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Idealism Enough: Response to Roche

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1. Introduction

Kant claims that we cannot know things as they are in themselves; we can know only appearances, which are mere representations that exist 'in us', and which do not exist apart from a connection to possible perception. He also says that appearances are objects in space and time, that they are transcendentally ideal but empirically real, and that he is not a Berkelean idealist. And he frequently talks about things as they appear to us and these same things as they are in themselves (for example, Bxx, Bxxvii, A38/B55, A39/B56, A42/B59, B69, B306, A276/B332, A546/B574, A360). If appearances are an aspect of the same things which also have a way they are in themselves, then it is hard to see how they can be mental entities, or things which exist in the mind, as Berkelean empirical objects are standardly thought to do. These different aspects of the way Kant presents his position create problems for interpreters. There are competing interpretative pulls to accommodate Kant's empirical realism and his transcendental idealism, and it is extremely difficult to keep the balance between these; criticisms of interpretations of transcendental idealism frequently focus on pointing out a failure to do justice to one of these two aspects of Kant's position, as a result of focusing too much on the other. Andrew Roche's interesting paper discusses my account of this old question. I am grateful for this helpful and insightful engagement with my work, which raises important concerns, and also presents me with an opportunity to clarify and develop some aspects of my position. As Roche explains, I reject two extreme interpretations of the status of Kantian appearances: one which sees Kant as a phenomenalist-type idealist about appearances, who thinks they literally exist in the mind, and one which sees Kant as a straightforward realist who merely wants to limit our knowledge to the spatio-temporal objects that affect our senses (to exclude knowledge of non-spatio-temporal objects, such as souls and God).[1] Thus, we need to find a kind of mind-dependence which does not literally involve existence in the mind. I take it Roche endorses this.

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My attempt to explain the kind of mind-dependence needed to understand Kant's idealism about appearances appeals to the analogy with so-called secondary qualities which Kant presents in the *Prolegomena*. How we understand the analogy will depend on what view of secondary qualities we read into it: I argue that an understanding of the mind-dependence of colour which is situated within a direct realist, or relational, theory of perception can provide a model for an account of appearance properties which are mind-dependent without existing in the mind.[2] Roche raises important concerns about the viability of this approach. He thinks that I may be committed to *Kant's* having a relational view of perception, and thereby also a disjunctivist view of perception, and argues that such a commitment would be implausible. And he argues that I am committed to identifying appearances with things in themselves in a way which is problematic, not least for my own use of the secondary quality analogy. He does not think my reading can do justice to Kant's idealism: it is not idealist enough, in his view. This is because he thinks that my interpretation cannot accommodate Kant's claims that appearances are *mere representations*, which exist 'in us', and the idea that space and time are somehow *imposed* by us. He argues that it is difficult to make sense of the status of space and time in my account. I think these are all important and useful points, and I will say something about each of them. Roche does not present a positive account, but does imply that he thinks an intentional object view might work, so I start by saying something about my concerns about such views.

2. Intentionalism and Phenomenalism

In discussing Kant's idealism about appearances, I use the term 'phenomenalism' broadly, to refer to all interpretations which mentalize Kantian appearances by seeing their existence as involving no ontological commitments over and above the existence of mental states, whether or not this involves positing distinct mental *objects*. This means that it includes interpretations like those of Van Cleve (1999) and Guyer (1987), who deny that their interpretations involve positing mental objects (and therefore also deny that they have traditional 'two world' interpretations). Similarly, it seems to me that at least some intentional object[3] (and adverbial[4]) interpretations of Kantian appearances keep appearances *in the mind* without making them into mental *entities*. I do not argue that this is necessarily the case, because intentional theories of perception differ considerably and are controversial, as is the status of intentional objects.[5] This means that we cannot use

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this notion to explain Kant's position without a detailed explanation and defence of the understanding of such objects. I will say something briefly about why I think the two main ways in which the notion of intentional objects of perception may be appealed to to explain the status of Kantian appearances will not help us to have an account which retains some kind of mind-dependence, yet does not involve appearances having a phenomenalistic existence, literally in the mind.

The key feature of intentional objects, as they are standardly understood, as objects of thought, is that they may not exist: I can think about things which do not exist.[6] This has been thought by some to enable an intentional account of perception to respond to the traditional arguments which appeal to hallucination and non-veridical perception to reject direct realism: they point out that, while something which does not exist can be the object of my thought, this does not mean that in the case in which I think about something which *does* exist, the object of my thought is anything less than the object itself. Similarly, it is suggested that the fact that I can, for example when hallucinating, represent things which do not exist, does not show that, in the case of veridical perception, the direct object of perception is anything other than the physical object perceived. When you are thinking about something which does not exist, the object of thought is *merely represented*; similarly, it may be argued that we can account for the occasional illusory character of perceptual consciousness in terms of representational mental states or intentional objects. The idea is that hallucination involves objects which are *merely* intentional,[7] whereas in cases of actual perception the intentional objects of perception are the external object themselves. Whether or not this is a way in which a direct realist about perception can deal with the argument from hallucination,[8] it is not clear that it can help us to explain Kant's idealism about appearances in a non-phenomenalist way. This is because there are two ways in which the analogy between Kantian appearances and intentional objects or intentional content can be understood, one of which will lead to seeing Kant as a phenomenalist, and the other seeing him as a straightforward realist.

