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ORALITY AND EPIC

E. Bakker, A. Kahane (edd.): *Written Voices, Spoken Signs: Tradition, Performance and the Epic Text*. Pp. viii + 305. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997. ISBN: 0-674-96260-5.

This book is the product of an interdisciplinary conference on oral epic. It presents nine contributions to the field, six by classicists and classical linguists, three by scholars of the European Middle Ages. While there is some overlap with previously published work (especially Chapters 3 and 7), the arguments presented are on the whole new. The book comprises a helpful introduction by the two editors and an equally helpful index. One regrets that the chapters are not arranged thematically (Chapters 9 and 8, for example, would have made a good opening), but this does not detract from the overall achievement.

In the first chapter, E. Bakker argues for a fresh understanding of time and narrative tense in Homer. Starting from the phenomenon of Homeric *enargeia*, he suggests that epic discourse, rather than taking us back into the past, draws the past into a future which culminates in the present of the performance. This is exemplified by the use of the Homeric particle ἄρα, the verb μέλλειν, and the optional augment. In Chapter 2, F. Bäuml suggests that the concept of 'fact' comes into being with the rise of literacy in the Middle Ages. Studying an entry in the *Royal Frankish Annals* and an anecdote from the tales of Notker Balbulus, B. sets up an opposition between 'fact' and 'truth' which he associates with written Latin discourse on the one hand and oral traditions in the vernacular on the other. This is perhaps one of the less convincing contributions to the volume. The notion of 'fact' is insufficiently contextualized, and the examples used do not always support the argument. In Chapter 3, J. Foley invokes the Homeric word σῆμα to restate and elaborate his concept of 'traditional referentiality' (p. 66). He convincingly suggests that, like the immanent referent of oral poetry, the σῆμα partakes in a 'poetics of recognition' (p. 72). Odysseus' wedding-bed serves as an example of the informed sign-reading involved in the process. In Chapter 4, A. Ford reconsiders the reception of Homer in the archaic and classical Greek world. Starting from the observation that Homeric poetry is often quoted out of context, F. suggests that, at some point in the fifth century, a concern with poetic unity supersedes an older interest in Homer as an authorizing label. While this part of the argument is largely convincing, F.'s attempt to use early quotations as evidence for performance practice seems less justified. In Chapter 5, A. Kahane sets out to link the semantics of Homeric epic to its metrical shape. He identifies the gap between each hexameter line as a point of special interest, using the words μοῦνος and οἶος to support his claim that in Homer such 'interstices of silence' (p. 116) may serve to dramatize tensions between the world of the story and that of the performance. In

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Chapter 6, R. Martin suggests that Homeric similes may be profitably viewed in relation to other poetic genres. Drawing on a wealth of comparative material, M. uses passages from elegy and choral lyric to argue that the similes display a generic character of their own within the 'polyphonic' whole of Homer's epic. In Chapter 7, G. Nagy employs the notion of ellipsis in Homer to support his case for an evolutionary model of Homeric poetry. He suggests that such instances of ellipsis as we find in *Iliad* 12.335f. can be regarded as special cases of the larger phenomenon of recomposition in performance. Chapters 8 and 9, like Chapter 2, are devoted to medieval Europe. First, W. Oesterreicher looks at 'orality in text' (p. 190). Adopting a conceptual (rather than medial) approach to orality, O. develops a number of criteria which may help to assess the 'notionally oral' character of any given text. Based on these criteria he singles out eight types of orality in text, ranging from 'writing by semiliterate persons' (p. 200) to 'simulated orality' (p. 205). In Chapter 9, U. Schaefer puts oral studies into the larger context of what she calls 'the medial approach' (p. 215). S. argues that we are currently witnessing a paradigm shift away from reading as a process in which 'encoded' messages are 'retrieved' (p. 228). As examples of non-decodable text, S. discusses Old English *gnomai*.

Despite its wide range of topics and approaches, the volume has a clear thematic focus. All contributors seek to leave behind the more formal concerns of past generations of scholars and aim instead at an understanding of orality as that which is (conceptually or actually) close, immediate, or performed (pp. 1–10). In their joint search for the new picture, classicists, linguists, and medievalists discover a range of different 'oralities'. Not everything on offer is equally convincing. For example, we are too often asked to jump from 'oral culture' to 'oral epic'; and the classicist in particular may feel uncomfortable when 'oral text' turns into 'epic', 'heroic epic', and even 'Homer' (understood as comprising *Iliad* and *Odyssey*) without further explanation. The concept of 'orality' thus becomes a way of excluding from the emerging discourse most that is 'oral' in Greek literature. Here we should protest, and it is one of the strong points of this book that it does reflect on its own limitations. Examples that stick to mind are J. Foley on 'oral poetics' (p. 82), R. Martin on the interaction between Homeric poetry and other poetic genres (Chapter 6), and W. Oesterreicher on epic as a relatively distant type of speech (pp. 207–14).

Cambridge J. HAUBOLD

HESIOD

G. ARRIGHETTI: *Esiodo, Opere. Testi introdotti, tradotti e commentati.* Pp. lxvi + 644.Turin: Einaudi Gallimard, 1998. Paper, L. 85,000. ISBN: 88-44660053-6.

This book, containing all the Hesiodic Corpus (including works considered spurious, by Arrighetti too), comes from an expert in Hesiod's poetry who, as well as writing several papers on it, has translated and commented on the *Theogony* (Milan, 1993^4)—a translation which modestly is not included in the bibliography.

The book includes text, translation, and commentary. At the end, there are also (in a critical anthology) several basic articles by other authors, like an abridged *Wege der Forschung*. All this makes the work very handy: how useful to have an index of all the proper names in the corpus!

Although the text has not been critically edited, A. does discuss textual matters.

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Sometimes, for instance, new punctuations are proposed; I consider very adequate that of *Op*. 826 (*τάων εὐδαίμων τε καὶ ὄλβιος ὃς τάδε πάντα*) with comments on p. 444, against West's *τάων. εὐδαίμων*, and also the punctuation of *Op*. 47, with comments on p. 409. Generally, the most doubtful texts belong to the fragments (which mainly follow Merkelbach–West's numeration). This is not surprising, because in a semi-popular edition (the work is included in the Italian *Pléiade*) it is difficult to include texts that require specialized philological techniques. So, in some cases, the source is transcribed and in others it is not; only on some occasions is there an indication that illegible verses are neglected (cf. fr. 64). On the other hand, though I am conscious that this would break with a tradition, I suggest publishing the *Catalogue of Women* after the *Theogony*, because, as A. himself comments on more than one occasion (pp. 376, 447), there is no doubt that the first work is the continuation of the second.

The translation, leaving aside some misprints, such as the one on p. 83, is very accurate. It does not follow a set metre, but it does try to imitate the Greek hexameter, by ending the verses with paroxyton words (corresponding to Greek spondaics). Moreover, it stands out for achieving something very difficult: it follows the Greek text accurately (it even succeeds in respecting the word order) without artificiality. The cases in which this happens do not prove unnatural (*Th.* 469–70: 'pregò i genitori / suoi'; *Th*. 688–9: 'e tutta / mostrò la violenza').

The commentary is quite different from West's. From a formal point of view, as contrasted with English commentaries, which usually have brief introductions and linger on the analysis of each verse, A. acts the other way around: his introductions (both to each work and to each passage of them) are very extensive, whereas his commentary on single verses is brief. From the point of view of the contents, A. analyses the literary aspect more than the philological one (contrary to West). So important matters are raised such as the relation of the *Theogony* and the *Works* (a question which underlies all the commentary, not only on pp. 378–80, specifically dedicated to it); the existence of previous cosmogonies (p. 297) and the degree of novelty of Hesiod in the systematization of the different *τιμαί* (p. 293), which according to A. is very high; the 'Hesiodic pessimism' (according to A., pp. 387–90, what Hesiod does is to trace the evolution of human intelligence, for good or bad); the rôle of women and misogyny (in this way, the 'anti-misogynist' reflections of pp. 465–6 are well-conceived, considering the different rôle that the woman plays in a work that encourages labour, *hic et nunc*, such as the *Opera*, and a work about the creation of the world, set in mythical times and therefore less misogynist, such as the *Theogony*); and the scope of the didascalic character in the Hesiodic work (pp. 320–1), with important reflections about the value of poetic action, etc.

The comment of *Th*. 477–84 is very interesting. It definitely solves, to my mind, the problem of the relation between the birth of Zeus and Crete: according to A., the same narration is repeated in two different ways, giving each of them different details, as is usual in other Hesiodic texts.

Maybe what is missing in A.'s book (apart from specific questions, like a study in depth of the analysis of the structure of the myth of races, or of the orientalizing character of Hesiod) is more audacity in the formulation of hypothesis: for example, as the introduction of work and Pandora's arrival are discussed profusely (p. 384), why not relate both realities, postulating a happy past (characterized by a fertile land, pandora) and today, in which man lives subject to work, from when he was born of a woman (the first of whom was also called Pandora), or why not interpret *Op*. 27–41 (pp. 405–6) according to Thür's theories, which have only been applied to Homer up to

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now, and would show here a medial or decisive oath, guaranteed by the presence of chthonic plants like mallow or asphodel? (By the way, M. Gagarin, in *Early Greek Law* [Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London, 1986], offers a slightly different interpretation of the passage from the one proposed in his works as cited by A.)

To sum up, A.'s work serves with dignity its corresponding rôle in the collection it is set in and, beyond these limits, it will easily become an important reference book. Its recent appearance enables him to use contributions like those, for example, of Verdenius or Ballabriga, which were of course unavailable to West. However, the scale of these will always be an obstacle which A. will have to fight against.

University of Barcelona MARTÍ DURAN

TRAGEDY

P. E. EASTERLING (ed.): *The Cambridge Companion to Greek Tragedy.* Pp. xvii + 392. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997. Cased, £40/$59.95 (Paper, £14.95/$19.95). ISBN: 0-521-41245-5 (0-521-42351-1 pbk).

Approaches to Greek tragedy have changed radically over the past thirty years. Whereas a generation ago the primary focus was on texts and their interpretation, scholars today take a broader view, attaching great importance to the historical conditions in which the plays were first produced. Tragedy is no longer seen as a timeless art form whose appeal self-evidently transcends differences in time, language, and culture, but rather as the product of a particular 'historical moment', when archaic modes of thought came into conflict with the rapidly developing social and political systems of fifth-century Athenian democracy. Following in the highly influential footsteps of J.-P. Vernant, many studies have shown how tragedy, as an institution of the democratic *polis*, enabled the city not only to display itself to itself, but also to explore the underlying tensions in society through the medium of heroic myth. Tragedy is thus not simply a species of literature, but a major cultural event in the lives of Athenian citizens. At the same time there has been increasing emphasis on the plays as theatre and a strong move away from what is generally perceived to be an Aristotelian view of tragedy as a genre to which performance is incidental.

The new *Cambridge Companion* instantiates these trends in criticism in a way that demonstrates their power. This is not an introductory survey, but rather a series of sophisticated essays which use the insights of modern critical theory to deepen our understanding of tragedy as a cultural phenomenon. It is divided into three parts, which deal with (1) the institution of tragedy in its historical context, (2) readings of the plays themselves, and (3) the reception of tragedy from antiquity to the present.

Paul Cartledge opens the volume with a discussion of the place of theatre in Athenian civic life, in which he deploys by now familiar arguments to show that Greek tragedy is fundamentally political in nature because of the context in which it was performed. This theme is further developed by Simon Goldhill in a chapter on the Athenian audience in which he argues that being a member of an audience, whether in the Assembly, law court, or theatre, was above all 'to play the rôle of the democratic citizen'. The sheer scale of the Great Dionysia, which brought together a larger body

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of citizens than at any other time in the Athenian calendar, is a measure of its prestige and importance, but also gives credence to the often repeated claims that poets were the teachers of the people. It is all the more striking, therefore, that the pictorial record, considered here by Oliver Taplin, is so sparse. Mythological and heroic scenes figure prominently on fifth-century Attic vases, but, in marked contrast to the South Italian vases of the fourth century which Taplin has discussed elsewhere, very few of these scenes signal a connection with the theatre. As to why Athenian tragedy is apparently so little reflected in contemporary vase painting, Taplin speculates that it was the 'political' nature of Greek tragedy that made it an unsuitable subject for depiction. Religion is, of course, an integral part of the life of the *polis*, and tragedy is undeniably 'religious' in the broadest sense. Dionysus, the glamorous and ever-elusive god under whose sign the dramas were performed, is the subject of a subtle and wide-ranging chapter by Pat Easterling, who draws on recent research to present an overview of the various facets of his character and cult which made him uniquely appropriate as the god of theatre. She herself points to the strong connexions between Dionysus and the world of the dead, referring to the story of the drunken Silenus, father of the satyrs, who, when forced to answer the question 'What is best?', replies 'Not to be born at all', the next best thing being to go back to where one came from as quickly as possible. Dionysus' worshipper, in his wild and drunken state, articulates a view that is explored again and again in the world of Greek tragedy and its enduring preoccupation with death.

In the second section of the volume Edith Hall offers a powerful analysis of the sociology of tragedy, arguing that the plays legitimize the social status quo, whilst at the same time giving voice, albeit in fictional form, to those who are excluded from the public discourse of the *polis*, notably foreigners, women, and slaves. Paradoxically, therefore, tragedy can be seen to be more truly 'democratic' in the modern sense of the term than the society which produced it. The multivocal form of tragedy owes much to the development of rhetoric in fifth-century Athens, a theme explored by Goldhill in a chapter on the language of tragedy. The formal aspects of the genre are also discussed by E., who reminds us of just how little we know about dramatic performances in ancient Athens and what they meant to those who watched them. But she is surely right to stress that the plays were about real issues, however displaced in terms of time, place, and persons. Indeed, as she suggests, part of tragedy's power lies in its ability to use the essentially metaphorical status of the events enacted on stage in order to explore problems which were of fundamental importance to contemporary society. In practice, as Aristotle observed, the plots of Greek tragedies were drawn from a limited number of legends, which became, in Peter Burian's words, 'an integral part of the system of tragic discourse'. His chapter on the shaping of tragic plot shows how tragedy constantly reinterprets these traditional stories, using myth both to question and to validate cultural norms.

Tragedy was largely a product of a very particular society—fifth-century Athens—but it rapidly transformed itself into an art form of universal appeal. The details of how this transformation came about are difficult to reconstruct, but E. offers some illuminating insights in a chapter on the history of tragedy from the late fifth century B.C. to the end of pagan antiquity. Clearly tragedy did not die with Euripides (in Nietzsche's famous formulation), but continued to be a hugely popular art form throughout the fourth century and beyond. But the tendency towards the canonization of the great fifth-century tragedians (evident already in Aristophanes) gained momentum when in 386 B.C. an official contest in revived 'old' plays was instituted at the City Dionysia. This process was reinforced in the Alexandrian period

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when selected plays acquired classic status as texts to be studied in schools. In the Latin-speaking world Greek tragedy was revitalized through translations and adaptations, and it was through Seneca that tragedy was transmitted into European culture. The rediscovery of Greek tragedy in the Renaissance and the subsequent history of its reception form the subject of original and fascinating chapters by Burian, on adaptations from the Renaissance to the present, and Fiona Macintosh, on nineteenth- and twentieth-century productions. Goldhill provides a fitting conclusion with a clear and thoughtful discussion of modern critical approaches to tragedy, which covers anthropology, psychoanalysis, structuralism, post-structuralism, and gender. Of course there is no natural or self-evident way of reading, and this volume as a whole shows how all interpretations are historically contingent. But part of tragedy's appeal to later generations must surely arise from the existential questions that it raises, an aspect of the genre that is here down-played. Those interested in a more philosophical perspective would do well to consult M. Silk's *Tragedy and the Tragic* (Oxford, 1996), which provides a balance to the predominantly historicizing approach represented by the present book. In general, however, the *Companion* provides eloquent testimony to the vigorous state of critical thinking about Greek tragedy at the end of the twentieth century.

University of Warwick PENELOPE MURRAY

THE TRAGIC EXCHANGE

V. WOHL: *Intimate Commerce. Exchange, Gender, and Subjectivity in Greek Tragedy*. Pp. xxxvii + 294. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1998. Cased, $40 (Paper, $19.95). ISBN: 0-292-79113-5 (0-292-79114-3 pbk).

This book belongs to a type especially common in North America. The type consists of a lucid and often ingenious 'reading' of a selection of (already much 'read') Greek tragedies (in this case *Women of Trachis*, *Agamemnon*, and *Alcestis*). The 'reading' is controlled not by detailed understanding of Athenian social formation, history, economy, religion, etc., but rather by a loosely conjoined series of ideas selected from a variety of theorists (in this case Levi-Strauss, Marx, Althusser, Bourdieu, Mauss, Freud, Lacan, Klein, Kristeva, and others). Characteristic of the type is to envisage tragedy as belonging to the interrogative mode: what tragedy does is to 'call into question'.

Although I have my doubts about the type, W. has certainly written an intelligent and interesting instance of it. The starting point of her complex argument is the idea (associated with Levi-Strauss) that the social order is founded by men exchanging women. Implicit in this model is male as (active) subject and female as (passive) object. But in tragedy women confuse this distinction by attempting to become active subjects. The attempt fails in the end, but in the process calls into question the distinction and indicates alternatives to it.

This argument, being about attempts to pass from object to subject, correspondingly involves, at the theoretical level, an attempt to integrate anthropology (the objective exchange of women) with psychoanalysis (the male and female subjectivities surrounding the exchange of women). So, for instance, the Oedipus

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complex is 'in essence an exchange of women': in yielding his mother to his father the little boy receives the tacit promise of a woman of his own. This ambitious theoretical breadth is an admirable feature of the book, even though the breadth is at times specious.

An example of this speciousness is provided by the use made of Marx's notion of the commodity fetish, a notion that appeals to W. because it concerns the subjectivity of an economic process. For Marx this fetishism consists in the fact that, in a passage quoted by W. herself, 'the social character of men's labour appears to them as an objective character stamped upon the products of that labour'. W. supposes that this notion of Marx includes the character stamped on things by virtue of being *exchanged*, and so deploys the notion to explain the *charis* attaching to *agalmata*, which she (misleadingly, in my view) regards as misrecognized commodities. Further, she even takes certain tragic females (Iphigeneia, Helen) to be fetishized commodities in Marx's sense, with the 'labor that produces women' being 'no less than the *habitus* of their father, his status, wealth, power, and prestige' (p. 66). Implicit in commodity fetishism, she goes so far as to claim, is (Kleinian) sadism (p. 102). By now we are a very long way from Marx's notion, which W. has appropriated (and distorted) to serve her master category of gender.

The test of applying theory to tragic texts is whether it resolves puzzlement, whether things fall into place. W. has done enough to indicate in a general way the intriguing possibilities of applying her combination of theories to tragedy, and this is no mean achievement. But the treatment of specific passages sometimes seems forced, for example in the claim that there is an erotic cathexis between Herakles and his son Hyllus (p. 21); or that 'if the murder [of Iphigeneia] is a defloration, then Agamemnon himself penetrates his daughter' as well as hoarding her for himself (pp. 74, 81); or that the sacrifice of Iphigeneia is a 'potlach' (pp. 69, 71)—surely it should be asked whether the Greeks in general went in for potlach. A rather obvious (but unaddressed) problem with the argument as a whole emerges right at the beginning, where the fight between Herakles and Akheloos for the hand of Deianeira is called 'paradigmatic of a structure termed by anthropologists "the exchange of women" '. But Deianiera is simply not described as *exchanged*, nor even as *transferred* between two men. A similar doubt surrounds some of the other tragic females discussed (notably Iphigeneia). I also have difficulty with the central idea of tragedy as sophisticatedly interrogative, 'encouraging us to ask after the genesis and history of such concepts as woman, gender difference, male domination, the individual subject, social and economic history, the state' (p. xvii), along with 'stances that could be taken up in practice' and the hope for 'less oppressive alternatives' (pp. xxi–ii). A problem here is, of course, that literature which does not offer alternatives to patriarchy runs the risk (with constant debate over the 'canon') of being rejected altogether by the gender-determined expectations of the consumers on campus. Certainly W.'s deployment of economics is a brave and welcome attempt to widen the debate somewhat.

Infuriatingly, not only does this book have endnotes (rather than footnotes), it does not even have headers over the endnotes to enable them to be found. Publishers should understand that notes to academic books are not an alienating embarrassment to be hidden away, but usually a vital and interesting part of the argument.

University of Exeter RICHARD SEAFORD

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GREEK TRAGIC FRAGMENTS

J. DIGGLE (ed.): *Tragicorum Graecorum Fragmenta Selecta.* Pp. ix + 182. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998. Cased, £25. ISBN: 0-19-814685-X.

F. JOUAN, H. VAN LOOY (edd., trans.): *Euripide Vol. VIII. Fragments: 1re partie, Aigeus-Autolykos* (Collection des Universités de France: l'Association Guillaume Budé). Pp. lxxxiii + 342 (160 double). Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1998. Cased. ISBN: 2-251-00466-1.

Elderly readers may remember a brown OCT by A. S. Hunt, *Tragicorum Graecorum Fragmenta Papyracea nuper reperta* (Oxford, 1912), containing *Ichneutai*, *Hypsipyle*, and some lesser pieces. Now we have a blue one in which the main accretions and lucubrations of the century are taken in and digested. Not that the selection is limited to papyrus fragments: it includes some sixty-six of the more notable quotation-fragments too. The plays represented are: Aesch. *Glaukos Pontios*, *Danaides*, *Diktyoulkoi*, *Edonoi*, *Theoroi*, *Kares*, *Myrmidones*, *Niobe*, *Xantriai*, *Prometheus Lyomenos* and *Pyrkaeus*, *Psychagogoi*; Soph. *Aias Lokros*, *Aleadai*, *Achilleos Erastai*, *Eurypylos*, *Thyestes*, *Inachos*, *Ichneutai*, *Niobe*, *Polyxena*, *Rhizotomoi*, *Skyrioi*, *Tereus*, *Tyro*; Eur. *Alexandros*, *Antiope*, *Archelaos*, *Autolykos*, *Bellerophontes*, *Erechtheus*, *Kresphontes*, *Kretes*, *Melanippe Sophe* and *Desmotis*, *Stheneboia*, *Telephos*, *Hypsipyle*, *Phaethon*, *Phrixos* A/B, *Chrysippos*; Critias *Peirithoos*, *Sisyphos*; Neophron *Medea*; and the Gyges fragment.

A fruity bundle, then, and meticulously edited, with many orthographic and other improvements in the text, and a generous apparatus by the standards of the series. But I became increasingly perplexed as to the rationale of the undertaking, and particularly the criterion governing the inclusion of quotation-fragments. Whether they were chosen for their intrinsic interest or their contribution to the lineaments of lost plays, there are too many unaccountable omissions for the volume to serve as a poor man's Snell–Kannicht–Radt. One might envisage its use as a base text in graduate seminars focusing on the papyrus plays (if the young people could be persuaded to shell out £25 each). But then, if there were any curiosity about plots, supplementary texts would have to be supplied. For example, for Euripides' *Alexandros* we are given the papyrus Hypothesis and four papyrus fragments, but none of the thirty or so quotation-fragments, many of which can be put into context so as to give substance to the précis in the Hypothesis; not to mention those of Ennius' *Alexander*, which suggest that Euripides gave Cassandra a lyric prophecy scene modelled on that of the *Agamemnon.* For *Bellerophon* we are given three sententious quotation-fragments: several of the twenty-six excluded have more bearing on the action. For *Antiope* the relevant section of Hyginus is quoted in lieu of a Hypothesis; why is the same not done for *Kresphontes*, *Erechtheus*, or *Telephos*? Students of these plays will need to consult Diggle, but their obvious first recourse will be the two Aris & Phillips volumes of Euripides' *Selected Fragmentary Plays*, ably edited by C. Collard, M. J. Cropp, and K. H. Lee.

The printing is more accurate and attractive than some we have seen, but wasteful of space, with broader side margins than usual, unnecessarily wide line-spacing, and over twenty pages that are more than half blank. A good deal more material could have been fitted in even without increasing the thickness of the volume, and it is not a thick one. Where papyrus lines are filled out from quotations, half-brackets should

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have been used. Papyrus indentation of shorter lyric lines should have been reproduced (e.g. in *Theoroi* fr. (a) 5, (c) 43–8). The spine is crassly stamped *Tragicorum Graecorum*; no doubt some honest craftsman took the words printed largest on the title page to be self-sufficient as a short title, but was there no one to give him better guidance?

Aesch. *Kares* 10f., φιτυμάτων (Bergk) | *Μίνω<ν>*? Cf. *Cho.* 618 (gen. *Μίνω*). But this fragment is surely not Aeschylean. Soph. *Aias Lokros* 6, one expects -φωνος not -φώνης. *Ichn.* 91 et al., φησιν and φημι are properispomena when not enclitic. *Niobe* hypoth. 8, Lloyd-Jones's ἀκτὶς is unmetrical. Frr. I–II app., 'Niobidae' should be 'Niobidi' (five times). *Tereus* I 7, there is no such form as αὐξανθῆι. Eur. *Alex.* hypoth. 2, e.g. *Τροία μὲν ἥδε*]. *Kretes* III 2, e.g. *σὺ δὴ κακόν*. *Hyps.* 263 app., '1500' should be '1600'. *Fab. incert.* IV, the address is clearly to Hades (cf. Aesch. *Pers.* 629, 650), not Hermes.

The Budé is the first of three or four projected volumes covering the fragments of Euripides. A long introduction surveys the evidence for the number and titles of the lost plays, the tradition of the text, Euripides' choice of myths, chronology, imitations and quotations, papyri, and editions. For each play there is a substantial Notice (with bibliography), in which the background myth is expounded, with extensive quotation of sources both in the original and in translation and reference to vases; opinions on dating and on reconstruction of the plot are reviewed, and suggestions are made for placing the individual fragments in context. The fragments are reordered, and separately numbered for each play; sources and contexts are set out. Fragments of versions by Ennius, Pacuvius, and Accius are provided where relevant.

This is an excellent plan, carried through well enough to make the work a useful instrument. It is adequately documented and up to date (though it could not take account of Diggle's new OCT). It is marred, however, by some weakness on the philological side, and an unacceptable degree of negligence in transcribing texts and in proof-reading. The papyrus texts are not controlled with the accuracy to be expected; for example, what is printed at *Alexandros* 26.1–6 ignores the advance made by Coles, *BICS* Suppl. 32 (1974), 46f., and supplements are not properly measured for length. The printer has not been made to produce proper half-brackets and braces (see the clumsy approximations on p. 111), or to print dots for lost letters below line level. In *Antiope* 42 Lycus' interlocutor is absurdly labelled *ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΣ*, because he addresses him once as ἄνθρωπε. The editors do not have a sure sense of what to leave out of an apparatus. In several places they confuse by ellipses of the type '*τὠμῷ λόγῳ* Grotius: *τ' ἐμῶ Μ*' (for *τ' ἐμῶ λόγω Μ*). Their grasp of metre is faulty: some verses are printed in unmetrical form (*Alcmeon* 10.2; *Antigone* 12.1), and several crashingly unmetrical supplements are quoted in the apparatus (a sixth-foot spondee from Jouan, *Aiolos* 12.2; fourth-foot spondees, *Alcmeon* 25.2; *Antiope* 39.1 [acknowledged!], 42.69); anapaests and lyrics are confused (p. 232 on fr. 1028 N.; p. 286 on *Archelaos* 27, which is printed on p. 303 without recognition that it is a dactylic tetrameter and hexameter). I have never seen a scholarly edition in which so many Greek words are wrongly accented (δεσποταί, χρησιμόν, ἡδόνας, ᾠδαν, *Ποσείδων*, μέστη, φώνῃ, μέσουντος, προσίδουσα, ὀφέλος, *Χίον* 'Chian', *Εὐβούλος*, βιοτόν, δυό, διασπᾶσαι, κῶφον, εὑρέτην, ἄστων, *Καλλίκλης*, στύλος, μελπεῖν, οὔπερ, *Μύσοι*, τίκτουσας, ἡ νεύρα). Breathings combined with a circumflex have come out wrong in many places and not been corrected. Despite the new numeration introduced by the editors, fragments are sometimes cited by their Kannicht numbers. There is inconsistency and error in the spelling of scholars' names (Aélion/Aelion, Mittsdoerffer/Mitsdörffer, Stählin/Staehlin; Sylberg). At *Alexandros* 20.9 χραίνει is printed for κραίνει, at 22.11 ὁ

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twice for δ, at 41 *μ'* for μ[; in Ennius' fr. 6 *nomen* for *nomina*; id. fr. 13.1 *mulier* omitted, 13.4 *me* for *mei*; pp. 149, 150, 160, 'Anténor' thrice for 'Agénor'; *Andromeda* dub. 3 *ὥστεν* for *ὥστ'*; *Antigone* 22.8 *ἐ[ειϛ* for *ἐ[χειϛ*; p. 230 n. 54, a passage already quoted four pages before is here quoted with a different and unintelligible text; *Antiope* 42.115 *παρ'* for *πρὸϛ*. There are numerous other minor errors, including misprints even in French words.

The successor volumes will be very welcome, but we must hope that they will be produced with much greater care and attention.

All Souls College, Oxford M. L. WEST

THE BACCHÆ DISMEMBERED

V. LEINIEKS: *The City of Dionysos: a Study of Euripides' Bakchai.* (Beiträge zur Altertumskunde, 88.) Pp. 407. Stuttgart and Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1996. Cased, DM 138. ISBN: 3-519-07637-3.

Euripides' *Bacchae* seems to inspire scholarly excesses; to the extent that L. attempts to moderate these, his project is potentially worthwhile. In so doing, however, he rules out many fruitful modes of interpreting the play, and ultimately fails to offer an interpretation at all. L. labors at a disadvantage from the start due to the recent publication of three important studies (Seaford's 1994 *Ritual and Reciprocity* and 1996 commentary, and the second edition of Segal's *Dionysiac Poetics*), which he was unable to consult and to which his book will be inevitably and, I fear, unfavorably compared.

L. sets himself a task at once seemingly modest and impossibly ambitious; his book's 'sole purpose is to elucidate what Euripides had to say in his play' (p. 7). L. assumes (without argument) that the ancient author's ideas are transparent and that the critic's job is essentially to paraphrase those ideas, presenting them in 'more readily comprehensible form' (p. 7). He attempts this through explication of individual words within their ancient context. L.'s main contribution lies in his far-ranging and sensible discussions of such key terms as *entheos*, *homophagos*, and *thiasos.* While the conclusions he reaches are not always convincing (a *neanias* is 18–50 years old) or startling (*nomos* is divinely protected custom), these dictional analyses are useful and often interesting. Here one laments the poverty of the index, which, with only thirty-nine main entries, severely limits their usefulness.

A play is more than the sum of its words, however, and although one applauds the attempt to uncover Euripides' precise meaning, L. rarely shows what difference it makes to our understanding of *Bacchae* that a certain word means one thing and not another. The book lacks the cohesion of a sustained interpretation. There is virtually no connection between the seventeen chapters: Chapter 1 (on the failure of leadership in later Euripides—but not in *Bacchae*) is completely unintegrated and its conclusions never mentioned again; likewise, the final chapter, instead of offering general conclusions, turns to textual questions. Many chapters barely mention the play or relate their material to it (e.g. Chapter 8). Reading 'what Euripides had to say' word-by-word, L. fails to appreciate the text's overall architecture.

Moreover, in paraphrasing the ideas of the play, L. reduces them to the prosaic. Many protracted discussions conclude that Euripides' usage is 'traditional and not surprising' (p. 248). Thus we are told that 'Euripides' treatment of the gods is for the most part traditional and straightforward' (p. 41) or that the astonishing phrase

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θιασεύεται ψυχάν (*Bacc.* 75) is 'not in any way mysterious or excessively profound' (p. 339). Not surprisingly, the argumentation is mostly negative: the god does not enter his worshipper; the play does not evoke mystery-cult; sexuality is not an important factor. Suggestive readings are often rejected through reductive syllogisms, usually without discussion or engagement with opposing opinions. In this resistance to interpretation, L. plays Pentheus to Euripides' Dionysus, but a Pentheus who refuses even to go see what is happening on the mountain.

L. attempts to fix a single and stable meaning for words; in so doing, he ignores the ambiguities that complicate virtually every word in the play. How can one simply accept the bacchants' definition of *sôphrosunê*, knowing where it leads? Or believe that 'correct perceptions are . . . the same for everyone' (p. 238), when the play is precisely about the problem of perception and illusion? L. treats as unambiguous issues that are extremely complex; thus he can take the bacchants as paragons of wisdom and their *thiasos* as a political model for Athens, or argue that the principle of Dionysiac liberation remains 'strong, valid, and unquestioned' at the end, despite the human suffering (p. 325). And this after condemning others for failing to embrace the play's contradictions (p. 5).

Indeed, there is a general refusal to engage with other scholarship. L.'s disclaimer that a full study of the secondary literature is 'a task beyond merely human ability' is no excuse for the omission of numerous seminal works from the notes (there is no separate bibliography). Scholars are cited when they agree with him or exemplify a position he is dismissing (and—annoyingly—quoted, so that one hears every statement twice), but he never enters into sustained discussion with them, nor participates in the sophisticated debates surrounding almost every issue.

L. does offer some potentially valuable insights, particularly concerning the theme of liberation (Chapter 15). But for the most part, the book oscillates between belaboring the obvious (Dionysus is associated with vines; Pentheus thinks Dionysus is not a god but he is wrong) and making outrageous and unsubstantiated claims ('Pentheus is the single most violent and potentially destructive person in Greek tragedy', p. 216; Euripides first formulated the ideal of universality and in this directly inspired Zeno, pp. 345–8). Closing his eyes to the play's revelations, he performs an interpretive *sparagmos*, leaving it to others to pick up the pieces.

The Ohio State University VICTORIA WOHL

ARATUS

D. KIDD (ed.): *Aratus:* Phaenomena: *Edited with Introduction, Translation and Commentary*. (Cambridge Classical Texts and Commentaries, 34.) Pp. xxiv + 590. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997. Cased, £60/$100. ISBN: 0-521-58230-X.

The volume under review continues the Cambridge series of commentaries that A. S. F. Gow's *Machon* began in 1965 and that also contains numerous other volumes of Hellenistic literature (Edelstein/Kidd on *Posidonius*; Bulloch on *Callimachus' Fifth Hymn*; Hopkins on *Callimachus' Hymn to Demeter*; Reed on *Bion of Smyrna*). Since Mair's Loeb edition of 1921 this is the first English edition of the poem with a translation and a commentary. There have, however, been editions in Italian (Zannoni, 1948), French (Martin, 1956), and German (Erren, 1967/71). In order to

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make it clear right from the start: K. not only treats the extremely difficult author in an exemplary manner in an exquisite presentation, but he also makes a valuable addition to the renewed and intensified study of Hellenistic poetry in recent years.

The volume has an extensive introduction (pp. 1–68): K. touches only briefly upon the life of Aratus against the backdrop of the ancient tradition of *vitae*. Aratus had special links to the Antigonid court and his works were taken up by several contemporary poets. At the same time the phrasing of the *Phaenomena* shows that Aratus was aware of their poetry; K. does not want to overemphasize the *vitae* notice on the *Phaenomena* as commissioned poetry. To the same extent he is reticent with regard to Aratus' stay at the Seleucid court that has been hinted at. In this context he does not refer to other works that have been ascribed to Aratus (fragments in *SH* 83–120, cf. G. Weber, *Historia* 44/3 [1995], 283–316, especially 308–10).

There is a helpful overview of the poem's structure (five parts: 1–18, 19–461, 462–757, 758–1141, 1142–1154); K. points out the connection between the *Phaenomena* and Hesiod's *Works and Days* in great detail. He draws particular attention to the Stoic influences to emphasize the fact that the concept of a rational god in philosophical prevalence is not given precedence over the poetic aim.

Considerable space is dedicated to astronomy and weather signs, i.e. the tradition Aratus' poem belongs to: K. mentions early Greek poetry, and calculations by Meton and Euctemon in the fifth century B.C., he reconsiders the question of the influence on Aratus of the *Phaenomena* of Eudoxos of Cnidos (in this respect he justifiably claims for Aratus an understanding of astronomical matters), and finally he refers to Attalus of Rhodes and Hipparchus of Nicaea, who commented on Aratus' *Phaenomena* in a well-informed way. With regard to the weather signs, K. is able to refer to Ps.-Theophr., *De signis*; he thinks, however, that Aratus must have been aware of additional material.

Language, style, and the hexameter are treated extensively: in this way the essence of the commentary is shown and connected with ample references, so that, for instance, the innovative side of Aratus' usage or his poetical rendering of technical matter in his composition of didactic epic become abundantly clear.

K.'s comment on the relationship of Aratus to other contemporary poets and the intensive adaptation of the *Phaenomena* in Latin literature are of special interest: K. treats of the well-known passages in Callimachus, Apollonius, and Theocritus (e.g. 17.1, 7.53–4, 13.25, and 22). He does so, however, by looking exclusively for exact equivalents to the phrasing and references. What is missing here are at least some remarks on Aratus' position within the new poetry. Similarly, notice of the adaptation of Aratean material by Virgil is limited almost exclusively to the provision of references.

K. gives detailed information, based on the studies of Martin, on the scholia and ancient commentators of the following centuries. His observations on texts and manuscripts are very valuable: not only does he provide material on the edition by Theon of Alexandria (first century B.C.), on the Aratus-Papyri (the earliest from the second century B.C.), on the Aratus Latinus of the eighth century A.D., and on the Byzantine revisers, but he also manages especially to trace the complicated tradition of manuscripts, beginning with the Marcianus of the late eleventh or early twelfth century, and shows their relationship with the fourteen MSS used here. The commentary becomes particularly valuable, since the Edinburgh MS (last decade of the thirteenth century), which is important as the primary Planudean manuscript, has been here used for the first time.

The translation is precise throughout and contains a number of improvements in

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comprehensibility, compared with the attempts of the authors named above. With regard to the constitution of the text, K. follows the manuscript tradition as far as possible, unlike Maass (e.g. in ll. 49, 54, 80, 85). In some cases the reading of the Marcianus is found in new manuscripts (e.g. ll. 124 τειξείεσθε; 423 ἐμπλήξῃ; 433 τεύχοι; 950 χέρσῳ; 1143 δυοῖν), in others new readings are introduced (l. 401 δινωτοί).

It is not possible to discuss here details where the commentary points out parallels to Homer etc., gives factual explanations, references to other passages in Hellenistic poetry, and discussion of recent literature on the topic. Just a small number of aspects may be highlighted: In l. 190 K. explains ἐπημοιβοί as zig-zag patterns of stars. K. has contributed to a better understanding of ll. 413f. (pp. 330f.) insofar as he links the words νεφέων . . . ἄλλων and εἰλυμένον . . . ἄστρον according to the manuscript tradition. In l. 656 K. interprets ἀρνευτῆρι not as 'diver', but suggests 'tumbler'. Based on Hom. *Il.* 12.385, 16.742f. and *Od.* 12.413, this results in a vivid description of the movement of Cassiopeia.

An index of Greek words, a collection of passages by other authors that have been taken into account, and a general index complete this very valuable volume.

Eichstätt Catholic University GREGOR WEBER

METAPOETICS, OR LEAVING THE POETRY BEHIND?

MARK ANDREAS SEILER: *Ποίησις Ποιήσεως: Alexandrinische Dichtung κατὰ λεπτόν in strukturaler und humanethologischer Deutung: Kall. fr. 254–268C SH; Theokr. 7; Theokr. 11; 'Theokr.' 25.* (Beiträge zur Altertumskunde, 102.) Pp. ix + 263. Stuttgart and Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1997. ISBN: 3-519-07651-9.

This Zurich doctoral thesis bases itself firmly on the findings of structuralism and semiotics, which nowadays need no introduction, and on humanethology, especially as propounded by I. Eibl-Eibesteldt, *Die Biologie des menschlichen Verhaltens. Grundriss der Humanethologie*[2] (Munich and Zurich, 1986). Seiler sets out to demonstrate how these disciplines overlap and provide support for metapoetical readings of Alexandrian poetry, which some scholars have come to regard as the cutting edge of Hellenistic literary criticism. This is a new approach to metapoetical reading, which in some ways it extends to lengths which illustrate metapoetical criticism's elastic limit.

S. begins by taking poem 25 of the *Corpus Theocriteum* as a response ('Kontrafakt') to Kallimachos' *Victoria Berenices*. The response is of course metapoetical. The λεπτὴ τρίβος along which Herakles and Phyleus walk signifies that they are in Kallimachean territory. This is guarded by the bull, Phaethon, who represents Kallimachos; the bull's charge at the skin of the Nemean lion hanging over Herakles' shoulder is motivated by Kallimachos' distaste for objects won by heroic epic means; Herakles, on a metapoetical level equivalent to 'Theokritos' (S. inclines to believe that Theokritos is the author of the *Herakles Leontophonos* when he wants to show that the poem has analogous strategies to those he finds in the undisputably Theokritean pieces, as at pp. 86f. and 222; otherwise he is content with the quotation marks), disposes of the

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bull/Kallimachos without difficulty (albeit in a Kallimachean manner). But, when Herakles makes his own foray into epic as he recounts his victory over the Nemean lion, his heroic epic mode is undercut by the fact that it has to be flayed by means of its own claws; that is, on a metapoetical level, the author would here overcome the narrative style of heroic epic by its own poetic means (p. 85). In the *Muscipula* Molorchos discovers and sets his mousetrap as a snare for un-Kallimachean readers, whom S. argues are dehumanized into mice.

S. next turns to the *Thalysia* to demonstrate the metapoetical reading from a human-ethological perspective. For example, Komatas was sustained in year-long isolation in the λάρναξ by bees. What this actually signifies is the ability of poetry, denoted by the bees through their intertextual relationship with Kallimachos' cicadas, to help the emotionally vulnerable to master and sublimate their various traumata, thinking which S. is on safe if well trodden ground to descry in Hellenistic, especially Epicurean, philosophy. This potential is also to be seen realized in the songs of Lykidas and Simichidas. (S. identifies the latter with Theokritos on the strength of the intertextual evidence of the poetic bees, who are, self-evidently, σιμαί; intertextual evidence, it seems, is instantly compelling on its own.) The Polyphemos of *Idyll* 11 is to be seen in the same light, except that, because he is so hopelessly out of control, his poetry is judged as non-κατὰ λεπτόν, i.e. as 'bad' (pp. 197f.). The description of the cup in *Idyll* 1 explores the theme again in the picture of the lovers, but also offers two 'traps', the fisherman's net and the boy's cricket-cage, as a response to Kallimachos' mousetrap.

Just what does intertextuality involve? What are the parameters of its plausibility? S. provides us with many informative examples. Of particular importance to him is the Kallimachean παγίς, the two of them being mentioned explicitly at fr. 259.17 *SH*, the 'Phänotext'. At l. 32 Kallimachos calls them διχθαδίους . . . φονέας, which S., like others, sees as a citation of Hesiod's *Works and Days* 432, δοιὰ . . . ἄροτρα . . . / . . . πηκτόν, the 'Hypotext' (thus forgetting, as disastrously as others, the clearer and more humorous recollection of Achilles' 'twofold dooms', διχθαδίους κῆρας, at *Il.* 9.411, or of Zeus placing 'two fates of grievous death' in his scales at *Il.* 8.70 and 22.210). Kallimachos' mousetrap is brought into an intertextual relationship with Hesiod's (metapoetic) agrarian tool, the plough, which is 'well put together', πηκτόν. Theokritos, for his part, responds to this use of the 'Hypotext' in *Idyll* 11, first when he 'echoes' Hesiod's -ατι πᾶξ- at *Works and Days* 430, as he describes how the arrow of love was 'stuck' in Polyphemos' heart (πᾶξε, 16), and secondly when he makes Polyphemos call Galatea 'whiter than curds', λευκοτέρα πακτᾶς (20), taking in the 'lyre', πηκτίδων, in a passage in Sappho, another of Kallimachos' 'Hypotexte'. The essence of his argument is the common root of all these words, πηγ: because of it, all the 'intertextuality' is 'metapoetic'.

How plausible is this kind of evidence? The answer to that must be: not at all. How naturally would a Hellenistic reader have associated words as diverse in meaning as 'mousetrap', 'well constructed', 'to stick in', 'curds', and 'lyre'? The semantic context alone would have cushioned the words from association on the basis of an Indo-European word-root. The quasi-science uncovers not Alexandrian learned allusion but free association, and at times mere subjectivism, on the part of modern criticism. And what, other than a desire to elicit a metapoetic strategy, obliges us to choose *Works and Days* 432 as the 'Hypotext' of Kallimachos' 'Phänotext' rather than *Il.* 8.70 or 22.210? Many other 'echoes' I consider to be simply situational (as on pp. 94 and 188).

In S.'s judgement, to say such things would place you among 'die nicht (konsequent)

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κατὰ λεπτόν Lesenden'. But metapoetics is by definition to be found 'behind the poetry'. Do we want to run the risk of leaving the actual poetry behind?

University of Canterbury, New Zealand GRAHAM ZANKER

HERODOTUS

R. WATERFIELD: *Herodotus. The Histories.* Pp. li + 772, 10 maps. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1998. Paper, £7.99. ISBN: 0-19-282425-2.

Herodotus is growing bigger and bigger. With a timeline, textual notes, a glossary of Greek terms, a list of foreign words, a thorough index, ten maps, and the introduction and notes provided by Carolyn Dewald, this new translation continues the inflationary trend of Marincola's recent revision of de Sélincourt's Penguin.

The trend is, without doubt, a good one. D.'s notes are, as she herself acknowledges, highly dependent on the commentaries of A. B. Lloyd and the *Fondazione Lorenzo Valla* series. Reference is made to only a small number of secondary works, above all to the *Cambridge Ancient History*. They are inevitably sketchy in places. But her 140-page commentary includes everything that you could reasonably expect in such space. D.'s introduction also reflects a thorough awareness of the secondary literature; so, in addition to questions of Herodotus' historical reliability, there are discussions of his 'narrative habits' and of the 'underlying assumptions and patterns' of the *Histories*, religious assumptions, the hardness and softness of peoples, balance, order, and antithesis.

Most important of all, this is an introduction that could not only safely but usefully be recommended to students: it is admirably suited for the first-time reader. It opens with the most potted of potted histories of the Persian empire and Persian wars, fifth-century intellectual developments, the Athenian democracy, and the Athenian empire (pp. ix–x). There follows a synopsis of the plot of the *Histories* (pp. xiii–vi); the notes also include lengthy introductions to the structure of each book. Students' difficulties with Herodotus focus on precisely these questions of structure: 'there is no sense of direction', it is often said; 'he just goes off on a tangent'. The underlying patterns—for example, Herodotus' echoes of his opening at the end of the *Histories* (p. xli)—need to be pointed out. Despite very occasional descents into jargon ('interconnected spatial and social reciprocities', paraphrasing John Gould at p. xvii), D.'s discussion of Herodotus' 'narrative habits' (pp. xvi–xxvii) and her book-by-book descriptions in the notes highlight what one might call the submerged structure of the *Histories* splendidly. Her introduction should be a sufficient innoculation against pained first reactions.

There are bound to be some faults found with any such work. The mention of Darius as 'also an Achaemenid' (p. xiv) disguises a huge range of difficult questions concerning his succession. The arguments marshalled against Detlev Fehling could perhaps have been usefully enlarged (pp. xxiii–v); D.'s positive discussion of Herodotus' reliability, however, steers an exemplary course between the twin errors of extreme scepticism and the desire to vindicate Herodotus at every turn. I also have difficulties with D.'s rigid distinction of *spatium mythicum* and *spatium historicum* (p. 597), and with the assertion that the ideas of Solon in Book I have 'less to do with Greek ideas about the personality of divinity than with the observed fact that human life is very difficult' (p. 601): why should these be incompatible? Might not Greek ideas

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of divinity have sought to explain the difficulties of life? In general, however, it would be hard to imagine a better guide than D.

There is only one disappointment to this new translation, and it is undeniably a central one: the translation itself. Waterfield raises high hopes (p. xlii): his predecessors have 'either tended to go too far in the direction of modern English fluency, or have adopted a stilted and awkward style to get across Herodotus' lack of rhetorical flair'. W.'s translation is accurate. There are none of the bowdlerizations of Rawlinson: camel's genitalia are back where they should be (3.103). But it is without life or flair.

> Here are presented the results of the enquiry carried out by Herodotus of Halicarnassus. The purpose is to prevent the traces of human events from being erased by time, and to preserve the fame of the important and remarkable achievements produced by both Greeks and non-Greeks; among the matters covered is, in particular, the cause of the hostilities between Greeks and non-Greeks.

