Taiwan in Japan's Security Considerations

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During the Cold War period, particularly after the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, Japan's political and security relations with the People's Republic of China and Taiwan had to cope with the realities of "two Chinas," with the history of the Japanese colonization of Taiwan and its military aggression in China compelling post-war Japan to assume basically "non-strategic" security orientation. The fundamental argument in this article is that Japan's *de facto* "two Chinas" policy throughout much of the post-war period was not the result of careful consideration of its security priorities, but was rather a choice by default.

A serious problem in the post-war study of Japanese foreign policy in general is often a result of over-estimating Japan's "strategic" responses and over-reading its "strategic" thinking. This preoccupation with Japan as a strategic player is often revealed in the tendency to count it as one of the four major powers with the United States, Russia and China, but this has long been a fundamental source of confusion in the discourse and study about Japan.

Here, "strategic" is used to refer to the nature of behaviour and thinking of powers which are capable and prepared to affect the structure of international politics as poles of the structure. Among the so-called four major powers, the United States, China and Russia have been such poles, but Japan was clearly not. This is why the fundamental premise of Japanese foreign and security policy has been the U.S.–Japan security relationship, and the robustness of the relationship, despite some recurring friction and political frustrations, is a testimony to the fact that Japan was not a comparable power to the United States, China and Russia. Japan did not have an independent strategy to work on the structure, nor was it prepared domestically or internationally to contrive or carry out such a strategy.

It is of course possible to regard the Japanese approach as representing an alternative strategy, but treating Japan's China and Taiwan policies as such does not serve any meaningful purpose. By the same token, treating Japan as a strategic actor, if only potentially, would give rise to a typical "conspiracy" theory, because records of Japanese behaviour do not satisfy such strategic perspective. The foreign policy of post-war Japan, particularly in the domain of security, can be analysed and interpreted objectively if seen from the perspective of Japan's inability and unwillingness to develop an independent strategy, rather than a result of any centralized intention, still less a "conspiracy." As shown in detail below, the Japanese government in its policy towards China and Taiwan during much of the post-war period attempted to stay away from the dominant strategic logic put forward by the United States, China and Russia.

For the analytical perspective, the history of Japan's military aggression in China in the 1930s and 1940s is critical, making most Japanese

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anti-military and extremely reluctant to be involved in the major powers' strategic issues. The U.S.–Japan security treaty, originally accepted by the Japanese government to fill the dual requirements of coping with Cold War realities and preserving the war-renouncing Article Nine of the so-called Peace Constitution, was very unpopular among the dominantly pacifist Japanese because the treaty was interpreted as a mechanism to draw Japan into the Cold War.

Thus, the extent to which the history of military aggression in China came to be reflected in the post-war foreign policy of Japan was significant. It explains why, during much of the post-war period, China was not regarded as a threat by most Japanese, and China and the United States often competed in Japanese public opinion polls as the nation most favoured by the Japanese.

With regard to Japan's post-war attitude towards Taiwan, the most important point is that the history of military aggression in China and that of the colonization of Taiwan reinforce each other behind post-war Japan's *de facto* "two Chinas" policy. On the one hand, the historical experiences of China and Taiwan were divergent, suggesting the importance of Japan's relations with both of them. On the other, however, because of the history of Japanese expansion into Asia where aggression and colonization proceeded side by side, Japan lost its legitimacy as an independent strategic player, encouraging it to see its relations with China and Taiwan in fundamentally non-strategic ways.

The Colonial Period: An Overview

After the opening-up of the country and the Meiji Restoration in the mid 19th century, the Japanese elite expected and encouraged China to reform itself in order to resist Western imperialism, but this feeling was mixed with and was eventually replaced by the determination that Japan should not suffer the fate of China. Such determination was put into practice in various forms of its aggressive foreign policy at the expense of China.

Since the colonization of Taiwan after 1895, however, Japan's external policy was generally "successful" until the 1930s.[1] Japan forged an alliance with Great Britain in 1902 and defeated Russia in the Russo-Japanese War in 1904–05. It then annexed Korea in 1910, and was one of the "Principal Allied and Associated Powers" in the negotiations over the Treaty of Versailles at the end of the First World War. Japan then gained the status of a permanent member of the Council of the League of Nations together with Great Britain, France and Italy. Until the 1920s, Japan enjoyed Taishō democracy at home, and was a respected power in the world led by the West.

Under these circumstances, Japan leaned a great deal from the West and tried to be a "good" colonial power as the only Asian country

1. Wolf Mendl, *Japan's Asia Policy: Regional Security and Global Interests* (London: Routledge, 1995), p. 25.

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achieving that status. The role of Taiwan here was critical. It became a training ground for numerous colonial officials, and programmes successfully implemented in Taiwan, such as land survey, population census, government monopolies, and investigation of native customs and traditions, became models for other colonies.[2] These programmes were important because virtually all colonial officials were Japanese, except in Korea where "an unusually large number of Koreans were employed in the colonial government at all levels."[3] In Taiwan, civil considerations were central from the beginning, guided by the civil administrator Gō tō Shunpei who was assisted by "honest and skilled young subordinates dedicated to bringing order and security to the island, improving its road and communications systems, modernizing its cities, reducing disease, and above all transforming the island economy – particularly its agriculture and industrial base – which made the colony economically self-sufficient within a decade."[4]