On the one hand, Kantian appearances could be understood in terms of an analogy with the *merely* intentional objects in terms of which intentional theories of perception characterize hallucination. On this reading, Kantian appearances are compared with representational mental states which are in the mind. As we have seen, in the theory of perception at least part of the point of introducing intentional objects is supposed to be to enable us to characterize hallucinations by appealing

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to representational mental states rather than mental entities, while asserting that in the case of non-hallucinatory perceptual experience the intentional objects of the experience are the external objects themselves. This means that to compare Kantian appearances with merely intentional objects is to keep appearances in the mind, resulting in a more sophisticated version of a phenomenalist interpretation. An example of this kind of view is provided by Aquila's interpretation. He says: 'To exist as an appearance is to exist in what I shall call a "phenomenalistic" sense; it is to exist, in a certain sense, merely "intentionally"', adding that it is 'not strictly speaking possible to suppose that the very same thing might exist in both of the senses in question' (Aquila 1983: 89–90). This kind of intentionalist interpretation can be grouped with the phenomenalist interpretations.

On the other hand, the point of the analogy with intentional theories of perception could be to compare Kantian appearances with the mind-independent objects which the theory holds to be the intentional (direct) objects of perception in cases of veridical perception.[9] On this way of reading the analogy, the intentional objects in terms of which Kantian appearances are explained are supposed to be that to which the mind is actually directed – the actual objects of experience. It is in this sense that Adams attributes phenomenalism to both Leibniz and Kant.[10] Adams denies that phenomena (his primary concern is with Leibnizian phenomena but he thinks it applies to Kant as well) are mental images, and says they should instead be understood in terms of intentional objects, by which he means things which are objects for minds or objects of perception, or the 'representational contents of our perceptions – what appears to us'.[11] But if Kantian appearances are compared to the independent things which are the objects of veridical perception, then the appeal to intentional objects does not explain the sense in which appearances are mind-dependent. In the sense in which intentional objects are not intentionally inexistent objects of thought, but rather 'what appears to us', they can, and do, feature in straightforwardly *realist* accounts of perception. A realist thinks that external objects can be and often are objects for minds, or objects of perception, and that the 'representational contents of our perceptions' are features of the way things mind-independently are.[12]

In summary, on the one hand, appearances could be compared with the *merely* intentional objects, or representational mental states, involved in hallucinatory perceptual events. In this case, appearances are once again compared with something which is characterized entirely mentally,

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which will result in a (sophisticated) phenomenalist reading of transcendental idealism. On the other hand, appearances could be compared with the actual objects which are the intentional objects of perception in normal veridical perception, but now the comparison with intentional objects fails to capture any sense in which Kant's position is idealist, or any sense in which empirically real objects have a necessary connection with possible perception. Clearly I have not said enough here to exclude the possibility of alternative intentional object interpretations; my aim is simply to show that at least some intentionalist interpretations can be classed with phenomenalist readings, and will be vulnerable to objections to the latter.

3. Is Kant a Disjunctivist?

I appeal to a particular theory of perception to explain the account of secondary qualities we need to explain a kind of mind-dependence which does not involve existence in the mind. I have followed John Campbell's terminology in calling this the *relational* view, where the term 'relational' marks the fact that 'the object perceived is a constituent of the conscious experience itself' (Campbell 2002: 117). This contrasts with the so-called Cartesian view of perception, which understands perception as involving mental states with the right kind of (usually causal) relation to objects outside the mind, where a mental state with the same content could exist without the objects outside the mind. For the relational view, the presence to consciousness of the object is part of what makes the mental state the state that it is.

Roche says that it is not clear whether I am merely appealing to a relational account of perception to explain the account of secondary qualities I want to draw on to explain Kant, or whether I am attributing to him a relational account of perception. He argues that the latter would be implausible, because it involves, in his view implausibly, seeing Kant as a disjunctivist. I certainly think that the relational view enables us to present the account of colour we need to make sense of Kant's suggested secondary quality analogy, but in addition, like a number of other philosophers, it seems to me that a central part of the innovation of Kant's system is his rejection of the Cartesian conception of experience.[13] However, 'disjunctivism' and 'the relational account' of perception are contemporary names for contemporary theories. There is no systematically developed 'theory of perception' in our contemporary sense in Kant, and almost no discussion of whether and how illusion and hallucination pose problems for a direct theory of perception. This is simply

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not one of Kant's concerns. This means that there is a clear sense in which it is problematic to argue either that Kant did or did not hold one of these theories. Still, this does not rule out finding in Kant some of the ideas which these theories of perception are trying to capture. In particular, it seems to me that Kant thinks that perception of empirically real objects involves those objects being directly present to consciousness, without mental intermediaries: it involves being in representational mental states which essentially involve the (empirically real) object as constituents.

Roche thinks that a relational view is committed to disjunctivism, as the only way in which it can deal with hallucination and dreaming, and that Kant cannot be seen as a disjunctivist. One of Roche's reasons for thinking that Kant cannot be committed to something like disjunctivism is that although, as he acknowledges, Kant consistently holds that hallucinations and dreaming are not *experiences*, he argues that Kant does think that veridical experiences, hallucinations, and illusions form a common kind. This issue is complicated, since there is of course much dispute about what is meant by 'disjunctivism'[14] and the sense in which disjunctivists deny a 'common kind' between veridical experiences, hallucinations, and illusions. Many disjunctivists may allow that there is a common kind in some sense, for example, a phenomenologically indistinguishable mental state, or common cognitive processing (Campbell 2002: 118). In addition, there is debate about whether the disjunctivist move works only for hallucination and not for illusion,[15] and the position I draw on to illustrate Kant's idealism is one which does *not* make a disjunctivist-type move for illusion. Since Kant is not in the business of situating his position in relation to this contemporary debate, we are unlikely to find a clear explication of the sense in which he does and does not think there is a 'common factor', in a way which would determine how to position his view in the contemporary debate. And even if it is true that a relational view must make something like a disjunctivist move to deal with hallucination (and possibly also illusion), this would not show that if Kant had a relational view we will therefore find a disjunctivist move in his writing. He may simply not have developed the consequences which his account of perception has for how to think about illusion and hallucination, since dealing with these is not his concern. He may not have realized that a relational view requires something like the disjunctivist move (assuming it does). Thus, weighing the fact that Kant seems to think that hallucination and dreaming have something in common with veridical perception[16] against his frequently saying that hallucinations and dreams are not

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experiences does not seem to me to give us decisive grounds for situating his account of perception either way, in terms of the contemporary debate. However, while I do not think that Kant says enough about the 'common factor' to ground a particular interpretation, I think there are a number of other considerations which support thinking that Kant's view does involve a rejection of the Cartesian conception of experience.

