Indeed, throughout the book, we are left with many interesting points which could have been developed with solid arguments and with a larger bibliography.

The third section of the book represents a new way of reading the return of Odysseus. It is a very good section, with a great interest for the rôle of landscape in colonial discourses. It argues that Odysseus represent the spirit of the colonial age, and re-founds Ithaca in the light of his experience of travel.

However, there is an important aspect which is absent from D's book; that is, the religious dimension of travel in relation to pilgrimage, knowledge, and sightseeing (see I. Rutherford, 'Theoria and *Darshan*', *CQ* 50 [2000], 133–46). The book focuses on the construction of colonial identity through relations of trade and commerce, but it seems to forget that songs and poets represent other kind of values to the society, especially on a cultural and moral level, and not only they should be regarded as a form of merchandise in the context of colonial trade. It is a book in which analogies and comparisons are drawn too far sometimes in order to make them fit with the relationship between ships and songs in the colonial context (pp. 68–78).

In spite of this, D.'s aim is a good one: she praises poetry. Also, the book situates Homer within the new trends of humanities of reading geography as discourses of identity. Although the book does not develop a theoretical frame related to ancient and modern geography, it does use elements from cultural geography, such as landscape, in order to construct the colonial experience. D. translated the passages she used, and that give a refreshing meaning to the episodes quoted. It is a book which proposes an original view of reading the return of Odysseus, and makes the reader aware of the commercial world which existed together with the themes which the *Odyssey* developed.

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HESIOD'S MYTHS

W. Blümer: *Interpretation archaischer Dichtung. Die mythologischen Partien der Erga Hesiods. Band I. Die Voraussetzungen: Autoren, Texte und homerische Fragen.* Pp. 285. *Band II. Wahrheit und Dichtung: Die Verse 1–105. Bibliographie.* Pp. 395. Münster: Aschendorff, 2001. Cased, DM 198. ISBN: 3-402-05420-5.

These two volumes, a revised *Habilitationsschrift*, are the first instalment of a study of Hesiod *Op*. 1–211. Volume I clears the ground for detailed interpretation. The principal question exercising the author is, did Hesiod know Homer? This takes us to the heart of the Homeric Question, especially as represented by the apparently popular 'evolutionary theory' of Gregory Nagy. Fifty-four pages are devoted to its refutation; the upshot is that the theory is 'a dangerous mixture of incomprehensible isolation of texts, violent distortions, unproven or false premises and overblown conclusions, one-sided comparisons and recherché combinations, mistaken reasoning and large-scale circular arguments' (I.87–8). We await Professor Nagy's reply with some interest. However, though I do not agree myself with Nagy's theory, I do not think B. has fixed on its weak point; he stakes everything on Nagy's supposed misunderstanding of *Il*. 9.413 (*κλέος ἄφθιτον*): Achilles has not yet made his decision to stay on and win immortal glory at the cost of death, says B., so all of Nagy's talk

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about Achilles' reference to his future fame in the epic tradition is beside the point; in fact, Achilles says at this point that he will go home. The argument is symptomatic of a literal-mindedness, and a view of literature, which often left me shaking my head; I seem to have a quite different idea of what constitutes a good argument. On to Janko (I.125–38, who is more respectfully treated), whose powerful linguistic arguments, after Hoekstra and Edwards, dictate the chronological sequence *Iliad—Odyssey—Theogony—Works and Days*; B. attempts to pick some holes in the statistics, but fails to respond to the argument about clusters, and does not grasp the unity and working of the Greek oral tradition. Janko's theory rejected, *Geistesgeschichte* is next considered, and fares no better. The key turns out to be history and archaeology. Hesiod's poems clearly reflect Euboia in its *Blütezeit*, before the Lelantine War, whereas Homer's do not (no reflection of Lefkandi in them); Homer's poems know the rise of Delphi, whereas Hesiod's do not. So Hesiod is the first poet of the West. His two poems, like Homer's, are written compositions, and our texts stem from their written exemplars.

Volume II moves on to discuss many problems in *Op*. 1–105, with a detailed discussion also of *Th*. 507–616 (much excision). The key to understanding *Op*., says B., is to realize that it is correcting a fixed version of *Th*. In particular, Epimetheus has no part in the genuine verses of the *Th*. In *Op*., the story has been revised; Epimetheus (who is human—not, therefore, Prometheus' brother) is free to choose or reject Pandora (in *Th*. she was simply inflicted by Zeus); Pandora is not the original woman, just a woman who happens to embody evil. Epimetheus chose Pandora, and look what came of it; Perses and the βασιλῆες, take note, and learn that the half is better than the whole. The interpretation will not work (B. thinks) if Pandora is the original woman, who must as a matter of definition come to Earth (but not, apparently, evils). Part of the case for seeing Pandora as just a woman depends on accepting D's διασκῆσαι in verse 64 (useful discussion, this), and on disregarding Peitho's later associations with Aphrodite: though Pandora needs to be somewhat attractive (else Epimetheus might ignore her), she cannot be the arch-seductress, emblematic of womankind. So (II.73) Peitho is here as representative of the Oceanids, whose catalogue she heads in *Th*. 349; their function is to make men flourish, and it is health and prosperity that Epimetheus jeopardizes by his stupid choice. Pindar, it seems, knew a text with διδασκῆσαι, and knew an erotic Peitho (*Pyth*. 4.217–9); this just shows that the text was already corrupt by his day, and that poor Pindar was unable to understand Hesiod's meaning. It is possible too that Homer in *Il*. 18.420 betrays knowledge of the corrupted text of Hesiod; 'the assumption of so early a corruption poses not the slightest problem' (II.221), though it seems incredible that so fundamental a misunderstanding of the passage (on B.'s assessment) could have affected the text so quickly.

