as those who embrace them. Alexander George and Andrew Bennett's *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences* is an impressive and welcome addition to this literature.

Alexander George has helped to explicate and develop the case study method for decades, and with his former student Andrew Bennett he has produced a book that is not only clear and comprehensive but also bold and frank. The authors' first contribution is to offer a systematic guide to the nuts and bolts of case study–based research. There are chapters on designing, executing, and analyzing the results of case studies; on distinguishing structured, focused comparison, controlled comparison, and within-case analysis; on case studies and the philosophy of social science; and on two particular types of work that George and Bennett advocate, process tracing and the congruence method. Taken together, these chapters tell students and fellow practitioners all they need to know (and more) about how to go about such research.

However, the book also offers a spirited defense of *why* scholars should do it—a subject that other recent books on qualitative methods have neglected. Two of the authors' arguments are worth special mention, those relating to causality and to the generation of new insights, hypotheses, and theories.

George and Bennett argue that case studies offer the best, and perhaps only, way to explore causality. Only by carefully studying the unfolding and dynamics of particular cases, they claim, can scholars figure out precisely what mechanisms and variables caused a particular political outcome to occur. Case study analysis can "check for spuriousness," "document . . . alternative causal paths to the same outcome and alternative outcomes for the same causal factor," and remains "the only observational means of moving beyond covariation alone as a source of causal inference" (pp. 223–24). "Even when rational choice theory or other formal models predict outcomes with a fairly high degree of accuracy," the authors note, "they do not constitute acceptable causal explanations unless they demonstrate . . . that their posited or implied causal mechanisms were in fact operative in the predicted cases" (p. 208). By reminding us that the central challenge of political science is understanding *why* political outcomes occur, they perform a great service to a discipline that in recent years has grown unhealthily obsessed with hypothesis testing (or the "logic of confirmation") alone.

George and Bennett are also keen to assert the contributions that case studies can make to the generation of new thinking. Here they take aim at the claim made by Gary King, Robert Keohane, and Sidney Verba (1994) in *Designing Social Inquiry* that "there is no such thing as a logical method of having new ideas. . . . Discovery contains 'an irrational element,' or a 'creative intuition'" (p. 12). George and Bennett agree that there is no surefire way to produce new ideas, but argue that case study work is uniquely well positioned to uncover "variables that were otherwise left out in the initial model" and generate new hypotheses "through the study of deviant or outlier cases and in the course of field work" (p. 20). Statistical methods, in contrast, "can identify deviant cases that may lead to new hypotheses, but in and of themselves . . . lack any clear means of actually identifying new hypotheses" (p. 21).

In sum, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences* aims to show not only that case study–based work can be as sophisticated and methodologically aware as quantitative and formal work, but also that it offers distinctive advantages in addressing causality and producing fresh thinking. With its fairly accessible style and helpful tips for teaching, this should make it a must-read for all political scientists interested in methodology.

Overcoming Apartheid: Can Truth Reconcile a Divided Nation? By James L. Gibson. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2004. 448p. $47.50 cloth, $22.50 paper.
DOI: 10.1017/S1537592707070508

— William A. Munro, *Illinois Wesleyan University*

In this engaging and meticulously constructed statistical analysis of attitudes among South Africa's apartheid-defined racial groups (African/black, Coloured, Asian, white), James Gibson sets out to do two things. One is to map the state of political reconciliation among these groups. The second is to measure the impact of South Africa's truth and reconciliation process, focusing on the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), in promoting reconciliation. The analysis is based largely on a national opinion survey carried out in 2000 and 2001, but also draws comparatively, where possible and appropriate, on a similar survey from 1997.

Taking reconciliation as a multidimensional concept, Gibson measures it along four distinct "subdimensions." At the *individual* level, he assesses the degree to which South Africans express equal respect for members of other groups. At the *cultural* level, he measures South Africans' commitment to the rule of law (as a proxy for the human rights culture the TRC sought to build). At the *group* level, he assesses the levels of tolerance that South Africans feel for their political enemies. And at the *institutional* level, he assesses South Africans' loyalty to the new institutional order by examining their attachment to parliament and to the constitutional court. The book walks the reader through each of these measures, and it is an enlightening walk. Overall, the findings are sobering: South Africans are not very reconciled (partly because of racial isolation); no group is strongly attached to the rule of law, though whites are more attached than blacks; South Africans tend to be quite intolerant of their political enemies, and intolerance breaks down significantly along racial lines (though notably, South Africans across racial groups are

https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592707070508 Published online by Cambridge University Press

least tolerant of organizations that are weakly allied to the rule of law); South Africans across racial groups tend to think that amnesty produces unfair outcomes.

