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ISRAEL'S "SECURITY NETWORK" AND ITS IMPACT: AN EXPLORATION OF A NEW APPROACH

This article discusses a critical factor that has influenced Israel's politics, society, economy, and public discourse since this state's establishment in 1948, and particularly after the 1967 war: a highly informal but at the same time very potent "Security Network." This Network has been critically involved in the political, social, economic, and cultural spheres, and its impact is felt in major and lesser issues. It is made up of actors who (*a*) are connected by informal, nonhierarchical ties; (*b*) share common values and perceptions regarding Israel's security and the ways to promote it; (*c*) have identical or similar individual and collective interests; and (*d*) are capable of joining hands to influence policymaking on different levels and in various spheres of the country's public life.

There are two types of actors that make up Israel's Security Network: first, prominent members of the state's large and varied defense establishment (DE)[1]; second, influential actors within its various civilian spheres, particularly in its "political society"[2] and "civil society."[3] The first category of actors includes "security officials" in active service, that is, senior army officers and their equals in the state's other security apparatuses. The second category includes retired security officials (including officers in the army's reserves) who have been integrated into various political, socioeconomic, and cultural spheres, as well as a host of civilian politicians, bureaucrats, private entrepreneurs, and journalists on the national and local levels.

Drawing on the expanding literature on "policy networks" (see later), we conceptualize the intricate informal ties between all these actors in terms of a policy network whose inherent concern is the broad realm of security—we therefore refer to it as Israel's Security Network—and explore its significant impact on policymaking in this state in recent decades. Indeed, although the Network itself is quite diverse, our emphasis here is on its common features and interests and, ultimately, on its exceptional ability to impact many aspects of public life in Israel.

The main goals of this essay are thus the following: to define Israel's Security Network and discuss its composition, size, and the myriad roles it has come to play; to explain how this Network came into being and how it managed to acquire its prominent status,

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and to show its relative strength in various areas and actual impact in concrete cases; and to provide a conceptual framework that would encourage additional studies on this topic both in Israel and in other countries that show similarities in this sphere.

Despite its relatively large size—a conservative estimate would put the number of the Network's active members at several hundreds per decade, reaching at least a few thousands since 1948—and considerable influence on policymaking and concrete policies in recent decades, the existence and impact of Israel's Security Network constitute an understudied aspect in the otherwise extensive literature on its politics and society. Particularly striking is its absence from recent academic debates over the country's pattern of civil–military relations, which, in turn, suggests interlinkages between Israel's Zionist and national background, its unsettled borders, its unending conflicts with its neighbors, and the peculiar type of relations that have developed between its civilian and military spheres.[4] Before we explain what the Security Network is and how it emerged, it is appropriate that we briefly touch on these debates, and especially on those areas where our own approach is different and could be of theoretical and analytical help.

THE DEBATE ON CIVIL–MILITARY RELATIONS IN ISRAEL AND OUR APPROACH

Broadly speaking, one can distinguish between the "traditional," "critical," and "new critical" approaches to the study of the relationship between Israel's civil and military realms.[5] The first approach has drawn on general theories of civil–military relations, and especially on the sociological approach developed by Janowitz and Luckham, as opposed to Huntington's political approach.[6] This school, whose members were influenced by structural–functional theories that had dominated Israeli social sciences until the 1980s, focused on the formal structural and functional features of what they had perceived as the distinctive civilian and military subsystems of the Israeli state. Their overall argument was that the civilian sector in Israel was, traditionally, the dominant among the two.[7] It is easy to comprehend that this school has overlooked many features of the Israeli case, especially since 1967, and particularly the more informal aspects of the relations between what they had perceived as two separate subsystems. The second approach heralded a more general inclination of Israeli social scientists in the 1980s and 1990s to reexamine the history of the Yishuv—the Jewish Community in Palestine before 1948—and the State of Israel, including the societal and political arrangements that influenced the relationship between their civilian and military sectors and their policy roles. Its adherents dealt more critically with the underlying ideological positions of these two sectors, focusing, for example, on the continuous involvement of political parties (especially Mapai) in the Israel Defense Force (IDF) since 1948, the military's growing intervention in politics since 1967, and the ways in which Israel's political society has turned into a lodestone for retired security officials.[8] Still, the focus was on two clearly distinguishable sectors and insufficient attention was paid to informal aspects. Finally, the third approach is influenced by the postmodernist tradition in the social sciences, which percolated into the Israeli social sciences during the 1990s. Unlike the other two approaches, it emphasizes the cultural aspects of Israeli politics and society, and especially their "militaristic" tendencies, and criticizes the almost nonexistence of a vigorous civil society in this state, which allows its DE to play a major

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role in policymaking.[9] Although we accept that Israel's civilian sector is relatively weak, particularly when compared with the DE, we do not concur that civil society does not exist in this case. We contend, moreover, that the weakness of the latter stems from various factors, such as the general predominance of the State over society, the considerable lag in the active involvement of civil society organizations in Israeli politics, and the continuous economic difficulties experienced by large segments of Israeli society that lead them to rely on the state.

To sum up, traditional and critical studies, which apply theories of civil–military relations to the Israeli case, suggest a "partnership" between its clearly distinguishable civil and military subsystems, whereas new critical studies anchored in postmodern approaches posit that its society is inherently "militaristic," a fact that accounts for the predominance of the security sphere and the inherent weakness (or the nonexistence) of a truly civilian sphere. Yet, only few works have offered a more dynamic appraisal of the Israeli case, for example, by identifying something resembling a "military–industrial complex" in Israel.[10] Moreover, no attempt has been made to broaden this characterization to deal with the intricate informal ties and relationships that emerged among various actors operating within Israel's DE and other actors within the country's political, social, economic, and discursive realms, and to explore their accumulative impact on policymaking and major policies in Israel.

ISRAEL'S SECURITY NETWORK

Israel's Security Network is a particular type of a policy network. The concept of policy networks—"clusters of actors, each of which has an interest, or 'stake' in a given policy sector and the capacity to help determine policy success or failure"[11]—has been developed as a way to describe, explain, and predict the outcomes of policymaking by means of such hybrid arrangements.[12] Such networks involve the institutionalization of beliefs, values, cultures, and particular forms of behavior. They are organizations that shape attitudes and behavior. Networks result from repeated behavior and, consequently, they relieve decision makers of making difficult decisions; they help customize behavior. They simplify the policy process by limiting actions, problems, and solutions. Networks define roles and responses. In doing so, they are not neutral but, like other political institutions and processes, they both reflect past power distributions and conflicts and shape political outcomes.[13]

Our concept of Israel's Security Network, thus, connotes a complex and fluid type of relationship between acting and retired individuals and groups of security officials and civilian actors, one that is ultimately capable of shaping policymaking in general and determining concrete policies and their implementation. Like other similar networks, actors from both types of realms have shared values, interests, and goals. Not every person can join this Network; thus, the inclusion and exclusion issue is a significant matter for active and potential members. The stability of the Network depends on continuous contacts between its active members. The structure of the Network is not determined by formal agreements, and it is not hierarchical. The boundaries between the actors that make up this Network can continuously change and they are blurred, significant overlapping areas are created, and the civilian actors are neither equal in their power to the security officials nor able to exercise effective control over them, or

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significantly reduce their impact on policymaking. In addition, movement between the DE and each of the civilian spheres remains frequent, if not "natural."

As indicated above, the concept of a Security Network is different from previous conceptualizations of the Israeli case. In contrast to traditional and critical approaches, which speak of "fragmented boundaries" between purportedly autonomous security and civil spheres, or of a "partnership" between them, we contend that Israel's Security Network works *against* systemic differentiation of the DE from the political society and the civil society, as well as against more efficiency, transparency, and accountability in the agencies that comprise it. Instead, it creates a high level of continuous mutual penetration and interdependency, where security officials require mainly the formal approval of their civilian partners, who occupy key positions in the cabinet, the Knesset, and other institutions, and in return legitimize the latter's actions. The persistence of this state of affairs renders the notion of the IDF's "role expansion" or "role contraction,"[14] or the notion of a "crisis" in civil–military relations in Israel,[15] irrelevant, because these terms suggest the existence of two clearly delineated and stable subsystems that are more or less equal in strength and interact voluntarily.

We also posit that Israel's Security Network stems not from the "militaristic" nature of Zionism, underscored by both the cultural and materialist strands of the new critical approach, but rather from the particular informal power structure established by the founding fathers of the Israeli State and their successors, who sought to use the DE to promote the process of *state formation*.[16] The boundaries between the security and civilian spheres of the nascent state, which were deliberately kept porous, ultimately allowed security officials to penetrate civilian realms and forge alliances and networks with influential actors within them. In their quest to guarantee the corporate interests of their institutions, as well as their own personal and collective interests, actors from within the DE and their civilian partners (who included a growing number of retired security officials), thus, came to eclipse Israel's civilian leaders, and as an informal collective entity became one of the most influential amalgamated political actors in the country. In our view, it is the continued existence of Israel's Security Network, especially since 1967, which has hindered the emergence of more differentiated civilian and military spheres in this country. This factor has contributed to the chaotic development of Israel's state and society and encouraged militaristic views and *modi operandi*; it also represents a major obstacle to the advancement of its democratic regime.[17]

Turning to the general literature on civil–military relations, the nominal separation between Israel's national-security realm and each of its political, social, economic, and discursive spheres, as well as the considerable weakness of its civilian realms, renders Huntington's notion of "objective control" of the military (i.e., a professional army separated from society by integral borders and supervised by the political society) inapplicable. The same is true with respect to Janowitz' model of a society of citizen soldiers, where the armed forces are effectively woven into the civil society. At the same time, our concept of the Security Network does bear a certain resemblance to two other—more critical—concepts developed during the Cold War to explain the potent fusion of security and civilian interests that comes at the expense of other national interests and public goods. The first is Mills' notion of a "power elite" composed of state functionaries, heads of large corporations, army generals, and social leaders, who "are in positions to make decisions" that have "major consequences" for their fellow

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countrymen[18]; the second is President Eisenhower's notion of a "military–industrial complex" in the United States, which, he warned, could lead to the "disastrous rise of misplaced power."[19] Yet, there are also considerable differences between our concept of the Security Network and these "models." Our analysis, which is informed by the expanding literature on "policy networks," also highlights both the structure and actual impact of this Network on policymaking and concrete policies.[20]

The strength of Israel's Security Network is particularly significant when juxtaposed with other institutions involved in policymaking in that country, especially the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,[21] and the decline of some of the major actors that had dominated its political society and civil society in the period of the Yishuv and the early years of independence. These include Israel's major political parties, especially the Labor Party, its workers' unions (chiefly the Histadrut) and the Kibbutz and Moshav movements, all of which were weakened considerably by the processes of liberalization and privatization in the country in the last decades. Indeed, whereas Israel's current political parties and civil society groups can hope to achieve only limited goals (e.g., the distribution of government positions among their own members, increased funds to either the ultrareligious or secular sectors), it is the Security Network that influences major policies.

