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PROCLUS ON PLATO'S *TIMAEUS* 89e3–90c7

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Abstract. Although the existence of an Arabic translation of a section of Proclus' commentary on Plato's *Timaeus* lost in the Greek has been known since long, this text has not yet enjoyed a modern edition. The present article aims to consummate this desideratum by offering a critical edition of the Arabic fragment accompanied by an annotated English translation. The attached study of the contents and structure of the extant fragment shows that it displays all typical formal elements of Proclus' commentaries, whereas its conciseness and shortcomings raise certain doubts about its completeness. As a parergon, the article includes an analysis of a hitherto neglected letter by Ḥunayn ibn Isḥāq, which is attached to the fragment in the manuscript transmission. In addition to providing some insight into the origins of the Proclian fragment, this letter sheds some light on the Syriac and Arabic reception of some works by Hippocrates and Galen, especially Hippocrates' *On Regimen in Acute Diseases* and the history of its Arabic translation.

Résumé. Bien que l'existence d'une traduction arabe d'une section perdue en grec du commentaire de Proclus sur le *Timée* soit connue depuis longtemps, ce texte n'avait fait jusqu'à présent l'objet d'aucune édition. Le présent article vise à remédier à ce manque, en proposant une édition critique du fragment arabe accompagnée d'une traduction anglaise annotée. L'étude qui l'accompagne, consacrée au contenu et à la structure du fragment transmis, montre qu'il présente, au plan formel, tous les éléments caractéristiques des commentaires de Proclus, quand bien même sa concision et ses défauts soulèvent certains doutes quant à sa complétude. En forme d'appendice, l'article propose une analyse d'une lettre de Ḥunayn ibn Isḥāq négligée jusqu'à présent, jointe au fragment sous sa forme transmise. Loin de se borner à nous fournir des renseignements sur les origines du fragment de Proclus, cette lettre jette aussi quelque lumière sur la réception syriaque et arabe de certaines œuvres d'Hippocrate et de Galien, tout particulièrement sur le traité *Du régime dans les maladies aiguës* d'Hippocrate et sur l'histoire de sa traduction arabe.

I. INTRODUCTION*

The transmission of Proclus' commentaries on the works of Plato and Aristotle has not exactly had luck on its side. Among the few that

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survive at least partially in Greek is his commentary on Plato's *Timaeus*, finished by Proclus according to Marinus' of Neapolis biography of Proclus[1] at the age of 27. The tradition of the Greek manuscripts transmitting this commentary breaks off at Proclus' comments on *Tim*. 44d. A short section of this commentary has been preserved in a 9th century Arabic translation.[2] This fragment contains Proclus' commentary (or extracts thereof) on *Tim*. 89e3–90c7, *i.e.* a section lost in the Greek original, but it is also notable for the fact that it includes at least some thoughts by Proclus on medicine, bodily health and physical disorder, topics almost completely neglected in his other philosophical writings. Although most of the fragment has been translated into German by F. Pfaff as early as in 1939, the present article contains the *editio princeps* of the Arabic version.[3] A French translation of the fragment, prepared by G. Vajda, has been published as an appendix to Festugière's annotated translation of the parts extant in Greek.[4] The hitherto available details on the Arabic transmission and reception were collected by G. Endress.[5]

II. MANUSCRIPT EVIDENCE, TRANSLATION, TRANSMISSION

The transmission of the Arabic fragment is embedded in the Syro-Arabic circulation and reception of the *Corpus Galenianum*. The Istanbul codex Aya Sofya 3725, the unique manuscript preserving the fragment, is a collective Arabic manuscript combined of two originally separate volumes. The first part (fols. 1–72), which contains four medical and pharmacological writings by Arab authors,

publications, put some of his unpublished works at my disposal and, last but not least, corrected my English.

[1] Marinus, *Proclus ou Sur le bonheur,* texte établi, traduit et annoté par Henri-Dominique Saffrey & Alain-Philippe Segonds avec la collaboration de Concetta Luna, Collection des universités de France (Paris, 2002), § 13, p. 16. On the reliability of this information v. *ibid*., p. 112, note 12.

[2] For two other Greek fragments see Concetta Luna & Alain-Philippe Segonds, "Proclus de Lycie", in Richard Goulet (ed.), *Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques,* vol. V, 2e partie–Vb: *De Plotina à Rutilius Rufus* (Paris, 2012), pp. 1546–657, esp. 1576–8.

[3] Franz Pfaff, "Kommentar des Proklos zu Platons Timaios C. 43 (89e–90c). Aus dem Cod. Arab. Agia Sophia 3725 (pgg. 214–218) übersetzt von F. P.", in *Galeni De Consuetudinibus*, edidit Ioseph M. Schmutte, Corpus Medicorum Graecorum Supplementum III (Leipzig, 1941), pp. 53–60. Pfaff's translation omits the first paragraph of the fragment and is at many places wrong or dubious (cf. below, notes 40–41).

[4] Proclus, *Commentaire sur le Timée.* Traduction et notes par André-Jean Festugière. Tome cinquième – *Livre V. Index général,* Bibliothèque des textes philosophiques (Paris, 1968), pp. 241–8.

[5] Gerhard Endress, *Proclus Arabus. Zwanzig Abschnitte aus der* Institutio Theologica *in arabischer Übersetzung*, Beiruter Texte und Studien 10 (Wiesbaden, 1973), pp. 24–6, and *id.*, "Proclus de Lycie: Œuvres transmises par la tradition arabe", in Goulet (ed.), *Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques,* Vb, pp. 1657–74.

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dates according to the description by H. Ritter and R. Walzer[6] from the 6th/12th century. The bulk of the second part (fols. 73–218) is formed by Arabic translations of ten Galenic treatises. According to H. H. Biesterfeldt, the colophon of one of the treatises displays the year 457/1064–5 as date of copying.[7]

The last Galenic treatise in this collective manuscript (fols. 194b–206b) is the Arabic translation of Περὶ ἐθῶν (*On Habits*), which was edited, together with an English translation, some three decades ago by F. Klein-Franke.[8] As in his other philosophical writings, Galen quotes in this treatise (among others) Hippocrates and Plato. The Hippocratic quotations are taken from the *Aphorisms, On Regimen in Acute Diseases,* the *Epidemics,* and *On the Physician's Business*, the Platonic quotation covers exactly *Timaeus* 89e3–90c7. The fragment of Proclus' *Timaeus* commentary forms one of two attachments appended to Galen's Περὶ ἐθῶν for the purpose of elucidating these Hippocratic and Platonic quotations. The *Explicit* of the translation of Galen's treatise is immediately and without any caesura followed by the following introduction to these two texts (fol. 206b8–9):

[Text 1]

وهذا شرح ما دخل في هذه المقالة من كلام بقراط وافلاطون وأوّله شرح معانى كلام بقراط من قول جالينوس قال جالينوس. . .

The following is an explanation of Hippocrates' and Plato's teachings quoted in the preceding treatise [by Galen]. The first [section] is an explanation of the meaning of Hippocrates' teaching through Galen's [own] words. Galen says. . .

This note is followed by a lengthy excerpt of Galen's commentary on Hippocrates' *On Regimen in Acute Diseases* (fols. 194b2–213a15),

[6] Cf. Helmut Ritter & Richard Walzer, "Arabische Übersetzungen griechischer Ärzte in Stambuler Bibliotheken", *Sitzungsberichte der Preußischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, phil.-hist. Kl.*, 26 (1934): 801–46.

[7] Cf. Hans Hinrich Biesterfeldt, *Galens Traktat, Dass die Kräfte der Seele den Mischungen des Körpers folgen' in arabischer Übersetzung*, Abhandlungen für die Kunde des Morgenlandes XL, 4 (Wiesbaden, 1973), p. 10.

[8] Cf. Felix Klein-Franke, "The Arabic version of Galen's Περὶ ἐθῶν", *Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam*, 1 (1979): 125–50. The Greek text has been edited five times. For the first four editions cf. Schmutte, *Galeni De Consuetudinibus*, pp. vi–vii. A fifth edition is available in Walter Müri, *Der Arzt im Altertum. Griechische und lateinische Quellenstücke mit der Übertragung ins Deutsche* (München, 1938), 6th ed. in the series *Sammlung Tusculum*. (Düsseldorf, 2001). For the Arabic reception and transmission cf. also Manfred Ullmann, *Die Medizin im Islam*, Handbuch der Orientalistik. Erste Abteilung: Der Nahe und Mittlere Osten, Ergänzungsband VI, Erster Abschnitt (Leiden, 1970), p. 45; Fuat Sezgin, *Geschichte des arabischen Schrifttums.* Band III: *Medizin – Pharmazie – Zoologie – Tierheilkunde* (Leiden, 1970), p. 105.

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which deals with the Hippocratic text quoted by Galen in the preceding Περὶ ἐθῶν.[9] Neither this excerpt nor the extant complete Arabic translation of Galen's commentary has been edited so far.[10] The excerpt ends with the following words (fol. 213a15–16):

[Text 2]

فهذا ما أردناه من شرح ما دخل في هذه المقالة من كلام بقراط على سبيل المثال

This now is what we wanted to explain about the Hippocratic teaching adduced by way of exemplification in this treatise [*i.e.* Περὶ ἐθῶν].

After this excerpt of Galen's commentary, the manuscript contains the fragment of Proclus' *Timaeus* commentary edited below. The fragment is introduced by the following short transition (fol. 213a16–17):

[Text 3]

وأمّا ما دخل فيها من كلام افلاطن على طريق المثال فإنّ بروقلس يقول فيه هذا القول

As for the Platonic teaching adduced in it [*i.e.* Galen's Περὶ ἐθῶν] by way of exemplification, Proclus comments on it as follows.

And at the end of the Proclian text, which is also the last text in this manuscript, we read again a corresponding *Explicit* (fol. 218a17–19):

[Text 4]

تمّ ما شرح به قول بقراط وافلاطن وتمّ كتاب العادات والحمد لله ذي القدرة التامّة والنعمة العامّة وصلواته على رسوله محمّد وآله وسلّم تسليماً

This is the end of the explanation of Hippocrates' and Plato's words and the end of [Galen's] book *On Habits*. Praise be to God, who possesses perfect power and all-embracing graciousness, and God's blessing upon His prophet Muḥammad and his family! May He keep [them] safe.

[9] On the Arabic translations of Hippocrates' work and Galen's commentary cf. below, the Appendix.

[10] For manuscripts and testimonies of this work cf. Ritter & Walzer, "Arabische Übersetzungen griechischer Ärzte", p. 815f., Ullmann, *Die Medizin im Islam*, p. 51, § 61, and Rainer Degen, "Zur arabischen Überlieferung von Galens Erklärung des Buches 'Über die Diät der akuten Krankheiten'", *Zeitschrift für die Geschichte der arabisch-islamischen Wissenschaften*, 5 (1989): 178–89; Sezgin, *Geschichte des arabischen Schrifttums*, III, p. 123, § 75. It would be interesting to see whether both versions, the excerpt preserved in MS Aya Sofya 3725 and the integral version preserved in MS Paris hebr. 1203,2, draw on the Syriac translation by Ḥunayn or even represent one and the same Arabic version.

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The translation of Galen's Περὶ ἐθῶν itself preserved in MS Aya Sofya 3725, is preceded by an introduction (fols. 193b1–194b1) which comprises a letter from Ḥunayn ibn Isḥāq's hand addressed to Salmawayh ibn Bunān, court physician and personal doctor of the ʿAbbāsid caliph al-Muʿtaṣim.[11] From this letter we learn that Ḥunayn prepared a translation of Galen's Περὶ ἐθῶν and attached the two excerpts of the commentaries by Galen and Proclus to this translation, because he deemed them suitable for a better understanding of the Galenic work. In Ḥunayn's letter to Salmawayh we read:

[Text 5, MS Aya Sofya 3725, fols. 193b13–194a1, 194a6–b1]

فسّرت لك المقالة التي سألتنيها من مقالات جالينوس وهي مقالة في العادات وبعثت بها إليك و لم أفسّرها وأبعث بها مفردة لكنّي أضفت إليها وألحقت بها تفسير الشرح وذلك بسبب ما دخل فيها من كلام ابقراط و كلام افلاطون على طريق المثال فإنّي وإن كنت أعلم أنّه لا يذهب عنك ولا يفوتك شيء من مثل هذا الكلام وإن لم يكن معه شرحه لما أقتله علماً من أنّك في أعلى طمعات من شرح معاني كلّ ما قيل في الكتب قولاً جيّداً صواباً [. . .] رأيت أنّه ينبغي أن أضيف إلى كلّ كلمة من هذا الكلام الذي دخل في هذه المقالة على طريق القياس والمثال تفسيراً لشرح[12] معانيها كيما يقدر من لم ينظر بعقله في واحد من الكتب التي منها انتزع جالينوس هذا الكلام أن يفهم معانيه بسرعة وسهولة ورأيت أنّ أوّل من ينبغي أن يختار لتفسير معاني كلام بقراط جالينوس صاحب سرّه والمقابل فيه بالحقّ وأحقّ من يتولّى شرح معاني كلام فلاطن برقلس المشهور في العلماء ولما رأيت أنّ هذا أمر ينبعي أن أفعله وظننت أنّه ليس كلّ إنسان يستصوب أن يكون كلام واحد بعضه مشروحاً[13] وبعضه قد ترك بلا شرح رأيت أنّ أمرّ بعد ذلك بسائر الأبواب التي ذكرها جالينوس في هذه المقالة وأشرح معانيها وإن أنا زدْت في ذلك وأضفت إليه

[11] This letter is found on fols. 193b7–194b1 of the manuscript. A (rather faulty) German translation has been provided by F. Pfaff in Schmutte (ed.), *Galeni De Consuetudinibus*, pp. xli–xlii. On Salmawayh ibn Bunān (d. *c.* 226/841) cf. Ullmann, *Die Medizin im Islam*, p. 112.

[12] لشرح تفسيراً *propos.* M. Rashed (personal communication, September 1, 2012): تفسير الشرح MS.

[13] مشروحاً *scripsi* : مشروح MS.

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شيئاً فإنّما أتي بالشيء الذي أزيده أو أضيفه ممّا هو لجالينوس ومن ذخائره المخزونة في كتبه لا من فكرتي التي لا نتيجة لها ولا حصول وذلك من أمرها معروف ولو لم أتفوّه به.

[(a)] I translated for you the treatise of Galen you asked me for, namely the treatise *On Habits*, which I send to you [here].
[(b)] However, I did not only translate and send this [treatise]. Rather, I attached and appended to it the translation of the [relevant] explanation,[14] because [Galen] adduces in this [treatise] Hippocratic and Platonic teachings by way of exemplification. The reason is that, although I am sure that nothing of this kind of teaching will escape you or be neglected by you, even if it is not accompanied by its explanation, I am no less aware of the fact that you strive most eagerly to obtain explanations of what all that is taught in the books in an excellent and correct way means. [. . .] I deemed it suitable to attach to each word of these teachings quoted in this treatise by way of comparison[15] and exemplification a translation of what explains their meaning, in order that he whose mind has not yet studied any of the books from which Galen excerpted this teaching will be capable of grasping its meaning immediately and easily. Furthermore, I thought that the one who must be given preference with respect to the interpretation of the meaning of Hippocrates' teaching is Galen [himself], who shared the secrets of Hippocrates' [thoughts] and is compatible to him in trustworthiness, and that [the one] who deserves most to attend to the explanation of the meaning of Plato's teaching is Proclus, the [philosopher who is] well-reputed among scholars.
[(c)] Now, seeing that this had to be done and taking into consideration that not everybody might approve of [the fact] that one part of one [and the same] teaching is [additionally] explained, whereas the other part is left without explanation, I thought I should, after this, go through the other sections quoted by Galen in this treatise and explain their meanings. Whenever I supplied and attached something to this, I set forth only those things I [could] supply and attach from what [originates] from Galen and from the treasures stored in his books, not from my own thoughts which are – as is well-known and goes without saying – unproductive and fruitless.

Ḥunayn speaks in this letter about four different texts. He mentions in section **(a)** his translation of Galen's *On Habits*, in section **(b)** translations of two sections of Galen's and Proclus' commentaries on Hippocratic and Platonic quotations in this work, and in section **(c)** his own explanations on "the other sections quoted by Galen in this treatise" excerpted from or alluding to other works by Galen.

[14] *Or:* the interpretation [found] in the commentary [tradition]. The second stem of the Arabic root *f-s-r* ("to interpret") seems to be used in the present text both in the sense of "translation" as well as in the sense of "explanation, elucidation".
[15] *Or:* by way of syllogistic reasoning, *ʿalā ṭarīqi al-qiyāsi*.