The Taiwanese anti-colonial movement against Japanese rule peaked in the late 1920s. The mainstream leaders, however, were largely reformists, demanding substantial Taiwanese participation in the political, economic and social life of the colony. The campaigns were conducted primarily through the Japanese media, by cementing relationships with Japanese politicians and opinion-makers, and by submitting petitions to the Japanese Diet.[5]

Since the 1930s, however, the perception of Japan as a responsible colonial power, which was prevalent abroad at the time if not among the colonized peoples, quickly gave way to the image of an aggressive empire using colonies as stepping stones for the conquest of all Asia. Of course, this was largely because of a change in Japan's colonial policies, heavily influenced by aggressive military thinking. In Korea, for instance, recruitment of Koreans into the Japanese armed forces (first on a voluntary basis in 1938, then as mandatory conscription from 1943), a great number of labour conscripts, and the Japanization campaigns including the forced adoption of Japanese names and Shintō practices, all started from the mid-1930s under the direct influence of Japanese militarism.[6]

Taiwan suffered the same fate. The post of governor-general had been assumed by civil administrators from 1919, but in 1936 a retired admiral of the Japanese navy took the post. From then until the late 1930s, the three pillars of Japanese colonial policy in Taiwan developed: Japanization with the emperor system as the foundation, industrialization, and the fortification of Taiwan as a base for *nanshin*, expansion towards the south. With the outbreak of Japanese all-out military aggression in China

2. Edward I-te Chen, "Japanese colonialism: an overview," in Harry Wray and Hilary Conroy (eds.), *Japan Examined: Perspectives on Modern Japanese History* (Honolulu: The University of Hawaii Press, 1983), p. 202.
3. *Ibid.* pp. 201–202.
4. Mark R. Peattie, "Japanese colonialism: discarding the stereotypes," in Wray and Conroy, *Japan Examined*, p. 210.
5. E. Patricia Tsurumi, "Colonizer and colonized in Taiwan," in *ibid.* p. 220.
6. Kim Han-Kyo, "Japanese colonialism in Korea," in *ibid.* p. 224.

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after the Marco Polo bridge incident in July 1937, the Japanization of the Taiwanese people was considered pressing, including a ban on the Taiwanese language and forced use of Japanese names and Shintō practices. Then came massive labour conscription, followed by military conscription in 1942.[7]

In sum, Japan's colonial policies in Taiwan reflected its national priorities as it struggled through the world dominated by the West; first as a good student of the Western colonial powers, then as an "equal" colonial power, and finally as an aggressive challenger to the international system dominated by the West. The way this last phase of Japanese expansion came to an end influenced heavily the basic mode of Japanese foreign policy in the post-war years including relations with Taiwan.

Japan's Defeat and Taiwan

Taiwan in the Yoshida Doctrine. When Article Nine of the Japanese Constitution was imposed by the occupation authorities in 1946, the Japanese leaders correctly took it as a prerequisite for the preservation of the Emperor system, which was considered essential by Washington for successful occupation policies despite strong resistance from other allied countries and the Asian victims of Japanese aggression. Japanese Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru's motives for accepting the Peace Constitution were mixed, including his distrust of Japanese militarism, sensitivity towards Asian neighbours, devotion to economic recovery, and defence of the Emperor system. His policy dispositions and convictions did not change despite the outbreak of the Cold War in 1947 and the Korean War in 1950, and he continued to defend the Peace Constitution. After 1947, however, American strategy towards Japan drastically shifted and Washington pushed for Japan's rearmament under the realities of the Cold War.

Yoshida, or indeed Japan as a whole, was thus struggling between the two divergent currents of the time: the old current stemming from the wartime considerations that called for the de-militarization of Japan, and the new current of the Cold War that made Washington realize the importance of Japan as its stronghold in East Asia. Yoshida's idea as he strove to gain independence from the occupation was to take care of Japan's security needs without substantial rearmament or changing the Peace Constitution. The U.S.–Japan security relationship was the answer, but an ambiguous one.

The initial source of ambiguity was the gap between Japan's unwillingness to meet the United States' request for full-fledged rearmament, on the one hand, and Washington's hesitation to commit itself fully to defending Japan because of the Vandenberg Resolution obliging its

7. Gō tō Kanichi, "Taiwan to Nanyō" ("Taiwan and the South Sea"), in Kōza Iwanami (ed.), *Kindai-Nihon to Shokumin-chi 2* (*Modern Japan and Colonies 2*) (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1992), pp. 161, 167–69.

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security partners to provide their own self-help efforts and mutual assistance, on the other. In order to fill this gap, Yoshida had to commit himself in his talks with John F. Dulles in January 1951 to the establishment of the Security Force of 50,000 troops,[8] which came into existence in August 1952 and grew into the Self-Defence Forces (SDF) in July 1954. Japan's *de facto* rearmament was thus decided in the context of Yoshida's determination to maintain the Peace Constitution and to refrain from full-fledged rearmament.

