beauty (in Beazley's judgement, 'nothing fouler than the Panathenaic vases from the fourth century has survived from antiquity'). But they can do much more than illustrate books on Greek sport, as is clear from a set of symposium proceedings entitled **_Panathenaika_.[7] Part of this volume dwells on new finds, whose provenance is not just Athens, but Macedonia, Cyrenaica and elsewhere; further essays attend to neglected aspects of production, imagery, distribution and technique (one surprise, unveiled by Alan Shapiro, is the quantity of Panathenaics made in red-figure). Not everything can be clarified – we are not sure, for example, whether the winner of a running event took home only vases painted with runners. But among the certainties that emerge is the value of the Panathenaic amphorae beyond Athens, and beyond their original contents (a full-size pot held some 38 litres of oil). In South Italy the *kudos* associated with the prize vases *as vases* is demonstrable from several tomb assemblages; eventually the distinctive shape of the vase was itself adopted in Magna Grecia as a trophy of posthumous heroization. 'Athenocentrism' is sometimes invoked as a crime of modern scholarship: but these vases are further proof of its pervasive force in antiquity.

NIGEL SPIVEY

[7] *Panathenaika*. Symposion zu den Panathenäischen Preisamphoren. Edited by Martin Bentz and Norbert Eschbach. Von Zabern, Mainz, 2001. Pp. xv + 205, with 45 pages of black and white plates.

Philosophy

**_Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy_[1] continues to maintain its high standards as a twice-yearly publication; but, oddly enough, the scope of the articles has contracted as their number has increased: all but one of the seventeen in the two volumes to be reviewed this year treat directly of topics in Plato or Aristotle. (The single exception is Suzanne Bobzien in vol. XIX, 'Did Epicurus Discover the Free Will Problem?') So, as a temporary relief from this glut of Classicism, I shall turn first of all to a major book on later ethical philosophy: Richard Sorabji's B_Emotion and Peace of Mind_,[2] a study of the Stoic theory of emotion and its influence, particularly on Christian thought. The tendency of research in this area has been to look at how the Stoics handled emotion from the point of view of their theories of cognitive functioning more generally (emotions being, by general Stoic consensus, directly related to belief in some way). Sorabji, however, approaches the question from the opposite end: he bases his account on a study of the therapeutic models suggested by the Stoics for dealing with (i.e. for eradicating) emotion. If it seems surprising that this approach is not more common, we need to remember that the Stoics themselves had much more to say about the nature of emotions than their cure (Cicero, *T.D.* 4.9); and despite the obvious attractions of Sorabji's approach, his conclusions sometimes rest, perforce, on rather thin evidence. Sorabji quickly determines, for example, that Chrysippus' therapeutic advice implies an analysis of emotion in terms of *two* judgements: one evaluating the

[1] *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy*. Vol. XIX, Winter 2000 and Vol. XX, Summer 2001. Edited by David Sedley. Oxford U.P., 2000 and 2001. Pp. 372 and 340. Hardback £35.00 each; paper £19.99 each.

[2] *Emotion and Peace of Mind*. From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation. The Gifford Lectures. By Richard Sorabji. Oxford U.P., 2000. Pp. x + 499. £30.00.

https://doi.org/10.1093/gr/49.1.126 Published online by Cambridge University Press

