indeed, it is difficult to see what more it might mean for Plato than their coming to see that it is best for them to be persuaded to do as the wise few see fit. When, therefore, Wallach comes finally to apply Platonic lessons to contemporary issues, one can perhaps look favorably upon his conclusions (i) that Plato would prefer rehabilitation to incarceration for criminals; (ii) that he would advocate the teaching of 'religious ethics' in public schools; and even perhaps (iii) that he would favor institutional autonomy for universities (since his Academy might well have been a haven for unpoliced discourse), but one wonders how Wallach could think that Plato would be intolerant of 'political correctness' (p. 430), understood as the promoting and promulgating of certain views to the exclusion of others. For Plato, must not the many be taught what and what not to believe?

Despite offering valuable insights not only into the *Republic*, *Statesman*, and *Laws*, but into the *Protagoras* and *Gorgias* as well, particularly as they bear on the question of democracy, Wallach's book is both imprecise and unsubtle in interpreting the shorter dialogues—*Laches*, *Charmides*, *Euthydemus*, and *Meno*. In several instances his account fails to get straight even the basic facts of the dialogues, not to mention their arguments. To consider just the *Laches*, it is not the case that the two fathers in the *Laches* seek to have their sons taught ἀνδρεία (p. 132)—it is Socrates who so narrows the focus of the discussion; also, Laches points out not that craftsmen lack ἐπιστήμη of hopes and fears and therefore lack courage (p. 133), but that they lack courage despite having such ἐπιστήμη. Wallach's penchant for aggregating scholars and then labeling them substitutes, in many cases, for nuanced readings of their work, and even suggests, on occasion, that the author has at best only second-hand acquaintance with the works he cites. The book is overly long and repetitious. And the author should have taken more care with the Greek. His transliterations are inconsistent and inaccurate (*dynamis*, but *hupothesis*; *therepeuein* and Melisias instead of *therapeuein* and Melesias). In consulting the Greek text, the author does not always know which Greek words correspond to which English words in the translation (the most egregious instance of this being his selection of φάρμακον as the Greek for 'original' [p. 343] in a translation of *Pol*. 277c).

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OUSIA IN ARISTOTLE

M. V. WEDIN: *Aristotle's Theory of Substance: The* Categories *and* Metaphysics Zeta. Pp. xii + 482. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. Cased, £37.50. ISBN: 0-19-823855-X.

W.'s first book was *Mind and Imagination in Aristotle* (New Haven, 1988). In that excellent work, W. championed an unorthodox position. He argued that, for Aristotle, episodes of cognition are explained through appeal to lower-level systems that rely on basic physiological structures. Importantly, he argued that even Aristotle's account of intellect must give way to a non-transcendentalistic analysis. In that work, W. exhibited all of the virtues that are associated with the best Aristotelian scholarship in the analytic tradition. At each turn, he offered sophisticated textual exegesis, mapped and evaluated the possibilities for interpretation, and presented thorough discussion of the relevant secondary literature. Through that work, W. introduced an interpretation that may well emerge as a new orthodoxy.

In this, his second book, W. once again attacks an existing orthodox position. Here

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the target is the standard view that the theory of substance advanced in the *Categories* is not compatible with the theory advanced in *Metaphysics* Z (Z). While the *Categories* surely promotes concrete individuals (like 'this man here') as primary substances, many scholars hold that Z promotes the forms of concrete individuals as themselves being primary substances. Since form is not identical to the composite of form and matter (which constitutes the individual), it is thought that the theories advanced in the *Categories* and Z are profoundly incompatible (pp. 1–2, 124, 164, 177, 376). W. defends the alternative view: compatibilism. He argues that Aristotle is engaged in different projects in the *Categories* and Z. In the former, Aristotle establishes the ontological primacy of concrete individuals, while in the latter he establishes form as the cause of the ontological primacy of concrete individuals. In Z Aristotle argues that form has explanatory primacy as the substance-of *Categories*-primary-substances (pp. 5–6, 133, 155–8, 420).

W. works through a number of difficult tasks. I offer a brief account of three such tasks. (i) W. shows that Z provides textual support for taking form to be the substance-of *Categories*-primary-substances. He does this by drawing attention to the 'substance-of' idiom (*ousia hekastou*) which Aristotle first employs at Z.3.1028b35. W. contends that through his use of this idiom Aristotle indicates that he seeks the cause of *Categories*-primary-substances (pp. 8, 157–8, 167–9, 346). (ii) W. argues that in Z Aristotle does not sacrifice the thesis that *Categories*-primary-substances are the subjects of accidents, since Aristotle does not in fact introduce form as the underlying subject of accidents. Here W.'s argument hinges on an appeal to *De Anima* A.4.408b5–15, a passage in which Aristotle claims that, while soul is the form of the body, it does not itself enjoy subjecthood, for even though the individual thinks or perceives in virtue of having soul, the soul itself neither thinks nor perceives (pp. 141–9). (iii) W. challenges the notion that since in Z.13 Aristotle denies that the universal is the sort of substance (or now substance-of) which he seeks, he must also deny that form (presumably, insofar as it is general and, thus, universal) is the substance-of *Categories*-primary-substances. One key component within W.'s solution is the suggestion that only the universal predicated of a composite substance is excluded, whereas form is not predicated of the composite (pp. 8, 368–78).