Roche's other reason for thinking that Kant does not have a relational view of perception is that he thinks this will not make sense of the Kantian notion of intuition. My view is exactly the reverse: I think we cannot make sense of the Kantian notion of intuition *without* seeing that Kant rejects the Cartesian account of experience. Before discussing this, I mention another reason I have for thinking Kant is committed to the idea that empirically real objects in space are directly presented to us in perception, without mental intermediaries: the way Kant presents the positions he rejects in the Refutation of Idealism. This also, it seems to me, provides one of the strongest reasons for rejecting a phenomenalist interpretation of appearances. In the Refutation of Idealism Kant argues that outer experience is primary, and that we could not be aware of the temporal order of our inner mental life if we did not have experience of objects outside us in space. He characterizes the idealism he rejects as a view which sees the immediate objects of perception as mental items and argues, against this, that external objects in space are the immediate objects of perception (A367, B276–9).

Kant divides his idealist opponents into those who, dogmatically, deny the existence of matter or external objects (such as Berkeley) and those who, sceptically, doubt the existence of external matter (such as Descartes). He identifies the external objects Descartes doubts with the material objects that Berkeley denies, and identifies the mental access to ideas Descartes allows as beyond doubt with the access Berkeley gives to his empirical objects. Kant says that he wants to prove, against both these views, that the immediate objects of perception are external objects in space. Clearly, Berkelean empirical objects *are* immediately perceived, but Kant takes it that they are not external objects in space, but rather something mental, and wants to show on the contrary that the immediate objects of perception are external, material objects in space. Descartes's view introduces mental intermediaries through which we perceive physical objects in space, and Kant rejects this part of his position. While the details of the argument of the refutation of idealism are somewhat obscure and remain controversial, Kant's presentation of his *aims*, and of what he is arguing against, is clear. He says that he

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wants to establish the reality of the very outer objects whose existence (he thinks) Berkeley denies and Descartes renders doubtful, he wants to reject the view that our experience of our own minds is more immediate than our experience of outer objects, and he wants to establish, on the contrary, that experience of objects in space is direct and immediate. The external objects whose existence Descartes renders doubtful are neither mental items nor constructions from mental items, and Kant does not suppose they are. Kant's assertion of the existence of the very external objects which Berkeley denies and Descartes doubts is not compatible with thinking that these external objects exist as constructions out of the mental entities or states which Berkeley and Descartes allow. And Kant's statement of what he is trying to achieve is that he wants to reject the idea that our experience of objects in space goes via mental intermediaries. Thus, although he does not explictly situate his view in terms of the theories of perception we discuss today, he clearly commits himself to a key part of the direct realist or relational position.

Roche argues that a relational view of perception cannot make sense of the Kantian notion of intuition, because 'It is natural to construe intuitions as the direct objects of perception (a sense-datum reading) or as the representational vehicles – not themselves perceived – to objects appearing to be in space and time (an intentional object reading). Both construals are incompatible with a relational view, which denies any sort of perceptual intermediary'. My view is that intuitions are (or rather essentially involve) the direct objects of perception, but this does not involve a sense-datum reading, and is quite compatible with a relational view. When we have an intuition, this involves the object the intuition represents being present to consciousness.

Roche argues that the passages suggesting that intuitions involve the presence of an object can be taken to emphasize the *passivity* of intuition – that they involve something being given to our senses. But this is not the only significant feature of the way Kant talks about intuition; in addition, there is the way he defines them, and there is their role. The essential defining features of Kantian intuition are that intuitions are singular and immediate,[17] and the role of intuition is that of giving us the objects about which we think. I argue that a clear and straightforward way of understanding the idea that intuitions are singular and immediate is to see intuitions as representations which essentially involve the presence to consciousness of the particular things they represent.[18] In other words, intuitions represent objects *immediately* because they *present* the object itself, as opposed to referring to an object

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through the mediation of further representations (which enable us to think about the object whether it is present or not). Immediacy says that an intuition is not simply a representation which is caused by a particular thing, but that it is in fact a *presentation to consciousness of that thing*. By way of contrast to the immediacy of intuition, Kant explains the mediacy of concepts by saying 'since no representation pertains to the object immediately except intuition alone, a concept is thus never immediately related to an object, but is always related to some other representation of it (whether that be an intuition or itself already a concept). Judgment is therefore the mediate cognition of an object, hence the representation of a representation of it' (A68/B93; A19/B33; A239/B298; *Proleg.* 4: 282). In saying that a concept is always related to an object through a representation of it, whereas an intuition relates to an object immediately, he rejects the idea that intuitions involve mental intermediaries. I therefore think that when Kant talks about intuitions as involving the presence of objects this goes further than merely emphasizing their passivity, which, in addition, would not distinguish intuitions from *sensations*. Clearly, there is much more to be said about the contested notion of Kantian intuition, but, with these considerations in mind, I do not think Roche has said enough to show that Kant's notion of intuition is incompatible with his having something like a relational view of perception.