object of the emotion (as good or bad), the other establishing an 'appropriate' response to it. Chrysippus, Sorabji argues, believed that one might best begin emotional therapy by addressing just the second of these judgements. The suggestion is interesting and attractive; but it is not clear that someone who started from the more substantial evidence for the Stoics' psychology of action would be comfortable with it. Even if it is true that my decision to run away from a lion is posterior to my judgement that the lion endangers my happiness (the matter is controversial), it is not at all clear that I could isolate the one from the other. Part of what it means to judge that the lion is a threat to my happiness might be precisely that I go on to judge that it is *right* to escape (note *rectum* at Cicero, *T.D.* 4.14: 'appropriate' has technical connotations too weak in this context). In this case, one might rather expect Chrysippus to tackle our underlying beliefs about the sort of things that are good and bad (this perhaps being the ultimate point of Cicero, *T.D.* 3.76–7 cited by Sorabji at 32 n. 16); and, in the short term, to address our propensity for making hasty and over-blown evaluations of the particular situations we find ourselves in (cf. the notion of ἀπροπτωσία, defined e.g. at *D.L.* 7.46). Having said all of this, though, Sorabji certainly wins out over the 'bottom-up' approach in communicating the sense of humanity behind what, since antiquity, its enemies have branded an inhuman philosophy. In fact, as he shows, the Stoics never lost sight of the *experience* of emotion; and the later Stoics, at least, made much of its non-cognitive aspects. Sorabji explores, for example, how Seneca and Epictetus use involuntary 'first movements' (roughly: physical reflexes) as a way of bolstering the Chrysippean theory of emotions against Posidonius' attack. We sometimes mistake the feelings associated with these 'first movements' for emotions, they say, but emotions properly speaking still crucially depend on our making certain *judgements* about our situation. The influence of this theory and the debate from which it comes is profound, and in the remainder of the book Sorabji traces some of its threads – through, for example, to Evagrius' tactics for dealing with his eight 'bad thoughts' (the ancestors of the Seven Deadly Sins), and the views of Augustine and Julian on lust. And more material even than this is packed in. If a criticism can be made of the book, it is the dizzying effect of the many perspectives, historical and trans-historical, sparked off by Sorabji's main theme. Comparisons between ancient and modern approaches to psychological therapy are an interesting addition to the mix – even if the attempt to argue the book's relevance occasionally leads to some rather pious post-modernism at these points (2; cf. 165: 'What is needed is a pluralism in therapy; none has the monopoly of wisdom').

It has been a good year for Sceptics as well, with the publication of Richard Bett's book on [B★★]*Pyrrho, his Antecedents, and his Legacy*[3] and Charles Brittain's on [B★★]*Philo of Larissa*.[4] The former strikes a much-needed blow at the tendency of scholars to talk as if 'Pyrrhonism' were co-extensive with the thought of Sextus Empiricus: in fact, as Bett shows, the Pyrrhonian tradition was extremely various. Pyrrho himself seems to have held at least one positive view about the world (which is one more than Sextus), namely the view that things are *in their own natures* indeterminate. In Bett's characterisation, indeed, Pyrrho emerges (and not without historical plausibility), as a kind of 'Plato without the Forms' (143). Bett's examination

[3] *Pyrrho, his Antecedents and his Legacy*. By Richard Bett. Oxford U.P., 2000. Pp. x + 264. £35.00.

[4] *Philo of Larissa*. The Last of the Academic Sceptics. By Charles Brittain. Oxford U.P. 2001. Pp. xii + 406. £40.00.

https://doi.org/10.1093/gr/49.1.126 Published online by Cambridge University Press

of the later reception of Pyrrho is especially valuable for its bold treatment of Aenesidemus, whose reinterpretation of Pyrrho's famous dictum that the world is 'no more one thing than another' as a *relativist* claim ('both this and that') rather than a claim of indeterminacy ('neither this nor that') paves the way towards the 'terminal state' of Pyrrhonism as represented in the later writings of Sextus Empiricus. If the Pyrrhonian tradition has acquired an artificial unity in much secondary literature, so too have many scholars talked as if the New Academy stood for a unified and none-too-subtle brand of Scepticism – or at least that it should have done. Brittain's study of the last Sceptical head of the Academy, Philo of Larissa, might help here. Our evidence for Philo is sparse and tricky (an appendix contains, with translations, full testimonia so that we can see for ourselves), and it needs careful contextualization. Furthermore, as Brittain argues, the original contribution to epistemology made in Philo's so-called 'Roman Books' emerged at the end of a philosophical journey which took him through both of the major traditions of Carneadean Scepticism which preceded him (that of Clitomachus, and that in which he was associated with Metrodorus). The upshot of this is a work of much greater scope and appeal than one might have thought: an outstanding study of an individual philosopher, but also one of the best guides currently available to the range of epistemological thought within the Academy. Chapters on ethics and rhetoric, in which Philo was interested, widen its thematic appeal; and a chapter on arguments for the 'unity of the Academy' (one such argument stood at the heart of the Roman Books) extends its historical scope as far forward as Augustine. Brittain's study might, among other things, help to clarify the philosophical position of one of Philo's most famous students, Cicero. In P. G. Walsh's [B]*Cicero, On Obligations*[5] (a translation of the *de officiis*), Cicero is, not for the first time, accused of inconsistency for his attraction to a 'Stoic-Peripatetic' position in ethics despite his avowed Scepticism (1.2, 3.20 with notes). But as Walsh has to acknowledge later on (3.119 with note), Carneades himself found the ethical system of Callipho most 'plausible' – and Callipho seems precisely to have been a Peripatetic hybrid of sorts. This quibble apart, however, Walsh's translation is excellent; and there is much to praise in the accompanying material as well. A nice touch in the introduction, for example, is a section on the 'subsequent influence of the treatise'. At the far end of antiquity, things have been relatively quiet. *The World of Parmenides*,[6] containing essays and fragments of Karl Popper's writings on Greek philosophy, was originally published in 1998, but now makes a welcome debut in paperback. The collection amounts to a rather broader history of philosophy than the title suggests: Einstein and Schrödinger rub shoulders with Xenophanes and Pythagoras, within a distinctive vision of the history of science. According to Popper, the Presocratics were 'critical rationalists', which is to say that they proceeded by critical examination of hypothetical models of the cosmos (which is to say that they were Popperians). Socrates, and the Socratic *elenchus*, stood at the end of this critical tradition, which was replaced by the inductive method of Aristotle, destined to hold sway over the philosophy of science until the twentieth century (which is to say, until Popper). Whiggish though it is, this thesis is refreshingly straightforward – and explains