The Security Network and Its Facets

The most significant sphere in which Israel's Security Network is manifest is the political society. From 1948 onward, but more conspicuously since 1967 because of Israel's overwhelming military victory, actors within the DE and its retirees have effectively monopolized the definition of, and the setting of priorities regarding, Israel's national security, the allocation of state resources, and other political, social, and economic matters. At the same time, retired and serving security officials penetrated, merged with, and established close links with actors in Israel's political and bureaucratic sectors on both the national and local levels. Fourteen retired army officers were elected as heads of municipalities in 1993, seventeen were elected in 1998, and nineteen were elected in 2003 (many others serve in other capacities in most municipalities). Thus, an article in the IDF Veterans Association bulletin contended: "No doubt, there is a clear recognition of the managerial and executive capacities of IDF retirees in the municipalities, on all levels and positions. These retirees continue to contribute to Israel's public affairs, as they were educated and experienced in the school of the IDF."[22]

The second sphere where the impact of the Network is apparent is Israel's civil society. One example is the movements in the realm of national security, such as the left-leaning Council for Peace and Security (CPS) and the rightist Security and Peace, which despite their political differences nonetheless share the view that the DE itself is beyond criticism. Thus, when Chief of Staff (CS) Moshe Yaalon was invited to speak before the CPS in August 2004 and one of its members criticized the IDF and its CS for what he described as their immoral conduct vis-à-vis the Palestinians, nearly all his colleagues attempted to silence him.[23]

The Network's third facet is its role in Israel's economy, where the DE presides over large industries and effectively controls vast public resources. The DE controls approximately half of Israel's land resources and a significant part of its airwaves,[24] and according to a recent article, "defense products and systems account for 32 percent of

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Israeli industrial exports."[25] In addition, many retired security officials serve as directors of large public and private firms, and under their influence and directorship, substantial segments of private industry have become security oriented. This factor considerably influences Israel's foreign policy and global orientation; thus, it has established close relationships with countries such as Singapore, South Africa, Turkey, Slovenia, and, more recently, with China and India, all of which have purchased Israeli weapons, obtained training by Israeli experts, and in certain cases conducted joint research projects with Israel's DE. In recent years, Israeli sales of military equipment to India and China created severe tensions with the United States.[26]

The fourth sphere where Israel's Security Network has been visible is the public discourse on national security as well as the formulation of the country's educational policies. In addition to the military censorship on all items dealing with national security, because of the predominance of the Network and their dependence on it for continuous flow of information, journalists generally exercise self-restraint, and military correspondents in both state-owned and private radio and TV channels, who depend almost entirely on the DE for information, more often than not reflect its positions and serve as it unofficial spokesmen.[27] At the same time, those analyzing the DE more critically—who are, of course, not part of the Network—are subject to pressures.[28] The area of public education, in turn, features several groups led by former security officials that advocate reforms, often stressing the causal linkage between the performance of Israel's educational system and its national security (see below).

Because of the informal nature of Israel's Security Network and its behind the scenes activities and because of the frequent changes in its composition due to old age, death, and loss of stature, it is difficult to determine the exact number of its members at a given time, provide an accurate description of its structure, or present a full assessment of its impact. Nevertheless, the next section presents some telling evidence regarding its size in the Knesset and the government.

THE EMERGENCE OF THE SECURITY NETWORK

The emergence of Israel's Security Network and its pivotal role can be explained in two ways. Using the toolkit of the new critical approach, one can consider its ascendancy in terms of the emergence of an abstract "military culture" and "militaristic politics" in Israel,[29] or, as others have put it, the *Diktat of Defense*. Without reiterating the debate as to whether Israel is indeed a "garrison state," has a "militarized" or "mobilized" society, or exhibits a "civil militarism,"[30] many public opinion polls have shown and it is widely accepted that a majority of its citizens consider security matters and concerns to be paramount.[31] In addition, the heads of the DE are widely considered to be more credible than Israel's political leaders.[32] This political culture factor has undoubtedly *facilitated* the emergence of the Network, and can account for its members' strong public appeal, which helps them achieve their ends. Still, when trying to explain the *emergence* of the Security Network and identify the turning points in this process, another set of factors, which involves more practical and measurable variables, ought to be considered.

In this context, the first factor that comes to mind is the growth in the number of people serving in the DE and later becoming dependent on its pension system, the size of the DE organizations, the volume of weapon systems they acquired, and related industries

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they established, and, consequently, the budgetary allocations for security purposes—all of which had risen considerably in the wake of the 1967 and 1973 wars.[33] There were several attempts to reduce the total allocation to the DE, whether because of harsh economic conditions in the early 1950s and mid-1980s, hopes for regional peace in the late 1970s and during the 1990s, and in the current decade as a result of the deepening economic recession in Israel and the changes in its geostrategic environment.[34] Still, and in a broader perspective, none of these steps have reduced the DE's predominance in Israel or allowed for the dismantling of the Security Network. As we show below, the opposite is true.

The need to maintain such a huge enterprise has turned the IDF into one of the largest Israeli customers in the domestic and foreign markets. The implications have been numerous: for example, the IDF determines standards of products and influences demand and supply of numerous goods. Gradually, the DE has become a major participant in all aspects of research and development in Israel, with noted examples being the Merkavah tank, the Arrow missile, the Amos and Ofeq satellites, nuclear research, and the high-tech industry. Even Israel's high-tech boom in the 1990s was due, at least in part, to some fifty enterprises launched by former security personnel. The market value of fifteen firms established by former members of the army's principal intelligence-gathering unit was estimated at $10 billion.[35] Almost unnoticed, as a result of its ownership of military industries, the IDF became not only a significant importer but also a major exporter of weapon systems, electronic devices, and know-how. Security-related exports have risen from an average of less than $1.5 billion per annum in the early 1990s to an average of $2.8 billion later, reaching a total of $20 billion in the period 1993–2003. In 2002, they reached $4.18 billion.[36] In addition, the DE initiates and finances numerous scientific studies, including in the fields of strategy, psychology, education, and the exact sciences, and operates special higher educational programs for its officials with the cooperation of Israel's universities.

Another factor is the relatively early retirement age of IDF personnel (the cycles of these retirements began in the mid-1950s). This factor, the product of pressures by the IDF on the government in the wake of the 1956 war, created a growing group of relatively young, retired security personnel seeking opportunities for second careers and enjoying at the same time financial backing in the form of generous pensions.[37] Moreover, that these men and women receive their pensions from the state and continue to serve in the reserves contributes to their unmitigated loyalty and allegiance to the DE and to their wish to continue to be members of the Network.

A strong commitment to the DE and an affiliation with the Security Network, create many career and business opportunities in Israel. This has been highly beneficial for both the retired personnel and members of the DE. A telling example is the field of arms trade and weapons export, which has attracted many retired officers and civilians who have worked for the DE since the early 1960s. Later, in the early 1980s, in view of the growing demand for Israel's expertise in securing facilities and persons, there emerged a vibrant branch catering to the local and foreign markets. The 11 September 2001 attacks on the United States reinforced this trend. Thus, the demand for these experts has grown, consequently opening up new possibilities for the Network and its members.[38] One report, which discusses the expansion of Israeli firms into the realm of security and safety, explains it in the following manner:

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The State of Israel would naturally prefer to offer the world Jaffa oranges, polished diamonds, Hi-Tech and colorful flowers—which it has been successfully exporting for many years. However, this country's unique geopolitical situation has forced it to also focus on security, and develop . . . state-of-the-art know-how, products and systems related to maintaining alert and security and fighting terror.[39]

In view of Israel's victory in the 1967 war and the creation of the myth of the DE's infallibility, demands for the services of its retired personnel in civilian markets increased manifold. Subsequently, their numbers as senior managers of, and advisers to, public and private economic enterprises grew further. A very limited survey that we conducted in 2003–4 has shown that over a hundred retired senior officials have served as high-ranking officials in public services and private firms, advisers, or heads of municipalities in Israel. Some statistics are provided below.

Three main advantages that former security personnel have over civilians helped Israel's DE become prominent in training officials for the public administration and significant parts of the economy. First, they have financial backing in the form of generous pensions and other benefits that facilitate their integration in civilian enterprises. Second, their purported and actual qualifications are considered to be applicable and, hence, attractive to both public and private firms. Third, they tend to have personal connections with other Network members (institutionalized through organizations such as *Tzevet*, the IDF Veterans Association, which serves as a lobby, or pressure group promoting their collective interests[40]) and with domestic and external actors. This connection enhances their mobility and adds to their appeal.

However, the two most important factors that account for the spread of the Security Network and its salient influence on actual policies in Israel are the increasing role of the DE in policymaking not only with respect to pure defense matters but also in regard to scientific and educational issues, and the much overlooked, gradual, but vast increase in the involvement of retired security officials in Israel's political society, which began in the mid-1950s and was enhanced by major events, especially the 1967 war and the Palestinian Intifadas. The next part discusses both processes and shows how their convergence has contributed greatly to the spreading, persistence, and, ultimately, the influence of Israel's Security Network.

How the DE Monopolized Israel's National Security Policies

This section discusses the process whereby Israel's Security Network came to play a pivotal part in determining the state's national security policy. As we suggest, in some instances this resulted in more bellicose behavior by Israel toward its neighbors. However, what is more important is how Israel's national security became monopolized by "experts," who effectively marginalized other actors from "their" turf. Indeed, whereas during the first two decades of independence conflicts occurred mainly between civilian and military leaders, the conflicts that took place since 1967 were, in many cases, within the Network itself.