While W. does an excellent job of parsing through the thick layers of argument in Z, he does not provide a clear sense that there is an overarching methodological framework which explains the progression of Aristotle's thought in that book. W. does suggest that Aristotle's comments regarding the explanatory rôle of form in Z.17 provide methodological constraints that are projected back into earlier chapters (pp. 7, 341, 405), but this part of his case seems tenuous.

In this book, W. exhibits many of the scholarly virtues that were evident in his first book. He offers intricate exegesis, surveys interpretative possibilities, and discusses much of the relevant secondary literature. As a result, this book will appeal not only to those interested in the debate over compatibilism, but also to those who have a straightforward interest either in the *Categories* or in Z. W. offers insight into a number of localized issues. For example, he persuasively argues that the account of homonymy, synonymy, and paronymy in *Categories* 1 establishes a framework of grouping principles that ultimately provides a foundation for the meta-ontology which is advanced in *Categories* 2–5 (pp. 11–27). In addition, he argues that the 'Socrates the Younger Passage' (Z.11.1036b24–32) is compatible with, but does not entail, the thesis of compositional plasticity: a thesis that is of special importance to Aristotle's functionalist interpreters (pp. 327–39).

W.'s approach to the secondary literature is not without its faults. Two noteworthy

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oversights immediately spring to mind. First, W. does not mention Daniel Graham's *Aristotle's Two Systems* (Oxford, 1987), even though Graham offers arguments in support of incompatibilism. It is likely that this initial oversight does not detract significantly from the value of W.'s overall argument, since he does evaluate a number of distinct and highly tractable arguments from prominent incompatibilists. However, W.'s second oversight is egregious. He does not mention Robert Bolton's 'Science and the Science of Substance in Aristotle's *Metaphysics* Z' (*Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* 76 [1995], 419–69). In this paper, Bolton argues that Aristotle is engaged in different projects in the *Categories* and Z, and he offers a pioneering defence of compatibilism. Bolton argues that in Z Aristotle is engaged in a causal inquiry which seeks a scientific explanation of (*Categories*-)primary-substance (Bolton, pp. 433–7). I offer a brief account of three important elements from Bolton's analysis. (i) Bolton defends compatibilism by relying on the 'substance-of' idiom at Z.3.1028b35 (Bolton, p. 442). (ii) He argues against the standard view that form is a basic subject (of accidents) by appealing to *De Anima* A.4.408b5–15: the passage in which Aristotle claims that, while soul is the form of the body, it does not itself enjoy subjecthood (Bolton, p. 448). (iii) Bolton argues that Aristotle's rejection of the universal in Z.13 leaves it open that specific forms are causes of (*Categories*-)primary-substances (Bolton, pp. 458–64). In addition to these accomplishments, Bolton shows that there is a clear overarching methodological framework in Z. This is the framework of the method of scientific inquiry, which Aristotle discusses in the *Posterior Analytics* (Bolton, pp. 429–64).

In some respects Bolton's ground-breaking analysis is in harmony with that which W. has now advanced, in other respects it differs in noteworthy ways from W.'s, and in yet other respects Bolton's analysis presses beyond W.'s. Thus, while W. has offered a fine defence of compatibilism, it is regrettable that he did not take full advantage of relevant secondary literature. For, if he had, his defence might have been considerably improved.

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ARISTOTLE ON EDUCATION

R. R. CURREN: *Aristotle on the Necessity of Public Education*. Pp. xv + 279. Lanham, Boulder, New York, and Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000. Paper, £20.95. ISBN: 0-8476-9673-1.

Randall R. Curren's *Aristotle on the Necessity of Public Education* treats a topic that is of great importance but has also until very recently fallen into neglect, namely education in antiquity. C. reads the thought of one author, Aristotle, within a particular context that has him look at precedents for the philosopher and at his possible applications for subsequent, contemporary thinking on how we teach. The study has seven chapters. The first two look at what Plato and Socrates, as transmitted by Plato, had to say on the topic of education and why it was an important issue for legislators of the classical city. C. concludes that Plato saw education as being important for producing the good citizen (p. 58). The next two chapters, III and IV, focus on Aristotle, and they look in particular at the *Politics*. Chapter III considers the author's arguments for public education in *Politics* 8, and it insists upon the significance of the raising and training of the young when it argues that Aristotle's audience would have included lawmakers (p. 78). Chapter IV argues for the unity of the *Politics*, maintaining that there are important links between Books 5 and

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