[5] *Cicero, On Obligations*. Translated with an introduction and explanatory notes by P. G. Walsh. Oxford U.P., 2000. lx + 218. £40.00.

[6] *The World of Parmenides*. Essays on the Presocratic Enlightenment. By Karl Popper; edited by Arne F. Petersen with the assistance of Jørgen Mejer. Routledge, London, 1998. Pp. xvi + 328.

https://doi.org/10.1093/gr/49.1.126 Published online by Cambridge University Press

better than most historians of early Greek philosophy have been able how 'science' grew out of 'myth'. (As far as Popper is concerned, science just is the construction and critical examination of speculative models.) As the title suggests, though, Popper's real hero is Parmenides, whose work represents the ultimate triumph of rationalism over experience. There is some wild speculation about Parmenides' home life; but also a seductive enthusiasm, and real insight into his poem. Another re-issue – though in this case a revision as well – is Brad Inwood's [B]*The Poem of Empedocles*[7] in the *Phoenix Presocratics* series. Texts and translations of the 'Strasbourg' fragments of Empedocles now take their place with the rest, all arranged according to a speculative reconstruction of the poem's original structure. *The* poem, because Inwood had always argued for the unity of Empedocles' thought and the 'lack of reason for treating the fragments as having come from two separate poems' (18); and in this, as in every other matter of significance, the new fragments have rather supported his view than the opposite. In consequence, the really excellent Introduction (which includes, among other things, some interesting reflections on Empedocles' influence on Plato) stands much as it did in the first edition of 1992. Back in fourth-century Athens, E. V. Muir helps set the scene for Plato with an edition and translation of [B]★*Alcidamas, the Works and Fragments*.[8] The commentary is pitched just right, and it is a pleasure to find Alcidamas made so accessible at last: of all the Classical rhetoricians he is, word for word, one of the best value for money. Not that Plato himself would agree, I suppose, since for him rhetoric was bought at the price of one's soul. In [B]*Plato and the Hero*,[9] Angela Hobbs explores Plato's analysis of why it is, in that case, that the example of philosophical bounders such as Callicles and Thrasymachus proved so attractive to Athenian male youth. The answer seems to lie in their *manliness* (*andreia*), a quality which is missed by Plato's focus in the *Gorgias* on Callicles' addiction to *pleasure*, and only picked up in the *Republic* with the introduction of *thumos* ('spirit'). If there were more books devoted to this rather neglected aspect of Platonic psychology, I could make it a more meaningful compliment that this is the best of them. Exploring the role of *thumos* as the policeman of one's self- image, Hobbs opens up fascinating new vistas on the educational programme of the *Republic*, and on Plato's use of heroic role-models. She also gives something new to say in response to the question of whether Plato was a feminist. The correct answer remains No; but Hobbs argues convincingly that his realignment of *thumos* with the philosophical life, rather than with the life of political glory, is associated with a shift towards a non-gendered account of *andreia* – a 'manliness' open to women as well. To assist with the *Republic*'s ostensible sequel comes [B]*Reason and Necessity*,[10] a collection of eight articles tackling the *Timaeus*. The range of interest to which the book appeals is impressive: beyond M. R. Wright's opening discussion of 'Myth, Science and Reason in the *Timaeus*', there are details of demiurgy (Sergio Zedda, Scott Burgess, Jan Opsomer), ethics and psychology (Christopher Gill),