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The appended explanations announced in section **(c)** are neither extant in the present manuscript nor testified in Ḥunayn's *Letter on the Translations of Galen's Works*. In all likelihood, Ḥunayn dealt there with Galen's quotation from Hippocrates' works other than Περὶ διαίτης ὀξέων, *i.e. Aphorisms, Epidemics,* and *On the Physician's Business* (cf. above), on which Galen had also composed separate commentaries. As for the texts mentioned in sections **(a)** and **(b)**, the letter raises three questions: (i) Into which language did Ḥunayn translate Galen's *On Habits*? (ii) Were the translations referred to in section **(b)** originated by Ḥunayn himself or did he extract them from already existing translations (Ḥunayn speaks of attaching [*aḍāfa*] and appending [*alḥaqa*] the texts, but does not explicitly say that he translated them)? (iii) Was the Arabic version of the excerpts of Galen's and Proclus' commentaries preserved in our manuscript prepared on the basis of the Greek original or a Syriac translation?

The first and third questions are easily answered on the basis of additional bibliographical material. First, we have Ḥunayn's statement regarding Galen's *On Habits* in his *Letter on the Translations of Galen's Works*:[16]

[Text 6]

كتابه في العادات: هذا الكتاب مقالة واحدة [...] ترجمت هذه المقالة إلى السريانيّة لسلمويه بن بنان ويتلو هذه المقالة تفسير ما أتى به جالينوس فيها من الشهادات من قول افلاطن بشرح ابروقلس[17] له وتفسير ما أتى به من قول بقراط بشرح جالينوس له. وترجمه حبيش إلى العربيّة لأحمد بن موسى.

[*Galen's*] *Book on Habits*: This book [consists of] one treatise. [...] I translated it into Syriac for Salmawayh ibn Bunān. This treatise is followed by an explanation of the testimonies of Plato's words quoted in it by Galen by means of Proclus' commentary on them as well as by an explanation of

[16] Gotthelf Bergsträsser, *Ḥunain ibn Isḥāq über die syrischen und arabischen Galen-Übersetzungen*, Zum ersten Mal herausgegeben und übersetzt von G. B., Abhandlungen für die Kunde des Morgenlandes XVII.2 (Leipzig, 1925), p. 26.

[17] This word is undotted in the unique manuscript used by Bergsträsser. Bergsträsser first thought erroneously of *Herophilos* and provided in his edition the reading ايروفيلس, but in a later publication (*Neue Materialien zu Ḥunain ibn Isḥāq's Galen-Bibliographie*, Abhandlungen für die Kunde des Morgenlandes XIX.2 [Leipzig, 1932]) corrected this error. It may be worth noticing that the spelling of the Arabic word, when written without diacritical points, allows also the reading *Hierocles*. However, taking into consideration that nothing is known about a *Timaeus* commentary by Hierocles of Alexandria and that the other Arabic testimonia point unmistakably to Proclus, there can be little doubt that all Ḥunaynian documents discussed here refer to a work by Proclus.

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Hippocrates' words quoted by [Galen] by means of Galen's commentary on them. Ḥubaysh translated [all] this into Arabic for Aḥmad ibn Mūsā.[18]

This note clarifies question (i): Ḥunayn translated Galen's Περὶ ἐθῶν into Syriac. As regards question (iii), Text 6 seems to indicate that it was Ḥunayn's nephew Ḥubaysh ibn al-Ḥasan al-Dimashqī rather than Ḥunayn himself who prepared the Arabic translation of the two commentaries. However, it still leaves open the possibility that the Arabic translation was produced on the basis of Greek texts, because Ḥunayn simply refers to the fact that these excerpts "follow" *(yatlū)* the Galenic text without mentioning any translation. Fortunately, MS Aya Sofya 3725 contains another note which helps clarifying this question definitely. In a short preamble prefixed to Ḥunayn's letter to Salmawayh and possibly originated by Ḥubaysh himself, we read the following:

[Text 7, MS Aya Sofya 3725, fol. 193b3–7]

رسالة حنين بن اسحق إلى سلمويه بن بنان فيما أسأله من ترجمة مقالة جالينوس في العادات من اللسان اليوناني إلى اللسان السرياني كتبها إليه سريانيةً وترجمها مع مقالة جالينوس وما يتلوها من التفسير من اللسان السرياني إلى اللسان العربي حبيش بن الحسن لأبي الحسن أحمد بن موسى.

Letter by Ḥunayn ibn Isḥāq to Salmawayh ibn Bunān on the translation of Galen's treatise *On Habits* from the Greek language into the Syriac language entrusted by [Salmawayh] to [Ḥunayn]. [Ḥunayn] sent it to [Salmawayh] in Syriac, and Ḥubaysh ibn al-Ḥasan translated this [letter] together with Galen's treatise and with the commentary following it from the Syriac language into the Arabic language for Abū al-Ḥasan Aḥmad ibn Mūsā.

Hence, there can be little doubt that [1] Ḥunayn ibn Isḥāq translated Galen's Περὶ ἐθῶν from Greek into Syriac; [2] it was due to Ḥunayn's activities that – *within* the Syro-Arabic reception – excerpts of Galen's commentary on the Hippocratic Περὶ διαίτης ὀξέων and of Proclus' commentary on Plato's *Timaeus* were appended to and transmitted in the company of Galen's Περὶ ἐθῶν; [3] Ḥunayn himself put

[18] Bergsträsser translates the last sentence of Text 6 as follows: "Ḥubaiš hat sie [*i.e.* al-maqāla, *R.A.*] ins Arabische übersetzt für Aḥmad ibn Mūsā." However, the suffix *-hu* in *tarjamahu* cannot refer to *al-maqāla*, *i.e.* Galen's Περὶ ἐθῶν, but must refer either to *tafsīr mā atā bihi min qawl Buqrāṭ*, *i.e.* the excerpts of Galen's commentary on Hippocrates' Περὶ διαίτης ὀξέων, or to all three texts mentioned in this paragraph in general. From Text 7 it is clear that it is the latter what is meant here by Ḥunayn.

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all this together in Syriac for Salmawayh ibn Bunān; and [4] Ḥubaysh – possibly in cooperation with or under the supervision of Ḥunayn – translated the entire convolute, comprising Ḥunayn's letter to Salmawayh, the Graeco-Syriac texts (presumably including the explanations mentioned in Text 5[c] and omitted in the present manuscript), and the editorial remarks inserted by Ḥunayn between these texts, from Syriac into Arabic for Abū al-Ḥasan Aḥmad ibn Mūsā.[19]

The second question, that is whether Ḥunayn himself prepared the Syriac translation of the fragment of Proclus' commentary or he extracted it from an already existing (possibly even complete) translation of Proclus' commentary, can be answered only indirectly. First, we know that Ḥunayn translated Galen's commentary on Hippocrates' Περὶ διαίτης ὀξέων.[20] Thus, the fact that he refers to "having appended" – as he puts it – extracts of this work without mentioning his translation into Syriac does not necessarily point to an earlier version by another translator which was later on extracted by Ḥunayn. Secondly, and more important, we have the textual evidence of MS Aya Sofya 3725. This manuscript contains both the Hippocratic quotations as well as the Platonic quotations *twice*, first as part of Galen's Περὶ ἐθῶν and once again as *lemmata* of the following commentaries, the Hippocratic quotations in Galen's commentary on Περὶ διαίτης ὀξέων, and the Platonic quotations as *lemmata* in Proclus' commentary. Now, if the Syriac versions of the excerpts of Galen's and Proclus' commentaries had been prepared by a translator other than the one who had translated Galen's Περὶ ἐθῶν into Syriac, this must have been reflected by terminological, technical and stylistic differences between the correlating sections in Galen's Περὶ ἐθῶν on the one hand and the two commentaries on the other hand. And since, as we have seen above, all three texts were translated by the same translator, Ḥubaysh, from Syriac into Arabic, at least some traces of these differences in the Syriac versions should still be noticeable and distinguishable within their Arabic translation. Yet this is not the case. On the contrary, the correlating sections, both the Hippocratic as well as the Platonic quotations, correspond to each other word by word in each version, notwithstanding minor variations due to the manuscript transmission.[21] Hence, there can be no doubt that Ḥunayn translated into Syriac not only Galen's Περὶ ἐθῶν and

[19] The younger brother of Muḥammad ibn Mūsā, the famous sponsor and patron of science and scientific translations. On Aḥmad cf. Roshdi Rashed, *Apollonius de Perge, Coniques,* Tome 1.1: *Livre I*, texte établi, traduit et commenté par R. R., Scientia Graeco-Arabica 1 (Berlin, 2008), pp. 25f., 42–5, 500–6; *id.*, *Les mathématiques infinitésimales du IX^e au XI^e siècle.* Vol. 1: *Fondateurs et commentateurs* (London, 1996), pp. 1–7.

[20] Cf. Bergsträsser, *Ḥunain ibn Isḥāq über die syrischen und arabischen Galen-Übersetzungen,* p. 41 (Ar. text), p. 33 (German trans.).

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his commentary on Hippocrates' Περὶ διαίτης ὀξέων, but also the section of Proclus' commentary on the *Timaeus*, the Arabic version of which is preserved in the present manuscript. Furthermore, the interpolated metatextual notes we encounter in our manuscript (Texts 1–4, above) in all probability go back to corresponding Syriac notes by Ḥunayn himself, which is why we find almost literal parallels of these notes in Ḥunayn's letter to Salmawayh (compare Texts 2 and 3 with Text 5, lines 2–3).

Unfortunately, Ḥunayn does not give any details as to what his source looked like (whether or not he had access to the complete commentary on the *Timaeus*) and whether the section he selected for his appendix to Galen's Περὶ ἐθῶν is all that he translated of this commentary. Syriac sources do not mention Proclus' *Timaeus* commentary. As already suggested by G. Endress,[22] Ḥunayn may have found this fragment (and only this fragment) in the Greek manuscript he used for his Syriac translation of Galen's work. Be that as it may, we can be quite sure that apart from the fragment preserved in MS Aya Sofya 3725, no complete or substantial Arabic version of Proclus' commentary on the *Timaeus* circulated among medieval Arabic writing philosophers. Medieval Arabic bibliographies, which mention commentaries or exegetical works on the *Timaeus* by Galen and Plutarch of Chaeronea,[23] are likewise altogether silent about Proclus' commentary, with the exception of Ibn Abī Uṣaybiʿa (d. 668/1270) who merely repeats in his *ʿUyūn al-anbāʾ fī ṭabaqāt al-aṭibbāʾ* almost literally the bibliographical information supplied by Ḥunayn in his *Letter on the Translations of Galen's Works* (Text 6).[24] And the only textual testimony hitherto known, preserved in Abū al-Rayḥān al-Bīrūnī's *Taḥqīq mā li-al-Hind*, stems precisely from the section translated by Ḥunayn and Ḥubaysh. Al-Bīrūnī summarizes there some lines of Proclus' comment on *Tim*. 90a7–b1. Although al-Bīrūnī does not mention his source and the reference is of quite paraphrastic nature, partly even misrepresenting Proclus' thoughts, the terminological correspondences leave little room for doubt about the fact that he used Ḥubaysh's translation of the section selected by Ḥunayn, as becomes clear from the following collation:

[21] Obviously, Klein-Franke did not take into consideration for his edition of Galen's Περὶ ἐθῶν the *lemmata* of Galen's commentary through which a number of scribal errors within the transmission of Περὶ ἐθῶν might be corrected (as well as *vice versa*).

[22] Cf. note 5.

[23] Cf. my "Plato's *Timaeus* in the Arabic tradition. Legends – testimonies – fragments", in Francesco Celia & Angela Ulacco (eds.), *Il Timeo. Esegesi greche, arabe, latine*. Greco, Arabo, Latino. Le vie del sapere. Studi 2 (Pisa, 2012), pp. 181–267.

[24] Ibn Abī Uṣaybiʿa, Abū al-ʿAbbās Aḥmad, *ʿUyūn al-anbāʾ fī ṭabaqāt al-aṭibbāʾ*, ed. August Müller (Königsberg, 1884; repr. Westmead, 1972), part 1, p. 95.

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al-Bīrūnī, *Taḥqīq mā li-al-Hind*, p. 42.11–16

وقال ابروقلس الجرم الذي حلّته النفس الناطقة قبل الشكلَ الكرّيَّ كالأثير وأشخاصه والذي حلّته <النفس الناطقة> وغير الناطقة قبل الاستقامةَ كالإنسان والذي حلّته غير الناطقة فقط قبل الاستقامةَ بانحناء كالحيوانات غير الناطقة والذي خلا عنهما و لم يوجد فيه غير القوّة الغاذية قبل الاستقامةَ وتمّ انحناؤه بالانتكاس وانغرس رأسه في الأرض كالحال في النبات وإذ صار على خلاف الإنسان فالإنسان شجرة سماوية أصلها نحو مبدئها وهو السماء كما صار أصل النبات نحو مبدئها وهو الأرض

Trans. Ḥubaysh, MS Aya Sofya 3725, fols. 215b13–15, 216a3–16

وذاك أنّه كما أنّ النبات الأرضي أصله ممّا يلي الأرض كذلك نحن إذا كنّا نباتاً سماوياً صار أصل أبداننا ورأسها ومبدأها ممّا يلي السماء [. . .] حيث ما كانت النفس الناطقة وحدَها فالجسم الذي هي فيه يكون كرياً مثال ذلك ما نجده في الأجسام السماوية وحيث ما كانت النفس الناطقة والنفس التي ليست بناطقة معاً فالكرية والاستقامة موجودتان جميعاً في ذلك الجسم مثال ذلك ما نجده في أبدان الناس وحيث ما كانت النفس التي ليست بناطقة وهي النفس البهيمية وحدَها فالكرية وحدَها غير موجودة في ذلك الجسم وأمّا الاستقامة فلا مثال ذلك ما نجده في أبدان الحيوانات التي لا نطق لها فإنّ هذه الحيوانات أبدانها منكبّة منحنية إلى ناحية الأرض وحيث لا يكون ولا واحدة من هاتين النفسين وتكون النفس الغاذية وحدَها فالكرية لا توجد في ذلك الجسم والاستقامة توجد فيه إلّا أنّها تكون منكوسة ويكون رأسه مركوزاً في الأرض مثال ذلك ما نجده في النبات وإذ كان الأمر على هذا فاختلاف أشكال الأجسام إنّما جُعل بحسب الأنفس التي تفعل في الأجسام

Continued

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Continued

Trans. Ḥubaysh, MS Aya Sofya 3725, fols. 215b13–15, 216a3–16	**al-Bīrūnī, *Taḥqīq mā li-al-Hind*, p. 42.11–16**
For just as the root of an earthy plant belongs to what is immediately attached to the earth, so will the root and the head and the beginning of our body, provided we are heavenly plants, belong to what is immediately attached to the heavens. [. . .] Whenever the rational soul is on its own, the body, in which it is, is spherical, which, for example, is the case with the heavenly bodies. And whenever the rational soul and the irrational [animal] soul are together, sphericity and upright position exist together in this body, as we find, for example, in the body of man. And whenever the irrational soul, that is the animal soul, is on its own, there is no pure sphericity in this body, yet there is no upright position [either]. We can see this, for example, in the body of irrational animals, for the bodies of such animals are thrown down [or] bending down towards the earth. [Finally,] whenever neither of these two souls exists [in a body] and the nutritive soul is on its own, there is no sphericity in that body, yet there is upright position in it, except that this is turned upside down and with the [body's] head stuck into the ground, as is the case with plants. This being the case, it is [clear that] the diversity of shapes of bodies is established solely in accordance with the souls which are at work in these bodies.	Proclus says: The body which is occupied by the rational soul adopts a spherical shape, e.g. the ether and its [celestial] individuals. The [body] which is occupied by <the rational> and the irrational soul adopts the upright position, e.g. man. The [body] which is occupied by the irrational soul only adopts the upright position [together] with a [certain] bending, e.g. the irrational animals. And the [body] which has neither of the two and in which there is only the nutritive power adopts the upright position, yet its bending becomes so strong that it is turned upside down and with the [body's] head stuck into the ground, as is the case with plants. And if it is to be distinguished from man, then [in this way:] man is a heavenly tree, the root of which is like its principle, namely the heavens, just as the root of plants is like their principle, namely earth.

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Taking into consideration that no other part of Proclus' commentary left any trace in the medieval Arabic philosophical and bibliographical literature, while Arabic writing scholars displayed a remarkable interest in Plato's *Timaeus*, we may assume that the section translated by Ḥunayn and later on by Ḥubaysh was the only fragment of this commentary accessible in Syriac and Arabic.

III. STRUCTURE AND COMPLETENESS

Judging from the elaborated comprehensiveness of Proclus' Platonic commentaries in general and the parts of his commentary on the *Timaeus* extant in Greek one may be surprised by the relative conciseness of the sections translated by Ḥunayn/Ḥubaysh. After all, the passage *Tim*. 90a–d is one of the few *loci classici* of one of the central doctrines of Platonism, the ὁμοίωσις θεῷ.[25] However, excepting the first section, the mere structure of the Arabic fragment as such does not point to any extensive lacunae, omissions or abridgements.