As Japan gained independence in 1952 after the seven-year American occupation, Yoshida's choice was thus to pursue a road to its post-war recovery and prosperity through the U.S.–Japan security relationship and by taking advantage of dominant Pax Americana under the Cold War situation, which motivated him to cut the military burden to the minimum. This basic policy came to be known as the Yoshida Doctrine.[9]

It is important to recognize, however, that Yoshida's China policy was not identical to that of the United States. If they appeared similar, this was because Pax Americana was so predominant. Yoshida later recalled that "we had been defeated in a reckless war which placed Japan under the U.S. occupation, and then pursued a road to recovery and reconstruction. Japan's post-war international standing, i.e., its position as a member of the free world, was determined by this fact." He then continued that to promote contact with China was to "play the fool who willingly disturbs the balance of power of international politics."[10] At the same time, however, he also contended in 1957 that "America has not come near understanding China truly," and that "almost all the post-war U.S. policies towards China were a failure."[11]

This combination of the choice of the United States as a fundamental reference point of Japanese overall foreign policy on the one hand, and the belief that Japan's relations with China did not fit this strategic framework entirely on the other, continued to inform Japan's ambivalent China policy, which inclined towards a *de facto* "two Chinas" policy. Yoshida wished to remain as flexible as possible in dealing with the China/Taiwan question even after the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950.[12] He thought, as did the whole of Japan at the time, that for its post-war recovery, trade with mainland China would be indispensable. In late 1949, Inagaki Heitaro, minister of MITI, talked about the ministry's expectation that trade with China would eventually reach 25 to 30 per

8. Watanabe Akio, "Kowa-mondai to Nihon no Sentaku" ("Peace problem and Japan's choice"), in Seigen Miyazato (ed.), *Sanfuransisuko Kowa* (*San Francisco Peace*) (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1986).

9. John W. Dower, *Empire and Aftermath: Yoshida Shigeru and the Japanese Experiences, 1878–1954* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979); Michael Schaller, *The American Occupation of Japan; The Origins of the Cold War in Asia* (New York: Oxford University Press 1985), pp. 276–77, 293–94.

10. Yoshida Shigeru, *Sekai to Nippon* (*The World and Japan*) (Tokyo: Bancho Shobo, 1963), pp. 144–45.

11. Yoshida Shigeru, *Kaiso Junen, Dai-1-kan* (*Recollections of Ten Years, Vol. 1*) (Tokyo: Shincho-sha, 1957), p. 270.

12. The arguments here draw much upon my *Japan's Economic Diplomacy with China, 1945–1978* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 20–24.

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cent of Japan's trade with the world.[13] In 1951, after the outbreak of the Korean War, Yoshida also wrote in *Foreign Affairs*:

> In some quarters a fear is entertained that a separate peace might permanently sever Japan's trade with Red China. Red or white, China remains our next-door neighbor. Geography and economic laws will, I believe, prevail in the long run over any ideological differences and artificial trade barriers.[14]

These views had some realistic base at the time. Before the Korean War, the United States itself had not abandoned hope of industrializing Japan with Chinese resources. It is also important to recall that before the Korean War the United States had still been pursing a policy to "Titonize" China, that is, to make it independent of the Soviet influence like Tito's Yugoslavia, and eventually to establish diplomatic normalization with Communist China at the expense of the Kuomintang.[15]

When the Cold War turned into war in Korea, Japan's realistic hope of establishing substantial relations with China vanished, and the question of signing a peace treaty and establishing diplomatic normalization with Taipei loomed large. Several studies reveal that Yoshida's true intention was to keep Japan's future alternative as wide as possible.[16] The reason Yoshida thought that he had the flexibility even under the realities of the Cold War was two-fold: one derived from his insight into Sino-Soviet relations, and the other from a disagreement between the United States and Great Britain over their China policies.

Yoshida thought that the civilizations, national characters and political conditions of China and the Soviet Union were mutually incompatible.[17] Before signing the "Yoshida Letter" of 24 December 1951, which was drafted by John F. Dulles and was forced on him, Yoshida had attempted to convince Dulles that Japan could play an important role in detaching China from the control of the Soviet politburo, but to no avail.[18] He had also been encouraged by the agreement between Dulles and Herbert S. Morrison (the British foreign minister), signed on 19 June 1951, to the effect that no Chinese representative would be invited to the San Francisco Peace Conference and that it would be up to Japan to decide its attitudes towards the China question. Yoshida thus insisted to Dulles in December 1951 that he was prepared to "begin negotiations" to "normalize relations with the Nationalist government within the area

13. Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, "American policy toward Sino-Japanese trade in the postwar years: politics and prosperity," *Diplomatic History*, No. 8 (Summer 1984), pp. 193–95.
14. Shigeru Yoshida, "Japan and the crisis in Asia," *Foreign Affairs*, No. 29 (January 1951), p. 179.
15. Akira Iriye, *The Cold War in Asia: A Historical Introduction* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1974).
16. Dower, *Empire and Aftermath*; William J. Sebald and Russel Brines, *With MacArthur in Japan: A Personal History of the Occupation* (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1965); Hosoya Chihiro, "Yoshida Shokan to Bei-Ei-Chu no Kozo" ("The Yoshida Letter and the structure of U.S.–Britain–China relations"), *Chuo Koron*, No. 97 (November 1982).
17. Yoshida Shigeru, *Kaiso Junen, Dai-3-kan* (*Recollections of Ten Years, Vol. 3*) (Tokyo: Shincho-sha, 1957), p. 72.
18. Hosoya Chihiro, "The Yoshida Letter and the structure of U.S.–Britain–China Relations," p. 83.