[7] *The Poem of Empedocles*. A text and translation with an introduction by Brad Inwood. Revised Edition. University of Toronto Press, 2001. Pp. x + 334. Paper £20.00.

[8] *Alcidamas*. The Works and Fragments. Edited with introduction, translation and commentary by J. V. Muir. Bristol Classical Press, 2001. Pp. xxxiii + 94. Paper £10.99.

[9] *Plato and the Hero*. Courage, Manliness and the Impersonal Good. By Angela Hobbs. Cambridge U.P., 2000. Pp. xvii + 280.

[10] *Reason and Necessity*. Essays on Plato's *Timaeus*. Edited by M. R. Wright. Duckworth / The Classical Press of Wales, London, 2000. Pp. xvi + 191.

https://doi.org/10.1093/gr/49.1.126 Published online by Cambridge University Press

music (Andrew Barker), cosmology-as-embryology (Lesley Dean-Jones), and zoology (Gordon Campbell). All of these articles are first rate; the Outline of Topics (xvi), and a Bibliography of main editions, commentaries and translations (181) turn them into an extremely pleasant companion to what can be a rather spiky work. In B*Plato's Progeny*[11] (part of Duckworth's 'Classical Inter/faces' series), Melissa Lane explores the modern reception of Plato in an attempt to explain the continuing appeal of his philosophy. Kant and (especially) Nietzsche are very much to the fore here; but the supporting cast is impressive, stretching from Arnold to Augustine, Pater to Popper. Without assuming any particular background knowledge, the three central chapters of the book develop a series of oppositions in the reading of Plato's works: Socrates (subversive or victim of Athenian justice?); Platonic metaphysics (other-worldly foundation for a 'totalitarian' ethics or immanent validation of the beauty and goodness of our world?); the *Republic* (radical utopia or reactionary 'closed society'?). Negotiating the 'absolutes' which form these pairs of opposition, Lane herself argues for the possibility of a twenty-first-century Plato, a Plato for the world of liberal democracy, whose works are always complex and subtle enough to raise questions and possibilities for where we are now without demanding absolutist commitment. Ardent traditionalists, appalled to find Plato (post-)modernized like this, might find nearer soul-mates in Mark Edwards' B*Neoplatonic Saints*[12] – new translations of Porphyry's *Life of Plotinus* and Marinus' *Life of Proclus*. In fact it seems to me slightly misleading to call Plotinus and Proclus 'saints', just because it seems to me slightly disingenuous to say that ancient professors 'were estimated, not by their writings, and still less by their reading, but by the quality of their lives' (lx) – especially in the context of a philosophy so bookishly devoted to the understanding of Plato. Nevertheless, these lives are well worth reading, even for the infidel; and Edwards' generous introduction is a model of lucidity which will smooth the beginner's way into Neoplatonism. (Old hands can test their learning against the treasury of observation and elucidation contained in some 401 footnotes.) Carlo Natali's important study of *phronesis* in Aristotle (originally published as *La saggezza di Aristotele* in 1989) appears for the first time in English as B★★*The Wisdom of Aristotle*.[13] Three chapters examine the mechanics of practical wisdom and show how it (through deliberation and the 'practical syllogism') is able to mediate between a scientific understanding of the world and our daily experience of it. The fourth chapter works through the consequences of this insight for an understanding of Aristotle's theory of virtue and happiness. Natali argues that Aristotle holds a position on happiness that can be characterized (in the terms of a modern controversy) as *both* 'inclusive' *and* 'dominant'. One is happy just when one's actions are all 'well-performed' actions (*eupraxiai*) but, Natali suggests, there are different ways of organizing such actions, some of which in any case are more important than others. As long as they are organized to allow, as far as possible, for contemplation, the life in accordance with *perfect* virtue (the 'dominant' view of happiness expressed in the *Nicomachean Ethics*) is identical with the life in accordance with *complete* virtue (the

[11] *Plato's Progeny*. How Plato and Socrates Still Captivate the Modern Mind. By Melissa Lane. Duckworth, London, 2001. Pp. x + 165. Paper £9.99.