I find myself irritated by 'non-Greeks'. 'Barbarians', I presume, has been judged unduly pejorative, or not adequate to represent the abstract polarity of Greeks and 'non-Greeks'. But even if we were to accept this—and the sacrifice of colour that follows from it—why the clumsy repetition of 'non-Greeks'? Whatever their possible faults, the other available versions—the folksy David Grene, with his 'that time may not draw the color from what men have brought into being', or Marincola's more literal revision of de Sélincourt—by keeping the flow of Herodotus' sentence intact, do suggest the drift in the proem from the broad to the narrow remit of the *Histories*. They also convey some sense of grandeur.

University College London THOMAS HARRISON

HERODOTUS SIGNIFIED

J. E. VAN DER VEEN: *The Significant and the Insignificant: Five Studies in Herodotus' View of History.* (Amsterdam Studies in Classical Philology, 6.) Pp. 146. Amsterdam: J. C. Gieben, 1996. Hfl. 85. ISBN: 90-5063-296-3.

This book, the result of a doctoral dissertation, is about the uncertain status of the significant in Herodotus: elements which appear to be significant turn out to be a false marker of significance, while other insignificant elements (characters, objects, and events), which are presented in such a way as not to command the reader's attention, play a major rôle in the story; the aim of the book is to demonstrate in what way these seemingly irrelevant elements are important for Herodotus' narrative. The stories chosen for treatment are that of Polycrates (3.39–44, 120–5), Cyrus' youth (1.107–30), the give-and-take in Syloson's story (3.139–49), Socles' speech to the Spartans (5.92), and how the attribution of greatness to Athens (7.139) is treated in the rest of the work. Darius and Xerxes on the Persian side, and Amasis, as an epitome of the relevance of the irrelevant, complete the investigation. The book includes a (not full) bibliography, a summary and *Samenvatting*, and four indexes: nominum, locorum, verborum, and rerum.

After the Introduction, Chapter Two, 'The Lord of the Ring: Herodotus on the Fall of Polycrates' (3.39–44, 120–5), is a sound analysis. But in the comparison of Amasis' advice with what Polycrates finally did (p. 8), v. d. V. seems to misunderstand the text:

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in Amasis' message the element of thinking (φροντίσας) has not been removed, since Polycrates' reaction is introduced by a far more important verb 'he questioned himself' (ἐδίζητο), a philosophical term both in Presocratics and Herodotus. Polycrates fell, but not because the loss of the ring has not made him suffer. Polycrates' ring is a guilt-culture attitude and no doubt symbolizes his power and wealth. Amasis' advice is a kind of oracle, which Polycrates does not appreciate, as usually in the *History*: Oroetes knows that he had plans for great matters but he had not money to match his plans, and Herodotus recognizes that he was very fond of money in order to fulfil his plans to master Ionia and the islands.

In Chapter Three, 'The Significance of the Insignificant: Cyrus' Youth in Herodotus', v. d. V. argues that the presentation of Cyrus, Cyno, and Pitradates suggests that the humble in various ways are part and parcel of the overriding theme of human instability. In Chapter Four, 'A Minute's Mirth', the story of Syloson's giving his cloak away and receiving Samos in return, provides a good example of the insignificant which turns out to become significant, and it is a case of the pattern of action provoking reaction, or a pattern of historical causation in Herodotus narrative. In Chapter Five, 'Socles' Speech to the Spartans', in a pragmatic approach to Socles' speech the author suggests that the elevation of the lowliest and the debasement of the worthy both play their part, the former in the story of Cypselus and the latter in that of Periander, and finally that the notion that what seems irrelevant may be or become relevant is used. In Chapter Six, 'The Effects of Athenian Democracy in Herodotus', the author follows the references in the *History* of the twenty ships which the Athenians sent to the aid of the Ionians, which were the beginning of evils for Greeks and barbarians (5.97.3): thus, the rise of Athenian democracy is associated with the relevance of the irrelevant and with the small becoming great, while the same theme affects the image of the Athenian democracy and is applied to the claim that the Athenians are the liberators of Greece.

In the Epilogue, in Darius' becoming king the insignificant has become significant in two ways: a man of no great importance has become king and a commoner has been instrumental in the process; while Decocedes, the man who entered the story as a cast-off slave, has gained historical significance. Xerxes' fall is occasioned by underestimation of the seemingly irrelevant which underlines the principle that anything is possible. In Amasis' case the change from insignificance to importance of the circle theme is illustrated, while in the statue of the god made out of the golden footbath we see the instability of great and small of Herodotus' *Methodenkapitel* (1.5.4).

The choice of subject is sound, the author succeeds in his aim, and the book is worth reading for the analysis of the importance of irrelevant elements for Herodotus' narrative. But sometimes he overstates the smallness: the punishment of the Athenians is used in the council of the Persian nobles but it is the *nomos* of not staying still which governs Xerxes' mind. He also rightly puts his study in the perspective of the programmatic principle of the circle theme (1.5.4; 207.2) and Solon's statements that 'anything can happen' in the whole length of time, and 'look at the end'.

Croesus indeed typifies the whole fate of man, and his status at 1.30–2 is a point in the rise and fall motif, but the conversation at 1.30–2 only by inference may mean that 'the not so prominent have a better chance of becoming *olbios*': the prominent becoming *olbios* must be judged at the end, when he has brought his life to a good end, because a man with great wealth is prone to commit *hybris*, like the *esthlos* in the *Works and Days* (214–16). The important matter in Solon's conversation with Croesus, viewed as a part of the latter's whole life, is the way *ate* (blindness) in *koros* (surfeit)

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situations flatters the candidate and urges him to undertake *hybris* which brings *ate* (disaster). This motif of rise and fall of a ruler, which is part of the cycle theme, is also best described at work mainly in the council of the best in the beginning of the seventh book. V. d. V., thus, fails to take his point further: that this process from the significant to the insignificant is, just as in tragedy, a feature of the tragic heroes in the *History*, and that the potential both for significant and insignificant change, as in tragedy, is not recognized by the characters; *ate* blinds men. Herodotus uses the ambiguity of the word (and the action) taken from tragedy to present his characters in the making of his history.

University of Ioannina I. N. PERYSINAKIS

HORNBLOWER'S THUCYDIDES

S. HORNBLOWER: *A Commentary on Thucydides: Volume II: Books IV–V.24*. Pp. xvi + 520. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996. Cased, £65. ISBN: 0-19-814881-X.

By any account, Thucydides is not an easy writer to understand. Already castigated in antiquity for the difficulty of his prose style, his omissions require considerable explanation and excuse; the complexity of his views leaves the reader uncertain of his actual beliefs; and at every stage his methods of composition, his intended audience, and his aims in writing the way he does spark controversy, even whilst his brilliant intelligence and searching analysis command respect. There are so many problems with Thucydides that one can almost forget, when in the midst of them, what a poor state we would be in had his work not survived, and how monumental his achievement was.

Hornblower's commentary, perhaps by that strange process whereby one who studies an author with such intensity becomes a little like the object of his/her study, is not dissimilar. No one will dispute the brilliance of the author; few, if any, would have contemplated such a task, or done it better; and it is all too easy to focus on problems rather than the achievement. So one ought to commence by saying that H.'s commentary is of enormous value, and will very likely last as long as Gomme's commentary, if not longer, as a primary point of reference for any serious endeavour to understand individual Thucydidean passages, as well as in this volume offering a valuable methodological approach that will give continuing impetus to further analysis.

The first volume of the commentary was criticized for not having an introduction, or any maps. This volume has one map (though decent relevant maps are not hard to find, and there is no reason to suppose that any commentary should supplant the need to consult any other works), but it does have a tremendous introduction of nearly 150 pages. Otherwise the format is the same as in Volume One.

One enormous and inevitable difference between H. and Gomme is the amount of secondary literature to which reference is made. H. sets some pretty fearsome reading lists for his audience. He appears to have read everything on the vast areas that Thucydides touches upon, and has enhanced the volume's usefulness by a very solid and comprehensive index. Gomme is sometimes the more generous with explanatory material around and about the point in question, and he is easier to read, more urbane, less technical—see, for instance, the delightfully unhelpful note on 4.80.4, the murder of the 2000 helots in Sparta, which consists of a lengthy citation of Grote's

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outrage, followed by a rather dry comment that 'Grote's dislike of fraud and cruelty, his belief in the efficacy of public discussion, seem old-fashioned', and the suggestion that Thucydides might have suspected that this sort of thing was bound to happen again and again. H. by contrast has a problem with the date of the episode, worries at length and most interestingly about garlands and processions, and finishes by contemplating whether the episode ever took place, without offering a final opinion. This is one of H.'s most Thucydidean touches—there are a lot of occasions when the reader will never be wholly sure what H. actually thinks; certainty is often unattainable, and H. is disinclined to offer specious security.

There are so many books on Thucydides now, many in the form of running commentaries rather than line-by-line ones, that it might be questioned whether H. has chosen the best medium for his views (which is different from the foolish question of whether we still need commentaries). H. defends himself persuasively at the outset of the commentary. His format scores as an ancilla to the still indispensable Gomme et al., and H. gives a judicious account of all the things that Gomme had little or no interest in, or could not have been expected to know, forty years ago. Where it does not score as well is in the really major interpretative questions regarding Thucydides' philosophy, such as those raised by Orwin (*The Humanity of Thucydides* [Princeton, 1994]), who can develop a long and extremely difficult argument over 200 pages about Thucydides' view of the interaction between necessity, justice, and piety, but there is a place for both sorts of works, and H. is scrupulous in his citations.

The one place where the format does seem to constrain H. is in his wonderful account of Brasidas. Using a narratological approach, H. is able to show first that Thucydides does have a special language for talking about Brasidas, and that shifts in focus can at one point make Brasidas the epic hero and at other points raise questions. H. also has a lot of very interesting and valuable things to say about Sparta, Thessaly, and Thrace. At the end of the long section of the introduction, and indeed after reading the understandably similar remarks in the commentary, I am not sure what H. has actually concluded, other than that Thucydides did not quite know what to make in the final analysis of this remarkable Spartan (another point where text and commentary seem to have achieved a certain uniformity of view), and maybe an article would have been clearer and easier; having said that, this is to my mind the most impressive part of the commentary, a genuine and original advance over Gomme of course, and highly stimulating. This reflects the two great achievements of H.'s work in general: he succeeds in making us think afresh about one of the most endlessly discussed writers of antiquity, and he succeeds in showing that the history of the fifth century need not be a history of Athens with asides about the rest of the world.

The introduction says a great deal about speeches, personal names, religion (H. in defensive mode against those who have wrongly criticized him for saying that Thucydides was not interested in religion), and Thucydides' use of Herodotus (exhaustively documented). Taking fully into account compositional problems, it makes a strong case for the artistry and the innovation of the work, with some interesting thoughts on the use of original documents, as in Book 5 with the Peace of Nicias. There is also a lengthy account of Thucydides' interest in the kinship factor (on which see also the [less sophisticated] account of G. Crane, *The Blinded Eye: Thucydides and the New Written Word* [Lanham, 1996]).

Reviews are not the best tributes to commentaries (especially not of this size); a better and quite secure one will be that for years to come, we will all turn to H. when we want to understand more about Thucydides, and much else besides. On occasion,

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we will be confused, disappointed, or dubious—just the same as when we read Thucydides himself—but one already wonders how one ever managed without it.

University of St Andrews CHRISTOPHER SMITH

AESCHINES

M. R. DILTS (ed.): *Aeschines:* Orationes (Bibliotheca Scriptorum Graecorum et Romanorum Teubneriana). Pp. xxxviii + 327. Stuttgart and Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1997. Cased, DM 168. ISBN: 3-8154-1009-6.

The present Teubner volume containing the three extant speeches of Aeschines edited by Dilts is intended to replace the learned but dated edition of Blass. The editor has laboriously collated the medieval manuscripts and taken into account readings transmitted in papyri and other ancient authors. The product of this activity is a neat description of the textual tradition of Aeschines, and a *constitutio textus* based on thorough scholarship and well-balanced judgement. D. argues that only eight of the MSS are primary, while the rest are copied from them. Like his predecessors, he believes that none of the primary manuscripts is superior. D. announces (p. xx) that he often corrects spelling errors without reference in the apparatus criticus. However, with forms like *γίνομαι/γίγνομαι* or *γινώσκω/γιγνώσκω* one stands on unsafe ground. D. may be right to believe that the forms *γίνομαι* and *γινώσκω* are not classical (they do not appear in inscriptions before the year 306/5, even though they become normal later: see Threatte *Grammar* 1.562), but one could argue that they were closer to fourth-century pronunciation, and some authors actually wrote them (like Aristotle *EN* 1143 a 34, 1154 b 1, 1169 b 30). Recording such variants might allow scholars to form an opinion of their own on the individual habits of Aeschines.

D. makes different choices from Blass on many occasions, and often I would agree with him. For example: 1.39.2 *τουτῳί* would add a derogatory tone which is not desirable at this point; 1.45.4 *ἐγὼ ἐμαυτόν* captures the required emphasis; 1.49.3 *ἀλλήλων* is supported by the following contrast between two types of human nature; 1.56.6 *ἐλάττους ἢ ὀγδοήκοντα* is undoubtedly correct; 1.108.7 *ἡμετέρας* is more appropriate for the nostalgic tone adopted by the orator here; 2.111.2 *ἑαυτοῦ* is certainly correct, as it is, in fact, supported by the mistaken reading of the other MSS (a^{ac}mgVxL) *ἐπ' αὐτοῦ*; 3.71.3 *τοιαύτην τινὰ δόξαν* (MSS) is certainly more satisfactory than the suggestion of Weidner *τοιοῦτόν τι*, adopted by Blass.

D. removes many unnecessary interventions by Blass, which were the product of the latter's rigid perception of the rules governing hiatus. For example, there is no good reason why one should delete *ἀδικεῖν* (1.111.9), *ἡγοῦμαι* (1.137.5), *ἐν τῇ αὑτοῦ πατρίδι* (1.145.5), *ὑπὸ Φιλίππου* (2.16.4), *ἐκεῖνον τὸν χρόνον* (3.54.6), or add *τ'* after *γεγονέναι* in 1.136.3. Still, I would agree with Blass in a number of places; for example: 1.74.11 *γνωρίζετε* is more effective in terms of rhetoric; 1.81.9 Blass, following **f**, correctly omits *τὸν 'Ολύμπιον*. In the other passages which D. cites as parallels (1.55 [not 33], 76, 3.255) only the name of Zeus is mentioned, while here we have two names (Zeus and Apollo) connected with *καί*. 1.141.11–12 the transmitted text *καὶ τοὺς ἀκρατεῖς ὧν οὐ χρὴ καὶ τοὺς ὑβριστάς* seems to me to be perfectly

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sound. 3.44.2 Blass following **ak** omits *περί* in comparison with 3.205, I think correctly.

On several occasions D. agrees with Blass, but I would disagree with both of them. For example: 1.13.4 *ἐκμισθώσῃ* is preferable, because it actively presents the father or guardian as the person procuring the boy. Aeschines is keeping close to the language of the legal document which he paraphrases and in the concisely drafted Athenian laws similar fast changes of subject are normal (see e.g. D. 59.16); 1.22.1 *μέντοι* would signal the resumption of the narrative after the recital of the document; 1.35 the numerous linguistic anomalies might arguably be attributed to the forger of this document and not to mistakes of the scribes; 1.65.3 the suggestion of Reiske *τίς ὃς* gives a much more satisfactory text at this point and it should be adopted, in my opinion; 1.159.7 <*τὴν*> *τάξιν* is unsatisfactory; the definite article has no place after *ὁποτέραν*.

I noticed a number of printing mistakes and minor failings. I correct only the most significant: 1.2.1 (*app. crit.*) the correct references are 1.122, 142, 147; 1.33.4 no semicolon after *πράγματι*; 1.48.5 no comma before *τούτῳ*; 1.60.5 (*app. crit.*) *καὶ ὁ*] *καὶ* Bl. would be clearer; 1.183 (*app. fontium*) one could add a reference to D. 59.87, where the probably original document of the law paraphrased by Aeschines is partially quoted.

D. does not put forward proposals of his own. However, I feel that there is room for further improvements. For example: in 2.42.2 I suggest *καὶ ὡς μνημονικῶς* (based on the incorrect reading of *β ὡς καὶ μνημονικῶς*), which would convey the required meaning, namely that Demosthenes said two different things: (a) that Philip was the best orator under the sun and (b) that he answered very accurately all the points put forward to him by the Athenian ambassadors.

I doubt whether the structure *τῷ δήμῳ τῶν Ἀθηναίων* adopted by D. in 1.25.13 and 3.101.8 is possible. The structure found in numerous inscriptions, and most consistently transmitted in the better manuscripts of various authors, is *ὁ δῆμος ὁ Ἀθηναίων*, *τοῦ δήμου τοῦ Ἀθηναίων*, etc. I suggest that the text here should be *τῷ δήμῳ τῷ Ἀθηναίων*, and for the same reason in 3.101.8 I would adopt the emendation of Weidner (also accepted by Blass) *τῷ δήμῳ τῷ Ἀθηναίων*. In 2.181.8–9 the omission of *παιδοποιούμενοι . . . συκοφαντίας* would not impair at all the meaning of the passage. On the contrary, the text would be more fluent and better balanced.

Objections on individual points do not undermine the fact that D. has succeeded in making sense out of a chaotic tradition, and in presenting a considerably improved text. Even though a lot more work needs to be done on the text of Aeschines, what this edition has achieved is no small prize.

University of Glasgow K. KAPPARIS

CLEITARCHUS

LUISA PRANDI: *Fortuna e realtà dell' opera di Clitarco*. (Historia Einzelschriften, 104.) Pp. 203. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 1996. Paper, DM 76. ISBN: 3-515-06947-X.

For anyone familiar with Nicholas Hammond's demolition of the 'Alexander Vulgate' (N. G. L. Hammond, *Three Historians of Alexander the Great* [Cambridge, 1983]), Luisa Prandi's timely evaluation of Cleitarchus provides a welcome analysis

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of the narrative behind the skirmishing. A general agreement exists that a strand of evidence common to the extant narratives of Diodorus, Curtius Rufus, and Justin derives ultimately from an early history, independent of the histories of Ptolemy and Aristobulus, and P. takes as her starting point an assumption that we accept Cleitarchus as the most likely candidate for this rôle. Cleitarchus' popularity in the late Republic and early Empire makes this a logical proposal, although P.'s methodology cannot always support the conclusions drawn.

Part 1 deals with general appreciation and usage of Cleitarchus, focusing on reconstructing as much as possible of his life and work. P. commences with a chronological discussion of the extant fragments, contrasting and comparing the authors who cite Cleitarchus as a source, and drawing out potential biographical detail. This provides a clear and incisive picture of his widespread acceptance as an authority on Alexander (pp. 14–52). P. argues, justifiably, that two traditions exist: a tradition centred on the person and exploits of Alexander himself, and a separate one, providing a more generally Hellenic approach to the material. Similarly, P. argues conclusively for an early date for Cleitarchus' history, towards the end of the fourth century B.C. (p. 71). P. contends that Cleitarchus composed his history in Egypt under Ptolemy I (who also composed a work on Alexander), although without determining the likely level of interaction between the two historians (pp. 79–81). This issue—just how closely the two men worked—is vitally important if we are to determine Cleitarchus' angle on Alexander, yet the evidence linking Cleitarchus to Alexandria is, as P.'s discussion implicitly demonstrates, weak.

P. does attempt to broaden the discussion (pp. 55–7), but her consideration of the tradition linking Cleitarchus to Stilpon of Megara, and through him to Ptolemy (pp. 67–79, 83) fails to consider the potential conflicts of interest involved. P. accepts, for example, that Arrian's account (largely dependent on Ptolemy) excludes any rôle for Ptolemy's mistress Thais in the burning of the palace at Persepolis (p. 80), although Cleitarchus makes her responsible (Athen. 13.576 D–E = F 11). Since Thais had a prominent place in Ptolemy's court, and her children had dynastic importance, we may surmise that a contradiction on this point would have been inadvisable, suggesting that Cleitarchus wrote before Ptolemy's account was composed. Conversely, if Cleitarchus wrote afterwards, or even concurrently, we would have to consider why he chose to contradict his patron, and whether other factors might have made both accounts acceptable. These modulations are cursorily dismissed by P. with the comment that Ptolemy had no need to censor historical narratives (p. 81).

Part 2 focuses on Cleitarchus' influence on later historians of Alexander, with major discussions of Diodorus 17 (pp. 86–124) and Curtius (pp. 125–44). P. postulates dual sources for Diodorus' narrative: Cleitarchus (whose citation by Diodorus is fully discussed [pp. 117–24]) and a more 'Hellenic' strand, identified as Duris of Samos (pp. 87–8). Whether or not one agrees with P.'s arguments regarding Duris (pp. 88–93), a more basic problem remains, namely the viability of the dual source theory as it stands. P.'s discussion of the contradictions between Cleitarchus and Diodorus fails to prove the existence of a second primary source, e.g. the discussion of the sack of Thebes (pp. 42–5, 89–90). When we take into consideration the volume of material that Diodorus would have compressed (twelve to fifteen books in Cleitarchus' narrative) and his possible distortions of this original, it seems possible that both Diodorus and Athenaeus are using the same source, but with different emphases.

In P.'s assessment of Curtius a similar problem arises. P. works from the hypothesis that the divergences between Diodorus and Curtius represent two distinct primary sources, yet P. again passes over the problematic relationship between authors and

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source material. Curtius' highly complex narrative, encompassing contemporary political commentary, natural history, and historical narrative, is unlikely to reproduce source material undigested. Furthermore, since Curtius' narrative makes evident his shaping of events, P.'s concession that we cannot be certain why Curtius diverges where he does (e.g. p. 104) makes an argument based on quantifiable divergences from another secondary account fraught with problems, e.g. P.'s treatment of the Charidemus episode (pp. 126–8). For Diodorus, Curtius, and the other 'Vulgate' authors discussed by P., both inadvertence and deliberate choice may account for some divergences of material.

Ultimately, Cleitarchus remains a shadowy figure despite P.'s efforts, but this volume does succeed in highlighting his importance in the ancient world, both as a source and as a sounding board for historical critique. P. provides a careful analysis of the Cleitarchan fragments, and demonstrates the centrality of his narrative not only to Alexander historians of the late Republic but also to the cultural horizons of the expanding Roman world.

University of Birmingham DIANA SPENCER

TOPICS 1 AND 8

R. SMITH: *Aristotle:* Topics: *Books I and VIII with Excerpts from Related Texts: Translated with a Commentary* (Clarendon Aristotle Series). Pp. xxxv + 207. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997. Cased, £35 (Paper, £14.99). ISBN: 0-19-823945-9 (0-19-823942-4 pbk).

This is a translation of and commentary on the outer books of the *Topics* where the central notion of the *Topics*—the topoi—does not actually occur, but which describe the dialectical context in which topoi are used. S. explains the notion of the topos in the introduction (pp. XXIV–XXVIII) and includes the (uncommented) text of 2.8–11 where topoi actually occur. S. does well in following Theophrastus and Alexander in his understanding of the topos and gives as an example 'If the contrary of Contrary A belongs to the contrary of Contrary B, then Contrary A belongs to Contrary B', an instance of it being 'If harmful belongs to bad, then beneficial belongs to good'. S. is then not sure whether this is the description of an argument—'Harmful belongs to bad. Therefore, beneficial belongs to good'—or whether the topos has to be stated explicitly as a premiss in the mentioned argument (so that the conclusion would follow by modus ponens), but he thinks that 'Aristotle [. . .] might be inclined towards the first' (p. XXVI). This seems to me to be a mistake. Alexander, whom S. cites, says that it is a premiss and so does Aristotle in 8.14.17–33, a passage which S. in fact interprets very well in this way. For further arguments for the interpretation of topoi as hypothetical premisses cf. P. Slomkowski, *Aristotle's Topics* (Leiden,1997), Chapter 2. Moreover, the former argument is in fact not a syllogism, as it has only one premiss. Cf. also S.'s commentary on 105a25–31.

S. (p. XXXIII) rightly says that examples can be found where 'Aristotle establishes the invalidity' of a topos by providing a counter-example (ἔνστασις), but he is wrong in asserting that Aristotle never argues for the 'validity' of a topos—he often does so with the help of induction, either described explicitly as such (2.113b17, 115a5, 122a19, 123b7) or more often expressed through the phrase 'likewise also in other instances' (113b18, 114b27, 116a27, 119a6, 121a9, etc.).

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S. translates 1.2, 101b2f., ἐξεταστικὴ γὰρ οὖσα πρὸς τὰς ἁπασῶν τῶν μεθόδων ἀρχὰς ὁδὸν ἔχει, as: 'for since its [scil. dialectic's] ability to examine applies to the starting points of all studies, it has a way to proceed'. But ἐξεταστική would have to take the genitive (not πρός), and 'the way to (ἐπὶ) the principles' is found in a number of passages in Aristotle (cf. e.g. *APst.* 84b23, *Eth. Nic.* 1095a33, cf. also *APr.* 43a21, 53a2f.). Thus, it should be translated: 'for since it [sc. dialectic] has an examinatory character, it has a way to the principles'. The reason behind S.'s strange translation (argued for, unconvincingly, on p. 179) lies in his conviction that there is no way in which dialectic could discover principles (pp. 52–5). But the establishing of topoi which are principles (cf. 163b27f., 33)—forms of the principle of the excluded middle (2.6, 112a24) and of contradiction (2.7, 113a22f.) are among the topoi—by induction, which is, apart from the syllogism, the other main form of dialectical reasoning (*Top.* 1.12), suggests that principles are established in the same way. Aristotle says as much in *APst.* 2.19, where induction is couched in empirical terms (which could easily be restated in endoxical premisses), but S. finds that 'it is difficult to reconcile this with Aristotle's claim that the principles must be better known than what follows from them' (pp. XVIIf.). But clearly, principles are better known 'by nature', but not 'to us' (cf. e.g. *Phys.* 1.1, 184a15–18; *Top.* 6.4, 141b3–4; 8.1, 156a5–7). That with the help of dialectic we 'hit' the principles is also clear from *Rhet.* 1.2, 1358a23–6.

S. delivers a good discussion of the predicables in *Top.* 1.5 and 8, and points out an interesting difficulty with respect to the definition of proprium (pp. 61f.). A is a proprium of B if and only if A counterpredicates with B (101b18–23). Since counter-predication is symmetrical, B is also a proprium of A, a consequence which Aristotle probably did not intend. S. is also quite right in his interpretation of homonymy in A 15: most often it is words which are said to be homonymous (or 'said in many ways'), less often things, and sometimes the phrase can be read both ways (pp. 88f., 93).

In the very good commentary on book 8 there is one point which strikes me as incorrect. S. maintains that the questioner can only use questions that have been answered affirmatively by the answerer (pp. XXIIf., 44). But it would go against the competitive spirit of the game if the answerer always knew that only the questions answered in the affirmative could be used by the questioner, cf. 8.1, 156b6–9; clearly, negated questions can be used as well.

The translation is on the whole commendable, although there are a few oddities. The infinitives at the beginning of the investigation-instructions in the organa in A 15–17 (106a10, 106b13, 21f., etc.) clearly function as second person imperatives (cf. Kühner–Gerth, *Griech. Gram.*, II, 2, pp. 19–24) and should not be translated as infinitives; cf. 106b29, 107b39, 108a7, etc. where Aristotle uses verbal adjectives as an alternative. The translation of τοὺς μὲν οὖν τόπους ὅθεν δεῖ λαμβάνειν, εἴρηται πρότερον (8.1, 155b17f.) as 'the attack-locations from which one should get <premisses> then, were discussed earlier' is patently wrong; and λόγους in 106a3 should definitely be translated as 'accounts', not 'definitions' (cf. commentary ad loc.).

As for the bibliography, S. strangely writes in the preface (p. VII) that 'Brunschwig's Budé edition remains the only commentary in any modern language'. But there are in fact two Italian commentaries on the *Topics*: Alessandro Zadro, *I Topici* (Naples, 1974) and Giorgio Colli, *Aristotele: Organon* (Turin, 1955); the latter is actually included in S.'s bibliography.

The criticisms leveled above mainly refer to the introduction—the commentary itself is on the whole very helpful and illuminating. One thing that I sometimes missed in the actual commentary was reference to the inner books of the *Topics*: e.g. in 2.6, 102b31–2 it should have been observed that the meaning of accident is different from

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that defined in 1.5, and is prevalent in the inner books of the *Topics* (cf. especially 6.5), and there are a number of inferences in book 8 which would warrant a comparison with certain topoi in the inner books. Perhaps S. was hindered by his taste—he finds that books 2–7 'make very repetitive and tedious reading' (p. XXXIV). And, unfortunately, *de gustibus non est disputandum.*

University of Cambridge PAUL SLOMKOWSKI

POLYBIUS' ETHICS

A. M. ECKSTEIN: *Moral Vision in the Histories of Polybius.* Pp. 331. Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press, 1995. ISBN: 0-520-08520-5.

No ancient historical writer supplies authorial opinions and evaluations more lavishly than Polybius, and many of these judgements are ethical in character. The ethical aspect of Polybius' work has received little attention in recent research, and has been played down at the expense of the pragmatic and utilitarian elements in his thought. It is sometimes suggested that what purport to be ethical judgements in reality derive from utilitarian considerations, and Polybius is commonly taken to be a ruthless admirer of political success. Walbank, whose monumental contribution to Polybian studies has to a great extent set the agenda for subsequent research, is the most notable exponent of this interpretation, which has found few dissenters.

E.'s lucid and attractively written monograph provides a welcome and convincing corrective, which puts the importance of ethical values for Polybius beyond doubt and illuminatingly surveys his moral world. E. shows that Polybius' moral outlook was determined by his aristocratic background and that he attached supreme importance to honour and duty, traditional values of his class. In successive chapters (Chapters 2–4) he examines the ways in which this aristocratic ethos shaped his attitude to a number of related issues: personal courage; war, peace, and personal wealth; deceit and good faith. These are followed by an examination (Chapter 5) of Polybius' attitude to various disruptive threats to the aristocratic social order, and by a demonstration (Chapter 6) that for Polybius generalship called not merely for technical competence but also for self-control and the ability to impose order. Next (Chapter 7) E. turns to the crucial issues posed by the imperial power of Rome—how others should, in Polybius' view, conduct themselves towards Rome and what judgement he formed of the Romans' own conduct. Finally (Chapter 8), E. discusses what he takes to be Polybius' increasingly pessimistic view of human character.

E.'s work includes many close and sympathetic readings of Polybian passages, the great majority of which convince. A notable instance is afforded by Polybius' judgements on the conduct of individuals and communities in defeat, expressing contempt for those like Deinon and Polycrates who tried to save their skins, and praising the communal suicide at Abydos. Walbank saw in these passages a shocking ruthlessness towards failure, but E. cogently reinterprets them in terms of the aristocratic code of honour (pp. 40–54).

E. rightly insists on Polybius' independence of judgement. Occasionally he seems unduly reluctant to concede that sincerely held moral judgements may nonetheless have been influenced by personal or national prejudices (e.g. pp. 62, 96–7). Sometimes, too, he seems too concerned to impose consistency on Polybius' opinions and unwilling to recognize some of his ambivalence, for example in his discussion of

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Polybius' account of Scipio's attack on the Carthaginian–Numidian camps (pp. 86–7). E. correctly maintains that Polybius' praise of his hero's exploit (14.5.15) relates simply to its audacity and brilliant execution, but he is surely wrong to deny that the deceptive peace negotiations which paved the way for it, though not a formal violation of the laws of war, were just the kind of trickery which Polybius had deplored at 13.3.

Polybius' judgement of Roman imperial conduct in the period after Pydna has been at the centre of earlier discussion of his views on political morality, although the debate is hampered by the loss of much of this part of his text. Walbank holds that the numerous passages on the period 167–152 B.C. where Polybius explains Roman decisions in Machiavellian terms are cynical and detached, not disapproving, and that he took a pro-Roman view of their conduct in the Third Punic War and the upheavals contemporary with it. E. (pp. 102–9) notes that in some of the Machiavellian passages Polybius does condemn the Roman actions as violations of justice, and to my mind he is right to maintain that Polybius deplored the Machiavellian policies which he took Rome to be following in the years after Pydna. In the extant portion of his text Polybius does not pass his own judgement on the Romans' conduct towards Carthage at the time of the war, but reports various views which he claims were held in Greece (36.9). Regrettably, E. devotes only cursory attention to this much-discussed passage (pp. 217, 232). To my mind, the most plausible interpretation is that Polybius resorted to this indirect mode of exposition because of the ambivalence of his own feelings: he was gravely concerned about the Romans' actions, but too intimately involved to express open disapproval (cf. E. at p. 232 n. 149).

Some cavils are inevitable, but E. is to be congratulated on producing a work which is both a major re-evaluation of one of the greatest of ancient historical writers and an important contribution to the understanding of the ethical dimension in ancient historiography.

University of Nottingham J. W. RICH

STRABO IN GREECE

R. BALADIÉ (ed.): *Strabon: Géographie: Tome VI (Livre IX): Texte établi et traduit* (Collection des Universités de France publiée sous le patronage de l'Association Guillaume Budé). Pp. 456, 4 maps. Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1996. frs. 475. ISBN: 2-251-00450-5.

This is the third of the Budé Strabo texts prepared by Raoul Baladié (IV–V; see P. Levi, *CR* 40 [1990], 14–16; cf. *CR* 32 [1982], 22–3) and covers book 9, Attica, Boeotia, Phocis, Locris, and Thessaly. The first Strabo Budé volume (11) to appear (in 1966) covered books 3 and 4; it was edited by F. Lasserre (see D. R. Dicks, *CR* 19 [1969], 47–9), who contributed a further four volumes to the series (III, VII–IX; see D. R. Dicks, *CR* 20 [1970], 326–7, 25 [1975], 26–8, 28 [1978], 17–18; P. Levi, *CR* 33 [1983], 17–18). The opening volume (1.1–2), providing a general introduction and discussing books 1 and 2, was prepared by C. Aujac (see D. R. Dicks, *CR* 21 [1971], 188–94).

Strabo drew on a number of sources for book 9 and these are discussed whilst building on B.'s earlier comments (Strabo Budé V, pp. 19–25). The Homeric *Catalogue of the Ships*, which is frequently quoted in book 9, seems to have influenced Strabo's

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choice of cities to describe. He was clearly using Apollodorus' commentary on the *Catalogue* (pp. 16–17), and also seems to have been familiar with Demetrios of Scepsis (9.5.18; p. 17), although possibly through Apollodorus' work. There are sections of Strabo on Boeotia (9.2.2–4), Delphi (9.3.11–12), and Locris (9.4.7) which are largely based on Ephorus, the pupil of Isocrates (pp. 17–18). Indeed, they include an assessment of Ephorus as a source (9.3.11). Other sections on Locris may be derived from Ephorus perhaps via Apollodorus (9.4.10–11; p. 18). Book 9 also sees one of the three citations in Strabo of Hieronymus of Cardia (in the Thracian Chersonese) (9.5.22).

The structure within Strabo's book 9 suggests that he was drawing on a source which described the coastal regions of the Megarid, Attica, Boeotia, and Locris. Strabo appears to be drawing on a single account of a voyage which surfaces in different parts of book 9. B. suggests that the geographical works of Artemidorus of Ephesus might lie behind such an account.

B. addresses the question of whether or not Strabo's account is an autopsy (pp. 19–23). For example, Strabo is aware of the destruction of the long walls by Sulla in 86 B.C. (9.1.is) (see p. 193). The mention of the Odeion of Perikles (9.1.17), a building destroyed by the Athenians in 86 B.C. and then rebuilt by Ariobarzanes Philopator (65–52 B.C.), might indicate that this was a building familiar to Strabo in its reconstructed state (p. 22). Details of the architects are derived from an inscription (*IG II*^{2} 3426) rather than Vitruvius (5.9.1) (p. 195 n. 3); see also J. Travlos, *Pictorial Dictionary of Ancient Athens* (New York, 1971), pp. 387–91; K. W. Arafat, *Pausanias' Greece: Ancient Artists and Roman Rulers* (Cambridge, 1996), pp. 100–1. Strabo also observes that the Laurion silver mines had ceased to operate (9.1.23), and at Delphi, the inhabitants of his day lived around the Castilian spring (9.3.3). In addition the coloured marble of Skyros was observed to have been used at Rome for monolithic columns and large plaques (9.5.16); see B. Di Leo, 'Africano', in M. L. Anderson and L. Nitsa (edd.), *Radiance in Stone* (Rome, 1989), p. 49.

When dealing with Attica a modern commentator has to decide about limiting the number of references that can be provided. The Telesterion, described by Strabo (9.1.12) as ὁ μυστικὸς σηκός, at Eleusis is usefully discussed with a reconstruction in G. C. Izenour, *Roofed Theaters of Classical Antiquity* (New Haven, 1992). The temple of Nemesis at Rhamnus has been published by M. Miles (*Hesperia* 58 [1989], 133–249) and the statue, attributed by Strabo (9.1.17) to either Diodotus or Agoracritus of Paros, is discussed by A. Stewart (*Greek Sculpture: an Exploration* [New Haven, 1990], p. 165, figs 403–7); see also B. Petrakos, *BCH* 105 (1981), 227–53. Pausanias (1.33.3) attributes the statue instead to Pheidias.

Strabo's tour of Boeotia starts in the south-east at Delion and moves northwards up the coast, while making a circular diversion through the territory of Tanagra. The remaining section deals with the cities round Lake Copais. The passage on Mount Helikon and the *hieron* of the Muses (9.2.25) has now received a full treatment by G. and C. Müller (in A. Hurst and A. Schachter (edd.), *La montagne des Muses* [Geneva, 1996], pp. 27–9, 171–6). The picture presented in Strabo of deserted or reduced villages and cities (e.g. Harma: 9.2.11; Haliartos: 9.2.30) is consistent with the picture derived from archaeological field-surveys, in particular from Boeotia (S. Alcock, *Graecia Capta: the Landscapes of Roman Greece* [Cambridge, 1993], p. 97). However, the mention that only the cities of Thespiai and Tanagra endured among the Boeotian cities (9.2.25) should perhaps be balanced by the fact these were two *civitates liberae* (Alcock, *Graecia Capta*, p. 147); in fact, archaeological and epigraphic evidence suggests that these were two of several settlements in the area. Strabo (9.5.12) later

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expands on this deserted landscape of Roman Greece when he comes to discuss Thessaly.

This volume will assist those working on the topography of mainland Greece, and the notes are well chosen to help the reader to understand the text. There is also a concise bibliography divided into regions (pp. 25–38). The volume concludes with a lexicon of place-names (pp. 233–98) and is complemented by four folded colour maps of Thessaly, Phocis and Locris, Boeotia, and Attica which show contours and heights.

University of Wales, Swansea DAVID W. J. GILL

TWO LIVES

A. GEORGIADOU: *Plutarch's Pelopidas. A Historical and Philological Commentary.* Pp. x + 258. Stuttgart: B. G. Teubner, 1997. Cased. ISBN: 3-519-07654-3.

D. R. SHIPLEY: *Plutarch's Life of Agesilaos. Response to Sources in the Presentation of Character*. Pp. xiv + 514, 4 maps. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998. Cased, £65. ISBN: 0-19-815073-3.

A comparative review of commentaries on Plutarch's comparative *Lives*: the man may well have approved. 'The interpretation of the complex and varied work of Plutarch continues', as Shipley (father of Graham 'Samos' Shipley) opens (p. v). Indeed, and we have in these two books worthy additions to the growing series of modern anglophone commentaries on the various *Lives*, among which Stadter's *Pericles* perhaps remains exemplary (P. A. Stadter, *A Commentary on Plutarch's Pericles* [Chapel Hill, 1989]).

The commentaries treat ancient lives that intruded into one another. Both are based upon heavily revised versions of PhD theses. Neither prints a continuous text of their own: Georgiadou depends upon Gärtner's revision of Ziegler's Teubner (1994), S. upon Flacelière and Chambry's Budé (1973), though he oddly uses the Loeb edition for the rest of Plutarch's works; each supplies a page of dissents from the editions they follow (G. p. 43; S. p. xiii). Both commentaries are prefaced with *c.* 50-page introductions and furnished with *c.* 30-page bibliographies (G.'s being 'select', S.'s, *qua* Harvard-style, comprehensive of works referred to).

The commentators provide equally plausible but strongly contrasting reasons for their choice of text. G. justifies her *Pelopidas* in terms of its relative isolation, and in terms of lost texts. It is the single most important historical source for the Theban hegemony, and it is also the text upon which we now depend for any understanding of Plutarch's own Theban context. This is true because of the loss of Plutarch's *Parallel-Lives* pair of the *Epaminondas* and the *Scipio* (which Scipio? G. opts for Africanus, p. 8). The *Pelopidas* constitutes the principal basis for the reconstruction of the *Epaminondas*, and this is an important aim not only for the reflexive reasons of a better understanding of the *Pelopidas* itself (what did Plutarch omit here to avoid undue repetition?) and of the historical period it covers, but because the *Epaminondas* was the first of Plutarch's *Parallel Lives*, and so could tell us much about Plutarch's conceptualization of his project as a whole. The *Epaminondas* consequently figures largely in G.'s introduction (pp. 6–9 and 32–7). Furthermore, the sources Plutarch used for his *Pelopidas* are almost entirely invisible; he is even more than usually reticent about them in this *Life*. This necessitates a fairly detailed investigation into

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them too in the introduction (pp. 15–29; Callisthenes, as opposed to Ephorus, was probably the principal source, but much doubt remains).

By contrast, S. justifies his *Agesilaos* with references to that text's connections with other extant texts. Its main sources, unusually, survive: Xenophon's *Agesilaos* and *Hellenica*, and Ephorus (via Diodorus). And Plutarch is in any case relatively forthcoming about his range of sources in this *Life*. This allows for a detailed comparison (more literary than historical) of Plutarch's text with those sources, and much space in the body of the commentary is devoted to this (and pp. 46–55 of the introduction), hence S.'s subtitle. Also, the text can be usefully associated and compared with Plutarch's other writings on Sparta, and in particular his other Spartan *Lives*, namely *Lycurgus*, *Lysander*, *Agis*, and *Cleomenes*, which may perhaps be seen as a 'Spartan cycle', and in which the city of Sparta may be seen as almost as important a subject as the individuals focused upon (pp. 3–4 and 23–4). These texts, too, consequently appear often in the commentary.

As G.'s subtitle itself suggests, she envisages her project in a highly traditional way: 'My aim has been to present and assess the information available on this *Life* and, where possible, to resolve outstanding problems' (p. vii). She treats of a traditional text, and a canonical series of scholarly issues associated with it. The execution and layout too are traditional. The introduction is divided into two main sections, one focusing on Plutarch himself (his own life; his *Lives*; the problems relating to the lost *Epaminondas* and *Scipio*; and Plutarch's relationship with Thebes), the other focusing on the *Pelopidas* (Plutarch's scope and methods in the work; the likely chronological place of the *Life* amongst Plutarch's other works; the sources used; the comparison between Pelopidas and the paired Marcellus; discussion of the rôle of Epaminondas in the *Pelopidas*; a comparison with Nepos' *Pelopidas*; and finally a comparison of the *Pelopidas* with Plutarch's account of the key episode of the liberation of the Cadmeia in the *De Genio*). G. writes in a clear, direct, and readable style. The following commentary is businesslike: brief lemmata, full references to primary and secondary material, and no words wasted. There are no indices.

On seeing the OUP imprint, one might well have expected something similarly traditional from S., but his commentary is unconventional in some of its themes and in its layout. After a preface almost philosophical in character, the introduction is divided into six sections: the place of the *Agesilaos* in Plutarch's career; his literary techniques; the pairing of the *Agesilaos* with the *Pompey*; Plutarch's formal comparison between Agesilaos and Pompey; the themes upon which Plutarch dwells in the *Agesilaos*, and their contextualization in Plutarch's other works and the rest of Greek literature (Spartan decline, militarism, exceptional Spartans, friendship, the extension of influence, deception, Panhellenism); and finally a review of the sources used by Plutarch. The section on the themes is particularly successful, and in my view the highlight of the book. The more literary bias of this project is clear. S.'s style makes for harder reading than G.'s.

The commentary is distinctively arranged. Having been told by a publisher's insert that the book contained the Greek text of the *Agesilaos* I spent some time leafing back and forth through the book failing to find it. It eventually emerged that the book does indeed contain the entire Greek text, but fragmented and distributed through the commentary to serve as the lemmata, with the result that one must sometimes search across several pages to read a single Greek sentence, divided up as it is by rows of dots and extensive portions of intervening comment (e.g. pp. 73–7). In other words, the book does not provide a text one can effectively read through. Occasionally one finds the opposite: a long tract of Greek text which dwarfs the commentary upon it (e.g.

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pp. 346, 368–9). One appreciates S.'s desire to lay the relevant portion of text directly before the reader of the commentary, particularly as he does pay so much attention to matters of wording and style, but even so it would surely have been preferable to print the text separately and continuously and then pick it up with with one- or two-word lemmata in the commentary. This would actually have saved space, in view of the generous spacing given to the Greek passages in the format used. The perverseness of the practice adopted is thrown into high relief by the fact that the *Comparison* between Agesilaos and Pompey, on which no commentary is offered (there is, however, discussion of it in the introduction, pp. 17–24), is printed in continuous format as an appendix. S.'s concern about foreground discussion of the *Agesilaos* in its relationship to other texts perhaps led also to another unconventional decision for a commentary, namely to demote all references to scholarship to notes—and endnotes at that. Since these consist for the most part of brief Harvard-style references, their separation both wastes space and vexes the reader unnecessarily. Significant discussions of self-contained issues within the commentary are accorded italicized titles. There are four indices: general, Greek words, loci, inscriptions.

Given the rather different focuses of the two commentaries, it is not surprising that there are few manifest contradictions between them. It is noteworthy, however, that in considering significant literary antecedents to the *Parallel Lives*, S. lays emphasis on the Greek tradition (p. 6), whereas G. lays emphasis on the Latin (p. 4). It is intriguing also that S. should emphasize the rhetorical nature of Plutarch's work throughout his commentary, while G. suspects that Plutarch cherished a traditional Platonic contempt for rhetoric (p. 1). Both may, I suppose, be right. It is a shame that neither of these commentaries, worthy as they are, explicitly salute the fact, surely instrumental in bringing these scholars to Plutarch, that their chosen author is among the most—perhaps is the most—humane of ancient writers.

University of Wales, Swansea DANIEL OGDEN

APPIAN'S *IBERIKE*

C. LEIDL: *Appians Darstellung des 2. Punische Krieg in Spanien (*Iberike *c. 1–38, §1–158a). Text und Kommentar*. (Münchener Arbeiten zur Alten Geschichte, 11.) Pp. 330, map. Munich: Editio Maris, 1996. ISBN: 3-925801-20-0.

P. GOUKOWSKY (ed.): *Appien.* Histoire Romaine. Livre VI. L'Ibérique. (Collection des Universités de France publiée sous le patronage de l'Association Guillaume Budé). Pp. lxxv + 138, map. Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1997. ISBN: 2-251-00460-2.

Changes in fashion produce curious variations in the attention paid to ancient works and their authors at different times, but few so remarkable as those concerning Appian's history of the Roman wars in the Iberian peninsula. The *editio princeps* was issued by Henri Estienne in 1557, six years after the publication of most of the other books of Appian's *Roman Histories*, and respectively eleven and three years after the appearance of translations in Italian (from the press of Paolo Manuzio) and Latin (by Caelius Secundus Curio, and included in Sigismond Geslen's translation, published in Basle). in 1592, Henri Estienne included it in his new edition of all

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Appian's extant work, with a fuller textual commentary, but it took until the late eighteenth century (omitting Tollius' edition of 1670, which added little in the case of the *Iberike*) for substantial further work on Appian to appear. In 1785 there appeared the three learned volumes of Johannes Schweighaeuser's edition, which provided a much improved text and a commentary which took account of the historical as well as the philological significance of the author. In the case of the *Iberike*, both were much needed. After that, although editions by Duebner (1840), Bekker (1852), Mendelssohn (1879), and Viereck and Roos (1939, republished with additions by Gabba in 1962) progressively improved the text, no commentary on the *Iberike* appeared for more than two centuries. In 1987 Kai Brodersen added brief notes to a German translation by Otto Veh of the books of Appian on the growth of the Roman empire. Then in 1996 and 1997 the two works reviewed here appeared, both editions with much fuller commentaries of the *Iberike* alone, one by a young German and one by an established French scholar; and at the same time another (by the reviewer) was in preparation. Not only is the simultaneity remarkable, but also the fact that the three last were working (so far as can be told) in ignorance of the endeavours of the others, at least until late in 1995.