As noted by historians and sociologists, because of an inherent continuity in its historical development, any discussion of the process of state formation in Israel and the making of its political society and civil society, including the relationship between

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its civilian and military realms, must begin with the Yishuv during the last two decades before 1948.[41] This observation also applies to the structure and roles of the Yishuv's military forces. The emphasis here is on the latter and their penetration into and shaping of the political, social, economic, and discursive subsystems of the Yishuv.

Until World War II, the Yishuv mainstream ("Organized Yishuv") established and commanded two paramilitary organizations, Haganah and Palmach, whereas the Revisionists (extremist nationalist movement) had two autonomous organizations, Etzel and Lehi. These forces were relatively small, utterly dependent on the relevant parties and political institutions, and reliant on few "professionals," mostly volunteers. Except for certain, quite primitive weapons production and storage facilities, they did not penetrate other subsystems of the Yishuv.

This pattern had changed during the latter stages of World War II, and more so in the years immediately preceding 1948. This expansion and penetration began during the period when David Ben-Gurion, then chairman of the Jewish Agency, assumed the political responsibility for the security of the Yishuv in general and for running the Haganah and the Palmach in particular. The other senior positions in the DE were held, however, by more junior politicians, not professional fighters. This finding meant that, until that point, and except for tactical decisions pertaining to military clashes with the British or the Palestinians, the politicians firmly controlled the militias. It also meant that the "professional" military commanders were authorized to deal mostly with pure security matters.

The personnel changes in the command of the Yishuv defense forces were accompanied by three major developments. The first was that Jewish soldiers, who had served in the British army during World War II, began joining these forces, especially the Haganah. Ben-Gurion, who respected their professional capabilities, encouraged this trend. In turn, it marked the beginning of the professionalization of the commanding ranks, particularly of this purportedly nonpoliticized organization. The second development was that there was a significant increase in manpower, material resources, purchase of weapon systems, and equipment for these organizations, and hence a significant increase in budgetary allocations. The third interconnected development was a gradual penetration of the defense organizations into other subsystems of the Yishuv—especially the production and procurement of arms and the establishment of various facilities such as camouflaged weapons storage caches, camps, offices, and research and development.[42]

Thus, to all intents and purposes, it was during that period (from the early 1940s up to 1948) that what we call the Security Network was created, began to spread, and became active in various civilian subsystems of the Yishuv. Although purportedly Ben-Gurion was running the show, actually an increasing number of functionaries, especially "professional" military persons and civilian officials, became intimately involved in policymaking and decision making. Their activities helped extend the Network and its impact.

The 1948 war only expedited these processes. The simultaneous dismantling of all four underground militias, their partly voluntary and partly imposed amalgamation and the establishment of the IDF, the rapid substantial increase in the latter's size, and the growing size and importance of the secret services (which became known as the Mossad and Shin Bet), on the one hand, and the transformation of the Yishuv's political and bureaucratic institutions into state agencies, and the retirement of several

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young officers, on the other hand, created organizations that developed autonomously. One pattern did not change, however: the very intimate informal connections between security and politics. Because each of the four prestate militias had been organized by a political group or institution that held firm ideological views, their members generally shared these ideologies. In other words, since those early days of Israel, there have been inherently close links between ideology, politics, and military service. This pattern was maintained in the newly established IDF and the secret services, where certain units were "reserved" for members of certain political movements. It created a tradition of deep involvement of Israel's DE in ideological debates that determined the state's politics, to the point that this was perceived as natural and legitimate.[43]

Rather than in peace agreements, the 1948 war ended in Armistice Agreements between Israel and its neighbors. This unfortunate ending from an Israeli perspective created an ingrained perception that the new state would rely on its sword for many years to come. The frequent clashes with Arab states and the Palestinians that occurred later fostered a persistent Israeli self-image of a state facing a continuous existential threat and being under siege.

This situation was advantageous to the DE, because it entailed a permanent need for its expertise, and the result was the investment of enormous resources in its agencies in the following decades. The unbeatable combination of Israeli political–military–economic isolation that fostered a strong sense of the need for self-reliance, the persistent image of continuous existential threat, and the substantial resources placed at the disposal of the DE, created the foundations for the expanding informal autonomy of the latter and its domineering involvement in matters far beyond the strict defense issues. An early proof of the IDF's deep involvement in most civil spheres and its disregard for due procedures is supplied by the protocol of an Israeli cabinet meeting in November 1948, just six months after the state's establishment. During the meeting, minister after minister, virtually all of them, bitterly complained about the IDF's penetration into their civilian areas of responsibility, and its acting according to its commanders' whims. Thus, the minister of transportation complained about the IDF constructing roads and airstrips wherever it had chosen; the minister of agriculture bemoaned the IDF building camps and holding military exercises on agricultural lands without the ministry's approval; and the minister of finance charged that the IDF had far exceeded the budgetary allocations approved by the cabinet and the Knesset.[44]

At the same time, the IDF increased and established its predominance in the spheres of strategic and tactical planning in the intertwined areas of defense and foreign relations, in effect marginalizing the Foreign Ministry.[45] Concurrently, the secret services, chiefly the Shin Bet, became the main source for information, assessment, and policymaking regarding Israel's Palestinian citizens. Since 1967, they have performed the same functions vis-à-vis the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories.

The strength of Israel's DE in the early decades of independence is demonstrated by its ability to act autonomously of the politicians. During the 1948 war, various offensive operations and strategic and tactical moves were planned and implemented by the IDF, and the same applies to the moves leading to various periods of ceasefire, their actual beginning and ending. Only some of the operations conducted during that war had been previously discussed and approved by the cabinet. Moreover, most military operations were of the "rolling" type, leaving the IDF with plenty of room for maneuver vis-à-vis

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both the political leaders and its Arab opponents. Ending the military operations that had been approved by the cabinet, in many cases, was decided by the IDF. Thus, only after immense pressure did the IDF acquiesce to the politicians' orders to withdraw from the areas it had occupied in the northern part of the Sinai and the Gaza Strip.[46]

During the 1950s, it was the IDF that initiated and executed dozens of limited and extensive retaliatory operations. Frequently, the attempts, for example, of Israel's moderate Prime Minister (PM), Sharett, to control and limit these retaliatory actions failed. The army's goal was to push the Arab states and Israel toward a war, and these retaliations indeed paved the way to the 1956 war. In fact, the IDF's initial combative moves in the Sinai that opened the war were never approved by the politicians; they were planned and executed according to the ideas and inclinations of CS Moshe Dayan, and some of his generals, especially Ariel Sharon.[47] Similarly, in the last phase of the 1967 war, IDF generals did not heed the cabinet's instructions to avoid reaching the bank of the Suez Canal.[48] Establishing the ceasefire line on the bank of the Canal, which obstructed the free passage of commercial ships, was among the causes for the War of Attrition in 1969–70.[49] The casualties inflicted on Israel during that war, in turn, led to the construction of the Bar-Lev Line, a massive system of fortifications along the waterline that offered lucrative contracts to Israel's leading construction firms but eventually had disastrous results in the 1973 war. During that war too, military commanders, once again especially Sharon, disregarded orders coming from the civilian leaders, particularly concerning the offensive over the Suez Canal with the purpose of carrying the war to its western bank.[50]

In the mid-1970s, members of the Security Network were active in forging Israel's policy toward Lebanon (see below). Rather than the civilian politicians, members of the Security Network were mainly responsible for the initiative of bombing the Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1981, for which, according to David Ivry, then Israeli air force commander, the military had been preparing for a long time.[51] Israel's invasion into Lebanon in June 1982 was yet another example of an initiative primarily taken by the IDF, in close cooperation with the defense minister and the Mossad. Although there were differences among these actors (e.g., regarding Israel's alliance with the Phalanges), all shared the view that war was in Israel's best interest. Thus, Defense Minister Sharon, a veteran Network member, and CS Rafael Eytan misled PM Menachem Begin, the cabinet, the Knesset, and the general public about the war's true purposes: to reach Beirut, establish a pro-Israeli government there, expel the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Syria from Lebanon, and take control of its southern part.[52] The role of the Security Network in determining Israel's Lebanese policy in the war's aftermath was also pivotal (see later).

The same pattern continued to govern the IDF's behavior during the two Palestinian Intifadas. During the first Intifada in 1987, it was the IDF that determined the tactics intended to quell the Palestinian uprising. The IDF, which made no secret of its combative preparations since the Oslo Agreement of 1993, also played the critical role in the escalation in 2000, which stemmed, at least in part, from its policy of massive retaliation against Palestinian demonstrators.[53] During the second Intifada, it was the DE, with the vocal encouragement of members of the Network (e.g., Uzi Dayan, former head of the National Security Council), which determined the route of the Separation Barrier built in the West Bank but without consulting key civilian players such as the Office of the State Attorney at the Ministry of Justice. The result was not only a barrier that caused

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much suffering to the Palestinians living in its proximity, but also one that had to be altered occasionally with great expenses and which was difficult to defend before the Israeli Supreme Court and the International Court of Justice at The Hague.[54]

Four episodes in Israel's military history demonstrate the problematic relations between the IDF and members of the Network, on the one hand, and the civilian politicians, on the other hand. First there was the "generals' revolt" against the politicians' control over the military during the 1948 war.[55] Then there was the second "revolt," on the eve of the 1967 war, when the general staff demanded to launch a preemptive war and PM Eshkol wanted to pursue a diplomatic solution first. Outraged by Eshkol's "hesitancy," members of the IDF general staff, with the active support of other Network members, practically forced him to appoint former CS Dayan as defense minister, in what was later termed a "quasi-military coup."[56] Eshkol's coalition was also enlarged to include the Likud, and Israel's first National Unity Government was formed. This move legitimized the Likud, which had been in opposition for two decades, and contributed to its ascendance to hegemonic power a decade later. A third episode is what Peri calls the "Democratic Putsch of 1999."[57] During the elections held that year, numerous members of the Network, including approximately a hundred retired army officers, joined hands to replace PM Benjamin Netanyahu with "one of their own"—former CS Ehud Barak. This action, which some consider to be legitimate,[58] in fact represented a successful attempt by the Network to mobilize its members to preserve its hegemonic role in the political society, against the backdrop of a supporting public that considered military leaders to be far more credible than their civilian counterparts.[59] The fourth case, Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000, is discussed below.

However, the growing involvement of the Security Network in making war and the way the conflicts between Israeli military and civilian leaders over the best ways to conduct wars were replaced by conflicts within a predominant Network are only part of the picture. The other side of the same coin is the decisive involvement of serving and retired army generals and other security officials in negotiations with Israel's Arab neighbors.