Yet these dispiriting trends mask considerable, and frequently surprising, variations within and between racial groups. For instance, a greater proportion of blacks than whites "believe that the struggle to preserve apartheid was just" (p. 83). Whites are more attached to the rule of law, but less attached to parliament or the constitutional court. Most Africans oppose amnesty but support the TRC. Most are angry at the government's failure to compensate victims of apartheid, but that does not appear to have undermined the new regime's moral authority. Thus, one of the book's most striking features is its vivid depiction of the complexity and fluidity of political attitudes in transition as South Africans negotiate overlapping identities, affiliations, and perspectives on race, culture, and politics. For this reason alone, it is an extremely valuable addition to the scholarship on sociocultural and political dynamics in contemporary South Africa.

In addition, Gibson finds support for the hypothesis that truth contributes to reconciliation. To test this, he delineates the elements of a "collective memory" of apartheid advanced by the TRC (its "truth"), and measures the degree to which racial groups accept this account of history. Then he tests the acceptance of this truth against the degree to which South Africans express attitudes of reconciliation toward one another. He concludes that the TRC was quite successful in creating a collective memory that acknowledged that all sides in the liberation struggle carried out vile acts. This established a "moderate view of apartheid" (p. 99) that made it easier for all sides to accept the TRC's truth and undermined each side's ability to present their struggle as one of "pure" against "evil" forces. As such, it facilitated reconciliation.

The evidence for a *causal* relationship between truth and reconciliation is not strong, however. Careful not to overstate his claims, Gibson conjectures about the processes whereby truth leads to reconciliation. He suggests that "the truth and reconciliation process may have changed the way South Africans think about each other by creating cognitive dissonance and by mitigating cognitive dogmatism," thereby weakening interracial fear, suspicion, and hatred (p. 158). But alternative conjectures are equally plausible. As much opinion polling in the mid–1990s showed, attitudinal shifts were much messier and drawn out than Gibson's account suggests. In his view, the truth and reconciliation process *brought about* a process that was, in fact, well under way when the TRC was established. Indeed, it is more likely that the TRC marshaled deepening uncertainties and incoherences into an authoritative narrative than that it *created* the cognitive dissonances. Here one wishes for closer attention to the dynamics of the transition that the author's dependence on cross-sectional data disallows.

Among the many arresting findings of the book, two stand out for their broader implications. One, in a nuanced discussion of why South Africans may be skeptical of the rule of law, is the conclusion that "*for South Africans of every race, law seems to be perceived as a mechanism for preventing the majority from getting what it wants.* Those who believe in strong majoritarianism are much less likely to believe in legal universalism" (p. 200; italics in original). This finding provides principled support for the stress others have laid on the importance of protecting minority rights in new democracies (see, for instance, the UN Development Program's 2004 Human Development Report). The other is that even if citizens oppose amnesty, their opinions are substantially moderated by the presence in the process of some form of justice (distributive, procedural, restorative, or—last and least—retributive). As Gibson stresses, *"justice does matter"* (p. 284), but it can be realized in a variety of forms and depends on practical perceptions of fairness within the community—what one might call the popular moral economy (not his term). Gibson does not suggest how we might analyze this, but it opens a promising avenue for further research.

The book's findings also invoke new analytical challenges, notably the need to understand *how* attitude formation occurs in transitional polities. For instance, while its account of the TRC's actual workings is sketchy, the data suggest that this process may have been crucial in cementing its legitimacy and moral authority. In addition, the political dynamics of transition may have a causal impact on the relationship between truth and reconciliation that the book does not probe. And, as Gibson notes, we need to know more about how institutional consolidation occurs than his analysis allows. Taken together, these findings suggest the salience of *process* as a causal factor that is not taken up here. That said, this is a clear, creative, and insightful empirical analysis. Inasmuch as social science research advances through the production of new questions as well as new knowledge, it is exemplary, and will be enlightening and useful not only to transitions scholars and South Africanists but also to students in methodology classes.

Rotten States? Corruption, Post-Communism, and Neoliberalism. By Leslie Holmes. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2006. 440p. $84.95 cloth, $23.95 paper.
DOI: 10.1017/S153759270707051X

— Paul E. Sum, *University of North Dakota*

As a veteran of corruption studies in the postcommunist world, Leslie Holmes addresses three fundamental issues confronting students of corruption: the definition and categorization of corruption, the impact corruption has on democracies, and causal factors that account for its rise within postcommunist states. The comparative study focuses on Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, and Russia. China,

https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592707070508 Published online by Cambridge University Press