That said, the two editions under review are notably different both in style and intention. At the most obvious level, Leidl's volume, concentrating as it does on Appian's account of the Hannibalic war in Spain, contains just over one-third of the whole work (158 of 404 sections). This is no doubt the result of its origin in a dissertation, though the thoroughness with which L. has addressed himself to his task makes one wish that he had covered the rest of the *Iberike* as well. Goukowsky's text, by contrast, is in the well-known and well-respected series of texts produced for the *Collection des Universités de France*, and not only includes the whole of the *Iberike*, but is part of the planned coverage of all of Appian's histories. Inevitably in such a format, annotation, both textual and explanatory, is briefer.

So far as the text itself is concerned, both the editors have re-read the main MS, the eleventh-century Vaticanus Graecus 141 (*V*) which Mendelssohn demonstrated to be the source of all other surviving copies. G. has noted five places where his reading of *V* differs from those of his predecessors (pp. XLIV–XLV) and, in the case of the two of these which occur in the section of the text with which L. deals, the two editors agree. In their account of the supplementary sources for the establishment of the text, the difference between the two is one of emphasis rather than of conclusion. G. sets out with exemplary care the contributions made by citations in the *Suda* and Constantinian *Excerpta*, while L. has made a significant, if negative, contribution in showing that the early translations are almost certainly not witnesses to an independent tradition, and that their variants from the text of *V* should be treated as conjectures. This is further expounded by L. in his article, 'Appian im 16. Jahrhundert', *Ath.* 85 (1997), 155–92. There are occasional slips in L.'s text, however. At 2.8, he prints τότε rather that τό τε; and at 24.94 he prints Mendelssohn's correction of Γέσκωνος for *V*'s Γίσκωνος, despite having argued for and printed *V*'s reading of exactly the same name at 16.60. At the same places, G. adopts Mendelssohn's conjecture without comment. On other occasions, G., observing rightly that *V* is often corrupt, is more adventurous in proposing emendations, particularly in the later part of the work, with which L. does not deal and where the worst problems occur. Often these proposals have much to commend them, though occasionally they depend on an assumption that Appian could not have been so inept as to write what appears in the MSS. Thus, at 6.24 he prints the reading of the *Excerpta*, that the river Ebro debouches ἐς τὸν ἑσπέριον ὠκεανόν, rather than, as *V* and the MSS derived from it,

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ἐς τὸν βόρειον ὠκεανόν. It is true that, while both statements are false, the former has the support of some ancient geographers (see G., pp. LXIV–LXV); but when attempting to establish the text of an author so geographically inconsequential as Appian (who places Saguntum both north and south of the river Ebro), this does not seem a secure ground for emending the text.

It is in evaluating the historical worth of Appian's text that the two editors differ most, and again in approach rather than in conclusions. While both make helpful and intelligent comments on the occasional problems presented by the work, L. is primarily interested in Appian's presentation of the events of the Hannibalic war and the value of the information which he alone provides, while G. considers at greater length the matter of Appian's sources. Both are judicious in their verdicts, with L. believing that Appian can usefully be read to supplement Polybius and Livy (pp. 299–304), and G. that Appian drew on several sources, including Polybius and some Roman writer or writers, who cannot (except for Rutilius Rufus, mentioned at 88.382) be identified with certainty (pp. XXXIII–XLIII).

Both these editions have much to commend them, and will provide access to Appian's account of the wars in Spain to a far greater extent than has been available hitherto. It might be observed that neither gives an account of the relationship of the picture that Appian in the mid-second century presents of this crucial part of the development of Roman imperialism; but this would be to require of them a form of historical commentary which neither intends to supply. Their reticence at least leaves room for another commentary on Appian's *Iberike*, which the reviewer hopes will not be long in appearing.

University of Edinburgh J. S. RICHARDSON

PERFORMING LUCIAN

JESÚS UREÑA BRACERO: *El diálogo de Luciano: ejecución, naturaleza, y procedimientos de humor*. (Classical and Byzantine Monographs, 31.) Pp. viii + 239. Amsterdam: Hakkert, 1995.

I can recall a first graduate supervision in which Roger Mynors asked 'I wonder what Lucian's audience would have been like?', and a viva which included the question 'But how were these dialogues actually performed?'. This is a book mainly about Lucian's dialogue technique in the context of his performances for live audiences ('el diálogo leído es visto como un ente vivo, como un proceso de comunicación en el que ni el lector ni el auditorio son sujetos pasivos', p. 5). A very respectable attempt is offered at both the questions I found myself leaving largely unanswered.

Preliminaries begin with consideration of the titles and speaker-indications in the dialogues, where B. takes the MS tradition to be editorial. The subject of titles is always a difficult one, given the vagueness of ancient and more recent citation habits themselves, but it is at least useful to have discrepancy between MS titles and such references as those of Photius conveniently set forth. Speaker-indications are no easy matter either: if a sophist reads out dialogues in two contrasting voices, speaker signs could still be already embedded in the text as silent indications to the author himself.

The substance of the book centres on the question of how Lucian's dialogues were performed: B. has confirmed Bellinger's argument of the twenties that these were pieces to be read aloud by one performer. The trouble is that this can never really be proven to the exclusion of other possibilities: it would clearly still be quite possible to

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have two reciters for Lucian's miniature dialogues; and for these, like any other works, to be put in the hands of private readers. And it is rather difficult to imagine a piece on the scale of Lucian's *Hermotimus* being performed effectively in public, even if we have evidence that Plato's dialogues themselves were so read under the Empire. Such considerations as the careful placement of vocatives to distinguish speakers clearly, especially at the beginning of a dialogue, might indeed imply that it was designed for performance; but that is not the same as proving that even a single performance took place. It is easy to be hypercritical; but the problem is sometimes a little more complex than B. presents it. There remains, moreover, the problem of the other works: was *De Dea Syria* never read aloud in spite of its not being read as a dialogue? And was the problematic *Nigrinus* sharpened by dramatic delivery?

Much discussion is devoted to the transition from rhetoric to dialogue, and similar matters relating to the *naturaleza* of Lucian's writing (pp. 57–83): I wonder if it were really necessary to spend over two pages listing the gorgianisms in the *Phalaris* Declamations to make the point that the Lucian of the dialogues tends to avoid them, as any conscientious and polished imitator of Plato would be bound to do except for special effect. I should for many years have been in agreement with B. that Lucian's σατυρικός simply = γελωτοποιός. But the more one examines satyric repertoire outside Lucian, the more one suspects that there may genuinely have been some group of typical satyr-related themes of which we have not quite found the measure.

Humour is not an easy subject to circumscribe with academic techniques, and B. has set an additional obstacle in considering the dialogues apart from the rest of the work (pp. 99–170). Verbal humour and that of content are divided, obviously but perhaps regrettably: much of Lucian's humour, as I savour it, is born from some elusive interaction of both, a matter which makes him much more elusive than, say, the *Apocolocyntosis*-author. This is the point where B.'s work is most vulnerable to the cult of lists—of diminutives, aposiopeses, and the rest. But the emphasis accords neatly with what can be effectively put across at a reading.

B. has produced an extensive penultimate chapter on proper names (pp. 171–99): these do not extend to the indulgent excess of Alciphron, but they repay another visit, and again one is stimulated to further enquiry. I suspect, for example, that the rather puzzling Tychiades in *De Parasito* and elsewhere has many of the connotations of the Fortunatus of the Fortunatus-legend. Again the repository of information in one place is particularly useful.

I noticed a few minor slips: the index of modern authors omits the one name on p. 44; Froma Zeitlin is at least twice misspelled; and an item in the bibliography by me is misattributed to Andrieu. But these and others like them do not detract from the usefulness of the book. It lies in its conjunction of topics and emphasis on spoken delivery rather than in any great originality of the parts. B. is conscientious in setting arguments in the context of a broad doxography of Lucian; there is a general clarity of presentation, though the multiple subdivision of paragraph headings (sometimes amounting to five digits) really seems to call for a little more *labor limae* in the conversion of thesis to book. But it is refreshing to see Lucian read again for his own sake and with minute attention to the text, rather than simply to fit this or that construction of second sophistic culture; it is refreshing also to see reader-reception theory intelligently used rather than blindly and dogmatically followed. In a sense this is aimed at the future commentator on Lucian, a constituency not always either numerous or grateful; and that constituency will be well advised to take B.'s work into account.

University of Kent at Canterbury GRAHAM ANDERSON

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PHILOSTRATUS

J.-J. FLINTERMAN: *Power,* Paideia *and Pythagoreanism: Greek Identity, Conceptions of the Relationship between Philosophers and Monarchs and Political Ideas in Philostratus'* Life of Apollonius. (Dutch Monographs on Ancient History and Archaeology, 13.) Pp. 276. Amsterdam: J. C. Gieben, 1995. Hfl. 125.00. ISBN: 90-5063-236-X.

This book is a major contribution to Philostratean scholarship, with far-reaching implications for ancient ideals of relations between intellectuals and rulers, theories of kingship, Greek self-awareness and its attitude to Rome, and the third-century 'crisis'. Space here permits only a few words on two of the themes in this rich and scholarly work: 'sources and methods', and 'Hellenism and Rome'.

Attempting to reconstruct the pre-Philostratean tradition of Apollonius, F. forms a 'working hypothesis' that it is represented by those 'letters of Apollonius' which are only in the independently transmitted collection (pp. 70–4). The presence of letters from the *VA* in the collection show that it was made after Philostratus. Thus, as F. acknowledges (e.g. p. 155 n. 153), it can never be certain that letters only extant in the collection do ante-date the *VA*. The use of the image of Apollonius in the debate between paganism and Christianity after Philostratus, especially in the fourth century, could have provided a keen impetus to create 'letters of Apollonius' quite probably intended to supplement, modify, or refute the influential image created by the *VA*.

F. takes as a starting point (p. 2) an aside by A. D. Nock, 'it is possible to exaggerate the range of Philostratus' imagination'. Such a position might lead us to underrate Philostratus' literary creativity, or, to put it another way, his cunning in intertextuality. Philostratus claims to have read a work by Apollonius, *On Sacrifices* (*VA* 3.41, 4.19, which he may or may not say was in Cappadocian). Such a work ascribed to Apollonius existed, for Eusebius quotes it (*Praep. evang*. 4.13). This fragment flatly contradicts Philostratus' summary. Philostratus is either claiming knowledge of a work he had not read or misrepresenting the contents of one he had (cf. pp. 76–7). It is just conceivable that Philostratus invented this title and that a later author decided to write it up, and in so doing altered Apollonius' views on sacrifice.

On the 'interminable controversy' about 'Damis' F. argues (pp. 79–88) that Philostratus used a pseudepigraphic text ascribed to Apollonius' follower. One of F.'s main arguments for the existence of this text is that it is hard to imagine why Philostratus should invent a text to disagree with it and thus 'bring about a certain distance *vis-à-vis* his own creation' (p. 85). As F. is aware (pp. 231–2), his argument can be turned on its head: Philostratus disagreed with his invented source precisely to bring about a distance between himself and his creation, to make the latter (more) plausible. A comparison can be made with the *HA*'s playing with its invention 'Cordus' (or 'Junius Cordus' or 'Junius', or 'Aelius Cordus'). Usually summoned up to be followed (e.g. *Alb*. 7.3), 'Cordus' sometimes is dismissed as too trivial (*Alb* 5.10; *Macr*. 1.3–5; *Max*. 31.4; *Gord*. 21.3–4; *Max. et Bal*. 12.4; cf. Ph. *VA* 5.7, 7.28), too prurient (*Max*. 29.10), or both (*Max. et Bal*. 4.5). On occasion he is invented to be contradicted (*Alb*. 11.2–4; *Gord*. 19.8–9). For what it is worth, the author of the *HA* thought that Philostratus was operating on terrain suitable for his own talents: he projects a life of Apollonius (*Aur*. 24.9).

For F., as for most, 'there is no reason to doubt Philostratus' claim to be drawing on

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the book by Maximus on Apollonius' stay in Aegae' (p. 68). On the other hand there is no testimony independent of Philostratus to the existence of Maximus, and the name Maximus had pre-existing philosophic connotations (Maximus of Tyre). The reality of Maximus may be bound up with that of 'Damis', and much depends on one's reading of the crucial passage in the *VA* (1.3) where Philostratus outlines his sources and methods. Three (otherwise unattested) sources, Damis, Maximus, and Apollonius' will, are to be used, but (the independently attested) Moeragenes is to be ignored. The passage can be read as a false multiplication of sources: 'Damis' for the central picture, with 'Maximus' to underpin the picture before 'Damis' joins Apollonius (at *VA* 1.19), and 'Apollonius' will' to do the same after 'Damis' leaves the sage (at *VA* 8.28–9). Philostratus could have invented a neatly fitting together triad of 'sources' to cover his real source and methods: expanding (four books to eight) and altering (mage and philosopher to sage) the Apollonius of Moeragenes, whose work in fact is not ignored (*VA* 3.41).

F. persuasively argues that the universality of Greek culture encountered by Apollonius on his travels serves an ideological function: neutralizing any tension between the sage's Greek identity and the idealization of barbarian wisdom. Interesting, new readings of Apollonius' travels are given by P. Hanus, 'La vie d'Apollonius de Tyane: d'une géographie réelle à une géographie mythique', in J.-C. Carrière, E. Geny, M.-M. Mactoux and F. Paul-Lévy (edd.), *Inde, Grèce Ancienne* (Paris, 1995), pp. 81–97, and J. Elsner, 'Hagiographic Geography: Travel and Allegory in the *Life of Apollonius of Tyana', JHS* 117 (1997), 22–37. A concentration on the eastern journeys of Apollonius can overplay the universality, and possibly the seriousness of ideological purpose, of Hellenization in the *VA*. Philostratus removes any Hellenization from Baetica, except Gades, for comic effects ('natives run away from Greek actor' etc., *VA* 5.8–9).

F. (pp. 117–27) constructs a good case for Philostratus' attitude to Rome in the *VA* as being one of acceptance, positive appreciation, but almost complete lack of identification. Although the positive appreciation amounts to little more than the idea that it took more courage to travel outside the empire than within it (*VA* 1.20). Other readings are possible. For Elsner (op. cit.) the *VA* goes beyond a tacit resistance to Rome and depicts Greece conquering her Roman master. Yet once Philostratus had selected a philosopher for his hero, such a line was made almost inevitable by the Greek expectation that rulers should heed the *paideia* of Greek philosophers, and if they did not the philosophers should confront them and, of course, come off best (cf. pp. 162–93). F. shows how in the *VS*, and thus probably in Philostratus' own view, *paideia* and power tended to operate in different spheres: *paideia* as a leisure activity for rulers. But it seems unsafe to generalize from the attitude of Philostratus, who after all was not a typical sophist. Philostratus might have accepted the divide between culture and politics in F.'s view that 'the (Greek sophists') fixation on the classical past was a cultural phenomenon which cannot be interpreted as an expression of resistance to Roman rule' (p. 49), but we cannot assume all sophists, let alone all Greeks, did, or that all modern scholars should: cf. S. C. R. Swain, *Hellenism and Empire* (Oxford, 1996).

The above comments should be interpreted as signs of the thought-provoking nature of this book. Its translation from Dutch is welcome.

Corpus Christi College, Oxford H. SIDEBOTTOM

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DIO'S VOCABULARY

M.-L. Freyburger-Galland: *Aspects du vocabulaire politique et institutionnel de Dion Cassius*. Pp. 264. Paris: De Boccard, 1997. Paper. ISBN: 2-7018-0108-7.

In this book Freyburger-Galland has given us a useful, well-documented, elaborate, though not exhaustive survey of Cassius Dio's political, administrative, and military vocabulary. An introduction on Dio's life and career, his method of writing, and his attitude toward Rome is followed by chapters on Dio's Greek equivalents for Roman geographic and political terms (pp. 31–74), Latin words denoting social groups and political institutions (pp. 75–112), Roman definitions of forms of government (pp. 113–53), magistrates and functionaries of republican and imperial times (pp. 154–85), and military units and personnel (pp. 186–214). At the end of the book the author gives us a conclusion, a bibliography, and some indices.

In each of the four chapters on Dio's terminology F.-G. first describes common Greek equivalents, translations, and transliterations of Latin terms which are extant in Greek inscriptions and literary texts, and then gives Dio's vocabulary. In opposition to H. J. Mason, *Greek Terms for Roman Institutions* (Toronto, 1974), she concludes that Dio's work shows a predilection for classical Greek words that could be interpreted as equivalents to Latin terms and that Dio avoided Latinisms and transliterations of Latin terms into Greek (pp. 212, 217). Having been a Roman senator, Dio must have known Roman political and administrative terminology well, but he preferred to write in pure Second Sophistic Greek, choosing terms and wordings that are reminiscent of the works of Thucydides and other classical Greek writers.

Unfortunately the author does not pay much attention to Dio's political views, which she virtually passes over in the introduction. Nor does she deal with Dio's perception of the Roman Empire and Roman imperial power. She consequently misses the opportunity to put Dio's terminology in the right philosophical and political perspective. In one short sentence (p. 221) she suddenly declares that Dio was heavily influenced by Plato and Aristotle in his favourable view of republican government. Dio cannot be classified, however, as having belonged to a specific school or way of thinking, because he eclectically drew from the common blend of popular and ethical notions which were taught at the schools of rhetoric and had thus become widespread among Greek-speaking upper classes (see G. J. D. Aalders, 'Cassius Dio and the Greek World', *Mnemosyne* 39 [1986], 291–302). Dio saw the Roman Empire as a worldwide *polis*, the *urbs Roma* serving as the *astu* and the rest as its *chora* (52.19.6; see L.de Blois, 'Emperor and Empire in the Works of Greek-speaking Authors of the Third Century AD', *ANRW* II 34.4, p. 3407). In Dio's view the emperors had to see to it that the organs composing the body that was the empire, i.e. the Senate, the knights, the cities and their élites, the populace of Rome, and the armies, fulfilled their tasks in a proper way in a balanced hierarchical order. If they failed to do so soldiers might be the first to disrupt social order and upset political equilibrium. The empire would then change into a military tyranny. In Dio's opinion, the majesty and power of the Augustan monarchy constituted the proper counterweight to military ambitions. That is why Dio venerated Augustus and paid so much attention to his reign. Although F.-G. mentions B. Manuwald, *Cassius Dio und Augustus* (Wiesbaden, 1979), in her bibliography, she seems to have missed his well-founded conclusions. This is not an isolated example. In the main text as well as in elaborate footnotes, she shows a wide knowledge of all kinds of ancient Greek literary and epigraphical texts, but she leaves

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aside some important, especially German, modern publications, which she mentions in her bibliography but never actually uses. To give one example: in the introduction, on pp. 10–11, in the paragraph on Dio's life and career she should have used P. M. M. Leunissen, *Konsuln und Konsulare in der Zeit von Commodus bis Severus Alexander (180–235 n.Chr.)* (Amsterdam, 1989), p. 163 n. 147 and M. Hose, *Erneuerung der Vergangenheit. Die Historiker im Imperium Romanum von Florus bis Cassius Dio* (Stuttgart, 1994), pp. 356–60.

The translations and paraphrases of Greek texts into French given by the author are almost always correct and accurate. To mention only one slip of the pen: although F.-G. very well knows that in Dio's work *demokratia* denotes republican government (pp. 116 ff.), on p. 84, speaking about Dio 50.1.1, she translates this term into *régime démocratique*.

University of Nijmegen, The Netherlands L. DE BLOIS

THEMISTIUS

J. VANDERSPOEL: *Themistius and the Imperial Court: Oratory, Civic Duty, and* Paideia *from Constantius to Theodosius*. Pp. xii + 280. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995. ISBN: 0-472-10485-3.

In this book, based on a thesis, V. has three aims: to present a new chronology for Themistius, to provide summaries of his speeches, and to assess his rôle and actions (p. vii). Between introduction (pp. 1–30) and epilogue (pp. 217–21) V. proceeds to look at Themistius' speeches in chronological order: with 'early life' (pp. 31–49) separated from a reign-by-reign progression (pp. 71–217) by a chapter on Constantinople (pp. 51–70). There are five appendices. The first (pp. 225–9) gives a brief discussion of Themistius' philosophical works and extant speeches. The second (pp. 230–40) provides a translation of *Or*. 28 and discussion of its date with summaries of *Orr*. 21, 23, 26, and 29. The third and fourth (pp. 241–9) look at Arabic authors on Themistius' works to Julian and the addressee of the *Risâlat* (for V. the *Risâlat* is a translation of either the original or an epitome of Themistius' Panegyric to Julian, pp. 126–34). The fifth (pp. 250–1) is a chronological table of Themistius' speeches (here *Or*. 25 is dated to A.D. 375/6, while in the text [p. 177] it is earlier than *Or*. 11 of A.D. 373).

V. has taken the books of C. P. Jones as models (p. viii), and in this closely argued work has lived up to them. V. makes many attractive and detailed arguments. Themistius was taught by Basil of Neocaesarea (pp. 34–5). Jovian's accession was brought about by the Joviani (pp. 142–3). In *Or*. 5 Themistius was not responding to an edict of toleration of paganism by Jovian, but instead was making a plea that the emperor's announcement that he would persecute no Christian sect be extended to pagans (pp. 148–53). In the same oration Themistius used (Ps.-) Aristides, *Or*. 35 (pp. 9–10, 139, a suggestion now supported by C. P. Jones, 'Themistius and the Speech *To the King*', *C. Ph.* 92.2 [1997], 149–52, who shows Themistius using this work for *Or*. 16).

Not all V.'s arguments are so convincing. The main point which he provides against the traditional date of A.D. 350 for *Or*. 1 is that Themistius could not have

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described Constantius at Antioch as 'shining nearby' Nisibis (pp. 73–7). This seems to put too great a faith in Themistius' geographical precision. Vagueness is apposite here (cf. Amm. 16.69–70). He is vague elsewhere (see pp. 179–80 on *Or*. 13) and seems not to have visited Antioch until A.D. 356 (p. 95). W. Portmann, 'Zum Datum der ersten Rede des Themistius', *Klio* 74 (1992), 411–21 (arguing for a date of A.D. 351 for *Or*. I) probably appeared too late for V. to include. As these examples show, V. is more concerned with the date, context, and, to some extent, sources of Themistius' speeches than with literary analysis.

Some of V.'s assumptions might repay further work. While acknowledging Themistius' use of Dio Chrysostom's works *Peri Basileias*, V. refers to Themistius' speeches as Panegyrics (pp. 6–7). Yet the works *Peri Basileias* and Panegyrics are different types of literature: both going back to Isocrates, the former to the *To Nicocles* and the latter to the *Evagoras*. The difference is set out by Pliny in his *Panegyric* (3.18.3). Themistius' blurring the boundaries between the two might make him even more 'uncharacteristic of his own century' (indeed of any other) than V. has him (p. 20). Again, V.'s assumption (p. 8) that a sophist was the same in the fourth as in the second century A.D. is debatable. It might be argued that in the face of the threat of Christianity the symbols of the two once consciously opposed rôles of sophist and philosopher had begun to merge. Were this the case, Themistius' insistence as a philosopher on his complete difference from a sophist may be another way in which he harked back to the second century A.D. V.'s idea (p. 14) that the tradition of making speeches to emperors invoking *paideia* had been broken in the third century (because traditional government 'was not evident or even possible', and thus Themistius and his contemporaries were repairing it) seems improbable. Various factors tell against it. The date of (Ps.-) Aristides is controversial and many would still date it in the third century. In the middle of that century Herodian can be seen to have judged the emperors in his *History* on their closeness to or distance from *paideia* (H. Sidebottom, 'Herodian's Historical Methods and Understanding of History', *ANRW* 11.34.4 [1998], pp. 2803–12). Whatever the third-century evidence, V. fails to explain why the fourth century, 'an age when the principles of *paideia* had largely been forgotten by the throne' (p. 14), should bring forth lots of speeches based on *paideia*.

With its shift of analysis of Themistius' speeches from 'imperial propaganda' and 'flattery' to Themistius' own political intentions, this book will undoubtedly provoke further study. Various areas could repay modern attention: Themistius' attitudes to the past (e.g. *Or*. 6.74c, Caracalla is very recent), to ethnography (e.g. *Or*. 16.211d, taxes, enlistment, governors, and laws equal way of life), to geography (e.g. *Or*. 16.205a, a man from the uninhabited ends of the earth), and to the natural world (e.g. *Or*. 10.133b, one among several rivers with attitude). Given the current reassessment of Greek attitudes to their own Greekness and to Rome in the first three centuries A.D., a fresh look at the fourth-century self-styled exponent of *paideia* who wished he could swap Greek for Latin (*Or*. 6.71c) would be interesting.

Students in the English-speaking world would benefit from a translation like the recent Italian one by R. Maisano (1995). This need should be met by the work of D. Moncur on the political speeches and R. J. Penella on the private ones signalled in P. J. Heather and J. R. Matthews, *The Goths in the Fourth Century* (Liverpool, 1991) p. 14.

Corpus Christi College, Oxford H. SIDEBOTTOM

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HERMES TRISMEGISTUS

G. LÖHR: *Verherrlichung Gottes durch Philosophie. Der Hermetische Traktat II im Rahmen der antiken Philosophie- und Religionsgeschichte.* Pp. x + 402. Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1997. Cased, DM 228. ISBN: 3-16-146616-0.

Hermes Trismegistus, 'Thrice-Greatest' (a translation of an epithet of the Egyptian god of wisdom, Thoth, with whom Hermes was identified), is the purported author of several *logoi*—for which 'sacred revelations' has been suggested as a translation—from Egypt, written in Greek. Stobaeus in the fifth century A.D. used long extracts of these Hermetica in his *Anthology*, which provides useful material for reading the text of the *logoi* and correcting the manuscripts, as well as yielding some additional Hermetic material (as do some of the Nag Hammadi writings). The Greek *Corpus Hermeticum* (CH) itself contains seventeen *logoi*, known from some twenty-eight MSS, the four earliest of which are from the fourteenth century. It is difficult to characterize these *logoi*, but they can probably be best described as theological and philosophical texts.

Löhr presents a detailed and precise commentary on the second (II) of these, which will be essential reading for anyone dealing with any of the hermetic material. CH II is in fact CH IIb (see p. vii). Before this *logos* begins, a title (*Ἑρμου πρὸς Τὰτ λογὸς καθολικός*) appears in the MSS, which is generally believed to belong to another *logos* (IIa), now lost. CH IIb's title (hereafter CH II, IIb's usual designation) is itself unknown (see also pp. 94–7); this *logos* mainly concerns ideas concerning motion and corporeality.

Although it could be said that a Greek text of CH II is readily accessible (A. D. Nock [ed.] and A.-J. Festugière [trans.], *Corpus Hermeticum* [Budé, Paris, 1960^2], vols i–iv), a commentary of this size (pp. 44–251) should perhaps have included a text (which only runs to eight pages in the Budé, and that is with a fairly extensive *app. crit.*). L.'s extensive commentary is keyed into the page and line numbers of the Greek text of Nock in the Budé, but the lack of a Greek text and a thorough *app. crit.* is inconvenient.

L. provides a German translation of CH II (pp. 24–37), with notes on particular Greek words and phrases, especially where Stobaeus' text differs from that of the manuscripts of the corpus itself. Nock, however, has done the hard work on Stobaeus, and the latter's text can be used to correct that of the corpus. For example, L.'s note on *οὐδαμῶς* in 11.9 at p. 31 n. 62 hardly goes beyond what Nock already provides. L. understandably provides no help on 11.7, the most corrupt textual section of II, where there are two difficult and apparently intractable passages. There is also a difficulty with the text at the beginning of 11.14, where L. (p. 35 n. 95) comments on Scott's solution but provides nothing new. Otherwise, the text of this *logos* is largely straightforward.

In addition to the commentary, L. has important sections on specific themes, and the discussion of the 'theology' of CH II is particularly useful (pp. 255–62). The speakers in the dialogue are discussed (pp. 267–74), and a chapter places CH II in its historical context (pp. 275–304). That Alexandria is where the CH was written seems reasonable; that it belongs to the 'Greek-hellenistic' milieu (rather than to any Egyptian tradition) and dates to the second or third century A.D. are now largely accepted conclusions (pp. 275–85). L. sees CH II as 'middle-Platonic', and correctly argues that it is not Christian or gnostic in inspiration.

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One of L.'s most interesting contributions is his argument (pp. 285–97) for a hermetic cult and community, about which scholars have long debated. He methodically lists and discusses the evidence which there is for this, including the Nag Hammadi material (CH II itself sheds no light on this aspect). Not all readers will share his conclusions that there was a hermetic cult and community, and some will prefer to see the *logoi* as literary philosophical discourses not reflecting the beliefs of a specific religious group, particularly given that the various *logoi* are by different authors and often present quite different views. L. discusses the relationship of CH II with the other hermetic *logoi* (pp. 297–304), and in his commentary refers to these whenever appropriate.

The work is heavily footnoted throughout. The bibliography is extensive and conveniently divided into sections, giving the specific editions of the ancient sources used, and the modern works are divided into those specifically concerned with hermeticism, and less central literature. The *Stellenregister* is thorough, listing the page numbers where discussions and references to various ancient works can be located, and this is always an indispensable tool in using a commentary. L. has provided a detailed and lucid commentary on an important *logos* in the CH. It will be an essential, important, and stimulating work for anyone whose work in any way involves the CH and related fields, such as gnosticism, the Nag Hammadi texts, and early Christian literature.

University of New England, Australia MATTHEW P. J. DILLON

HANSEN'S ECCLESIASTICAL LIBRARY

L. PARMENTIER: *Theodoret Kirchengeschichte* (3rd edn by H. Hansen). Pp. cviii + 478. Berlin: Akademie, 1998. Cased, DM 158. ISBN: 3-05-003198-0.

The appearance of H.'s annotated third edition of L. Parmentier's 1911 publication of Theodoret's *Ecclesiastical History* provides an opportunity to notice the major efforts of H., and of other editors in the *Griechischen Christlichen Schriftsteller* series, in providing scholars with critical editions of the major church historians. H. himself has been associated with the Theodosian trinity of orthodox writers, since he was also responsible for bringing to completion the new edition of Socrates (1995), replacing the 1853 text of R. Hussey, on which a succession of German scholars had been working for 60 years, and for revising (1995) the 1960 edition of Sozomen for whose original publication he had finished the labours of J. Bidez; in addition, there is the revision of his own reconstruction of the remnants of Theodore Lector (1995; first edition, 1971), both the epitome of Socrates, Sozomen, and Theodoret, and Theodore's continuation. Mention should also be made of F. Winkelmann's revisions (1972, 1981) of Bidez's 1911 Philostorgius. Now that accurate texts have been established the way is open for the production of good modern translations, since for all these authors anglophone students have to rely on nineteenth-century versions in the Bohn Ecclesiastical Library or the Nicene and post-Nicene Fathers series. Philostorgius is already in hand (Alanna Emmet Nobbs for *Translated Texts for Historians*, Liverpool

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University Press), but firm offers for others would no doubt be welcomed—by *TTH*, for example.

Turning to Theodoret, H. has undertaken a work of consolidation. For the second *GCS* edition (1954), F. Scheidweiler provided numerous acute textual notes (pp. 351–68) but reduced Parmentier's introduction to one-quarter of its original size. H. has sensibly reinstated the original introduction, which is particularly strong on the MS tradition and the subsequent impact of the text, and contributed eight pages of comments (pp. 429–36). The text benefits from a further forty-two pages of corrections and supplements (pp. 437–78). In the majority of cases H. tidies up the apparatus criticus, or corrects or adds to the citations of parallel texts. In a number of cases W. Goeber's study of Theodoret's clausulae (Halle, 1924) provides improvements for the sake of rhythm, while scrutiny of the numerous disputes involving the turbulent Athanasius of Alexandria has led to emendations to, or observations on, the various documents which Theodoret cites; the majority of substantial comments, however, are quoted from Scheidweiler (many directed at the German translation of A. Seider [1926]). H.'s personal input is limited. I was not convinced by his suggested emendation of κωμῳδούντων to κωμῳδοῦντες in the narrative of the destruction of the image of Serapis (v. 22.6; p. 321.15): although it is logical to have the triumphant Christians mock the disgraced idol's head, the change requires the further deletion of καὶ, and the flow of the sentence suggests that it is indeed the worshippers of Serapis who now laugh at the head being dragged through the streets. Although outrage might seem to us a more likely response than laughter from these devotees, Theodoret may have improved the story to demonstrate the complete triumph of Christianity. It would have been easier to use H.'s contribution to the volume if the *GCS* editors had permitted him to provide a consolidated list of abbreviations, or even a short bibliography of relevant modern works. Those who already possess both the Parmentier and Scheidweiler editions may think twice before committing scarce resources to this volume, since the new material can be easily transcribed or copied.

Such comments might seem to belittle H.'s work, but it is necessary to recognize that Theodoret was probably the least important of his editorial tasks for *GCS*, which was why it was correctly left until last: the palm belongs to H.'s Socrates, since his *History* precedes and underpins those of the other two Theodosian authors, and Hussey's text had long needed re-editing, although for sheer difficulty H.'s meticulous work on Theodore Lector stands out. It is unfortunate for H. that his previous labours have not been noticed by *CR*, or indeed other English-language classical journals: as he observes in the preface to the second edition of Theodore, the first edition produced only a tiny echo in the scholarly world. Late Antiquity is currently a fashionable area of research and teaching, but this popularity could not be sustained without such high-quality textual labours as H. has undertaken throughout the past 40 years.

University of Warwick MICHAEL WHITBY

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DISIECTA MEMBRA

E. COURTNEY (ed.): *The Fragmentary Latin Poets*. Pp. xxv + 504. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993. Cased, £55. ISBN: 0-19-814775-9.

J. BLÄNSDORF (ed.): *Fragmenta Poetarum Latinorum epicorum et lyricorum praeter Ennium et Lucilium* (post W. Morel novis curis adhibitis edidit Carolus Buechner, editionem tertiam auctam curavit J. B.) (Bibliotheca Scriptorum Graecorum et Romanorum Teubneriana). Pp. xxvi + 494. Stuttgart and Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1995. Cased, DM 195. ISBN: 3-8154-1371-0.

In 1572 Scaliger issued *Publii Virgilii Maronis appendix cum supplemento multorum antehac numquam excusorum poematum veterum poetarum.* By augmenting the supplement rather than issuing fresh supplements of their own, his successors up to H. Meyer in 1835 behaved as though Latin poetry not printed before 1572 remained a useful category. Meyer was not proposing new categories when he said that 'Anthologia latina tripartita est, quia partim e codicibus manu scriptis, partim ex ceteris litterarum Romanarum auctoribus, partim ex inscriptionibus est conflata'.

A generation later, however, the compilation did split into Meyer's three parts. Though Riese in 1869 and Baehrens in 1879 overhauled the first in very different ways, they left the third to Buecheler and agreed to dispense with the second: there was no point in assembling things quoted by other authors, 'quod in illis fontibus iamiam leguntur' (Riese), 'quippe quae facile illinc possint peti' (Baehrens; *facile* indeed!). The decision was a strange throwback to the principle implicit in Scaliger's title. Not only did Scaliger himself transgress it by including what Pithou soon advertised as 'alia sparsim antehac errantia', but already in 1564 H. Stephanus had published over 400 pages of 'Fragmenta poetarum veterum Latinorum quorum opera non extant', and Ribbeck and Vahlen in the 1850s were doing nothing new when they assembled fragments of drama and of Ennius. 'At the instance of friends', however, Baehrens changed his mind, and in 1886 *Fragmenta poetarum romanorum* appeared. Though he liked the convenience of comprehensive collections, he excused himself from duplicating Ribbeck's volumes and declared himself unwilling to include the verse from Menippean satires, especially since Buecheler had appended them to his Petronius.

Baehrens's successors have continued to temper comprehensiveness with economy. Morel dropped Ennius and Lucilius in deference to Vahlen and Marx; Courtney brings back the minor works of Ennius but drops Livius Andronicus and Naevius in deference to editors not named. In addition, every compiler asserts a measure of independence by finding intrinsic reasons for including or excluding things never included or excluded before. Blänsdorf, who corrected the proofs of Büchner's posthumous edition (1982) and now revises it, has eleven entries for Seneca, ten more than Büchner and eleven more than C., who excludes translations (fr. 11, 'dubium' indeed, is *Ep.* 49.12 *veritatis simplex oratio est*, of which 'metrum incertum'). Reviewers can join in the game, and I will record my opinion that verses preserved in the only context that their author ever gave them ought not to be wrenched from it, as verses in the *Historia Apollonii* are by Bl. and verses in Pliny's letters have been since Scaliger (under Symmachus, p. 447, C. misleadingly says that Pliny 'inserts some of his verses in his correspondence').

Much the most helpful innovation in either of these new compilations is that C.

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provides a commentary. Though Teubner texts are not meant to serve as commentaries, it seemed perverse that Morel and Büchner gave the fragments of 'A. Furius Antias' without citing the evidence either for 'A.' or for 'Antias', especially since Baehrens had cited the evidence for 'Antias' and the passage that supplies 'A.', namely Cic. *Brut*. 132, also supplies a synchronism. In effect, 'A. Furius Antias' is an emendation of Gellius's 'Furius' and therefore needs an apparatus; and anyway editors often include *testimonia* and usually say in their preface what is known about the author or the date of the work. Such parsimony left C. with an even bigger gap to fill; and though Bl. now furnishes each poet with 'Vita' and 'Opera', he hides the evidence for 'Antias' in a reference to Pauly–Wissowa, where it is still not given in a way that will satisfy anyone who starts from what he quotes of Gellius. C.'s section on 'Sources of Quotations' is also more discursive than the 'Conspectus editionum adhibitarum' and 'Sigla codicum auctorum saepius adhibitorum' of Büchner and Bl., and he often cites more of the context, even so far as to let it dictate the order of presentation.

Morel and Büchner produced slim volumes of 196 and 233 pages, though Büchner's lines are longer; Bl., with lines slightly shorter than Morel's, reaches 520 pages. C. keeps his volume in manageable compass by adopting firm views, avoiding doxography, and occasionally substituting a reference for an explanation, as when he offers a tantalizing glimpse of the *caesura Korschiana* (p. 44) or writes *quo 'tegmine fagi'?* on the authority of Housman (p. 284).

C.'s commentary is typical of his energy and efficiency, and it is hard to think of any other scholar alive today who could have tackled with such erudition and such independence of judgement the whole range from the minor works of Ennius to Tiberianus and Symmachus. Few pages go by without an incisive observation or a provocative comment; see, for instance, p. 7 on *satura*, pp. 22, 73, 154, 242, and 276 on postponed *at*, *nam*, *atque*, *et*, and *neque*, p. 37 on the prosody of *reliquus*, p. 50 on epitaphs in hexameters, p. 52 on the addressee of Prop. 3.20, p. 96 on 'canon', p. 126 on *impendio*, p. 171 on when Lucretius published, p. 190 'some modern scholars grossly over-estimate Hellenistic features in Lucilius', pp. 313–14 on Ovid fr. 16 and *Priapea* 3, p. 371 on '*recusatio*', and p. 449 on the difference between *iuvenalis* and *iuvenilis*. About metre especially he writes some excellent notes, for instance on Accius fr. 2 *metellique caculaeque*; surprisingly often, he exposes metrical flaws in repeatedly printed conjectures, for instance Buecheler's <*Terenti opus*> in Volcacius fr. 3.1, which Bl., who takes account of C.'s volume ('ut potui inspexi'), expels from his text but strangely retains in his apparatus together with an unmetrical conjecture of Büchner's. He not only takes pains over the attribution of conjectures but unlike Bl., so far as I have noticed, makes several of his own; *gracilissimus* at Accius fr. 5 and *iugis* at Tiberianus fr. 1.9 stand out.

Good examples of C.'s work are his notes on frr. 15–16 of Calvus (pp. 207–9) or on the single fragments of Octavian (pp. 282–3), Sentius Augurinus (pp. 365–6), and Ablabius (p. 424). His thorough treatment of Cicero has a three-page introduction, half of it concerned with versification (pp. 149–52), and 'The "new" poets' and 'The "poetae novelli" ' each receive another three pages (pp. 189–91, 372–4). His epilogue on the output and date of Furius Bibaculus (pp. 198–200) sets out the problems with admirable clarity and caution; an argument in favour of his conclusion, perhaps, is the Virgilian rhythm of frr. 8–10 and 12–14 (admittedly Macrobius quotes them for their resemblance to things in the *Aeneid*, but he says nothing about rhythm).

Inevitably, C.'s briskness has drawbacks. The daggers round *illo* at Laevius fr. 18.1 will suggest *Ilio* or *ilico*, both of which have been conjectured; but far from saying

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what is wrong with them, C. mentions neither. Janet Fairweather's amoebaean interpretation of Gallus fr. 2 'for many reasons', none specified, 'seems very improbable' (p. 264). If the thought strikes you that Furius perhaps 'butchered Memnon' in a description of his mother, Dawn, you will not know whether C. has rejected the idea or never met it (p. 197). For completing *cedant arma togae, concedat laurea* . . . Cicero needed a word that conveyed both elements of 'civil award'. When he quotes the line in later years, he gives *laudi*, which provides only the second; but when other writers quote it, they give *linguae*, which provides only the first. Mariotti, ignored by C. (p. 172), illustrated Cicero's fondness for expressing abstract oppositions in concrete pairs. Is it really outweighed either by the assonance in *laurea laudi* or by the possibility that *linguae* is 'a satirical distortion by some *Ciceromastix*'? On the contrary, as Baehrens held, *laudi* could be a concession to wisecracks about *homines malae linguae etiam si tacerent*. Bl. cites Mariotti and more, but you will have to read it all yourself.

A drawback of Bl.'s bibliography is that he does not say what it covers. When Büchner did his best to cite 'omnes dissertationes quae fragmentorum formam attingunt', what does 'cautious augmentation' of such a bibliography mean (p. x)? On my copy of Büchner I have references to eight recent articles in English that Bl. does not cite.

Bl. also gives a fuller apparatus than Büchner. I have not checked it systematically, but I noticed a serious error in Apuleius fr. 6 (the oracle in *Cupid and Psyche*, which Bl., like Morel and Büchner, classes for no stated reason among 'e Graecis conversa'). At v. 1 editors accept Luetjohann's *rex siste* for what Bl. presents as 'subsiste F: existe ϕ'. If these reports were true, they would disprove the usual view that ϕ derives from F, because *existe*, unmetrical nonsense, is closer to the truth; but editors say that F has *subsiste* as part of a correction in erasure. I see no point in such entries as '. . . lertie BLK: Lertie *Baehrens*' (p. 136) or '. . . alpes *codd. Porph. et Ps.-Acr.*: Alpes *Morel*' (p. 204). A particularly unhappy entry is this, on v. 5 of Marianus (p. 352): 'Romam sup [a misprint] ipso omnes vocant *Morel* [Baehrens]; *de dimetri iambici interiore neglecta* [read <*brevi*> *interiore*; cf. Büchner] *cf. Ignoti odarium p. 348 v. 16* [where he mends the metre by accepting a conjecture]'. On Septimius Serenus fr. 19 he adds muddle to a poorly drafted entry of Büchner's ('salo *Baehrens . . ., corr. Scaliger*') and a poorly chosen text (not explained by Buecheler), and he is at least the seventh editor since 1870 who has failed to say where Scaliger proposed *cedo* and *solo*; the answer is given by T. Gaisford, *Scriptores Latini rei metricae* (Oxford, 1837) x (cf. 493), namely on his copy of Diomedes (Leipzig, 1542), now in the Bodleian (Auct. S 4 17). Latin of Büchner's that does not mean what he intended survives in the entry on Valgius fr. 1. Bl.'s simplification of Büchner's entry on Calvus fr. 16 does not fit his presentation of fr. 15, which differs from Büchner's.

Bl.'s index of *initia* is an innovation, and I suppose it may save one a moment if one encounters a fragment in the author who cites it. When I forget who mentioned 'Dictynna Catonis', though, or what an epigram about Pompey said, I look for an index of names, which neither Bl. nor C. provides. Pompey does appear, however, in C.'s 'General Index'.

C.'s note on Cicero fr. 10.78 does not fit his text, and the complexity of some notes makes it hard to understand expressions like 'this work' and 'this poem' (p. 246 foot; 'Varro' 14 lines up also lost me), 'this' (p. 248, 14 lines up). Both volumes have more misprints than one expects from either press; most are harmless, but in Apuleius fr. 7.8 (C. p. 397) an *n* has fallen out, not teeth (perhaps the *n* that turned Shackleton Bailey's leech into a swallow), and *agitur* at Tiberianus fr. 1.1 (C. p. 430) should be *igitur.* Did

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Gellius at 19.7.13 really write *ex* rather than *et* (H. Stephanus) in *nimium poetica, ex prosae orationis usu alieniora* (C. p. 124)?

In short, C. has done an outstanding service, and it is hard to see why anyone should consult Bl. first; but Bl.'s bibliography affords some protection against C.'s tendency to one-sidedness. If Teubner ever think of revising Bl., they could recover some of the ground lost to C. by making room for the reinstatement of Ennius and Lucilius, who are not on everyone's shelves.

At *CR* 112 (1998), 200 I apologized to the editors and the author for the lateness of a review, and this is the other that I have had on my conscience. Meanwhile, C.'s volume has been reviewed in more detail by J. J. O'Hara, *C. Ph.* 89 (1994), 384–91; H. D. Jocelyn, *Hermathena* 'CLVIX' (1995), 53–77; and S. Mariotti, *Gnomon* 70 (1998), 204–9. From A. S. Hollis's article 'A Fragmentary Addiction', in G. W. Most (ed.), *Collecting Fragments/Fragmente sammeln* (Göttingen, 1997), pp. 111–23, one learns that he too plans a commentary on poetic fragments, though a more selective one on a broader scale; and the article includes interpretations that differ from C.'s.

Pembroke College, Cambridge M. D. REEVE

CHARACTER INVENTION BY PLAUTUS

P. RIEMER: *Das Spiel im Spiel: Studien zum plautinischen Agon im 'Trinummus' und 'Rudens'*. (Beiträge zur Altertumskunde, 75.) Pp. 216. Stuttgart and Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1996. Cased, DM 84. ISBN: 3-519-07624-1.

Peter Riemer's *Die Alkestis des Euripides* (Frankfurt a.M., 1989) was a 1988 Cologne 'Inauguraldissertation' which investigated the models of certain scenes of the play in earlier tragedy and the motifs composing its dramatic structure. This volume derives from a 'Habilitationsschrift' presented at the same university in 1993. It is driven by a similar interest in motifs and a similar belief in the importance of considering a stage-poet's use of earlier models in evaluating his work, but arrives at conclusions about Plautus' *Trinummus* and *Rudens* rather more far-reaching than those about the *Ἄλκηστις* were. According to R., Plautus would have replaced a deception attempted by a slave in Philemon's *Θήσαυρος* with one by a *sycophanta* (*Trin.* 843–997) and the finding of a travel-bag with dramatically vital contents by a house-slave in a Diphilian comedy with the finding of such a bag by a fisherman (*Rud.* 906–1423). The two new characters he would have endowed with features of his own person and fortune.

Earlier scholars have seen in the *sycophanta* an addition to the model of the *Trinummus*, but while many have detected incoherence and rank contradictoriness in *Rud.* 906–1423 none has gone so far as to make the fisherman a Plautine invention. R.'s principal novelty is, however, to claim that Plautus created new titles for the two plays in order to draw the attention of the mass of his audience to the scene or scenes for which he rather than the respective Greek poet was responsible, that he was setting himself up as a kind of competitor with the Greek poet and asking for the comic talent displayed in the new scenes to be judged against that displayed in the scenes which followed the original more closely. He even goes so far as to suggest (pp. 126–32,

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184) that Plautus accentuated the moralism of the latter scenes in order to reduce their attractiveness to the Roman public.

The confused and confusing terms of the title, 'Spiel im Spiel' (in the text at pp. 26, 121, 135, 187; cf. 81–2) and 'plautinischer Agon' (in the text at pp. 133–4, 187; cf. the use of 'Agon' at p. 185, of the noun 'Agonistisches' at p. 130, and of the adjective 'agonistisch' at pp. 182, 184, 185) relate to the altered scenes and the competitive aims of the alterations. An excursus rehashes an old view attributing to Terentian inventiveness the prominence of the parasite in the final scenes of the *Phormio* together with the disappearance at v. 882 of the intriguing slave and associates with this inventiveness the change made to Apollodorus' original title. Students of comedy will find the essay entertaining but scarcely persuasive.