Again, this pattern can be traced back to Ben-Gurion, his cabinet, and the role of the IDF command in 1948–49. Many generals (Dayan, Yigal Alon, Yitzhak Rabin, Yehoshafat Harkabi, Mordechai Maklef, and others) actively participated in the armistice talks, leaving their fingerprints on most agreements on Israel's interim borders. Military officers also participated—and dominated—the armistice commissions formed in 1949.[60] This pattern persisted during the 1960s and early 1970s. Thus, for example, retired General Aharon Yariv was instrumental in the talks with the Egyptians at the end of the 1973 war. Although CS Mordechai Gur was skeptical of President Sadat's intentions in the late 1970s, retired generals Dayan and Ezer Weizman played a significant role in reaching the Camp David Accords with Egypt in 1978.[61]

Later, in the 1990s and early in this decade, other generals, such as Amnon Lipkin-Shahak, Uzi Dayan, and Uri Saguy, actively participated in most of the talks with Jordan and Syria, as well as in various contacts with the Palestinians. Again, their role was not limited to discussing security issues, but also to legitimizing the talks. This was particularly evident in the Israeli–Palestinian track, where security officials gradually took over the negotiations, replacing the civilians who initiated the Oslo process. In this case, the result was a peace agreement with an overly strong emphasis on security

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matters. In the course of this process, retired security officials (e.g., former Shin Bet official Yossi Ginosar) even assumed the role of special emissaries to the Palestinian leadership.

More recently, security officials participated in the talks concerning the U.S.-sponsored "roadmap," whereas others took part in drafting the unofficial Geneva Accord. The public criticism of the Sharon government's policy vis-à-vis the Territories by four former Shin Bet directors in November 2003—which, yet again, is best explained as an intra-Network conflict—is also illustrative.[62] This intensive involvement attests to the DE's considerable influence on Israeli public discourse and behind the scenes decision making. Indeed, in present-day Israel, security officials are deemed indispensable not only for their professional expertise, but also because only they can legitimize war and peace.[63]

The Growing Involvement of Retired Security Officials in Israel's Politics

Before 1955, the year that Israel's seventh cabinet was formed, not a single former security official served in its government.[64] Then, during the period 1955–61, there was one former security official, and in the period 1961–67, two. In the latter two periods, retired security officials served as ministers of transportation, agriculture, and labor. However, in June 1967, an important change occurred: the National Unity Government, formed during the "Waiting Period" that preceded the war, not only had three former security officials but also featured them in the positions of deputy Prime Minister (Yigal Alon) and Defense Minister (Dayan). The next cabinet (1969–74) also had three retired security officials, whereas the next three cabinets, which followed the 1973 war and governed up until 1981, had five each. By then, former security officials were in charge of more areas, including trade, industry and development, and information. In the 1974–77 period, a former CS, Rabin, served as Israel's PM for the first time. In the second and third Likud governments (1981–84), there were three and four former security officials, respectively. The three National Unity governments that followed (1984–90) included six, six, and seven former security officials, respectively. By now, former security officials served as ministers of education, science and development/technology, communication, health, foreign affairs, police, and, of course, defense. The fourth Likud government (1990–92) and the subsequent Labor government (1992–95) each had five retired security officials, and the next two cabinets—first Labor and then Likud—had four each. The number of former security officials in the next cabinet (1999–2001) again jumped to seven: the PM (Barak), who also served as defense minister, two of his three deputies, and the ministers of communication, housing, science, culture and sport, tourism, transportation, industry and trade, and regional development. Israel's next cabinet, the National Unity Government (2001–3), had six former security officials, and the current cabinet (2003–) started off with four and, at the time of writing, has six.

Examining the post of prime minister also yields interesting results. Before 1992, only two PMs (Rabin and Peres) had a significant background in the DE, whereas all others were party functionaries. However, since 1992, only one PM (Netanyahu, 1996–99) had a modest security background (he compensated for this by appointing general Yitzhak Mordechai as his defense minister), whereas all other contenders for the job were retired

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security officials. This development was preceded by the monopolization of the position of defense minister by former security officials since 1967. Indeed, with the exception of Begin (May 1980–August 1981), this position has never since been conferred on anyone without significant experience in security matters. It should be mentioned in this regard that the cooling off period after the retirement of former officers and before entering the political and bureaucratic arenas was always short; but during the past two decades it has become even shorter and some security officials became ministers, MKs, and senior functionaries in both the public and private sectors immediately after their retirement.

Several interesting conclusions can be gleaned from these data. In the early decades of independence, former security officials were by and large absent from the state's highest formal policymaking body, the cabinet, in which civilians—mostly party officials—were predominant. This is not to say, however, that security officials did not have major impact on policymaking in that period (discussed earlier).

In the same way that the 1967 war had accelerated the "securitization" of Israel's cabinets, the Lebanese War expedited it from 1984. Again, the immediate political context was the formation of the second National Unity Government, which evinced the inability of the two major parties to go at it alone. Indeed, during the crises of 1967 and 1984 (and, to some extent, in 2001), national unity was deemed a virtue, and those representing it best were former security officials, who were appointed to key government positions. This finding suggests that the historical pattern of civil–military relations in Israel, at least since 1967, has ceased to be conflictual: the growing penetration of retired security officials into the political society has ultimately reshaped it, and struggles over security policies now occurred *within* the DE and/or among different actors in the Security Network.

Since 1992, that is, in the wake of the first Intifada and the Gulf War, a similar process has taken place. Not only was the DE not confronted for its inability to crush the Palestinian revolt (or deter Iraq from launching some forty missiles at civilian targets in Israel in 1991), but Rabin, the figure most associated with the army's predicament in 1987, became the country's PM and defense minister. The same applies to Sharon, the PM at the time of writing. This finding suggests that ups and downs in the performance of Israel's DE were not a crucial factor in determining who would be appointed as defense minister or as PM. The growth of Israel's Security Network and its penetration into the political realm, in other words, was not a function of the success of a particular defense policy but, rather, stemmed from the relative power of the DE compared with the weakness of the political parties.

These conclusions are reinforced when examining Israel's legislature. The number of MKs with security backgrounds rose from 0 percent in the period 1948–51, 2.5–3.4 percent in 1955–65, and 4.1 percent in 1965–74, to 8.3 percent in 1974–77 (and again in 1981–84), to 12.5 percent in 1977–81, and to a steady 10–11.6 percent since 1984.[65] Ideologically and because of their military service, which creates certain behavioral patterns, retired security officials were, perhaps not surprisingly, inclined toward the more hawkish poll of the political spectrum, although there were exceptions. Thus, although a few did join smaller parties—with more representing left-wing parties in the period 1974–81 and 1984–88, and more representing right-wing parties in 1981–84 and since 1988—the majority have joined parties located at the center of Israel's political spectrum, particularly Labor (five to six MKs since 1965), Likud (two to three MKs since

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1974, except the period 1977–81 when it had four MKs) and various center parties (most notably Dash with five MKs in 1977). In fact, security officials sometimes approached, or were courted by, both Labor and Likud, ultimately accepting the highest bid. This was the case, for example, with former army generals Sharon, Mordechai, Shaul Mofaz, and ex-Shin Bet official Ehud Yatom, who wavered and finally joined the Likud, and former generals Ephraim Sneh, Benjamin Ben-Eliezer, Matan Vilnai, Amram Mitzna, and Dani Yatom, who wavered and joined the Labor. Other former generals, like Yigael Yadin, Meir Amit, Amnon Lipkin-Shahak, and others, were instrumental in Israel's short-lived center parties in the 1977 and 1999 elections. Because of this pattern of affiliation and thanks to their hawkish positions, former security officials had much better chances to influence policymaking in a political system that has been dominated by the two largest parties and their coalitional partners, especially when national security matters continued to be paramount.

How do these processes fit two other significant developments in Israel in recent decades: first, the change in political views toward right-wing and ultrareligious ideologies and parties; second, the growing emphasis on individualism and the rapid dismantling of the welfare state? As we have seen, the number of former security officials joining right-wing parties since 1988 has been higher than those in leftist parties, and since 1984, it has been equal to, or slightly higher than, the number of those joining Likud. It could also be argued that the Network has adapted itself to, and perhaps encouraged, both processes. On both the political and socioeconomic levels, retired security personnel who joined center-right–wing or right-wing parties legitimized these parties.[66] However, former security officials also benefited from and enhanced the second development: with their own economic status assured (see later), they could use their careers in the DE as a springboard to senior positions.

Ramifications

As suggested by the above discussion, the expansion of Israel's Security Network through the years has hindered the ability of "pure" civilian institutions to control it and counter its influence on its democratic regime.[67] This situation is even more noticeable when considering the various dimensions of the Network, that is, the linkage between actors operating within the DE and Israel's politics, society, economy, and the public discourse. Even after the glamour of the DE began to fade as a result of its debacles in the 1973 and 1982 wars and the two Intifadas, the participation of its retired officials in these spheres did not decline. Indeed, our data suggests that the Network is still spreading, not least because of the well-established practice of "a friend brings a friend," Israel's version of the old-boy network. One explanation for this is that security officials who take on civilian posts find it easier to perform when joined by their former colleagues to whom they remain loyal even after retirement. Indeed, retired security officials have come to one another's help in their time of need, including testifying in courts on their behalf (e.g., former Defense Ministers Sharon and Mordechai), holding ceremonies in their honor in military facilities after they were convicted (e.g., retired IDF colonel and Mossad official Yaacov Nimrodi, who also owns the daily *Maariv*), and working to obtain their release from enemy hands after dubious business deals (e.g., retired IDF colonel Elhanan Tenebaum, who was kidnapped by Hizbullah). Yet another factor,

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which is also at the backdrop of the cases discussed below, is the weakness of Israel's civil society and political society, mainly in terms of their financial and organizational capacities.

CASE STUDIES

The ultimate test of any new theoretical approach is its ability to explain concrete cases, and do so more convincingly than its predecessors. It is thus appropriate that we put our concept of Israel's Security Network to the test and see whether it can account for specific processes of policymaking in Israel. In this section, we present three examples of different areas where the impact of Israel's Security Network on policymaking has become apparent in recent years: (*a*) its expanding role in the public discourse in general and the educational system in particular, (*b*) its impact on determining the national budget, and (*c*) its role in shaping Israel's policy vis-à-vis Lebanon. These examples prove our characterization of the Network as an informal collective actor whose overriding influence is continuous, which is gradually spreading into civilian spheres and is capable of getting its way in specific instances of policymaking, despite resistance from competing actors and notwithstanding significant changes in Israel and in its regional and international environment.