4. Mere Representations in Us

My view tries to explain a sense in which appearances are mind-dependent without making them exist literally in the mind. But Roche argues that Kant describes his view in a way which makes it more strongly idealist than my interpretation can account for. Kant says that appearances exist *in* minds,[19] that they are *mere representations*,[20] and that their existence has an essential connection to possible perception.[21] I agree that these features of the way Kant describes appearances are important, that they are presumably the reason phenomenalist-type interpretations have been so common, and that they must be explained by an adequate interpretation of transcendental idealism. Further, ideally, we need to explain these features of the way Kant describes his position at the same time as doing justice to his empirical realism, and his rejection of Berkelean idealism and of the Cartesian conception of experience.

I argue that Kant's claim that appearances are 'in us' does not commit us to a phenomenalist reading of appearances. Even more strongly, some interpreters have argued that it need not be understood as

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involving any kind of idealism. Allison (2004), for example, argues that we must read such passages bearing in mind Kant's disambiguation between the empirical and transcendental senses of '*in uns*' and '*ausser uns*' (A373). Allison says that understood empirically, the terms 'in us' and 'outside us' mark a distinction beween objects of inner and outer sense respectively, but understood transcendentally, they mark a distinction between 'two manners in which objects can be considered in relation to the conditions of human sensibility' (Allison 2004: 24). Allison is clearly right to point out the significance of the disambiguation between the empirical and transcendental senses of 'in us', but of course this does not settle the interpretative question: establishing that, for Kant, there are distinct empirical and transcendental senses in which objects can be 'in' our minds does not establish any particular account of the latter.[22] Clearly, we need to pay attention to the passage in which Kant describes his disambiguation. Kant says that:

> the expression *outside us* carries with it an unavoidable ambiguity, since it sometimes signifies something that, *as a thing in itself*, exists distinct from us and sometimes merely something that belongs to outer *appearance*, then in order to escape uncertainty and use this concept in the latter significance – in which it is taken in the proper psychological question about the reality of our outer intuition – we will distinguish *empirically external* objects from those that might be called 'external' in the transcendental sense, by directly calling them 'things *that are to be encountered in space*'. (A373)

Kant says that what is outside us in the empirical sense are things which exist in space, whereas what is transcendentally external is 'something that, *as a thing in itself*, exists distinct from us' (A373; my underlining). The empirical contrast between 'in us' and 'outside us' is between things which are in our minds and things that are in space, while the transcendental contrast is between things whose existence is *distinct* from us and things whose existence is not distinct from us. In the latter sense, to say that things are in us is to say that their existence is not distinct from us. At the very least, Kant's point here is to insist that the question of whether objects are outside us in space is a separate question from whether they are independent of us. This, I think, supports thinking that transcendental idealism involves a kind of mind-dependence which does not involve existence in the mind, and that Kant's saying that appearances exist 'in us' does not count against this.[23]

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Roche is worried that my reading cannot do justice to Kant's use of the term 'representations'. This term is seen by many commentators as support for a phenomenalist interpretation (see, for example, Van Cleve 1999: 123; also Barker 1969; Wilkerson 1976: 186). It is repeated many times, throughout the *Critique*, and not only does Kant call appearances representations, he says that they are *mere* representations, and he frequently links calling appearances representations to asserting their mind-dependence. He says that appearances are mere representations which do not exist apart from a connection to possible perception (A225/B272; A376; A493/B521; A493–4/B521–2).

As Roche points out, I suggest that my reading can accommodate this, since, as I see it, appearances are representations in the sense that they present objects to us: they exist in relation to conscious minds. However, he says that this cannot be what Kant means by representations, since Kant includes under the term 'intuitions, concepts (conceivings), judgements (judgings), cognitions, perceptions, and sensations (for example, A320/B376-77)'. I take it that 'representations' is Kant's most generic term for mental contents, which includes both sensations and experiences. It is clearly not the case that Kant thinks that all representations have the same status, since while appearances are representations not all representations are appearances. Someone who has a relational view of perception may say that perceptual states have representational mental content which essentially involves the objects perceived, without thinking that all representational mental states have this status; thus, they could think that some representations exist merely in the mind, while others involve the presence of the object represented. Thinking that all representations involve the mind, and that some representations are literally in the mind, does not commit us to thinking that all representations are literally in the mind. On my view, Kant's calling appearances mere representations is meant to mark the idea that they exist only in relation to the possibility of their being perceived by us. In other words, not only are they presented to consciousness, they are essentially things which can be presented to consciousness. Below, I say a bit more to clarify this; for now, I comment simply that it does not seem to me that the fact that Kant calls appearances representations, and also calls intuitions, concepts, and perceptions representations, is sufficient to support Roche's claim that my interpretation is not idealist enough.

Roche also argues that my view cannot give a satisfactory account of the long tradition of holding that in some sense we *impose* spatio-temporality onto experiences. His point here is not just an appeal to the

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interpretative tradition (as oppposed to the text, where we do not actually find talk of imposition) but also to Kant's idea that our representations of space and time are *a priori* intuitions, and that *a priori* intuitions are not passively received, but rather what we bring to, or 'put into', the objects of experience. He claims that my reading accounts for the ideality of appearance properties, but not the ideality of space and time. This is an important issue. In Kant's account, space and time are actually more mind-dependent than the empirical properties we experience spatio-temporal objects as having; they are *merely* the forms of our intuition, and represent 'no property at all of any things in themselves nor any relation of them to each other' (A26). However, I think this is something my account can accommodate. Below, I sketch my use of the secondary quality analogy in a way which, I hope, explains how it can accommodate the ideality of space and time, as well as the question of whether or not my account identifies intrinsic properties and mind-dependent relational properties.