The arguments which R. brings forward in favour of regarding *Trin*. 843–997, *Rud*. 906–1423, and *Phorm*. 829–1055 as little in debt to the Greek poets who constructed the basic plots of the three plays give much weight to the dramaturgical oddities, improbabilities, inconsistencies, and illogicalities which he has observed in the Latin scripts. Such phenomena have long been observed (cf. Ter. *Andr*. 18–21). They can be used to found almost any fancy about any actual script which survives. The constitutional sceptic will note with amusement that E. Lefèvre brought out in 1995 a study (*Plautus und Philemon*) composed independently of R.'s which gives the core of *Trin*. 843–997 to Philemon (see particularly pp. 110–13) and that much of the scene looks likely to survive O. Zwierlein's critical knife (see *Zur Kritik und Exegese des Plautus* III 189, 198, 209, 224–5, IV 142 n. 299, 225 n. 506). Curious also is the enthusiasm expressed by R. (pp. 183, 184) for the dramatic quality of writing which he has declared to be so unconcerned with rationality. He takes for granted that Plautus set out more to please the ignorant mass of his audience than those who commissioned from him the translation of pieces by illustrious Greek poets.

The eight so-called 'didascalic' references in prologues of the Plautine corpus (at least six apparently complete prologues do not have one) are believed by R. to come from Plautus himself. The general case for regarding them as the product of a time when the activity of the scenic poet was more highly regarded than at the beginning of the second century is, however, a strong one and not to be set aside by a particular defence of *Trin*. 18–21 (pp. 50–3). Neither Enn. *Sat*. 6–7 (a salutation of Ennius the satirist by a personnage of a satire) nor id. *Var*. 15–16 (an address to the citizens of Rome regarding the epic *Annales* in an epigram of disputed authorship and date) supports belief in the Plautinity of any of the 'didascalic' references.

It is undeniable that the titles *Trinummus* and *Rudens* relate to the action of *Trin*. 843–997 and *Rud*. 938–1044 respectively and to little else in either play. *Cistellaria* likewise relates exclusively to *Cist*. 653–773, but no one has yet argued, or is likely to argue, that the two scenes owe any of their characters or anything of their structure to Plautus rather than Menander. *Phormio* relates as much to *Phorm*. 315–440 as to *Phorm*. 829–1055; *Bacchides* as much to *Bacch*. 35–108 as to *Bacch*. 1120–1286; *Stichus* as much to *Stich*. 402–53 as to *Stich*. 641–775. Speculation like R.'s about the purpose of the replacement of *Ἐπιδικαζόμενος* with *Phormio* would have to go much further and would end up undermining the theory of the 'Spiel im Spiel'. *Casina* relates to a character who never even appears on stage but without whom the *Κληρούμενοι* could have no action at all. *Cas*. 279–423 appears to have presented the sortition more or less as Diphilus did. Considered all together, the new titles invented by Plautus indicate no more than a lack of interest at the beginning of the second century in how much or how little a poet diverged from the text he was commissioned to adapt. It is perhaps significant that *Phormio* does not signal any

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judgement by Terence on what was particularly entertaining in Apollodorus' plot or characterizations.

The interpretation of the title *Trinummus* is more difficult than R. realizes. A masculine noun *trinummus* is more likely to denote a man earning three *nummi* (δίδραχμα: see *Truc*. 445, 561–2) than a single coin having the value of three *nummi*. The *sycophanta* of the script in fact received three coins (vv. 844, 848). Even if a single coin worth six drachmas existed in the real or in the comic world its value would not have been derisory: such a sum could purchase the services of three high-class cooks (see *Aul*. 448, *Pseud*. 808–9) or six ordinary ones (*Merc*. 777, *Pseud*. 808), or twelve street-walkers (*Poen*. 868) or eighteen cheaper ones (*Cist*. 407, *Poen*. 270). *Trinummus* would not have formed, as R. thinks (pp. 50, 129, 182), a striking or witty antithesis with Θησαυρός, certainly not one of the sort that the hypostasis *Inopia* forms with *Luxuria*.

The prologue of the *Rudens* does not state the title of the Diphilian original. It is far from clear that this could not have been a Greek word for 'rope'. Comic titles like Δακτύλιος and Λαμπάς have to do with material objects little less trivial. Without saying why, R. follows others in rejecting Marx's notion that Diphilus called his play Ἐπιτροπή but, again without saying why, he endorses enthusiastically the accompanying notion that Plautus' purpose in calling his version *Rudens* was to intensify the spectators' curiosity. A foundation for his own further speculations thus hardly exists.

Phorm. 24–9, a passage full of problems (Bentley's rewriting at least recognizes one of them) and almost certainly corrupt, seems to have offered some sort of reason for Terence's retitling of the Ἐπιδικαζόμενος but certainly does not have to be taken to announce an extension of the parasite's rôle in the second half of the action, as R. argues (pp. 164–8). The phraseology of *Asin*. 12 *Asinariam uolt esse si per uos licet* and *Trin*. 20–1 *Trinummo . . . hoc uos rogat ut liceat possidere hanc nomen fabulam* strongly suggests that Terence wanted the spectators' approval for his change of title rather than for any change in the size of the rôle of a character.

The very idea of a competition, even a figurative one, between a small piece of original Latin dramatic writing bordering on farce and a whole Greek drama of serious intent into a translation of which the near-farcical piece has been set is hard to credit. Like has to compete with like. Where the *Trinummus* is concerned, if vv. 843–997 are in any sense Plautus' own work they would be better ranked against *Pseud*. 956–1051 (treated by R. as one of Plautus' models: pp. 80–2, 85–6) or *Most*. 431–531 (discussed by R., pp. 60–5).

Kidlington, Oxfordshire H. D. JOCELYN

DRN III

P. M. Brown (ed.): *Lucretius: De Rerum Natura III* (Classical Texts). Pp. 234. Warminster: Aris & Phillips, 1997. Paper. ISBN: 0-85668-695-6.

This edition admirably fulfils the editor's first declared aim, to explicate the philosophical argument of the book. The full and lucid summaries that punctuate the commentary deserve special praise in this connexion. The translation is clear and accurate, though it was probably a mistake in this day and age to start off in 'thou' and 'thee' mode, especially if you don't get it quite right ('wert' for 'wast'; a glance at

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Munro would have steered B. round that pitfall). B. rightly maintains the orthodox view that the *DRN* did not receive the author's final revision (p. 2). Those who, like Deufert (*CR* 48 [1998], 25–7), think otherwise will now have to address themselves to the powerful case presented by David Sedley, *Lucretius and the Transformation of Greek Wisdom* (Cambridge, 1998), pp. 134–85. (Cf. also Sedley, pp. 62–93 on 'Lucretius the Fundamentalist', a magisterial exposition of the view briefly presented by B. [p. 9] of Lucretius as transmitter rather than innovator.)

A few points arising from the commentary: **14–15** B. is sceptical about the allusion to the birth of Athena detected by West and myself, as indeed it would appear is Sedley (p. 71 n. 46). However, be the objections to this suggestion what they may, they cannot be taken to include the fact that for Epicurus and Lucretius the seat of the intellect was in the breast and not the head. The allusion, in characteristic Lucretian style, implicitly corrects and patronizes the myth and its propagators. *Hoc ueteres Graium cecinere poetae*: yes, wisdom did indeed spring from a divine mind, but not quite as they proclaimed. **64** *non minimam partem . . . aluntur* 'are nurtured in no small degree: a restricted claim'. Not all that restricted: *non minimam* is litotes for *maximam*. **83–4** B. interestingly recurs to a solution neglected, indeed passed over in silence, by modern editors, Munro's postulation of a lacuna after 82. This is economical, and avoids the need to emend *suadet*, but I am still left uneasy about the change of reference and emphasis of *hunc*. **146** *cum neque res animam neque corpus commouet una* 'when neither spirit nor body is simultaneously stirred by the process', citing Munro in support of this interpretation of *res*, though he in fact renders it by 'impression'. This was one of the few places in the commentary where I was left puzzled by B.'s argument, which seems to me to complicate an essentially simple point. Line 145 emphasizes the autonomy of the *animus*, which requires no external stimulus for it to function. B.'s explanation introduces the idea of independent mental activities simultaneously affecting the body and the spirit, something that I have difficulty in extracting from the context. **173** I take the opportunity to add to the small anthology I have accumulated on the pleasure of swooning: Pusey described the experience of being nearly drowned as 'very delightful' (Faber, *Oxford Apostles* [Penguin edn], p. 132). **244** *nec magis e paruis et leuibus ex elementis*, the transmitted text, kept and defended against Wakefield's *est* for *ex*. However, 6.354–5 is not really parallel; and B.'s explanation of the repeated preposition as 'Lucretian shorthand' for *factum e* wears an *ad hoc* appearance. **267** *odor et quidam color et sapor* 'smell, taste, and a particular colour'. The colour is no more 'particular' than the other attributes: *quidam* must be read *ἀπὸ κοινοῦ*. The point is generally missed by the translators: Sir Ronald Melville, the most recent, is an honourable exception. **676** The variant *largiter*, attested by Charisius and Nonius, ought perhaps to have been mentioned in view of Timpanaro's weighty espousal (*Maia* 22 [1970], 355–7 = *Contributi di filologia e di storia della lingua latina* [1978], pp. 140–6). **814** The reasoning by which B. defends the transmitted *sit* against Lachman's *fit* strikes me as very fine-drawn, and rendering it by 'was' hardly assists his argument. **854–8** The metrical comment is incautiously worded: it is not 'the naturally short *o*' that is 'lengthened', but the *syllable* containing it that is treated as metrically long, or better perhaps 'heavy'. Commentators on Latin poetry *must* read their *Vox Latina*. **870–2** B. sees no reason to suppose an allusion to Persian funeral customs. But after *posto*, which clearly implies burial, and *flammis*, which as clearly implies cremation, a reference to death in battle is inappropriate; a few lines later Lucretius makes an express point of the distinction (888–93). **1018** *factis* kept and explained as 'perhaps . . . a poetic local ablative . . . after *factis* 1014 a singular is implausible'. But (i) *utrum in alterum abiturum erat*? (ii) Why, given the

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existence of the common construction, should Lucretius have chosen to torture the syntax in the manner imputed to him by B.? At p. 97 (31–4n.) there is a naughty 'due to', and at p. 101 (65–7n.) 'chiasmic' should be 'chiastic'.

These remarks should be seen in the perspective of the vastly greater number of places where B. unquestionably hits the nail on the head. He has certainly obliged me to think again about more than one passage in my own commentary, and he has provided a much more ample and informative account of the philosophical content of the book than I succeeded in doing. His edition can be confidently recommended to students at all levels of attainment.

Cambridge E. J. KENNEY

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE *AENEID*

H.-C. GÜNTHER: *Überlegungen zur Entstehung von Vergils* Aeneis. (Hypomnemata, 113.) Pp. 95. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1996. Paper, DM 32. ISBN: 3-525-25210-2.

Günther's short monograph, a *parergon* he tells us arising out of his study of the text of Propertius, is an attempt to sift out some of the solid results of the (now largely unfashionable) analytical study of the stages of composition of the *Aeneid*, and in so doing to give the reader a glimpse into the 'Werkstatt' of the poet, a glimpse made possible by the fact that at the poet's death the work lacked its final revision. G.'s starting point, like that of Thomas Berres, whose *Die Entstehung der Aeneis* (*Hermes* Einzelschrift 45 [Wiesbaden, 1982]; reviewed by Horsfall, *CR* 34 [1987], 15–17) is the most recent major study of the topic, is the half-lines, those undoubted signs of incompletion. Like Berres, G. maintains that a large proportion of the poem's fifty-eight half-lines are indices of later additions by Virgil to the draft of his poem (as opposed to those that indicate a lacunose first sketch of a passage); unlike Berres, he maintains that in almost all of these cases the half-line marks the end of the later addition, rather than the end of the original text. Starting with relatively unproblematic examples such as *Aen*. 7.702, where the half-line comes at the end of the first of two similes applied to the troops of Messapus, G., like those before him, is able to show that half-lines are frequently associated with further inconcinnities or inconsistencies in the text. More debatable is the claim that in any particular case it can be *proven* that we are dealing with an addition rather than with a single draft whose constituent elements have not yet been completely harmonized, or even with a deliberate parading, by a learned Alexandrian poet, of inconsistency or discontinuity. In the case of *Aen*. 7.702 one might note that the Homeric model for the swan simile at 699–701 is part of a sequence of four similes that introduce the Catalogue of Ships; one can imagine a counter-argument that the two bird similes at *Aen*. 7.699–705 represent a rough draft of an imitation of the Homeric sequence, displaced from its position at the head of the Catalogue, rather than two consecutive shots at a single simile. G. is justified in his complaint that modern Virgilians too often simply overlook the signs of incompletion in the poem; but at times his logic-chopping argumentation excludes considerations of a wider interpretative nature. For example, he argues (pp. 23–5) that the half-verse at 7.455 is an example of a lacunose draft, a further sign of which is the compressed brevity of Allecto's scornful reply to the sleeping Turnus, whose own words she throws back at him; but compare the pointed brevity of Ascanius' reply to Numanus at 9.634–5, also

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repeating some of Numanus' own words (if not at such length). There are further parallels between the two passages, and in both a decisive penetrating blow makes further words unnecessary. Another example: the argument (pp. 28–30), starting from the problem of the introduction of Nisus and Euryalus at 9.176–81 as if we had not encountered them before, that the whole of book five (or at least the foot-race) is later than book nine ignores the extensive agonistic imagery in book nine, which it is difficult to believe that Virgil did not from an early stage mean to allude to the literal foot-race in which Nisus and Euryalus compete in book five.

G. extends the result of his analysis of half-lines to wider considerations. The claim that book three was composed relatively late is strongly supported by the argument that half-lines in other books in passages relating to episodes in book three are clues to reworking of those other books undertaken after the composition of three. (On the much vexed issue of the foundation prodigies foretold in book three and fulfilled in later books, reference is lacking to E. L. Harrison's important discussion in *PLLS* 5 [1985], 131–64.) G. also ventures fascinating reconstructions both of Virgil's own working practice and of the procedures of the posthumous editor, Varius. He is radically sceptical of the reliability of much that is contained in the *Vita Donati*; the tendency of his own analyses to throw doubt on the existence of a coherent prose plan for the whole poem is reinforced with the argument (pp. 65–6) that the Donatan report conforms with a stereotype of peripatetic aesthetics and literary biography (as in the story of Menander's insouciance at not having written his play shortly before the Dionysia, since he had already worked out the structure and only had to add the lines). Varius is presented as a conscientious and careful editor, whom we may thank for as clean as possible a *Lesetext*, conforming closely to the intentions of the poet at the time of his death. At this point we enter the realms of a superior historical fiction. G. is conscious of the speculative nature of this and much else in the book. But this is highly intelligent and disciplined speculation, and G. fully makes his case that the development of the *Aeneid* is a topic that still deserves the attention of all Virgilians.

New Hall, Cambridge PHILIP HARDIE

LYRIC TALES

M. LOWRIE: *Horace's Narrative Odes*. Pp. viii + 382. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997. ISBN: 0-19-815053-9.

Horace's Narrative Odes attempts to fill a perceived gap in previous general accounts of Horace's lyric poetics. Lowrie's project is to provide a systematic inquiry into the function of narration in the *Carmina*. She is by no means the first investigator to tackle the vexed question of the thematic pertinence of narrative with respect to individual odes, but part of the novelty of her analysis resides in its ambitious scope. L.'s purview encompasses not only extended reworkings of mythical material (e.g. the Europa tale in *C*. 3.27—discussed under the rubric of 'Narrative Seduction' on pp. 297–314), but also shorter embedded 'stories', whether traditional or idiosyncratic (e.g. the retelling of an episode in the life of Teucer in *C*. 1.7; or the nebulous personal *historiae* alluded to in *C*. 3.7). Her inquiry reflects a thorough acquaintance with the oceanic scholarly literature on the *Odes*, as well as a familiarity (less uncommon in the discipline than formerly) with major currents in contemporary literary theory (e.g. narratological, deconstructionist, and post-modernist). Her approach to theory is distinctly eclectic: the Europa tale, for

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instance, is partly explained in terms of Barthes's notion of *jouissance*, while the inset prophecy of Nereus to Paris in the enigmatic *C*. 1.15 is analysed with judicious use of key narratological concepts that derive from Genette (pp. 131–2).

The book divides into two major sections of asymmetrical length. Part I ('The Poetics of Presence/The Poetics of Immortality') contains the first three chapters following the introduction, whereas Part II ('Lyric Narratives') occupies the bulk of the work (Chapters 4–9). Part I is more than a theoretical overture to the main portion: it sets out to anchor the author's hermeneutic perspective in readings of specific odes. The initial chapter on 'Lyric Discourses' lays out a crucial dichotomy that informs many subsequent readings. L.'s announced program is to elaborate a strong claim of an intrinsic antinomy between 'discourse' and 'narrative' (see pp. 33–5). In her own words, 'My primary concern is the dis/unity involved in the relation of lyric to narrative. Lyric is a genre that primarily enacts, so the incorporation of narrative creates a discursive dissonance. I will argue that lyric ways of making sense are essentially antithetical to narrative ways of making sense . . .' (p. 13). L. is fully aware of the tradition of exemplary narration in early Greek lyric (e.g. in Simonides, Pindar, and Horace's Lesbian models), but she problematizes the relationship between 'point' and 'story', between lyric argument and seemingly tangential narratives. L. finds the relation of narrative *exemplum* to argument not merely complex but deeply self-contradictory and productive of an ineradicable tension. Since she sees 'exemplarity', especially within the discursive framework of lyric, as inevitably implicated in incoherence, one of her major aims of interpretation is to disclose gaps and logical inconsistencies where others have sought to demonstrate unity. She regards the working assumption of 'unity' as an illusion engendered by certain readers' subliminal desire for closure. Literary critics of the *Carmina* who do not share her postmodernist premises will certainly disagree about how successful this overall deconstructive agenda is in relation to the interpretation of particular poems; but all (dissenters included) will benefit from her provocative readings of individual odes, where she throws down the gauntlet of internal disunity with conviction and panache.

Part I includes a chapter ('The Time of Writing and of Song') that raises a number of intriguing questions which are not, however, adequately resolved in the course of the discussion. Here L. stakes a preliminary claim for a strong opposition, *scribere/dicere*, operating in Horatian lyric, but despite the tantalizing diction of the paradigmatic *C*. 1.6, the case for a weak opposition remains valid, in my view, especially considering that its terms are collapsed no sooner than they are posed in the text (cp. '*Scriberis* Vario *carminis* alite'). Virgil's *recusatio* in the prooemium of *E*. 6—a passage that L. also lays under contribution in support of the dichotomy—may be read, as L. herself acknowledges, as manifesting a similar conflation of terms (cp. 'cum *canerem* reges' and 'quae Vari *praescripsit* pagina nomen'). The old orthodoxy that *dicere* and *canere* as terms for literary composition are virtually interchangeable in Augustan poetry appears to resist falsification. L. refers to these counter- indications in her account of *C*. 1.6 (pp. 59–64), but informs us in a footnote (p. 60 n. 27) that she is preparing a monograph on 'writing and singing in Latin poetry' that will presumably present more cogent evidence for her thesis.

In her treatment of exemplarity a recurrent theme is the poet's representation of historical events (cp. her readings of the Cleopatra Ode ['Foreign War/Civil War'], pp. 145–64, or of the Ode to Pollio, pp. 175–86). For L. Civil War references are always subversive of lyric discourse: even when oblique they disrupt laudatory agenda. In this regard, the cycle of Roman Odes and the Augustan encomia of Book 4 receive

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detailed exegeses (see Chapter 7: 'History and Epic: The Roman Odes', pp. 224–65, and Chapter 9: 'Praising Caesar', pp. 317–52). L. regards Horace's later panegyrics (especially those of Book 4) as testimony to the 'failure of aesthetics' under the pressure of politics ('art's declaration of its own eclipse', p. 351)—an argument too ingenious to lend itself to succinct summary here. The concluding chapter is markedly 'reader response' in its insistence on tracing the interpreter's perplexity and on ascribing this perplexity to the text. On the whole, the book poses a comprehensive postmodernist challenge to well-established views concerning Horatian lyric.

Duke University GREGSON DAVIS

PROPERTIUS

J. K. NEWMAN: *Augustan Propertius. The Recapitulation of a Genre.* (Spudasmata, 63.) Pp. ix + 560. Zurich and New York: Georg Olms, 1997. Paper, DM 68. ISBN: 3-487-10298-6.

This is in many ways an idiosyncratic book. On the positive side, readers are offered the musings of a broadly literate and observant mind confronting the complexities of Propertian poetry. Newman often makes interesting and thought-provoking connections (for example, reading Propertius' characteristic tone in terms of the traditions of satire). However, the negative side of the book's idiosyncrasies is that impressionistic (and often inconsistent) argumentation and failure to engage with contemporary scholarship seriously limit the persuasive power of these observations.

N.'s basic thesis is that Propertius' 'categorization as "one of the elegists," "a love-poet," even "a non-conformist" has robbed him of his rightful place at the centre of the Augustan, vatic assertion and confession' (p. 5). N. describes Propertius' characteristic combination of masochism and moralizing, of passionate outbursts and learned allusion as part of a long tradition that embraces both the satirist and the *vates*, poetic practitioners who were always granted 'the license to throw into relief what decorum hides' (p. 6), and to range freely between bawdy humor and elevated pronouncements in pursuing their task (readers of N.'s previous book on Catullus will recognize echoes here). This is an attractive thesis, combatting as it does the impulse to segregate Propertius from the public life of his time; it also opens up possibilities for interpreting the full range of Propertian poetry—from the most tortured expression of *furor* to the antiquarian and patriotic elegies of Book IV—without ignoring certain parts of the corpus or overworking the concept of irony to explain them away. However, in practice, the book's exposition does not hew to this line. Perhaps the most obvious failure is in the style of argumentation: much of the book consists of long digressions (on, e.g., Etruscan funerary iconography) which, despite the impressive detail and the wide learning they evince, are never fully integrated into the analysis of Propertius. But more important than this rhetorical miscalculation are the author's lack of contact with current scholarly debate and the inconsistency of his own claims.

Perhaps the single most influential trend in the scholarship of elegy since the mid-1980s has been a refusal to believe in the transparency of this poetry, its illusion of emotional immediacy. The most uncompromising (and wittily assured) statement of the separation between the suffering lover and the accomplished poet was made by Paul Veyne in his *L'élégie érotique romaine* (Paris, 1983; English translation: Chicago, 1988); however, the literary, political, and sociological implications of this separation were better brought out by other scholars, especially Maria Wyke. What is surprising

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in N.'s book is that he writes as if none of this discussion has yet happened. He rails against those who read Propertius' poetry as the objective record of a love affair, but that was already very much a minority position even when Veyne's book appeared fifteen years ago. Apart from one minimal ('cf. . . .') citation of just one of Wyke's many important articles on elegy, there is no acknowledgement of this major scholarly trend.

Furthermore, his own position is far from consistent. It is as if he wants to celebrate Propertius' sheer artistic virtuosity by emphasizing the separation between life and art, but is not willing to give up on the poet's earnestness. On one hand, N. can be applauded for refusing to reduce poetry to mere gamesmanship (cf. the 'neo-aestheticism' of Veyne as described by D. Fowler *G&R* 37 [1990], 104–5). On the other hand, he does not develop any satisfying model for interpretation; although he frequently gestures towards a dialogic framework in which a complex relationship between art and life might be described, he just as frequently voices what sounds very much like a Romantic belief in the transcendence of the artist's *ingenium*.

N.'s impassioned but inconsistent treatment of Propertius' 'feminism' offers a good example of the weaknesses of his argument: the picture of Propertius as an enlightened champion of women bears in this book the brunt of the Romantic need to prove the artist to be a humane visionary, against the author's own explicitly stated claim that Propertius was a practical, professional man of his own times. Although N. is here trying to raise important questions (about the rôle of the feminine in Propertius' poetry and about the poet's female readership), the execution is fatally flawed. First, he again fails to engage with, or even cite, key statements on these issues by Judith Hallett (*Arethusa* 6 [1973], 103–24) and Barbara Gold (in N. S. Rabinowitz and A. Richlin [edd.], *Feminist Theory and the Classic* [New York and London, 1993]). Secondly, he over-reads a few couplets (3.2.9–10, 3.3.19–20) as proving that Propertius' books were 'great favorites with women' (p. 9; cf. p. 316), without dealing with the complicated fact that these lines form part of Propertius' swaggeringly provocative definition of the difference between his poetry and respectable, public epic. The problems evident in this microcosm give an accurate picture of the potential stimulation and the actual disappointments offered by the book as a whole.

University of California, Berkeley KATHLEEN McCARTHY

MEDEA WRITES

F. BESSONE: *P. Ovidii Nasonis. Heroidum Epistula XII Medea Iasoni.* Pp. 324. Florence: Felice le Monnier, 1997. Paper, L. 70,000. ISBN: 88-00-81286-4.

An eighteenth-century translator of Medea's epistle characterized it as 'complaining, soothing, and menacing'. B.'s interests lie chiefly in the epistle's menace, especially menace of a metaliterary kind, as is clear from her introduction, subtitled 'Medea e lo spazio elegiaco'. Here B. discusses the interplay between the various literary Medeas, and demonstrates how the Medea of *Her*. 12 reshapes her literary past and, in particular, foreshadows her literary future. B. presents this foreshadowing in generic terms: Medea is a figure from tragedy who deigns to lower herself to the level of elegy just long enough to write an epistle; by the end, she is eager to return to tragedy, and signals this return with terms denoting the loftier genre ('Le minacce con cui Medea anticipa il futuro sono anche dischiarazioni di intenti poetici', p. 33);

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in addition, these same terms advertise Ovid's own version of what happens next, his tragedy Medea ('Ovidio rimanda a se stesso: l'annuncio del dramma imminente è anche l'annuncio del dramma scritto da Ovidio', ibid.). B. regards all this as ingenuity on the part of the author; she sees the interplay between *Her.* 12 and what can be reconstructed of Ovid's tragedy as evidence of the epistle's authenticity (pp. 16–19). Most of the arguments in B.'s introduction, and in her appendix (pp. 287–8) on 'la funzione della "memoria" letteraria' which she tags to *memini* (1),[1] are already familiar; but here they are conveniently collected and engagingly, if somewhat laboriously, expressed.

B. gives text with apparatus, but the Heroidean textual critic will find here little that is unfamiliar. B.'s text rarely deviates from her 'edizione di riferimento'—Heinrich Dörrie's 1971 edition, which B. rather charitably terms 'meritoria ma non sempre attendibile' (p. 43). These deviations, twelve in all, are set out in a clear table (p. 45). They are, for the most part, uncontroversial: five of them were suggested twenty-five years ago by Dörrie's reviewers. The apparatus seems accurate (my own examination on microfilm of P, the fallible *optimus*, upholds B.'s reports of its readings over those by Dörrie), but is, as B. herself states, 'molto selettivo' (p. 43). No conjecture of B.'s own is to be found in her apparatus, let alone in her text. To lament this lack of critical and editorial daring may seem churlish, especially since new editions of the *Heroides* are imminent (one of which promises over 900 conjectures, enough to glut even the most voracious textual appetite); yet the state of the text is so appalling that successful interpretation relies heavily on textual criticism. Concerning punctuation B. is worryingly blasé: her six deviations from Dörrie's punctuation (B. does not list them: 'Non sono qui segnalate divergenze di punteggiatura', p. 45) are erratic, and include two typos (50, 70); one seemingly pointless divergence (177); and one change (202) which may be correct, but which sadly undoes Housman's ingenious '[aries est] dos mea, qu "am" dicam si tibi "redde", neges' (paraphrased by Housman as 'aries est dos mea, et, si dicam tibi "hanc redde", neges').

B.'s commentary is learned and well-observed, but lacks economy: every line of the epistle is discussed, and notes a page long are common. The more casual reader may be deterred by the amount of information and argumentation, even with the comprehensive index acting as guide. B.'s notes are at their most detailed, and also their most verbose, when she pursues the themes set out in her introduction. No instance of foreshadowing is missed (see e.g. her notes on 180, 187, 208); allusive irony is found even in apparently harmless utterances (e.g. in 'quis enim bene celat amorem?', 37); and words are made to bear a generic significance wherever possible (e.g. 208 *ingentes*). Many persuasive points are made; sometimes they are made pointedly and succinctly (e.g. at 152, on the child's naive enthusiasm at seeing his father in the marriage-procession: 'L'immagine è quella di un trionfo (romano): il bambino interpreta il corteo nuziale, la *deductio*, come un magnifico trionfo del padre'); but frequently they are condemned to flounder amidst excess verbiage (e.g. at 69, where the nice point that *fuerant certe* is an 'Alexandrian footnote' reminding the reader of Apollonius Rhodius 3.980ff. is all but swamped by B.'s rhetoric). On occasion, intriguing ideas are relegated to square brackets, the significance of which B. does not explain (thus e.g. the reminiscences at 46 and 155–6 of other parts of the myth).

A reviewer of an earlier work in this series remarked on the extravagance of devoting a 276-page book to the first three *Heroides*. B.'s 324-page book on just a

[1]The numeration here is that which B. herself follows, and which she explains on p. 43.

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single epistle may strike some as unacceptably prolix; but success in bringing current ideas on the *Heroides* to the understanding of Medea's letter offsets B.'s verbosity.

University of Newcastle upon Tyne J. E. REESON

HEROIDES

PETER E. KNOX (ed.): *Ovid:* Heroides: *Select Epistles* (Cambridge Greek and Latin Classics). Pp. ix + 329. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995. Cased, £40/$64.95 (Paper, £14.95/$22.95). ISBN: 0-521-36279-2 (0-521-36834-6 pbk).

E. J. KENNEY (ed.): *Ovid:* Heroides XVI–XXI (Cambridge Greek and Latin Classics). Pp. xiii + 269. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. Cased, £40/$64.95 (Paper, £14.95/$22.95). ISBN: 0-521-46072-7 (0-521-46623-7 pbk).

The informed study of Ovid and of elegy is significantly advanced by these two major commentaries on the *Heroides*, together with the new texts provided. Both commentaries take the literary interpretation of these difficult, rewarding, and neglected poems into fresh territory.

P. K. presents a selection of the single *Heroides*, namely 1, that of Penelope; 2, Phyllis; 5, Oenone; 6, Hypsipyle; 7, Dido; 10, Ariadne; and 11, Canace. He also includes the *Epistula Sapphus*, which he convincingly argues is un-Ovidian. E. J. K. includes all the double epistles, which he argues are authentic.

P. K.'s selection makes interesting and varied reading, ranging from 10, virtually all lamentation, to 11, virtually all narrative, and including heroines familiar and unfamiliar to students alike. It is also good to have one's view on Augustan poetry improved by a thorough treatment of the *ES*—un-Ovidian is not unworthy. Yet his selection cannot be reconciled with his views on the authenticity of the epistles. P. K. takes an objectivist stance, arguing that only those poems mentioned in *Amores* 2.18 are genuine: yet he excludes 4, Phaedra (guaranteed by *Amores* 2.18), and includes 10, Ariadne (not mentioned)—and whatever poem on Sappho was meant by *Amores* 2.18, it is not the *Epistula Sapphus*.

E. J. K.'s views on the authenticity of the double *Heroides* are more overtly subjective, in essence that, once allowances have been made for spurious interpolated couplets, the poems are authentic in their entirety. Though it fits the series's brief that his views are expressed concisely, one wishes that for these poems above all he had stretched a point—it is frustrating to be referred to earlier and forthcoming articles.

Both P. K. and E. J. K. provide thoughtful introductions, which weight their material differently. It is a basic contention of both commentaries that the heroic world of epic and tragedy is recast by Ovid in elegiac and modern terms, and both document this process with learning, subtlety, and acuity.

P. K.'s densely written introduction covers a lot of factual ground admirably well, from Ovid's career to the distinctive features of the metre and style of the *Heroides*. Particularly good is the discussion of the genre, where he stresses Ovid's innovations, and the contribution made by rhetorical exercises and tragic and poetic monologues. In an important discussion of 7, Dido, he argues that in each poem Ovid self-consciously refers to a single literary text rather than to a heterogeneous literary or

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mythological tradition. Though this approach falls down rather when applied to 2 and 11, where we lack the ancestor texts, it nevertheless yields a convincing interpretation of 7 as a negative, or 'pessimistic', reading of *Aeneid* 4. A similar insight could have been applied to the other poems, for none of the absent heroes are permitted to answer the call of duty, but are all accused of personal failings (e.g. 1.1 *lento . . . Ulixe*, 2.78 *perfide*, 5.109 *tu leuior foliis*, 6.109 *mobilis*).

E. J. K.'s laconic introduction goes straight to the double *Heroides* and their narrative sources. He dates the double epistles to late in Ovid's career, and there is enough material in the commentary to enable the reader to consider them in their context as late Ovidian, late Augustan poetry. (The disquieting parallels between the careers of Paris and of Aeneas are well brought out.) He includes a welcome discussion of the arrangement of the epistles, noting that the central pair 18–19 (Leander and Hero) separate two interludes of ironic comedy with their romantic tragedy, and that in this context the happy ending of Callimachus' Acontius and Cydippe is subverted.

Throughout, E. J. K. concentrates on Ovid's depiction of the female characters in each exchange of letters, well demonstrating how Ovid reworked the precepts of the *Ars Amatoria* to create them from miscellaneous sources (in the case of Helen) or *ex nihilo* in the case of Cydippe, who, he plausibly argues, was a *kophon prosopon* in Callimachus. It is a real strength of this commentary to find the female perspective, and female suffering, so valued. In 16–17 he finds the omission of the Suitors' Oath puzzling, but it may be that it was crucial to Ovid's conception of Helen. With the Oath, Helen needs to be in the grip of a grand passion to elope—yet on the evidence of 17 she is not (one mention of *noster amor*, in 17.246). Rather, she speaks of *pudor* and *fama*, sounding more like a lady tiptoeing through a minefield of protocol to secure social advancement—a character straight out of the *Ars*.

Appropriately in a series aimed primarily at students, both editors are sufficiently generous with lingusitic help to put the texts within the reach of novice Latinists.

Thus P. K. will, for example, explain that in 2.98 *Demophoonta* is a Greek accusative, 2.142 scans as *-ĕrunt*, 6.7 *quamlibet* is to be taken with the ablative absolute *aduerso . . . uento*, 7.155 *superet* is a final subjunctive, *ES* 121 *non ueniunt in idem* is a Grecism. Equally helpful is the demarcation and discussion of the sections of each poem as they unfold. Key features of Ovidian style, such as syllepsis, are eludicated as they occur, though it is a shame that the *ἀπὸ κοινοῦ* construction is defined unambiguously only on its tenth appearance. The practice with Greek quotations is inconsistent, and may trouble the student: some are given only in translation (as at 1.78), others in Greek and English (1.63, 5.136), but a very few remain untranslated (as at 1.27, 1.29, and 1.87). The lack of cross-referencing is frustrating, e.g. at 2.117–120 on the emotive paradox of the fatal marriage there is no reference to 6.43–6, 7.93–6, or 11.103–6. The key terms *queror* and *querela* appear in neither index. A strong point of P. K.'s commentary is his knowledge of Ovid's amatory works, but a skimpy index makes it impossible to recover his important observations.

Likewise, E. J. K. at 16.183 explains *turba . . . numeroque* as a hendiadys, 17.179 *uir abest nobis* as 'dative of dis(?)advantage', 18.88 *uisa* sc. *est*, 21.44 scans *adēst*. More use is made of translation to clarify linguistic points, e.g. at 17.165 and 20.101–2. Greek quotations are consistently translated. E. J. K. articulates the text by paragraphing it, which is typical of his approach—helpful, authoritative, and wasting no words. Again, the indexes are exiguous. Though it is possible to trace Callimachus, it is not possible to track down the valuable comments on Ovid's amatory works. There are no entries for the fire imagery that dominates 16, Paris.

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Both volumes depart from the normal format of the Cambridge series in devoting more space than is usual in the commentary to textual matters, and in providing a fuller apparatus. This is unavoidable, for the text of *Heroides* is an unholy mess, and for 16.39–144 and 21.147–250, ill-attested to boot.

E. J. K.'s text is original; and that of P. K., though based on that of earlier editions, draws on E. J. K.'s unpublished apparatus. It is much to be regretted that E. J. K. has not edited all of the *Heroides* for the Oxford Classical Text series.

It is no mean achievement to produce even a servicable text of these poems, and it is a pleasure to report that the texts of the *Heroides* provided by E. J. K. and P. K. are of a high quality, and mark a considerable advance over the Loeb edition of Showerman and Goold, the other edition likely to find its way into the hands of students. Two examples only must serve. First, at 2.53 P. K. prints E. J. K.'s emendation *his* for the vulgate *dis*, thus, as the commentary makes clear, adroitly summing up the catalogue in 49–52 of all the ruses that Demophoon had used to deceive Phyllis. Demophoon's oath by the gods (35–42) belongs to an earlier phase of Phyllis' reproaches, and at this point she is determined to press on with her assault, not recapitulate. Second, at 20.53, E. J. K. prints W. S. Watt's correction *nata esses* of *aut esses*, which produced either a harsh ellipsis or near nonsense.

Both commentaries use scholarship to enhance and illuminate the literary values of their texts, and can only stimulate further interest, now far better informed, in these rewarding poems.

Royal Holloway, London L. MORRIS

ARS AMATORIA II

MARKUS JANKA (ed.): *Ovid, Ars Amatoria, Buch 2: Kommentar* (Wissenschaftliche Kommentare zu griechischen und lateinischen Schriftstellern). Pp. 514. Heidelberg: C. Winter, 1997. Cased. ISBN: 3-8253-0593-7.

J. has, first and foremost, stepped into F. Bömer's shoes. His commentary on Ovid, *Ars* 2, published in the same series as Bömer's monumental work on the *Metamorphoses*, discusses with the same thoroughness textual criticism, language, sources, and *Realien*, and J. acquits himself masterfully. He puts forward several well-founded arguments for remaining faithful to manuscript readings, e.g. 2.308 *quaedam gaudia noctis habe*: Kenney uses *cruces* here, but J. offers the plausible translation 'Hab' eine gewisse (sc. stattliche) Anzahl verbalisierter Liebesfreuden in Petto', i.e. 'declare your enjoyment of love frequently and diversely' (p. 248). The verses 2.669–74, which some editors reject as spurious or shift, are rendered meaningful here, being put into context with new arguments (pp. 465–9). It is doubtful whether remarks on usage such as 'Die Junktur *tigris domare* erscheint nur selten', followed by expansive quotation of the rare examples (p. 166), will contribute greatly to our understanding of a work like the *Ars*, and such elaboration (in J. not rare), which is perhaps in the era of the CD ROM in any case superfluous, only adds to the sheer length of this commentary (514 pp. for 746 vv.!). However, the *Ars* has hardly been spoilt so far in terms of scholarly scrutiny—Book 3 still awaits its modern commentary—so too much is definitely not too late. Even so, it is a pity

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that, apart from a list of the lines given a *textkritisch* going-over, J. has provided no indices.

J. also shows an interest in something that Bömer hardly noticed: Ovid's humour. Alongside some (not all though) erotic double entendres (*bene* pp. 261f. on 2.333 *officia* with its additional sense as *munera Veneris*), he notes above all parodies, supplementing those observed by his predecessors with new ones (cf. esp. p. 316 on the allusion in 2.413 to Virg. *Aen.* 6.851–3). J. displays refreshingly profound knowledge of almost all literature on the *Ars* and summarizes his forerunners' conclusions in the introductory remarks to each of the sections into which he divides the text. He is rarely critical, however, with one exception: A. Sharrock, *Seduction and Repetition in Ovid's Ars Amatoria 2* (Oxford, 1994). This book is a comprehensive and mostly convincing illustration of the text's polyphony at 2.1–144 and 493–534, giving particular prominence to the implicit metapoetics. To J. it is like a red rag to a bull. So ingrained is his disapproval of such interpretations that when he addresses Sharrock *ad hoc*, he generally abandons argumentation in favour of comments such as 'irrelevant', 'erroneous', 'untenable', 'over-interpreting'; judgements like these are passed on virtually every page from p. 43 to p. 129. He does occasionally resort to considered arguments, citing, for instance, analogous passages which he believes refute Sharrock's reading. Thus on 2.46 *et leve per lini vincula nectis opus*, which Sharrock interprets as an allusion to Callimachean poetics, J. notes that the only parallel for this 'significantly describes the labours of a spider (cf. *Am.* 1.14.8 *cum leve deserta sub trabe nectis opus*)', a poetological level of meaning being therefore 'definitely out of the question' (p. 75). Leaving aside *Met.* 6.1ff., where the spider Arachne is turned into a metaphor for a 'Callimachean' artist, a spider's *opus* is compared in *Am.* 1.14.8 to the *puella*'s hair; as part of the *puella*'s *corpus*, which can also be read as the *corpus* of the *Amores* (A. Keith, *CW* 88 [1994], 27ff.), the *puella*'s elaborate coiffure stands metaphorically for poetry. J.'s parallel thus corroborates Sharrock's reading.

No one will deny that Sharrock's interpretation of *Ars* 2 enters at times the realm of pure speculation, but J.'s offensive hits not only at her: in effect it strikes at a whole line of approach applied in the last decade by many scholars. He ought to have confronted the method as such, but has failed to do so. He ignores any recent literature that goes beyond the narrow confines of *Ars* analysis, disregarding P. Veyne and D. Kennedy on the genre, G. B. Conte on new approaches to Roman literature, and essential reading on Ovid's other works, such as F. Spoth (*Heroides*), S. Hinds (*Metamorphoses*), A. Barchiesi (*Fasti*), and G. Williams (*Tristia*, *Ex Ponto*, and *Ibis*). J.'s introduction, in which he could have put his reading of the *Ars* into context as regards modern scholarship, is more than lean; its seven pages offer only a sketch of past *Ars* research and name the aspects to which the commentary gives weight. When J. talks here for example about Ovid's intertextual references (p. 36), it is hard to imagine that he means the same as exponents of modern critical methods who actually coined the term 'intertextuality'. It is certainly striking that, when J. cites parallels to passages in the *Ars* from older authors, he mostly talks of Ovid 'imitating', 'following', 'drawing on', or similar. And J.'s application of the name Ovid hardly suggests familiarity with literary theory. He does occasionally mention the poetic *persona* and note some reservations about biographical interpretations (esp. p. 226). But it is neverthless invariably the real author speaking in the text—e.g. p. 156, where 'Ovid identifies himself with his pupils'—not the *praeceptor amoris* into whose rôle he has slipped.

J.'s commentary has breathed new life into the scholarly tradition so impressively represented by F. Bömer, and this we must definitely welcome. But recent scholars have

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also breathed new life into Ovid studies, and perhaps J. should not have closed his mind quite so persistently to their arguments.

Munich NIKLAS HOLZBERG

'ILLE NOVAVIT OPUS'

BARBARA WEIDEN BOYD: *Ovid's Literary Loves: Influence and Innovation in the* Amores. Pp. xii + 252. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1998. Cased, $39.50. ISBN: 0-472-10759-3.

The book is intended essentially as a refutation of what B. believes to be the *communis opinio* that Ovid as author of the *Amores* ranks within the elegiac tradition as a mere epigone, because he imitates or, at best, parodies Propertius. This view was certainly prevalent at the end of the seventies, but several scholars have since argued most convincingly against it. Readers of, for example, the books by M. Labate (Pisa, 1984), M. Keul (Frankfurt a.M., 1989), and B. Gauly (Frankfurt a.M., 1990), and the articles of Ch. Neumeister (*A&A* 28 [1982], 94ff.: on *mimesis* and *imitatio* in *Am.* 2.18) and B. Zimmermann (in Picone/Zimmermann, *Ovidius redivivus* [Stuttgart, 1994], 1ff.: on the poetics of the *Amores*) will therefore already be familiar with B.'s principal ideas. She herself does not seem to have looked at these or in fact at any other recent *Amores* studies of significance except those written in English. 'Foreign-language' *Amores* literature written after 1981 is represented in B.'s bibliography by three Italian articles covering together seventeen whole pages.

In order to show that Ovid produced with his *Amores* his own very original contribution to the genre, B. considers three aspects of the poems: intertextuality (Chapters 1–3), the poet-lover's self-portrayal (Chapters 4–5), and the relationship between the *Amores* and Ovid's later works (Chapter 6). The examination of intertextuality in selected poems or passages produces the following picture: multiple allusion, not merely constant references to Propertius alone, so that the poet can go beyond existing generic confines and enrich the elegy with new possibilities in language, form, and content. However, quite apart from the fact that recent studies have already come to the same conclusion, this is no new departure in Roman love elegy: multiple allusion is characteristic of Propertius' and Tibullus' poetry, and both of these—especially Propertius in his fourth book—widen the boundaries of the genre. True innovation in the *Amores* can, by contrast, be found in respect of wit, eroticism, psychology, narrative technique, confronting contemporary society, and Augustus. But these very themes, a discussion of which could have meant a Great Leap Forward in our interpretation of the *Amores*, are faded out by B.

Having said this, the *Amores* narrator at least engages B.'s attention in one regard: in the two chapters on the poet-lover's self-portrayal she reads the elegies as a plotted narrative with beginning, middle, and end. She is, in my opinion, absolutely right to do so, but, again, neither is the idea new (cf. e.g. Zimmermann, pp. 13ff.), nor is Ovid the first to present a collection of elegies as a 'story'. Propertius 1–3 and Tibullus 1–2 can also be read as plotted narrative, as has been demonstrated most extensively by K. Neumeister (*Die Überwindung der elegischen Liebe bei Properz* [Frankfurt a.M., 1983]) and F.-H. Mutschler (*Die poetische Kunst Tibulls* [ibid. 1985]). And B.'s analysis of the 'story' creates some unfortunate confusion. She differentiates between two narratives, the programmatic story of the poet 'about his early career' (p. 133) and the amatory plot about the lover, which is embedded in the poet's tale. Accordingly, in her

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interpretation, where she only singles out individual poem sequences, she separates those which belong to the programmatic story (1.1–3, 1.15–2.6–3.9, 2.1–3.1–3.15) from those belonging to the amatory plot (here only 1.5–7–9). Yet, as—oddly enough—B. herself frequently notes, all of these poems draw on the tension between elegiac eroticism and elegiac poetics: opus is the poetry book, but equally the act of love, and *puella* is the desired one, but at the same time a metaphor for elegiac poetry. It would therefore have made more sense to read the *Amores* in linear progression (cf. the outlines of one such interpretation in my *Ovid*^{2} [Munich, 1998], pp. 55ff.).

In her last chapter B. announces so very tantalizingly that she wants to investigate an approach by which the *Amores* could be seen 'as providing the program, as it were, for much of Ovid's subsequent poetic productivity' (p. 203). It is actually possible to read Ovid's works from the *Heroides* through to his exile poetry as a series of 'metamorphoses' of the elegiac discourse found in the *Amores*. But B. leaves this avenue largely unexplored. She contents herself with two textual comparisons (*Am.* 3.2 with *Ars* 1.135–62 and *Am.* 3.6.45–84 with *Fast.* 3.11–40)—of which the one has already been given frequent thought in the past (most recently by Gauly, pp. 137ff.), and the other offers too few analogies—and with applying A. Sharrock's interpretation of Pygmalion as elegiac poet-lover (*JRS* 81 [1991], 36ff.) to the poet-lover of the *Amores*.

The only true merit of B.'s book is its wealth of new observations on the intertextuality of single elegies, in particular of those that have hardly been spotlighted before now (cf. pp. 53–66 on 2.16, pp. 67–79 on 3.10, and pp. 142–7 on the prefatory epigram; B. wonders quite rightly here whether 'the so-called first edition ever existed in any form other than as fiction'). Her contribution to the textual analysis of the *Amores* is therefore significant. As far as an adequate evaluation of these poems, one encompassing their thematic polyphony and fighting it out with modern scholarship, is concerned—well, that is a book which has yet to be written.

Munich NIKLAS HOLZBERG

AMATORY OVID

D. JONES: *Enjoinder and Argument in Ovid's* Remedia Amoris. (Hermes Einzelschriften, 77.) Pp. 119. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 1997. DM 54. ISBN: 3-515-07078-8.

J. L. ARCAZ, G. LAGUNA MARISCAL, A. RAMIREZ DE VERGER (edd.): *La obra amatoria de Ovidio: Aspectos textuales, interpretación literaria y pervivencia*. Pp. xii + 249. Madrid: Ediciones Clásicas, 1996. ISBN: 84-7882-244-5.