The Arabic text falls into five main sections: at the beginning we find a sort of "Preamble" which is followed by four quotations of the Platonic text, namely *Tim*. 89e3–90a2, 90a2–b1, 90b1–c4, and 90c4–7, each of which accompanied by Proclus' commentary. What I called "Preamble" mirrors in all likelihood a certain portion of the first part of a τμῆμα or βιβλίον of Proclus' commentary. It starts, after the formula "qāla Burūqlus" ("Proclus says"), with a summary of *Tim*. 87c1–89e2 and proceeds with an introduction to the section beginning *Tim*. 89e3 in which, according to Proclus, Plato turns from the *general* discourse *(ʿāmmiyyatan)* on remedies for all kinds of living being and for the body to the more *specific* discourse *(khāṣṣatan)* on remedies of the soul. This discourse is further subdivided, in this "Preamble", into Plato's remarks on all three types of the soul and a section devoted solely to the rational soul. Hence, there can be little doubt that the "Preamble" is not the beginning or any other part of a πρᾶξις of Proclus' commentary. Its *skopos* goes beyond any particular *lemma* of the following commentary sections, certainly beyond *Tim*. 89e3–90a2, the first *lemma* of what follows; and it displays the literary features of the genre of prefaces or introductions to the main subdivisions or τμήματα of the text to be

[25] For an overview in Plato cf. David Sedley, "The ideal of Godlikeness," in Gail Fine (ed.), *Plato 2. Ethics, Politics, Religion, and the Soul* (Oxford, 1999), pp. 309–28; for Proclus cf. Robbert Van Den Berg, "'Becoming like God' according to Proclus' interpretations of the *Timaeus*, the *Eleusinian Mysteries*, and the *Chaldaean Oracles*," in Thomas Leinkauf & Carlos Steel (eds.), *Plato's Timaeus and the Foundation of Cosmology in Late Antiquity, the Middle Ages and Renaissance*, Ancient and Medieval Philosophy De Wulf-Mansion Centre, Series 1, vol. 34 (Leuven, 2005), pp. 189–202.

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commented upon. Furthermore, it is not subdivided into *lemma, theoria* and *lexis*, as is the case with almost all πράξεις of Proclus' commentary.[26]

Whether the preceding section or book of the commentary dealt exclusively with *Tim*. 87c1–89e2, the section summarized at the beginning of the "Preamble", or included also previous sections of Plato's work, is not quite clear. A remark at the end of the "Preamble", which mentions that Plato dealt in the previous discourse with the body as opposed to the following section devoted to the soul, rather points to the latter. Note that for Proclus the distinction between *general* and *specific* elements of creation is closely related to the opposition between the realm of matter and necessity and the realm of soul and intellect. Possibly it is exactly this transition from the treatment of the body and its health to the medicine of the soul, *i.e.* from *Tim*. 87c–89d to *Tim*. 89e–90d, that Proclus is referring to in his Prologue to the commentary, where he says:

> In addition to what we have mentioned, the final stages of creation have also been elaborated, both their general kinds and specific details, those that arise in the skies or on earth or within living creatures – those that are contrary to nature and those that conform with it. Just here the basic principles of medicine are also revealed, this being the point where the natural philosopher leaves off (λήγει), since he is a student of nature – for what accords with nature goes together with nature, while what is contrary to nature involves passing beyond it. Accordingly, it is the physicist's job to establish in how many ways this deviation occurs, and how one may be restored to balance and to the natural state, but it is for the medical craft (τῆς ἰατρικῆς τέχνης) to unravel what follows from all this.[27]

Likewise, it is not evident, whether the present "Preamble" is supposed to introduce the reader only to *Tim*. 89e3–90d7 or to the entire remaining part of the dialogue. As we have seen above, it is due, not to the literary structure of Proclus' commentary, but to Galen's quotations of the Platonic text that the Arabic fragment breaks off after the comments on *Tim*. 90c7.

While the above observations indeed corroborate the assumption that the Arabic "Preamble" reflects Proclus' preface to a new τμῆμα

[26] On the structure of Proclus' commentaries cf. André-Jean Festugière, "Modes de composition des commentaires de Proclus", *Museum Helveticum,* 20 (1963): 77–100; Erich Lamberz, "Proklos und die Form des philosophischen Kommentars," in Jean Pépin & Henri-Dominique Saffrey (eds.), *Proclus, lecteur et interprète des anciens*, Actes du colloque international du CNRS Paris (2–4 octobre 1985) (Paris, 1985), pp. 1–20.

[27] *Procli Diadochi in Platonis Timaeum commentaria*, ed. Ernst Diehl, Bibliotheca Scriptorum Graecorum et Romanorum Teubneriana, 3 vols. (Leipzig, 1903–1906), vol. 1, p. 6.7–16 (henceforth: *In Plat. Tim.*); trans. Harold Tarrant, *Proclus: Commentary on Plato's Timaeus*. Vol. 1: *Book 1: Proclus on the Socratic State and Atlantis* (Cambridge, 2007), p. 98–9.

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or βιβλίον starting at this point of the Platonic text, there is good reason to doubt its completeness. The extant Greek portion of the commentary is divided into five books.[28] Four of these books comprise prefaces in their own right, which display a number of characteristic features. Among other things, they introduce the reader to the new topic of the following section, explain how this topic is embedded in the overall plan of the Platonic work and how it is internally structured, summarize what has been achieved so far, discuss literary and stylistic features of the Platonic text, and reflect in a rather independent – Proclian – way on central issues of the following section. However, the last two aspects are entirely absent from the Arabic "Preamble". Furthermore, even leaving out of consideration Proclus' preface to Book I of his commentary, which serves simultaneously as a prologue of the whole work as such, the discrepancy between the comprehensiveness and richness of contents of the three Greek prefaces to Books II, III and V on the one hand and the Arabic "Preamble" on the other hand is significant. The latter covers no more than 11 lines, whereas Proclus' preface to Book II extends over more than nine pages (ed. Diehl, vol. 1, pp. 205–14), that to Book III over three pages (ed. Diehl, vol. 2, pp. 1–3), and the preface to Book V again over 10 pages (ed. Diehl, vol. 3, pp. 162–71). Probably, Ḥunayn either summarized Proclus' preface or his source contained only the last paragraph of the preface, *i.e.* the section immediately preceding the first Platonic *lemma*. I tend to favour this latter assumption, because it is supported by the fact that the last section of Proclus' preface to Book III (ed. Diehl, vol. 2, p. 3.9–28) displays striking parallels in style and structure to the present Arabic section. In other words, the Arabic "Preamble" may be a literal translation of the closing paragraph of Proclus' preface to the last book of his *Timaeus* commentary.[29]

The four sections following this "Preamble" comply more or less with the structure of the πράξεις of Neoplatonic commentaries. All

[28] On the structure of this commentary see the general introduction by Dirk Baltzly and Harold Tarrant in Tarrant, *Proclus: Commentary on Plato's Timaeus,* I, p. 13ff.

[29] The fact that Plato's work is referred to, at the beginning of this "Preamble", as "his book entitled Timaeus" *(kitābuhu al-musammā Ṭīmāwus)*, which are certainly not Proclus' own words, does not disprove this assumption. This and similar types of periphrastic translation of simple references to the title of a book in the Greek original can be found in various paraphrastic and literal Arabic translations from the Greek (cf. Alexander of Aphrodisias, Qu. III 3, *Kitābuhu alladhī yudʿā Kitāb al-Nafs*, p. 168, ed. Ruland, for Περὶ Ψυχῆς, p. 82, ed. Bruns; *id.*, *Kitābuhu al-musammā al-Samāʿ al-Ṭabīʿī*, Maqāla fī al-Mādda wa-al-ʿadam wa-al-kawn, p. 44, ed. Badawī; *id.*, *al-Kitāb al-musammā Bārī<a>rminiyās*, Maqāla fī Inʿiqās al-muqaddimāti, p. 63, ed. Badawī; Philoponus, In De an. III, *Kitābuhu alladhī yudʿā Baʿda al-Ṭabīʿa,* p. 335, ed. Arnzen, for *in Metaphisicis* [= ἐν τοῖς Μετὰ τὰ φυσικά vel sim.], p. 111.49, ed. Verbeke; Ps.-Plutarch [Aetius], Placita philosophorum, *Kitābuhu al-mawsūmu bi-al-awwali min al-Ṭabīʿiyyāti*, p. 23, ed. Daiber, for τὸ πρῶτον Φυσικῶν, p. 326, ed. Diels, etc.).

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sections start with a *lemma* of the Platonic text. As already noted by Lamberz,[30] the *lemmata* of Proclus' *Timaeus* commentary are, unlike those of Proclus' commentaries on *Alcibiades I* and *Parmenides*, not abbreviated by ἕως τοῦ or μέχρι τοῦ and, more important, represent a reading of the Platonic text earlier than and independent from its Medieval and Renaissance transmission. The Arabic transmission, dating back to the early 9th century, is thus also of interest for the constitution of the Platonic text. This involves the problem of textual discrepancies between the *lemma* at the beginning of the πρᾶξις and the quotations within the commentary proper (usually also called *lemmata*) which is well-known from the Greek tradition, but occurs in the Arabic fragment, too.[31] *E.g.*, the third *lemma* reads for τῷ μὲν οὖν περὶ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας ἢ περὶ φιλονικίας τετευτακότι καὶ ταῦτα διαπονοῦντι σφόδρα πάντα τὰ δόγματα ἀνάγκη θνητὰ ἐγγεγονέναι (*Tim*. 90b1–3) *fa-man kānat himmatuhu fī al-shahawāti wa-ḥubbi al-ghalabati wa-kāna yataʿabbadu lahumā taʿabbudan shadīdan fa-lā budda ḍarūratan an yakūna ārāʾuhu kulluhā ārāʾan māʾitatan.* The last part of this sentence is quoted again within the commentary. However, in this quotation the word *kulluhā*, which renders πάντα, is omitted. The reading πάντα becomes even more questionable, once we take into consideration that the word *kulluhā,* in our manuscript, seems to be added interlinearly in the *lemma* and is entirely omitted in the correlating quotation of the Platonic sentence in the Arabic version of Galen's Περὶ ἐθῶν (p. 148.23 ed. Klein-Franke). In the same πρᾶξις, the lines *Tim*. 90b6–7, τῷ δὲ περὶ φιλομαθίαν καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀληθεῖς φρονήσεις ἐσπουδακότι, are rendered through *fa-ammā man kānat himmatuhu fī ḥubbi al-taʿallumi wa-fī fahmi al-ḥaqqi*. Yet, the corresponding *lemma* within the commentary reads *wa-ammā alladhī yuʿnā bi-ḥubbi al-taʿallumi wa-bi-fahmi al-ḥaqqi wa-bi-taʿabbudin lahumā,* which apparently indicates that Proclus replaced – in his comment – ἐσπουδακότι by another word similar in meaning (taking for granted that Ḥunayn and Ḥubaysh were consistent in their use of Syriac and Arabic terminology) and, secondly, added after this word a phrase similar to Plato's καὶ ταῦτα διαπονοῦντι (*Tim*. 90b2).[32]

The individual lessons of Proclus' commentaries proper are often subdivided into (A) a section explaining in a general way the philosophical contents of the Platonic *lemma* (the so-called θεωρία) and (B) a section examining particular words or phrases of the text under discussion (the

[30] Lamberz, "Proklos und die Form des philosophischen Kommentars", p. 7f.
[31] For the scholarly literature on this problem cf. *ibid*., pp. 8–16 and the literature mentioned there.
[32] Cf. also below, note 137.

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so-called λέξις).[33] This structure is also visible in the Arabic text. The first πρᾶξις of our fragment (on *Tim*. 89e3–90a2) falls into (A) a philosophical discourse on the three types of soul and the role of proportionality and stability in their different motions and (B) a section on "the meaning of the terms [employed] in the discourse" (*maʿānī alfāẓ al-kalām*), in which Proclus explains the phrases τρία τριχῇ ψυχῆς ἐν ἡμῖν εἴδη and ἕκαστον κινήσεις ἔχον. Similarly, the third πρᾶξις provides first (A) a general interpretation of *Tim*. 90b1–c4, before it (B) investigates the phrases τῷ δὲ περὶ φιλομαθίαν καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀληθεῖς φρονήσεις ἐσπουδακότι and καθ' ὅσον δ' αὖ μετασχεῖν ἀνθρωπίνῃ φύσει ἀθανασίας ἐνδέχεται in detail. Again, the fourth πρᾶξις on *Tim*. 90c4–7 is splitted into (A) a short general remark and (B) καθ' ἕκαστα discourses on the phrases τὰς οἰκείας ἑκάστῳ τροφάς and τὰς οἰκείας … κινήσεις as well as on the words εὐδαίμονα and θεραπεία.

However, as noted by Baltzly and Tarrant,[34] Proclus does not comply rigidly with this structure. Sometimes, Proclus skips, so to speak, the λέξις, in other cases he appends to his comments proper an excursion rather independent from the Platonic text. Furthermore, Proclus now and then inverts the order of θεωρία and λέξις.[35] Similar phenomena occur in the second lesson of the Arabic version (on *Tim*. 90a2–b1). This πρᾶξις starts with (A) the θεωρία on *Tim*. 90a2–3, which is followed by (B) a terminological analysis of δαίμων (90a3) and its use in other Platonic works. After this terminological section, Proclus resumes the general interpretation (A) by discussing the remaining parts of the *lemma*, to which he finally adds (C) an excursion on "an admirable issue" (*maʿnan ʿajībun*) present in this *lemma*, namely the reason for the upright posture of the human body.

To sum up, the four lessons preserved in the Arabic fragment display all characteristic structural and textual features known from Proclus' commentaries and especially from his commentary on the *Timaeus*. Furthermore, the *lemmata* quoting the Platonic text are in themselves complete, without caesura or omissions between the sections quoted, and in correct succession. Finally, the Arabic version of Proclus' comments proper does not show any inconsistency or rupture in the chain of argumentation.

On the other hand, the reader of the Arabic fragment is struck by the conspicuous absence of certain elements of Proclus' philosophy in general and of his commentary on the *Timaeus* in particular. As mentioned above, one would expect in the present context a much broader

[33] On these parts of the lesson or πρᾶξις cf. Festugière, "Modes de composition"; Lamberz, "Proklos und die Form des philosophischen Kommentars", p. 16f.
[34] Cf. Tarrant, *Proclus: Commentary on Plato's Timaeus*, I, p. 15f.
[35] For examples in Proclus' *Timaeus* commentary cf. Festugière, "Modes de composition", pp. 89–91.

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discussion of Proclus' conception of ὁμοίωσις θεῷ, taking into consideration the relevance of this topic in Neoplatonic philosophy and the elaborated comprehensiveness of the commentary parts extant in Greek. Secondly,[36] one misses entirely the pagan theologian Proclus, the discussion of esoteric concepts (such as the theory of *pneuma-ochêma*), as well as Proclus' usually very detailed consideration of the ancient tradition. One may try to explain all this by the fact that Proclus, at the present place of his commentary, has almost reached the end of the Platonic text and refrained from repeating what he had already explained in detail in the preceding parts. However, this assumption is not supported by the Proclian commentaries which are extant in full, which is why I rather tend to the conclusion that we are faced with a revised abridged version of the original Proclian text. If that is indeed the case, this revision probably goes back, not to Ḥunayn, but rather to a Greek scholar of Late Antiquity, and it may have come down to Ḥunayn in the form of scholia in the margins of Galen's Περὶ ἐθῶν.

IV. TEXT AND TRANSLATION

The following edition of the Arabic text is based on the Istanbul manuscript Aya Sofya 3725, fols. 213a17–218a19.[37] Descriptions of this manuscript are found in the works by Ritter & Walzer, Biesterfeldt, and Klein-Franke[38] and need not be reiterated here. The constitution of the Platonic *lemmata* at the beginning of each "lesson" is additionally based on the relevant sections of the Arabic version of Galen's Περὶ ἐθῶν preserved in this very manuscript.[39] Orthographical inconsistencies in the use of *Hamza* and *Alif maqṣūra* as well as in the spelling of the names Aflāṭun (Plato, in the manuscript افلاطون, افلاطن, or فلاطن) and Burūqlus (Proclus, برقلس, بروقلس, or ابروقلس) have been standardised tacitly. Any other changes to the manuscript reading as well as the few cases of illegibility or uncertainty are noted below the text.

The attached English translation is, hopefully, of benefit to the historian of philosophy. The notes discussing the relation between the Arabic version of the Platonic quotations, which represent the version quoted by Proclus as transmitted in an 8th or 9th century manuscript, and their Greek parallels may also be of some value for philologists interested in the Greek transmission of Plato in Late Antiquity.

[36] As brought to my attention by Carlos Steel (personal communication, April 11, 2012).
[37] I am grateful to the staff of the library for providing a digital copy of this section of the manuscript as well as to Professor Heidrun Eichner for her help in obtaining this copy.
[38] Cf. above, notes 6–8.
[39] Referred to, in the notes, through "Gal., *Fī al-ʿĀdāt*". I wish to thank Dr. Roland Wittwer and the staff of the *Corpus Medicorum Graecorum* (Berlin) for granting me access to this part of the manuscript by means of a print of the Berlin microfilm.