The Public Discourse and the Educational System

The first case that we discuss is the gradual, but nonetheless persistent, penetration of former security officials into the sensitive sphere of education, which characterized early periods in Israel's history but has become more pronounced in recent years, and their growing impact on policymaking in this sector.

In late 2004, it was announced that, according to a new project initiated by the Ministry of Education and the army's education branch, army officers at the rank of lieutenant colonel would be positioned in seventy-four high schools throughout the country to "accompany" students in the eleventh and twelfth grades who are nearing their military draft, until they join the IDF. In fact, this program, called the "The Next Generation" and which elicited some resistance from Israeli intellectuals, only served to formalize a situation that has been in place for some time.[68] First, the invitation of army officers to speak before high school pupils on the military service and other matters had already been a common practice in Israel. Second, various aspects of the school curriculum (e.g., physical education and *Shelah*, Hebrew acronym for "field, nation, society") have been geared to prepare students for military service.[69] Third, the integration of dozens of former security officials in Israel's educational system, as part of their growing involvement in municipal politics as mayors and members of municipal councils had already gained momentum. In recent years, these former officials have become teachers and principals of prestigious schools throughout the country.[70] This process was encouraged by a special program called *Tzevet* (Team),[71] funded by the Ministry of Education, which prepares retired army officers and other security personnel to serve as principals and teachers at educational institutions. According to data from 2001, more than 300 officers trained by *Tzevet* had been integrated in schools throughout

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the country since 1987.[72] In addition, a former colonel in the IDF was appointed deputy director of the Ministry of Education, the highest professional position in the educational system.[73]

Two additional processes, which also intensified in recent years, complement these trends. The first is the emergence of civil society movements led by retired security officials in the realm of education (e.g., Citizens for Education in Israel, chaired by a former air force chief and a former director of the Mossad, which is part of the Forum for National Responsibility, a group headed by a former IDF general).[74] These movements advocate reforms in Israel's educational system, making an explicit linkage between the situation of the latter and IDF's qualitative edge. A second process is the growing number of former security officials employed by various research institutions affiliated with Israel's universities and private colleges. At present, two of these—the former head of the IDF's colleges and a former director of the Shin Bet—serve as Chief Executive Officers of colleges.

Together, these factors mean that many members of the Network are in a position to disseminate the traditions and worldview of the Network throughout Israel's educational system. They also demonstrate the manifold ways in which their influence is exercised.

These developments can be seen as part of a process whereby the discursive realm of the Israeli polity is becoming increasingly securitized. Indeed, recent years have seen the involvement of scores of retired security officials in the media, especially the radio and TV but also in the press, where they often address matters that have little to do with security. Initially, these were lower ranking officers.[75] However, in the past few years, and especially during and in the wake of the 2003 war in Iraq, retired army generals were appointed as commentators for the various radio and TV channels. In addition, senior retired security officials write regular and op-ed articles in all major newspapers. That the IDF continues to operate its own radio station, liberal as it may seem, reinforces and perhaps epitomizes this situation, especially when its reporters, many of whom are conscripts, later join other media channels. More often than not, all these actors present the views and attitudes of the Security Network and support—rather than criticize—the DE.

Determining Israel's National Budget

According to data from September 2005, the actual budget of Israel's Defense Ministry in the period 1999–2004 has exceeded the budget officially approved by the government by 10–15 percent,[76] but without informing the cabinet, the Knesset, or the public. This section attempts to elucidate this puzzle by focusing on how the budget for 2004 was determined.

For several months in 2003 Israel's Treasury, headed by Minister of Finance Netanyahu, had been announcing its intention to make a deep cut in security allocations for 2004, as part of its overall plan to cut government expenditures, and it appeared that this time it would get its way. First, on the one hand, the overall economic situation in Israel was grave and seemed to require drastic measures; on the other hand, the security situation improved somewhat. Second, the Ministry of Finance managed to make substantial cuts in other areas, most notably health, social security,

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wages, and education. The DE too, it was argued, must contribute its share. Third, the destruction of the Iraqi army significantly reduced the so-called existential threat to Israel, allowing for deep cuts in the IDF's ground forces. Fourth, a media virtuoso, Netanyahu, who was also the probable heir to PM Sharon, led the campaign. Fifth and finally, security experts, economists, and journalists supported the Treasury in its quest, and the media was flooded with reports on the excessive privileges of military personnel and op-eds urging the government to introduce long-awaited reforms in the DE.[77]

The original allocation for security purposes for 2003 had been NS 33.6 billion, but the DE later received "supplements" that increased it to NS 36.5 billion. The Treasury had hoped to reduce the base budget for 2004 by NS 3 billion, that is, to NS 30.6 billion, whereas the IDF sought an allocation similar to the one it received for 2003.

The DE proved a formidable opponent. In what has become an annual ritual in Israel, the IDF, supported by the Security Network, underscored the threats to Israel's national security, and argued that responsibility for cuts in security allocations in such perilous times would rest on the civilians' shoulders.[78] Characteristically, CS Yaalon likened the army's negotiations with the Ministry of Finance to a "Turkish bazaar," adding that the latter was not authorized (!) to make decisions on cuts in the security budget because it would not be responsible for their consequences. The Treasury's behavior, he stated, was "on the threshold of irresponsibility."[79] Instead of reprimanding him, Defense Minister Mofaz, a former CS, accused the Treasury of stabbing the DE in the back, adding that the proposed budgetary cut would place Israel under an "unreasonable threat."[80] Other retired security officials also joined the struggle. Some published a newspaper ad explicitly warning the cabinet not to "shatter our security" by opening an "internal front" against the security forces "who are fighting day by day and hour by hour for the security and future of the state of Israel."[81] Others used their civilian positions to make the military's case. The military-affairs correspondent of channel 2—and a lieutenant colonel in the army reserves—argued that the proposed budgetary cut would "destroy" the DE.[82] MK Sneh, a retired brigadier who chairs the subcommittee for defense preparedness in the Committee of Foreign Affairs and Security, also warned against an additional cut in security allocations. Because his was one of the only civilian institutions acquainted to a certain degree with the details of the security budget, his stance was particularly significant.[83]

Thus, and despite the public support for the Treasury's moves, the DE, through the Network, managed to reduce the proposed cut in its budget, especially after PM Sharon—yet another retired general—personally intervened in the matter and ruled against a drastic cut. Initially, the PM ruled that the allocation for security for 2004 would be NS 32.85 billion—NS 0.75 billion less than the base budget for 2003 and NS 3.65 billion less than the overall budget for 2003—but the next day, he increased the cut to NS 1.07 billion, leaving the base budget at NS 31.78 billion. In late 2003, the Knesset approved a budget of NS 29.9 billion for security purposes. This was after its Committee for the Security Budget, which is made up of members of the Knesset's Finance and Foreign Affairs and Security Committees, refused to vote on the proposed budget (NS 32.4 billion), after Mofaz, Yaalon and his deputy appeared before it and criticized it.[84] Finally, in April 2004, the Knesset's Finance Committee decided to raise the security budget to NS 35 billion, only slightly less than the NS 36.4 billion demanded by the DE

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in late 2003, and with other resources, especially the U.S. military aid, it now stood at NS 47.13 billion. The Treasury's initiative was thus all but reversed.[85]

This case demonstrates the extent to which Israel's Security Network influences major policymaking issues that have wide political, social, and economic ramifications, even when initially the circumstances are seemingly unfavorable for the Network.

Shaping Israel's Policy Vis-à-Vis Lebanon

Much of the writing on Israel's policy toward Lebanon from the latter's "collapse" in 1975–76 until Israel's unilateral withdrawal from its self-declared "Security Zone" in South Lebanon in May 2000 contextualizes it within Israel's continuous efforts to address its broader "security dilemma" in the Middle East.[86] With regard to Lebanon, these efforts included reaching formal and informal arrangements with its neighbors, such as the "red lines" agreement with Syria in 1976, the ceasefire with the PLO in 1981–82, and the 17 May 1983 accord with Lebanon; alliances with Christian militias in the border area and the Phalanges; and occupying parts of Lebanon during the Litany Operation of 1978, the Lebanon War (1982–85), and the period of the "Security Zone" (1985–2000).

However, how could this involvement, which lasted for two decades and a half, persist despite significant developments in Israel's close environment such as the removal of the bulk of Palestinian fighters from Lebanon in 1982, the considerable weakening of Syria in the early 1990s, and Lebanon's resuscitation in the early 1990s? It is here that special attention must be given to the impact of Israel's Security Network, both in the sense of informal ties forged between acting and retired security officials and shared notions and conceptions regarding Israel's national security and the means to advance it.

As in the other territories it occupied, the ambiguity surrounding Israel's military presence in South Lebanon provided a hospitable climate for the Security Network to expand, both in terms of the prerogatives of its members and their ties with other actors. Already in 1976 it was the DE that established ADAL (Hebrew acronym of the South Lebanon Area), which provided military and humanitarian support to the local Christian militias and maintained effective control over parts of this region well before 1982.[87] Similarly, and on a much larger scale, in the period 1985–2000 Israel's self-declared "Security Zone" was administered exclusively by the DE, through the Office of the Coordinator of Israel's Operations in Lebanon (CIOL) and the IDF's Liaison Unit to Lebanon (LUL). Because in this period the army reserves did not serve in South Lebanon, and because media reporters who entered the area mostly engaged in "embedded journalism," it is easy to comprehend why the Israeli public knew very little about the Security Zone up to the late 1990s. In addition, most journalists covering the area identified with the IDF's mission there and, in many cases, had intimate ties to acting and former security officials. Finally, some retired security officials, including at least one former LUL chief, served as media commentators on military affairs, and in this capacity continued to present the DE's position.[88]

Economic factors should be considered in this respect as well. In the period 1986–2000, approximately 2,500 Lebanese militiamen served in the South Lebanon Army

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(SLA) and were on Israel's payroll,[89] and each earned $400–500 per month, reaching a total of approximately $17 million for the entire period. SLA officials enjoyed an additional income from various "taxes" imposed on commodities entering the Security Zone.[90] In addition, approximately 2,500–5,000 Lebanese workers, each of whom earned $350–750 per month, were employed in construction, agriculture, industry, and the hotel sector in northern Israel.[91] Although these laborers earned more than five times that of their counterparts in other parts of Lebanon,[92] they were dependent on the SLA: they could enter Israel only if sponsored by its members (most were their relatives) and had to pay their "sponsor" approximately $50 per month, as well as an additional 10 percent, which went to the SLA command.[93] Israeli employers, who were encouraged to hire Lebanese workers, also benefited from this arrangement, because the latter did manual labor jobs and were not represented by Israel's labor union. For some of the northern settlements, and especially those near the border checkpoints, this situation was particularly advantageous. Metula, for example, became a popular tourist resort for Israelis and Lebanese, as well as an unofficial "hub" for all those who mattered regarding the Security Zone—politicians, reporters, and IDF and SLA officers. Israeli firms, in their turn, sold soft drinks, alcoholic beverages, clothing, medicine, and fruit and vegetables to Lebanon.[94] As in the past, Israeli construction firms profited from building massive fortifications in and around the Security Zone, and from the continuous efforts of the LUL and its Civilian Assistance Unit to improve the infrastructure there as a counterweight to the enticements and pressures of the government in Beirut and Hizbullah.[95] Finally, one could mention Lebanese and Israeli networks of smugglers and drug traffickers, which capitalized on the virtually open border between the two states.