5. The Secondary Quality Analogy

In the paper in which I explore the secondary quality analogy (Allais 2007), I draw on a metaphor John Campbell uses to give us a grip on the idea that what we know about cognitive processing need not drive us to a representational view of perception. He asks us to compare perception to viewing a scene through a pane of glass: in the metaphor, a representative account of perception involves seeing images on the glass, while for the direct realist, we see straight through the glass, to the objects beyond it (Campbell 2002: 119). He then asks us to imagine that the glass is volatile, and that keeping it transparent requires constant recalibration and adjustment. The upshot of the constant activity is to keep the world in view, not to create images on the glass. The analogy cannot be taken too far (it could be thought to suggest a homunculus looking through the eyes), but what it is meant to give us a grip on is the idea that cognitive processing does not threaten the relational account of perception.

I suggest that we can illustrate a possible account of non-veridical perception by introducing a variation on Campbell's analogy of the glass-like transparent medium of perception. Imagine that a malfunction in the adjustment mechanism causes the medium to fail to be completely transparent, and instead distorts the shapes of things to some extent, as, for example, a fishbowl lens might. According to the relational view, just as when the medium is transparent, it is not the

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case that the distorted things are seen through seeing an image on the glass—it is the things themselves, beyond the glass, which we directly see. If the fully transparent glass allows us to be directly in touch with the objects themselves, we can also be directly presented with the objects themselves when they are seen through a distorted glass. The curved appearance of the distortedly appearing objects is not a sensation objects produce in us; it is a feature of the objects which are seen, but which are seen in a way which differs, to some extent, from the way they are apart from their being seen. The argument against direct realism from non-veridical perception tries to force a non-identity between the physical object and what is directly perceived by claiming that the latter has properties that the former does not have. In response, the view I am describing denies that there is something of which the subject is aware which possesses sensible qualities that the physical object lacks: the physical object has the property of appearing the way it does, despite the fact that the way it appears differs, to some extent, from the way it is apart from its appearing. We must move slowly here: this is *not* meant to be an account of the status of Kantian appearances (it is an account of empirical illusion), but merely of one way of thinking about non-verdical perception, which allows that although seeing is relational in the sense that the object is essentially present to consciousness, it does not follow from this that the way the object is seen as being is entirely the way it is apart from its being seen, or that seeing is entirely transparent.

In this context, there is a natural use for talk of the way things are in themselves (of course, we are some way from Kant's use of this notion). We can now consider the shapes of things as they are apart from their being seen, or as they are apart from their visually appearing, and the way the shapes of things appear. We can use the term 'as they are in themselves' to refer to the way they are apart from their visual appearing. The view we are considering allows it to be a possibility that the way things visually appear may differ from the way they are in themselves, even though the visual appearing is something which essentially involves the objects, and not something which exists merely mentally. If this is possible, then it seems also to be possible that there are properties which belong to objects *only* as they perceptually appear. We can call properties of objects which we experience in perception *manifest* properties. We can then introduce the idea of *essentially manifest properties*: properties which objects have only in their perceptually appearing to subjects. The account of colour we need for the secondary quality analogy is that colour is an essentially manifest property.

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To say that colour is an essentially manifest property is not to say that colour is a property of a mental state. Rather, on this view, colour is a relational property of objects, which they have as they appear to or are experienced by (certain kinds of) conscious subjects. Philosophical accounts of colour are subject to pulls in opposite directions by two features of colour. One pull is to preserve the idea that colour is, as it phenomenologically appears to be, a property of objects. The other pull is created by the idea that colour has an essential relation to visual experience. The idea that colours are essentially manifest properties attempts to accommodate both pulls. According to this view, there is an essential relation between colour and visual experience; colours are essentially features of the way objects look to conscious subjects. Colour is neither a mind-independent power to produce a purely mental effect, nor a purely mental effect produced by such a power, but rather is the mind-dependent way something mind-independent appears.

The view can be further explained by looking at one traditional argument for the idea that colour is mind-dependent, the idea that colour can be accessed only by sight (unlike shape and size, which can be accessed by more than one sensory modality). David Smith argues that this is the strongest argument for the secondary quality status of colour (although he characterizes this status a bit differently), saying that 'it is not a contingent peculiarity of color qualia that they are not enjoyed through the exercise of smell or touch: for they define the sense modality of sight. When an object is perceived through a sense modality, the intrinsic nature of that sense determines how that object sensorily appears to the subject' (Smith 1990: 239). The idea is that we cannot make sense of the idea of accessing colour through any modality other than vision, because colour has an essential relation to visual experience; it is essentially a feature of the way objects *look*.[24]

I suggest that we understand the sense in which appearances are mind-dependent along these lines: we should understand Kant's idealism about things as they appear to us as saying that what appears to us (what we experience) are essentially manifest features of reality, and that we can have knowledge *only* of essentially manifest features of reality. Appearances do not exist merely in mental states, but they do not exist in things as they are apart from their perceptually appearing to us. Appearances are not just perceptible things, things which manifest themselves to us, they are *essentially* perceptible, or *essentially* manifest. As Kant puts it, 'What is not to be encountered in the object in itself at all, but is always to be encountered in its relation to the

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subject and is inseparable from the representation of the object, is appearance' (B70n.). Immediately before presenting the secondary quality analogy Kant defines idealism as the view that the 'things that we believe we perceive in intuition are only representations in thinking beings' and explicitly rejects this view. However, he immediately goes on to say that appearances are representations (*Proleg*. 4: 289). In the same passage, Kant seems both to assert and to deny that the things we perceive in intuition are representations in us. Using the idea of essentially manifest properties, this can be explained. On the one hand, appearances are not representations in thinking beings in the sense of things which exist only in our minds. On the other hand, appearances are mere representations in the sense that they belong to objects only as those objects are for the consciousness of subjects like us. They are objects only *for* conscious subjects, not things that exist merely *in* consciousness.[25]