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Furthermore, a new translation seemed to be in order, because both Pfaff's and Vajda's translations omit the first section of the fragment (what I called "Preamble") and misread the Arabic manuscript at some places.[40] Pfaff's translation is also lacunose at other places (*e.g.* it omits the first sentence of the third Platonic *lemma, Tim.* 90b1–5) or fails to grasp the Arabic syntax.[41]

In the notes to the English translation I point here and there to other writings by Proclus and Plato or to the modern scholarly literature. However, a number of passages are not quite clear to me; and I leave it up to the experts of Proclus' philosophy to analyse in detail the text of this fragment philosophically. In the following translation, words, phrases, or paragraph numbers added in order to render the text more fluent and unambiguous or to make the structure of the argument readily accessible are set between square brackets. The same applies to the translation of personal pronouns replaced by the relevant word or concept to which they refer and to translations of implied subjects and objects of finite verbs.

[40] *E.g.*, cf. Arabic text, ll. 91–92, where the text reads *wa-ammā al-istiqāmatu fa-lā - mithālu dhālika mā najidu . . .*, while Pfaff's translation (p. 58.10f.) seems to be based on the reading *wa-ammā al-istiqāmatu fa-lā mithlu dhālika mā najidu. . .*; ll. 143–144, *wa-dhālika anna jamīʿa al-tamāmāti al-ukhari innamā yaḥudduhā al-nāsu fa-ammā hādhā al-tāmmu fa-laysa al-nāsu yaḥuddūnahu bal Allāhu*, where Pfaff seems to have read forms of the verb *yaʾkhudhu* (or *yajidu*) instead of *yaḥuddu*, rendered through "erwerben" (p. 60.4–5), or l. 72, *al-juzʾ al-ʿaqlī,* translated by Pfaff through "die höchste Art" (p. 57.19), probably based on the reading *al-juzʾ al-aʿlā.* For Vajda, cf. below, l. 55, where Vajda realised that *fa-ammā*, as transmitted in the manuscript, makes no sense (*v.* p. 243, n. 2, of Vajda's translation), yet based his translation on the reading *fa-innā,* which does not really improve the text, instead of the correct emendation *bi-annā.* At l. 57, Vajda translated *ka-mā* ("comme", p. 243.11), although the manuscript has clearly *kay-mā* ("in order that"); at l. 80, Vajda omitted *wa-mabdaʾuhā.* At l. 98, Vajda seems to have read *fa-hiya al-khāliqu* ("elle est créatrice", p. 245.8). The manuscript is not quite clear (cf. below, n. 76), but the reading *fa-hiya* is definitely impossible (hence also the proposed translation), because the related noun, *al-shakl*, is masculine. Again, *al-nawʿ al-mudabbir al-māʾit min anwāʿ al-nufūs*, ll. 115–116, can hardly mean "celle des espèces de l'âme qui gouverne (la partie) mortelle" (Vajda, p. 246.4), which would require *al-nawʿ al-mudabbir li-al-māʾit*, etc.

[41] *E.g.*, *ammā bi-al-nafsi fa-li-annā bi-hādhā al-juzʾi naʿrifu al-ajrāma allatī fawqanā* (l. 75) does not mean "Was die Seele anbetrifft, deshalb, weil wir wissen, daß in diesem Teil die Körper sind, welche über uns sind" (Pfaff, p. 57.23), but rather "As for the soul, this is because it is through this part that we know the bodies superior to us"; *ḥaythu mā kānat al-nafsu al-nāṭiqatu waḥdahā* (l. 87) hardly means "da die denkende Seele die 'Eins' ist" (Pfaff, p. 58.4), but "whenever the rational soul is on its own"; *illā annahā takūnu mankūsatan* (l. 95) cannot refer to the masculine noun *al-jism* (body), as translated by Pfaff ("sondern er [der Körper] ist nur nach unten geneigt", p. 58.16), etc. (further mistakes have been noted by Vajda).

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Proclus on Plato's *Timaeus* 89e3–90c7
(Arabic text, MS Aya Sofya 3725, fols. 213a17–218a ult.)

قال بروقلس

إنّ افلاطن لمـّـا وصف في كتابه المسمّى طيماوس مداواة جملة الحيوان العامّية الكاملة أيّ مداواة هي ومداواة (fol. 213b) البدن أيّ مداواة هي أقبل على ذكر النفس خاصّة ليصف كيف ينبغي أن تداوى[42] وذلك أنّ كلّ واحد من البدن والنفس جزء جزء للحيوان لكن ليس على جهة واحدة بل النفس جزء للحيوان من طريق أنها رئيسة وسيّدة لجملة الحيوان والبدن جزء له من طريق أنّه عبد وخادم لفعلها وآلة لها لأنّ النفس هي التي تحرّك البدن وتدبّره وإذ كان الأمر منها على هذا فبالواجب صارت أحقّ بالعناية وأولى بالمداواة كيما إذا بقيت على حال سلامتها وفضيلتها كان تدبّرها للبدن بالوجه الأفضل.

ولأنّ كلامه الذي قطعه وفرغ منه كان في البدن لم يخرج بالكلام من ذكر البدن إلى ذكر النفس الناطقة بلا واسط بينهما لكنّه يصف أوّلا مداواة تعمّ النفسين البهيميتين والنفس الناطقة فيقول هذا القول :

قال افلاطن [89e3–90a2]

وكما قلنا مراراً شتّى إنّ فينا ثلثة أنواع نفوس في ثلثة مواضع وكلّ واحد منها له حركة كذلك ينبغي أن نقول هاهنا أيضاً بحسب ذلك القول إنّ النوع الذي يتعطّل ويُمسِك عن حركته من هذه الأنواع يجب ضرورةً أن يكون ضعيفاً جدّاً والنوع الذي يُراض منها يجب[43] أن يكون قويّاً جدّاً. وإذ[44] كان الأمر على هذا فقد ينبغي أن نحفظها[45] ليكون حركة بعضها إلى بعض معتدلة.

[42] تداوى *scripsi* : يداوا MS
[43] يجب ضرورةً] يجب Gal., *Fī al-ʿĀdāt, 148.15*
[44] وإذ] وإذا Gal., *Fī al-ʿĀdāt, 148.15*
[45] *sine punctatione* MS

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قال بروقلس

إنّ افلاطن يذكّرنا أوّلا بثلثة أجزاء النفس وأنّه ينبغي أن تكون حركاتها بعضها إلى بعض على (fol. 214a) اعتدال كيما لا يغلب أحد الثلثة فيُغمر الآخران فإنّه ليس ينبغي للنطق أن يبطل وينقص[45] فعل الغضب وفعل الشهوة لأنّه ينتفع بهما في معاونتهما له على العناية بمصالح البدن (إذ كان الملك لا ينبغي له أن يُهلك من في طاعته وفي ملكه) ولا ينبغي للغضب والشهوة أن يبطلا فعل النطق وذاك أنّ النطق إذا فتر عن فعله صار جميع تدبّر البدن يجري غَمَّآء[46] وعلى غير نظام.

وفعل هذه يُحفظ على هذه الصفة: أقول إنّه لمـّـا كان كلّ شيء لا يتحرّك ولا يعمل يكون ضعيفاً جدّاً وكلّ شيء يرتاض يكون قويّاً جدّاً صار من الواجب أن تكون حركات النفس معتدلة كيما يفعل كلّها فعلَها. واعتدال هذه الحركات هو أن يكون النطق المدبّر والأصل الذي منه مبدأ الحركة ويكون الغضب والشهوة خاضعين سامعين مطيعين للنطق ويكونان لا يحرّكان ويفعلان إلا بمقدار ما يوافق النطق ويُبلغ له ما يريد. فإنّه إذا كانت حركات هذه على هذا من الحال كان لجملة النفس قوام[47] وموافقة واعتدال ونظام.

وبعد أن قال هذا القول في ثلثة أجزاء النفس صار إلى الكلام في النفس الناطقة التي هي المقدّرة لهاذين الجزئين المائتين مقادير حركتهما والمدبّرة للبدن والمتمّمة لنفسها. وقبل أن نصير إلى الكلام فيها ينبغي لنا أن نشرح معاني ألفاظ الكلام الموضوع فنقول إنّ قوله ثلثة أجزاء النفس يريد به النطق وهو الاشتياق إلى الأمر الأفضل والشهوة وهو (fol. 214b) الشوق إلى إتمام ما ينجز[48] البدن والغضب وهو الشهوة لدفع ما يؤذي البدن وذاك أنّا نشتاق إلى الشيء ونشتهيه وتتوق أنفسُنا إليه إمّا لأنّه في نفسه جيّد وإمّا لأنّه جيّد لمكان شيء آخر. وشهوتنا للشيء الجيّد في نفسه تكون بالنطق وذاك أنّا

[46] غَمَّآء *scripsi* : عَما (*parum clare*) MS; *cf.* E. Lane *s.r.* غمّ.
[47] قوام] القيام *in textu* + قوام *supra lin.* MS
[48] ينجز *scripsi* : MS *vix legitur*, جز** *vid.*

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إنّما نشتهي معرفة الحقّ ومعرفة الأشياء الموجودة من طريق ما هي موجودة بالنطق وأمّا الشيء الذي إنّما هو جيّد لمكان شيء آخر فهو الشيء الذي يحفظ[49] علينا وفينا ما للطبع والصحّة. وهذا لا يخلو[50] من أن يكون إمّا اجتلاب أمر نافع أو أمر متمّم وإمّا دفع أمر ضارّ وأمر فيه خسران. واشتياقنا إلى الشيء النافع المتمّم يكون بالشهوة ودفعنا الشيء الضارّ المخسّر يكون بالغضب.

وإذ كان الأمر على هذا فقد يعلم ممّا قلنا أنّ أجزاء النفس ثلثة وذاك أنّها يقابل بعضها بعضاً والأشياء التي يقابل بعضها بعضاً ليست شيئاً واحداً[51] بعينه. ومع هذا فإنّ لكلّ واحد منها تمام غير تمام الآخر وإصلاح كلّ واحد منها إذا دخله الفساد غير إصلاح الآخر والنطق يفعل فعله في الدماغ والشهوة تفعل فعلها في الكبد والغضب يفعل فعله في القلب. والدليل على ذلك من الآفات العارضة في هذه الأعضاء ومن[52] مداواتها وذاك أنّه متى حدثت بالدماغ آفة أضرّ ذلك بالفكرة ومتى حدثت بالفكرة آفة داوينا الدماغَ وعلى هذا المثال يجري أمر ذيّنك (fol. 215a) الآخرين.

قال افلاطن [90a2–b1]

فأمّا نوع النفس الذي هو أشرفها <فينا>[53] فينبغي أن نعلم أنّه شيء من جنس الملائكة حبا[54] الله به كلّ واحد منّا فنحن نقول في هذا النوع إنّ مسكنه في رأس البدن وإنّه بحسب[55] مناسبته للسماء يرفعنا[56] عن الأرض على أنّ قولنا صواب بأنّا[57] نوع من[58] النبات لا نبات أرضي بل نبات سماوي وذلك أنّ النوع الإلهي إنّما هو من[59]

[49] يحفظ *scripsi* : نحفظ MS *ut vid.*
[50] يخلوا MS
[51] شيئاً واحداً *scripsi* : شي واحد MS
[52] الاعضا من : الأعضاء ومن *scripsi*
[53] *supplevi, cf. infra, l. 63, et* παρ' ἡμῖν *Tim.* 90a2
[54] حبا *clare* MS (= δέδωκεν, *Tim.* 90a4) : خصّ Gal., *Fī al-ʿĀdāt, 148.18*
[55] بحسب] يحسب Gal., *Fī al-ʿĀdāt, 148.19*
[56] ترفعنا] يرفعنا Gal., *Fī al-ʿĀdāt, 148.19*
[57] بأنّا *scripsi* : فاما MS : أنّا Gal., *Fī al-ʿĀdāt, 148.19*
[58] نوع من] *inv.* Gal., *Fī al-ʿĀdāt, 148.19*
[59] من *scripsi* (*cf.* ἐκεῖθεν, *Tim.* 90a7) : في MS, Gal., *Fī al-ʿĀdāt, 148.20*

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الموضع الذي فيه أوّل كون النفس كيما إذا هو مدّ[60] رأسَنا وأصلَنا ورفعه قوامُ[61] البدن كلّه على الاستقامة.

قال بروقلس

60 إنّ افلاطن بعد أن فرغ من ذكر المداواة العامّية التي تشمل[62] ثلثة أجزاء النفس أحبّ أن يذكر مداواة الجزء الناطق وقبل أن يتكلّم في هذا الجزء يأخذ في مدحه ووصف محاسنه فيسمّيه[62] أوّلا الأشرف وذلك لأنّه كما أنّ أشرف ما في هذا العالم كلّه العقل كذلك الجزء العقلي فينا أشرف ما فينا ثم[63] إنّه بعد ذلك يقول[62] إنّ منزلة هذا الجزء من جملة الحيوان كمنزلة الملك والسفير بين الله تعالى وبين الخلق.

65 يعني بالملك والسفير بين الله والخلق المدبّر الأقرب وذاك أنّ هذا الاسم الذي يسمّى به افلاطن هذا الجزء الذي من جنس الملائكة يتصرّف[62] عنده على ثلثة وجوه وذاك أنّه مرّة يريد به السفير بين الله وبين الناس كائن ما كان ومرّة يقسّم ما هو بين الله والناس إلى ثلثة أقسام كما يفعل في كتب النواميس أحدها الشيء الذي من جنس الملائكة والآخر الشيء (fol. 215b) الذي يسمّى كثرة ايروايس[62] والثالث الملائكة ومرّة يصرّفه
70 على نحو آخر كما فعل في كتابه المسمّى بوليطيقوس[62] فيعني بقوله شيء من جنس الملائكة العقل أي المدبّر القريب لهذا الكلّ فعلى هذا المذهب أيضاً يعني بقوله هذا شيء من جنس الملائكة الجزء العقلي لأنّ هذا الجزء هو المدبّر القريب.

ثمّ إنّه بعد هذين البابين أخذ في باب ثالث فقال إنّ بسبب هذا النوع من أنواع النفس صرنا نقدر[64] أن[65] ننتصب[66] على استقامة ونجعل ميلنا كلّه إلى فوق بالنفس
75 والبدن معاً أمّا بالنفس فلأنّا بهذا الجزء نعرف الأجرام التي فوقنا وهي الأجرام الأزلية الإلهية وبمعرفتنا بهذه الأجرام نعرف الله تبارك وتعلى وأمّا بالبدن فلأنّ هذا الجزء هو

[60] مدّ *scripsi* : مر *vel* مد MS : صد Gal., *Fī al-ʿĀdāt, 148.21*
[61] قوام *clare* MS : فوق Gal., *Fī al-ʿĀdāt, 148.21*
[62] *sine punctatione*
[63] *sine punctatione et parum clare*
[64] *an* نقرر *?*, MS *sine punctatione*
[65] أن *in marg.* (*cum* ¬ *post* نقدر)
[66] *sine punctatione*

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السبب في انتصاب أبداننا على الشكل المستقيم وذاك أنّ هذا الجزء لمـّـا كان ليس من الأرض ولا شيء أرضي بل من السماء وشيء سماوي صار يجعل أصل البدن فوق وبسبب أنّ أصله فوق صار منتصباً على استقامة وذاك أنّه كما أنّ النبات الأرضي أصله ممّا يلي الأرض كذلك نحن إذا كنّا نباتاً سماوياً صار أصل أبداننا ورأسها ومبدأها ممّا يلي السماء فإنّ افلاطن يسمّينا نباتاً وذلك أنّ تدبير أبداننا كتدبير أجسام النبات لأنّا لسنا[67] بشيء واحد مفرد بل ثلثة أشياء من ثلث جهات مختلفة أحدها الجهة التي نحن فيها نُظراء النبات والثانية الجهة التي نحن فيها نُظراء الحيوانات والثالثة الجهة التي نحن فيها أناس فنحن نبات بالنفس الشهوانية (fol. 216a) وحيوانات[68] بالنفس الغضبية وأناس بالنفس الناطقة.