Since the *Remedia Amoris* has not benefited much from the Ovidian renaissance of recent years, a book devoted to the poem ought to be particularly welcome. Jones's study is a focused and well-executed treatment of its thesis, but although of interest to scholars it is not likely to do much to raise the status of its subject more generally. There are no translations, but this is not too serious an omission since the book probably does not have much to offer to readers other than determined students of a particular brand of Latin rhetoric. It offers a description of the rhetorical feature which J. calls 'Enjoinder and Argument', or 'E+A', in its various manifestations: that

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is, the way in which the teacher gives his pupils some instruction, and then offers reasons why the advice should be followed. Much of the *Rem.* makes use of this feature: we learn that most (but not all) imperatives are Enjoinders, and many (but not all) Enjoinders are supported by Gnomic Proofs and exempla. The book aims to 'reveal the skeletal logic of this persuasive device', but readers expecting a modern exposition of Ovidian persuasive rhetoric will be disappointed. It is not fair to complain that a book does not do what it never set out to do, but it did seem odd not to mention (for example) the seductiveness of hunting in erotic discourse apropos the injunction to the suffering lover that he should wear himself out in that pursuit (*Rem*. 199–206, discussed by J. at p. 26). It seems to me that there are many places where Ovid's rhetoric in the *Rem*. is working playfully, teasingly, *against* the primary aim of curing the lover of his love. On p. 43, likewise, J. discusses the advice about engaging in lovemaking unflattering to the beloved, without any acknowledgement that there is something very sexy and seductive about this passage. J. reads the poem in a straightforward, positivistic way: readers sympathetic to this approach will find it worthwhile to wade through the variations on a theme, and will indeed be rewarded by some nuggets. But I was interested in the comment on p. 62: 'In this erotodidactic work pains should be taken to avoid reading amatory motifs into Exempla where such motivational material is not present, but it must also be recognised that Ovid often injects amatory material into Exemplary items where logic does not demand it.' So we must be careful to avoid responding to the subliminal seductiveness of Ovid's erotic rhetoric. We shall really have learned the lesson of the *Remedia Amoris* if we can do that.

La obra amatoria de Ovidio is, by contrast, a much broader work. It is a collection of essays by a variety of Spanish scholars, including the editors, on various aspects of Ovid's amatory poetry (not including the *Heroides*, but with a surprisingly high profile for the fragment about cosmetics, *Medicamina Faciei Femineae*). A great deal is packed into the book's 250 small pages, constituting a wide-ranging and cohesive study of Ovid's amatory poetry, covering textual questions, literary readings, and reception. The range of themes is good, but, for me, the work is marred by a sense that it could have been written fifteen years ago. A glance at the (collected) bibliography betrays the critical agenda: there is very little sign, either in the bibliography or in the essays themselves, of work done in the field since the early eighties, in English, French, or Italian (with a few notable exceptions). I would have to acknowledge that the same accusation could be made in reverse: but the impression remains that the volume offers very little that is new. Quite a large proportion of the space is devoted to description and paraphrase of the text, at a very straightforward level.

The volume begins with a brief paper by Antonio Ramírez de Verger, which discusses various textual cruces in the amatory poetry. The longest analysis here is of *Rem*. 565–6, a problematic couplet (regarded as spurious by editors such as Goold and Henderson) in a series of instructions to various types of people to make full use of any source of worry in their lives, in order to drive out love. R. argues for the reading *facto* where Kenney prints *fato* (both readings have manuscript support), keeping Kenney's *obesse* for the other contested word. The line would then read something like 'and he should think that his wife is an obstacle to the actions which are his own responsibility' (p. 13). I expect the debate will continue. The next paper, by Luis Rivero Garcia, is a more substantial work, devoted to the text of the *Medicamina Faciei Femineae*. Finally in this section, Juan Luis Arcaz Pozo traces the distinctive Spanish contribution to the manuscript history of Ovid's amatory works.

The middle section comprises four literary studies. The first is an analysis by

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Fernando Navarro Antolín of the *lena* and her relationship with the *puella*, and the poet. Bringing together *Am.* 1.8, 1.10, 3.5, and 3.8, together with poems by the other elegists, he argues that the use of the *lena* to give erotodidactic advice becomes, in Propertius and still more in Ovid, an opening-up of the subjective elegiac voice to other viewpoints, which may undermine the lover's position. Connected with this paper (but perhaps it could have been more so) is the chapter by Eulogio F. Baeza Angulo, on magic in the amatory poetry. He gathers all the main relevant examples, together with comparisons from other poets. There are some nice touches, such as the stress on the way the speaker of *Am.* 3.7 uses the awesome power of magic to excuse his uncharacteristic impotence, whereas his partner has a more mundane explanation: 'alio lassus amore uenis' (3.7.80). In between, Rivero García continues his work on the *MFF* with an analysis of its structure and literary value, and Francisco Socas Gavilán takes on the question of Ovid's 'Augustanism', particularly in the *Ars Amatoria* and in the poet's own life. He concludes that although the poem may have been just the excuse the emperor was looking for, the interactions of poetry and life in antiquity make writing such a poem a political act.

The final section is devoted to the reception of Ovid's amatory works in later literature, a topic which, although not exactly neglected, deserves more attention, having suffered by comparison with the lively interest in *Metamorphic* Nachleben. The first paper, by Gabriel Laguna Mariscal, examines the influence on the amatory works in 'Late Antiquity': in fact most of the paper deals with poets we might call 'silver' rather than 'late', such as Seneca, Juvenal, Martial, and Statius, together with snippets from later authors. L.'s view is that the most interesting aspects of Ovidian influence are in the fields of rhetorical technique and amatory topoi. The final two papers of this section and of the book treat Ovidian influence on Spanish writers of the sixteenth century, notably Melchor de la Serna (Juan Luis Pozo and Vicente Cristóbal) and Francisco Farfán (Cristóbal alone). This last essay I found one of the most interesting in the volume. It is concerned with the way in which the *Remedia Armoris* has been appropriated in different cultural contexts as a powerful intertext for anti-erotic moral tracts.

Keele University ALISON SHARROCK

NOTHING TO DO WITH CAESAR?

R. GRANOBS: *Studien zur Darstellung römischer Geschichte in Ovids 'Metamorphosen'*. Pp. 174. Frankfurt am Main, etc.: Peter Lang, 1997. ISBN: 3-631-31953-3.

This dissertation, approved by the Technical University of Berlin in 1996 and lightly revised for publication, supposes that Ovid faced a compositional challenge as he brought the chronological thread of the *Metamorphoses* down to Roman history. He had to cope with his audience's disbelief that metamorphosis could occur in historical contexts. Conversely, his literary and historiographical sources for Roman history offered little material suited to narrating transformations. G.'s task is to describe how Ovid reconciles metamorphosis with Roman history and to re-examine the old charge that the poet's *ingenium* was flagging at the end of the *Metamorphoses.* G. argues that Ovid reduces historical events and chronology to a minimal and often discontinuous framework that is subordinated to stories of metamorphosis. In G.'s opinion, Ovid replaces the political message of Roman history (cf. the *Aeneid*) with

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the un-Augustan theme of metamorphosis. G. prejudices his investigation, however, by limiting it to the segment of narrative that extends from the kings of Alba to the Roman advent of Aesculapius (14.609–15.744). He excludes the assassination and deification of Julius Caesar on the grounds that the episode has been much discussed and is extraneous to his topic (p. 17 n. 39). In addition, he passes over the 'extremely complex' problem of Ovid's relationship with Augustus because it is of only secondary importance. In G.'s view, Ovid focuses on the 'Sagenhistorie' of Romulus and Numa Pompilius so as to avoid the problem of narrating unreal metamorphoses in later history. Yet G.'s analysis loses credibility and interest precisely because of its refusal to address the political implications of the final 'historical' event of the poem. As the exilic Ovid says, 'in tua deduxi tempora, Caesar, opus' (*Tr*. 2.560). Surely metamorphosis has something to do with Caesar.

The dissertation is divided into three overlapping studies, which are devoted to structural analysis, classification of metamorphoses, *Quellenforschung*, and fussy debates with outdated scholarship. The first study analyzes the 'Aufbau' of the Roman coda. G. observes that more than half of Ovid's Roman history consists of Greek inset narratives and concludes that their primary function is to compensate for the scarcity of metamorphoses in Roman history (p. 23). G. also identifies instances of chronological inconsistency and discontinuity, which he interprets as evidence of Ovid's difficulty in arranging his material. While G. does not believe that the *Metamorphoses* was an 'adhuc crescens et rude carmen' (*Tr*. 1.7.21) at the time of Ovid's relegation, he naively repeats the old saw that the poet could have improved the final book (p. 41). G. does not suspect that his 'irritation' at the poem's lack of chronological continuity might be a calculated effect. The second part of the dissertation classifies and analyzes the representation of the eight metamorphoses in the main narrative of Roman history: the spring by the gate of Janus, Romulus, Hersilia, Egeria, Tages, the spear of Romulus, Cipus, and Aesculapius. G. attempts to reconstruct the original form of these stories from extant sources (Ennius, Cicero, Livy, Valerius Maximus, Plutarch) and to describe Ovid's methods of adapting them to the theme of metamorphosis. The final part of the dissertation examines the view of Roman history that emerges from the *Metamorphoses*. G. believes that Ovid generates a positive and idealized image of Rome, which is poetically rather than historically true. Rome's warlike past is played down as Romulus and Numa are represented as brokers of peace and happily married husbands. Cipus is a good Roman magistrate who subordinates himself to the *res publica*. Finally, the political authority of the Senate is celebrated as it wins the favor of Aesculapius. While G. refuses to find anything subversive in Ovid's harmonious picture of Roman history, he maintains that, despite similarities to the rhetoric of Augustan restoration, it is as unpolitical as the theme of metamorphosis itself (p. 158).

Although G. proves his competence in assembling and comparing ancient sources, his interrogation of the *Metamorphoses* is extremely narrow and embarrassingly out of step with mainstream Ovidian studies in the mid-nineties. One would need ten tongues to name the ranks of recent books and articles that have the honor of being neglected by G. As a result, no notice is given to debates that bear on G.'s argument: the ambiguous politics of the end of the *Metamorphoses*; the relationship of Romulus to Augustus; whether or not the poem is about metamorphosis; whether or not metamorphosis is un-Augustan; what determines belief and disbelief in metamorphosis; the relationship between inset and frame narrative; and what the intertextual relationship between the *Metamorphoses* and *Fasti* is. It comes as no surprise then that G. advances our understanding of Ovid's text in no appreciable way.

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On the contrary, after reading G., one might hope that Ovid had a better use for Roman history than the tedious imperative of narrating metamorphoses.

The Pennsylvania State University STEPHEN M. WHEELER

EPIC SPEAKERS

M. HELZLE: *Der Stil ist der Mensch: Redner und Reden im römischen Epos*. (Beitrage zur Altertumskunde, 73.) Pp. 349. Stuttgart and Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1996. Cased, DM 118. ISBN: 3-519-07622-5.

This study offers a detailed examination of the relationship between individual speaking style ('idiolect') and characterization in Virgil, Lucan, Statius, and Silius Italicus. H. excludes Valerius Flaccus, contending that the *Argonautica* does not lend itself to the same kind of speech analysis as other Roman epics. There may well be good reasons for excluding Valerius (e.g. length), but this is unlikely to be one of them. Some years ago a study by Eigler (*Monologische Redeformen bei Valerius Flaccus* [Frankfurt a.M., 1988]) laid much of the groundwork for such a study of the *Argonautica*, and H. would have done well to follow it up. In a substantial methodological introduction (pp. 11–48), H. argues for a strong correspondence between the idiolect of an individual and the direct narrative characterization of the same figure in the chosen poems. The correspondence is explained via the practice of *recitatio*, which offered limited means for characterization through change of voice, and therefore prompted poets to individualize through choice of words, figures of speech, and, at times, metrical devices. H. goes on to discuss the rôle of *ethopoiia* in classical literature, quoting liberally from the plentiful ancient sources on the subject. After laying out his methodology, H. gets down to analysis of individual authors. He proceeds chronologically, devoting a single lengthy chapter to each poet; a more conceptual organization of the material might well have had its advantages. Treatments of specific passages occasionally tend to the prolix and, inevitably, some analyses are more convincing than others. On the whole, H. has rather more useful and original things to say on Lucan and Statius than he does on Virgil and Silius.

A potential problem for speech analysis in imperial Roman epic arises from the poems' rich intertextuality, but in general H. assimilates this element well in his discussions of diction. A good example is the analysis of Lucan's Caesar and Amyclas episode (pp. 86–104), where H. observes that the latter makes repeated use of Greek loan words through literary allusions which (paradoxically) emphasize his close connection to the natural world. The demonstration of Lucan's marshalling of diverse intertexts (including the *Hecale*, *Georgics*, and especially Aratus' *Phaenomena*) in aid of characterization shows H.'s work at its best, and this section represents an important contribution to Lucanian scholarship.

At times, H.'s relentless use of 'statistics' seems methodologically suspect. In the initial chapter H. rightly raises the issue of circumstance as a determinant of diction (p. 48)—an obvious limiting factor in any study of this kind. Nevertheless, H. occasionally fails to draw the obvious conclusion in specific discussions. As a result, the focus on diction can sometimes make too little of situational considerations, especially when H., as often, juxtaposes individual characters. In discussing Statius' Antigone and Argia, for example, H. suggests that this pair, united in their defiance of Creon, deploy vocabulary from contrasting 'registers': Argia from the language of love and marriage, Antigone from the language of familial piety. This is supported

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by a statistical exposition, intended to demonstrate fundamental differences in characterization. But, as H. notes earlier, the exclusive focus of both women is the same man—the now deceased Polynices—and their respective relationships to him would appear to preclude the possibility of meaningful contrast in the chosen terms. Put another way, since only one of the women happens to be in love with and married to Polynices, the fact that only she consistently deploys the language of love and marriage in discussing him proves very little and does not seem to merit the lengthy demonstration it receives.

The chapter on Statius is unique in its extended discussion of larger poetic issues. H. argues here that the poet has structured his closing book along the lines of a tragic play, and a considerable amount of space (pp. 146–59) is devoted to assimilating different passages to specific parts of a Greek tragedy. The subsequent analysis of systematic allusion to Virgil's Dido (pp. 162–4) is very good indeed, but it would have been nice to see these two promising lines of inquiry brought into closer contact. In particular, H. might have argued for a fusion of the characteristics of tragic Dido and the exile Aeneas in the single figure of Polynices, who emerges as a more complex character through this double intertextual foil. In Virgil the tragedy of Dido and the successful 'homecoming' of the exile Aeneas are carefully separated; in Statius the return of the exile becomes a tragedy, collapsing the Virgilian distinction. But for such a line of inquiry, H. would have needed slightly more intricate analytical tools, including a notion of (post-Virgilian) allusivity informed by the work of scholars like Hardie and Hinds. Indeed, a pervasive shortcoming of this study is that H. has largely failed to take into account the important critical movements that have flourished for some time in Britain and America in particular. Thus, while Feeney, Hardie, Henderson, Hinds, Masters, and co. are well represented in the bibliography, nowhere in this study is there a meaningful engagement of their various 'New Latinist' approaches which have revolutionized readings of the poems in question.

As a result, H.'s study, though undeniably useful, is somewhat less relevant to the current critical debate than it easily might have been.

University of Texas at Austin ANDREW ZISSOS

SENECA TRAGICUS

L. CASTAGNA (ed.): *Nove studi sui cori tragici di Seneca.* (Biblioteca di Aevum Antiquum, 8.) Pp. viii + 185. Milano: Vita e Pensiero, 1996. Paper, L. 30,000. ISBN: 88-343-1740-8.

S. MARCUCCI: *Modelli "tragici" e modelli "epici" nell' Agamemnon di L. A. Seneca.* (Biblioteca Universitaria Italiana di Saggi, Ricerche e Studi, 8.) Pp. 108. Milan: Prometheus, 1996. Paper, L. 25,000.

These two volumes, the first a collection of nine essays dealing with the chorus in five Senecan tragedies, the second a study of *Agamemnon* alone, constitute still further evidence of the continuing vitality of the current revival of interest in Seneca's dramas.

Various collections of essays on Senecan tragedy have been published in recent decades. Castagna's volume is unique in that it focuses on 'the lyric space', the choral odes. The book contains: Giancarlo Mazzoli on typology and structure, Antonio Martina on the pre-Senecan and Senecan chorus, Rita Degl'Innocenti on *Hercules*

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Furens, Rosanna Marino on *Troades*, Maria Garzia Bajoni on *Medea*, Franco Caviglia, Paolo Mantovanelli, and Massimo Rivoltella on *Oedipus*, and Giuseppe Aricò on *Agamemnon*. It seems unfortunate that studies of two of Seneca's most widely admired dramas are absent: *Phaedra* and *Thyestes*.

The collection begins with two general essays. Mazzoli examines the typology of the choruses under four headings (number, placing, relationship with actors, composition) with a view to establishing a Senecan norm. As a result he argues that three plays, *Hercules*, *Medea*, and *Thyestes*, constitute a group meeting the 'classic' standard (p. 6). He then goes on to examine the odes on the basis of morphology, arguing that, once again, *Hercules*, *Medea*, and *Thyestes* constitute an identifiable (and possibly later) group. After surveying earlier Roman tragedy, Martina is concerned with the extent to which Senecan choruses are integrated with the action. Martina believes that the plays were not intended for the stage, but for recitation (p. 21), and so it is not surprising that he concludes that the choruses do not have a continuous existence outside the choral odes (p. 25). On the other hand, his detailed analysis of *Medea* reveals the first ode as tightly integrated with the play's action.

Next follow essays on individual plays. Pierini is concerned with the first ode in *Hercules Furens*. She explores its literary and philosophical connections with Euripides, Ovid, and Lucan, but especially with Horace and Tibullus. She then interprets the ode as a denunciation of Caligulan Rome. Marino discusses one of the most famous choral problems in Seneca, the contradiction between the first and second odes in *Troades* on the question of the soul's immortality. However, being more concerned to explore the contradiction in Seneca's philosophical works, she has little to say about the play itself. Bajoni discusses in detail the conclusion of the first Argonautic ode in *Medea*. As the title of her paper indicates, she is more concerned with the theme of 'unknown worlds' than with *Medea.* Thus she pays attention to the treatment in Claudian propaganda of the conquest of Britain and to Columbus' use of the passage as a prophecy of his own discoveries. By contrast, Caviglia is concerned with using the choral odes to interpret *Oedipus.* He rightly insists on the relevance and functional diversity of the odes. He then examines each ode in detail, relating it to preceding and subsequent action. Mantovanelli is concerned with textual and interpretive problems within a section of Oedipus' second ode (440ff.), while Rivoltella is concerned with a section in the third, the myth of the Spartoi (731–50), and its relationship to its Euripidean and Ovidian antecedents. Aricò is concerned with the third ode in *Agamemnon*, in particular with the argument of Pierre Grimal that only lines 664–94 should be attributed to the subsidiary chorus and that the other parts of the ode and the chorus's speeches at 710ff. and 775ff. belong to the main Argive chorus.

Marcucci's book-length study of *Agamemnon* is concerned with the relationship between Seneca's play and its models, both Greek and Roman. Chapter 1 examines the play's relationship with the Aeschylean version, Chapter 2 looks at earlier Latin treatments, while Chapter 3 is concerned with Lycophron's *Alexandra*.

In Chapter 1 M. is primarily concerned to rebut Tarrant's view (expounded in his 1976 edition of the play) that 'nothing in Seneca's play requires direct knowledge of Aeschylus'. M. aims to establish that Seneca's text remains incomprehensible without that of Aeschylus (pp. 17f.). Thus she points to the chorus' praise of *aurea mediocritas* at 103–7 and compares the Aeschylean chorus's treatment of the theme at 468–74. She argues that the 'macro-structure' (p. 36) of Aeschylus' play resembles that of Seneca: we have a first half dominated by Clytemnestra and a second half centred on Cassandra. She also highlights similarities between the messenger narratives in both

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plays (pp. 38f.) and the use of the word ἀηδών/aedon in both plays (Aesch. 1145; Sen. 671). She also argues for important resemblances between the final scenes of both plays.

Chapter 2 deals with the Latin models for Seneca's *Agamemnon*. First of all, M. considers the influence of republican tragedy, especially Andronicus' *Aegisthus*, Accius' *Clutemestra*, Pacuvius' *Dulorestes*, and Ennius' *Alexander*. Next she considers Horace, Ovid, and Virgil. Horace is important for the choral odes. Ovid is significant for both odes and action. Particularly striking are the links between the address to Juno at 340ff. and *Amores* 3.13, and between *Heroides* 9 (Deianira) and Act 2. Virgil is particularly important for Eurybates' narrative, but also for the prologue (the description of the palace of Pelops being based on that of Latinus, *Aen*. 7.170–6), while Seneca's treatment of the Cassandra is modelled on Virgil's Sibyl.

Finally, in Chapter 3, M. considers the influence of Lycophron's 'monodrama' *Alexandra*, arguing that even if Lycophron cannot be accepted as a direct source for Seneca, at least he is a likely intermediary (p. 89).

Neither of these books is likely to revolutionize current conceptions of Senecan tragedy. Some of the essays in Castagna's volume are concerned with issues which most would regard as tangential, while M.'s study, though worthy in itself, is not concerned with questions which most readers of the play are likely to consider central, questions of dramatic structure, coherence, and meaning.

University of Tasmania P. J. DAVIS

LOOKING AT LUCAN

M. LEIGH: *Lucan: Spectacle and Engagement* (Oxford Classical Monographs). Pp. xi + 366. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997. Cased, £47.50/$85. ISBN: 0-19-815067-9.

Over the past decade, the complexities of the *Pharsalia* have become increasingly apparent. By peeling away simple Stoic and uncritically Republican interpretations, we have begun to find a work as intrigued by the monarchical Caesar as it is disheartened by his opponents Cato and Pompey. Leigh's book contributes to this scholarly trend by examining how spectacle and spectatorship in the *Pharsalia* can involve conflicting political ideologies.

In Chapter 1, L. contrasts the spectators Gaius Cornelius and Lucan the narrator at 7.185–213, and argues that their opposed reactions to Caesar's domination represent two programmatic modes of spectatorship at odds throughout the epic: one that acquiesces in, the other that opposes, Caesar's success (see below for critique). L. links Cornelius' passive acceptance of Caesar's 'spectacle' to an Augustan or imperial interpretation of fate and history, while he interprets Lucan's impassioned 'engagement' as an attempt to resist (or make the reader resist) Caesar's historical victory—hence the terms of the book's title.

The next two chapters concentrate on the workings of 'engagement' through close readings of individual passages. Chapter 2 focuses on the Spanish campaign of book 4 to show how Lucan can build in his readers the hope that Caesar might be defeated despite their knowledge of historical fact. L. also suggests the ideological implications of Caesar's *clementia* toward the Republicans defeated in Spain and the perils of succumbing to it. Analyzing episodes from book 7, Chapter 3 shows how Lucan narrates from the perspective both of a character within the poem and of someone

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who, living a century later, understands the ramifications of Caesar's victory. In L.'s view, Lucan, by fusing these 'temporalities', points to the deceptiveness of the Augustan/imperial ideology as well as the perplexing failure of the Republican opposition to defeat Caesar and thus prevent the disaster of his own Neronian Rome.

In Chapter 4, L. turns to Pompey's response to his defeat at Pharsalus (7.647–711). Because he cannot 'engage', Lucan's Pompey acts in such a way as to distort the exemplary traditions of both *devotio* and the good general. Moreover, he fails as a hero because of the constraints of the epic genre, which must de-Republicanize him if he is to attain individual epic (i.e. kingly) greatness (p. 150).

The two chapters that follow examine Caesar and his deluded troops. Chapter 5 takes Scaeva as self-consciously 'deforming' not only the tradition of epic *virtus* but also 'the structuring principles of the Roman exemplary narrative' (p. 184). Chapter 6 explores how Lucan has transformed the theme of loyalty to Caesar (already present in Caesar's own *Commentaries*) into a perverse desire to fight in Caesar's presence. The spectacular nature of the consequent violence done to military *virtus* and to traditional notions of the good death is symptomatic of the crazed world of the Caesarians.

Focusing on the *Pharsalia*'s amphitheatrical language, L.'s concluding chapter interprets Scaeva's *aristeia* as a gladiatorial bout, the battle at Massilia and the Vulteius episode as *naumachiae*, and Cato's snake encounter as a *venatio* (p. 235). L. argues that Lucan emphasizes the *thauma* of these spectacles over their *pathos*, and closely associates this tendency with the nature of spectacle in Neronian Rome. Lucan has 'set up a dialectic between nostalgia for the lost past he evokes and the guilty pleasures of the present he lives' (p. 291)—an idea explored further in the book's epilogue through reference to the literary tradition of describing Rome's civil wars.

By thus focusing on spectatorship, L.'s book offers a number of original interpretations. Though the spectacular nature of Lucan's poetry is not new to scholarship, L. suggests a more complex understanding of the political dimensions underpinning viewing that will certainly spark more inquiry. In addition, L.'s placement of *virtus* within the tradition of exemplary literature, his insightful treatments of Pompey and Cato, and his emphasis on the cultural contexts of Lucan's spectacles are other topics that readers will find rewarding.

Despite these merits, the book has frustrating limitations. For one, L. often opts for digressions (especially when dealing with comparative sources) that are not always profitable or that could have achieved their purpose in briefer compass. So, in Chapter 1, we get a discussion of the nature of 'tragic history' only to find that the *Pharsalia* moves 'beyond' that vexed and controversial genre; and in Chapter 6, ten pages on how battle scars were indications of valor and patriotism. Such detours tend to obfuscate the overall coherence of L.'s argumentation and make the book difficult to read.

More crucially, L. does not provide a clear conceptual framework for understanding either spectacle or spectator. Indeed, spectacle seems to involve everything from amphitheatrically figured descriptions to just about any event to which an individual character (or reader) might react. Nor does L. take full advantage of current secondary literature on spectacle or the arena. Books by Wiedemann, Bartsch, and Plass on Roman spectacles and audience response, for example, are absent from discussion and bibliography (as is Henderson's work on Lucan).

Lacking a firm grounding for interpreting spectacle, the book's overall attempt to attach political ideology to spectatorship is not entirely successful. In Chapter 1, for example, L. identifies the *augur* of 7.192 as Gaius Cornelius, and argues that his

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prophetic reaction to the impending civil war represents a programmatic Caesarian type of spectatorship. L., however, can make this argument only by importing numerous outside sources about Cornelius and his prophecy of Caesar's victory, since Lucan's *augur* is not named and foretells only the battle, not its outcome. But even if Lucan's *augur* were to foresee Caesar's victory, would such 'spectatorship' necessarily entail a Caesarian ideology?

Because L. does not provide a solid conceptual basis for understanding spectacle and ideology, the book, despite its potentially fruitful approach, offers its readers an unsatisfying combination of intriguing ideas and insufficient execution.

Middlebury College RANDALL T. GANIBAN

VENANTIUS FORTUNATUS

S. QUESNEL: *Venance Fortunat: Oeuvres: Tome IV: Vie de Saint Martin: Texte établi et traduit* (Collection des Universités de France publiée sous le patronage de l'Association Guillaume Budé). Pp. 384. Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1996. frs. 315. ISBN: 2-251-01396-2.

The works of Venantius Fortunatus are a rich resource for scholars in many fields: political, social, and ecclesiastical historians, as well as students of literature and language. Fortunatus was a writer well grounded in both secular and Christian Latin literary traditions, a richness which he drew upon creatively in the wide range of works he composed for patrons in Merovingian Gaul in the latter half of the sixth century, writing for the royal family and secular magnates, as well as for ecclesiastical dignitaries. Panegyric, epithalamium, consolation, and informal occasional poems set the seal of *Romanitas* and the classical tradition upon his patrons' cultural aspirations; the great processional hymns, eulogies to Christian virtues, and hagiographies reflected the spiritual and ecclesiastical focus of his work.

The first volume of a complete modern edition and translation of his secular works, by Reydellet (*Venance Fortunat: Poèmes: Tome I, Livres I–IV* [Paris, 1994]), has been published, with a second promised. Quesnel's work is therefore welcome in making similarly available one of Fortunatus' major hagiographical works, a metrical life of St Martin, written for the poet's friend and patron, Bishop Gregory of Tours. Earlier bishops had commissioned poems to enhance the cult of the saint. Gregory was a Gallo-Roman with outstanding literary abilities and aspirations himself, and vigorous ambitions to strengthen Tours as the cult centre of this major Gallic saint. Fortunatus, settled in Poitiers by the early 570s and already linked by strong ties of friendship and Christian devotion to Radegund, the founder of the community of the Holy Cross there, and to Gregory himself, set about the daunting task of a metrical adaptation of Sulpicius Severus' *Vita Martini*. He worked on the composition between 573 and 576, producing four books, which he dedicated to the bishop.

This edition and translation provides parallel Latin and French texts, with substantial footnotes, and a full introduction to the poet and his background, and to the manuscripts and the text itself. The manuscript tradition of the *Vita Martini* is less rich and complex than that of Fortunatus' *Carmina*. Q.'s account of the establishment of the text is admirably detailed and clear, with an apparatus which is informative without being unnecessarily cumbersome. The translation is excellent, and Q. provides

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appropriate footnotes to explain her decision in the case of the ambiguities or textual difficulties which are not uncharacteristic of Fortunatus' work.

The introduction is eighty-eight pages long, with a brief bibliography. Q. characterizes Fortunatus' use of language and literary style with an accuracy and empathy which warn the reader of the real difficulties and the features which are alien to a late-twentieth-century ear—the overworked and obscure turns of phrase, the density of allusion and resonance; but she also enthuses about his equally real virtues—the sharp eye for vivid colour and visual texture, the direct and personal voice, the capacity to create a complex and lengthy overall design with finely interwoven detail within it. Her footnotes on the text are full and helpful, especially on linguistic and textual matters, but also on the historical context,which needs interpretation to make sense to a modern reader—the note on Bishop Avitus (1.25), for example, or the relationship between Amboise and Tours (4.210). Throughout, Q., with a light but well-judged touch, makes the reader aware of the relationship between Fortunatus' text and that of Sulpicius Severus, thus illuminating the poet's purpose and craft.

A major concern, however, is the apparent lack of use of or reference to works from the English-speaking world. The only English book quoted in the bibliography is Chase's essential work on the hagiographies of St Martin (A. H. Chase, 'The Metrical Lives of Sanctus Martinus by Paulinus and Fortunatus and the Prose Life by Sulpicius Severus', *HSCP* 43 [1932], 51–76). Q.'s introduction sketches Fortunatus' life, his Merovingian context, and relevant literary traditions and ecclesiastical context. The total absence of reference to the wealth of scholarly works in English even over the past decade results in an inadequate account in some aspects, or to an unbalanced one in others. On matters of detail, for example, Šasel's curious theory that Fortunatus was a Byzantine double agent is expounded, with no mention of Brennan's strong refutation of that thesis (J. Šasel, 'Il viaggio di Venanzio Fortunato e la sua attività in ordine alla politica bizantina', in *Aquileia e l'occidente mediterraneo, Antichità altoadriatiche* 19 [1981], 359–76; cf. B. Brennan, 'Venantius Fortunatus: Byzantine Agent?', *Byzantion* 65 [1995], 7–16). The date at which Fortunatus became a priest is based on the view of Lucchi, editor of Fortunatus in 1786/7, with no mention of recent discussion of the subject (e.g. J. W. George, *Venantius Fortunatus: a Poet in Merovingian Gaul* [Oxford, 1992], pp. 212–14). For the general overview of the period, it would be difficult to know where to start in listing the books which should inform such a profile, and that cover ground which is not represented at all in the bibliography of this edition: I. Wood (*The Merovingian Kingdoms, 450–751* [London, 1994]), R. Van Dam (*Leadership and Community in Late Antique Gaul* [Berkeley etc., 1985]), C. Stancliffe (*St. Martin and his Hagiographer. History and Miracle in Sulpicius Severus* [Oxford, 1983]), and P. Brown (*The Cult of the Saints: its Rise and Function in Latin Christianity* [Chicago, 1981]) are immediate examples.

In sum, this is a valuable and welcome volume in general, but one which requires the reader to find their own way to major areas of modern scholarship which illuminate Fortunatus' life and world.

The Open University in Scotland JUDITH GEORGE

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VARRO THE FARMER

D. FLACH (trans.): *Marcus Terentius Varro, Gespräche über die Landwirtschaft Bücher I, II.* (Texte zur Forschung, 65, 66.) Pp. 382, 405. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1996, 1997. ISBN: 3-534-11647-X, 3-534-11648-8.

Varro was an immensely learned scholar whose studies covered many branches of enquiry. Fifty-five titles by him are known, though he probably wrote many more works. Therefore his treatise on farming (*De Re Rustica*), published in 37 B.C. and which survives complete, reflects only one of his numerous interests. Nevertheless, he provides a systematic, analytical treatise in three books devoted to agriculture, to animal husbandry, and to stock raising of smaller animals on the farm. These books include arable cultivation, arboriculture, market gardening, the growing of luxury foods, the management of farm slaves, and the design and construction of the most effective kind of villa and farm buildings. Varro has in some ways been neglected by commentators, and Flach offers the first translation and commentary in German. F. is of course well-suited to write on this topic, having contributed many studies on Roman agriculture, and this is a significant and substantial addition. Each of the first two books of the *De Re Rustica* is covered in a separate volume, with a third promised for Book III. There is a wide-ranging introduction, which includes an account of Varro's life, the composition of the work, his sources, aspects of the presentation and subject matter of the work, and the manuscripts with discussion of variant readings. The translation is an accurate and clear rendition of the Latin, though it would have been preferable to have text and translation on opposite pages. In a brief review it is possible only to recognize the scholarship and detailed knowledge that sustain the commentary, which explains what Varro has to say about farming practices, discusses historical references and the biographical details of historical figures, and also deals with linguistic points, syntax, the etymology and meanings of words, and problematical points of translation. F.'s contribution will certainly become a standard reference work on Varro the agronomist.

It must be noted, however, that the way in which the two volumes reviewed here have been organized and presented is wasteful and repetitious, since each volume has a similar layout, with its own introduction and bibliography. There is significant reduplication in both parts of the two bibliographies, and the stemma diagram is repeated in both volumes. In the introductions, the sections dealing with Varro, sources, composition, and manuscripts could surely have been abbreviated and combined for incorporation in one volume, making it easier to consult and saving expense. Furthermore, in the third volume presumably we are to have yet another introduction and bibliography. The bibliographies are comprehensive but curiously find no place for M. S. Spurr, *Arable Cultivation in Roman Italy* (London, 1986). In volumes as lavishly produced and as detailed as these the *Stichwortverzeichnis* is inadequate; there should be a separate index of Latin words.

Despite its many qualities, I think that F.'s book would benefit from more discussion on Varro's place among the agricultural writers, and the relevance of his work to agricultural practice. Why did he write? What is the significance of topics he omitted? Was he attempting to provide systematic instruction and advice for practising farmers? Or was he writing merely for the amusement of absentee, upper-class owners? This question is important since commentators have doubted the practical application of Varro's writing, perhaps influenced by its rhetorical setting in

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the form of a dialogue and its literary aspirations. But Varro himself was not given to a theoretical approach, and criticizes the Greek writer Theophrastus for his devotion to theory (1.5.2). He had good first-hand knowledge and much of his material seems to be based on practical know-how tested by experience. In addition Varro's prose style is unaffected and based on the Latin of everyday speech. Most importantly, the evidence from the excavation of the villa at Settefinestre near Cosa in Tuscany (built in the later first century B.C., and probably a working farm and country retreat of a senatorial family) has done much to substantiate in detail the recommendations of Varro and Columella, since the layout, structure, and farming enterprises of the villa seemingly put into practice the advice of the agronomists. Strangely, F. mentions the evidence of the villa only once, briefly in Buch 2, p. 256 with reference to Varro's recommendations on piggeries.

Varro lived through one of the most turbulent periods of Roman political, social, and economic life, which brought great agricultural disruption, confiscation of landed property, and the settlement of many veteran soldiers on the land. He had himself served as a military commander, and had been on the wrong side during the civil wars. Indeed, he was subsequently proscribed by Antony and had his estate and library at Casinum plundered. He will have been familiar with the division and allocation of lands, and had been a member of Caesar's land commission to distribute Campanian land in 59 B.C. (1.2.10). Although there are few echoes of these events in Varro's treatise, the reader might expect to hear more in F.'s commentary about the context in which Varro wrote, in particular centuriation, field systems, and Roman land holding. For example, in Buch 1, p. 260 *subseciva* (lands excluded from distribution as unsuitable) are mentioned, but their relevance to farming, common pasture, and the appropriation of additional land is not explained. The commentary could perhaps better illuminate Varro's ideas on farming practice by ranging more widely to take account of the general characteristics and use of land in Italy of the late Republic and early imperial period. More use could be made of the evidence of a different type of technical writer, the land surveyors (*agrimensores*), of whom only Frontinus is mentioned in the index of sources.

The Queen's University of Belfast BRIAN CAMPBELL

LATIN HISTORIANS

C. S. KRAUS, A. J. WOODMAN: *Latin Historians*. (*Greece & Rome* New Surveys in the Classics 27.) Pp. 132. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997. Paper, £7. ISBN: 0-19-922293-2.

This volume is a refreshing reminder of what can be achieved when two scholars embark on a genuinely collaborative venture. K. and W. share Chapters 1 (Introduction) and 2 (Sallust), Chapter 3 (Livy) is by K., while W. has written Chapters 4 (The First Century A.D.) and 5 (Tacitus). The authors claim 'not to be concerned primarily with introducing readers to the "state of the question" ', but they do summarize (pp. 5–6) recent scholarly debate: P. A. Brunt, S. Usher, M. Grant, C. W. Fornara, and T. Cornell are cited as supporters of the 'traditional' view that ancient historiography is not, after all, so different from its modern counterpart, while T. P. Wiseman and W. advocate an alternative viewpoint that ancient historians 'resorted to invention on a large scale' (p. 5) in a genre which was closely related to poetry and oratory. This presentation perhaps polarizes the debate rather sharply: so,

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Brunt acknowledges (my italics) that 'History was to be differentiated both from poetry, *though the historian could at times properly use poetic diction* and . . . from epideictic oratory, *to which it was closely related in style*' (*Studies in Greek History and Thought* [Oxford, 1992], p. 183). Yet the authors' synopsis is generally helpful, particularly concerning scholars' viewpoints on the truth value of ancient historical narratives.

A willingness to explain matters clearly for newcomers typifies the volume throughout. An appendix discussing editions and central articles (pp. 119–23) and a basic bibliography (pp. 124–8) provide useful help, while footnotes after each chapter offer more specialized information. The authors meticulously gloss terminology and identify historical figures without interrupting their argument: e.g. Dionysius of Halicarnassus (p. 17), syncrisis (p. 19), hyperbaton (pp. 31 and 69), peripeteia (p. 60), focalization (p. 66), parataxis (p. 69), hypotaxis (p. 70), Fenestella (p. 87), and intertextuality (p. 97) are all clarified (although the unannotated reference to the cult film *Buckaroo Banzai* [p. 53] might fox some!). The volume has been well produced, although one missing cross-reference is 'above p. 98–9' (p. 101), and in the translation of *Annals* 13.17.1, 'Germanicus' should read 'Britannicus' (p. 111).

The shared chapter on Sallust, who lacks his own volume in this series, is understandably the longest. An introduction (pp. 11–13) clarifies Sallust's historical context as a writer and notes how his preoccupation with *virtus* is expressed through a series of ambivalent character sketches. W., after analysing Sallust's own flawed career (pp. 15–16), which lurks problematically behind the *BC*'s prologue, fleshes out the opening remarks about *virtus* by discussing the shifting characterization of Catiline (pp. 19–21). The issue of style—and how it reflects a writer's ideology—is also raised (p. 12). The authors illustrate Sallust's 'rocky, unbalanced syntax', but also note that he is 'equally capable of writing sentences full of rhetorical balance' (p. 12). This nicely avoids simple pigeonholing. Building on W.'s analysis, K. notes the *BJ*'s ambitious nature, 'halfway between a monograph and annals' (p. 21), and explores the characterization of Jugurtha, who embodies a disturbing mixture of corruption and *virtus*. Finally, K. turns to the *Historiae* (pp. 30–41), acknowledging that its fragmentary condition generally encourages 'atomising' rather than a 'synthetic approach' (p. 30), but here she discusses broadly Sallust's preface, characterization, and ethnographical descriptions. We should welcome the decision to analyse this fragmentary text in an introductory survey, since it surely encourages students to develop a more integrated approach to the ancient world.

One attractive feature of the volume is that there is no standard template of topics covered in each chapter, although several themes recur. K. argues that Livy's history pulls in opposite directions, offering readers both an escape from current troubles and the opportunity to improve the present. Accordingly, she discusses the monumental nature of the text itself as a 'written city' (p. 58), which can entertain and excite us, and analyses it as an exemplary narrative, from which readers can (and should) learn. Finally, K. examines (pp. 62–70) style, exemplarity, characterization, and speeches in Livy 36.10–11 and discusses (pp. 70–4) the author's *persona* and relationship with Augustus.

W. bridges the gap between Livy and Tacitus in a short chapter (pp. 82–7) on Velleius Paterculus and Curtius Rufus. W. is rightly exasperated by scholars who underestimate these important authors, but one would have welcomed a longer chapter on the pair, particularly since accessible modern discussions of Curtius Rufus are rare. Presumably considerations of space prevented this, and also precluded the inclusion of a final chapter on Ammianus Marcellinus.

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W. opens the final chapter by discussing how Tacitus manipulates beginnings and endings. Noting that the beginning of a work and a story rarely coincide, he guides us through the prefaces of the *Histories* and *Annals*, exploring nuances of vocabulary and grammar, and showing how sensitive Tacitus is to the 'seamlessness of history's web' (p. 97). Next, he tackles intertextuality (pp. 97–102), asking 'when is a source not a source?'. He urges us to consider the *Res Gestae* not as a source, but as an 'inviting text whose official line Tacitus could subject to malicious reinterpretation' (p. 98). Such an approach should galvanize students to investigate for themselves how and why Tacitus manipulates texts (whether literary or epigraphical). Discussion of the relationship between *Annals* 2–3 and the Piso inscription follows (pp. 99–101). This is particularly welcome, since few students using school libraries will have access to the Woodman and Martin commentary on *Annals* 3. Finally, W. analyses the Tiberian hexad, arguing along lines familiar from his recent articles (cf. *CQ* 39 [1989] and *PLLS* 8 [1995]), and concludes with a re-reading of *Annals* 3.65.1, Tacitus on history's highest function (cf. *Mus. Helv.* 52 [1995]). Even if one does not agree with the suggested repunctuation of this passage, W.'s argument encourages students and scholars alike to read critically and to think carefully about the context of such famous Tacitean soundbites.

This is a richly rewarding volume, which will generate enthusiasm for Latin historians amongst newcomers, while challenging others to view these texts through fresh eyes. We should look forward to any future collaboration between K. and W., whose approaches are so distinctive but complementary.

University College London RHIANNON ASH

LIVIUS INGENS

S. P. Oakley: *A Commentary on Livy: Books VI–X: Volume I: Introduction and Book VI*. Pp. xxi + 799, 1 map. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997. ISBN: 0-19-814877-1.

This, the first of a projected three volume commentary on Books VI–X of Livy, introduces the pentad as a whole and comments on Book VI. The second volume, which has just appeared, covers Books VII–VIII; the last will treat Books IX–X. Comparison with R. M. Ogilvie's masterful commentary on Books I–V (Oxford, 1965) is inevitable, as well as with C. S. Kraus's recent edition of Book VI (Cambridge, 1994). To Ogilvie O. expresses heartfelt thanks for having encouraged him initially in his study of Livy, confessing that he has 'been ever conscious of his example' because Ogilvie 'combined—perhaps for the first time in a commentary on a classical author—historical, archaeological, topographical, literary, linguistic and textual comment' (p. vii). To Kraus O. frequently acknowledges his indebtedness; her excellent edition is particularly rich on stylistic and linguistic matters. Throughout O. is generous in acknowledging and evaluating the work of others, a welcome contrast to the hypercritical posturing one sometimes finds.

Yet one is struck immediately by the disparity in length between Ogilvie's commentary and that of O. Ogilvie used 774 pages to introduce and comment on the first five books; after 799 pages O. has finished only the first of his pentad's books (among Livy's shortest). Is O.'s greatly expanded canvas justified? Are the results worth the great length? The answer is an emphatic yes. O.'s is a splendid achievement, a worthy successor to Ogilvie's in every respect, one that will immediately take its place

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as a major source of reference for matters far beyond the second pentad or Livy's *oeuvre* as a whole. Latinists will find a mine of information on matters of style and language, including judicious remarks on what can properly be designated choice, poetic, archaic, mannered, and so forth. Historians will find much of value in O.'s broad introductory survey and detailed notes (his critiques of Beloch's views are noteworthy, as is his exposition of the thorny issues involved in the Licinio-Sextian rogations [pp. 645ff.]). Similarly, historiographers will find a full and balanced account of the Roman annalistic tradition, including narrative techniques, rhetorical aims, and debt to Hellenistic historiography. O., like Ogilvie, divides the text into thematic units, each prefaced by an introductory essay, in which Livy's hand in shaping his material is much to the fore, a welcome contrast to Briscoe's commentaries, where Livy the author is largely absent.

It is O.'s set practice to set out the full range of data on a given topic. The most striking example, if only because of its length, is his examination of the complex manuscript tradition of Books I–X. The 175 pages devoted to this topic take the inexpert reader, which includes this reviewer, through the labyrinthine algebra necessarily involved. The chief aim is to eliminate from consideration as many manuscripts of Books I–X as possible, of which there are at least 195. After the maze has been threaded, no fewer than 'twenty-nine wholly or partly uneliminable witnesses' remain (p. 325). O. intends to produce a new text of the pentad after the last volume of the commentary is finished. How much benefit this laborious analysis will bring to the full text of VI–X is not yet clear; although he believes that the rewards of such research will not be many, he argues that a full and up-to-date review of the evidence is desirable—a 'properly sign-posted account of the terrain' (p. 327). This analysis of the manuscript tradition is representative of the nature of the commentary that follows: data on a given point are fully deployed and discussed, even when, in the end, O. feels he must give a verdict of *non liquet*. The material is so full that few will be disappointed when seeking guidance and information. The Clarendon Press has done a great service to classical scholarship in allowing O. such latitude.

O.'s overview of the nature and growth of annalistic history is the most useful known to me. He believes that a 'hard core' of reliable information, transmitted through the Pontifical Tables, oral tradition, family histories, and the like, is enmeshed in the embroidery, distortions, and inventions of the annalists, and he reviews in some detail the kinds of information he considers authentic, such as names of magistrates, triumphs, and religious notices. Two important conclusions emerge: there is little discernible break in the quantity and nature of the evidence between Books V and VI (despite the Gallic Sack and the contrary statements of Livy [6.1] and others), while there is such a change in the material by the time we reach Book X. In the end a considerable body of evidence stands forth; it is doubtful that all or most of it has been invented, for some items are quite recondite (e.g. names of extinct families, obscure place-names), others clash with interpretations the annalists tried to foist on them (e.g. retrojecting the conflict between patricians and plebeians into the first years of the Republic), and the significance of still others seems to have escaped the annalists altogether (e.g. the connection between Rome's efforts to subdue the *ager Pomptinus* and the need for land settlements to alleviate the debt-ridden poor [p. 352]; or the reason for the *interregnum* at 10.1.10 [p. 47]). O. takes a position between the 'sceptical' and 'conservative' approaches to early Roman history, styling it one of 'moderate credulity' (p. 352 n. 73). He concedes that almost any piece of evidence assigned to the hard core is susceptible to attack (he seems less concerned with the conservatives, most of whom live abroad). But nothing can be accepted simply

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because it may belong to the hard core; each piece of evidence must be evaluated separately, item by item.