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where it is exercising its *de facto* power of control," but that he wanted to postpone the question of a peace treaty until the China question was solved internationally.[19]

But the American pressure prevailed. The Yoshida Letter, addressed to Dulles, ended with the sentence: "I can assure you that the Japanese government has no intention to conclude a bilateral treaty with the Communist regime in China."[20] Thus, the Japan–ROC Peace Treaty was signed on 25 April 1952.[21]

Japan's "two Chinas" policy. This choice of Taiwan against the Japanese wish to remain flexible towards China marked the beginning of Japan's *de facto* "two Chinas" policy. The focus then shifted toward increasing contact with Beijing without sacrificing the existence of Taiwan. Japanese diplomatic documents released in 1998 reveal this vividly. A document titled "Reconsideration of the China Issue," prepared by the foreign ministry's Asia bureau in August 1956, argued that Communist China was steadily becoming stable and its economic construction was progressing, and that the Kuomintang government was getting stable but was facing the ever strengthening balance in favour of Beijing. The document then proposed two general points: Japan would not recognize Communist China, and Japan would begin governmental negotiations with Communist China on unresolved issues such as trade, fishery, the postal service, repatriation and cultural exchanges.[22]

Japan's *de facto* "two Chinas" policy became much more explicit in the early 1960s. A document prepared by the foreign ministry's Asia bureau in March 1961 stated that "it is desirable for Japan that Communist China be granted representation in the United Nations, on the condition that Taiwan receives special treatment." With regard to "special treatment" about Taiwan, it called for UN resolutions on the following: it should be confirmed that Taiwan's legal status is undetermined and therefore Taiwan is not part of China; and the United Nations should supervise elections in Taiwan, which would determine whether Taiwan belongs to China or is independent.[23] It then contends that Japan should eventually recognize Communist China, but the appropriate timing should be after its admission into the United Nations or the determination of the legal status of Taiwan.

Needless to say, putting into practice these policy measures was simply beyond Japan's capacity, but this thinking reveals a very strong incli-

19. *Ibid.* pp. 74, 82.

20. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, "Sori no Daresu-ate Shokan" ("Prime Minister's letter to Dulles") (24 December 1951), Foreign Ministry Archive, Microfilm B′-0009.

21. For an account from the Taiwanese side, see Chang Chun, *Nikka: Fuun no 70-nen* (*Japan-China (ROC): 70 Stormy Years*) (Tokyo: Sankei-shuppan, 1980), pp. 129–142.

22. Asia Bureau, Second Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, "Chūgoku-mondai no Sai-kentō" ("Reconsideration of the China question") (21 August 1956), Foreign Ministry Archive, A′-1218.

23. Asia Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, "Tai-Chūkyō Hōshin (An)" ("Policy toward Communist China (draft)") (3 March 1961), Foreign Ministry Archive, A′-1218.

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nation among Japanese policy makers towards the status quo across the Taiwan Strait. In January 1961, the China section of the foreign ministry argued that Communist China should be admitted to the United Nations, but that even after it was admitted, the reality of "one mainland China" and "one Taiwan" would not change for a long time. In the meantime, the document argued, Japan should proceed step by step until the moment of diplomatic recognition of Communist China which should come after its admission to the United Nations.[24]

Of course, all these views are carefully expressed against the backdrop of the U.S.–Japan security relationship as the central basis of Japanese foreign policy. And it was indeed this backdrop that forced the Japanese government into the position of a "two Chinas" policy. On the one hand, despite the resistance to Taipei's assertion that it controlled all of China, Tokyo also felt the necessity of supporting Taiwan's existence through the mechanisms of the U.S.–Japan security ties. At the same time, however, there were also strong feelings in Tokyo that the American policy of containing China did not serve interests of Japan. After all, Japan wanted to continue to have good relations with both Beijing and Taipei, because the situation across the Taiwan Strait was beyond its control, and its position did not resonate with that of any parties including Taiwan, Beijing and Washington, all of which had their own share of the role for the division of China.

This lack of independent strategy towards the Taiwan question formed the fundamental basis of Japan's *de facto* "two Chinas" policy in the 1950s and 1960s. To cite another document of the Japanese foreign ministry, emphasizing a "natural" prospect of "two Chinas" rather than as an intentional design:

> The international situation will move in the direction of détente for the time being, and Communist China will "join" the United Nations in the near future. Japan then will recognize Communist China as a formal government on the mainland and will have normal diplomatic relations with it; the development in this direction is a natural one…. (In this case, the treatment of the Taiwan question will become a problem, but it appears a wise and moderate solution to follow the current of the time and a course of natural development, provided it is guaranteed that the island of Taiwan will not become a military base of Communist China in any form.)[25]

In sum, the choice of the U.S.–Japan security relationship was fundamental for overall Japanese diplomacy, which made it inevitable for Japan to choose Taipei over Beijing in 1952. The security relationship with the United States, however, was never perceived as a strategic basis for the choice of Taiwan. By the same token, the U.S.–Japan security ties did not convince Japan that Beijing needed to be contained along the line of the U.S. Cold War strategy in Asia. After all, Japan's "two Chinas"

24. China Section, Foreign Ministry of Japan, "Tai-Chukyo Saku (An)" ("Policy toward Communist China (draft)") (8 January 1961), Foreign Ministry Archive, A′-1218.

25. Asian Bureau, Second Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, "Tomen no Tai-Chukyo Seisaku (Dai-Niji An)" ("Present policy toward Communist China (second draft)") (12 September 1956), Foreign Ministry's Archive, unnumbered.

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policy existed almost by default with a lack of independent strategy in Tokyo at a comparable level with that of the United States or China.

