Cic. *Rep*. 2, while in no. 3 Cicero in *Rep.* is taken to be using Cato to criticize Polybius on the same point. No. 4 argues against Galbiati's attempt to reconstruct from Aristotle the missing criticisms of the Spartan constitution in the *De Republica* (although without seriously doubting the more general validity of Galbiati's method of source-criticism—pan-Panaetianism still holds sway). No. 5 argues that Cicero does not depend on the *Tripoliticus* of Dicaearchus (a work which receives further attention in an appendix to this volume); T. does not seem to use Büchner's commentary on Cic. *Rep*. where this question is also tackled. No. 6 compares Cicero's criticism of the Spartan constitution in *De Officiis* with that of Polybius: Polybius' criticism is constitutional, Cicero's is moral. In the end T. still seems to see this as chiefly a matter of source-criticism, but it is a better point than he realizes, bearing as it does on the whole issue of Cicero's attitude to constitutional theory compared with that of his Greek predecessors. Nos 7 and 8 deal with Nabis of Sparta and the speech attributed to him by Livy in Book 34, which is claimed by T. to stem not just from Polybius but also from the anti-Roman side of the debate at that time. This is interesting and may be true, but how are we to know that Livy is not just inventing it all? T. is well aware of the Augustan resonances in Nabis' speech, which might appear to weaken the case for an earlier source. No. 9, on Romulus as rival of Lycurgus, reverts to the Roman–Spartan comparison, while the final chapter deals with Tacitus' notorious criticism of the mixed constitution. T. takes this to be a tacit criticism of Polybius rather than of Cicero, but I am not so sure: Cicero's emphasis on the longevity and stability of the mixed constitution seems to receive a pointed reply in Tacitus' *haud diuturna esse potest*.

There are some good points in all of this, and it is always worthwhile to be reminded that the texts we have are only the tip of the iceberg of ancient political and theoretical debate; by the same token, the application of over-strict methods of source-criticism may in the end prove less helpful than one hoped. The rhetorical purpose and context of a given text is always at least as important as the pre-existing ingredients that went into its making.

Royal Holloway, London J. G. F. POWELL

GENERALS ON PARADE

D. HAMEL: *Athenian Generals. Military Authority in the Classical Period.* (*Mnemosyne* Supplement 152.) Pp. xvi + 250. Leiden, Boston, and Cologne: Brill, 1998. Cased, $87.50. ISBN: 90-04-10900-5.

In this well-written and engaging little book, Debra Hamel attempts 'to define the limits of authority which Athens' generals exercised in the military sphere with a view, principally, to illuminating the relationship between *strategoi* and the Athenian *demos*' (p. 1). I may be forgiven, I think, for giving away the conclusion right at the outset since the author herself does so on p. 1: the answer is that they 'did not exercise a significant degree of authority. . . . Rather, the *demos* controlled its generals both by means of its direct involvement in decision-making related to campaigns and by establishing in Athens a climate of fear . . .' So much for the question and its answer. It remains to provide the proof, and this Hamel does effectively in some 160 heavily footnoted pages that follow. Pp. 161–214 comprise sixteen useful appendices, most dealing with specific cases of individuals exercising command as generals, but also tackling such problems as the meaning of *strategoi*

© Oxford University Press, 2001

https://doi.org/10.1093/cr/51.1.107 Published online by Cambridge University Press

autokratores and the evidence for fatalities amongst the *strategoi.* The heart of the book deals with four aspects of the *strategia.* Part I: *Strategoi* and the Campaign (pp. 5–55) examines the powers of generals in the preparation for war and in the events immediately following battle; Part II: *Strategoi* and their Subordinates (pp. 59–75) discusses discipline in the army, awards of *aristeia* (and division of spoils), and the rôle of subordinates (and the rank-and-file) in decision-making; Part III: *Strategoi* and their Colleagues (pp. 79–113) treats the powers and status of the individual generals in relation to one another and to the *polemarchos*; Part IV: *Strategoi* and the *Demos*, deals with accountability, punishment, and fear thereof.

H.'s arguments move briskly, with examples and documentation relegated to footnotes. As a result, questions are posed and answered quickly with a minimum of description and paraphrase. The evidence itself is not always sufficient or satisfactory, but, working within its limitations, H. manages to come up with cogent interpretations, while seldom straying into fruitless speculation. Occasionally, the methodology falters: twice she presents evidence for the conduct of Iphikrates, only to undercut her argument by admitting that the sources (both writers of *stratagemata*—Polyainos 3.9.31 and Frontinus 3.12.2) are actually talking about mercenary rather than Athenian citizen-troops (pp. 48, 62). But, on the whole, the author sticks to business and avoids digression—colourful the book is not, but the thesis is clear and persuasive. The question of a 'hierarchy' of command within the *strategia* is handled with particular skill, and H. is not seduced by modern views that give Perikles special status: *dekatos autos* means 'nothing more than is usually implied by the use of the *αὐτός*-formula, that Perikles served on this occasion as one of ten generals . . .' H. endorses Fornara's view that all *strategoi* were, after a certain point, selected *ex hapanton*, rejecting Beloch's imaginative but unsubstantiated theory that nine were elected *kata phylas* and the tenth *ex hapanton.* H. does not, however, provide a positive answer to how a man like Perikles could exercise such tremendous power, if there is no evidence for a rotation of command or 'presidency' amongst the *strategoi.* Josiah Ober comments that 'there can be little doubt that his [sc. Perikles'] continuity in office made him de facto chairman of the board' (*Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens* [Princeton, 1989], p. 86), and this continuity certainly deserves greater attention if we are to understand the nature of Perikles' (or any other general's) authority.