In the latter half of the 1990s, and especially after two IDF helicopters collided in February 1997 leaving 73 Israeli soldiers dead, the public debate in Israel concerning its presence in Lebanon intensified, ultimately prompting its leaders to outbid one another over who would get Israel out of there first. One way to consider this episode is to regard it as a triumph of Israel's civil society, which managed to overcome the resistance of the DE to any change in its Lebanese policy. Another, which seems more convincing in light of that mentioned earlier, is to view it as an essentially intra-Network dispute. Unlike Ben-Gurion and Eshkol, who faced the "revolts" of 1948 and 1967, respectively (see earlier), PM Barak, who initiated and carried out the withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000, was himself a member of the Network and, as senior officer and CS, had been intimately involved with the formulation of Israel's policy in Lebanon. This enabled him to disregard the apocalyptic warnings of the IDF general staff, as well as the opposition of other Network members (e.g., the CIOL and some media correspondents). Whereas civil society groups, especially the "Four Mothers" movement, were indeed active in campaigning for an Israeli withdrawal, they were ultimately successful not because they offered a *civil* alternative to the current policy but because they managed to prove—by embracing the hegemonic discourse of national security and by recruiting "specialists," mostly retired security officials—that its *military* logic was flawed.

However, creating a rift within the Network was no easy task. Several cabinet ministers, such as Sneh and Ben-Eliezer, who had laid the groundwork for the Security Zone during their military service, were personally committed to the SLA.[96] Indeed, it took several major blows sustained by the IDF in Lebanon, as well as two unsuccessful large-scale military operations in 1993 (Accountability) and 1996 (Grapes of Wrath)—as well

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as the helicopter crash the next year—to tilt the scale. That a rift was created within the Security Network in this period is evinced by the fact that some of its members later accused PM Barak of the "worst of sins," namely, of showing weakness in the face of Arab pressures, particularly after the outbreak of the second Palestinian Intifada.[97]

The considerable impact of the Security Network on determining Israel's Lebanese policy for at least a quarter of a century leads one to ponder the extent of its role with regard to other contentious areas, especially the West Bank and Gaza since 1967. Indeed, several recent publications suggest that informal ties between acting and retired security officials, on the one hand, and certain civilian actors, including those involved in real estate and economic and agricultural enterprises, on the other hand, have been highly influential in shaping Israel's long-term policies.[98] We intend to explore these extremely significant issues in future publications.

CONCLUSIONS

This essay has defined Israel's Security Network, traced its origins, and situated it within the debate on this state's pattern of civil–military relations, which in turn forms part of the broader debate on its process of state formation and the transformation of its politics and society in recent decades. By critically employing recently developed theories, making use of previously unnoted and fresh data, and, most important, by being attentive to both formal and informal aspects of the relationship between Israel's civilian and military realms, we have offered significant indications about how the considerable "gaps" in the study of this topic in Israel and in other democratic and democratizing states facing similar developments and challenges may be addressed.

Returning to the contentious points of the approaches to the study of the relationship between Israel's civilian and military spheres, several important conclusions can be drawn. First, our emphases in this essay have been on the informal political, social, economic, and discursive exchanges within a variegated Security Network and its relations with other sectors of Israeli society. Although Israel's DE is an actor with distinctive corporate interests, in time it has gradually become intertwined with actors in other spheres. Second, we have demonstrated that the main concern of the informal Security Network that emerged in Israel through the years has been policymaking on the national and local levels, and that this is where its influence became apparent. Third, what stands out clearly from our analysis is the chronic weakness of actors within Israel's civilian spheres with little or no contacts and joint interests and activities with the Network, which are unable to prevent it from influencing and even determining policymaking in crucial areas. As we have shown, this applies to Israel's national budget, foreign relations, and certain aspects of the public discourse, and one could mention other spheres such as the nuclear realm, where, in a similar fashion, opacity and the monopolization of knowledge effectively hinders a more open debate. At best, civilian leaders and groups are capable of asserting themselves vis-à-vis the DE on certain occasions; but during long tense periods, they are forced to share power with it or accept its leadership. Fourth, a related conclusion is concerned with the constant intermingling between actors from both the security and civilian spheres, especially because of the increased penetration of retired security officials into most civilian realms. This factor certainly weakens civilian control of the DE in Israel, which was only recently described by a public commission

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as "partial, flawed, and arbitrary."[99] Fifth, we do not suggest that the Network is homogeneous, that it concentrates only on "pure" military issues, that there are no occasional disagreements among its members, or that the latter do not change over time. Rather, we argue that it is a variegated network with political, social, economic, and discursive facets. Hence, under changing circumstances, the emphasis of its activities and influence is also changing. The Security Network exhibits uniformity regarding the preponderance of the DE in determining Israel's security needs and interests and lends unequivocal support to its budgetary requirements. In addition, its members are sensitive to any attempt to question the DE's professionalism and etiquette. Yet, as far as political issues are concerned, and especially where the state's policies fail to meet their objectives (e.g., in Lebanon before 2000 and in Gaza before 2005), fissures can emerge within the network itself, and its members are found on both sides of the political divide, although only very rarely on the fringes. To conclude, whereas network members are divided sometimes over the actual policies of the state, they are united in their support for the DE and its status as *primus inter pares* as far as policymaking in security matters—as well as host of other, related issues—is concerned. Sixth, during the past few decades, mutual suspicion and competition over resources has increased within the Israeli polity, and these features may grow further if its security problems are solved or become more manageable. In such case, it would be more difficult for the Network to gain the upper hand, although we have laid the proper grounds for a prediction that the DE and the Network would fight to maintain their privileged position. Seventh and finally, we argue that the existence and influence of Israel's Security Network has significantly contributed to the chaotic development and transformation of this state and impinges on its democratic character.

As this article suggests, traditional theories of civil–military relations, formulated in and about Western democracies during the Cold War, are applicable to the Israeli case only to a certain extent. The reason for this is not that their underlying premise—that war is a political instrument and, therefore, the military should be under civilian control—is obsolete, but because, in Israel as well as in some new democratic and democratizing states, the means prescribed to attain this goal are counterproductive. In these states, especially when chaotic social and political transformations occur, the political society and the civil society tend to be weak, allowing defense apparatuses to evade their control and penetrate into them, regardless of whether civilian control of the military is supposed to be attained through institutionalization or through informal means. We propose that the pattern of civil–military relations in several Middle Eastern states, particularly those with certain democratic attributes (Turkey, Lebanon), is a case in point, and the same applies to some of the new states in Asia, the Balkans, and the former Soviet Union.

In the Israeli case, what has emerged is a Security Network that has spread into an increasing number of other systems in the country's public life: politics, society, the economy, culture, and the public discourse. Additional research is needed to assess the full impact of this Network on these and other spheres, particularly on the subtle ways it has helped shape them, as well as the connection to long-range, basic transformations in the Israeli society and in its polity that occur now in a chaotic fashion. For instance, a causal linkage seems to exist between the spread of the Network and antidemocratic values that prevail in Israel, such as a demand for a "strong leader." We have also posited that retired security officials encourage conservatism in regard to security and military issues, and this finding, too, warrants further investigation. Finally, we have contended

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that the continued existence of the Network in Israel attests to its incomplete process of state formation and democratic development. Because the imposition of Western-style civilian control of the military under such circumstances is highly improbable, Israel's predicament would be difficult to solve.

NOTES

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[1]Israel's DE consists of the IDF; the Shin Bet or *Shabak* (General Security Service); the Mossad; the police and paramilitary Border Guard; the military and aircraft industries (IMI and IAI, respectively); and the atomic and biological research agencies and facilities.

[2]Alfred Stepan defines the "political society" as "the arena in which the polity specifically arranges itself for political contestation to gain control over public power and the state apparatus." *Rethinking Military Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 4.

[3]According to Stepan, the "civil society" is "arena where manifold social movements . . . and civic organizations from all classes . . . attempt to constitute themselves in an ensemble of arrangements so that they can express themselves and advance their interests." ibid., 3–4.