وقد دخل في هذا الكلام معنى عجيب وهو السبب في أنّ خلقة أبداننا مهيّئة[69] على انتصاب واستقامة وذاك أنّه حيث ما كانت النفس الناطقة وحدَها فالجسم الذي هي فيه يكون كرياً مثال ذلك ما نجده في الأجسام السماوية وحيث ما كانت النفس الناطقة والنفس[70] التي ليست[71] بناطقة معاً فالكرية والاستقامة موجودتان[72] جميعاً في ذلك الجسم مثال ذلك ما نجده في أبدان الناس وحيث ما كانت النفس التي ليست بناطقة وهي النفس البهيمية وحدَها فالكرية وحدَها غير موجودة في ذلك الجسم وأمّا الاستقامة فلا مثال ذلك ما نجده في أبدان الحيوانات التي لا نطق لها فإنّ هذه الحيوانات أبدانها منكبّة[73] منحنية إلى ناحية الأرض وحيث لا يكون ولا واحدة من هاتين النفسين[74] وتكون النفس الغاذية وحدَها فالكرية لا توجد في ذلك الجسم والاستقامة توجد فيه إلّا أنّها تكون منكوسة ويكون رأسه مركوزاً[75] في الأرض مثال

[67] لسنا *scripsi* : ليس MS
[68] حيوانا MS
[69] مهيا MS
[70] والنفس *scripsi* : والنفس والنفس MS
[71] ليست *scripsi* : ليس MS
[72] موجودتان *scripsi* : موجودين MS
[73] منكبه MS
[74] ¬ *supra* النفسين MS *(an lacunam indicavit?)*
[75] رأسها مركوز *scripsi* : رأسه مركوزاً MS

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ذلك ما نجده في النبات وإذ كان الأمر على هذا فاختلاف أشكال الأجسام إنّما جُعل بحسب الأنفس التي تفعل في الأجسام وأقدم الأشكال كلّها الشكل الكري وفي كلّ موضع يُهيّئ الخالق[76] لكلّ واحدة من النفوس آلات تصلح لها وتوافقها وليس يختلف كلّ نفس بكلّ آلة فقد عرف من هذا القول أنّ افلاطن كان يرى هذا الرأي قبل ارسطوطاليس (fol. 216b) إذ كان قد نسب خلقة الجسم وأضافها إلى مطابقة النفس. 100

قال افلاطن [90b1–c4]

فمن كانت هِمّته في الشهوات وحبّ الغلبة وكان يتعبّد لهما تعبّداً شديداً فلا بدّ ضرورة[77] أن يكون آرائه كلّها[78] آراء[79] مائتة ويكون[80] ليس له البتّة ولا أقلّ القليل من الحال التي هي خلاف حال الأشياء المائتة التي يمكن أن تكون خاصّة لمن لا يموت فأمّا من كانت همّته في حبّ التعلّم وفي فهم الحقّ[81] وكان يروض نفسه في هذين خاصّة فهو 105 ضرورة يتفكّر فكرات إلهية غير مائتة متى التمس الحقّ ولابسه ويجب ضرورة أن يكون لا يعجزه[82] شيء من الحال التي هي خلاف حال الأشياء المائتة التي يمكن في طبع[83] الناس قبولها.

قال بروقلس

إنّ افلاطن لمـّـا وصف ما الشيء الذي هو أفضل ما فينا وأيّ المراتب مرتبته في 110 الأشياء الموجودة وأنّ هذا الشيء هو مدبّرنا[84] القريب وأنّه متّصل بالقوة الإلهية أخذ في الإخبار بمداواة هذا وابتدأ في ذلك من الحال التي هي خارجة[85] عن طبيعته أي من

[76] يُهيّئ الخالق *scripsi* : يهي الحالو MS *ut vid.*
[77] ضرورة] + من Gal., *Fī al-ʿĀdāt, 148.23*
[78] كلها *supra lin. et vix legitur; om. in lemma (l. 118), om.* Gal., *Fī al-ʿĀdāt, 148.23*
[79] آراء] *scripsi* : ارا MS : اذا *ed.* Klein-Franke, Gal., *Fī al-ʿĀdāt, 148.23*
[80] ويكون *clare* MS : فيكون Gal., *Fī al-ʿĀdāt, 148.23*
[81] الحقّ +] لهما وتعبّد *in lemma (l. 120)* : *om.* Gal., *Fī al-ʿĀdāt, 148.25*
[82] يعجزه] يعجز Gal., *Fī al-ʿĀdāt, 148.26*
[83] طبع] طبيعة *in lemma (l. 127)*
[84] مدبّرنا *scripsi* : مديرنا MS *ut vid.*
[85] خارجة *scripsi* : خارج MS

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مرضه كيما يخبر بالطريق في ردّه إلى الحال الطبيعية وهذا المدبّر ليس سبيله سبيل أولئك المدبّرين الأشراف وذلك أنّ أولئك يعنون بأمر الأشياء من[86] غير ميل ولا انحراف فأمّا هذا المدبّر الذي فينا سبيله[87] وميل وانحراف وذلك أنّه ربّما صارت له نسبة إلى النوع المدبّر المائت[88] من أنواع النفس ثم يتنقّض[89] إضافته إليه ويعود إلى مناقبه[90] (fol. 217a) وإن هو مال إلى النوع الغضبي صار يحبّ الغلبة بأكثر ممّا ينبغي فيكون لذلك يدبّر[91] النوع المائت الذي يتّصل به وينميه ويكون آراءُ ه آراء مائتة ويتبعه جميع الشرّ الهيولاني ويصير مائتاً[92] لا في جوهره لكن في عيشه[93] وسيرته.

وأمّا الذي يُعنى بحبّ التعلّم وبفهم الحقّ وبتعبّد لهما وبروض نفسه فيهما فإنّه من قبل أن ملابسته لأمور غير مائتة يكون آراءُه آراء غير مائتة وذاك أنّ طبيعة أنفس الناس هي على هذه الصفة أعني أن تسرع[94] في مشابهة الأشياء التي تصمد صمْدَها فإذا هي جاءت إلى الأمور المائتة صارت مائتة في عيشها وسيرتها وإذا هي عاينت الأمور التي لا تموت وحاولتها وتصرّفت فيها صارت غير مائتة ولا يعدم الموتَ حينئذ على سبيل ما للّه تبارك وتعلى عدم الموت ولا على سبيل ما للأجناس التي هي أفضل أجناس الأشياء بل دون ذلك ولذلك قال افلاطن إنّها تقبل الحال التي هي خلاف حال الأشياء المائتة بمقدار ما يمكن في طبيعة الناس قبول ذلك وإذ كان ذلك كذلك فمداواة هذه القوة الإلهية التي فينا هي أن يُجعلها غيرَ مائتة بمعرفة الأمور الإلهية التي هي غير مائتة.

[86] من *scripsi* : عن MS
[87] *vel* بسُبُله*?, parum clare*
[88] المائت *scripsi* : **المايب** *vel sim.* MS *supra lin.*
[89] *sine punctatione, an* ينتقص ?
[90] مناقبه *scripsi* : **مناميه** *vel* **مناهيه** *in textu parum clare* : **مايليه** *corr. infra lin.* (*an* **ما** يليه ?)
[91] يدبّر *scripsi* : في يدبره MS *ut vid., where the suffix* –hu *and the preposition* fi *are crossed out*
[92] مائتاً ه MS
[93] عيشه *scripsi* : علشه MS
[94] *sic?,* MS *parum clare*

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قال افلاطن [90c4–7]

ومن قبل أنّه لا يزال دائماً يرضى الإلهي وله مدبّر جميل الأمر متقن[95] ساكن فيه معاً هو في الطبقة العليا من القوة[96] وإتيان المسَرّة[97] والإرضاء[98] إنّما هو واحد بدل[99] كلّ شيء وهو (fol. 217b) أنْ يغذى كلّ واحد من الأشياء بالغذاء الخاصّ به المشاكل له ويحرّكه بالحركة الملا ئمة له.

قال بروقلس

إنّ افلاطن يخبرنا في هذا الكلام بمداواة النفس التي هي مداواة أوّلية تامّة ما هي ويقول إنّ هذه المداواة هي أن يعطى النفسَ حقّها من الحركات الخاصّية بها المشاكلة لها ومن الغذاء الخاصّ بها المشاكل لها ويعني بالحركات الخاصّية المشاكلة التثبّت في الأمور الإلهية التي هي غير مائتة والتأمّل لها ويعني بقوله غذاء خاصّ به مشاكل له الحالات[100] العسرة الزوال التي تصير للنفس[101] بتشبّهها بتلك[102].

فإنّ تمام هذه المداواة هو هذا كما أنّ الصحّة هي تمام مداواة البدن ولكن بمقدار فضل اللّه تبٰرك وتعٰلى على الناس كذلك[103] يفضل تمام هذه المداواة على تمام مداواة البدن وعلى كلّ تمام وذلك أنّ جميع التمامات الأخر إنّما يحدّها الناس فأمّا هذا التامّ فليس الناس يحدّونه بل اللّه تبٰرك وتعٰلى ولذلك صارت سائر التمامات الأخر يمكن أن يجاوزها[104] الناس من طريق أنّ تمامات أخر أعمّ منها وصار هذا التامّ لا يمكن أحد أن يجاوزه[105] لأنّه ليس شيء أتمّ منه وهو وحدَه حُوِىَ[106] بما معه.

95 متقن] متفق Gal., *Fī al-ʿĀdāt, 149.1*
96 القوّة *clare* MS : الفـــوز Gal., *Fī al-ʿĀdāt, 149.2*
97 المسرّة *scripsi* : المسره *vel* المنره MS *(parum clare)*; *cf.* Gal., *Fī al-ʿĀdāt, 149.2*
98 وإتيان المسَرّة والإرضاء *scripsi* : المسره وإتيان والإرضاء MS, Gal., *Fī al-ʿĀdāt, 149.2*
99 بدل *sine punctatione* : يدل على *ed.* Klein-Franke, Gal., *Fī al-ʿĀdāt, 149.2*
100 الخالات MS *ut vid.*
101 للنفس *scripsi* : النفس MS
102 بتلك *scripsi* : سلك *vel* سلكب MS
103 وكذلك] كذلك MS
104 يجاوزها *scripsi* : *sine punctatione* MS
105 يجاوزه *scripsi* : *sine punctatione* MS
106 حوى *scripsi* : MS *vix legitur*, حوا *aut* حعا *vid.*

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مثال ذلك أنّ تمام فعل الطبيب هو الصحّة لكن هاهنا تمام آخر هو أرفع وأعلى من هذا وهو تمام فعل المدبّر للمدينة وذلك لأنّ الطبيب إنّما يقاوم ويرفع الأسباب التي لا بدّ ضرورة من (fol. 218a) إضرارها بالبدن فأمّا المدبّر للمدينة فإنّه ليس يقتصر على أن يقاوم هذه كالطبّ[107] دون أن يقاوم ويرفع الأسباب التي ليس تعرض باضطرار وهاهنا أيضاً تمام آخر أرفع وأعمّ من تمام فعل المدبّر للمدينة وهو تمام فعل المحبّ[108] المؤثِر للأمور[109] الجميلة وذاك أنّ هذا ليس يقتصر على أن يصلح ما يصلحه الطبيب أو المدبّر للمدينة فقط لكنّه يحبّ إصلاح كلّ أمر جميل وهاهنا أيضاً تمام آخر أعظم من هذا ومن كلّ تمام وهو التمام الذي للفيلسوف فإنّ الفيلسوف ليس إنّما ينظر في الأمور الجميلة التي إنّما هي في العمل فقط لكن ينظر أيضاً في الأمور الجميلة التي في الجواهر والأسباب الأُوَل الفاضلة[110] ويُتبِعُ نظرَه فيها أن يتشبّه بها وهذا هو التمام الذي لا تمام بعده ولا يمكن طبيعة الإنسان مجاوزته.

وهذه هي المداواة الأُولى المنسوبة للنفس أعني الاقتداء بالله تبارك وتعالى والفاعل للتشبيه[111] هو المشاركة في الأمر والفاعل للمشاركة في الأمر هو التعجّب وذاك أنّ المعرفة بالأمور الإلهية تؤول بنا إلى التعجّب والتعجّب يؤول بنا إلى المشاركة في الأمر لأنّ[112] الإنسان ينافس فيما يُعجبه وبسبب مشاركته إيّاه في الأمر يتشبّه به.

تمّ ما شرح به قول بقراط وافلاطن وتمّ كتاب العادات والحمد لله ذي القدرة التامّة والنعمة العامّة وصلواته على رسوله محمّد وآله وسلّم تسليماً

TRANSLATION

Proclus says:

So far, Plato has described in his book entitled *Timaeus*[113] which kinds of remedy are for all living beings generally and in their entirety and

[107] كالطبّ *scripsi* : بالطب MS *ut vid.*
[108] *sic?*, MS *parum clare*
[109] المؤْثِر للأمور *scripsi* : الموثر الأمور MS, *v. infra, note* 147
[110] الفاضلة *scripsi* : *sine punctatione* MS
[111] للتشبيه *scripsi* : *sine punctatione* MS
[112] لأنّ *scripsi* : لا MS *clare, deinde 1 aut 2 litt. in ras. aut corr. non leg.*
[113] Cf. above, note 29.

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which kinds of remedy are for the body [only].[114] He now turns to a specific discussion of the soul, in order to describe its appropriate treatment. [He proceeds in this way,] because both, body and soul, are parts of the living being, yet not in one and the same way. Rather, soul is part of the living being in so far it is the leader and sovereign of the entire living being, whereas body is its part in so far it is the attendant and servant of the [soul's] activity and an organ for the [soul], for soul is that which moves body and regulates it.[115] And since this applies to soul, it is necessarily most worthy of care and most deserving of treatment. For [only] when the soul is preserved in the state of health and excellence, it performs the regulation of the body most excellently.

Since [Plato] dealt in that discourse, which is brought to an end and finished [at this place], with body, he does not proceed abruptly from the discussion of body to that of the rational soul, but rather describes first the remedy common to the two irrational souls and the rational soul as follows:

[114] Cf. *Tim*. 87c1–89e2.

[115] Here and in what follows I translate forms of the second stem of the root *d-b-r* through "to regulate", "regulator", etc. The relevant Arabic words *possibly* reflect forms and derivatives of κυβερνάω, κυβερνήτης, etc. in the Greek (this correspondence is also attested for the Arabic translation of Galen's Ὅτι ταῖς τοῦ σώματος κράσεσιν…, which has been prepared by the same translator, Ḥubaysh ibn al-Ḥasan al-Dimashqī, as well as for Isḥāq ibn Ḥunayn's translation of Aristotle's *Physics*; however, the same Arabic words served also as equivalents of various other Greek words [cf. http://telota.bbaw.de/glossga/], and further below, the participle *mudabbir* even stands for Plato's δαίμων, *Tim*. 90c4). At the present place, the supposed correspondence deserves special attention, because the application of the term κυβερνάω, etc., on the particular human soul does, as far as I see, not exactly correspond with Proclus usual terminology (while it is frequent in later Neoplatonic writings). Proclus rather applies this terminology *In Plat. Tim*. II, 106.29, on the souls of the heavenly bodies, and at other places on the world-soul as related to the entirety of bodily nature (cf. *In Plat. Tim*. II, 24.7; *Théologie platonicienne,* texte établi et traduit par Henri-Dominique Saffrey et Leendert G. Westerink, 6 vols., Collection des universités de France [Paris, 1968–1997], I, 64.16 [henceforth: *Theol. Plat*.]). Elsewhere, he uses κυβερνάω and its derivatives, in order to describe the guidance of the universe through the *Nous* (*In Platonis Parmenidem commentaria,* ed. Carlos Steel, Scriptorum Classicorum Bibliotheca Oxoniensis, 3 vols. [Oxford, 2007–09], 943.17 [Cousin]: I, 141 [Steel], 964.9: I, 169 [henceforth: *In Plat. Parm*.], *In Plat. Tim*. I, 403–404, 413.2) or the relation between *Nous* and world-soul (*Theol. Plat*. IV, 22.21, 43.17, *Sur le Premier Alcibiade de Platon,* texte établi et traduit par Alain-Philippe Segonds, Collection des universités de France, 2 vols. [Paris, 1985–86], 77.11 [henceforth: *In Plat. Alcib. I*]). Furthermore, we find numerous references for this terminology in Proclus' descriptions of how the daemon is related to the individual life he guides (*e.g*., *In Platonis Rem publicam commentaria,* ed. Wilhelm Kroll, Bibliotheca Scriptorum Graecorum et Romanorum Teubneriana, 2 vols. [Leipzig, 1899–1901; repr. Amsterdam, 1965], II, 94.26, 98.26, 299.17 [henceforth: *In Plat. Rem publ*.], *In Plat. Alcib. I,* 40.23, 45.14, 76.18, 79.15, 199.20, *In Plat. Parm*. 1128.1 : III, 114 [v. app. crit., p. 115, ad 1128.2, and p. 468, note 102, of the trans. by Glenn R. Morrow & John M. Dillon, *Proclus' Commentary on Plato's* Parmenides [Princeton, 1987], etc., as well as below in the present fragment). The application to particular sub-lunar souls must be based on the assumption that the *one* rational soul, which ensouls all living beings ("διὰ μόνης τῆς λογικῆς ψυχῆς", *In Plat. Rem publ*. II, 284.4), transfers its cybernetical function to the individual souls. (Cf. also Proclus' comments on *Tim*. 34c4ff. explaining the role of the soul as ruler and master [ἀρχικός, δεσπότης] of body, *In Plat. Tim*. II, 117–119).

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Plato says [89e3–90a2]:

We have often stated that there are in us three kinds of soul [located] at three [different] places, each of them having motion.[116] Accordingly, the following statement of ours must suffice here again: Any of these kinds, if remaining inactive and ceasing from its motion, must necessarily become very weak, while the kind which is trained must become very strong. This being the case, we should take care of the [different kinds of soul], in order that their motions are in due proportion to each other.

