of publications and teaching programmes will show that the philosophical doctrines on which I turn my battery of tricks are in the main Thomistic. Thus I am an analytical Thomist.

I am not trying to trivialise analytical Thomism, perhaps in order to invalidate Haldane's evident approval for its practitioners. I am rather trying to tease out the difficulty that I am sure many must feel, as I do, over the tension between form and content involved in the very name of "Analytical Thomism".

Haldane evidently thinks that analytical philosophy is principally a set of philosophical techniques, and perhaps of philosophical attitudes. If it has come to be associated with a certain set of doctrines, that is a historical accident of the circumstances in which it has grown up. The techniques certainly, and the attitudes perhaps, can be detached from this widespread doctrinal content, and used to approach a wider set of problems without being necessarily limited to the neo-empiricist doctrines which most analytical philosophers would espouse.

When Haldane seems to rebuke, gently, those Thomists whose attitude to contemporary English-speaking philosophy is not one of dialogue but of wholesale rejection, he surely has a good case. One can imagine St Thomas endorsing Haldane here. Haldane's case is even stronger when he hints that the Catholic intellectuals' task is not complete when they have safeguarded the faith of the faithful: the world remains to be converted.

But is it true that the only or the best way to convert analytical philosophers is to engage in dialogue with them on their own terms? showing them, by means of their own methods, the deficiencies of their philosophy? Are form and content so separable in philosophy, and particularly in analytical philosophy?

A Thomist, whether sympathetic to Haldane's thesis or not, may remember that the philosophy he espouses has lasted through centuries in a number of forms, and long outlived the medieval *quaestio* form in which it was born. To this extent, a Thomist may be expected to hold that form is independent of content, and that therefore Thomism pursued with analytical methods is as likely to be philosophically

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fruitful as was Thomism pursued by any other method fashionable over the past seven hundred years. It looks as if Haldane's suggestion in favour of analytical methods ought to be accepted.

I wonder. Haldane has perhaps been fortunate in his philosophical training, and never had to work through the textbooks of "manual Thomism", as it is called, produced in the first half of this century. But many of us have worked through them: and I challenge anyone to say that these books, though crammed with valuable Thomistic content, did not by their very form as textbooks falsify the nature of philosophy as an inquiry. May not the analytic form and method (which may keep alive the sense of philosophy as an inquiry) equally falsify the nature of philosophy, or of Thomism, in other directions?

What I need to do here, perhaps, is to point to definite distortions the analytical method might import into our study of Thomas. Not wishing to to examine the work that others or I have done in this mode for its errors, I have to fall back on drawing attention to broader dangers.

First, analytical philosophy is limited in its scope. It is true that analytically-trained philosophers work in nearly all fields of philosophy, as they do in Thomism, but there is no doubt that what is considered the cutting edge of philosophy in English-speaking countries is the philosophy of language and logic. This field is at the core of undergraduate courses, and (at the other extreme) nearly fills the most prestigious journals. Those who work in this field look down on those who work in other fields, for all their analytical methods. One hears a distinction drawn between "hard" philosophy and "soft" philosophy, between "real philosophy" and "save-the-world" philosophy. It is similar to the way in which theoretical physicists despise other branches of science as "cookery", and equally unreasonable. When we work in an analytical mode, may we not come to share in these ungracious and erroneous attitudes, and come to give undue—even exclusive—importance to a very narrow part of the subject?

Secondly, analytical philosophers are unhistorical, as Haldane himself comments. It is clear that this is connected with an attitude which treats "hard philosophy" as a science, and anything which goes further back than the last couple of issues of a favoured journal as "history of philosophy"; just as Galileo and Lavoisier no longer belong to physics or chemistry but to the "history of science". In Britain we have seen that those who write philosophical books have been deliberately down-graded by those leaders of the profession of

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academic philosophy who happily collaborated with recent Government-sponsored assessments of research "quality". Books, they clearly think, cannot contain "hard" or "real" philosophy, because scientific books are in general mere textbooks, summaries for the student of the science of a recently past generation. Only articles in journals are real science, so, since philosophy is a science, only articles in journals are real philosophy.

If Thomists ever came to share these attitudes—attitudes which are so widespread and so strong in the analytical world that it is hard to see how we could escape them, once we throw ourselves wholeheartedly into that world—we would be cutting ourselves off from Thomas (of course) but also from the rest of the living present of philosophy.

There are those who take to Thomas an attitude mainly of scholarly elucidation, as there are those who take the same attitude to other philosophers. These people are the natural allies of the Thomist. They are already alienated from us—partly by their own stupidity, partly by ours. They have never noticed that someone who writes on Thomas chiefly because of philosophical interest is engaged in a different enterprise from their own. They review our books and accuse us of lack of bottom or partiality—and, indeed, had such books been put forward as scholarly exegesis they would indeed be faulty. Meanwhile we tend to despise them as non-philosophers. Maybe this is in some way inevitable: but we have overlapping interests and should strive to be allies if we cannot be friends.

I abominate the concept of "history of philosophy", and never allow the label to be applied to my work without protest. But there is good work which is more fittingly called "history and philosophy" and we should endeavour not to fall out with its practitioners. The more "analytic" we are, the more likely we are to fall out.

Lastly, analytical philosophers are linguistically and culturally isolated. The academic collaborators in applying the British Government's research assessment exercise to philosophy, stated in their guidelines that "work of international standing" meant "work of standing in America (and perhaps Australia)". I trust that in *New Blackfriars* I can leave that remark without any comment.

If these attitudes cannot be separated from analytical method, then despite its attraction and its real value we must give up analytical method, and with it any pretension to be "Analytical Thomists". To what extent can they be separated? I don't know: and I suspect that none of us know. Perhaps all we can do is follow Haldane's advice and try it out.

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