[4]Yoram Peri, *Between Battles and Ballots* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983); Dan Horowitz and Moshe Lissak, *Trouble in Utopia* (Albany, N.Y.: SUNY Press, 1989); Rebecca Schiff, "Civil–Military Relations Reconsidered: Israel as an 'Uncivil' State," *Security Studies* 1 (1992): 636–58; Baruch Kimmerling, "Patterns of Militarism in Israel," *European Journal of Sociology* 34 (1993): 196–223; Uri Ben-Eliezer, "A Nation-in-Arms: State, Nation, and Militarism in Israel's First Years," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 37 (1995): 264–85; Yehuda Ben Meir, *Civil–Military Relations in Israel* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995); Daniel Maman and Moshe Lissak, "Military-Civilian Elite Networks in Israel: A Case Study in Boundary Structure," in *A Restless Mind*, ed. Benjamin Frankel (London: Frank Cass, 1996), 49–79; Yagil Levy, "How Militarization Drives Political Control of the Military: The Case of Israel," *Political Power and Social Theory* 11 (1997): 103–33; Uri Ben-Eliezer, *The Making of Israeli Militarism* (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1998); Martin Van Creveld, *The Sword and the Olive* (New York: Public Affairs, 1998); Alan Dowty, *The Jewish State* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1998); Edna Lumsky-Feder and Eyal Ben-Ari, eds., *The Military and Militarism in Israeli Society* (Albany, N.Y.: SUNY Press, 1999); Daniel Maman, Eyal Ben-Ari, and Zeev Rosenhek, eds., *The Military, State and Society in Israel* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction, 2001), 403–5; Shimshon Bichler and Jonathan Nitzan, *From War Profits to Peace Dividends* [in Hebrew] (Jerusalem: Carmel, 2001); Yoram Peri, *The Israeli Military and Israel's Palestinian Policy* (Washington, D.C.: USIP, 2002); Majid Al-Haj and Uri Ben-Eliezer, eds., *In the Name of Security* [in Hebrew] (Haifa: Haifa University Press, 2003); Zeev Rosenhek, Daniel Maman, and Eyal Ben-Ari, "The Study of War and the Military in Israel," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 35 (2003): 461–84; Ofer Shelah, *The Israeli Army* [in Hebrew] (Or Yehuda: Kinneret, 2003); Yagil Levy, *The Other Army of Israel* [in Hebrew] (Tel Aviv: Yediot Achronot, 2003); Uri Ben-Eliezer, "Post-Modern Armies and the Question of Peace and War: The Israeli Defense Forces in the 'New Times,'" *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 36 (2004): 49–70.

[5]For a useful albeit not exhaustive discussion, see Eyal Ben-Ari, Zeev Rosenhek, and Daniel Maman, "Military, State and Society in Israel: An Introductory Essay," in *Military, State and Society*, 1–39; for research trends, see Rosenhek et al., "Study of War."

[6]David Segal, "Civil–Military Relations in Democratic Societies," in *Armed Forces at the Dawn of the Third Millennium*, ed. Jurgen Kuhlmann and David Segal (Munich: SIB, 1994), 37–48. Cf. Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1960); A.R. Luckham, "A Comparative Typology of Civil–Military Relations," *Government and Opposition* 6 (1971): 5–35; Samuel Huntington, *The Soldier and the State* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1957).

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[7]Shmuel Noah Eisenstadt, *Israeli Society* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1967); idem., *The Transformation of Israeli Society* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1985); Amos Perlmutter, *Military and Politics in Israel* (New York: Praeger, 1969); Horowitz and Lissak, *Trouble in Utopia*; Ben Meir, *Civil–Military Relations*.

[8]See especially Peri, *Between Battles* and his other works.

[9]Kimmerling, "Patterns of Militarism," 197–98; Schiff, "Civil–Military Relations"; Ben-Eliezer, *Making of Israeli Militarism*; Lumsky-Feder and Ben-Ari, *Military and Militarism*; Levy, *Other Army of Israel*. For criticism, see Gabriel Sheffer, "Has Israel Really Been a Garrison Democracy?" *Israel Affairs* 3 (1996): 13–38; Yoram Peri, "The Radical Social Scientists and Israeli Militarism," *Israel Studies* 1 (1996): 230–66.

[10]Alex Mintz, "The Military-Industrial Complex: American Concepts and Israeli Realities," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 29 (1985): 623–39; Yoram Peri and Amnon Neubach, *The Military-Industrial Complex in Israel* (Tel Aviv: ICPME, 1985).

[11]John Peterson, *Policy Networks* (Vienna: Institute for Advanced Studies, 2003), 1.

[12]David Knoke, *Political Networks* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

[13]David Marsh and Martin Smith, "Understanding Policy Networks: Towards a Dialectical Approach," *Political Studies* 48 (2000): 6. See also, Bernd Marin and Renate Mayntz, "Studying Policy Networks" in *Policy Networks*, ed. Bernd Marin and Renate Mayntz (Frankfurt: Campus, 1991); *Policy Networks in British Government,* ed. David Marsh and Rod Rhodes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992); David Marsh and Gerry Stoker, "Conclusions," in *Theory and Methods in Political Science*, ed. David Marsh and Gerry Stoker (London: Macmillan, 1995), 292–94.

[14]Moshe Lissak, "Uniqueness and Normalization in Military-Government Relations in Israel," in *Military, State and Society*, 403–5.

[15]Yoram Peri, "Civil–Military Relations in Israel in Crisis," in *Military, State and Society*, 107–36.

[16]By this last term we mean the cumulative product of three interrelated and often overlapping subprocesses: (a) *state building*, which consists of measures that produce "territorial consolidation, centralization, differentiation of the instruments of government, and monopolization of the means of coercion"; (b) *state craft* (or state construction), defined as the "processes or mechanisms whereby a state enhances its power and authority," using its formal agencies but also an array of informal, including cultural, means; and (c) *national integration*, which involves centrally based efforts to inculcate the state's entire populace with a common identity. Charles Tilly, "Reflections on the History of European State-Making," in *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*, ed. Charles Tilly (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1975), 42. Timothy Mitchell, "The Limits of the State: Beyond Statist Approaches and Their Critics," *American Political Science Review* 85 (March 1991), 77–96; George Steinmetz, ed., *State/Culture* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1999). The quote is from Eric Davis, "Theorizing Statecraft and Social Change in Oil-Producing Countries," in *Statecraft in the Middle East*, ed. Eric Davis and Nicholas Gavrielides (Miami: Florida International University Press, 1991), 12; Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 2nd ed. (New York: Verso, 1991); Eric Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism Since 1780* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983); Anthony Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986).

[17]One indication for the lack of development of Israel's democracy is the Freedom House survey. In 2005, Israel received a combined average rating of 2.0 and was behind all North American and Western and Central European states, except Mexico and Lithuania (2.0); some of the successor states of Yugoslavia such as Serbia and Montenegro (2.5), Macedonia (3.0), and Bosnia and Herzegovina (3.5); Albania (3.0); and Moldova (3.5). The Palestinian territories under its control, evaluated separately, received a combined average rating of 6.0 (see http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2005/combined2005.pdf). It should be noted that Israel's democracy has maintained a combined average rating of 2.0 since 1977 (except in 1999, when it received a rating of 1.5).

[18]C. Wright Mills, *The Power Elite* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956), 4.

[19]"Farewell Radio and Television Address to the American People by President Dwight D. Eisenhower," 17 January 1961 (http://www.eisenhower.archives.gov/farewell.htm).

[20]Mills argues, by contrast, that "[t]he idea of the power elite implies nothing about the process of decision-making as such: it is an attempt to delimit the social areas within which that process, whatever its character, goes on." *Power Elite*, 21.

[21]Oren Barak and Chanan Cohen, *The Future of Israel's Ministry of Foreign Affairs* [in Hebrew] (Jerusalem: Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations, forthcoming).

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[22]*Tzevet* 67 (December 2003–January 2004): 28.

[23]*Haaretz*, 14 September 2004.

[24]Amiram Oren, "Security and Territory in Israel—A Combination Veiled Behind a Curtain," unpublished paper, February 2005, 1.

[25]D. Dvir and A. Tishler, "The Changing Role of the Defense Industry in Israel's Industrial and Technological Development," *Defense Analysis* 16 (2000): 35.

[26]For the origins of this process see Bichler and Nitzan, *War Profits*, 190–96, 363–64. On Israel's military ties with Singapore see, for example, *Haaretz*, 15 July 2004 and on its ties with India and Turkey see, for example, Ilan Berman, "Israel, India, and Turkey: Triple Entente?" *Middle East Quarterly* 9 (2002): 33–40.

[27]Michael Miro, "The Impact of the IDF on the Israeli Media." Paper presented at the Van Leer Institute, Jerusalem, 18 November 2004. The author is Acting Director of the Israeli Broadcasting Authority, Channel Two. See also, Gadi Wolfsfeld, *Media and the Path to Peace* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

[28]Noted examples are the harassment of *Haaretz* columnist Reuven Pedhazur, a pilot in the IDF reserves, who criticized the performance of the Patriot missile and the development of Israel's Arrow missile, and of Avner Cohen, who has written extensively on Israel's nuclear project. The IDF also dislikes critical works by its own personnel. A telling example is Colonel Emanuel Wald, who was asked by CS Levi in the 1980s to write a comprehensive report on the IDF's future development based on its past experience. When it became known that Wald's report would be critical of the IDF, the CS tried to prevent its completion. Wald published his criticisms after retirement. Emanuel Wald, *The Wald Report* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1992). A detailed study on the 1973 War prepared by the IDF's History Department remains unpublished, reportedly because it criticizes military commanders in that war, including the current PM Ariel Sharon.

[29]Uri Ben-Eliezer, "Do the Generals Rule Israel?" in *A Society in the Mirror*, ed. Hanna Herzog [in Hebrew] (Tel Aviv: Ramot, 2000).

[30]Kimmerling, "Patterns of Militarism."

[31]Consecutive opinion polls taken in Israel in the period 2000–2003 show that those feeling that their personal security, or Israel's national security, was under high or fairly high threat were very close to, or above, 50 percent. For details, see the Web site of the Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research (http://spirit.tau.ac.il/socant/peace/).

[32]Asher Arian, *Israeli Public Opinion on National Security, 1999–2003* (Tel Aviv: JCSS, 1999–2003).

[33]Presentation by Zalman Shiffer, former economic consultant at Israel's National Security Council and consultant for the Bank of Israel, WISS Meeting, Neveh Ilan, 18 March 2005.

[34]By 2000, the percentage of public resources allocated to security had dropped to 8.6 percent of the Gross Domestic Product, but the outbreak of the second Intifada saw military consumption rising by 15 percent. Ibid.

[35]*New York Times on the Web*, 18 August 1997 (http://www.nytimes.com/library/cyber/week/081897ware.html); *Haaretz*, 15 August 2003; Dvir and Tishler, "Changing Role," 38.

[36]*Haaretz*, 9 June 2003, 5 September 2003, 22 January 2004.

[37]*Haaretz*, 14 March 2003.

[38]One example is the decision of El Al President David Hermesh to create a commercial unit for training security agents at foreign airlines in the wake of the 2001 attacks (see http://www.israelinsider.com/channels/security/articles/sec_0108.htm). In 2000, Hermesh's appointment elicited criticism due to his ties to his former army superior, Minister of Transportation and former CS Amnon Lipkin-Shahak.