Proclus says:

Plato reminds us first of the three parts of the soul and of the necessity that their motions are in due proportion to each other, in order that none of the three prevails and, as a consequence, inundates the other two. For the rational [part of the soul] should not stultify and diminish the activities of the irascible and the appetitive [parts of the soul], because it can benefit from the two when they assist it in taking care of the body's well-being (as a matter of fact, a king[117] should not ruin those who obey him and are ruled by him); and [conversely] the irascible and the appetitive [parts of the soul] should not stultify the activity of the rational [soul], because when the rational [soul] declines in its activity, the entire regulation of the body comes to run into confusion and disorder.

The activity of these [parts of the soul] is preserved in the following way: I say that any motionless and inactive thing is very weak, while anything trained is very strong. Therefore, it is necessary that the motions of the soul are in due proportion, in order that each [part] can perform its activity. Proportionality of these motions consists in that the rational [soul] is the regulator and the origin, from which motion starts, while the irascible and the appetitive [parts of the soul] pay attention and are submissive and obedient to the rational [soul] and move and act only to such an extent which is in accordance with the rational [soul] and gives to it what it demands. For, when the motions of these [parts of the soul] are in this state, there is stability, appropriateness, proportionality and order for the whole soul.

Having said this on the three parts of the soul, [Plato] moves on to a discourse on the rational soul which determines for these two mortal parts [of the soul] the quantities of their motions, regulates the body, and brings itself to perfection.[118] [However,] before we can proceed to this

[116] Ar. suggests the reading κίνησιν instead of κινήσεις.

[117] For the equation of the intellect and the intellectual daemon subsisting in the human rational soul with the role of a king cf. Proclus, *In Plat. Tim*. I, 251, also *In Plat. Alcib. I*, 78.1ff.: "Seul le démon met toutes nos affaires en mouvement, les gouverne toutes et les met en ordre [. . .]; et il est le seul souverain (βασιλεύς) de tout ce qui est en nous et autour de nous, pilotant la totalité de notre vie." (trans. Segonds, vol. 1, p. 63).

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discourse, we must explain the meaning of the terms [employed] in the discourse set forth [so far]. We say: Speaking of three parts of the soul, [Plato] means the rational [soul], which is the striving for the best thing, the appetitive [soul], which is the longing for the perfection of bodily performances, and the irascible [soul], which is the desire to repel [all] that which harms the body.[119] For we strive for something and desire it, and our souls yearn for it, either because it is good in itself or because it is good for something else.[120] If we desire a thing which is good in itself, [this] happens through the rational [soul], because it is only through the rational [soul] that we desire knowledge of the truth and knowledge of the beings in so far they are beings. On the other hand, that which is good only [by being good] for something else, this is something which preserves for us and in us that which is [beneficial] to nature and health.[121] Such a thing consists by necessity either in the attraction of something helpful or perfective or in repelling something detrimental and harmful. If we strive for something helpful [or] perfective, [this] happens through the appetitive [soul], and if we repel something detrimental [and] harmful, [it] happens through the irascible [soul].

This being the case, it becomes clear from what we said that there are three [different] parts of the soul, because they oppose each other, and things opposing one another are not one and the same thing.[122] Furthermore, each of these [parts] has a perfection different from

[118] *Al-mutammima li-nafsihā* possibly stands for αὐτοτελής, usually applied by Proclus to the One, the divine henads, and the participated intellect (ὁ μετεχόμενος νοῦς), *e.g.* Proclus, *The Elements of Theology*, A Revised Text with Translation, Introduction and Commentary by Eric R. Dodds, Second Edition (Oxford, 1963), §§ 114–116, *In Plat. Alcib. I,* 66.3ff., *In Plat. Tim*. I, 371.23, II, 92.5, 313.3, etc. For the conception of the individual human soul as self-perfecting entity, cf. *In Plat. Tim*. II, 129.18: ὁρῶμεν … ἐπὶ τῶν ἡμετέρων ψυχῶν· κινοῦσι γὰρ ἑαυτὰς καὶ τελειοῦσι καὶ ἄγουσιν ὅπῃ βούλονται ("[…] we see in the case of our souls, for our souls move themselves, perfect themselves and proceed where they wish", trans. Baltzly, *Proclus. Commentary on Plato's* Timaeus*,* vol. 4, p. 88). On the relationship between self-perfection, self-motion and self-thinking of the rational soul in Proclus' philosophy cf. Stephen Menn, "Self-motion and reflection: Hermias and Proclus on the harmony of Plato and Aristotle on the soul", in James Wilberding & Christoph Horn (eds.), *Neoplatonism and the Philosophy of Nature* (Oxford, 2012), pp. 44–67, esp. 58ff.

[119] Cf. Proclus, *In Plat. Tim*. I, 33f.: τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν, ὃ δὴ τὰς χρείας ἐκπορίζει τοῦ σώματος, τὸ θυμικόν, ὃ πᾶν τὸ τοῦ ζῴου λυμαντικὸν ἀναστέλλειν τέτακται. The conception of the vegetative soul displayed here may be influenced by Galen's interpretation of *Tim*. 77b6ff.; cf. James Wilberding, "The secret of sentient vegetative life in Galen", in Peter Adamson & James Wilberding (eds.), *Galen and Philosophy*, Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies. Supplement (London, forthcoming).

[120] Cf. Plato, *Rep*. II, 357b ff., Aristotle, *Eth. Nic.* I 4.

[121] The former is good for the soul itself, the latter for the whole of body and soul; cf. Proclus, *In Plat. Tim*. II, 118: "The property of masterhood extends to the soul because it does all things for the sake of its own good, but the property of being a ruler belongs to it because of the fact that it fills all things with what is good." (trans. Baltzly, vol. 4, p. 76), also *In Plat. Tim*. II, 158.

[122] A reference to Plato's famous arguments for the tripartition of the soul, *Rep*. IV, 436b ff. (Cf. also Proclus, *In Plat. Tim*. II, 39: "things that have the most contrary motions are themselves most contrary", trans. Baltzly, vol. 3, p. 86, similarly *In Plat. Tim*. II, 29f.)

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the perfection of the other one; and when one of them sustains a loss, it is restored [in a way] different from the restoration of the others. Again, the rational [soul] performs its activity in the brain, the appetitive [soul] does so in the liver, and the irascible [soul] does so in the heart. This is shown by the damages befalling these organs as well as by their [appropriate] remedy. For, when damage occurs to the brain, this harms the faculty of reason, and when there occurs damage to the faculty of reason, we give medical treatment to the brain;[123] and things are analogous with the other two [parts of the soul].

Plato says [90a2–b1]:

As for the species of soul which is the noblest <in us>, we must consider that it is something that belongs to the genus of angelic things [and] has been given to each of us by God. We thus say about this species that it dwells at the top of the body and, due to its [close] relationship with the heavens, raises us from earth in such a way that we [can] truly say that we are a species of plants which is not an earthly but a heavenly plant. For the divine species is exactly from that place[124] where the coming-to-be of the soul first [begins], in order that, when it stretches our head and our root and raises the [head], the position of the whole body be upright.[125]

Proclus says:

Having finished the exposition of the general remedy used as common [treatment] for the three parts of the soul, Plato wishes [now] to expose the remedy of the rational part. However, before discussing this part, he begins by praising it and by describing its advantages. First, he calls it the noblest [part], for just as the intellect is the noblest thing in the whole world, so is the intellectual part in us the noblest thing in us. Then, in what follows, he says that the place this part holds among the entirety of living beings is like the place of an angel and messenger[126] between God (exalted is He) and the creation.[127]

[123] Of course, this applies only to the embodied soul employing bodily organs, not to the rational soul as such; cf. Proklos Diadochos, *Über die Vorsehung, das Schicksal und den freien Willen an Theodoros, den Ingenieur (Mechaniker)*, Nach Vorarbeiten von Theo Berger übersetzt und erläutert von Michael Erler (Meisenheim am Glan, 1980), p. 61, and *ibid*., note 2.

[124] The translator took ἐκεῖθεν γάρ (*sc*. ἐστι) as predicate of τὸ θεῖον.

[125] The translator took τὴν κεφαλὴν καὶ ῥίζαν ἡμῶν ἀνακρεμαννὺν ὀρθοῖ πᾶν τὸ σῶμα as a new, separate sentence with ὀρθοῖ in the optative expressing the purpose of what is said in the preceding sentence (therefore connected through the conjunction *kay-mā*, "in order that").

[126] *Or:* mediator, *al-safīr*. In all likelihood, the expression *al-malʾak wa-al-safīr* ("angel and messenger") is a hendiadys for one Greek word, presumably ἄγγελος.

[127] For the daemons as mediators or messengers between man and the Gods cf. also Proclus' *In Plat. Parm*. 663: I, 51f. (trans. Morrow & Dillon, p. 50), I, 71f. (trans. Morrow & Dillon, p. 62). At an earlier place of the *Timaeus* commentary, Proclus mentions that Porphyry ascribed this role to the archangels (τοῖς ἐν οὐρανῷ ἀρχαγγέλοις, *In Plat. Tim*. I, 152.13).

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With the angel and messenger between God and the creation he means the closest regulator.[128] For this name, applied by Plato [at this place] to this part, which belongs to the genus of angelic things, is employed by [Plato] in three [different] modes: [(i)] Sometimes he refers with it to [any] messenger between God and man,[129] whatever [this messenger] might be; [(ii)] at other times – *e.g.* in the book of the *Laws* – [Plato] divides that which is between God and man into three strata, first that which belongs to the genus of angelic things, secondly that which is called the plurality of Heroes,[130] and thirdly the angels;[131] [(iii)] and again at other times he employs this [name] in yet another mode – as he does, for example, in his work entitled *Statesman* – and means with "something that belongs to the genus of angelic things" the Intellect, *i.e.* the closest regulator of this universe.[132] In this way he means also [at the present place] with

[128] I have not been able to find any Greek equivalent of this expression in Proclus' writings. In all likelihood, this toponymic terminology is based on Proclus' doctrine of hierarchically ordered vertical chains of hypercosmic and encosmic divine, daemonic and human intellects. The "closest regulator" thus must be the lowest daemonic intellect which is located immediately above the human soul, *i.e.* a particular intellect (μερικὸς νοῦς) participated by the human intellect (cf. *In Plat. Tim.* I, 245). Presumably, Proclus draws at the present place on Plato, *Phaedrus* 247c7, where this intellect is called the κυβερνήτης *(mudabbir)* of the human soul (v. also Radek Chlup, *Proclus. An Introduction* [Cambridge, 2012], pp. 127–36, 158–62).

[129] Cf. Plato, *Symposium* 202e, where Plato assigns to the daemon the functions of "translation and mediation" (ἑρμηνεῦον καὶ διαπορθμεῦον) between man and the Gods and *vice versa*.

[130] The MS allows the reading *kathrata Īrū'īs* (as translated above) or *kuthruhu Īrū'īs* (meaning perhaps "that which is called – in the plural [form] – Heroes"). Vajda obviously read *kathīratan Īrū'īs* and translated "qui est nommée souvent *Iroas*" (p. 243.27).

[131] In Plato's *Laws*, there is no clear correspondence to this tripartite conception. At several places, Plato locates there between man and the Gods the three strata of Daemons (δαίμονες), Heroes (ἥρωες), and Private Statues or Shrines (ἱδρύματα ἴδια) dedicated to ancestral deities (cf. *Laws* 717b, 718c–d, 738d, 818c, etc.). The present Arabic terminology points to another division by Proclus. The expression "that which belongs to the genus of angelic things" *(al-shay'u alladhī min jinsi al-malā'ika)* seems to paraphrase the word δαίμων (or its plural δαίμονες, as it occurs in this use also in the translation of *Tim.* 90a3 above). *Īrū'īs* is obviously a transliteration of ἥρωες. Yet, it is not clear what the third term, *al-malā'ika*, translates. The underlying Greek term may be either a derivative of δαίμων, *e.g.* τὰ δαιμόνια, or, as already proposed by Franz Pfaff (*Galeni De Consuetudinibus*, p. 57, note 1), οἱ ἄγγελοι. The intermediate trias of δαίμονες, ἥρωες and ἄγγελοι is indeed mentioned in various writings by Proclus, *e.g.* in *In Plat. Tim.* I, 137 (trans. Tarrant, vol. 1, p. 233), *In Plat. Tim.* II, 112 (trans. Baltzly, vol. 4, p. 69), *In Plat. Tim.* III, 109, 164, 178, 196, *In Plat. Parm.* 952.20: II, 153 (trans. Morrow & Dillon, p. 302), etc. At other places, Proclus rather seems to correlate Heroes or heroic souls with Plato's ἱδρύματα ἴδια, *e.g. In Plat. Tim.* II, 230 (trans. Baltzly, vol. 4, p. 213, cf. also Baltzly's note 436). In any case, assuming that *al-malā'ika* translates here οἱ ἄγγελοι presupposes a certain inconsistency in Ḥubaysh's terminology (cf. above, note 126).

[132] Cf. Plato, *Statesman* 272e, where Plato seems to equate the Highest Daemon (ὁ μέγιστος δαίμων) with the Steersman of the Universe (ὁ τοῦ παντὸς κυβερνήτης). Obviously, this Highest Daemon has to be kept apart from "the daemons" (οἱ δαίμονες), who, only shortly before (*Statesman* 271d), are described as divine herdsmen (νομῆς θεῖοι), each of whom is a sufficient or independent (αὐτάρκης) guardian of the individual species of living beings he is assigned to. At *In Plat. Tim.* II, 112 (trans. Baltzly, vol. 4, p. 69), Proclus equates the Demiurge with the Highest Daemon, yet there are at least two further types of

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"something that belongs to the genus of angelic things" the intellectual part,[133] because this part is the closest regulator.

After these two [preliminary] sections, he begins with a third section and says that it is due to this species of the soul that we are able to stand upright and to direct upwards our posture as a whole, with both soul and body. As for [directing it upwards] with the soul, this is because it is through this part that we know the bodies superior to us – I mean the eternal divine bodies – and through our knowledge of these bodies come to know God (magnified and exalted be He). As for [directing it upwards] with the body, this is so because this part is the cause of our bodies' standing in an upright shape. The reason is that this part – being neither of earth nor of something earthly, but rather from heaven and something heavenly – is such that it raises the root of the body upwards. And since the body's root is [turned] upwards, [the body] comes to stand upright. For just as the root of an earthly plant belongs to what is immediately attached to the earth, so will the root and the head and the beginning of our body, provided we are heavenly plants, belong to what is immediately attached to the heavens. And indeed, Plato calls us a plant. [He does so] because the regulation of our body is similar to the regulation of the plant body, for we are not one unitary thing, but three things in three different respects. In the first respect we correspond with plants, in the second respect we correspond with animals, and in the third respect we are human beings, that is we are plants through the appetitive soul, animals through the irascible soul, and human beings through the rational soul.

Now, this discourse contains one [specifically] admirable issue, namely the cause why the nature of our body is appropriate for standing and upright position.[134] To be more precise, whenever the rational soul is on its own, the body, in which it is, is spherical, which, for example, is the case with the heavenly bodies. And whenever the

daemons: At *In Plat. Rem publ.* II, 256, 271–3 (trans. Festugière, vol. 3, pp. 214, 229–31), Proclus distinguishes between angelic daemons guarding individual souls and fused with the realm of generation and a higher class of daemons, which exist οὐσιώδεις and prior to any interrelation between the individual souls and their fate, both types of which being different from the Highest Daemon. On the Middle Platonic and Neoplatonic debates on the classes and numbers of daemons cf. also Harold Tarrant, "Must commentators know their sources? Proclus *In Timaeum* and Numenius", in Peter Adamson, Han Baltussen, Martin W. F. Stone (eds.), *Philosophy, Science and Exegesis in Greek, Arabic and Latin Commentaries*. Vol. 1, Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies, Suppl. 83.1 (London, 2004), pp. 175–90, esp. 182f.

[133] *Al-juz' al-'aqlī*, "the intellectual (*or*: intellective) part", for ὁ νοητικός (*i.e.* δαίμων)? For the equation of Nous and Demiurge in Proclus' philosophy cf. Robbert M. Van den Berg, *Proclus' Hymns. Essays, Translations, Commentary*, Philosophia antiqua 90 (Leiden, 2001), pp. 49–61.

[134] For Plato's theory of human posture cf. Pavel Gregorić, "Plato's and Aristotle's explanation of human posture", *Rhizai*, 2 (2005): 183–96.