Ultimately, the greatest problem for Athenian generals was fear of retribution in the form of prosecution. Not only were the citizen troops whom they commanded members of the *ekklesia*, and thus the very 'bosses' of the generals themselves, but the citizens formed also the jurors on military tribunals in which generals might bring charges against their subordinates or common soldiers. As a result, says H., the discipline of Athenian armies was lax and fear of the assembly (upon return from campaign) limited the general's ability to chastise the disobedient. To this must be added the fickleness of the mob, which, especially during the late stages of the Peloponnesian War, sought scapegoats for every Athenian setback, for the loss of citizen lives, or for grandiose hopes disappointed. Surprisingly, H. discusses the Arginousai trial only in passing (pp. 118–19, 127), though it represents the most famous (notorious?) example of punishment at the hands of the *demos.*

The limitations on the powers of the *strategia* are, in fact, hardly surprising. The generals were restricted in many cases to the management of military affairs, that is, to the formulating and execution of tactics, whereas matters of grand strategy, which had far-reaching political implications, or of the treatment of the enemy—which had implications for 'foreign policy', since peace-settlements and future relations between states could be affected by the treatment of the defeated—were rightly in the domain

https://doi.org/10.1093/cr/51.1.107 Published online by Cambridge University Press

of the *demos*. In other states, which have a professional army and a professional officer-class responsible to a commander-in-chief (e.g. the US President) or a ministry of war, this separation of powers is hardly surprising. It is merely because of the elected nature of the *strategoi* that one assumes (wrongly) that they might have had more extensive powers than other commanders in other states. Once told, we might be inclined to remark that the conclusion is rather obvious, but this is to a great extent because the author provides such cogent arguments in a book that offers much in addition to enrich our knowledge of the *strategia*.

University of Calgary WALDEMAR HECKEL

INTO THE LIMELIGHT

GRAHAM SHIPLEY: *The Greek World after Alexander, 323–30 BC*. Pp. xxxi + 568, figs, maps. London and New York: Routledge, 2000. Paper, £19.99 (Cased, £60). ISBN: 0-415-04618-1.

The Hellenistic world has stepped smartly out of the shadows. Long the stepchild of classical studies, it has now attracted its second full-scale survey in English during the past decade, plus a host of monographs, conference volumes, and major works of reference. Graham Shipley's book exhibits the prominence of the subject.

S. has produced a readable, wide-ranging, and thoroughly up to date textbook. But more than that. He is not content simply to convey the conventional—nor indeed to condemn it. The judgements are judicious but pointed. S. leans heavily on prior scholarship, as is inevitable, even obligatory, in a study of this scope. Yet he reaches his own conclusions, while allowing the reader to ponder alternatives. The book enters controversies but avoids polemic. It deftly shifts between narrative portions and thematic discussions. A very large number of well-chosen quotations, from literary, epigraphic, and papyrological sources, provide vividness and immediacy. Footnotes (at the back of the book) are extensive but not oppressive, displaying an admirable command both of earlier influential scholarship and of the most recent contributions on a multitude of topics. This work will be much plundered by the teacher and researcher, and widely welcomed by the student.

The particular blend will not be to everyone's taste. Narrative segments are curtailed and condensed, which may cause some frustration to the novice who needs a firmer grip on the course of events. Separate lists of dates, dynastic chronologies, and genealogical tables, although helpful for reference, leave the narrative gaps unfilled. Individual personalities do not much emerge from the mix. One gets little sense of fascinating figures like Demetrios Poliorketes, Pyrrhos, Kleomenes III, Kallimakhos, Arkhimedes, and Polybios. S. leans to the larger picture. Yet even here there is a significant omission: no discussion of developments in art and architecture. S. supplies a number of illustrations, and topics like ruler portraits or urban planning do appear, but the subject receives no systematic treatment. A vital ingredient of Hellenistic culture, and a most revealing one, escapes view.

The book, however, contains numerous compensations. Chapters on the major kingdoms include valuable summaries of topography, terrain, landscape, and resources. A key chapter engages the central issue of the relationship between monarchic power and civic society in the individual communities of Hellenistic realms. Substantial analyses of religion, philosophy, literature, and, especially, science as means of expressing social

© Oxford University Press, 2001

https://doi.org/10.1093/cr/51.1.107 Published online by Cambridge University Press