Sino-Japanese Diplomatic Normalization and Taiwan

Legal matters concerning Taiwan. The post-war political context of Taiwan–Japan relations was thus characterized by the lack of a Japanese strategy towards the triangular politics between the United States, China and Taiwan. This was vividly demonstrated again at the time of Sino-U.S. rapprochement in the early 1970s. Without the rapprochement, the Japan–China diplomatic normalization in September 1972 and the termination of diplomatic relations between Taiwan and Japan would not have happened. But Japan did not respond to this highly political development according to the strategic logic that moved Washington and Beijing.[26]

The decision for U.S. President Richard Nixon to go to China, announced on 15 July 1971, came as a shock to the Japanese government. The Japanese ambassador to Washington, Ushiba Nobuhiko, was informed of Nixon's announcement less than an hour before, and the Japanese prime minister, Satō Eisaku, is said to have learned of it only a few minutes before. There arose a strong feeling among Japanese policy makers that they were betrayed by the United States. A foreign ministry official who played a key role in normalization stated: "there was resentment over the fact that the United States had gone ahead of Japan in opening up contact with China. Unless Japan got ahead of the United States in the actual normalization, the people would not accept such a verdict.[27] For the Tanaka Kakuei cabinet which succeeded the Satō administration in July 1972, "it was a matter of survival in domestic politics to achieve normalization before the United States did."[28]

With the establishment of the Tanaka administration in July 1972, diplomatic normalization with Beijing was already a foregone conclusion. Tanaka was determined (as was the Chinese leadership) to grab the momentum of Sino-U.S. rapprochement and achieve normalization as quickly as possible. Despite several complicated issues, the actual negotiation process was surprisingly short, with the joint communiqué to establish diplomatic normalization signed on 29 September 1972, less than three months after the inauguration of the Tanaka cabinet. The speed was particularly impressive because many of the key issues related to the question of Taiwan, a matter of diplomatic principle for Beijing.

The lack of strategic imperatives on the part of Japan was demonstrated by the fact that the Japanese negotiators concentrated on the question of compatibility between the Japan–ROC Peace Treaty signed in 1952 and the legal issues in the joint communiqué with Beijing. They

26. For an overview on how Japan reformulated its relations with Taipei with the "Japanese model," see Ralph N. Clough, *Island China* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1978), pp. 189–200.

27. Sadako Ogata, *Normalization with China: A Comparative Study of U.S. and Japanese Processes* (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 1988) p. 37.

28. *Ibid.* p. 50.

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insisted, for instance, that the termination of "the state of war" had already been declared with Taipei, so that this phrase could not be used. The Chinese compromised with the wording, declaring the termination of "the abnormal state of affairs," in Article One of the joint communiqué. Another legal issue was the Chinese renouncement of the right to demand war reparation, which had also been stated in the Japan–ROC Peace Treaty. The Chinese compromise was to drop the term "right," with the agreed Article Five stating that the Chinese government "renounces its demand for war reparation from Japan."

The question of the legal and political status of Taiwan was more complicated, but Japan responded from its usual stance of non-commitment. The Chinese position had been conveyed to the Japanese side in the form of "the three principles for the restoration of relations," which said: the PRC is the sole legitimate government representing China; Taiwan is a province of China and an inalienable part of Chinese territory; and the Japan–Taiwan treaty is unlawful and should be abolished. The first point posed no problem, and Article Two of the joint communiqué declared: "The government of Japan recognizes the government of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal government of China."

Regarding the second and the third points, the joint communiqué made only an indirect reference. While declaring in the preamble that "the Japanese side reaffirms its position that it intends to realize the normalization of relations between the two countries from the stand of fully understanding 'the three principles for the restoration of relations' put forward by the government of the People's Republic of China," Article Three stated that "the government of Japan fully understands and respects" the stand of the PRC government that "Taiwan is an inalienable part of the territory of the People's Republic of China," and that the Japanese government "firmly maintains its stand under Article Eight of the Potsdam Proclamation."

Since then, the Japanese official position on the question of "two Chinas" has come to be based on these two commitments: understanding and respect for the PRC's position on "one China," and the acceptance of Article Eight of the Potsdam Proclamation." The latter declared that the Cairo Declaration should be fully implemented. The Cairo Declaration had stipulated that Japan should return all the territories taken from China. Through this round-about logic, Japan assumed a stand that Taiwan had been returned to "China" at the end of the Second World War, and therefore Japan was in no position to speak about Taiwan. This was compatible, according to the Japanese government, with its long-standing position that "Japan, which renounced [its right over] Taiwan in the San Francisco Peace Treaty, is in no position to make an independent judgement on the legal status of Taiwan."[29]

29. "Dai-70-kai Kokkai-ni okeru Ōhira Gaimu-daijin no Gaikō enzetsu" ("Diplomatic speech by Foreign Minister Ohira at the 70th Session of the National Diet"), in Kazan-kai (ed.), *Nicchū-kankei Kihon-shiryō-shū, 1949–1997* (*Basic Documents on Japan-China Relations, 1945–1997*) (Tokyo: Kazankai, 1998), p. 450.