[12] *Neoplatonic Saints*. The Lives of Plotinus and Proclus by their Students. Translated with an introduction by Mark Edwards. Liverpool U.P., 2000. Pp. lx +150, with two maps.

[13] *The Wisdom of Aristotle*. By Carlo Natali. Translated from the Italian by Gerald Parks. State University of New York Press, 2001. Pp. xii + 259.

https://doi.org/10.1093/gr/49.1.126 Published online by Cambridge University Press

'inclusive' version, favoured in the *Eudemian Ethics*). Such a pleasing reconciliation that one really does hope Aristotle thought of it. The book is completed by an Afterword, which briefly surveys work done on *phronesis* between the original publication of the book and its appearance now in English. Aristotle's view of happiness is a question with which the name of Anthony Kenny has been closely associated, and is tackled in the opening two papers of the ten reprinted in his *Essays on the Aristotelian Tradition*.[14] (Kenny keeps the 'inclusive' and 'dominant' accounts of happiness separate, and with them the *Nicomachean* and *Eudemian Ethics*.) Other topics covered here include the mental philosophy of Aristotle, and his medieval and modern reception (including 'The Thomism of Pope John Paul II'). The collection ends with two forays into Aristotelian stylometry. The title of David Charles' book B★★*Aristotle on Meaning and Essence*[15] belies the scope of its significance for Aristotle studies. At the heart of this exegetically and philosophically rich investigation of Aristotle's theories of essence, explanation, significance, psychology, and biological classification, lies the reconstruction from (mainly) *Posterior Analytics* B of a unified theory of definition. Definition, Charles argues, is not grounded in our ability to use words appropriately (to know what it is that a name signifies): Aristotle thinks that we can do this even before we know that the 'name' picks out an object that actually exists. Rather, definition starts with our identification of a 'causally basic feature' which guarantees for some of the names we use that the objects named exist as genuine unities; and it proceeds through the distinction of differentiating features in the object whose presence is explained by the causally basic feature. Definition (walking hand in hand with explanation) thus establishes essences which are neither 'given' to our intellects by nature (as Plato); nor merely features of objects made 'necessary' by the requirements of signification (the 'shadow cast by our linguistic practices'). Anyone turning for comfort to B★★*Aristotle's Metaphysics Lambda*,[16] on the understanding that this is theological treatise, will be disappointed to read Michael Frede's introduction. *Metaphysics* Λ, he argues, is not (*pace* Ross) a theological work at all; it is not even *about* god. Instead, it is a much more hard-nosed work about *substance*, which starts in the usual Aristotelian way by trying to explain the objects around us, and comes to discuss immaterial substances, and the unmoved movers in particular, only when they turn out to be among the 'principles and causes' of these things. Eleven authors lead us in turn through a 'discursive commentary' on the 10 chapters of the work (Λ.9 is deemed awkward enough to merit two discussions): respectively, Michael Frede, David Charles, Lindsay Judson, Michel Crubellier, Alan Code, Enrico Berti, André Laks, G. E. R. Lloyd, Jacques Brunschwig, Aryeh Kosman, and David Sedley. It hardly needs saying that the unity of this scheme belies the diversity of style, approach, and interpretation to be found here. And how, in the end, can one fail to feel some warmth towards a book on the *Metaphysics* in which Aristotle is accused of getting 'seriously out of his depth' (261)?

GEORGE BOYS-STONES

[14] *Essays on the Aristotelian Tradition*. By Anthony Kenny. Oxford U.P., 2000. Pp. vi + 174. £25.00.

[15] *Aristotle on Meaning and Essence*. By David Charles. Oxford U.P., 2000. Pp. xiv + 410. £35.00.

[16] *Aristotle's Metaphysics Lambda*. Symposium Aristotelicum. Edited by Michael Frede and David Charles. Oxford U.P., 2000. Pp. vi + 366. £40.00.

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