Ogilvie believed that Livy's text could be divided up according to its annalistic sources and names put to them. O. rightly rejects this approach, preferring to characterize the nature of annalistic elaboration generally and, where possible, to hypothesize how the varied, often conflicting, strands in a given story came to take their final form. Yet this approach, increasingly popular in recent years, has pitfalls of its own. A painstaking analysis of the tale concerning Manlius Capitolinus' sedition and death in Chapters 11–20 (pp. 476–93) reveals so many contradictions and impossibilities that one doubts whether plausibility, or at least what we today would characterize as plausible, was really, as O. argues (pp. 75ff.), a desideratum of ἀκρίβεια or invention of circumstantial detail. For in order to secure the dramatically satisfying denouement of having Manlius hurled to his death from the same spot he had once repulsed the Gauls when roused by Juno's honking geese (5.47), the annalists shifted the place where the Gauls ascended from the south-west face of the Capitol above the shrine of Carmentis to the Tarpeian Rock overlooking the forum on the east. During Manlius' trial in the Campus Martius before the Comitia Centuriata he is represented as pointing to the Capitol to secure the people's sympathy by reminding them of his heroic exploit; then, as the centuries are being summoned to vote, the tribunes, anticipating acquittal, abruptly adjourn the proceedings and fix as the site for the completion of the trial the Petelian grove outside the *porta Flumentana*, in order that the Capitol would be out of sight of the voters. Yet the Petelian grove lay between the Capitol and the Palatine, in full view of not just the Capitol but of the Tarpeian Rock itself. How could the annalists, including Livy, invent or repeat such an impossible scenario, whose falsity would be obvious to anyone familiar with Roman topography and judicial procedure? To say that Livy 'did not grasp this', to call him confused, is feeble, as it is to assert that 'the combination of the two trials must have seemed almost as bizarre to the later annalists as it does to us' (p. 492). The annalists, after all, created these impossibilities, and many, many more instances could be cited. Was plausibility, as we understand it today, really a desideratum of ἀκρίβεια? For when O. says that 'in general the ancients were ill equipped to distinguish between what was plausible and what was true, and what was fictitious and what was true' (p. 77 n. 206), the question is being formulated from a modern perspective. The mind-set of the annalists was different from ours, and deserves to be rethought and restudied in its own terms. When they are characterized as witless fabricators unaware of what they had created or as fabulists bemused by their own grotesqueries, it does not take us very far, nor should we forget that Livy was one of them.

Princeton University T. J. LUCE

THE BUDÉ VALERIUS MAXIMUS

R. COMBÈS (ed., trans.): *Valère Maxime:* Faits et Dits Mémorables: *Tomes I–II:* livres I–III, IV–VI: *Texte établi et traduit* (Collection des Universités de France publiée sous le patronage de l'Association Guillaume Budé). Pp. 341, xi + 271 (text double). Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1995, 1997. ISBN: 2-251-01386-5, 2-251-01401-2.

In the final footnote to the preface of my Teubner edition of Valerius Maximus—

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which will, I hope, have been published by the time this review appears—I wrote that Combès's edition of books 1–3 came into my hands when my work was almost complete, but that since the editor, with one exception, cited only those manuscripts used by Kempf, I had refrained from detailed examination of his edition. By the time the second volume became available to me, my typescript was already with the printer.

It had not been my intention to say anything further about C.'s work (I had no desire to exacerbate the already bad relations between myself and M. Jal, who is responsible for the Latin side of the Budé series). I could not, however, resist the request of the editors of this journal to review the two volumes, and the main purpose of this review will be to justify and expand the remarks I have referred to. I shall not, in the present circumstances, discuss C.'s choice of reading in individual passages. (In what follows all page references are to volume I.) In his edition of 1854 Kempf made use of seven manuscripts. He correctly identified Berne, Burgerbibliothek 366 (A [C. calls it B]; s. $ix^{2/3}$) as the oldest extant manuscript, but his selection of the rest was inevitably haphazard. Just before he completed his Teubner edition of 1888, Kempf became aware of Florence, Med. Laur. Ashburnham 1899 (L; s. ix^2), one of the manuscripts just acquired by the Medicean from the library of Lord Ashburnham, and plausibly judged it to be a twin of A. C. uses these eight manuscripts, together with a twelfth-century MS at Montpellier, his own university (though he appears not to have collated the manuscript itself; cf. p. 64 n. 1). He knows of Munk Olsen (cf. p. 63 n. 1) but has ignored, or been ignorant of, work done on transmission since 1888 (and the same is true, for the most part, of work on individual textual problems).

Had C. taken the obvious step of consulting the entry by Marshall, largely based on the unpublished Cambridge thesis of C. J. Carter, in *Texts and Transmission*, he would have learnt of Brussels, Bibliothèque royale 5336 (G), a manuscript of the eleventh century and older than all other MSS except A and L. Its importance was discovered by Schullian in 1937; she argued, in my view correctly, that G was independent not only of AL, but also of their common source. In my edition I have treated G as possessing authority equal to AL: it might be objected that since there are other MSS related to G which do not appear to derive from it, it is not legitimate to regard G alone as evidence for the source of its family; if those other MSS have the reading of AL, G's reading cannot be regarded as authoritative. It seems to me, however, that such MSS are in fact contaminated, and that the age and quality of G justify giving it a position equal to that of AL. It remains true, of course, that a reading in G differing from that of AL, even if apparently right, may still be a conjecture or a corruption.

The rest of the manuscripts used by C. have no independent value. What he calls G—Wolfenbüttel, Gud. Lat. 166, which contains only extracts, not the full text—may in fact have been copied from the Brussels MS, as Carter suggested. The fact that the Montpellier MS so often agrees with the corrections in A (p. 70) is due to the fact that, like others, it derives from A after it had been corrected from Paris (see below). C. argues (l.c.) that a 'second source', available in the ninth century, explains the agreement of the corrections in AL with the Montpellier MS. At p. 64 n. 2, inconsistently, he had claimed that the earlier corrections in A were derived from the original exemplar. That too is implausible, since it would mean that time and again the scribes of both A and L made the identical mistake in copying the same exemplar.

Apart from the direct tradition, the editor of Valerius has the assistance of two epitomes made in late antiquity, by Iulius Paris and Ianuarius Nepotianus (the latter

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survives only to the beginning of book 3). Their texts were published in 1828 (C. says 1831) by Angelo Mai, from Vat. Lat. 4929 (C. says 4229) and 1321 respectively. Long before, however, Paris had an influence on the direct tradition, for Lupus of Ferrières had used him to correct the Berne MS some time after he had made his original corrections (some MSS, of which the most important is Avranches, Bibliothèque municipale 157, derive from A before it had been corrected from Paris; I am beginning to regret that I did not collate the Avranches MS, since where Lupus, in his second stage of correction, erased the original reading of A, and L and G disagree, it might provide good evidence for that reading). Lupus also added at the beginning of his manuscript Paris' summary of the *exempla* missing in the direct tradition (1.1.ext.5–4.ext.1; he also included 1.1.ext.4, in order to indicate where the material belonged), and that of the *exemplum* about Brennus (which follows 1.1.18 in Paris and Nepotianus) in the bottom margin of f. 4^{u}. At the end he copied the fragment *de praenominibus* which follows book 9 in Paris. Now the missing fragments from book 1 were first printed—from a manuscript derived from A—in the Mainz edition of 1471, as was the *de praenominibus* (the Brennus *exemplum* is not in the Mainz edition, but is found in the edition published at Venice in the same year), and modern editors, starting with Kempf in 1854, have added the text of Nepotianus. C., on the grounds that the material 'n'est pas l'oeuvre de Valère Maxime' (p. 26 n. 1), declines to follow them, reserving it for his edition of the epitomators. What is more, he rarely quotes Paris (or Nepotianus) in his apparatus (in the *conspectus siglorum* they appear under *editiones* rather than *codices*), which has the effect of failing to make it clear which of Lupus' corrections are taken from Paris and which are not. (All appear in his apparatus as 'B^{1}'; the *siglum* is duly decoded on p. 89, but the notation is misleading, since it suggests that the corrections are by the original scribe [some, in fact, are just that, but it is not always possible to distinguish, and in my edition I use the *siglum* 'A^{c}'].)

There are a number of signs that C. is out of his depth when dealing with manuscripts. Misled by the fact that Lupus' copy of Paris' summary of the *exempla* missing in the direct tradition has suffered substantial physical damage, C. talks of Lupus 'les reduisant a des notes'; he initially refers to L as just 'Laurentianus 1899', in the list of *sigla* as 'Laurentianus olim Ashburnhamensis 1899'; the Berne library is called the 'Stadtbibliothek'; in relation to the Brennus *exemplum*, C. talks of 'le manuscrit de l'abrégé de Paris (où il a la reference 1,1, *ext.* 9)', as if such references are found in the manuscript; similarly, in his note on 6.5.1a, 'les copistes' are said to be responsible for placing four *exempla* 'sous une même numérotation'.

The introduction and notes (all the latter at the end of each volume) contain some sensible observations and much useful information, if little originality, but also some strange errors. On p. 12 we read that Tiberius 'avait refusé d'être *Augustus* . . . et Valère Maxime respecte cette décision'. In fact, of course, *Augustus* is part of Tiberius' official titulature. He observes that only at 4.3.3 is Tiberius referred to as *Augustus*, saying 'il partage même exceptionellement le surnom': he fails to mention that *Augustis* there is a conjecture of Pighius for the transmitted *Augusto.* In my edition, while giving Pighius a *fortasse recte*, I have deleted the word as a gloss on *uitrico*.

The following refer to the notes. 1.1.19: Dio 51.8.2 does not say that Antony ordered Turullius to try to save Cleopatra; in any case, it is the lack of syntax, not any supposed historical fact, that justifies the positing of a lacuna. 1.5.4: C. thinks that *catellus* means 'cat'. 1.8.ext.13: C. writes 'les copistes ont été trompés par la succession des *nomina*'; his text has *deformi*, but both note and translation suggest that he

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intended to print *deformis*. 5.2.6: C. observes that *geminarunt ea* was first proposed by Kempf in 1854, not by Blomgren in *Eranos* 1966 (he means 1956); in the apparatus the conjecture is ascribed to Blomgren.

University of Manchester JOHN BRISCOE

SENECAN STUDIES

S. AUDANO (ed.): *Seneca nel bimillenario della nascita.* Pp. 204. Pisa: Edizioni Ets, 1998. Paper, L. 30,000. ISBN: 88-467-0107-0.

This volume records the *acta* of a conference held at Chiavari in April 1997 to celebrate Seneca's bimillenary. It took place under the auspices of the Associazione Italiana di Cultura Classica, and the range of the contributions are a welcome reminder of the continuing buoyancy of Senecan studies—and not just in Italy, though appropriately much distinguished work on Seneca has in recent years been produced there.

After an editorial preamble by Sergio Audano giving us the background to the conference, we have nine papers which cover a wide range of Senecan topics, both general and quite detailed. A short piece by Marcello Gigante gives a vigorous defence of Seneca's approval of Epicurus in spite of his own Stoic principles (in contrast, say, with Lucretius' commitment to Epicurus and Cicero's to Platonism). He sees Seneca as a symbol of 'un sincretismo maturo', who regarded *ataraxia* as a more complete ideal than *apatheia*, and deserted the Stoics when contrary teaching seemed to him obviously right. Apposite quotations from *Ot*., *Beat*., and *Epp*. 18 and 88 allow Seneca to explain himself as the eclectic he obviously was. Alberto Grilli takes us through some key events in Seneca's life and some important statements in his work to show how he experienced and taught the proper combination of the practical and the contemplative life. We have his own clear statement about this in *Ot*. 5.1: 'natura nos ad utrumque genuit, et contemplationi rerum et actioni'. We have too his discussion (in *Tranq.*) of εὐθυμία, *tranquillitas*, as a goal to aim for: Grilli takes this up, suggesting that Seneca was stressing εὐθυμία because the 'neo-stoicism' had abandoned it or was returning to the more rigid ἀπάθεια of earlier Stoicism. This is questionable, as it is generally agreed that the Stoicism of Roman times had considerably modified its former harshness towards human feelings.

Next Cesare Letta takes up the theme of the development of Seneca's thoughts on the principate as we can trace them in the prose works up to *De Clementia*. He concedes that such an analysis can be hampered by the uncertainty about the dating of some of the works, but suggests that there is enough agreement for his purposes, and considers his theme under five heads: (1) the principate in itself and its relationship to a tyranny (can there be a good king?); (2) the principate in relationship to republican *libertas* and civil war; (3) the imperial cult; (4) individual emperors or members of the imperial family; and (5) the political duty of the *sapiens* in the principate. A very dense and detailed contribution by Giorgio Brugnoli examines the course of the manuscript tradition of Seneca's writings. He starts by listing for each work the century in which the first *testimonia* occur (e.g. from Minucius Felix in the second century for the *Letters*; and from Quintilian in the first century for the *Tragedies*). Then the major manuscripts for each work or group of works are given with their dates, with a special list of those which can be dated to or around the twelfth

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century, which was particularly rich in Senecan manuscripts. There is a bibliography of works related to the textual tradition and *Fortleben* of the works; and a specimen passage, *Phoe*. 643–64, comparing the texts offered by Zwierlein (OCT 1986), Giardina (1966 and 1987), the Etruscus, and the 'A' recension. Though by its nature this material is somewhat indigestible to read through, the chapter has a lot of useful information compendiously assembled and convenient for consultation. Giancarlo Mazzoli considers Seneca's attitude to 'la letteratura', starting from his enthusiastic response to Nero's alleged remark 'vellem nescire litteras' (*Clem*. 2.1). Generous fishing in the waters of Seneca's letters and treatises builds up a somewhat complex picture of Seneca's views on the place of literature and literary activity in private and public life. A logical synthesis is difficult when we are faced by statements like 'non delectent verba nostra sed prosint' (*Ep*. 75.5), 'otium sine litteris mors est' (*Ep*. 82.3), and the comparative downgrading of *liberalia studia* in *Ep*. 88.

G. G. Biondi takes a look at the tragedies, starting with an interesting comparison between Sophocles' *O. T*. and Seneca's *Oedipus*, in which he sees Seneca's play lacking the *vis tragica* of his Greek precursor. Much of the piece examines the nature of Seneca's *cantica* (intense monodies): in these the character illustrates a sort of 'epifania del delirio', and Seneca is showing himself a pioneer in psychic exploration. The self-revelatory element of these monodies is compared with Catullus (e.g. 5), and with the *cantica* of Plautus (e.g. the *lena* in *Curculio*). No celebration of Seneca's achievement could ignore his remarkable influence on later literature, and an Italian conference naturally concentrates on his *Nachleben* in Italy. G. B. Squarotti discusses the debts to Seneca of Politian, Boccaccio, and Tasso, and shows that all three were inspired by one tragedy in particular, the *Phaedra*. Ernst Vogt gives us a survey of the long and distinguished history of Senecan scholarship in Italy, starting with Petrarch, whose *Epistulae familiares* includes one addressed to Seneca (24.5). Up to the present day there is no sign that the stream of books devoted to the sage is in danger of drying up. Finally, Mario Citroni looks at the future prospects of Senecan studies in educational curricula, and eloquently defends the value of Seneca's writings as 'un' esperienza intellettuale ed estetica intensa e profonda'. A good trumpet note on which to end a book which is on the whole lively, readable, and informative, and a serviceable addition to any Senecan library.

University of Birmingham C. D. N. COSTA

MILESIAN TALES

E. Lefèvre: *Studien zur Struktur der 'Milesischen' Novelle bei Petron und Apuleius* (Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur, Mainz). Pp. 100. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 1997. ISBN: 3-515-07181-4.

Students of Petronius and Apuleius are often referred to the so-called 'Milesian Tales' of Aristides. Since these texts are no longer extant, it is hard to say anything about them with certainty, except that they were erotic tales widely read in antiquity. In this small monograph, Eckard Lefèvre attempts to go well beyond this general conclusion and reconstruct what these tales must have been like, mainly on the basis of the two Roman novels. L.'s underlying assumption is that Petronius and Apuleius

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must have reworked the tales in a manner analogous to how Romans wrote comedy or epic modelled on Greek originals.

Analysing some well-known passages from the *Satyrica* and *Metamorphoses* commonly held to be of a 'Milesian' nature, such as 'The Widow of Ephesus' (*Sat*. 111–12) or the adultery tales in *Met*. 9, L. discerns a twofold structure in nearly all of them. The first part in each case contains an orderly series of events with a satisfying climax, while the second part further complicates matters, repeating or mirroring motifs, adding unexpected turns and specific Roman elements, or piling up jokes. For instance, the Widow of Ephesus tale could have ended with the motif that the virtuous lady was seduced by the soldier and persuaded to live (*Sat*. 112.3). Instead, however, it goes on with new developments, finally attaining a new climax, shocking or tasteless to some readers: the 'dead man on the cross' (112.8).

A similar 'appendix technique' is detected by L. in most of the other examples. So his conclusion hardly comes as a surprise: in these second parts of their tales, Petronius and Apuleius are adding elements of their own, thereby trying to surpass the Milesian originals followed in the initial sections. These Milesian originals, then, were fairly uncomplicated, straightforward stories.

Although much of this must remain speculative, given the lack of evidence, a general literary development from simple models to more complex reworkings seems likely enough, even beforehand. But having said this, some objections may be raised. L.'s approach remains rather one-sided, focusing only on the Milesian model behind the Roman texts, at the expense of other possible influences such as comedy, satire, or mime, which are hardly more than mentioned in passing. The model of the 'appendix technique' is applied rigidly and almost mechanically: every element in a Petronian or Apuleian tale that according to L.'s norms does not fit in organically is immediately taken as a sign of a conscious addition.

Regrettably, L. appears to value such contributions of the Roman novelists rather negatively. From his various aesthetic and stylistic remarks a conviction emerges that the pure simplicity of the Greek originals has given way to Roman imbalance and disharmony, or even to bad taste and sloppy writing. On occasion L. also quotes extremely negative value judgements by others without dissent; thus he refers to Friedländer's devastating remarks on the latter half of the famous 'Cupid and Psyche' tale by Apuleius ('teils gezierte und frostige Allegorie, teils platte Travestie', p. 61). Perhaps even more characteristically, L. repeatedly compares a Renaissance reworking of a motif to show how the later author returns to a more sober and organic narrative structure. For example, Boccaccio's version of the 'lover in the wine cask' is clearly preferred by L. to Apuleius' version (9.5–7), criticized for not being well-rounded (pp. 46–7). All this seems to reflect a decidedly 'classicist' approach to or even bias against Silver Latin Literature, such as is rarely expressed in studies nowadays.

The final chapters on pseudo-Aeschines, Aristaenetus, and Sisenna remain too short to be satisfying (twelve pages), and do not add much to the main argument, while the 'Ausblick' merely functions as a repetition of the negative judgements on Petronius and Apuleius: the Greek Milesian tales probably were 'von ziemlicher Frische und Unverbrauchtheit', unlike the Roman novels that stem from 'den Pulten gewiegter Literaten' (p. 87). As a conclusion, this is rather meager. To mention another thing, there is not a word on the macrostructure of Aristides' book. Was it anything like a coherent, thematic collection, or was it only loosely arranged? Lack of evidence is not a sufficient reason to leave such a question unasked, certainly in a book like this.

In short, allowing for some speculation, L.'s study may be right in the end about the

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Greek originals: these tales are likely to have been fairly straightforward. But its one-sided approach and consistently classicist attitude seriously detract from its merits and usefulness. What counts most in the end is to understand more about extant texts rather than lost texts.

Leiden University VINCENT HUNINK

EARLY AUGUSTINE

T. FUHRER (ed.): *Augustin:* Contra Academicos (vel de Academicis): *Bücher 2 und 3: Einleitung und Kommentar.* (Patristische Texte und Studien, 46.) Pp. x + 532. Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1997. ISBN: 3-11-015204-5.

Although there is a steady stream of scholarly publications on every aspect of Augustine of Hippo's life and thoughts, there are few modern commentaries in any language on his individual writings. Even the best-known of these, the *Confessions*, had to wait until 1992, when J. J. O'Donnell's three-volume Oxford edition appeared, to be followed on a smaller scale by G. Clark's 1995 Cambridge commentary on Books I–IV. It is thus particularly to be welcomed that F. (recently appointed to the Chair of Latin at Zurich University) provides a massively detailed exegesis (429 pages of commentary) of Books II and III of Augustine's first surviving work, the *Contra Academicos*, covering exhaustively its background, argument, and language. F. displays great erudition and fine judgement throughout: her commentary will be the starting point for all future serious study of the group of philosophical dialogues that Augustine wrote at Cassiciacum in northern Italy in the immediate aftermath of his conversion in 386.

There are understandable reasons for the non-inclusion of Book I of *Contra Academicos* in F.'s edition. It is introductory and scene-setting in nature, and does not contain any argument that is not somehow reiterated and developed in Books II and III, books which Augustine, moreover, presents as the outcome of a self-contained group of sessions. Moreover, the *index locorum* identifies discussions of passages from Book I in the commentary. Yet it is none the less regrettable that, despite the length of her study, F. did not provide a commentary on Book I, whose proem, as well as the strategy of its discussions (an aspect to which F. is especially sensitive) of error and wisdom, would have been elucidated by her scrutiny: for who, after F., will now attempt another commentary on this work in the foreseeable future?

An introduction of fifty-four pages covers the place of the work in Augustine's writings, its date, addressee, the participants in the dialogue, its setting, historicity, form and structure, title, sources, language and style, argument, and purpose. F. has interesting observations on the stylized manner in which Augustine presents himself and the other participants, and she provides an illuminating analysis of the argument from two perspectives, those of external framework (settings, protocols of discussions, and intervals) and thematic development. These do not always coincide, and F. perceptively identifies the principal function of the former as retarding the argument, and so facilitating emphasis, repetition, and reformulation. Thus two traditional questions of Augustinian scholarship, the historicity of the Cassiciacum dialogues

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and the function of the scenic setting, are firmly linked to the analysis of the argumentational dynamism of the work.

Throughout her study F. gives full consideration to the traditions in which Augustine's work is embedded, and this sense of literary and philosophical perspective serves at once to define the value of the work and to elucidate several of its features. Its form is related to the conventions of the literary-philosophical dialogue (a perspective that, again, addresses the question of historicity); its use of Cicero's *Academici Libri* is closely monitored (F. is commendably agnostic on the matter of which edition of Cicero's work Augustine uses, pp. 37–40), but non-Ciceronian elements in Augustine's account of academic scepticism are also duly noted (pp. 136–7, 145–6). F. has in general little time for those modern scholars who find parts of Augustine's argument naive, justifying some sections of apparently little value by accounting for their rôle in the development of his overall strategy: e.g. the discussion of probability in *C. Acad.* 2.7.16–8.20 paves the way for Augustine's recasting of sceptic positions in the context of Platonism in 3.17.37–18.41.

The introduction of a specifically Christian dimension towards the end of the dialogue has always posed problems of interpretation. F. is persuasive in arguing through close textual analysis that the 'una verissimae philosophiae disciplina' of 3.19.42 is neither Christianity nor a fusion of Christianity with Platonism, but is Platonism itself, understood to be broadly compatible with Christian doctrines (pp. 451–4). Yet she also identifies elements in the same chapter of Augustine's characteristic later scruples about some aspects of Platonism, chiefly his doubts that, by contrast with Christianity, it can effect the ascent (or return) of the soul which it proclaims (pp. 460–8).

It is a mark of the quality of this commentary that one can find little or nothing to fault in it. It would, however, have been helpful if a thematic index had been included, for many specific discussions will be of value to the student of Augustine who does not work through F.'s book. Here are some instances: the vocabulary of the theme of error (pp. 147, 393–4), gestures and weeping in descriptions of prayer (pp. 182–3), uses of Virgil (pp. 198–204, 273–81, 328–9), Augustine and Descartes (pp. 309–11, 356), *respicere* (p. 97), the motif of the soul's return (pp. 200–2), Augustine and Plato (pp. 357 n. 35, 406–18). On the broader background of the motif of the sea-storm and harbour in 2.1.1 the seminal article of C. Bonner, 'Desired Haven', *Harvard Theological Review* 34 (1941), 49–67, might have been cited.

F. does not print a Latin text, but provides a list (pp. 484–6) of the passages where she deviates from W. M. Green's 1970 edition in the *Corpus Christianorum* series. Several of her conjectures (e.g. those at 2.2.5, 2.3.9, 2.4.10, 3.10.23) improve the text. She adds a list of corrigenda of the error-prone Green edition (pp. 483–4). References to scattered discussions of Augustine's language and style are collected on pp. 45–6, and provide evidence that scotches the conventional description of his style in this and the other early treatises as 'Ciceronian': these writings are quintessentially in late literary Latin. A generous bibliography completes this most valuable work.

University College London G. J. P. O'DALY

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CHURCH FATHERS

M. EDWARDS: *Optatus: Against the Donatists.* (Translated Texts for Historians, 27.) Pp. xxxi + 222, 2 maps. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1997. Paper, £12.50. ISBN: 0-85323-752-2.

A. T. FEAR: *Lives of the Visigothic Fathers.* (Translated Texts for Historians, 26.) Pp. xxxix + 167, 1 map. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1997. Paper, £9.95. ISBN: 0-85323-582-1.

M. A. TILLEY: *Donatist Martyr Stories: The Church in Conflict in Roman North Africa.* (Translated Texts for Historians, 24.) Pp. xxxvi + 101, 1 map. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1996. Paper, £9.95. ISBN: 0-85323-931-2.

L. R. WICKHAM: *Hilary of Poitiers: Conflicts of Conscience and Law in the Fourth-Century Church*. (Translated Texts for Historians, 25.) Pp. xxvi + 128. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1997. Paper, £9.95. ISBN: 0-85323-572-4.

Over the course of the last decade, or thereabouts, the series Translated Texts for Historians (hereinafter TTH) has greatly enhanced the teaching of university courses on late Roman and early medieval history to students not equipped to read the sources in their original languages. Although the explicit aim of the series has been 'to meet the needs of students', it was clear from the outset that the editors of TTH were concerned to meet the highest standards of scholarship. These four new volumes confirm the reputation of TTH as one of the most exciting and worthwhile publishing projects of recent years.

First up is E.'s new translation of Optatus' polemic against the Donatist schismatics in north Africa, and the documents that have come to be associated with it. To be sure, we have had a translation of this work before (by O. R. Vassall-Phillips in 1917), but it has long needed replacing. Thanks to the work in recent decades by T. D. Barnes, W. H. C. Frend, J.-L. Maier, and many others, we have a greater understanding of Optatus' religious, political, and literary milieux. This bears fruit most obviously in E.'s fine introduction and commentary. Without diminishing Optatus' value as a source on Donatism—and, indeed, on the otherwise shadowy and little understood policies of the emperor Constans (337–50)—E. nevertheless displays great sensitivity to Optatus' polemical misrepresentation of his opponents. For example, he shows just how tenuous is Optatus' characterization of Donatism as a movement originating in society's fringes, an idea that has been influential on some modern views of the schism (pp. xx–xxii). Likewise, he demonstrates that Optatus' views on papal primacy, which have been seized upon gleefully by historians of a particular confessional bent, mark the author out as something of an eccentric, rather than as a representative of fourth-century views (pp. xxv–xxvi). E. himself remarks (p. xxix) that his 'translation is always leaden, sometimes prolix and generally obscure when it attempts to be elevated', thereby reflecting his scathing assessment of Optatus' Latin. Even so, there could have been some consideration of the rhetoric to which Optatus aspired but so infrequently achieved. For example, Optatus endeavoured to show the patent absurdity of the Donatists' position: he scoffs at the hypocrisy of a group that derides

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its opponents as traitors yet benefits from the pagan emperor Julian's efforts to foment dissension within the Church (ii.16f.). Also, like Augustine, his great successor in the offensive against Donatism, Optatus needed to justify the use of secular force against his foes within the Church: his cunning solution was to blame the Donatists themselves for the violence visited upon them (e.g. at iii.1). Apart from this deficiency, faults are few (I note only that at p. 89 n. 30 Photinus of Sirmium becomes Photinus of Smyrna). The volume is completed by an index-cum-glossary (which ought to have encompassed also the introduction), two appendices, and clear maps. All in all, this is a splendid edition: the historical commentary is full, and the bibliography is right up to date on both secular and ecclesiastical matters (although, for the polemical use of Scripture, M. A. Tilley's *The Bible in North Africa: The Donatist World* [1997] should now be added). It will stand as a good example of what can been done with a text to turn it into a valuable teaching aid. Indeed, with such material to hand, students will be much better placed to witness at first hand the complex ecclesiastical politics of the Constantinian empire.

The competitive nature of north African Christianity exemplified by Optatus is underlined, from the opposite point of view, by the accounts of martyrdom translated by T. in her extremely useful and lively volume. The texts presented here not only relate the sufferings of martyrs, but do so in a polemical manner, making swipes at their authors' enemies both without and (more pertinently) within the Christian community. Moreover, just as Optatus had made issues of tradition central to his argument, so too the Donatists themselves claimed to be the true inheritors of pre-Constantinian Christianity. Thus T. provides a translation of the Donatist account of the martyrdom of Cyprian of Carthage; likewise she notes that 'Catholic' versions exist of others of the *passiones* she has presented. At times one wishes there had been more discussion of this fraught issue: while T. analyses the differences with regard to the *Passio S. Cypriani* (p. 2), rather more could have been said of the opposing accounts of the Abitinian martyrs or the *Passio SS. Donati et Advocati.* There are occasional lapses on points of detail. In the *Passio S. Marculi*, T. seems to have missed the tone of the narrative, which is deeply imbued with biblical, indeed apocalyptic, imagery. This, rather than the opprobrium traditionally attached by Romans to the title 'king', explains why Constans is called *rex* in §3 (*contra* T.'s n. 9 on p. 79; in the same note, T. has confused Constans and Constantine). The rendering of *popina* as 'fast-food restaurant' (*Passio SS. Donati et Advocati* §4) is jarringly colloquial: what would have been wrong with 'cheap eating-house'? But I should not be too negative: T. has performed a valuable service, providing a necessary corrective to the usual interpretations of Donatism. Her useful introduction on legal matters (pp. xxii–xxxvi) will delight students asked the hoary question, 'Why were the Christians persecuted?' More broadly, her presentation of the texts treads a sensible line between what such *passiones* and *acta* really reveal about the nature of persecution, and how the narratives were manipulated to persuade and inspire the Donatist audiences who read and heard them. Together with E.'s Optatus, T.'s volume provides an excellent insight into the troubled lives of north African Christians. Bearing in mind their complementarity, it is surely unfortunate that T. seems to have produced her volume unaware that E.'s was to appear a year later, so that her references to Optatus include Vassall-Phillips's outdated translation.

Turning now to F.'s compendium of Visigothic hagiography, I am reminded of an exchange between two former colleagues. Searching for a corrective to Gregory of Tours' defining influence on the study of the cult of saints, one colleague wondered 'if there might be interesting material in the Visigothic fathers?' 'I wouldn't bank on it!'

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came the scoffing reply. But F.'s fine volume amply refutes such derision. Five seventh-century texts are presented: King Sisebut's *Vita S. Desiderii*, Braulio of Saragossa's *Vita S. Aemiliani*, the *Vitae SS. Patrum Emerentensium* usually, but erroneously, ascribed to Paul the Deacon (cf. F.'s discussion at pp. xxx–xxxi), Ildefonsus of Toledo's *De Viris Illustribus*, and the anonymous *Vita S. Fructuosi.* The translation (based on recent editions by Spanish scholars) is clear, solid, and unpretentious, and is provided with ample notes and an extensive general introduction (pp. ix–xxxviii). Bearing in mind that all of F.'s introductory matter is included in this essay, rather than in prefatory notes to each text, it would have been useful if it, as well as the translation, had been covered by the index. This is doubly unfortunate because the introduction is a valuable study, from which not just students will learn a great deal. F. is perceptive of the potential of hagiography to shed light on Visigothic society, particularly in the aftermath of the conversion of the Goths from 'Arian' to 'Catholic' Christianity at the direction of King Reccared at the third Council of Toledo in 589. But equally F. is sensitive to the limits of his material, providing a judicious survey of how literary concerns will have underpinned the compilation of certain texts (for example, the influence of Pope Gregory the Great's *Dialogus* on the *Vitae SS. Patrum Emerentensium*: see pp. xviii–xx). Finally, F. provides a massive bibliography that will provide a useful tool for those beginning research on Spanish late antiquity; I would only add Richard Fletcher's splendid *The Conversion of Europe* (London, 1997), which has much to say on Visigothic Christianity, and especially on Sisebut. For too long the delights of Visigothic Spain have remained an arcane topic. Now, with F.'s welcome collection—which complements K. B. Wolf's *Conquerors and Chroniclers of Early Medieval Spain* published in the same series (TTH 9, 1991)—there is no excuse not to rectify this situation. Students and their teachers will be grateful to F. for many years to come.

Finally we come to W.'s collection of material by Hilary of Poitiers. The volume includes two works: the *Adversus Valentem et Ursacium* (also known as the *Opus Historicum*, and, most frequently, as the *Collectanea Antiariana Parisina*) and the open letter written to the emperor Constantius II at Constantinople in 360. Both works—but particularly the former—are of such unparalleled importance for our understanding of fourth-century credal developments and of the impact of emperors on the Church that it is hard to believe that they have never been translated into English hitherto. At times one wishes that W. had provided more detailed background information. As it is, the introduction leaves little room for the all-important political context that shaped the events described by Hilary. Indeed, some comments will raise an eyebrow or two. W. repeats Jerome's old mistake that Hilary's *Against Constantius* was composed after that emperor's death (p. ix), a view that has rightly been rejected (cf. T. D. Barnes, *JThS* n.s. 39 [1988], 609–11). Meanwhile W.'s assertion that the emperor Julian 'left the Church alone' (p. xxii) would have bewildered Optatus for one! The notes are rather too perfunctory, while their format is most idiosyncratic: they occur not at the point in the text to which they refer, but at the beginning of each section, so that an item and its explanatory note can be separated by several pages (e.g. n. 1 on p. 37 refers to the text on p. 41). Bearing in mind that the book is aimed at an anglophone student audience, the bibliography ought to have included T. D. Barnes's *Athanasius and Constantius* (Cambridge, MA, 1993) and D. H. Williams's *Ambrose of Milan and the End of Arian–Nicene Conflicts* (Oxford, 1995), rather than the weighty German tomes that W. cites. But it would be unfair to end with complaints. This excellent translation at last puts in the hands of undergraduates a text central to any understanding of the religious politics of the fourth century (in this respect it

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complements E.'s Optatus magnificently). Also, W.'s convenient restoration of the constituent fragments of the *Adversus Valentem et Ursacium* to their original order will make the volume a useful handbook for postgraduates and scholars who have grown tired of flicking back and forth through the jumbled fragments of Feder's *CSEL* edition.

Each volume is very well produced, especially bearing in mind that the series relies heavily on camera-ready copy or computer disks supplied by the individual authors; indeed, I noticed very few misprints. But this is a minor criticism for a series that valiantly strives to keep books within reach of hard-pressed student budgets. In sum, we have four admirable new volumes to add to TTH's distinguished list. With them at our disposal, we can now give Latinless students a more sophisticated taste of the interpenetration of ecclesiastical and imperial politics in the fourth century, and of the development of hagiography across late antiquity. But the value of these volumes is greater than that: they provide an excellent resource too for all those engaged in research on this seminal period.

National University of Ireland, Maynooth MARK HUMPHRIES

EVIDENTIA

C. Lévy, L. Pernot (edd.): *Dire l'évidence (philosophie et rhétorique antiques)*. (Cahiers de philosophie de l'Université de Paris XII, 2.) Pp. 448. Paris and Montreal: Harmattan, 1997. Paper. ISBN: 2-7384-5024-5.

The editors open this volume with egregious innumeracy by claiming (p. 10) that 1995, the year of the conference from which the papers are derived, was the 2050th anniversary (in reality, the 2039th!) of Cicero's coining of the word *evidentia* in 45 B.C. at *Academica* (*Lucullus*) 2.17. Cicero's *evidentia* translates the Greek ἐνάργεια and stands for the clarity and reliability of Stoic cognitive impressions, or of comparable apprehensions of the palpably, indefeasibly real. Philosophical ἐνάργεια/*evidentia* (French 'évidence', German 'Evidenz', Italian 'evidenza') is *self-evidence*, one kind of epistemological certainty. But the same terminology has another application, of course, in the rhetorical and literary spheres, where it denotes compelling verbal vividness (a quality of quasi-actuality) in narrative or descriptive writing. The existence of this collection of twenty-one papers represents a supposition that beneath this terminological overlap there lie shared concerns with the persuasive power of certain kinds of psychological experience, and also with the paradoxical problem of *speaking* about the very things to which the status of the undeniably authentic is ascribed.

The collection is divided into four rather broad sections. The first, 'Évidence et argumentation', is especially disparate: Barbara Cassin suggests that while philosophical 'évidence' moves from things to words, the rhetorical kind moves from words to things, and the literary (especially in ecphrasis) from words to words; Bernard Schouler sees Aristotle as a turning point in the recognition of rhetoric as potentially rational (though still fully 'human' in its reliance on probability); Aldo Setaioli finds a view of interpretation (removing the literary veil from the clear philosophical message) in Servius' platonizing note on *Aeneid* 6.703; and Emmanuel Bury traces the influence of Augustine's notion of internal illumination on

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seventeenth-century ideas of Christian preaching. In the second section ('L'évidence, obstacle ou accès à la connaissance?') Luc Brisson maintains that in Plato rational conviction always depends on the intuitive conviction of its axioms (philosophy requires susceptibility to the quasi-sensual clarity of the Intelligible); Frédérique Ildefonse examines the importance of cognitive impressions for Stoic logic; Woldemar Görler treats the importance of ἐνάργεια in Hellenistic philosophy more generally; François-Régis Chaumartin contends that Seneca's *Letters* move between a sense of the limits of human reason and a confidence in the divine principle; Clara Auvray-Assayas uses Cicero to reconstruct contemporary Epicurean concerns with 'natural' clarity of perception; and Daniel Delattre shows how Philodemus' *De musica* relies on Epicurean canonic to rebut Diogenes of Babylon's account of musical qualities. The third section ('Images, Imagination') returns to literature and rhetoric: Philippe Heuzé's chapter offers some lightweight thoughts on elements of clarity and obscurity in Virgil and Horace; Perrine Galand-Hallyn claims that the ironic rhetoric of Ovid's *Heroides* reflects the lost certainties of Roman culture; Ruth Webb links rhetorical vividness to the 'art-gallery' of images stored in the memory; Sandrine Dubel argues that in imperial progymnasmata ecphrasis involves mental movement through a spatio-temporal experience; and Colette Nativel explains how Franciscus Junius's *De pictura veterum* involves a conception of visual rhetoric that contains both Platonic and Longinian elements. The final section ('L'ineffable') brings together Alain Petit on various sorts of Pythagorean silence; Jacques Brunschwig on the difference between 'aphasia' in Pyrrho and in the neo-Pyrrhonists; Baudouin Decharneux on divine 'évidence' as revelation in Philo; Philippe Hoffmann on the mystical silences of Neoplatonism in the face of transcendent reality (much the longest piece in the book); Alain Michel on a Platonizing tradition of ineffability from Dionysius the Areopagite to Vico; and Gilles Declerq on the ramifications of the sublimity of unspoken thoughts (stemming from pseudo-Longinus *Sublim.* 7) in seventeenth-century French classicism.

As my bare catalogue shows, this is an extremely motley collection. Although not competent to pronounce on the merits of everything contained in it, I have to say that I found the general quality mediocre. Most of the chapters are rather short and sketchy; many are sparsely annotated; some should not have been published at all. With honourable exceptions (among them Brisson, Delattre, Webb, Dubel, and Brunschwig), there is a pervading sense of meandering round an ill-defined set of issues. At the end I remained unclear whether there is an interesting connection between philosophical and rhetorical ἐνάργεια. Not much here, in short, either to grasp in one's Stoic fist or to enjoy for its compelling cogency.

University of St Andrews STEPHEN HALLIWELL

GRONINGEN COLLOQUIA 8

H. Hofmann, M. Zimmerman (edd.): *Groningen Colloquia on the Novel, Vol. VIII*. Pp. ix + 241. Groningen: Egbert Forsten, 1997. ISBN: 90-6980-089-6.

The latest addition to this established series, though grounded as its precedessors have been on the fiction produced in antiquity, reaches out towards the post-antique history of the genre. This is important, because the study of the ancient novel is not

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only a specialism within classical studies, but also marks the (relatively neglected) starting point for any serious diachronic study of the novel as a genre.

The first five of the volume's nine essays are devoted to Apuleius. Mario Andreassi, revisiting a long-ago postulated source for *Met*. 10.2–12 in an Oxyrhynchus mime, decides against 'direct dependence' but suggests, instead, that there existed a fluid boundary between what is conventionally considered 'high' and 'low'. Stelios Panayotakis explores thematic coherences in the brief Underworld episode in the tale of Cupid and Psyche (*Met*. 6.18–19), so as to suggest both a possible underlying mythological strand (deceptive appearance, lameness, and old age as inherently associated with the Underworld) and a mirror-relation between Venus' power over Psyche within the tale, and the rôles of the tale's narrator and narratee (the unnamed old woman and Charite) in Lucius' narrative which frames it.

Anne E. Witte, from an anthropologist's perspective, examines the possible significance of what she terms 'calendar motifs' in the *Metamorphoses*. The comparison of the tale of Lucius with the later Mardi Gras (carnival) ritual is enticing if not wholly persuasive, while the absence of any reference to Mikhail Bakhtin's now-canonical appropriation of 'carnival' and the 'carnivalesque' for literary studies is surprising. Andrew Laird turns a philosopher's eye on the images and epiphanies of divinities in the *Metamorphoses*, arguing that Apuleius has carefully stage-managed, through the relevant ecphrases, and especially those in Book 11, a coherent progression from the description of a likeness to the description of divine essence which transcends the visual. Given what we know of Apuleius' extra-novelistic interests, such a reading is inherently plausible. But all this begs the very question that is forcefully restated in the next contribution: was Apuleius serious?

Danielle van Mal-Maeder thinks not. According to her reading, Lucius' much-discussed conversion to the worship of Isis is a send-up, entirely in keeping with the spirit of comedy and pastiche which, so the argument goes, informs the *Metamorphoses* from beginning to end. This is certainly a minority view, though, as her own cited references make clear, hers is by no means a lone voice in Apuleian studies; and E. J. Kenney, in his judicious introduction to the new English translation (Penguin, 1998: pp. xxix–xxx) also gives some room to the idea. The case is certainly persuasive that the last book of the *Metamorphoses can* be read in this way. Unwisely, in her zeal to prove that it was *meant* to be so read, Mal-Maeder seizes on tenuous evidence for a lacuna in the textual tradition and fills it with a hypothesis of such blatant wishful thinking as to put the rest of her argument (unjustly, in my view) at risk.

From here, we move into the post-Hellenistic Christian world. Dirk Hansen argues convincingly that the *Clementina* is written in such a way as to presuppose a knowledge of the *Aithiopika*, without, however, constituting a straightforward 'christianization' such as the *Acta Andreae* performed upon the Homeric epics. Rather, the presence of Heliodoros behind the text serves as a kind of 'stage-direction' (*Regieanweisung*).

Moving into the twelfth century, Ruth Harder confronts the verse novel written by the prolific Byzantine courtier Theodore Prodromos (probably a few years either side of 1140). Focusing on the many scenes in this text devoted to feasting and concomitant social interchanges, she notes the complete absence, for Byzantium, of detailed studies of these *realia*, such as exist for the ancient world, and bravely attempts to make a start, on the basis of the evidence provided by Prodromos. The result is a valuable systematic study of a series of episodes of the novel in which, in particular, the different social conventions depicted among Hellenes and among barbarian pirates are highlighted. The Hellenes are for the most part bland, bourgeois

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and (though Harder does not explicitly say so) boring; the barbarians have learnt their dining habits from Trimalchio (but also, bizarrely, from the more intimidating aspects of Byzantine court ceremonial), and are much more fun. Harder's approach sits uneasily between the literary sophistication that is only now being brought to bear on this and similar texts, and the *Aktualisierungsversuch* to which previous generations of Byzantinists subjected them, with meagre results.

Willem Aerts, in propounding a typology of literary portraiture in Byzantine literature, goes some way beyond the bounds of the novel as a genre, but ranges widely between the classical world and such emergent Modern Greek works as *Digenes Akrites* (probably twelfth-century) and *Erotokritos* (seventeenth).

Finally, a touching account of the death, life, and work of Philip Sidney (all of them, according to Robert Carver, more or less successful fictions) serves to promote the two versions of *Arcadia*, convincingly if unproblematically, as points of mediation between the ancient and the modern novel. Carver shows at the same time how Sidney, in moving from the Old Arcadia to the New, moved also from the sphere of Apuleius to that of Heliodoros—and this, at least as far as Sidney was concerned, was a retrograde step.

King's College London RODERICK BEATON

FRAGMENTS AS FETISHES

G. W. Most (ed.): *Collecting Fragments: Fragmente sammeln.* (Aporemata: Kritische Studien zur Philologiegeschichte, 1.) Pp. x + 338. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Rupprecht, 1997. Paper, DM 98. ISBN: 3-525-25900-X.

Glenn Most's interesting collection of seventeen essays has its origin in a colloquium on the fragment held at the Internationales Wissenschaftsforum at Heidelberg University in June 1995, intended to explore 'historical and methodological aspects of various philological activities'. It is divided up into five sections. The first, containing two essays (by Carlotta Dionisotti and Rudolf Wagner), discusses general considerations about what might be termed the politics of collecting fragments. The authors do not restrict themselves to fragments of the canonical authors of Greek and Roman antiquity, and their wide-ranging discussion is all the more useful and interesting because of this breadth. The second section (five essays) concentrates on Greek literary fragments, with special emphasis on Callimachus (contributions by Peter Bing, Giovanni Benedetto, and A. S. Hollis). The third section, on historical fragments, again consists of five essays, three of which (by Anthony Grafton, Guido Schepens, and G. W. Bowersock) consider those indispensable anthologizing works of nineteenth-century German scholarship, Felix Jacoby's *Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker* and Karl Müller's *Fragmenta Historicorum Graecorum*. This section concludes with a stimulating analysis by Sally Humphries of the rôle of the fragment in Greek historiography after Thucydides (pp. 207–24), which touches on many larger issues *en route*. The fourth section, less crisply themed than the others, includes four pieces on fragments which are not explicitly literary or historical, but which could be called paraliterary: philosophical, medical, and philological fragments. In the last section, the book's most explicitly theoretically informed

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contribution, by Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht (pp. 315–28), invites classicists to employ Walter Benjamin, Heidegger, and the psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan to think a little harder about the nature of the fragments which constitute so many of their sources. A short general index and a much fuller *index locorum* follow.

All classicists and ancient historians might be said to depend ultimately upon fragments of one sort or another: even when the text that one is using is ostensibly complete, one rarely has the whole *oeuvre* of the author, or knowledge of the full genre or broader context in which a particular work was once located. Yet the implications of this dependence on fragments are rarely considered beyond a lament for the lost part of the manuscript, or an acknowledgement that only so much can be done with the fragmentary evidence that survives. M.'s collection forces the classicist concerned with texts to consider some of these issues, which have been debated for some years in connection with ancient material culture and archaeological remains. This is an important initiative, which needs to be developed further. Many areas of classical scholarship would certainly benefit from a more reflexive attitude towards their fragmentary sources and the circumstances of their acquisition and collection. Papyrology is the most obvious example: its origins as a Eurocentric colonialist project, and the ways that this might have affected the compilation of the great papyrological corpora and consequently the way the texts in them can be employed, are rarely acknowledged by text editors. It is a shame that the book contains nothing on epigraphy, that most physically material of ancient textual remains. Consequently, the book largely maintains the artificial divide (meaningless in ancient times) between artefact and text. Although Humphreys (pp. 209–10) argues plangently and persuasively against this kind of decontextualization of text from environment, suggesting that 'fixation on material traces of the past, like fixation on fragments, is also a form of fetishism', her initiative remains to be taken up by most of the other contributors, who seem rather optimistic about what can be known.

These cavils aside, M.'s collection is pleasingly coherent and clear, and remarkably free of the 'curate's egg' factor which bedevils so many edited books. The two introductory essays in the first section establish the parameters of the question, and the rest of the contributions are, in a sense, case studies which explore particular avenues. While discussing very different types of evidence, widely separated in space and time, the contributors still manage to enter into dialogue with each other, so that the importance of the essays ranges beyond the individual and the specific. With such strong internal coherence, the book has almost none of the weak links so often found in books that have arisen out of colloquia. Another general strength of the work is that while most of the essays are theoretically informed to one degree or another, they lapse into neither incomprehensible jargon nor polemical tub-thumping. Theoretical insights are deployed thoughtfully, to shed light on the material under discussion, rather than gratuitously to show off the writer's sophistication (see, especially, Humphrey's subtle essay on historiography). In sum, M. may be said to have produced a paradigmatic edited collection: he presents us with new perspectives on both familiar and unfamiliar data in a series of papers which interact meaningfully with each other to produce a coherent but unrepetitious whole.

University of Warwick DOMINIC MONTSERRAT

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PASSION

S. M. Braund, C. Gill (edd.): *The Passions in Roman Thought and Literature*. Pp. viii + 266. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997. Cased, £37.50/$59.95. ISBN: 0-521-47391-8.