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Political and security dimensions. In political and security terms, however, the question naturally went beyond mere legal interpretation. The core concept of the new American diplomacy was reflected in the Nixon Doctrine, initially expressed as an "unofficial" remark by Nixon in July 1969 in Guam and eventually formulated into a three-point policy in Nixon's speech to Congress in November 1969 and in his first foreign policy report to Congress in February 1970.[30] The three points read as follows:

> First, the United States will keep all of its treaty commitments.
>
> Second, we shall provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation allied with us or of a nation whose survival we consider vital to our security.
>
> Third, in cases involving other types of aggression, we shall furnish military and economic assistance when requested in accordance with our treaty commitments. But we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense.[31]

The first and second points assured U.S. commitment to its treaty obligations and nuclear umbrella for allied countries, while the third asked the allies to assume primary responsibilities for their own defence. Accordingly, Japan was expected to strengthen its own defence efforts and to assume some responsibility for regional security. The Satō–Nixon joint communiqué in November 1969 included important stipulations from this point of view; the so-called "Korea clause" and "Taiwan clause" said, respectively, that "the Prime Minister … stated that the security of the Republic of Korea was essential to Japan's own security," and that "the Prime Minister also said that the maintenance of peace and security in the Taiwan area was also a most important factor for the security of Japan."[32] By the same token, the United States began to push for Japan's increased defence efforts under the slogan of "burden sharing" in the 1970s.

The Satō administration, however, was not prepared to see the implications of these international developments from the dominant strategic logic. This was demonstrated in the reversion of Okinawa, which was promised in the 1969 joint communiqué. From an American perspective, the reversion of Okinawa, an essential military base for the Vietnam War, was acceptable only along the line of the Nixon Doctrine. It was natural, therefore, that the reversion would bring about Japan's larger responsibility for the maintenance of regional stability as symbolized by the Korean and Taiwan clauses of the communiqué. Knowing that these clauses would cause an uproar in the Japanese Diet and mass media, however, Satō took them as "concessions" to the United States for

30. Richard M. Nixon, *U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970s: A New Strategy for Peace* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970).

31. Address to the Nation on the War in Vietnam. November 3, 1969," *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Richard Nixon, 1969* (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1971), pp. 905–906.

32. *Nihon Gaikō Shuyō Monjo-Nenpyō (2) 1961–1970*(*Major Documents and Chronology of Japanese Diplomacy (2) 1961–1970*) (Tokyo: Hara Shobō, 1984), p. 880–81.

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returning Okinawa. Satō's primary consideration was to regain the administrative right to Okinawa as an achievement of his "autonomous diplomacy," a diplomacy showing the Japanese public that Japan was not always blindly following the United States. After all, the massive reorganization of the international environment since the late 1960s was perceived by most Japanese primarily as an opportunity to diversify its diplomatic horizon; hence the "China boom" in Japan, in which both business and the government moved quickly and decisively to normalize relations with Beijing.

In short, Taiwan became a victim of this Japanese urge for "autonomous diplomacy" which was driven simply by the desire to expand Japan's diplomatic horizon. Nevertheless, it is important to note that the Japanese policy makers learned clearly in the 1970s that the fundamental premise of this "autonomous diplomacy" is none other than stable U.S.–Japan security ties. Hereafter, the expansion of Japan's political and security role through the consolidation of the U.S.–Japan alliance was most typically exemplified in the leadership style of Nakasone Yasuhiro in the 1980s.

The 1970s and 1980s were a unique period in which Japan enjoyed the compatibility of good relations with both the United States and China. Although its co-operation with U.S. anti-Soviet strategy began to show some signs of progress as it augmented its economic might, its policies towards China and Taiwan continued to be informed by non-strategic imperatives. On these grounds, Japan's relations with Taiwan also flourished at the non-official level.[33]

Post-Cold War Period

The logic of the U.S.–Japan joint declaration on security. Since the end of the Cold War, Japan has gradually begun to look at the Taiwan question as a security issue. This was triggered by changing patterns of major power relations after the end of the Cold War, centring around Sino-U.S. relations.

The end of the Cold War in Asia meant not only the closing of the U.S.–Russia confrontation, affecting the structure of international politics, but was overshadowed more importantly by the beginning of a difficult relationship between the United States and China after the Tiananmen incident of June 1989 and by Sino-Russian rapprochement highlighted by Mikhael Gorbachev's trip to China right in the middle of a mass demonstration in Tiananmen Square. Under these new circumstances, all nations in the region started to adjust to changing realities, and many have responded to others' redefinition of national priorities and strategies in their own frames of reference, fuelling widening perception gaps.

33. For useful basic data on Taiwan–Japan exchanges in such areas as flow of visitors, trade and economic co-operation since the termination of diplomatic relations, see "Nihon to Taiwan-kaikyō Ryōgan to no Kankei (1972–1992)" ("Japan's relations with both sides of the Taiwan Strait (1972–1992)") *Mondai to Kenkyū* (*Issues and Studies*), Vol. 21, No. 12 (September 1992), pp. 33–69.

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Evolving realities surrounding Taiwan–Japan relations appear to fit this post-Cold War pattern.

An epitome of this vicious cycle was recently seen in the "re-affirmation" process of the U.S.–Japan security relationship. A fundamental characteristic of the U.S.–Japan alliance has been the asymmetrical nature of bilateral co-operation. The process leading to its "re-affirmation" in April 1996 was the consolidation of this asymmetric alliance. The central function of the alliance for regional stability derives, first, from American preparedness to use the alliance for regional contingencies. Japan's military involvement would become an issue only when and if the United States decides to take action from its bases in Japan and only in the form of co-operation with the United States (no independent Japanese military action under any circumstances unless Japan's security is threatened). The central motive of the review of the Guidelines for U.S. Defence Co-operation was indeed to fine-tune such mechanisms of U.S.–Japan military co-operation.