One of Roche's worries is how space and time fit into this picture. Kant thinks that we could not experience individual objects without experiencing them as located in a spatio-temporal framework, and that the *a priori* nature of this framework means that it cannot be taken as reflecting mind-independent reality, but rather must be something brought to the world by our minds.[26] Let us return to the metaphor of the glass. We were imagining that the glass was doing something analogous to cognitive processing: taking sensory input and binding and organizing it in order to enable us to be in direct cognitive contact with objects beyond the glass. The cognitive processing is not producing an image which it makes available to consciousness,[27] but rather is making it possible for us to perceive the world. Now imagine that the glass has a built-in way of structuring, binding, and organising which does not reflect any aspect of the world beyond it, even though it is still input from the world beyond it which is being organized using this structure. The structure is a feature of the glass, and not of what is seen through it. It is still the case that we are seeing through the glass, to the world outside our minds, but if the structure which enables us to experience individual things does not present the world as it is in itself, the things that we experience through the structure will not be experienced as they are in themselves. On this view, the idealism about appearances in general would therefore follow, as Kant takes it to, from the ideality of our representations of space and time. Thus, it seems to me that my view can accommodate the idea that space and time are *only* features of objects as they appear, and do not represent any feature of things in themselves.

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The view of colour as essentially manifest involves thinking that things have mind-independent natures which appear to us as coloured, and which our visual experience of colour does not give us insight into, as they are in themselves (as they are apart from their visual appearing). Kant's view says that all properties that we experience are like this: there is some mind-independent reality which grounds the way we experience things as being, but our experience gives us no insight into the nature of this mind-independent reality as it is in itself. This raises the question of the relation between mind-independent properties and appearance properties, another point on which Roche has worries about my account. He argues that my position has a difficulty which Kant is often said to face:

> There is reason to think that Kant holds that appearances and things in themselves are distinct things. For instance, the former are said to be spatio-temporal, the latter not. On the other hand, there is also reason to think that he holds that appearances are *not* distinct objects from things in themselves. … Allais faces the difficulty of holding that appearance properties are mind-dependent and relational and yet, at the same time, holding that they are identical to properties that are mind-independent and non-relational. (p. 358)

This is an extremely tricky point, one on which I have not been sufficiently clear, and which I still struggle to express precisely. I think that once again the secondary quality analogy is helpful here. The account of colour on which I have been drawing says that colour is a property of physical objects, but not one they have as they are in themselves, apart from the way they are perceived by creatures like us. As an essentially visual (essentially manifest) property, its existence is not separate from the possibility of its being perceived by creatures like us. Objects have mind-independent natures which we experience as coloured, but as it turns out, there is no simple correlation between a particular colour and a particular mind-independent surface property. Instead, the physical bases of colour are vastly disjunctive, and it may be that the only thing that unites the various properties we experience as red is our experiencing them as red. This would mean that redness is a property which can be picked out only at the level of visual experience. Despite this, it seems that there is a sense in which it *is* the mind-independent features of reality which are appearing to us as, for example, red. On this account, redness, as an essentially manifest property, belongs to objects only in relation to the possibility of their being perceived, and does not

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present the intrinsic nature of the features of objects which appear red. But redness is also the way in which something mind-independent appears. An important point to note about this is that since redness is a feature of objects which exists only at the level of visual experience, although it does not present the intrinsic nature of the many physical properties which appear red, it would not be right to say that it misrepresents them.

Of course, the secondary quality analogy is limited in a number of ways, and a crucial one is that, in this case, we ordinarily take it that we *do* know something about the mind-independent properties of objects which we experience as red—this is what enables us to know that they are vastly disjunctive. Still, the analogy is helpful in presenting two ideas: one is that if we think of colour as an essentially manifest quality we can see it as mind-dependent yet not a systematic illusion or misrepresentation, and the other is that we can see a sense in which colour *cannot* be identified with any mind-independent property, but can also see the point of saying that there is a sense in which there are certain mind-independent features of things which are the features we experience as coloured. Both these points are important when we extend the analogy, as Kant does, to all manifest properties of objects. As we know, Kant frequently speaks of things as they appear to us and these same things as they are in themselves, and this has frequently been taken to support non-idealist, deflationary interpretations of transcendental idealism. On the other hand, he says that appearances are mere representations, which exist in us, and whose existence is not separable from a link to possible perception. There is a sense in which it is things themselves which appear to us, but another sense in which we cannot identify things in themselves and appearances, since the latter are mind-dependent.

An objection to this might be that Kant denies that we have any knowledge of things in themselves, and further, in opposing Leibniz, he denies that phenomena should be thought of as unclear or confused representations of things in themselves, saying, on the contrary, that they do not represent things in themselves *at all*. But if we say that things have a way they are in themselves which grounds the way they appear to us, this might be thought to imply, against Kant, that our experience *is* some kind of apprehension of things in themselves, and therefore that things in themselves do appear to us.[28] Kant says that it would be wrong to think that we have confused representations of things in themselves, rather 'We do not apprehend them in any fashion

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whatsoever' (A44/B62). He argues that, for Leibniz, 'appearance was the representation *of the thing in itself*' (A270/B327), and he rejects this view, saying that appearances 'do not represent things in themselves' (A276/B332).