This volume addresses particularly the use of Roman philosophy to construct 'a culturally relevant framework of interpretation' (p. 3) for Latin literature and derives from the 1992 Passions Conference at Exeter University. There are two introductions: one on the general programme of the collection, and one giving an outline of some of the major issues in Stoic, Epicurean, and Aristotelian thought on the passions. Both introduce the eleven articles and show their place in the work as a whole. The project has an astonishing coherence: most contributors anticipate and respond to each other's articles, and the book should be read accordingly.

At its best the book explores 'an interplay between intellectual and literary modes' (p. 3): it is dynamic. Further, 'we need to identify features which are sufficiently determinate . . . to enable us to discriminate between possible intellectual influences' but 'we should be ready to accept that the literary work may combine features in a way that reshapes their meaning in comparison with the intellectual source' (Gill, p. 214). There is a danger that in a dynamic of many shifting modes the argument can become elusive, but the results of J. Booth's inflexible reading of Catullus 76 against a series of literary and philosophical contexts suggest that this is a risk well worth running. Fowler's 'we are all constructionists now' (p. 17) is over-optimistic, and the biographico-intentionalist A. Erskine (on Cicero's *Tusculans*) and, to a lesser extent, the Romantic R. Webb (on *Enargeia*) are alienated.

D. Fowler's 'Epicurean Anger', on the strange decision of the professors of *ataraxia* not to insist on the complete extirpation of this passion, suggests a limited parallelism between the proto-passions felt by the Stoic sage and the Epicurean, natural tendency to anger. But hopelessly problematic, F. argues, is Philodemus' positive evaluation of the 'natural anger' of an Epicurean master of good constitution. As F. hints (p. 29), this is potentially productive for readings of Lucretius and of satire, and perhaps a coda in this literary area would have been more appropriate than the over-brief discussion of the anger of Aeneas actually given.

M. Wilson, on grief in Seneca's *Epistles*, opens with the therapeutic tradition of Greek and Roman philosophy. Seneca's construction of himself not as a doctor but as a fellow patient is used as a frame for reading a shifting dynamic in the rôles of Seneca and Marullus in the *consolatio* that is *Epistle* 99. Another dimension is added through the dialogue between Stoicism (Seneca) and Epicureanism (Metrodorus), and further tensions are brought in later, notably military Roman against therapeutic Greek. His skilful blend of literary and philosophical reading leads neatly to S. M. Braund on grief and anger in Juvenal 13, a satire she reads as a double parody: Calvinus receives first a contemptuous mock *consolatio* for a trivial wrong and then, angered, a new consolation which fuels that anger. The scope of the article then widens, with closing sections on intratextuality with the angry *persona* of the early satires and intertextuality with Seneca's *De ira*. The merit and newness in the article is in the detail, but W. S. Anderson, 'Anger in Juvenal and Seneca', pp. 293–361 in *Essays on Roman Satire* (Princeton, 1982), is unlucky to be honoured and largely silenced in the notes. A. Schiesaro, having already published a version of his conference paper (pp. 196–210 in J. Elsner and J. Masters [edd.], *Reflections of Nero* [London, 1994]) on passion and Seneca's tragedies, offers less here. One might expect more serious

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discussion of Seneca's dramatic form with regard to the issue of a 'critical spectatorship'.

D. Levene on pity, fear, and the historical audience in Tacitus builds on Aristotle and Gill to explore the pity/fear distinction as an audience-based/analytic distinction. Pity is often generated through the focus of a pitying character. In the account of the death of Vitellius L. reads a complex dialogue and conflict between the two voices which he ultimately relates to ambiguities in Roman attitudes to a bad emperor: an excellent piece, but S. Bartsch, *Actors in the Audience* (Cambridge, MA, 1994), is perhaps a surprising omission from the notes. M. R. Wright on anger in the *Aeneid* and E. Fantham on hatred in the *Thebaid* both address the rival merits of Aristotelian and Stoic frameworks for their epics. Both find the absolutism of the Stoic rejection of passion and disorder impossible: W. cannot accept the presentation of Hercules and Aeneas as (Stoic) failures (p. 183), F. the world of the *Thebaid* as anti-providentialist (and therefore anti-Stoic). Add to these Schiesaro's conclusion, 'the impossibility of Stoic tragedy' (p. 111). Is there not need for further discussion of tensions *within* Stoicism, within the frame itself? W. offers a 'vernacular' (Gill, p. 13) Aristotelian reading of the *Aeneid* with *ira* and *furor* as national and group 'survival mechanisms' (p. 179), properly employed. But to carry this ethical principle across the divide between human and divine is surely more problematic than W. allows. F. contrasts Greek epic and tragedy with Roman, and argues that the Roman construction of a self-destructive passion transcends character and psychological intelligibility to spread like a disease through the world. As with Braund, the new interest is not in my overview but in her detail. C. Gill on passion, *akrasia*, and the anger of Aeneas ends the collection with typically heavyweight psychology. G. discusses a Chrysippan model of passion in which a person's collapse into passion takes the form of defiance or disobedience of a known standard of rationality and virtue. This is interesting for tragic Seneca's distinctively self-conscious heroes, who think themselves into a state in which they know that they are not themselves, and should be read back into Schiesaro's article as an alternative conception of passionate 'otherness'. G. follows Wright in stressing the collective (broadly Aristotelian) justification of the killing of Turnus, but combines this with a Stoic rhetoric of madness to create a conflict which has its analogues both in the divine superstructure and in the rhetoric of Roman imperialism. Inevitably the brief length of an article leaves these two analogues more shadowy than one might wish.

University of Victoria CEDRIC LITTLEWOOD

RHETORIC

W. J. DOMINIK (ed.): *Roman Eloquence: Rhetoric in Society and Literature*. Pp. xii + 268. London and New York: Routledge, 1997. Cased, £45 (Paper, £14.99). ISBN: 0-415-12544-8 (0-415-12545-6 pbk).

This volume contains fourteen essays with a brief preface by Dominik, who states the intent of the work: to examine the origin, development, and theory of Roman rhetoric, its rôle in society, and its relationship to various literary genres. The book is a companion piece to *Persuasion: Greek Rhetoric in Action* (London, 1994). Space does not permit the discussion of each individual essay, but specialists and non-specialists alike, in the fields of both rhetoric and Roman studies, will find any of the essays both interesting and instructive. The book is divided into three sections:

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part one entitled 'Theories, Transitions and Tensions'; part two entitled 'Rhetoric and Society'; and part three entitled 'Rhetoric and Genre'. Each of these sections addresses a wide range of literary, historical, and cultural subjects.

Part One explores the theory and practice of rhetoric in Rome and the tensions between Greek and Roman rhetoric. The section includes an introduction co-authored by D. and by Gualtiero Calboli, and essays by John Kirby ('Ciceronian Rhetoric: Theory and Practice'), Neil O'Sullivan ('Caecilius, the "Canons" of Writers, and the Origins of Atticism'), and D. himself ('The Style is the Man: Seneca, Tacitus, and Quintilian's Canon'). Among these I found Kirby's the most useful; the greater part of his article, which focuses only on the *exordium* of the *Pro Milone*, shows how syntactic parallelism (through the use of conjunctive or disjunctive particles such as *aut . . . aut*, or *non . . . sed*) works in unison with certain thematic parallels (such as the contrast Cicero makes between *vis* and *oratio*) in the speech, and how the interplay of these parallels shapes Cicero's argument.

The second part of this study looks at how Roman culture and society influence rhetoric in both theory and practice. It is, on the whole, the book's most rewarding set of essays. Catherine Connors's very stimulating contribution ('Field and Forum: Culture and Agriculture in Roman Rhetoric') examines representations of rusticity and agriculture in Roman rhetoric. She argues that 'speaking about nature is inevitably a way of speaking about culture'; Connors focuses primarily on Roman rhetorical treatises and illustrates how such imagery reinforces gender stereotypes and perpetuates élite cultural institutions in Roman society. Amy Richlin contributes a short though excellent study ('Gender and Rhetoric: Producing Manhood in the Schools') on gender terms as terms of abuse in Roman rhetoric, in which an orator depicts his opponent with language designed to impugn his masculinity and sexuality. Fantham's discussion ('The Contexts and Occasions of Roman Public Rhetoric') is one I would be inclined to assign to students introduced to Cicero for the first time to help them to appreciate the physical surroundings in which Roman orators worked from day to day.

The final section covers a wide range of subjects which will be of particular interest to those working within the specific genres each article addresses. This section includes essays by Joseph Farrell ('Towards a Rhetoric of [Roman?] Epic'), Susanna Morton Braund ('Declamation and Contestation in Satire'), Sander Goldberg ('Melpomene's Declamation [Rhetoric and Tragedy]'), Joseph Hughes ('*Inter tribunal et scaenam:* Comedy and Rhetoric in Rome'), Peter Toohey ('Eros and Eloquence: Modes of Amatory Persuasion in Ovid's *Ars Amatoria*'), Robert Cape ('Persuasive History: Roman Rhetoric and Historiography'), and Michele Ronnick ('Substructural Elements of Architectonic Rhetoric and Philosophical Thought in Fronto's Epistles'). Of these, Goldberg's and Hughes's were the most informative. Goldberg argues for a shift in Roman tragedy from Cicero's day, when it was more in the nature of popular spectacle, to Seneca's time, when tragedy became something to be recited for the Roman élite and focused more on language than staging. G. illustrates this shift by a close reading of Seneca's *Thyestes* and *Phaedra*, where he argues that the influence of declamation is particularly in evidence. My only reservation concerning this otherwise attractive argument is that we rely on second-hand sources and fragments in reconstructing early tragedy, and a tendency towards action and spectacle in Cicero's day (which G. plausibly reconstructs) does not, in and of itself, mean language was secondary (see e.g. Quint. *Inst*. 10.1.97 on Accius and Pacuvius, *clarissimi gravitate sententiarum, verborum pondere*). Hughes's interesting and intelligent essay builds on previous studies of comedy in Cicero's orations to look at comic elements in the *Pro S.*

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Roscio Amerino, *Pro Roscio Comoedo*, and the *Pro Cluentio*, and concludes with a general discussion of the theory of comedy in Cicero's and Quintilian's rhetorical works.

For all the book's virtues, there are some omissions that stand out, given that part of this volume's professed intent is to offer innovative analysis in the field of Roman rhetoric. No essay directly addresses the relationship between class and rhetoric in Roman society (see e.g. P. Sinclair's recent book, *Tacitus the Sententious Historian: a Sociology of Rhetoric in Tacitus' Annals 1–6* [University Park, 1995]). Also absent is any discussion of the relationship between rhetoric and Roman imperialism (see e.g. Peter Rose, 'Cicero and the Rhetoric of Imperialism: Putting the Politics Back into Political Rhetoric', *Rhetorica* 13 [1995], 359–99). But these criticisms are more a reflection of my own interests and in no way detract from the book's strengths. In conclusion, this volume offers a rewarding set of coherently presented essays, and is a worthy contribution to the field of Roman rhetoric.

University of Maryland, College Park STEVEN H. RUTLEDGE

IN-FIGHTING

JOHN HENDERSON: *Fighting for Rome. Poets & Caesars, History & Civil War.* Pp. x + 349. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. Cased, £45. ISBN: 0-521-58026-9.

JOHN HENDERSON: *Figuring Out Roman Nobility: Juvenal's Eighth Satire* (Exeter Studies in History). Pp. viii + 168. Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 1997. Paper, £9.95. ISBN: 0-85989-517-3.

Two by John Henderson, philological funster who packs serious political punch and says any number of provocative things (in maddening prose) about Roman literature. Impatient, on his side, with traditionalism and 'formalist fiddling', H. sets out here to reread poets and historians in uncompromisingly political terms. In so doing, he misses out much that a literary critic might like to dwell on, much that Roman writers put into their works, but also generates powerfully impressive readings. Both books are worth the (considerable) time it takes to plow through them.

The first of the two volumes, *Fighting for Rome*, is in a fashion a reprise of work that has made his such a prepossessing voice in New Latinist circles; it collects previously published essays, though substantially revises and integrates them with frequent cross-reference. The book is thus intended to become an extended meditation on the theme of militarism, politics, and civil war in Appian, Caesar, Horace, Lucan, Statius, Tacitus, Livy. Desiderated coherence founders on the inevitable singularity of these differently originating essays, but the effort to bring things together neatly reveals many of the underpinning concerns of H.'s work, and interested readers will be grateful for the handy collection cum second thoughts. The essays are organized in pairs, the first of them focusing on historical narratives of the civil war itself. The anything-but-Jeromian 'Three Men in a Vote: Proscription (Appian, *Civil Wars* 4.1–6)' considers the nexus killing/writing that proscription embodies, (history) writing's complicity in the business of making history and, at the same time, its impotence to contain that history (proscription lists were always under revision, responding—finally unreliably—to circumstance, 'model[ling] the unwritable illegibility of oppression' [p. 34]). 'XPDNC: Writing Caesar' also explores the issue of writing

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history, here seeing the *Commentarii* as lengthy commentary on another piece of writing—the letter sent to, and suppressed by, the Senate shortly before Caesar made his fatal decision to begin a war, whose nature as *civil* war, his narrative would tirelessly write around; the writing thus becomes perlocutionary, fashioning the elements of political authority's self-presentation for the post-Caesarian world.

Two good essays on Horace follow. In the first, *Sat.* 1.7's bad joke about Brutus' being asked by Greekling Persius to polish off Rupilius (the) Rex is reread interrogatively: is it Horace's bad joke? Persius'? 'Humour' to be fobbed off on the lower orders' low sensibilities? What is the (political) point of Horace's evasiveness? And does that very evasiveness not require us to take the poem more seriously, wondering uncomfortably about the comforts of the social politesse that prompt us to dismiss this vulgar little satire? The next essay is a difficult, meandering *explication* of the Pollio ode (2.1), or rather a descant on Horace's thinking through Pollio's reading–writing–living history: Horace's 'bio-script' reads Pollio's (so, '*Horace*'s most explicit programme for reading Horace' himself), bringing the unfinishable business of the wars right down to 23. 'Lucan: the Word at War' begins the book's third pair, on epic. This is an updated version of the earliest essay in the volume, the remarkable 1987 essay that set the terms and tone of much subsequent work on this brilliant, deformed poem. 'Statius' *Thebiad:* Form (P)remade' is next, another civil war text projecting Roman angst onto the mythical past: Roman Thebes. The final two essays return to historiography. 'Tacitus: the World in Pieces' is itself a chapter in pieces, resisting summary. Now-familiar themes—imperial subsumption of polity, fusion of *domus*/*urbs*/*orbis*, struggles of language and power—dominate this reading of Tacitus' Nero; all very dense, very dark. The last, briefer piece on Livy is perhaps more effective, turning us explicitly to the scene and conditions of writing (history). That perch of perspective, the writer's moment in time from which the past is composed by the historian, is especially foregrounded in the instance of Livy, whose narrative overtakes the point at which he began writing. How is the configuring 'now' reshaped as the story goes on? This stress on writing's 'situatedness' informs the entire book.

Figuring Out Roman Nobility is a short book on Juvenal 8 ostensibly designed for undergraduates, non-Latinist at that. It is therefore jokier than the other book, with stronger doses of straight didaxis. Like the essays above, it is full of ingenious remark as it slowly works through the first thirty-eight lines of the satire on ancestry, a doting, politicizing prosopography that demonstrates how these Roman names are 'good to think with' and through. H. displays Juvenal's dismantling of (past—for these families had largely died out by J.'s day) nobility in loving detail, and just as keenly demonstrates the contingency of J.'s counterposed *virtus* in precisely the same (Juvenal-deconstructed) structure of values. The game is inescapable, yet the satire somehow works: 'Roman satire inhabits and animates Roman discourse like a virus that poisons as it inoculates the body politic' (p. 72).

For all its sprightliness, this book will be hard-going for undergraduates. And so, inevitably, H.'s style: arch, dense, wayward, entangled, witty, impedient, scintillating, prolix, involuted, allusive, punful. The problems it creates for readers struggling to follow or simply to see the root and stem of argument through the thick canopy of words are formidable and real. More seriously, it fashions a daunting, disquieting authority, perhaps especially in regard to those undergraduate readers of the Juvenal book, or, to be honest, H.'s real readers, serious, rising classicists with an eye toward the new. This writing, for all its attention to the reach of political power into our literatures, is itself an exercise in power (keep up if you can; quick or dead). And yet its verve, along with H.'s impressive scholarship, sets this work apart from the drear,

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scripted prose endemic to culture criticism. H. writes with committed energy rather than dogmatism, with an eye to the words on the page as well as the ideologies subtending them. These are two brilliant, tough, and valuable books.

University of Missouri D. M. HOOLEY

INTERTEXTUALITY

S. HINDS: *Allusion and Intertext: Dynamics of Appropriation in Roman Poetry*. Pp. xv + 155. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. Cased, £32.50/$54.95 (Paper, £11.95/$18.95). ISBN: 0-521-57186-3 (0-521-57677-6 pbk).

This witty, intelligent, and elegant book, just the size for a long plane ride, offers five independent but interrelated studies of hot topics in the study of allusion or intertextuality. A brief preface begins to sketch a nicely nuanced, moderate position on intentionality, and expresses Hinds's hope that the book 'will strike most readers as a pluralist one in its critical emphases', since 'the conscientious critic will resist the impulse to naturalize his or her own terminological choices in such a way as to preempt debate'. H. certainly seeks to promote rather than pre-empt debate, and if this book is argued about rather than revered it could have an extremely beneficial effect on the study of Latin poetry. A chapter on 'Reflexivity: Allusion and Self-annotation' discusses both 'the range of reflexive tropes used by Roman poets to describe and explore intertextual relations' (e.g. words like 'dicuntur', or the 'Alexandrian footnote') and 'signposting which is more deeply encoded, more fully integrated into its narrative contexts', such as characters' 'remembering' or 'recognizing' material from earlier texts, *Amores* 2.6's doubly imitative parrot, and allusive echoes in the Echo story in *Metamorphoses* 3. Chapter Two, 'Interpretability: Beyond Philological Fundamentalism', discusses the problem of recognizing subtle rather than obvious allusion, and boldly proposes (p. 26) that 'there is no discursive element in a Roman poem, no matter how unremarkable in itself, and no matter how frequently repeated in the tradition, that cannot in some imaginable circumstance mobilize a specific allusion'. Test cases here involve Catullan 'hate and love', the elegiac (and forensic?) 'me miserum', and the '10/100 mouths of bronze/iron' *topos* (or specific allusion? can we decide?) in Homer and Latin epic. Chapter Three, 'Diachrony: Literary History and its Narratives', looks sceptically at the 'claims of poetic primacy and innovation' of poets like Ennius and Virgil, and warns that (p. 63) 'all the ancient literary historical viewpoints which we inherit', whether implied by poets or stated by critics, 'are partial and tendentious, all involve the imposition of some kind of teleology'. H. suggests that Laevius may have influenced the neoterics more than they knew or would admit, and explores the pitfalls of discussions of 'decline', noting that (read carefully here) 'just because a poet says his work has declined, that doesn't necessarily mean it *hasn't* declined'. Chapter Four, 'Repetition and Change', argues that tendentious or misrepresentative allusion to an earlier author is '*constitutive* of allusive writing' and of engagement with a literary tradition. H.'s fascinating test case is 'Ovid's *Aeneid*' in *Metamorphoses* 13–14, where Ovid is 'engaged in a tendentious poetic appropriation of his predecessor'. The final chapter, 'Tradition and Self-fashioning', proposes a 'subjectivist' model for literary history, 'which will use allusion to redescribe (the) tradition as, in effect, something

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mobilized by poets for the particular purposes of particular poems'. Here H. looks at the engagements of Statius' *Achilleid* with both Catullus and Ovid, and at Martial's tendentious allusion to sexually frank portions of the *Ars Amatoria.* There is no conclusion, but in the last paragraph H. argues that we should not 'lose our curiosity about what poets mean to do when they allude', for even though 'the self-fashioning, intention-bearing poet is a figure whom we ourselves read out from the text to test our readings', still the readings we produce when we 'personalize' allusion are truer to the quirky allusive practices of real authors (here I am also importing arguments from the end of Chapter Two).

Latinists will find much to question in these chapters, but also much that is thought-provoking, valuable, and sensible. Like his poets, H. sometimes describes his predecessors 'tendentiously', perhaps especially those associated with 'philological fundamentalism', some of whose positions are not so very different from his. Older scholars may be put off by some of H.'s language, but since the book discusses many familiar issues and texts, open-minded traditionalists can use it as a kind of 'Rosetta Stone' for newer critical terminology. Despite limitations of space, especially in the footnotes, only in the final chapter's discussion of tendentious allusion was I disappointed to find insufficient reference to recent work, e.g. Joseph Farrell's *Vergil's 'Georgics' and the Traditions of Ancient Epic* (Oxford, 1991), which shows that Virgil's allusions to Homeric episodes sometimes interpreted philosophically make Homeric epic into a forerunner of Virgilian didactic. Otherwise the book both talks about classic problems in interesting new ways, and builds upon stimulating recent work by others, so that it would be ideal for 'History of Latin Literature' courses, or for a recently awakened Rip Van Winkle hoping to catch up on recent developments in the study of Latin poetry.

Wesleyan University JAMES J. O'HARA

ROMAN SPECTACLE

W. J. Slater (ed.): *Roman Theater and Society.* (E. Togo Salmon Papers, I.) Pp. xii + 186, 24 pls. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996. $42.50. ISBN: 0-472-10721-6.

The seven papers which make up this book are the product of the first E. Togo Salmon Conference, which was held at McMaster University in September 1993. They go beyond the standard works on Roman theatre by G. E. Duckworth and W. Beare in considering archaeological evidence and post-Republican drama in particular. The paucity of texts after Terence is a great problem, but the authors respond ingeniously to the challenge. By emphasizing the peculiar dynamics of Roman *spectacle* (a more fitting word than drama, as the editor makes clear in his preface), the contributors show how important the theatre was to both civic life and political hegemony throughout the Roman world.

In Chapter One E. J. Jory assembles evidence for the iconography of imperial pantomime. This is a much-needed work: the popularity of pantomime in the theatres of the Roman Empire has not been matched by scholarly attention to it. J. discusses the central elements of performance (the orchestra, chorus, and solo dancer), using the evidence of medallions, mosaics, terracottas, ivories, and altars (all illustrated) to build up a picture of the dancer's costume, mask, and movements. J. offers no absolute explanation as to why solo dance (backed by chorus) came to displace traditional

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theatre as the main form of public entertainment and medium of tragic myth, but this essay will certainly be important for future work on that topic.

The status and pay of actors and authors in the last two centuries of the Roman Republic, discussed by W. D. Lebek, raises many fascinating issues of patronage, both artistic and political. The careers of the earliest Latin dramatists are trawled for references to the selling of plays. The sharp dealing of Terence, who more than once sold the same play twice, reveals how an astute author could profit from the botched malice of his rivals. L. fruitfully compares the political involvement of second-century playwrights to the status and connections of first-century actors, principally Aesopus and Roscius, while the theatre's (polemical) potential as a political forum is made abundantly clear.

In Chapter Three K. M. Coleman explores certain similarities between the spectacles of the Roman amphitheatre and the Grand Procession of Ptolemy Philadelphus in honour of the deified Ptolemy I (probably held in the winter of 275/4 B.C.). Both events, it is argued, are geared to inspire civic pride, yet the likenesses sketched between their uses of mythology, largesse, technology, and animals seem often strained and historically superficial.

Chapter Four contains J. C. Edmondson's analysis of gladiatorial presentations as a structuring mechanism for the society of the early Empire. This is a highly stimulating and cogent piece, which illuminates fundamental aspects of Roman society, including the key rôle of militarism and the concept of *virtus*. E.'s command of the historical evidence is excellent, while the deployment of anthropological theory is measured and largely free of jargon.

E. R. Gebhard argues in Chapter Five that the theatres of the Empire display the influence of centralized propaganda in both their architecture and rituals. Looking at the rôle of imperial images in processions at Gaza and Gytheion, and in civic assemblies at Ephesus, G. attempts to show how imperial ideology could be fostered in festival and cult throughout the Roman world. There is also a discussion of official regalia at Oenoanda and the frieze of Septimius Severus at Hierapolis. G. claims that the images of rulers and gods 'were not static decoration but an active part of ceremonies' (p. 125). However, the nature of this 'action' is not made entirely clear.

'Performance, Power, and Justice in the High Empire' is the title of Chapter Six, in which D. Potter discusses the rôle of claques at public entertainments and trials. P. contends that consideration of unified chanting will cast new light on 'the political interests . . . of an urban population'. This might seem a little too much to claim for the noise of a crowd, but P. effectively surveys the evidence and indicates that there is more to it than mob rule and lynching. It is, nevertheless, revealing that 'the last surviving vestige of democratic expression' (p. viii) should be used mostly to murder political opponents.

The final chapter by T. D. Barnes explores the attitude of Christians to pantomime in late antiquity. (B.'s account of the growth of pantomime and mime in the course of the second century complements J.'s survey of artefacts in Chapter One.) Christian condemnation of pagan theatre is abundant, but as B. incisively observes, theatres continued to be used for entertainment and new ones were built well after the Empire became Christian. The conflict between official morality and the need to provide popular shows is well set out. In addition B. revises the standard view of Choricius, who wrote a defence of mime in the reign of Justinian, showing him to be a provocative pagan rather than a wayward Christian.

St Anne's College, Oxford WILLIAM ALLAN

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LATE ANTIQUE LITERATURE

L. J. ENGELS, H. HOFMANN (edd.): *Spätantike mit einem Panorama der Byzantinischen Literatur.* (Neues Handbuch der Literaturwissenschaft, 4.) Pp. xviii + 758, ills. Wiesbaden: AULA, 1997. Cased, DM 258. ISBN: 3-89104-052-0.

This handsomely produced volume on the literature of Late Antiquity is part of the *Neues Handbuch der Literaturwissenschaft* series, intended as a complete survey of world literature in 25 volumes. The term Late Antiquity is of course a fluid one: the editors have taken it specifically as the period from 284 (the 'Diokletianisch-Konstantinische Restauration') to 565, with the periods of 'frühbyzantinische Literatur' and 'spätlateinische Literatur' set at 330–610 and 283/4–*c.* 700 respectively. There is a useful chronological table of events and authors on pp. 717–23. However, the individual papers also include scholarly analysis and discussion of the earliest Christian literature and the Bible, both Septuagint and New Testament, as works written in the Greek and Latin language, and these are discussed in the context of late antique literature. In this volume the editors have deliberately integrated the discussion of Greek and Latin literature to emphasize the common elements of the tradition, as well as contrasting their specific cultural characteristics. In the same way they have combined Christian and non-Christian literature in respective generic chapters, and arranged the discussion of the material by genres rather than chronologically, thus avoiding the 'potted history' approach. A survey of Byzantine literature in general (from 330 to after 1453) is dealt with in a separate paper by Willem J. Aerts at the end of the volume ('Panorama der byzantinischen Literatur', pp. 635–716).

The volume commences with a useful chapter by Alexander Demandt on Late Antiquity as an epoch (pp. 1–28), covering chronology, the state, economy, and society and religion. Naturally the selection of texts for discussion concentrates primarily on works of philosophical and theological content: chapters on the Bible comprise 'Die Bibel: Entstehung und Zusammenstellung eines Textcorpus' and 'Literarische Aspekte der Bibel', both by Detlev Dormeyer (pp. 89–119, 121–49). The first deals with the transmission and collection of both the Septuagint and New Testament, as well as apostolic and post-apostolic literature, the second with such points as language in the Bible and the effect of language on its reception in both East and West (pp. 124–30). Theological literature both in the period before Constantine and from the fourth to seventh centuries is covered by Basil Studer (pp. 151–72, 355–402). Karl-Heinz Uthemann discusses homiletics and 'Christian rhetoric', as part of his challenging paper on the pagan orator and Christian preacher (pp. 265–320), while rhetoric *per se* is the concern of Manfred Fuhrmann in his overview of Greek and Latin philosophy and rhetoric (pp. 173–93). Peter E. Pieler gives a masterly account of legal literature from the beginning of the fourth century to the Justinianic codification, including a brief look at the legislation of the Germanic kingdoms and canon law (pp. 565–99).

Any historical view of literature has to include an analysis of a wide range of works, not simply the mainstream. Klaus Sallmann's discussion of specialists and the formation of the late antique encyclopaedia includes a consideration of the concept and definition of the specialist and looks *inter alia* at works of mathematics, astrology, prophecy, music, the exact sciences, geography, medicine and pharmacology, and military treatises (pp. 195–233). This volume is extensively indexed, and readers will

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easily find the relevant references to less well-known authors such as Avianus, Naucellius, and Eustochios the sophist. To aid accessibility, chapters are divided by subheadings into appropriate generic or chronological subdivisions, and all end with useful primary and secondary source bibliographies; works cited are primarily in German, but include monographs and articles in other European languages. Many of the chapters, most notably Hofmann ('Die Geschichtsschreibung') and Kytzler ('Fiktionale Prosa'), are appropriately and even lavishly illustrated.

One of the great strengths of the volume is the awareness that the concept of historical 'epochs' is an artificial one and that precise boundaries between periods based on historical events must give way to approximate dates relating to internal literary developments. Basil Studer's paper, for example, 'Die theologische Literatur vom 4. bis zum 7. Jahrhundert' (pp. 355–402, esp. p. 357) recognizes the need for different chronological parameters for different literatures, while Michaela Zelzer begins her discussion of epistolography with an analysis of Christian letter-writing before the fourth century and concludes with a brief excursus into Western works of the seventh and eighth centuries (pp. 340–1, 350–1). Similarly Jan den Boeft (pp. 257–9) considers medieval and Renaissance reactions to Neoplatonism in his account of Neoplatonism and its importance in Late Antiquity.

Three papers in particular foreshadow later developments in medieval literature: Bernhard Kytzler on fictional prose (pp. 469–94), which focuses on the life of Aesop, the Alexander-romance, the 'histories' of Troy and Apollonius of Tyre, Iamblichus' 'On the Pythagorean Way of Life', and *Christiana* such as the fictional lives of saints and the apocryphal acts of the apostles; Jean-Louis Charlet deals with the various poetic genres (pp. 495–564); and Engels charts the development from Late Antiquity to the Latin Middle Ages and the reception and impact of late antique writings in the West (pp. 601–33).

Inevitably discussion and analysis on occasion give way to little more than a summary of authors and works—see for example, Heinz Hofmann's survey of fifth to seventh-century hagiographical works in his discussion of hagiography as historiography (pp. 452–7)—but when contrasted with the more popular work of Albrecht Dihle (*Die griechische und lateinische Literatur der Kaiserzeit: von Augustus bis Justinian* [Munich, 1989], translated into English by M. Malzahn [London, 1994]), this work is clearly intended to appeal to the specialist and not simply to a general readership. The chapter by Lodewijk Engels and Heinz Hofmann in particular, on text, communication, and tradition ('Literatur und Gesellschaft in der Spätantike: Texte, Kommunikation und Überlieferung', pp. 29–88), which deals with literary communication, socio-cultural centres, the late antique book business, and communication in the bilingual *imperium Romanum*, will be of interest to all who work in the field of Late Antiquity.

The relegation of Byzantine literature to a separate appendix (which involves some duplication of material) is regrettable, and one hopes a decision of the general editors of the series rather than those of this volume: while the specialist can appreciate the difficulties involved in covering eleven centuries of prolific production in eighty-two pages, which also include a historical summary and a brief note on linguistic and metrical changes (pp. 636–42, 643–5), the arrangement will only reinforce the popular perception that Byzantine literature is a corpus of classicizing works of static nature and rigidly imitative content, as well as essentially an appendix to the literature of classical antiquity in terms of its literary merits on a world scale. Aerts's reiteration (p. 709) that Byzantine literature, though a continuation of the Late Antique tradition and one particularly conscious of its classical and Hellenistic heritage, was not one of

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decline, and his exposition of the innovative nature of some literary developments in Byzantium (such as the *Corpus Iuris Civilis*, the *kontakion*, and historiography as well as works in the vernacular like the romance *Digenes Akrites* and the Ptochoprodromic poems) is reassuring, but the very structure of the volume mitigates against the assumption that Byzantine literature is anything more than an appendage. Aerts is to be praised for the skill with which he has managed to cover essential developments without turning the survey into a mere list of names and works, and it would be captious to point out that he has omitted a discussion of the legal, military, scientific, and medical works, which the Byzantines would themselves have classed as literary texts (cf. H. Hunger, *Die hochsprachliche profane Literatur der Byzantiner* [Munich, 1978], esp. ii.428–80, where Pieler discusses post-Justinianic legal texts in-depth), the Late Antique equivalents of which are covered in the appropriate chapters in this volume, as well as coming close to omitting entirely the important genre of epistolography (p. 647). However, the Byzantine scholar will have much to gain from this volume as an aid in contextualizing the background to Byzantine literature and its heritage, and the reader who wishes for more detailed discussion of Byzantine works is advised to await the publication of Alexander Kazhdan's posthumous multi-volume *History of Byzantine Literature*.

This is an excellent volume for both the general reader and, to an extent, the scholar, but it fails to come to terms with the definition of the distinction between Late Antiquity and Byzantium. *The Oxford Dictionary of Byzantium* (Oxford, 1991) ii.1235 defines Byzantine literature as written between the early fourth and mid-fifteenth centuries, and for the early period (fourth to mid-seventh centuries) includes works in Greek, Latin, and Syriac, as well as noting that traditionally the place of creation can be as far apart as Arab Syria and Norman Italy: hence, by this definition, much of the volume deals with things Byzantine. Accordingly, in a series dealing with a vast survey of world literature, it might have been more accurate to define the whole collection as dealing with Late Antique and Byzantine literature and more realistic to have given more weight to the middle and late Byzantine periods and the forces that shaped their literary development.

University of New England, Australia LYNDA GARLAND

EARLY PYTHAGOREANISM

L. Zhmud: *Wissenschaft, Philosophie und Religion im frühen Pythagoreismus*. Pp. 313. Berlin: Akademie, 1997. Cased, DM 168. ISBN: 3-05-003090-9.

Zhmud provides a comprehensive and thorough examination of various aspects of early Pythagoreanism, which is useful for the specialist and non-specialist alike. His treatment discusses the sources for Pythagoras and Pythagoreanism, Pythagoras' departure from Samos (where I did not notice a specific reference to Apollodorus, F. Jacoby, *FGrHist* 244 F 338d, 339), his travels and teachings, Pythagorean religion, mathematics, music, astronomy, medicine, and philosophy, and questions concerning Pythagoreanism's relationship to 'Orphism' (if there was such a thing, as Z. argues there was).

Any discussion of early Pythagoreanism must take as an initial point of departure the vexed problem of the sources for Pythagoras and his teachings, and Z. does so (pp. 45–9). Of course, it is the familiar problem which confronts us in dealing with the

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ancient world. The sources for Pythagoras become more informative the more chronologically removed they are from the late sixth century. Scant contemporary and near-contemporary sources were already being heavily supplemented in the fourth century (see p. 45). Given this, in the section devoted to the sources the little information preserved by Xenophanes *could* perhaps have been privileged, and the same too could be said of Empedokles, though both feature later in the discussion of metempsychosis (pp. 117–28).

While much of the material in Iamblichus' *On the Pythagorean Life* is demonstrably late—and some of it influenced and tainted by pagan versions of Christian practice—clearly Iamblichus is drawing on earlier sources (particularly Aristotle and Aristoxenus), and the section on this author, and also that on Porphyry, needed to have been more analytical (pp. 48–9). A methodology for using this material, and a detailed evaluation of it, seems necessary, especially since Z. uses it in discussing early Pythagoreanism.

As Z. correctly argues, metempsychosis is a Pythagorean doctrine that can definitely be assigned to early Pythagoreanism, and judging from Xenophanes was, arguably, the most novel of Pythagoras' doctrines, even more so than (the related) vegetarianism. Xenophanes, his near contemporary, refers to Pythagoras claiming that a certain puppy had the psyche of someone Pythagoras once knew (H. Diels, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker* [Berlin, 1961], no. 21 B7 p. 131; Z.'s reference to 22 B7 on p. 117 needs correcting). The section on metempsychosis includes a useful discussion (pp. 119–20) on the relationship of this idea to Orphism and the three Orphic graffiti on tablets from Olbia, on one of which appear the words *σῶμα – ψυχή*, and on another, *βίος – θάνατος – βίος*. These words, along with Plato *Cratylus* 400c, as Z. argues, indicate that the Orphics, like Pythagoras, believed in a form of metempsychosis. Here as elsewhere Z. provides a sensible discussion. Empedokles' own position on this is referred to, but without particular attention to two important fragments (Diels 31 B117 p. 359: a person might already have been a boy, girl, bush, bird, or fish, and Diels 31 B137 p. 367: a father will sacrifice his dead son, who has taken on a new shape, if he makes blood offerings). While all this sounds remarkable, not every Pythagorean accepted vegetarianism or metempsychosis. This means, of course, that the rejection of the religious life of the *polis* which might seem implicit in Pythagoreanism—after all, the blood sacrifice was essential to public cult and ritual—would not have been as extensive as it seems.

The Pythagorean attention to numbers is well known, and Z. argues that while it has been suggested that early Pythagoreanism was not 'scientific', this was in fact not the case. The sections on mathematics are assisted by several diagrams and mathematical formulae. While much of this 'scientific' material has been frequently discussed in the past, these sections are nevertheless useful, especially the one dealing with medicine.

One feature that will be useful for the Greekless reader is the translation (usually without the Greek text) of some of the fragments from writers about Pythagoras and Pythagoreanism, such as Anaxagoras (p. 51), but other readers will need to keep Diels and Wehrli before them. A full reference to the edition of the fragments of an author was not always given, as in the translation of a passage of Anaxagoras just referred to, which is given as simply 'fr. 16'. This is to F. Wehrli's edition (*Die Schule des Aristoteles*, ii, 2nd edn [Basel, 1967], p. 12), rather than Diels, and while when Z. is using Diels this is made clear by citations recognizably from Diels (e.g. when citing on p. 41 a passage of Democritus as 68 A33), perhaps for those less familiar with Wehrli and Diels (which must include at least some of the audience for this book given the

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number of translations into German of Greek passages from ancient authors edited by Diels and Wehrli), the citations could have been made a little easier to recognize.

The only index is a 'Namenregister', which makes it difficult for the reader to look for discussions of specific Pythagorean concepts, such as vegetarianism, the Pythagorean attitude toward beans, and women's participation in Pythagoreanism, as well as 'moral' points such as his own reported attitudes to concubinage and sexual 'morality' (see Diog. Laert. 8.43; Iambl. *VP* 55, 132, 195, cf. 48; Hieronymus F42 Wehrli, x [Basel, 1969], p. 19). A list, however brief, of the fragments of Pythagorean writers that are discussed, and significant passages in Plato and Aristotle, would have been very useful. The bibliography is full and serves as an ample guide to the literature on this subject.

The sections on the sources, Pythagoras on Samos, and religion are useful, but the strength of the book lies in the discussion of Pythagorean science. Z. is much less interested in the 'social consequences' of Pythagoreanism, such as the existence of the *Pythagorikai*, Pythagorean women (see p. 114, where the references are to Diels, but could be to R. Kassel and C. Austin, *Poetae Comici Graeci* [Berlin, 1983–]: ii, Alexis F201–3; iv, Cratinus [Junior] F6). This book will be useful to those who need a good introduction to Pythagoreanism. But there is also much detailed material which is well presented, organized, and lucidly written, and this will be important to those working in this field of study. Z. shows a good grasp of previous literature, and argues coherently for his interpretations. This book easily joins the ranks of those that have to be consulted in any study of Pythagoreanism.

University of New England, Australia MATTHEW P. J. DILLON

SOPHISTIC THOUGHT

K. F. HOFFMANN: *Das Recht im Denken der Sophistik*. (Beiträge zur Altertumskunde, 104.) Pp. x + 469. Stuttgart and Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1997. Cased. ISBN: 3-519-07653-5.

Hoffmann begins this revised 1996 Cologne dissertation by noting that the image of the sophists has been rehabilitated over the last century from charlatans (H. Sidgwick) to professors (J. de Romilly). Some readers may wonder whether this is an improvement in status, but the remark indicates that H. will endeavor to find positive ideas in their works. His focus is 'Recht', a word and concept virtually impossible to translate into English (or any other language, including Greek). *Recht* is 'law' (*ius* not *lex*), but there is relatively little about law *per se*, and 'right', but moral philosophy is only a small part of the work, and 'justice', but justice (*to dikaion*) 'Gerechtigkeit' also plays a small rôle. To capture the full sense of this work, we might translate the title, 'Moral, Social and Political Aspects of Sophistic Thought'.

The first eight chapters examine texts: (1) Protagoras' Man-Measure statement and his Great Speech in *Protagoras*; (2) Thrasymachus, primarily on the basis of *Republic* I; (3) Polus and Callicles in *Gorgias*; (4) Hippias in Plato and Xenophon; (5) Antiphon the Sophist; (6) the Sisyphus Fragment (more likely by Critias than Euripides); (7) Anonymus Iamblichi; and (8) *Dissoi Logoi*. Throughout H. emphasizes the practical orientation and empirical approach of all the sophists, though these did not lead them to any doctrinal unity. The concluding chapter summarizes the results topically; the eight headings give a further idea what H. understands by *Recht*: Truth and Relativism, *φύσις*, *νόμος*, *δίκαιον*, Advantage ('Nutzen'), Contract Theory,

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Constitutions, and Equality of Mankind. On each topic H. notes the views of different sophists, grouping similar views together. At the end he tentatively offers a chronological sketch: Protagoras' generally constructive view, that despite the relativism of *nomoi* what is best for humans is objectively determinable, was followed (after Gorgias' visit to Athens in 427) by a period of radical criticism of *nomoi* and the promotion of *physis*, which gave way at the turn of the century to a conservative return to pre-sophistic views.

Discussion of these texts generally focuses on well-known issues: H. investigates the precise meaning of all the terms of Protagoras' famous saying (*metron*, *anthrôpos*, etc.), and concludes that for Protagoras all perceptions are subjectively true whereas usefulness can be objectively determined. More interesting (and persuasive) are connections H. finds with the Great Speech, particularly with the notion of *euboulia* as the practical means to achieve the utilitarian goals implied by the man-measure doctrine. Antiphon (the Sophist), to whom H. devotes nearly a hundred pages, is seen as rejecting *nomos* and also justice, a conventional idea he always links to *nomos*. *Physis* is the only objective reality, and advantage, which one should seek to maximize, the only objective value. One traditional expression of justice, however, is compatible with advantage and with *physis*—the rule not to do or suffer wrong (the precise sense of this rule needs further clarification). Interestingly, several fragments from Antiphon's other sophistic work, *Concord* (*Homonoia*), are cited in support of these views. H. also examines B1 (following Morrison's revised text) and concludes from it that Antiphon denied that words could have fixed meanings; this explains why we cannot have a single concept of justice. Finally, parallels with Thucydides suggest that *Truth* was perhaps written after 413.

H. has other useful and intelligent discussions of specific issues, and his command of scholarship is impressive though necessarily selective on the more heavily debated issues (for example, English readers may miss Burnyeat's influential articles on Protagoras in the *Philosophical Review* for 1976). For anyone investigating the specific issues covered, H. will be essential. But those who want a comprehensive view of the sophists may be disappointed. There is nothing on the sophists' views of rhetoric, language, religion, or education; nothing on the competitive nature of their enterprise or the possible influence of writing; nothing on who the sophists were, or how and when they were distinguished as a group from other *sophoi* or *philosophoi*; almost nothing on works such as Gorgias' *On Not Being* (which are not 'rechtsphilosophisch interessant'); and little on the nature of our evidence for the sophists or the influence of Plato on our view of them (the first four chapters are almost entirely concerned with Platonic texts, and there are as many references to Plato in the *index locorum* as to all the sophists combined).[1] Scholars, of course, should be free to write the book they want, but although H. may be right about the inadequacy of previous studies of this subject, one must wonder what purpose is served by limiting a work on the sophists to *Rechtsdenken*, when comprehensive, cross-disciplinary treatments are proving so fruitful in this and other areas. Specialists may consult this work with some profit, but English speakers in particular will continue to rely on the standard treatments of Guthrie (*The Sophists* [Cambridge, 1971]) and Kerferd (*The Sophistic Movement* [Cambridge, 1971]).

University of Texas at Austin M. GAGARIN

[1]For a very different approach to the sophists, see, e.g., Cassin, 'Sophistique', in J. Brunschwig and G. Lloyd (edd.), *Le savoir grec* (Paris, 1996), pp. 1021–39.

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IN SEARCH OF SOCRATES

M. L. McPherran: *The Religion of Socrates*. Pp. xii + 353. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1996. Cased, $35/£31.50. ISBN: 0-271-01581-0.

G. M. Mara: *Socrates' Discursive Democracy: Logos and Ergon in Platonic Political Philosophy*. Pp. x + 324. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997. Cased, $65 (Paper, $21.95). ISBN: 0-7914-3299-8 (0-7914-3300-5 pbk).

'We seek him here, we seek him there . . .' and elusive the historical Socrates must always remain. But the lure of the chase and the fascination exercised by this most argumentative and irritating of men continue to evoke portraits as disparate as these two by a philosopher and a political scientist.

McPherran's Socrates is essentially the Socrates of the *Apology* and the 'early' Platonic dialogues, with some help from Xenophon. His book, some portions of which are revisions of previously published journal articles, seeks to establish what can be ascertained about Socrates' religious views, in an attempt to rectify one-sided portraits of him as a 'consummate intellectualist', and to acknowledge his 'unique and groundbreaking contributions to Western religious thought'. Studies of the *Euthyphro* and the *Apology* form a substantial part of the book and are the basis of his claim that Socrates believed that gods exist, that they are perfectly wise and just, that they give us only good things, and that true piety consists in assisting the gods in their work, a work that produces good results, but of which we cannot have complete or certain knowledge. Consequently, since such gods could not be the gods of the traditional myths or be the object of the full range of traditional cult practices, Socrates, though not guilty as charged, did pose a threat to traditional Athenian state religion.

Later chapters consider Socrates' 'direct line' to the gods, arguing that he regarded 'extrarational sources', such as the daimonion and the oracle, as supplements to human reasoning and needing to be elenchtically tested; his confident belief that he, more than anyone else, had a religious duty to philosophize; his view on the immortality of the soul, which M. argues was one of agnosticism, and finally the respects in which Plato developed and went beyond Socratic theology.

In the detailed argument M. supplies individual Greek words and phrases at key points (it is a pity, in passing, that *adikei*, the legal term for 'is guilty of' is translated in the corruption charge as 'S. wrongs the youth by corrupting them'), but takes little for granted and leaves few stones unturned, so that the book is readily accessible (provided the reader is not allergic to split infinitives!) to non-specialist and specialist alike.

In total contrast to McPherran's Socrates, Mara's Socrates is the Socrates of the entire Platonic Corpus, understood as 'a single, complex dramatic and philosophical whole', with apparent inconsistencies explained by dramatic considerations such as the 'identities and abilities of the interlocutors'. His book is intended as a contribution to 'an important conversation about the importance of Platonic political philosophy for contemporary political theory, especially democratic theory'. Its central thesis is that Socrates' *logoi* (e.g. that virtue is knowledge, that the best city is one ruled by philosopher-kings, that knowledge is direct encounter with the 'ideas') are always tempered by his actual practice (*erga*), and so are not to be viewed, as they have been,

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as devaluing the imperfect human world in general and 'discursive democracy' in particular. He argues, for example, that it is enquiry and intelligent discourse, rather than conclusive/complete knowledge, that Socrates values as the humanly practicable aspect of his theory of ideas, and similarly that an improvement in democratic politics, rather than an unattainably perfect society, is what Socrates values as the practicable aspect of his political theory.

The detailed supporting argument in the seven chapters, entitled 'Democratic Discourse and Socratic Discourse', 'Apologia', 'Arete', 'Polis', 'Episteme', 'Eros', and 'Socrates' Liberal Ironism', assumes some familiarity with the vocabulary and views of modern political theorists as well as a wide knowledge of the Platonic Corpus, and in consequence is often densely written. This results at times in some rather opaque formulations, and at times in question-begging remarks such as that 'Protagoras begins to compromise himself when he equates good counsel and good citizenship'. The book is certainly a wide-ranging and thought-provoking study of Platonic political philosophy, but it is also undoubtedly one for specialist appreciation.