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rational soul and the irrational [animal] soul are together, sphericity and upright position exist together in this body, as we find, for example, in the body of man. And whenever the irrational soul, that is the animal soul, is on its own, there is no pure sphericity in this body, yet there is no upright position [either]. We can see this, for example, in the body of irrational animals, for the bodies of such animals are thrown down [or] bending down towards the earth. [Finally,] whenever neither of these two souls exists [in a body] and the nutritive soul is on its own, there is no sphericity in that body, yet there is upright position in it, except that this is turned upside down and with the [body's] head stuck into the ground, as is the case with plants. This being the case, it is [clear that] the diversity of shapes of bodies is established solely in accordance with the souls which are at work in these bodies, and [that] the most prior of all shapes is the spherical shape.[135] Each single [kind of] soul, wherever [it] is placed, has been provided by the creator with instruments that allow it to prosper and are appropriate to it, yet it is not [the case that] each soul is distinct [from the other] with respect to any instrument [whatsoever]. Thus, it becomes clear from this discourse that Plato held this position before Aristotle, since he already correlated and connected the nature of the body and the corresponding soul with one another.[136]

Plato says [90b1–c4]:

Now, when somebody is occupied with the desires and the love of overpowering [others] and devotes himself[137] eagerly to these two [activities], all his thoughts necessarily become mortal thoughts, and there will be nothing, not even the smallest part, of that

[135] Accordingly, Proclus ascribes to the embodied soul rectilinear motion and to the Nous circular motion, cf. *Procli Diadochi in primum Euclidis elementorum librum commentarii,* edidit G. Friedlein, Bibliotheca Scriptorum Graecorum et Romanorum Teubneriana (Leipzig, 1873; repr. Hildesheim, 1967), p. 147 (trans. Glenn R. Morrow, *A Commentary on the First Book of Euclid's Elements* [Princeton, 1970], p. 117). For the priority of the circle among geometrical figures and the sphere among regular solids cf. *ibid*., pp. 146–51 (trans. Morrow, pp. 117–20), and *In Plat. Tim*. II, 69: "For that which the One is among the divine things … this role is played in the same way by the sphere among the solid shapes" (trans. Baltzly, vol. 3, p. 125), also *In Plat. Tim*. II, 99 (trans. Baltzly, vol. 3, p. 161). For Proclus' correlation of circular and rectilinear motions with different types of soul and with the concepts of πρόοδος, κατάκαμψις and ἐπιστροφή cf. also Menn, "Self-motion and reflection", pp. 59–65.

[136] An allusion to Aristotle's critical comments on the idea that any type of soul can reside in any type of body regardless of their essential interrelation (*De An.* I 3, 407b12–26, against Pythagorean reincarnationists). In the background of this incidental remark lies Proclus' approach to the *Timaeus* and to Platonic *Physics* in general, which conceived the Aristotelian natural philosophy basically as an emulation of Plato's teaching without any substantial progress (cf. Carlos Steel, "Why should we prefer Plato's *Timaeus* to Aristotle's *Physics*? Proclus' critique of Aristotle's causal explanation of the physical world", in Robert W. Sharples & Anne Sheppard [eds.], *Ancient Approaches to Plato's* Timaeus, Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies, Suppl. 78 [London, 2003], pp. 175–87).

[137] As Marwan Rashed points out to me (personal communication, August 1, 2012), the Arabic translation may be based on the reading διακονοῦντι instead of διαπονοῦντι.

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disposition in him, which is different from the disposition of the mortal things, as far as these can occur in the highest degree in him who is immortal.[138] But he who is [eagerly] occupied with the love of learning and the understanding of the truth, and exercises his soul in these two [activities] in a particular way, must have divine [and] immortal thoughts, when he attains and grasps the truth. It is altogether necessary that he will not miss any part of the disposition, which is different from the disposition of the mortal things, as far as human nature is capable of acquiring this [disposition].

Proclus says:

Having mentioned what is the most excellent thing in us, which rank it occupies among the existing things, that this thing is our closest regulator, and that it is connected with the divine power, Plato starts with informing [us] about the remedy of this [thing]. In doing so, he begins with the disposition which is alien to the nature of this [thing], *i.e.* with its illness. He does so, in order to inform [us] about how to bring it back to [its] natural disposition, and [because] the behaviour of this regulator is not the same as the mode of behaviour of those noble regulators. The reason is that those [noble regulators] take care of the things without inclination or tendency, whereas the behaviour of this regulator in us shows both inclination and tendency. This is so because sometimes this [regulator] becomes interrelated with the mortal kind of psychic regulators, then his connection with it breaks off, and he returns to his natural disposition.[139] And when he inclines towards the irrascible kind [of soul], he begins to love overpowering [others] more than necessary. As a consequence, he regulates [only] the mortal kind [of soul], to which he is attached, and lets it grow; and "his thoughts become mortal thoughts",

[138] The second half of this complicated Platonic sentence (*Tim*. 90b1-6) is poorly represented in the Arabic. This is at least partly due to variant readings in the translator's *Vorlage*. First, there can be little doubt that the translator read καθ' ὅσον μάλιστα δυνατὸν ἀθανάτῳ γίγνεσθαι instead of καθ' ὅσον μάλιστα δυνατὸν θνητῷ γίγνεσθαι, rendered by *allatī yumkinu an takūna khāṣṣatan li-man lā yamūtu*. Secondly, he took μηδὲ σμικρὸν ἐλλείπειν in the sense of μηδὲ σμικρὸν ἐλλείπει (pres. ind. act. 3rd sg.), interpreted as *wa-yakūnu laysa lahu al-battata wa-lā aqallu al-qalīli*. Due to these variant readings, the translator was urged to interpret τούτου in the phrase τούτου μηδὲ σμικρὸν ἐλλείπειν as referring to the lacking disposition of immortality *(min al-ḥāli allatī hiya khilāfa ḥāli al-ashyā'i al-mā'ita)*. The reason for the subsequent omission of ἅτε τὸ τοιοῦτον ηὐξηκότι may be sought either in an omission in the Greek manuscript or in the fact that this clause made little sense in view of the preceding confusion.

[139] The end of this sentence, *i.e.* the place or state into which the psychic regulator returns, is not clear in the manuscript (cf. above, note 90). The infralinear correction may suggest the reading *mā yalīhi* ("and returns to the next [*i.e.*, the next higher stratum?]"). The Arabic expression rendered here by "becomes interrelated with" *(ṣārat lahu nisbatun ilā…)* points to some sort of interaction between essentially separate entities rather than any kind of substantial intermingling or blending (as one might assume in view of Porphyry's psychology; cf. James Wilberding, "Porphyry and Plotinus on the seed", *Phronesis*, 53 [2008]: 406–32).

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from him results all material evil, and he becomes [himself] mortal, though not in his substance, but in his way of life and conduct.

With being "occupied with the love of learning and the understanding of the truth" and with devoting and "exercising one's soul in these two [activities]" Plato means [the following]: It is through familiarising with immortal things that somebody's thoughts become immortal thoughts. The reason is that the nature of the human souls is of this character, I mean, that it hastens to assimilation with the things it aims at. Hence, if it reaches mortal things, it becomes mortal in its way of life and conduct; and if it is faced with immortal things, desires them and [finally] masters them, it becomes immortal. However, it is not, in this case, free from death in the way God (magnified and exalted be He) is free from death, neither in the way the most excellent genera of things are, but [in a way] inferior to this.[140] This is why Plato says that it acquires "the disposition, which is different from the disposition of the mortal things, as far as human nature is capable of acquiring it." This being the case, the [appropriate] remedy for this divine power in us consists in rendering it immortal through the knowledge of the divine things which as such is immortal.

[140] In *In Plat. Tim*. III, 215–218, Proclus distinguishes between different modes of immortality: "«Immortel» se dit au sens le plus propre et primordial de ce qui se procure à soi-même l'immortalité [. . .]. Ainsi donc est «immortel» au sens vrai ce qui est immortel par soi-même et ce qui se procure à soi-même l'immortalité, en revanche ce qui ni n'est vie par tout soi-même ni n'est subsistant par soi (αὐθυπόστατον) ni ne possède par soi-même l'immortalité n'est pas primordialment immortel. Dès lors, de même que ce qui est être à titre second n'est pas «être» (ὄν), de même ce qui est immortel à titre second n'est pas «immortel». Pourtant ce n'est pas non plus du mortel. [. . .] Il semble que, dans la catégorie de l'immortel, une première sorte soit commune à toutes les espèces diverses du non-mortel: c'est ce qui n'est pas privé de la vie qu'il possède [. . .]. Une autre sorte est propre aux Intelligibles: c'est l'immortel qui est tel en tant qu'existant toujours (ἀεὶ ὄν). Une autre sorte est celle des dieux encosmiques: c'est ce qui est immortel en tant que devenant toujours (ἀεὶ γιγνόμενον), puisqu'il a sa substance dans le «devenir toujours» (γίγνεσθαι ἀεί). Dès lors, tu pourrais dire qu'immortel et mortel s'opposent sans intermédiaire (ἀμέσως) si tu prends la signification commune de l'immortel, et qu'ils ne s'opposent pas sans intermédiaire si tu prends le primordialement immortel, qui est l'immortel en tant qu'existant toujours: car, entre celui-ci et le mortel, il y a comme intermédiaire l'immortel en tant que devenant toujours. Cependant l'immortel au sens propre est ce qui a complètement sa vie dans l'éternité: l'être qui a sa vie se développant dans toute la durée du temps et non pas la même toujours dans une unique indivisibilité, cet être-là est immortel en tant que devenant, et non en tant qu'étant." (trans. Festugière, vol. 5, pp. 76–9). This latter type of immortality is presumably the one applied here to the individual human soul, which thus mirrors the qualities of the world-soul inasmuch as this "is generated and ungenerated at the same time, a fact by virtue of which it always *has* being and life (*being* always living and existent); but on the other hand, it is also by virtue of this fact that it always *receives* them (perpetually *coming to be* Being and life). It thus exists from two sources – being both from itself and also from the things prior to it. [. . .] Therefore time and eternity pertain to the soul simultaneously. In as much as it is ungenerated, it is eternal. But as something generated, time applies. As a result it is, in a certain sense, eternal in so far as it is indestructible, but it is not eternal *simpliciter*", *In Plat. Tim*. II, 124f. (trans. Baltzly, vol. 4, p. 83).

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Plato says [90c4–7]:

And since he never stops to be attentive to the divine [power] and has the well-ordering perfect regulator dwelling together [with him] in himself, he will be at the highest degree of power and realization of happiness.[141] Now, there is only one way to be attentive in return for each thing,[142] and this is to feed each thing with its proper and appropriate food and to move it with its adequate motion.

Proclus says:

In this section, Plato informs us about the nature of the primordial and ultimate remedy of the soul. He says that this remedy consists in giving to the soul the correct motion which is proper and appropriate to it as well as the correct food which is proper and appropriate to it. With proper and appropriate motions he means the solid investigation and consideration of the immortal divine things; and with the expression "proper and appropriate food" he means the hardly alterable[143] dispositions which come to the soul through its assimilation to those [immortal things].

That this remedy is the ultimate [remedy], means this: Just as health is the ultimate [aim] of the body's remedy, yet [must be] measured with respect to God's superiority (magnified and exalted be He) over mankind, so is the ultimate [aim] of this [psychic] remedy superior to the ultimate [aim] of the body's remedy and any [other] ultimate [aim]. The reason is that all other ultimate [aims] are determined solely by man, whereas this ultimate [aim] is determined not by man, but rather by God (magnified and exalted be He). Therefore, it can happen that man transgress all the other ultimate [aims] insofar as[144] there are other ultimate [aims] which are more general,[145] whereas nobody can transgress this [divine] ultimate [aim], because there is nothing more complete than it and this alone is encompassed by what is in it.[146]

To give an example: The ultimate [aim] of the physician's activity is health, but there is another ultimate [aim] higher and more elevated

[141] *Al-quwwa wa-ityān al-masarrati* is a hendiadys for εὐδαίμων (provided my reading and emendation of the MS is correct, cf. notes 97–98).

[142] *Badala kulli shay'in* suggests the reading ἀντὶ παντός instead παντὶ παντός, *Tim*. 90c6; for *badala* = ἀντί cf. Gerhard Endress & Dimitri Gutas (eds.), *A Greek & Arabic Lexicon. Materials for a Dictionary of the Mediæval Translations from Greek into Arabic* (Leiden, 1992-), fasc. 8, p. 130 (henceforth: *GALex*), Manfred Ullmann, *Wörterbuch zu den griechisch-arabischen Übersetzungen des 9. Jahrhunderts* (Wiesbaden, 2002), *Supplement I–II* (Wiesbaden, 2006–2007), *Suppl. I*, p. 130 (henceforth: *WGAÜ*).

[143] *ʿUsru al-zawāl* may render a word like δυσμετάβλητος or δυσμετάθετος (cf. Proclus, *In Plat. Alcib. I,* 107.31, *In Plat. Parm*. 989.28: II, 204; for *ʿusr* + noun as etymological translation of compounds with δυσ- as first element cf. Ullmann, *WGAÜ*, p. 861, *WGAÜ Suppl. II*, p. 877).

[144] *Min ṭarīqi anna*, presumably translating ὡς or ᾗ, cf. Manfred Ullmann, *Die Nikomachische Ethik des Aristoteles in arabischer Übersetzung. Teil II: Überlieferung, Textkritik, Grammatik* (Wiesbaden, 2012), p. 318f (§ 96), *id*., *WGAÜ*, p. 793, *WGAÜ Suppl. I*, p. 440.

[145] The MS reads clearly *aʿamm*, which might be a corruption of *atamm* ("more complete").

[146] The Arabic text is not clear (cf. note 106). I do not see what Arabic text Vajda had in mind when translating "et elle seule peut émettre une telle prétention" (p. 247ult.).

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than this, namely the ultimate [aim] of the activity of him who regulates civil society. This is so because the physician establishes and removes only those causes which afflict the body against one's will, whereas the regulator of civil society does not restrict himself to the establishment of these [causes] – as medicine does – without establishing and removing [also] those causes which do not occur against one's will. Next, there is another ultimate [aim], again more elevated and more general than that of the activity of the regulator of civil society, namely the ultimate [aim] of the activity of him who loves and adores beautiful things, because this [person] does not restrict himself to merely improving that which is improved by the physician or the regulator of civil society, but rather loves to improve any beautiful thing [whatsoever].[147] And there is again another ultimate [aim] more honourable than that and than each [other] ultimate [aim], namely the ultimate [aim] of the philosopher. For the philosopher does not only consider the beautiful things which exist in practice only, but also those beautiful things which exist in the substances and in the first excellent causes. And once he considers these [things], he becomes assimilated to them, and this is exactly the ultimate [aim] beyond which there is no [other] ultimate [aim] and which cannot be transgressed by human nature.

And this, I mean the imitation of God (magnified and exalted be He), is the primordial remedy with respect to the soul. The agent cause of assimilation is participation in something;[148] and the agent cause of participation in something is amazement.[149] The reason is that knowledge

[147] Possibly a reference to Plato's concept of the musician who is said to love beautiful things in general (τὰ τοῦ καλοῦ ἐρωτικά), that is beauty "in connection with actions and things", but has not yet acquired the philosopher's sense of absolute beauty (cf. *Rep*. III, 403c, V, 476–479). Proclus refers repeatedly to the musician as φιλόκαλος (*In Plat. Alcib. I*, 206.10, *In Plat. Rem publ.* I, 59.1, etc.), which is why I read *al-muḥibb al-mu'thir li-al-umūr al-jamīla* (with *muḥibb mu'thir* as hendiadys for the element φιλο- in φιλόκαλος) at the beginning of the sentence (cf. also *GALex* I, p. 38).

[148] Namely, in the case of the soul, the participation in the Intellect, "for perfection comes to each when it becomes like its intelligible Form. As the aim of Soul is likeness to Intellect, so the good of all things sensible is likeness to the intelligible and divine Forms. Whence, then, comes this common and perfecting element if not from intelligible Likeness? Or, if you prefer, whence comes the factor that fills up their being? For the being of each thing is defined by this, I mean by its likeness to intelligibles, and it is through being like its Idea that each thing is what it really is", *In Plat. Parm*. 853.18–25: II, 21f. (trans. Morrow & Dillon, p. 222). Additionally, participation is an instrument or means of assimilation: "Participation, then, takes place by assimilation (ὁμοίωσις). He [*i.e.*, Socrates/Plato, *R.A.*] has introduced this concept by calling the Forms patterns and the things participating them likenesses, and this participation for this reason assimilation", *In Plat. Parm*. 906.27–30: II, 92 (trans. Morrow & Dillon, p. 265, v. also *In Plat. Parm*. 910: II, 96f.). However, the Intellect qua Idea of the soul is not the final cause of the latter's assimilation, "for even if we say that it creates by reason of its very essence, and that becoming like to it is an end for all generated things, nevertheless the final cause of all things in the strict sense and that for the sake of which all things are is superior to the Ideas", *In Plat. Parm*. 888.18-21: II, 67 (trans. Morrow & Dillon, p. 249, v. also *In Plat. Parm*. 912: II, 99f.).

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of the divine things makes us turn into amazement, and amazement makes us turn into participating in something, because man desires what he is amazed about, and in order to participate in it in some [respect], he assimilates to it.

This is the end of the explanation of Hippocrates' and Plato's words and the end of [Galen's] book *On Habits*. Praise be to God, who possesses perfect power and all-embracing graciousness, and God's blessing upon His prophet Muḥammad and his family! May He keep [them] safe.