In response to this, it is important to see that we can deny that we have representations of things *as* they are in themselves without denying that there is a sense in which we have representations of *things themselves*,[29] and, in fact, this is something we find Kant doing. While he denies that we have representations of things as they are in themselves, including confused ones, he also sometimes says that appearances represent things themselves:

> appearances are only representations of things that exist without any cognition of what they might be in themselves (B164)

> the word 'appearance' must already indicate a relation to something *the immediate representation of which* is, to be sure, sensible, but which in itself, without this constitution of our sensibility … must be something, i.e., an object independent of sensibility. (A252; my emphasis)

Here he says that appearances are the immediate and sensible representation of something which is an object independent of our sensibility. The passages in which Kant denies that we represent things in themselves in any way occur in places where his aim is to reject Leibniz's account of *confused* representations of things *as* they are in themselves (A44/B61–2; A271/B327; A276–B327). For Leibniz, the understanding is 'immediately related to things in themselves' (A271/B327), whereas Kant thinks that neither sensibility nor understanding give us knowledge of things as they are in themselves. So we can read Kant as follows: where he rejects Leibniz's view that appearance is the representation of the thing in itself, this is not because he is rejecting the idea that appearances represent things (themselves), which, as we have seen, he sometimes asserts, but rather because he rejects the idea that appearances represent things *as* they are in themselves. Immediately after criticizing Leibniz's view, Kant says that 'we do not understand through pure reason what *the things that appear to us might be in themselves*' (A276/B332; my emphasis), and here it is clearly things which appear to us which have a nature in themselves that we cannot know. Appearances are appearances of things themselves, and this means that there is a sense in which they represent things themselves

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and a sense in which they do not – they do not represent things *as* they are in themselves. Appearances are not confused or illusory representations of things as they are in themselves, but are representations of things which have a way they are in themselves.

There is much more to be said about the metaphysical status of essentially manifest properties, and the sense in which they are mind-dependent; here I will make one brief final comment about the direction in which I think we should go. As we have seen, one of the features of the text which seems to support a phenomenalist reading is the fact that Kant repeatedly says that outer objects exist or are real in perception only (*wirklich nur in der Wahrnehmung*), and that the actuality of a thing requires '*its connection with some actual perception* in accordance with the analogies of experience' (A225/B272, my emphasis; A376; A493/B521; A493–4/B521–2). Kant clearly expresses a necessary connection between the existence of empirical objects and our being able to experience them, and this must be accommodated and explained by any convincing interpretation of transcendental idealism.[30] Kant does not say that objects exist only in our actual experience of them (*esse est percipi*) but that their existence is not separable from our possible perception of them. He allows as part of what is empirically real things which are so small or so far away that we cannot perceive them, or for which we do not have the requisite sense organs (A225–6/B273; A522/B550). Once again, this creates interpretative pulls in different directions: we need a kind of mind-dependence which involves an essential relation to perception, while allowing a realism which accommodates the existence of things too far away for us to perceive. Although I cannot argue for this here, I suggest that, despite significant differences between the positions, it is helpful to compare Kant's idealism with a kind of anti-realism which rejects verification-transcendence.[31] The idea is that essentially manifest properties are not experience-transcendent. Kant does not think that objects depend for their existence on particular acts of apprehension by particular subjects, nor does he think that objects exist only as constructions out of merely mental states, but he thinks that the fact that an object exists is not separable from the fact that we can, in principle, have experience of it: in other words, Kant rejects experience-transcendence for appearances. Clearly, there is much more to be said on all of these points; I am grateful for the opportunity to have said a bit more to explain my view, and to Andrew Roche, whose stimulating paper provided the opportunity to do this.

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Notes

1 Although I do not argue for this here, or in the paper which is Roche's main concern, I also take it that transcendental idealism involves a commitment to an actually existing aspect of reality of which we cannot have knowledge. In other words, in my view, the notion of things in themselves is not simply a concept which we unavoidably think, with nothing actually corresponding to it, or merely a way of considering things. On the other hand, I also reject the extreme ontological view which sees things in themselves as noumena in the positive sense: that is, which thinks Kant is positively committed to the existence of non-spatio-temporal objects, such as Cartesian souls or Leibizian monads. See Allais 2010b. Translations used are from Kant (1997, 1998)

2 Note, I do *not* commit myself to this being Kant's considered view of secondary qualities; he sometimes suggests a different view, and it is not clear that he has a developed position on this. The secondary quality analogy is complicated by the fact that Kant *denies* that such an analogy is helpful in explaining transcendental idealism at B45. As I see it, at least one part of the explanation of this is that he appeals to a different understanding of secondary qualities in the B45 passage. Alternative readings of the secondary analogy, using different accounts of secondary qualities, are discussed by Van Cleve (1995). For a reading much more similar to mine, see Rosefeldt (2007).

3 See Aquila (1983), Cummins (1979), Pereboom (1988).

4 See Baldner (1990, 1988).

5 Robinson argues that 'intentional inexistence' 'is more of a name for a problem than it is a solution to one' (1994: 164).

6 Intentional objects have been appealed to by accounts of perception which analyse perceptual states in terms of beliefs. There are many objections to such accounts: as Robinson argues, 'The simplest way of understanding the difference between mental images and perceptual experience is that the contents of the former are intentional and of the latter are genuine instantiations of sensible properties' (1994: 66; see also Smith 2002: 42–7, 94–121). I assume here that the representational mental states appealed to by intentional theories could be understood in terms other than belief.

7 This view need not require that merely intentional objects must be understood as some kind of mental entities – Smith says that 'some objects do not exist' (Smith 2002: 234). As Smith explains the view, talk of 'merely intentional objects is, however, an invocation of "nothing" only in an ontological sense. We do, indeed, need an *ontologically reductive* account of intentionality. Non-existent intentional objects supervene on intentional experiences' (Smith 2002: 244).

8 See Smith 2002: ch. 9, for a defence of this idea.

9 I am not sure how to read Pereboom's (1988) account in this respect. To a large extent his account of Kant's views of intentionality seem straightforwardly compatible with realism: 'the immediate object of awareness is always the ordinary object' (Pereboom 1988: 326). He argues that idealism comes in because what we are immediately aware of are the contents of intuitions, but this notion seems straightforwardly available to a realist. For Kant, to say that what we are immediately aware of are intuitions is not, in itself, to say that what we are immediately aware of is mind-dependent.