This administrative process was triggered by two factors. The most apparent one was an evolving crisis on the Korean Peninsula culminating in 1994, as perceived by the U.S. decision makers, in the ultimate choice between war and the Korean Energy Development Organization. When the war scenario was being carefully scrutinized, the policy makers in both Washington and Tokyo came to the stark realization that they had not prepared anything on feasible military co-operation in the event of war on the Korean Peninsula.[34] Secondly, this realization gave rise to a serious concern about the survivability of the alliance in the event that Japan would not do anything in a war situation where American soldiers were dying. The deep and central motive of the re-affirmation process, therefore, was to save the fragile alliance.

This led to the "U.S.–Japan Joint Declaration on Security,"[35] signed by Japanese Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryūtarō and U.S. President Bill Clinton in April 1996. Regarding the regional implications of the alliance in a new age, the joint declaration stated:

> … They [the prime minister and the president] reaffirmed that the Japan–U.S. security relationship, based on the Treaty of Mutual Co-operation and Security between Japan and the United States of America, remains the cornerstone for achieving common security objectives, and for maintaining a stable and prosperous environment for the Asia-Pacific region as we enter the 21st century.

It then listed five areas in which the two nations would "undertake efforts to advance cooperation": continued close consultation on defence policies and military postures, as well as exchange of information and views on the international situation; review of the 1978 Guidelines for U.S.–Japan Defence Co-operation and studies on bilateral co-operation in response to

34. Funabashi Yoichi, *Dōmei Hyōryū* (*Alliance Adrift*) (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1997); Yoichi Funabashi, *Alliance Adrift* (Washington, D.C.: The Bookings Institution, 1999). Don Orberdorfer, *The Two Koreas* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1998).

35. U.S.–Japan Joint Declaration on Security: Alliance for the 21st Century" (17 April 1996).

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situations that may arise in areas surrounding Japan and affect Japan's peace and security; promotion of the bilateral co-operative relationship through the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement signed on 15 April 1996; promotion of mutual exchange in the areas of military technology and equipment; and prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, and co-operation in the ongoing study on theatre missile defence.

As a result of these developments, the U.S.–Japan alliance has begun to have a dual function. One is implicit: on the abstract level of the international structure, it functions as a *de facto* stabilizer in the long-term international dynamics of shifting major power relations. The other is explicit: the alliance must work to deal with potential short-term regional conflict such as the situation on the Korean Peninsula. This function derives primarily from the actual stipulations and arrangements based the bilateral security treaty. Of particular importance in this connection is the review of the Guidelines for Defence Co-operation between Japan and the United States. The revision of the guidelines included the study of possible ways of military co-operation in case of regional emergencies.

The review's interim report was released in June 1997, followed by the final report on 23 September 1997.[36] The review was conducted in conjunction with "the peace and security of Japan," not with that of the United States nor regional security, and this was due to Japan's constitutional limits, prohibiting the "use of force" beyond self-defence and for settling international disputes. Therefore, whereas U.S.–Japan co-operation should be relevant in "areas surrounding Japan," the new guidelines justified such co-operation only for the security of Japan and not for U.S. military objectives *per se*. By the same token, U.S.–Japan co-operation should not exceed the parameters set by the Japanese Constitution prohibiting Japanese "use of force" outside Japanese territories for settling international disputes. In addition, the range of self-defence is still interpreted by the Japanese government to exclude collective defence actions, such as U.S.–Japan joint military operations in the Korean Peninsula, even if such contingencies are interpreted to have a significant impact on Japan's security.

The type of Japanese co-operation for the United States in "situations in areas surrounding Japan," therefore, should not involve Japan's "use of force," and what constitutes the "use of force" was a central issue in Japan's policy-making process and U.S.–Japan negotiations in the revision of the guidelines. It was stipulated in the new guidelines, for instance, that Japan can transport American weapons and ammunitions in logistical support, but cannot provide Japanese weapons and ammunitions held by the self-defence forces for the United States under any circumstances because this would constitute the "use of force" by Japan. Areas

36. U.S.–Japan Subcommittee for Defense Co-operation, "The interim report on the review of the guidelines for U.S.–Japan defense cooperation," Honolulu, 7 June 1997. U.S.–Japan Security Consultative Committee, "Completion of the review of the guidelines for U.S.–Japan defense cooperation," New York, 23 September 1997.

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of such possible co-operation in "situations in areas surrounding Japan" listed in the new guidelines are relief activities and measures to deal with refugees, search and rescue, noncombatant evacuation operations, activities for ensuring the effectiveness of economic sanctions, use of facilities, rear area support (supply, transportation, maintenance, medical services, security, communications, others), surveillance, minesweeping, and sea and air space management.

Implications for Taiwan. A general question of dealing with the rise of China relates to the implicit function of the alliance, while the question of Taiwan concerns both the explicit and implicit functions. The China factor was generally in the minds of policy makers working on the re-affirmation task in the form of the joint security declaration released in April 1996. The specific issue of the security of Taiwan, however, was not. This issue began to loom large particularly after Chinese military actions at the time of the Taiwanese presidential elections in March 1996. The U.S.–Japan Joint Declaration on Security, however, was already complete by the autumn of 1995, and was originally intended to be announced at the time of Clinton's (cancelled) visit to the Osaka APEC summit.