[39]"Israel's Security & Safety Industries" (http://sofia.mfa.gov.il/mfm/Data/70481.doc).

[40]This could be gleaned from a cursory look at its publication, *Tzevet*, published since 1989 and distributed to this organization's 30,000 members.

[41]Eisenstadt, *Israeli Society*; Dan Horowitz and Moshe Lissak, *The Origins of the Israeli Polity* [in Hebrew] (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1977); Ben-Eliezer, "Nation-in-Arms."

[42]Eisenstadt, *Israeli Society*; idem., *Transformation*; Edward Luttwak and Dan Horowitz, *The Israeli Army* (London: Allen Lane, 1975); Michael Bar-Zohar, *Ben-Gurion*, 3 vols. [in Hebrew] (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1975), 1:510–38; Yoav Gelber, *The Emergence of a Jewish Army* [in Hebrew] (Jerusalem: Yad Ben-Zvi, 1986), 1–72; Horowitz and Lissak, *Trouble in Utopia*.

[43]Luttwak and Horowitz, *Israeli Army*; Peri, *Between Battles*; Yoav Gelber, *Growing a Fleur-de-lis* [in Hebrew] (Tel Aviv: Defense Ministry, 1992).

[44]Protocol of Meeting of Temporary Government, 21 November 1948, Israel State Archives.

[45]Gabriel Sheffer, *Moshe Sharett* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1996).

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[46]Bar-Zohar, *Ben-Gurion*, 2:860–61; Sheffer, *Moshe Sharett*, 425–28; Gabriella Heichal, *Civil Control over the Israel Defense Forces* [in Hebrew] (Jerusalem: Ariel, 1998).

[47]Ibid. Cf. Motti Golani, *There Will Be War Next Summer* [in Hebrew] (Tel Aviv: Maarachot, 1997), 397–409; idem., "Chief of Staff in Quest of a War: Moshe Dayan Leads Israel into War," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 24 (2001): 49–70; Sheffer, *Moshe Sharett*, chaps. 27, 28.

[48]Yossi Goldstein, *Eshkol* [in Hebrew] (Jerusalem: Keter, 2003), 569.

[49]Yaacov Bar Siman Tov, *The Israeli-Egyptian War of Attrition* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980). The occupation of the Syrian Golan in 1967, which commenced without the knowledge of most cabinet members, is another case. Matitiahu Mayzel, *The Golan Heights Campaign* [in Hebrew] (Tel Aviv: Maarachot, 2001), 241–80.

[50]Ronen Bergman and Gil Meltzer, *The Yom Kippur War* [in Hebrew] (Tel Aviv: Yediot Achronot, 2003), 221–85.

[51]Interview, 13 October 2003 (http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/1,7340,L-2788236,00.html#n).

[52]Ze'ev Schiff and Ehud Ya'ari, *Israel's Lebanon War* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1984).

[53]Peri, *Israeli Military*, 31; Ben Caspit, "An Army that has a State," 10 May 2003 (http://www.hevra.org.il/modules.php?name=Forums&file=viewtopic&t=36%E2%80%9D).

[54]*Haaretz*, 18 January 2004; Yeshayahu Folman, *The Story of the Security Fence* [in Hebrew] (Jerusalem: Carmel, 2004), 209–17.

[55]Bar-Zohar, *Ben Gurion*, 2:799–810; Peri, *Between Battles*.

[56]Tom Segev, "The Beginning of History," *Haaretz*, 5 June 2003. See also, Goldstein, *Eshkol*, 550–63; Ami Gluska, *Eshkol, Give the Order!* [in Hebrew] (Tel Aviv: Maarachot, 2004).

[57]Yoram Peri, "The Democratic Putsch of 1999," in *In the Name*, 125–43.

[58]Ibid., 141.

[59]In 1999, the "credibility gap" between Israel's military and political parties was 23 percentage points in favor of the former. Arian, *Israeli Public Opinion: 1999*.

[60]Moshe Dayan, *Story of My Life* [in Hebrew] (Tel Aviv: Devir, 1976), 79–92; Shmuel Chen-Shany, *From the Battlefield to the Negotiation Table* [in Hebrew] (Tel Aviv: Maarachot, 2002).

[61]Mordechai Gur, *Chief of the General Staff* [in Hebrew] (Tel Aviv: Maarachot, 1998), 293–392; Ezer Weizman, *The Battle for Peace* [in Hebrew] (Jerusalem: Edanim, 1982); Moshe Dayan, *Shall the Sword Devour Forever?* [in Hebrew] (Jerusalem: Edanim, 1981).

[62]*Yediot Achronot*, 4 November 2003.

[63]Polls taken in 1995 and 1998 showed strong public support for the involvement of security officials in negotiations. Arian, *Israeli Public Opinion: 1998*.

[64]Data compiled from the official Web site of the Knesset (http://www.knesset.gov.il/govt/heb/GovtByNumber.asp). We regard civilians with significant background in the DE (e.g., Shimon Peres and Moshe Arens) as security officials.

[65]Data compiled from the official Web site of the Knesset (http://www.knesset.gov.il/mk/heb/mkdetails.asp).

[66]Cf. Mills, *Power Elite*, 200. Examples include Ariel Sharon, Rafael Eitan, and Rehavam Zeevi, leaders of Likud (earlier Shlomtzion), Tzomet, and Moledet, respectively. The role of Dash in legitimizing the Likud by joining its government in 1977 is also significant.

[67]Cf. Dowty, *Jewish State*.

[68]*Haaretz*, 19 December 2004.

[69]The other side of the same coin is the appointment of a Shin Bet official as deputy to the head of the Arab education in Israel's Ministry of Education, which enables him to be involved in, and even veto, the appointment of Arab principals and teachers. *Haaretz*, 29 December 2004.

[70]Henriette Dahan-Kalev and Udi Lebel, "Security and Education: Generals as Israeli School Managers," [in Hebrew] *Politika* 11–12 (2004): 27–40. Noted examples include Gimnasia Hertzelia (Tel-Aviv), Gimnasia Ivrit (Jerusalem), Art School in Jerusalem, and Hebrew Reali School (Haifa). The appointment of a former army brigadier as principal of Blich School in Ramat-Gan was thwarted in 2003, and a retired brigadier was director of the *'Amal* professional schools.

[71]Not to be confused with the IDF Veterans Association mentioned earlier.

[72]*Haaretz*, 30 May 2001.

[73]Dahan-Kalev and Lebel, "Security and Education," 35.

[74]For positive coverage see *Tzevet* 67 (December 2003–January 2004): 18.

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[75]Such as Ron Ben-Yishai in TV Channel 1 and *Yediot Ahronot*; Yoram Hamizrachi in the Israeli Radio, IDF Radio, *Haaretz*, *Jerusalem Post*, and *Maariv*; and Roni Daniel in TV Channel 2.

[76]*The Marker*, 1 September 2005.

[77]*Haaretz*, 14 March 2003, 18 March 2003, 19 March 2003, 23 March 2003, 24 April 2003, 27 May 2003, 17 June 2003, 1 July 2003, 24 July 2003, 28 August 2003, 31 August 2003, 5 September 2003, 11 September 2003, 15 September 2003.

[78]*Haaretz*, 16 June 2003, 4 August 2003, 5 August 2003, 1 September 2003, 5 September 2003, 16 September 2003. For criticism, see *Haaretz*, 9 September 2001, 20 January 2002.

[79]*Haaretz*, 10 September 2003. See also, *Haaretz*, 9 June 2003, 3 September 2003, 9 September 2003.

[80]*Haaretz*, 15 September 2003.

[81]*Haaretz*, 14 September 2003.

[82]Israel Channel Two News, 12 September 2003.

[83]*Haaretz*, 4 August 2003, 8 September 2003.

[84]*Haaretz*, 19 December 2003.

[85]*Haaretz*, 15 September 2003, 16 September 2003, 4 January 2004, 5 May 2004.

[86]Avner Yaniv, *Dilemmas of Security* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987).

[87]Beate Hamizrachi, *The Emergence of the South Lebanon Security Belt* (New York: Praeger, 1988).

[88]See, for example, articles by retired Brigadiers David Agmon, former LUL chief, and Amos Gilboa, former head of Israel's negotiation team in 1984–85. *Maariv*, 20 October 1995, 26 October 1995, 20 March 1996, 11 April 1996, 18 February 1997, 4 January 1998. This practice continued even after 2000. See, for example, a sympathetic review of the Hebrew version of the memoirs of former SLA Chief Antoine Lahad by Eliezer Tsafrir, who was involved in establishing the ties with Lahad two decades earlier. *Maariv*, 13 August 2004.

[89]Reuven Erlich, "The Conception of the Security Zone and its Ability to Pass the Test of Reality" in *The Security Zone in Lebanon* ed. Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov [in Hebrew] (Jerusalem: Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations, 1997), 15.

[90]*Maariv*, 17 October 1997; *Haaretz*, 29 January 1999, 20 April 1999.

[91]Human Rights Watch, *Israel's Withdrawal from South Lebanon*, May 2000 (http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/lebanon/israel051000.htm).

[92]Erlich, "Conception," 25.

[93]*Haaretz*, 21 February 1997, 11 April 1997.

[94]*Haaretz*, 11 April 1997, 10 April 1998, 25 May 2001.

[95]*Haaretz*, 30 January 1995, 27 October 1995. The annual budget of the Civilian Assistance Unit was $8 million.

[96]Avraham Sela, "Civic vs. the Military: The Case of Israel's Security Zone in South Lebanon (1997–2000), paper presented to the Annual Conference of the Association for Israel Studies, Jerusalem, June 2004.

[97]*Maariv*, 30 October 2000; *Jerusalem Post*, 26 January 2001.

[98]The military correspondent of *Haaretz* mentioned a "wide and ramified network of ties and interests" between the IDF command and the leaders of the settlers in the Occupied Territories. *Haaretz*, 26 September 2003. See also, *Haaretz*, 6 February 2005; Idith Zertal and Akiva Eldar, *Lords of the Land* [in Hebrew] (Or Yehuda: Kinneret, 2004), 373–438.

[99]*Report of Public Commission for Assessing the Parliamentary Supervision of the Defense Establishment and the Ways to Improve it* [in Hebrew] (Jerusalem: The Knesset, 2004).

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