10 Adams, 1994: 219.

11 Ibid. 220.

12 In fact, a possible position is a naive direct realism which holds we have or can have knowledge of everything about objects, and such a position might even agree that objects are *nothing but* what appears to us. Whether or not this kind of position is idealist will depend on the direction of explanation for the claim that minds can have knowledge of everything about objects.

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13 Examples of others who defend this: Abela 2002; Collins 1999.

14 John Campbell presents his relational account as if it is *not* a form of disjunctivism. And there are many disputes about the characterisation and commitments of disjunctivism which need not be resolved for our purposes here. For example, there is dispute about issues such as whether hallucinatory states can be characterized only in a derivative way, as states which are subjectively indistinguishable from perceptual states we could actually be in (Child 1994: ch. 5; Johnston 2004) and whether perceptual experience must be understood as involving something like the grasping of demonstrative *thoughts* about objects, (McDowell 1998b; Child 1994; Campbell 2002: 136). Our concern is simply with the idea of a view of perception which thinks that when you see an object, the object itself is a constituent of your experience.

15 For discussion of this debate see Snowdon 1988; Child 1994.

16 Kant says 'From the fact that the existence of outer objects is required for the possibility of a determinate consciousness of our self it does not follow that every intuitive representation of outer things includes at the same time their existence, for that may well be the mere effect of the imagination (in dreams as well as in delusions)' (B278). He talks here about 'intuitive representation' rather than intuition, so this passage does not situate his view decisively. This passage does not constitute grounds for attributing a relational view to Kant, neither does it give us a decisive reason to reject such a view.

17 A320/B377; A713/B741; MM 29: 800, 888; MV 29: 970–3; VL 905.

18 I argue this in more detail in Allais (2009) and Allais (2010a), where I argue that it makes sense of the *role* of intuition, and also makes sense of his argument for the ideality of *a priori* intuition in the Transcendental Aesthetic.

19 B59/A42; A370; A490–1/B518–19; A492/B520.

20 B45; A101; A104; A490/B518–A491/B519; A369; A370; A383; A492/B520; A98, A109, A113, B164, A190/B235, A197/B242, A369, A372, A385, A386, A493/B521, A494/B522, A499/B527, A507/B535, A563/B591, A793/B821, *Proleg*, 288, 289, 319, 341, 342.

21 A225/B272; A376; A493/B521; A493–4/B521–2.

22 For example, a phenomenalist interpreter may argue that there is a way in which such a distinction could be available to Berkeley: Berkeley could distinguish between ideas which are subject to our control and are merely in our individual consciousness (my thoughts and imaginings, for example), and therefore not empirically real, and objects which are empirically real but nevertheless are in us in the sense that they cannot exist independently of their being perceived by us.

23 While I agree with Allison that Kant's saying that appearances are 'in us' does not establish the phenomenalist reading, it seems to me that Kant's account of what it means to be transcendentally 'outside us' is much more straightforwardly metaphysical than Allison's distinction between two manners in which objects can be considered in relation to the conditions of human sensibility. In the very passage in which Kant introduces the disambiguation he speaks of something which *exists distinct* from us, rather than of something thought of in terms of one of two ways in that objects can be considered. And while Kant's saying that appearances are 'in us' does not mean that we have to read him as a phenomenalist, he clearly uses the expression to assert some form of idealism: that objects do not exist distinct from us in some sense.

24 See Boghossian and Velleman who argue that 'the experience of seeing red is unmistakably an experience of a quality that could not be experienced other than visually' (1997: 96). In defence of this idea, we may appeal to facts about colour epistemology which, it seems, can be grasped only from the point of view of colour experience,

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such as that purple is darker than yellow, that red is closer to purple than it is to green, and that orange is binary whereas red is unitary. See Broakes 1997; Hardin 1997; Maund 2002; Shoemaker 1997. Maund points out that 'there are crucial features of colours that are not reproduced at the microstructural level of the physical objects, nor are they explained at that level' (Maund 2002: 16), and Shoemaker says that 'There is good reason to think, for example, that the phenomenological distinction between "unique" and "binary" hues (e.g., ones like "pure" red, on the one hand, and ones like orange, on the other) is grounded in a feature of our visual system, and has no basis in the intrinsic physical properties of the objects we see as coloured' (Shoemaker 1997: 230). Of course, the mere fact that colour distinctions don't map onto distinctions drawn at the level of micro-physics does not show that colour is mind-dependent; the argument requires the plausibility of the further idea that these claims about colours are essentially linked to visual experience.

25 To read the analogy as making appearances into representational mental entities or states that exist merely in thinking beings would be exactly the use of the secondary quality analogy that Kant expressly forbids at B45. The B45 passage says that we must not illustrate the transcendental ideality of spatial properties by comparing them to properties like colour, if colours are considered *not* as properties of things (*Beschaffenheiten der Dinge*), but merely as an alteration of the subject (*bloβ als Veränderungen unseres Subjekts*).

26 I discuss this in detail in Allais 2010a.

27 See Campbell 2002: 118.

28 This objection is developed by Van Cleve 1999: 138.

29 As Prauss (1974) has documented in detail, Kant primarily uses the expression 'things considered as they are in themselves', which marks out a particular way of thinking about things, rather than 'things in themselves' which might be taken to refer to a particular kind of thing.

30 Whether a necessary connection between what exists and what we can know is idealist depends on the explanation for the modal claim: a certain sort of realist might argue that something about our minds means that they are able to know everything that exists. It is clear that this is not Kant's view, not least since a large part of his aim is to restrict our knowledge of reality.

31 See Posy (1984, 1983), Rogerson (1993), Stevenson (1983), Walker (1983).

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