Glasgow University V. A. RODGERS

ARGUMENTS IN THE *REPUBLIC*

N. Blössner: *Dialogform und Argument: Studien zu Platons 'Politeia'*. (Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur: Abhandlungen der Geistes- und Sozialwissenschaftlichen Klasse, 1997, 1.) Pp. 358. Mainz and Stuttgart: Akadamie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur/Franz Steiner, 1997. Paper, DM 148. ISBN: 3-515-07060-5.

The thrust of this learned book is to reveal the dynamics of Plato's *Republic* and to explain how individual arguments contribute to the work as a whole. The main focus is on Books 8 and 9, the processes whereby constitutions and individuals change their character, and B. brings out how in these books the causes of change are selected by Plato in order to further the general argument that injustice does not pay, not for the sake of realism or through his having been influenced by the nature of contemporary constitutions; mutually inconsistent arguments within these books are to be explained through each argument's being designed for its immediate context only. But the *Republic* is more organized than it looks: Plato tackles the same problems in a variety of ways, with a variety of (sometimes conflicting) arguments, because reaching a philosophical conclusion is not a matter of swallowing a doctrine as if it were a dose of antibiotics, but a gradual process requiring one to jigsaw together and sift through different arguments and approaches, revising earlier conclusions in the light of objections and new developments.

An introductory chapter shows how discussions in Book 1 are deliberately improvised in order to anticipate fuller discussions later on. So, for example, at

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the end of the book justice and injustice are found to reside within the soul (350c, 353e), not in material goods, so we now need an account of the soul—which is what we get in Book 4. B. suggests that when in Book 2 Glaucon and Adeimantus get Socrates to substantiate his views further, his agreeing to their challenge is partly designed by Plato to answer the charge that Socrates corrupted the young, since it shows how on the contrary he did all he could to promote fair discussion.

B. then looks closely at 445c1–449b1 where Socrates says there is one good type of constitution, but four wicked types. If soul-parts and constitution-types were analogous, there would be three types of constitution in total, the good state ruled by wisdom, timocracy with *epithymeticon* in control, and tyranny ruled by desire, but Plato does not adhere slavishly to the analogy because he wants his scheme to encompass all the main political constitutions and ways of life known to him in order to show, by ruling out as evil not merely tyranny but other lesser degeneracies too, that there is absolutely no alternative to the good life. Again, while questioning the logical basis of the soul–state analogy, on the grounds that it is not clear why the soul has to have parts of just the same type and number as the state, B. points out that throughout Books 8 and 9 it is taken for granted that people's make-up is similar to the type of state they live in; in addition, the analogy shows that man has both an inner and an outer life, with the make-up of his soul created as much by the nature of the city in which he lives as by its own three-part structure, and enhances the thesis that happiness comes from interacting justly with others. B. argues that the soul-parts themselves are a mixture of impulses and capacities concerned with long-term goals (cf. 580c9–581e5), since in the *Republic* Socrates is concerned with how we should live our lives long-term; 439a–441c8 (on a man's desire for a drink), which could suggest that they are envisaged as motivating particular actions, is an aberrant passage merely designed to support the immediate argument that there are three soul-parts.

The final chapter boldly summarizes the main thesis to emerge from B.'s analysis: 'gefordert ist eine Rhetorik, die jederzeit auf jede Situation und jede argumentative Anforderung in der geschicktesten Weise reagiert' (p. 254), and contains a useful list (p. 246 n. 699) of more than forty places where Plato himself puts on his narratological hat and, by inserting into the dialogue objections, recapitulations, modifications of earlier discussions, etc., advertises that he is orienting the reader through the philosophical maze.

B. might have put his approach into perspective by pointing out other possible reasons for inconsistent or odd arguments within the *Republic*—authors do sometimes change their views, and the *Republic* is after all a report of an extempore discussion; and one is left feeling that the thesis that the *Republic* is a coherent organic unity devoid of significant contradictions is sometimes overstated. But in general this is a closely argued and persuasive book. It comes with 824 footnotes and a 46-page bibliography listing more than 1,000 items to boot.

University College London STEPHEN INSTONE

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PLATO'S *REPUBLIC*

R. KRAUT (ed.): *Plato's* Republic: *Critical Essays.* Pp. xiv + 248. Lanham, Boulder, New York, and Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997. Cased, £27 (Paper, £11.95). ISBN: 0-8476–8492-X (0-8476-8493-8 pbk).

D. H. RICE: *A Guide to Plato's* Republic. Pp. xv + 142. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997. Cased, £19.99 (Paper, £9.99). ISBN: 0-19-511283-0 (0-19-511284-9 pbk).

If Platonism represents a combination of metaphysical idealism, political authoritarianism, and ethical puritanism, it should indeed seem strange, as Richard Kraut remarks in introducing his selection of essays on the *Republic*, that Plato is still so important for many philosophers in our liberal-democratic culture. What will explain this? Surely something more than the observation (mentioned by both K. p. xi and Rice p. xii) that Plato's views are so different from ours as to pose an acute challenge to them. A fuller explanation would have to recognize that reading Plato, and not least the *Republic*, turns out to be, for many of us, a much more complex, rewarding experience than the standard model of Platonism gives us a right to expect. But that amounts to saying that this model is a simplification which fails to capture the way in which the dialogues give compelling shape to the sense of philosophy as an unending quest rather than an arrival at a final destination.

The reduction of the *Republic* to a vehicle of Platonism, and the failure to bring out the exploratory depth of Plato's writing itself, is the chief weakness of Rice's lively *Guide to Plato's* Republic, a book designed for (American) undergraduates on introductory courses of political philosophy. R. starts well enough: his first chapter interprets *Republic* 1 as a demonstration of how philosophy is rooted in ordinary life but needs to develop in part by the questioning of conventional 'authorities'. But R. believes that a change in dialogue style after Book 1 expresses a critique of Socrates' 'democratic' manner of discussion, and that Books 2–10 turn into a 'report' of philosophical truths. Thereafter he never once invites his/Plato's readers to question this drastically limiting assumption itself. In subsequent chapters (on the politics of Books 2–4, the metaphysics of the middle books, the comparison of justice with injustice in Books 8 and 9, and Book 8's critique of democracy) R. consistently treats the dialogue as a statement of definitive philosophical conclusions, resting on Plato's own supposed conviction that he has 'already arrived at the truth' (p. 51) and has 'seen' the form of the good (p. 82). The latter is explicitly said to be something Plato 'claims': where the claim occurs, R. omits to tell us.

R. never asks why, if *Republic* 2–10 represents a finished philosophical credo, Plato puts it into the mouth of a Socrates who shows serious uncertainty at key points and claims *not* to have left the Cave himself. Rather revealingly, R. expresses some impatience with following 'the order of Plato's exposition', suggesting that to understand the work we need a more synthetic view of the argument (p. 40); his later contrast between philosophy and literature in this respect (p. 116) makes one think he has forgotten that the *Republic* is itself great literature. After Chapter 1, where he

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seems alert to Plato's dialectical finesse, R. treats the dialogue form as a thin shell around a kernel of philosophical doctrine. This is partly because he is less interested in the work in its own right than as a spur to teaching the issues of political philosophy.

R.'s dogmatizing treatment of the *Republic* mars what is otherwise a crisp, lucid, interesting introduction for newcomers to the work. R. typically proceeds by lightly summarizing a stretch of the work, drawing out what he sees as the philosophical position it embodies, then criticizing this position. Where his approach will especially appeal to students is in its robust taking issue with Plato's arguments, and in the direct contemporaneity of its illustrative frame-of-reference (the world of television, junk food, rap); R. writes, be it noted, for classes that may include young Thrasymachuses (pp. 8, 128)! R. sees all philosophical systems as ultimately expressing postures towards the world. Platonic metaphysics he regards as motivated by a desire to escape from finitude into a compensatory world of permanent truth, though his psychologizing account of this motivation suffers from complete silence about the pre-Socratic background (just one instance of R.'s avoidance of historical perspective). R. even tries to compare Plato's putative motivation, *qua* fear of incompleteness, to that of the tyrant of *Republic* 9; but this argument is distorted by the unqualified translation of the tyrant's *eros* as 'love' (pp. 96, 101).

R.'s book is worth considering for anyone who wants students reading the *Republic* to be provoked into animated argument about its politics (less so about its psychology of the individual). It is less detailed and expert than Annas's *Introduction*, but takes little philosophical sophistication for granted. It is mostly accurate, at this level; but to make 'chair' and colours prime examples of Platonic forms (pp. 74–8) is cavalier, and 'pitting speech against speech' (pp. 26, 30, 51, 74, 81) is a misleading description of dialectic, apparently misunderstanding 348a–b; of minutiae, 'give free reign' twice over (pp. 62, 96) raises an eyebrow; there is a superfluous negative on p. 22 line 19.

K.'s collection of essays is suitable for more philosophically experienced students than R.'s audience. It is a selection of mostly much-cited articles or extracts from books, stretching in date from 1963 to 1992—a baker's dozen of essays by well-known scholars who include Christopher Taylor (on totalitarianism), Bernard Williams (on the city–soul analogy), Julia Annas (on Sun, Line, and Cave, from her *Introduction*), Iris Murdoch (from *The Sovereignty of Good*), and Gregory Vlastos (the only contributor with two pieces, on forms and on Book 5's 'feminism'). The spread of topics is wide, reasonably balanced, but relatively light on metaphysics (I am not complaining). The book would serve well as a set of secondary readings to accompany an advanced course on the *Republic*. One can always cavil with editorial choices, of course: why *three* pieces on women in Book 5 for example (especially when Vlastos's 'Was Plato a Feminist?', with its unexamined use of the concept of 'rights'—a fault echoed in Reeve's quasi-Platonic dialogue on the same subject—shows this great scholar below his best)? But this is a useful collection which will certainly find its way onto many bibliographies.

University of St Andrews STEPHEN HALLIWELL

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POLITICUS

M. MIGLIORI: *Arte politica e metretica assiologica: Commentario storico-filosofico al 'Politico' di Platone*. (Centro di Ricerche di Metafisica: Collana temi metafisici e problemi del pensiero antico. Studi e testi, 52.) Pp. 405. Milan: Vitae Pensiero, 1996. Paper, L. 39,000. ISBN: 88-343-0829-8.

S. ROSEN: *Plato's* Statesman*: the Web of Politics*. Pp. 208. New Haven, CT and London: Yale University Press, 1995. Cloth, $30 (Paper, $16). ISBN: 0-300-06264-8.

Plato's *Statesman* has long been a neglected work. These two books are part of a modest renaissance of *St.* studies, in which one may detect a remarkable convergence of judgement among scholars of analytical, Straussian, and Tübingen–Milan orientations. (I would class C. J. Rowe's recent edition and commentary (*Plato* Statesman [Warminster, 1995]) in the first group, Rosen in the second, and Migliori in the third—while recognizing each as an independent voice in a broad church.) The structure of the dialogue has come into focus. Rivalry for the crowning title of statesman, between contending experts whose knowledge is useful to the city, is the driving force behind the dialogue's attempt to define statecraft by individuation and separation of related arts. The use, and criticism, of names and examples are rightly seen to be central to the method of definition. The ontological status of the *definiens* (Idea? class? natural kind?) remains contentious, however, and the divisions of the schools can still loom large in matters of dramatic interpretation.

R. has a previous monograph on the *Sophist*, M. on the *Parmenides* and *Philebus*, which each provide useful contexts for studying the *St.* (M.'s being more dramatically distant and so more speculatively connected). R.'s book, with few references, a condensed style, and an extremely sparse index, is more a philosopher's musings than a scholarly monograph; I return to it anon. M.'s is the most spacious and thorough of the new studies, divided into three parts which, respectively, survey the current state of debate, give an 'analisi del contenuto' of the dialogue section by section, and reflect on its historical and philosophical significance. This amplitude allows M. to establish an indispensable set of parameters. Central is the idea that '[i]l motivo filosofico del dialogo e la definizione del politico' (p. 197). By classing the dialogue as a work in the philosophy of politics, this observation cracks the old chestnut of whether the dialogue is primarily about dialectic or politics, and explains why the questions pressed in the *St*. are so different from those of the first-order studies of politics in the *Republic* and the *Laws*. It is left to the *Philebus* to explain the philosophical tools used in the *St.* more fully, although the whole which is the special focus of philosophy can never be characterized in writing, which is why the *Philosopher* could not have been written. (Compare R., for whom no *Philosopher* was written because no writing could ever fully capture practical wisdom.)

'Dialectic' is for M., drawing on his previous monographs, linked to ontology; he blends analysis with Tübingen in identifying a group of late dialogues which evince a gradual 'dialettizzazione delle Idee' (p. 207). The claim that the divisions divide Ideas which have and are parts, yet are *enti incorporei* (p. 128) is so basic to M. as to be largely unargued, which is unfortunate since *So.* and *St.* seem to use their divisions in a provisional way, depending on the shifting aims of the enquiry, and to focus on the forms of expertise which are not self-evidently Ideas. M. could have done more to

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discuss the relation between division and example. Otherwise his treatment of the dialogue's methods, including the 'relativizing' tendency which unites the myth with the divisions, is strong. And he resolves one difficult puzzle: why does the *St.* seem to use 'king' and 'statesman' interchangeably? M. answers that because statecraft is the 'most important' part of the royal art, it can be metonymically used to refer to the latter, such that within a certain judgement of worth they can be said to be identical. Such a pattern of 'is and is not the same' is paralleled in the relation of weaving to clothes-making, and M. makes the formula more widely illuminating, for example, in discussing the Socratic character of the dialogue (p. 45, cf. p.76).

On purely political topics, M. can be too swift and dogmatic. He acknowledges the central rôle of the *kairos* in defining the political expertise of the statesman, who must have 'una visione strategica di ciò che è opportuno' (p. 304), but he does not meditate on what it means for Plato so to make political knowledge irremediably temporal. He seeks to derive an anti-contractarian moral from the myth which the latter can scarcely bear (although his observations about happiness and *homo faber* in the myth are stimulating). And, most dubiously to me, he derives a purely negative moral from Plato's reflections on the absence of any true statesman. The Stranger says that people to date have 'been unable to put up with' (*δυσχερανάντων*, trans. Rowe) the idea of a true statesman as king (301c6–8), on which M. comments 'non è atteso e, se arriva, non è creduto' (p. 167). He later points to this, as well as to the discussion of the second-best constitutions, in concluding that Plato was not a utopian and believed only in the slow and gradual amelioration of political rule constrained by law (pp. 313, 355–6). But his comment on 301c does not do justice to the Stranger's next remark, 'although if there were to come to be someone of the kind we are describing [the true statesman], he would be prized' (301d4, trans. Rowe).

M. finds the political moral of the dialogue to be the replacement of the question, 'what is the ideally best city?', with the more realistic question, 'what is the best city possible?' (p. 359). It is interesting that R. likewise fails to discuss 301d4: instead he takes a similar tack to M.'s, arguing that '[t]o be conceivable . . . is not the same as to be possible' (p. 155). Both assume too easily that their sense of what is possible is Plato's own; might not Plato's point rather be, as implied by 300a–b, that for a human statesman to be conceivable is precisely to be within the bounds of possibility?

R. and M. also coincide on the related point of finding the ideal statesman's direct rule simply infeasible, because so comprehensive. M. treats 294d–295b not as a definition of ideal rule but as a *reductio* of the idea that someone could in practice apply perfect knowledge to direct each subject as to how to act best throughout his or her life; R. breaks with the usual view that the *St.*'s concluding model of political weaving displays perfect statecraft because he finds practical wisdom to be essentially inaccessible. For R. the image of political weaving is about the fabrication of artifice (his book should have been subtitled 'the fabric of politics', rather than the naturalistic 'web'). Such fabrication includes both acting and making, what R. calls the Platonically blurred distinction between 'practice' and 'production'; for him the central question of the dialogue is how practical wisdom and technical knowledge each bear on politics.

In the absence of a true statesman, both R. and M. agree in their reading of the Stranger's claim that the closest cities can get to imitating his rule is to adopt a simulacrum of practical wisdom in the form of sticking to their laws. R.'s analysis of this crucial reversal in the text draws illuminatingly on his earlier study of the *Sophist*, where such simulacra are shown to imitate by artful distortion. Both accept the traditional reading of the crucial passage 300a–b, which has the imperfect cities

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sticking to the true statesman's laws, but makes less sense (how would they have access to such laws?) than Rowe's alternative on which the imperfect cities must stick to their own laws, whatever these may be (Rowe, *ad loc.*).

Despite these striking agreements on the political import of the dialogue, R. and M. do differ in important ways on the interpretation of its method and other matters. Where M. assumes that dialectic must deal with Ideas, R. takes a more deflationary view of the objects of division in the *St.*, noting that they are the arts and forms of expertise. He stresses the crucial and neglected 'productive' aspect of the divisions. Division 'constructs' classes and kinds according to the shifting purposes of enquiry, by sorting out similarities. Why should a dialogue which makes much of the combinatory power of weaving, make also so much use of division? Combination and separation are complementary and infuse one another; they are the elements of thought and so the elements of thought thinking about reality. Therefore division itself has to be paired with a method of *paradeigma* or using examples or models. R. argues that in using examples, the Stranger is taking the 'Cartesian turn toward the conceptual reconstruction of everyday experience' (p. 87) by analysing the abstract structure common to arts as superficially different as weaving and statecraft.

The Cartesian reference is anticipated earlier, when the Stranger is said to be Descartes's forebear, a link between the sophists and the Enlightenment insofar as he bridges the gap between theory and practice by production. Such pronouncements on the Enlightenment show the measure both of R.'s Straussianism (in looking for a major gulf between the ancients and the Enlightenment) and his iconoclasm (in siting that gulf within Plato himself). Wherever one stands on this grander claim, R.'s remarks on the elusive contrast between Socrates and the Stranger from Elea are insightful. Socrates is an erotic, a lover of the soul, who tries to rescue the philosopher from politics or at least make politics safe for philosophy; the Stranger is in part a logician, concerned with protecting the body by culture and law, who immerses the statesman-philosopher in a comprehensive concern for the city; 'Plato is neither the Stranger nor Socrates, but both and more' (p. 77). Compare M., for whom the Stranger is a post-Eleatic, capable of handling the Ideas in all their complexities.

These two books, so different in character, are both welcome and important reflections on the dialogue. M's book is a fine, carefully structured compendium of valuable observations, situating the dialogue among Plato's works and providing an unimpeachable platform and framework for further study. R.'s, more spare and idiosyncratic, finds a warning against the technicization of politics in the dialogue, which must stimulate even readers who cannot find it present to the same extent. Despite their differences, their many points of convergence say something hopeful about the capacity of Platonic research—for all its quarrelsome schools—to establish new and broadly shared levels of understanding.

King's College, Cambridge MELISSA LANE

THE *SOPHIST*

D. O'BRIEN: *Le non-être: deux études sur le* Sophiste *de Platon*. (International Plato Studies, 6.) Pp. xii + 181. Sankt Augustin: Academia, 1995. DM 58. ISBN: 3-88345-639-X.

This volume is made up of two studies of the *Sophist*, supplemented by notes and bibliographies. For those who do not read French there are brief English

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summaries. O'Brien is admirable both in the rigour of his argument and the extent of his grasp of the relevant scholarship. What follows here is consequently an overview of a work which is clearly a most welcome addition to Plato studies.

The focus for the book is provided in the poem of Parmenides where the goddess introduces three kinds of utterance, namely 'is', 'is not', and 'things that are not, are'. However, it is up to the reader or listener to supply a commentary on this by pointing out that the first kind of utterance is intelligible, with the result that being may be described, for instance, as having no beginning or end in time. Regarding the second there is nothing meaningful to say. The third, however, encapsulates what happens to the common run of mortals during the attempt to describe coming-into-being and passing-away in the world which is recorded by the senses and where cold gives way to hot or hot to cold. When hot prevails people still talk as if cold actually exists and vice versa. This kind of utterance is taken by the goddess to operate on the presumption that non-being is.

This motif of non-being occurs not only in the poem of Parmenides but also in the *Sophist* and in the *Enneads*, as indeed it does among those Greek philosophers who, with their heightened awareness of the fact of motion or change, sought the ground rules for establishing a co-relation between what one says and what remains the case.

O'B. has a strong sense of the fact that ideas do not arise in a vacuum. They emerge from within specific historical circumstances, and to the extent that they impinge significantly on the world they may be said to acquire a past and to have a potential future. They have, therefore, a life in time. But if so, a question then arises about the frame of reference within which they may be properly scrutinized. Is this a task for the historian? Or for the philosopher? Or for some kind of hybrid figure who may be called an historian of philosophy? O'B. begins and ends the first section of his book by touching on this issue, but he does not engage with any proposed answer. And this is a pity if only because fascinating hermeneutical themes are left in the wings while he remains busy at centre stage with an examination of the notion of non-being as this appears in Parmenides, Plato, and Plotinus.

If one is to follow the argument in the second study of the *Sophist* one needs to recall a primary datum, namely that, for Plato, the world of Forms exists and the relationship of participation which brings about the conjunction of material object and transcendent cause is the explanatory ground of philosophical utterance. So, when the goddess in Parmenides declares that it is a contradiction to affirm that 'what is not, is' that 'non-being is', one is obliged both to agree and to disagree. The trick, of course, is to regard this affirmation not in Parmenidean terms but within the Platonic frame of reference where any object can be described as x and not-x. It is x because it participates in x-ness (e.g. largeness). It is not-x because it also participates in otherness, which is to be understood *vis-à-vis* x-ness. If this is so understood, then one is saying both that the object 'is x' (e.g. large) and 'is not-x' (i.e. 'not small', 'not equal'). The sense of the latter part of the declaration can then be refined by noting that 'small', is plainly contrary to 'large', whereas 'equal' is other than 'large'. And it is within the framework provided by contrariety and otherness that the decisive moves can then be made.

Otherness and all parts of otherness participate in being, so that one can say of a specific object that it 'is x (large) and is not x' (meaning here that it is other than 'large', i.e. 'equal'). In Platonic terms it is 'large' and 'not-large' (meaning 'equal') because the object participates at the one time in both largeness and equality and,

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possibly, in several other forms as well. But, decisively, it cannot at the same time be small, since the forms of largeness and smallness are contraries. An object can participate in one or other of these but not in both simultaneously. An object cannot therefore participate in being and non-being where these are existential opposites, so that the latter becomes the negative of the former. Therefore when the terms 'being' and 'non-being' are used in the same way a declaration such as 'non-being is' proves to be a nonsense. But where the first 'is' of 'is, is-not' points to the existential and the second directs attention to otherness, then meaningful statements become possible in a way that is not envisaged within the simpler horizons sketched by Parmenides. Or, as O'B. puts it, 'Parmenides is neither accepted nor refuted. The Stranger has created a universe where Parmenides' undifferentiated conception of non-being no longer has meaning.'

National University of Ireland, Galway COLM LUIBHÉID

COMPANIONABLE ARISTOTLE

J. BARNES (ed.): *The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle*. Pp. xxv + 404. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995. ISBN: 0-521-41133-5 (0-521-42292-9 pbk).

What is a companion? And is this one a companion *qua* friend to (in this case) Aristotle or *qua* friend to the reader desirous of acquaintance with Aristotle? If the former, the book should care for Aristotle as a second self: present his work in a sympathetic manner, defend him against critics, correct on his behalf any faults justly identified. If the latter, the book should do the same for the reader: deliver a painless introduction to Aristotle and scotch any misunderstandings. Both ways, this volume turns out to be a true friend.

Concern for Aristotle for his own sake (not for his usefulness) may be what prompts Jonathan Barnes to ask in his introduction why we study the history of philosophy at all. 'For the last several decades', he tells us, 'it has been fashionable to recommend the study of the history of philosophy—and hence of Aristotle in particular—along the following lines. "As philosophers we are not primarily interested in history or in interpretation: if we read Aristotle's works, we read them as works of philosophy . . ."' That is, on the trendy view, studying Aristotle is worthwhile only if it supplies some insight or solution to our contemporary philosophical problems, or if, at least, it makes us question some preconceptions. Although B. generously concedes that this is 'not a despicable line of thought' ('reading Aristotle—like gazing into space or doodling on a piece of paper—may provide philosophical inspiration'), he prefers a purist line. Doubtless he is right that the trendy view has sometimes led to poor scholarship, caring more for what the text *might* say than what it does say, and preferring a lazy but fruitful reading based on shoddy misinterpretation to an historically accurate attention to the detail of the text. For B. the sheer love of Aristotle himself must drive us to attend to his text, to piece together what he really said and why. If we do not already have that selfless devotion to the history of

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our subject, nothing can instil it; indeed, in his view, there is no moral fault in the lack of it.

This seems unduly defeatist to me. Why suppose that an interest in the history of philosophy is akin to a liking for oysters, such that the lack of it is neither reprehensible nor open to remedy? Is it not more like lacking taste in music or neglecting your parents? Granted the philosophical justification by itself is unsound, but surely it does not follow that nothing else can stir someone to an interest in Aristotle. Rather this very companion could provide a rôle model to inspire the beginner's enthusiasm, and to let her acquire a genuine taste for sound scholarship in the process.

Indeed, to my mind, the essays in this book are striking examples of this model. The three chapters by B. himself are, predictably, not only lively and provocative guides to issues in their respective areas (namely Aristotle's life/works, metaphysics, and rhetoric/poetics) but masterpieces of English style as well—though with B.'s idiosyncratic predilection for rare gems of English vocabulary, his hypothetical philosophy student new to Aristotle should own either a large English dictionary or an extensive classical education. Among the other contributions, I was most impressed by Robin Smith's, which renders Aristotle's logic manifestly significant, indeed almost gripping. C. C. W. Taylor's chapter on Politics successfully sets Aristotle's thoughts in his own time, while suggesting how we might wish to defend or dispute them in various ways. Less satisfactory is D. S. Hutchinson's contribution on Ethics, in which the primary mode of presentation is paraphrase of Aristotle, with unfortunate results. H. rightly observes that Aristotle himself was addressing an audience of young men, but by reformulating Aristotle's views on the same basis, as though his present audience was entirely male, H. produces a peculiar anachronism. 'Readers should assume that what is being said is Aristotle's opinion, not mine, unless otherwise indicated' (p. 199). Perhaps they should, but this offers less help than we might like towards seeing when, how, and why we ought to agree or disagree. H. turns out to be no friend in leaving Aristotle to fend for himself in an alien and possibly hostile twenty-first century.

B. wisely leaves contributors to present their own line and, indeed, to disagree. Consistency is not a virtue and variety invites discussion; however, Chapters 4 and 5 (on science and philosophy of science, by R. J. Hankinson) use a separate name/date system for citing references, keyed to a private bibliography at the end of Chapter 5. One discovers the solution to this gratuitous intelligence test only by reading the second clause of footnote 3 in Chapter 4, or the second sentence of footnote 4 of Chapter 5. Given that there is a comprehensive annotated bibliography, divided by subject matter, at the back of the book (scholars will recognize this from *Articles on Aristotle*; here it is all in one volume and updated), surely Hankinson could have keyed his references into the numbered entries there? On that point the hands-off editorial policy lets the reader down.

Nevertheless, though a companion fail us once, we should not thereby distrust it in everything.

University of Wales, Swansea CATHERINE OSBORNE

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SYNTHESIZING ARISTOTELIAN SCIENCE

Z. BECHLER: *Aristotle's Theory of Actuality* (SUNY Series in Ancient Greek Philosophy). Pp. 270. New York: State University Press, 1995. ISBN: 0-7914-2240-2.

D. BOLOTIN: *An Approach to Aristotle's Physics. With Particular Attention to the Role of his Manner of Writing* (SUNY Series in Ancient Greek Philosophy). Pp. 156. New York: State University Press, 1998. Paper, £14.95. ISBN: 0-7914-3552-0.

P. H. BYRNE: *Analysis and Science in Aristotle* (SUNY Series in Ancient Greek Philosophy). Pp. xxii + 303. New York: State University Press, 1997. ISBN: 0-7914-3322-6.

These three books from the SUNY Series in Ancient Greek Philosophy have as little in common between them as is possible for books dedicated to precisely the same topic, namely the overall aim of Aristotelian science (in particular, of physical science). While at least two of the three must be wrong, as a matter of logic, all are intelligent, thoughtful reflections based upon a wide reading in the Aristotelian corpus. The books are attractively produced by the SUNY Press, in affordable paperback: the three combined cost less than an average Aristotelian tome.

Byrne's book, *Analysis and Science in Aristotle*, argues that Aristotle's scientific project was not deductive, but 'analytic', a concept which retains a certain vagueness: roughly speaking, 'analysis' for Byrne is any process starting from a fact, gradually leading to an understanding of that fact through a closer acquaintance with its components and interconnections. This is vague indeed: but perhaps such vagueness is to be recommended. Instead of trying to capture Aristotelian science by a definite formula, Byrne offers a weak characterization where, arguably, nothing more precise could fit the rich variety of Aristotle's work.

While Byrne's overall approach is thus likely to be accepted by many Aristotelian scholars, he may encounter more scepticism when it comes to his line of argument. The book starts with what is in itself an interesting question: why were the *Analytics* called '*Analytics*', i.e. what is the significance of the term? The first chapter is then dedicated to an etymology and interpretation of the term as used by Aristotle; the following six chapters take up issues in the *Analytics*, in light of this suggested interpretation of the term; and the final chapter takes a glance at Aristotle's actual scientific practice, outside the *Analytics* (this chapter is especially interesting, and it is a pity that Byrne left it as no more than the sketch it is). The balance of the book is thus firmly in the 'analysis' side, rather than the 'science' side, even concentrating on the word 'analysis' itself. Aristotelian scholars usually doubt nowadays how much one can project directly from the *Analytics* to Aristotle's practice; and the semantics of individual words do not seem necessarily so significant: after all, while '*Analytics*' is no doubt an Aristotelian label, he might have come up with it for many reasons, not necessarily important in themselves. It requires some special argument to convince us of the philosophical significance of the label for the understanding of the contents.

In fact, while Byrne's explication of the term is plausible (namely that the title '*Analytics*' is meant to imply that the work deals with procedures helpful for moving from facts to their explanations), he does not follow it up, in a sense, in the main six chapters of the book. For instead of identifying 'analytic' procedures offered in the

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Analytics, and thus connecting the semantics of the term, the nature of the treatise, and the scientific methodology offered, Byrne very often simply argues that this or that passage by Aristotle is an 'analysis' in the sense that Aristotle, himself, is doing some analysis in the course of his own argumentation—hardly surprising, in view of the generality of the concept! Thus, while many of Byrne's interpretations of individual passages in the *Analytics* are convincing, they do not add up to an argument for his main thesis.

Another problem has to do with Byrne's use of Greek mathematics. He often claims to get his interpretation through an understanding of Greek mathematical practices, most significantly the practice of Greek mathematical analysis. Some suggestions are excellent: for instance, Byrne seems to be the first to notice (pp. 143–4) that each Euclidean proof has many independent premises (especially those derived from the diagram). Still, he is not an expert in the area, and few non-experts could deal completely convincingly with an area such as Greek mathematics, which has been transformed over the last quarter-century thanks to the work of Knorr and others, and which, before that, had been in very bad shape. We are still struggling to repay the debts bequeathed to us by the generation of T. L. Heath.

Concentrating on mathematical analysis, I would say that this is a case where Byrne's conclusions are better than his arguments. I doubt how much Aristotle's use of the word 'analysis' owed directly to mathematical practice; and it seems to me that Byrne's interpretation of that mathematical practice is untenable (briefly, he seems to confuse 'analysis' with 'the process of obtaining an analysis'). However, if we take away the supposed mathematical foundation, Byrne's edifice remains standing: it is, as I said, a plausible explication of Aristotle, but it simply owes little to any precise mathematical detail. To conclude, then, this is a book which should be read for its inspiring ideas and for its overall convincing approach, but it is unclear how far Byrne *proves* his main thesis.

Bolotin's book proposes a radical reading of Aristotelian science, concentrating on his *Physics*. Aristotle, we are told, never meant what we think he did: no persistence of matter in change (Chapter 1), no teleology (Chapter 2), no potential infinite divisibility (Chapter 3), etc., all leading to an Aristotelian world which is fundamentally unintelligible. The argument is that Aristotle's historical context would force him to hide his true views, which were, if truly revealed, deeply at variance with the convictions of his contemporaries. This argument is not very convincing, as it is difficult to see how, say, failure to believe in infinite divisibility could lead to a Socrates-style trial. In fact Bolotin does not make a real effort to convince us of his main thesis: the book starts from Straussian assumptions and very much takes them for granted. It is a legitimate attempt to extend the Straussian program from Platonic ethics to Aristotelian science and, by the standards of Straussianism, it is a successful extension: the scholarship is wide and much attention is paid to textual details. It will, however, make few converts, especially since Bolotin's method is based so much on a take-it-or-leave-it approach: he runs through an Aristotelian argument, notes its many difficulties, then suggests that these difficulties can be solved by attributing to Aristotle some views other than those of the text—views which are only very sketchily related by Bolotin to the difficulties from which he started. Attention to textual detail is limited to the negative part, showing the difficulties; Bolotin's positive suggestions are hardly argued for. Still, even non-Straussians will benefit from the textual remarks made in the course of the negative sections of the book, which occupy most of this slim volume. (It should be noted that the subtitle might be misleading: that is, when Bolotin asserts that this book is written 'with particular attention to the role of

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[Aristotle's] manner of writing', all that is meant is the Straussian suspicion of authorial sincerity, and Bolotin does not confront at all the issue of Aristotelian style.)

If Byrne's conclusions are stronger than his arguments, the opposite seems to be true of Bechler. Bechler's book is a dense and very subtle argument for a thesis that probably only a few would accept. Thus this book is very useful: even if we reject Bechler's conclusions, we still must work hard to try to refute him, and in this way examine our presuppositions concerning Aristotelian science.

Bechler makes Aristotle a Megarian, in the sense that to say that X is potentially Y is either an identity-statement (X is already Y—which is what Bechler calls 'genuine potentiality') or it is a mere statement of logical compatibility (there is no contradiction in the statement 'X is Y'—which is what Bechler calls 'consistency-potential'). None of these potentials carries any information, so that Aristotelian science is seen as vacuous, justifying Molière's caricature. (It is indeed a main concern for Bechler, to justify the reaction of the Renaissance and the scientific revolution to Aristotle.) To complete the argument that Aristotle never allows, or at least should not allow, statements of the form 'X explains Y' where X and Y are distinct, Bechler dismisses teleology (the end is an explanation only when it is actualized, since the potential end must fall under one of the two categories of potentiality identified by Bechler), and argues that the First Mover doctrine is incompatible with the rest of Aristotle's philosophy (since it demands a separate form). Having secured this picture in Chapters 1 and 2, Chapters 3 and 4 go on to argue, respectively, for the emptiness of the Aristotelian syllogism (it is, Bechler argues, about set-inclusion, the sets understood in a purely extensional sense), and for the thesis that mathematics, for Aristotle, is a science without objects (in the case of mathematics, Bechler claims, the QUA operation attaches to properties which strictly speaking do not belong to the object of study, hence strictly speaking this is a science of non-existent objects-QUA-mathematical). These Chapters 3 and 4 are in a sense independent from the main thesis on the nature of potentiality, but Bechler does make many connections between the various arguments, often having recourse to a conception of Aristotle as a nominalist in the strong sense, for whom concepts are arbitrary mental constructions (thus no sense in which the potential exists; no intensional sets; and the QUA-operation constructs properties, at most, rather than revealing them). My brief summary does very little justice to the subtlety and indeed difficulty of Bechler's argument. Perhaps the most striking feature of this book is that all of this is presented not as a direct criticism of Aristotle—as so many mistakes Aristotle had made—but as an argument for the essential coherence of Aristotelian metaphysics. Bechler fundamentally dislikes this metaphysics, but he has the greatest respect for it, which makes him an interesting critic.

Bechler uses a great wealth of material from most of the Aristotelian corpus, and, in his notes, discusses a large array of the secondary literature (of which there is very much indeed, touching on such a wide range of issues). It is, however, a feature of the book that quotations from Aristotle are brought into the argument without any context. This is perhaps necessary in such a compressed argument, but the result is that we seem to get a processed and reconstituted Aristotle, so that Bechler effectively expects us to reverse the process for ourselves, and try to see how the views attributed by him to Aristotle on the basis of those (many) isolated remarks could fit the actual larger claims Aristotle made in the course of his treatises. Still, on the whole, Bechler's interpretations of the passages in question are only rarely vitiated by their being taken out of context. If this book is false, as I think it is, this has to do not with Bechler's reading of specific passages, but with his overall unwillingness to come to terms with

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a science which is genuinely non-mechanistic, so that a teleological explanation is not simply a reverse mechanistic explanation (the future goal explaining the motion towards it rather than vice versa), but a different kind of explanation: not an explanation of a process by some of its components, but its explanation through some of its attributes, namely by its being a 'good' in some sense. What Bechler seems to deny most of all is that an explanation through attributes (rather than through components) could be more than a tautological explanation of X by another description of X. As this denial goes to the heart of the difference between ancient and modern science, its articulation is of great value.

To sum up: who is responsible for this phenomenon of three books, on the same topic, with zero agreement? Partly, no doubt, this is because all three authors read Aristotle in the light of their own agendas (even Byrne, who does this least obtrusively, reads Aristotle in the light of the work of Bernard Longeran). But, I would suggest briefly, it almost seems as if any attempt to bring together all of Aristotle into a single approach is bound to represent an alien agenda. For, after all, had Aristotle wanted to pursue the sort of unified metaphysics ascribed to him by Bechler, Bolotin, or Byrne, why should he have left it for them to do so? He wrote what he wrote, and nothing else, and a reading of Aristotle has to face much more than the assertions contained in Aristotle's writing, trying to put them in some rational order: it has to face Aristotle's writings themselves, with their very special structure and goals—in order to uncover the rational order intended by Aristotle himself.

Dibner Institute, MIT REVIEL NETZ

ARISTOTLE ON PERCEPTION

S. EVERSON: *Aristotle on Perception.* Pp. x + 309. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997. £35. ISBN: 0-19-823629-8.

Aristotle's theory of perception is the best part of his psychology, and his psychology of his physics. And the theory of perception, according to Everson, is more than a museum piece: 'Aristotle . . . has a distinctive and sophisticated approach to psychological explanation and, whilst the actual material explanations he supplies are indeed incredible, his general approach remains an appealing one' (p. 11). Indeed, '. . . his psychological theory . . . far from being incredible, provides, at least in its explanatory structure, a powerful model for the study of mental events' (p. 288).

According to E., an Aristotelian perception is a conjunction of two events (p. 138). The first is a change or κίνησις in a sense-organ, caused by an external object. (My eye-jelly turns red under the influence of a nearby tomato.) The second is an activity or ἐνέργεια, which is, or perhaps includes, an awareness of an αἴσθημα (p. 137). (I am aware of the red stuff in my eyeballs: p. 203.) A change and an activity cannot be identical (p. 255); but the activity 'supervenes upon', or is causally necessitated by, the change. I recognize the similarity between the αἴσθημα and the object (p. 220); and thus, being aware of the αἴσθημα—the red stuff, I see the object—the tomato.

E.'s account of this theory covers all the standard topics—proper and common sensibles, *per se* and 'accidental' sensibles, the notion of 'receiving the form without the matter', and so on; and it also embraces other pertinent Aristotelian issues—φαντασία, alteration and quasi-alteration, 'accidental' causation, and so on. There are detailed analyses of particular texts, drawn from the whole corpus and generously quoted in English and in Greek. Whether or not Aristotle's theory is sophisticated, E.'s

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discussion is philosophically refined; and his reader is expected to have a nodding acquaintance with various notions in contemporary philosophical psychology. (And there is some sparring with the secondary literature—or rather, with recent Anglo-American material.) The reading is not easy, but it is pleasant enough; and for the most part E. writes in English prose. (I noticed few misprints, the only witty ones being at p. 176 n. 86 and p. 277 l. 5.)

Some readers may complain that E. sometimes tries too hard. Thus he gallantly attempts to clear Aristotle's remarks on *φαντασία* of the charge of inconsistency. But to do so he postulates an ambiguity on which Aristotle never remarks, and which leads to equivocation in at least one argument (pp. 181–5). Or again—a different sort of complaint—the pages on supervenience, which are the most demanding in the book, suggest what Aristotle might, or should, have said were he around today; but it is not evident that they interpret what he actually said.

But it is the detailed analysis which matters. I note a couple of small points which struck me.

First, Aristotle declares a soul to be *ἐντελέχεια ἡ πρώτη σώματος φυσικοῦ ὀργανικοῦ* (*An.* 412b5–6). The word '*ὀργανικός*' is normally taken to mean 'having organs'. E. claims that it means 'being an organ': it is not my body but rather my eye or my heart or my liver which is a *σῶμα ὀργανικόν* and which has a soul (pp. 64–5). '[T]he *psuchê* is the form of a living body, where a living body is either an organ or, derivatively, a whole animal' (p. 249). E. appeals to Bonitz's *Index*—in its several dozen Aristotelian occurrences, '*ὀργανικός*', means 'organ-like' and not 'organ-possessing'. A glance at LSJ indicates that Aristotle's usage is not idiosyncratic. In general, Greek adjectives of the form *Φ-ικός*, of which there are several thousand, usually bear the sense 'having the character of a *Φ*' (Buck and Petersen, *Reverse Index*, p. 637).

The translation 'having organs' is not a modern heresy. Alexander says expressly that '*ὀργανικός*' in this context means 'having organic parts' (*quaest.* 54.9–11); and, as far as I am aware, this has always been the orthodoxy. Moreover, it is clear why it should have been so: '*ὀργανικόν*' at *An.* 412a28 is equivalent to '*δυνάμει ζωὴν ἔχον*'; something is potentially alive if and only if it is capable of growth and nutrition; my organs—my ears, my liver, and so on—lack such capacities: it is my body which possesses them. Hence, *pace* E., the *σῶμα* at 412b5–6 is the whole works. Then must we accept the orthodox translation of '*ὀργανικός*'? Aristotle says at least once that an animal body is itself an *ὄργανον* (*PA* 642a10–13 cited on p. 79). So perhaps 412b5–6 refers to the whole body (and not to bodily parts) as being organ-like (and not as having organs)? This was the view of some late Platonists (e.g. Simplicius, *in An.* 90.29–91.4).

Secondly, there is a sentence at *Phys.* 246a6–7 which is of some consequence to E.'s account of Aristotelian supervenience:

ἀλλὰ γίγνεσθαι μὲν ἴσως ἕκαστον ἀναγκαῖον ἀλλοιουμένου τινός.

E. considers a number of subtle interpretations. They all suppose that Aristotle means to say something of the form: 'If something alters, then of necessity so-and-so must occur.' The alteration is a physical change in a sense-organ; the so-and-so is an activity of perception; and thus Aristotle is subscribing to some form of psycho-physical supervenience. I wonder if this can be right. From the point of view of Greek—or Aristotelian—idiom, it seems to me that the sentence ought to mean just the opposite: 'If so-and-so occurs, then of necessity something alters.' And the context in which the sentence occurs requires—or at any rate, strongly invites—such

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an interpretation. Aristotle means to say that perceiving is not an alteration, although it cannot take place without one.

The book is good enough to deserve detailed criticism. Indeed, I am not sure that I have read a better book on Aristotle's psychology. I enjoyed it, and I learned from it. It is rare that such things can be said about a book on ancient philosophy.

Ceaulmont JONATHAN BARNES

SENSE-ORGANS

T. K. JOHANSEN: *Aristotle on the Sense-Organs.* Pp. xvi + 304. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997. Cased, £37.50/$59.95. ISBN: 0-521-58338-1.

Johansen's primary aim is to answer two questions about Aristotle's treatment of the sense-organs: 'First, why do we have sense-organs? Second, why are the sense-organs composed the way they are?' (p. 23). J.'s main line of argument rests on the notion that the account of the relationship between form and matter that is set out in *Physics* II.9 underlies the account of the sense-organs in the *De Anima*, the *De Sensu*, and the biological works. He considers Aristotle's treatment of the sense-organs to be an example of teleological (or top-down) explanation. He argues that Aristotle explains the material constitution of a sense-organ from the point of view of its form and end (p. 36). First, animals, by definition, have a capacity to perceive. This capacity consists in an ability to be changed by sense-objects. And, since such an ability can only be found in matter, animals must have material sense-organs. Second, the matter of each type of sense-organ must be of a certain sort if the organ is to play its rôle in perception (just as the matter of an axe must be of a certain sort if it is to have the ability to chop). The eye (for example) must be composed of transparent matter, if it is to be changed by colour. And this matter must be watery, not airy, if the eye is to be easily protected: the transparent eye-jelly must be shielded by a covering membrane and an oily white. Further, since the action of colour upon the eye must be mediated to the seat of perception (which, for us, is in the region about the heart), it is necessary for there to be channels leading from the eye to this region. These features are necessary if there is to be an eye (p. 115). But, for a given species, certain features will be necessary owing to its natural environment. Fish (for example) have soft, highly transparent eyes which enable them to see well at a distance in an environment which does not contain many objects that could hit and damage the eyes (pp. 163–4). In addition, specific features of sense-organs are determined by other functions of the species. The elephant's trunk (for example) is both a nose and a hand (p. 169). Finally, certain features of sense-organs are determined by what matter is available given the other needs of the species. Quadrupeds (for example) need hairy backs for protection and so they lack hair on their lower eyelids (p. 174). The account of the sense-organs, as J. sees it, exhibits the complexity and flexibility that is characteristic of teleological explanation (p. 176).

J. achieves his primary aim. He offers a detailed study for each sense-modality and his arguments are both crisp and exacting. His investigation advances the state of research in this important area. The most striking advance comes in J.'s excellent discussion of smell and its relation to taste. Since much of what Aristotle says about smell depends on analogies to taste, it is not initially obvious whether smell has its own proper object or whether flavour and odour are the same for water animals

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(pp. 233–4). By thoroughly explicating the differences between the distance senses (including smell) and the contact senses (including taste), J. is able to use what little Aristotle says about smell and taste to establish a clear distinction between odour and flavour. He is then able to propose an interesting resolution to the interpretive difficulties.

J.'s secondary aim is to address two questions within the contemporary debate over Aristotle's theory of perception. First, does Aristotle think that perception involves material processes? Second, if he thinks that material processes are involved, does he also think that the same states of perceptual awareness could he realized by many different types of material processes? That is, does Aristotle think that states of perceptual awareness are multiply realizable (p. 6)? To answer 'yes' to each question is to pin Aristotle as a functionalist. J. answers 'no' to each question. He argues in support of an interpretation that has been championed by Myles Burnyeat: for Aristotle, there are no material processes in perception.

In respect of this secondary aim, the investigation is not entirely successful. J. expands on several arguments that have been advanced by Burnyeat. But in some cases these arguments have already been challenged in the literature. In addition, J. fails to pay sufficient attention to the problem of explaining the causal efficacy of intense perceptibles. Yet Aristotle's claims regarding the power of perceptibles to cause disturbing effects in the sense-organs have heen cited as evidence in support of the literalist's interpretation since as early as 1988. J.'s main strategy is to assimilate the treatment of the other sense-modalities to that of sight. (Burnyeat's case is certainly strongest for sight.) However, when J. steps away from this strategy and tries to deal on independent grounds with what he takes to be the literalist's strongest case—the perception of temperature—his argument falls flat. He argues that Aristotle's discussion of different senses of *hot* in *Parts of Animals* II.1 '. . . shows that the hot that acts on the sense of touch when perceived is different from the hot that acts on soulless things . . .' (p. 278). Thus, he claims that 'even if there always were a literal heating up of our bodies when we perceive heat, this would not enter into our [Aristotelian] account of perception' (p. 280). He concludes that '. . . the literalist's strongest case is weak' (p. 280). But this is not right. The discussion in *Parts of Animals* II.1 is a dialectical discussion in which Aristotle first shows that *hot* is said in many ways (649a35–b1), and then goes on to assert that there is a chief and unqualified sense of the term (649b19–23). This discussion simply does not show that, for Aristotle, the hot that acts on the sense of touch is different from the hot that acts on soulless things.

On the question of multiple realizability, J. directs his attention to passages in which Aristotle mentions inter-species differences in the constitution of sense-organs. However, he does not address Aristotle's seeming willingness to entertain the conceptual possibility of intra-species multiple realizability (in *Metaphysics* Z.11). At best, J. deals with half of the functionalist's case regarding multiple realizability.

This book fills a gap in the literature. J. offers a cohesive philosophical analysis of Aristotle's account of the sense-organs and, as such, his work supersedes that of Beare. This book will be a great benefit both to advanced students and to scholars. Further, while it does not resolve the issues within the contemporary debate over Aristotle's theory of perception, it can be read with profit by any person who takes an interest in that debate.

College of William and Mary JOHN E. SISKO

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