discussion are particularly helpful in conception, as are the pointers to relevant secondary literature that go with them. The bibliographies themselves are good (though I am unconvinced of the need to make them selective, or of the elegance of citing secondary material in different ways according to whether they are selected or not); there are indexes for terms, persons, and places occurring in the fragments themselves, and further *indices locorum*, *nominum*, and *rerum* for the commentaries. These are extremely useful works of generous scholarship which, by not rising to the promise made in the introduction to the Sources volumes (at p. 14) that the commentaries would be bold to offer personal opinions and speculation on T.'s Hellenistic influence, provide their own demonstration of the strengths of Theophrastean inquiry.

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PLUTARCH REMADE

T. DUFF: *Plutarch's* Lives. *Exploring Virtue and Vice*. Pp. xx + 423. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999. Cased, £55. ISBN: 0-19-815058-X.

Exploring virtue and vice: not 'describing', 'teaching', or 'enforcing', but 'exploring' ethical properties. Tim Duff's stimulating book seeks to show that Plutarch has been wrongly saddled with the label of the worthy but intellectually banal 'moralist'. No longer the Nestor-like figure of yore, Plutarch emerges from D.'s account as a sophisticated and original thinker who fully deserves the reputation he won in the Renaissance. The *Parallel Lives* are presented as powerful exercises in engaging the reader's own participation: 'Plutarch's texts resist simplistic univocal presentations of the past . . . they invite the reader to challenge and ponder' (p. 309). Although D. (as a Plutarchan) is too civilized to engage in methodological argy-bargy, his adoption of a 'readerly' approach to the texts clearly constitutes an implicit snub to those who would view Plutarch as a unified literary personality whose every work must reflect a consistent moral programme (or be marked as a failure). The author is dead; long live Plutarch the agent of energetic and inventive textual play!

The book is divided into three sections: 'The Moralizing Programme'; 'The Case Studies'; and 'Writing in Parallel'. The first is devoted to analyses of the prefaces of various Lives, to a general account of Plutarch's moralizing practice in the *Lives* and to contextualizing the *Lives* in terms of statements made elsewhere in the *Moralia*. A firmer grip than D.'s on Plutarch's voluminous *oeuvre* would be hard to imagine (or envy), and the synthesis that emerges is learned and cogent. D. cautions wisely against the quick-fix extrication of Plutarchan 'programmatic statements' as though they had a general applicability. Anyone who has ever casually cited the distinction between βίος and ἱστορία at the beginning of the *Alexander* (1.2) will hang her or his head in shame at the demonstration here that this statement has only a localized applicability, and is 'not a universally valid definition of biography' (p. 21) The overall conclusion of this section is that Plutarch expects his readers to 'imitate' (μιμεῖσθαι) his characters. This is not in itself new, but D. proceeds to show in the following chapter how 'imitation', in the *Lives* proper, is not such a simple process: the assessment of ethical status is largely left to the reader. This chapter argues persuasively that Plutarch's character studies show more interest in ambivalent 'great natures' (cf. Pl. *Resp*. 419d–492a) than in morally unequivocal figures. The final chapter in this section considers Plutarch's psychology, arguing with cogency and detail that Plutarch

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is primarily concerned with the unstable balance in his subjects between reason and passion (another Platonic idea).

The case-studies of four pairs (*Pyrrhus–Marius*, *Phocion–Cato minor*, *Lysander–Sulla*, and *Coriolanus–Alcibiades*) represent the substance of the book, and give D. an opportunity to display the thematic tessellations that can be detected in a Plutarchan pair. D. lays considerable emphasis in the book as a whole upon the importance of the paired structure, and upon the challenges to the reader that accrue as a result of the complex interconnections and differences that run between two *Lives*. These readings here are subtle and persuasive, and (despite the voluminous scholarship on these texts) represent a powerfully innovative way of reading the *Lives*. The one niggle—and it is a churlish one, given that no one could reasonably offer a close reading of every single *Life*—surrounds the principle of selection, which is not discussed anywhere. How representative are these four pairs? *Pyrrhus–Marius* is the fall guy, the one pair discussed here with an apparently 'fairly straightforward moral message' (p. 131); but does this exception prove the rule? How generalizable is the principle that Plutarch's writing knowingly tests the reader's interpretative confidence?

The final section deals with the syncritic structure, which is central to D.'s interpretation of the *Lives* as challenges to the reader's interpretative control, and in particular with the formal *synkriseis* that conclude many of the *Lives*. These brief epilogues, often disappointingly reductive, are, according to D., not the solutions to Plutarch's intended meaning of the *Lives* but part of the hermeneutic puzzle: the 'dissonance between Life and *synkrisis* . . . forces the reader to assume a more active role in assessing the men he has read about' (p. 283). This is a stimulating proposition, even if it does not fully explain why Plutarch has actively chosen to include these bizarre appendages in the first place. In the concluding chapter, D. widens his focus to consider Plutarch's comparative project as an enquiry into cultural definition in Roman Greece. Twenty-two pages is perhaps too brief a compass to do justice to this complex issue, and the conclusions here (Plutarch does not explicitly judge between Greek and Roman, but his categories of ethical assessment are definitively Greek) do not build substantively upon those of, for example, Simon Swain in *Hellenism and Empire* (Oxford, 1996), pp. 138–40. For once, D. reverts to the picture of Plutarch the genial conservative: there is no sense that the reader's conceptions of what it is to be Greek or Roman are engaged or put at risk.

Despite my intermittent snipes (a review *should* be critical . . .), this intelligent, learned, and lucid book will undoubtedly (and deservedly) have an immediate and profound impact upon studies of the *Lives*. In its sensitive and nuanced attention to the texture and detail of Plutarch's writing, as well as its methodological reorientations, it raises the stakes substantially. No serious Plutarchan scholar (as they say) will want to be without this one.

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TERGEMINUS SOPHOS

M. KORENJAK: *Publikum und Redner. Ihre Interaktion in der sophistischen Rhetorik der Kaiserzeit.* (Zetemata 104.) Pp. 254. Munich: C. H. Beck, 2000. Paper, DM 98. ISBN: 3-406-462-17-0.

In this imaginative and resourceful, but also somewhat straightjacketed (*habilitationsschriftlich*) study, Martin Korenjak sets out to collect and discuss the

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