Chinese hypersensitivity about the Taiwan question and its suspicion that Taiwan is a core area to be covered by the revised guidelines, however, have gradually shifted people's perception about the implications of the alliance re-affirmation for Taiwan. Theoretically speaking, the revised guidelines can be applied to a Taiwan contingency if it is judged as affecting Japan's own security. The Japanese government has never denied this point, which is in essence what it means when it says that "situations in the areas surrounding Japan" are a situational concept and not a geographical one. However the possibility of Japan taking independent military action in a Taiwan contingency is nil unless it is directly attacked. Nevertheless, the United States may react militarily on its own judgement. When and if Washington decides to act, Japan would have to make a decision whether or not to invoke the new guidelines. This is a simple logic, reflecting the asymmetrical structure of the alliance, and the Japanese security profile therein.

It is fair to say that no responsible policy maker either in Tokyo or Washington believes that a serious contingency calling for the invocation of the revised guidelines is imminent. It is against this backdrop that the director-general of the Defence Agency, Kyuma Fumio, stated on 29 July 1997 that there should be no need to prepare for a Taiwan crisis in actual joint military planning based on the review of the guidelines. In this regard, the central function of the re-affirmed U.S.–Japan alliance is still dominantly implicit, even involving the Taiwan question. In other words, it is still primarily a tool to maintain general strategic stability over the Taiwan Strait, upon which necessary political negotiations are to be conducted. On the other hand, however, the more the leadership in Beijing sees the direct linkage of the alliance with the security of Taiwan, the more its explicit function begins to stand out.

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The same point may apply to the question of the theatre missile defence concept and programme. First, in the mind of the Japanese policy makers, Japanese initial participation in the embryonic research stage of this programme is an act of security co-operation with the United States. It is fair to say that Japanese attitudes and policy towards the project beyond its commitment to the initial research phase are still uncertain. This is because the project entails not simply military balance but the overall strategic balance among major powers, and there is no indication that the Japanese government has given any serious thought to its strategic dimension. In other words, the function of the project still remains largely implicit in the context of shifting patterns of major power relations, rather than explicit for Taiwan security.

Conclusion

After the end of the war, Japan was squeezed between the Cold War imperatives to follow the U.S. strategic lead and thus to recognize Taipei as the sole legitimate government of China on the one hand, and the "weight" of China emanating from its civilization and long historical ties with Japan on the other. Facing this clash of divergent imperatives, Japan tried to avoid making a final choice. This in effect meant that defeated Japan was in no position to have an independent strategy, forcing it into the stance of non-commitment to any strategic urge represented by the United States or China.

This premise of Japan's policy towards Taiwan did not change even at the time of Sino-Japanese diplomatic normalization in 1972, triggered by the historic Sino-U.S. rapprochement in 1971–72. Diplomatic recognition was switched, but the fundamental inclination for "two Chinas" remained unchanged. Diplomatically, it was all too apparent that it was a losing game for Taipei. Japan's substantial non-official contact with Taiwan, however, remained intact with the consent of Beijing, and came to be called the "Japanese model."

The greatest benefit of this formula for Japan was that it did not have to issue a final verdict on the question of *de facto* "two Chinas" as long as it continued to abide by Beijing's official line of recognizing "one China." This formula worked, because this was also accepted by Beijing and thus became a basis for the China policies of many other countries including eventually the United States.

In this non-strategic orientation of post-war Japan, the legacies of Japanese colonialism in Taiwan and military aggression in China played a dual function. On the one hand, this history discredited Japan in the post-war years as an independent strategic actor, not only throughout Asia but among the Japanese themselves. On the other hand, these historical legacies provided a foundation upon which to regard China and Taiwan as different entities. The bottom line of the argument here, however, is that Japan did not have a strategy to deal with the reality of "two Chinas," and basically swam along the tide of international strategic imperatives.

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In the end, however, this may not have been entirely a bad policy. After all, managing relations with Taiwan has been difficult and complex for any country. Expressing a clear commitment could only make the situation around Taiwan bumpy. Despite the occasional surfacing of Beijing's hypersensitivity towards Japan's relations with Taiwan, the substance of the relationship between Japan and Taiwan has been relatively moderate; Japan has been extremely cautious and maintained a reserved stance about "official" contact with Taiwan,[37] and has not provided any military assistance whatsoever to Taipei.

It is interesting to watch how the end of the Cold War affects future development. Here, the implicit dimension with a view to managing patterns of inter-state relations at a more general level appears to be important. As demonstrated in the process of the re-affirmation of the U.S.–Japan alliance, its explicit application to Taiwan is a remote possibility. The Taiwan factor in Japan's security considerations in the post-Cold War era has not yet convinced Japan about the explicit function of the U.S.–Japan alliance towards China, and it is desirable to discourage any development of the Taiwan issue in this direction.

One of the key factors behind a relatively stable security situation over Taiwan, despite Beijing's occasional military activities, verbal blackmailing and hypersensitivity towards Japan, has been Japan's self-restraint from developing an independent strategy and its concomitant commitment to the security relationship with the United States.

37. For an account of Taiwanese attempts to upgrade contact with Japan to an official level, including Lee Teng-hui's failed attempt to attend the opening ceremony of the Asian Games in Hiroshima, Japan in October 1994, see Nakagawa Akio, "Nitchu-kankei ni okeru Taiwan" ("Taiwan in Japan–China Relations"), in Masuda Hiroshi and Hatano Sumio (eds.), *Ajia no naka no Nihon to Chū goku* (*Japan and China in Asia*) (Tokyo: Yamakawa Shuppansha, 1995), pp. 171–72; and Nakagawa Akio, *Taiwan wo Mitsumeru Me II* (*Eyes Looking at Taiwan II*) (Tokyo: Tabata Shoten, 1995), pp. 246–270.

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