V. APPENDIX: THE ARABIC VERSIONS OF HIPPOCRATES' Περὶ διαίτης ὀξέων

As stated above, Galen quotes in Περὶ ἐθῶν among other texts Hippocrates' Περὶ διαίτης ὀξέων (*On Regimen in Acute Diseases*). The quite comprehensive excerpt covers chapters 28.2–3, 29.2–32, and 36–37.3 of the Hippocratic treatise.[150] The translation of Galen's Περὶ ἐθῶν, in turn, is followed by an Arabic version of extracts from Galen's commentary on these sections of Hippocrates' Περὶ διαίτης ὀξέων, which contains the same quotations once again in exactly the same wording. Regardless of the fact that the Arabic translation of Galen's commentary has not yet been edited, the two texts preserved in MS Aya Sofya 3725 provide occasion to address anew the still pending question who prepared the extant complete Arabic translation of the Hippocratic text edited by M. C. Lyons.[151] This translation contains an Arabic version different from the sections quoted twice in MS Aya Sofya 3725.

The manuscripts used by Lyons point unanimously to Ḥunayn ibn Isḥāq as translator.[152] However, Ḥunayn himself reports in his *Letter on the Translations of Galen's Works* to have translated the

[149] *Al-taʿajjub*, presumably for τὸ θαῦμα or a form of θαυμάζω, cf. Proclus, *In Plat. Tim*. I, 133: προηγεῖται μὲν οὖν τὸ θαῦμα, διότι καὶ ἐν ἡμῖν ἀρχὴ τοῦτό ἐστι τῆς τῶν ὅλων γνώσεως, ἐν δὲ τοῖς θείοις συνάπτει τῷ θαυμαζομένῳ τὸ θαυμάζον ("So amazement comes first, because in us too it is the origin of the cognition of the whole, while among things divine it joins the subject of amazement with its object", trans. Tarrant, vol. 1, 228f.). For θαυμάζειν as the beginning of philosophy cf. Plato, *Theat*. 155d, Arist., *Metaph*. A 2, 982b11ff. On the role of amazement (θαῦμα) and the wish to participate in the One and the Good in Proclus' conception of the process of ὁμοίωσις θεῷ, cf. Werner Beierwaltes, *Proklos: Grundzüge seiner Metaphysik,* Zweite, durchgesehene und erweiterte Auflage, Philosophische Abhandlungen 24 (Frankfurt am Main, 1979), pp. 294–313.

[150] Corresponding with pp. 123–5 of the edition by Hugo Kühlewein, *Hippocratis Opera quae feruntur omnia*. Vol. 1 (Leipzig, 1894); and pp. 48–51 of the edition by Robert Joly, *Hippocrate*. Tome VI. 2e Partie: *Du régime des maladies aiguës. Appendice. De l'aliment. De l'usage des liquides* (Paris, 1972).

[151] Malcolm C. Lyons, *Kitāb Tadbīr al-amrāḍ al-ḥādda li-Buqrāṭ (Hippocrates: Regimen in Acute Diseases)*, edited and translated with introduction, notes and glossary, Arabic Technical and Scientific Texts, vol. 1 (Cambridge, 1966).

[152] Cf. Degen, "Zur arabischen Überlieferung", p. 185; Lyons, *Tadbīr al-amrāḍ,* p. XII.

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Hippocratic text together with Galen's commentary into Syriac,[153] without mentioning any Arabic translation by his hand, and adds the information that **(a)** he heard about *(balaghanī)* a translation prepared by Ayyūb (presumably Ayyūb al-Ruhāwī, *i.e.* Ayyōḇ Urhāyā = Hiob of Edessa[154]), and **(b)** ʿĪsā ibn Yaḥyā translated three of the five chapters of this work into Arabic for Abū al-Ḥasan Aḥmad ibn Mūsā.[155] Furthermore, Ḥunayn writes about **(c)** an abridged version of the contents or major points of the treatise *(ikhtaṣartu maʿānīyahu)* he had composed himself following the method of question and answer.

Lyons presents no definite solution to these conflicting bibliographical data, but proposes to conceive the ascription to Ḥunayn in the Arabic manuscripts as referring to Ḥunayn's Syriac translation of Galen's commentary from which ʿĪsā ibn Yaḥyā then extracted the *lemmata* of the Hippocratic text and translated them from Syriac into Arabic.[156] This proposal has been refuted by R. Degen, who argues that both the references to Ḥunayn in the manuscripts and the literal correspondences between the Hippocratic text edited by Lyons and the Hippocratic quotations in an Arabic translation of Galen's Περὶ τῆς κατὰ τὸν Ἱπποκράτην διαίτης ἐπὶ τῶν ὀξέων νοσημάτων rather point to Ḥunayn as the originator of the extant Arabic version of Hippocrates' Περὶ διαίτης ὀξέων. Galen's Περὶ τῆς κατὰ τὸν Ἱπποκράτην διαίτης is indeed explicitly adduced in the *Letter on the Translations of Galen's Works* as one of Galen's works translated by Ḥunayn himself into Arabic.[157] Unlike Lyons, Degen relates Ḥunayn's report on the Arabic translation by ʿĪsā ibn Yaḥyā (v. above, **[b]**), not to Galen's commentary including the *lemmata* of Hippocrates' Περὶ διαίτης ὀξέων, but rather to **(c)**, Ḥunayn's own abridged version in form of questions and answers.[158] However, this raises the question why Ḥunayn in the *Letter on the Translations of Galen's Works* mentions his Syriac translation of Galen's commentary, yet conceals his Arabic translation. Degen plausibly counterargues that this Arabic translation may date from a period posterior to the latest "update" of Ḥunayn's *Letter*.

Now, we know from the three documents, Ḥunayn's *Letter on the Translations,* his letter to Salmawayh ibn Bunān, and the preamble by Ḥubaysh, that the excerpts of Galen's commentary on Hippocrates' Περὶ διαίτης ὀξέων preserved in MS Aya Sofya 3725

[153] Cf. Bergsträsser, *Ḥunain ibn Isḥāq über die syrischen und arabischen Galen-Übersetzungen,* p. 41 (Ar. text), p. 33 (German trans.), and the comments by Degen, "Zur arabischen Überlieferung", p. 186.
[154] Cf. Ullmann, *Die Medizin im Islam*, p. 101f.
[155] Cf. above, note 19.
[156] Cf. Lyons, *Tadbīr al-amrāḍ,* p. XIII.
[157] Cf. Bergsträsser, *Ḥunain ibn Isḥāq über die syrischen und arabischen Galen-Übersetzungen,* p. 36 (Ar. text), p. 30 (German trans.).
[158] Cf. Degen, "Zur arabischen Überlieferung", pp. 186–9.

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were translated by Ḥubaysh from Ḥunayn's Syriac version into Arabic. According to Lyons hypothesis, we are thus faced with two Arabic translations of Ḥunayn's Syriac translation (or translations), the one prepared by ʿĪsā ibn Yaḥyā on the basis of Ḥunayn's complete Syriac translation of Galen's commentary, the other prepared by Ḥubaysh on the basis of Ḥunayn's Syriac translation of the sections quoted in MS Aya Sofya 3725. On the other hand, if we follow Degen's argumentation, we are faced, in MS Aya Sofya 3725, with Ḥubaysh's Arabic translation of these quotations from Ḥunayn's Syriac version, whereas the text edited by Lyons contains Ḥunayn's own Arabic version produced at a relatively late date of his translation activities. In what follows I will try to argue that both hypotheses are not very likely, although, to say this in advance, I am not able to supply any reasonable alternative. I use *Ḥ* as abbreviation for Ḥubaysh's translation in MS Aya Sofya 3725, *L* for the version edited by Lyons, and *S* for Ḥunayn's (lost) Syriac version on which Ḥubaysh drew.[159] Let us compare some examples:

Hippocrates, Περὶ διαίτης ὀξέων, § 28.2, ed. Joly, p. 48.2–5	***MS Aya Sofya 3725*, fol. 196b5–9 (= *Galen's* Περὶ ἐθῶν, ed. Klein-Franke, p. 141.5–8)**	***Kitāb Tadbīr al-amrāḍ al-ḥādda li-Buqrāṭ*, ed. Lyons, p. 17.10–13**
Ἀλλὰ μὴν εὐκαταμάθητόν γέ ἐστιν, ὅτι φαύλη δίαιτα βρώσιος καὶ πόσιος αὐτὴ ἑωυτῇ ἐμφερὴς αἰεὶ ἀσφαλεστέρη ἐστὶν τὸ ἐπίπαν ἐς ὑγείην, ἢ εἴ τις ἐξαπίνης μέγα μεταβάλλοι ἐς ἄλλο κρεῖσσον (ἐς ἄλλο κρεῖσσον Gal.: ἐς ἄλλα *cod., ed. Joly*).	قد تقدر أن تعلم بأهون السعى أمر التدبير الرديء في المطعم والمشرب إذا كان يجري على أمر واحد يشبه بعضه بعضاً دائماً فهو أوثق وأحرز وأبعد عن الخطر في التماس الصحّة من أن ينقل الرجل تدبيره دفعةً ويغيّره تغييراً عظيماً إلى شيء آخر أفضل منه	ومعرفة ذلك سهلة أعني أنّ التدبير الرديء بالمطعم والمشرب الشبيه بعضه ببعض أوفق بالجملة في جميع الأوقات في حفظ الصحّة من الانتقال بغتةً إلى تدبير آخر أجود منه

[159] It goes without saying that the wording of the Hippocratic excerpts preserved in *S* must have been more or less identical with the *lemmata* of Ḥunayn's Syriac translation of Galen's commentary, even if we assume that Ḥunayn did not simply extract his appendix to Galen's Περὶ ἐθῶν from his already existing translation, but prepared *S* separately or at an earlier stage of his career.

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Ḥ renders εὐκαταμάθητόν γέ ἐστιν by a verbal clause and reflects the determinative force of ἀλλὰ μὴν … γε[160] through the use of the elative *bi-ahwani al-saʿyi*. *L* hardly draws on the same Syriac translation as *Ḥ*, as it uses for εὐκαταμάθητόν … ἐστιν a much shorter nominal phrase, which renders both components of the word εὐκαταμάθητος through Arabic roots other than those used by *Ḥ* (respectively *S*). Furthermore, *L* fails to render the meaning of ἀλλὰ μὴν … γε (or simply ignores it). That Ḥunayn captured the meaning of the Greek particles in *S*, yet was unable or negligent to do so in *L,* is quite unlikely. Finally, while *Ḥ* interprets ὑγεία as "gaining" or "acquiring health" *(iltimās al-ṣiḥḥa),* it is rendered through "preservation of health" *(ḥifẓ al-ṣiḥḥa)* in *L*.[161]

Hippocrates, Περὶ διαίτης ὀξέων, § 30.1, ed. Joly, p. 49.4	***MS Aya Sofya 3725*, fol. 197a7 (= Περὶ ἐθῶν, ed. Klein-Franke, p. 141.20)**	***Kitāb Tadbīr al-amrāḍ al-ḥādda li-Buqrāṭ,* ed. Lyons, p. 19.1**
καὶ οὐρέουσι θερμὸν καὶ χλωρόν	ويبول بولاً حارّاً أصفر اللون	ويكون بوله بولاً حارّاً أخضر اللون

S seems to have renderd χλωρός, "pale-green, greenish-yellow", by a word meaning "pale, yellow", translated through *aṣfar* in *Ḥ*. The originator of *L* (or its Syriac antecedent), on the other hand, emphasized the greenish shade.

In this section, *L* omits τοιαῦτα (rendered through *ʿalā mā waṣaftu* in *Ḥ*). This is much easier explicable through an omission (or haplography, ταῦτα τοιαῦτα) in the Greek than through any kind of mistake in the Arabic transmission. However, this being the case, either *L* must have been produced (contrary to Lyons assumption) on the basis of a Greek manuscript or, following Degen's hypothesis, Ḥunayn must have used for his direct Arabic translation *(L)* another manuscript than for his Syriac translation *(S)*. Even more significant is the remaining part of the sentence: *Ḥ* and its Vorlage *S* are based on the reading εἵνεκεν … μεταβολῆς, παρὰ τὸ ἔθος οὔτε προσθεῖναι λυσιτελέειν φαίνεται…, *i.e.* they relate, probably correctly, παρὰ τὸ ἔθος to προσθεῖναι λυσιτελέειν φαίνεται. *L,* on the other hand, relates παρὰ τὸ ἔθος to the preceding μεταβολῆς ("because of the change … into what is beyond their normal practice"), reading εἵνεκεν …

[160] Cf. John Dewar Denniston, *The Greek Particles*, Second Edition Revised by K. J. Dover (Oxford, 1950; repr. London, 1996), pp. 116–19; γέ, attested in the manuscripts *MV*, is rejected by Joly.

[161] Furthermore, *L* omits μέγα (rendered through *taghyīran ʿaẓīman* in *Ḥ*), but that may have been caused by the manuscript transmission.

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Hippocrates, Περὶ διαίτης ὀξέων, § 31, ed. Joly, p. 49.11–14	***MS Aya Sofya 3725*, fol. 197a11–14 (= Περὶ ἐθῶν, ed. Klein-Franke, p. 141.23–25)**	***Kitāb Tadbīr al-amrāḍ al-ḥādda li-Buqrāṭ*, ed. Lyons, p. 19.7–9**
Ὁκότε οὖν ταῦτα τοιαῦτα γίγνεται τοῖσιν ὑγιαίνουσιν εἵνεκεν ἡμίσεος ἡμέρης διαίτης μεταβολῆς παρὰ τὸ ἔθος οὔτε προσθεῖναι λυσιτελέειν φαίνεται, οὔτε ἀφελέειν	فإذا كانت هذه الأشياء قد تعرض للأصحّاء على ما وصفت وذلك بسبب تغيّر التدبير الذي جرت به العادة في نصف النهار فالأمر ظاهر أنّه ليس ينبغي أن يزاد فيما جرت به العادة ولا ينقص منه	فمتى عرضت هذه الأعراض للأصحّاء بسبب تغييرهم التدبير في نصف اليوم إلى خلاف ما جرت به عادتهم فالأصلح عندي ألّا تزيد ولا تنقص

μεταβολῆς παρὰ τὸ ἔθος, οὔτε προσθεῖναι λυσιτελέειν φαίνεται... Hence, *S* cannot be the source of *L*, nor is it very likely that *S* and *L* stem from the same translator.

Hippocrates, Περὶ διαίτης ὀξέων, § 37.1, ed. Joly, p. 50.22–51.2	***MS Aya Sofya 3725*, fol. 197b9-13 (= Περὶ ἐθῶν, ed. Klein-Franke, p. 142.8–11)**	***Kitāb Tadbīr al-amrāḍ al-ḥādda li-Buqrāṭ*, ed. Lyons, p. 21.8–12**
Καὶ ὅσα μὲν κρεηφαγίη πολλὴ παρὰ τὸ ἔθος βρωθεῖσα ποιεῖ ..., ἧσσον ἄν τις θαυμάσειεν εἰ τὰ τοιαῦτα πόνους ἐμποιεῖ ἐν τῇσι κοιλίῃσι μᾶλλον ἄλλων	وليس بعجب لمن يتناول من اللحم مقداراً كبيراً على غير عادته ... أن يعرض له من أمثال هذه الأشياء في البطن وجع وإن يكون ذلك من بعضها أكثر من بعض	وكلّ ما فعله تناول اللحم بكثرة على خلاف العادة ... فالعجب من كلّ من كانت هذه حاله أنّ بعضه يحدث في المعدة من الوجع أكثر ومن بعض أقلّ

The two translations differ in that *L* seems to relate ἧσσον just like μᾶλλον to πόνους ἐμποιεῖ ("one wonders ... that it causes pain to the stomach, for some more, for others less"). Presumably, this misinterpretation was caused by the omission of εἰ in the translator's

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Vorlage. *Ḥ* correctly related ἧσσον to τις θαυμάσειεν and, unlike *L*, read εἰ *(wa-in)* in his Vorlage.

On the basis of this sample, we can rule out the hypothesis that both the version edited by Lyons and the Arabic excerpts translated by Ḥubaysh draw on Ḥunayn's Syriac translation of Galen's commentary (respectively excerpts thereof attached to Ḥunayn's translation of Galen's Περὶ ἐθῶν). First, because the ultimate Greek source of *L* differed from the source of *S* and *Ḥ*; secondly, because *S*/*Ḥ* deviate here and there in their interpretation of one and the same Greek text from *L*. As the bibliographical testimonies concerning Ḥubaysh's version are quite reliable, we are relatively safe in concluding that *L* does not derive from a Syriac version by Ḥunayn. Is *L*, then, a direct Arabic translation prepared by the late Ḥunayn himself? – In all likelihood, it is not. Sustaining this hypothesis would presuppose that Ḥunayn used for this translation another and less reliable Greek manuscript than the one he used before for his Syriac translation. Secondly, we would have to assume that Ḥunayn not only changed his mind about the meaning of some words and passages, but at some places even failed to grasp the exact meaning of the Greek which he had rendered correctly in his earlier Syriac translation. In general, *Ḥ* (respectively *S*) represents the Greek text in a superior and more faithful way than *L*. I therefore tend to conceive the attribution to Ḥunayn in the manuscripts used by Lyons as false (a phenomenon which is well known due to Ḥunayn's reputation and not an isolated case), no matter whether this concerns the postulated Syriac *Vorlage* or the Arabic version itself.

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