The style is prolix; the tone is self-assured; the conclusions are presented with much force. Nagy is not the only scholar who receives rough treatment. The reigning critical principle is what the original audience could comprehend upon oral delivery (5 seconds per line), taking the text as it comes in a linear manner; nothing else counts for interpretation—no parallel material, no symbolic associations, no cross-references (unless they can be easily comprehended during oral delivery: the references from *Op*. to *Th*., naturally), nothing implicit (Prometheus is no champion of mankind, because Hesiod does not say so). Hesiod emerges as a very careful, logical composer, who arranges every detail perfectly for his paraenetic purposes; though his art justifies the highest claims, his meaning is immediately accessible, should one follow the poet's words with patient devotion, 'even to a simple mind' (II.200). Much though this portrait of Hesiod might appeal, he is not the mythological thinker I admire. B.

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perhaps hopes to have settled many questions once and for all, and set western *Geistesgeschichte* on a completely new footing (II.231), but I doubt his interpretations will win general assent. Specialists will wish to engage with his arguments, and he has provided an enormous bibliography (156 pp.) as a reference.

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PINDAR, *OLYMPIAN* 7

A. RETTER: *Das Prooimion von Pindars siebter olympischer Ode: Versuch einer integrierenden Lösung von Bezugsproblemen*. (Innsbrucker Beiträge zur Kulturwissenschaft Sonderheft 113.) Pp. 321. Innsbruck: Institut für Sprachen und Literaturen der Universität Innsbruck, 2002. Cased, €52. ISBN: 3-85124-205-X.

The opening verses of Pindar's epinicians are often elaborately constructed and are clearly designed to make an immediate impact on the audience. Nowhere is this more obvious than in the first two stanzas of *O*. 7, and not surprisingly they have been analysed in some detail by a number of scholars. In very general terms, all would agree that Pindar is comparing his poem for Diagoras to a valuable wine cup given to a bridegroom, but there is disagreement about certain aspects of Pindar's language and there is certainly room for a thorough treatment of these verses. Such a treatment has now been the subject of Retter's 2001 dissertation under the supervision of Erich Thummer at Innsbruck, and the present book is the dissertation with only minor changes.

Apart from an introductory and a concluding chapter, the book concentrates on six problematic passages. The first is of relatively minor importance, the question whether *πάγχρυσον* (verse 4) is an adjective modifying *κορυφάν* or *φιάλαν* or an adjective with substantival force. He argues for the first possibility, rightly I think since *πάγχρυσον κορυφὰν κτεάνων* seems to be balanced by *γλυκὺν καρπὸν φρενός* in verse 8. As a result, no comma should be printed after the adjective.

The second problem is the question whether *φιάλαν* is the object of just *ἑλών* and *δωρήσεται* or of *προπίνων* as well. This leads to a long discussion (pp. 103–34) of the various meanings of *προπίνω* ('vorher trinken', 'austrinken', '[ver]schenken', 'zutrinken') and to the conclusion that *φιάλαν* is also the object of *προπίνων* with the meaning 'zutrinken'. This may well be correct, but since he argues that the participle is coincidental in time with *δωρήσεται*, I am surprised that he says nothing about whether the verb is a short-vowel subjunctive or a future. Also, in a long note on pp. 120–1 he gives the impression that he was the first to point out the similarities between *O*. 7.1–12 and Dionysius Chalcus fr. 1 W., but this was done over a century ago by E. Graf, *De Graecorum veterum re musica* (Marburg, 1889), pp. 40–1.

The third problem is the most contentious one. He rightly argues that in *τις ἀφνειᾶς ἀπὸ χειρός* the adjective means 'rich', not 'munificent', the preposition is not instrumental, and the hand belongs to a third person, not the father-in-law (*τις*). Thus the phrase should be translated 'from a rich hand'. But whose hand? R. opts for Bowra's 'divine patron', primarily because this provides a balance for Pindar's poem, a *Μοισᾶν δόσιν* (verse 7). I do not see how 'divine' can be assumed from the Greek and I prefer to follow Hartung who takes the hand to belong to a rich friend. If this is correct, the phrase is simply a further illustration of the cup's magnificence, but I must

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