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Movement Activists and Partisan Insurgents

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On the opening day of the 1972 Democratic convention, the women's caucus gave George McGovern a standing ovation. Its first meeting was packed, with 700 female delegates in attendance, exuberant over their numbers at the convention—triple the representation from four years earlier—and their new clout in presidential politics. Of all of the presidential candidates appearing, only Shirley Chisholm, the first African-American woman to run for president, was greeted with enthusiasm comparable to the warm reception for McGovern. Most of the women at the meeting were fervently anti-war and respected McGovern for his early and courageous stance on Vietnam. However, the size of the gathering attested to another of McGovern's achievements: his chairing of the reform commission that had rewritten the Democratic Party's rules on delegate selection, leading to the huge leap in the representation of women. As Liz Carpenter, a former White House aide to LBJ, put it when introducing McGovern, "We know we wouldn't be here if it hadn't been for you."

Expressions of affection for McGovern did not last long this day. Indeed, they did not survive his very first words to the caucus. Trying to fend off the praise with a bit of self-deprecating humor, McGovern quipped that the credit for women's presence at the convention "would have to go to Adam." Hisses and boos filled the room, and one woman sporting a McGovern button called him "George the pig." In an instant, McGovern had gone from a champion of feminism to a typical clueless male. His feeble attempt to apologize for his blunder—"Can I recover if I say Adam and Eve"—did not improve the audience's mood much.

As McGovern delivered his prepared remarks to the caucus, he was interrupted by shouts from the floor. "We know about the war," one woman complained, "what about abortion?" Some of the gibes at McGovern on the issue of abortion may have come from delegates backing other candidates, but the sentiments they voiced were shared by almost all of the women in the room. McGovern had embraced a long list of feminist goals, but he balked at endorsing the one item on the women's agenda that generated the most passion. Limping to the end of his remarks, McGovern only drew cheers when he pledged to support the caucus's challenge to the credentials of the South Carolina delegation because of its gender imbalance. It was a pledge that his campaign was about to break.[1]

Indelibly associated with the social movements of the sixties and early seventies–civil rights, antiwar, students, women, and gays—the McGovern insurgency of 1972 provides a case study that opens up some fresh questions about the relationship between parties and social movements in American political development. These are questions that have not previously received much scholarly attention. "The political science literature," wrote Daniel Fuerstman and Daniel Tichenor in a 2005 APSA paper, "reflects woefully little or no effort to carefully theorize or systematically investigate intra-party insurgency campaigns and their effects. Scholars have devoted far more attention to the impact of third-party challenges."[2] From another angle, sociologists who study social movements have only recently begun to examine the interpenetration of movements with mainstream political parties. The prevailing

1. Details on McGovern at the women's caucus meeting are drawn from Myra MacPherson, "Women Boo as McGovern Skirts Their Issues," *Washington Post*, 11 Jul. 1972; and Susan and Martin Tolchin, *Clout: Womanpower and Politics* (New York: Coward, McCann & Geoghegan, 1974), 46–47.

2. Daniel Fuerstman and Daniel Tichenor, "More than Spoilers: Insurgency Campaigns and the Transformation of American Partisan and Electoral Politics," paper presented at the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Washington, DC, Sept. 2005, 3.

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assumption in this new work is collaboration between the two; thus, Jack Goldstone observes "an ongoing symbiosis" between movements and parties, "with sharing of information and strategies, and each gaining from the others' success in mobilization and swaying public opinion."[3]

Although elements of collaboration can be found in this case study of mass movements and partisan insurgents, the principal focus is on conflict. An intriguing story in its own right, the movement-McGovernite relationship also suggests two general propositions:

> (1) Even when broad goals are shared, a social movement and a partisan insurgency will come into conflict due to their structural dissimilarities regarding agendas, time frames, and political identities.
> (2) The characteristics and intensity of conflict between a social movement and a partisan insurgency will vary with the stage of development of the movement.

My focus here is on movement conflicts with party insurgencies, where the two sides appear at first to be natural allies and their mutual difficulties are largely unexpected. But some of the structural and temporal dynamics I examine here will also be found when social movements encounter presidential campaigns conducted by party regulars.

Collaboration between movement activists and partisan insurgents, I suggest, is likely to be problematic for several reasons. First, activists and insurgents have *different political agendas*. Social movements may embrace a presidential candidate who favors their goals, but they will not subordinate their cause to the needs of that candidate. Insurgent campaigns might believe in the same ideals as the mass movements that support them, but they will not pursue these ideals if the electoral costs are likely to be high. Second, activists and insurgents have *different political time frames*. Activists look to make progress toward objectives that may take years to achieve. Insurgents feel the urgency of an upcoming ballot. Third, activists and insurgents have *different political identities*. Activists define themselves through their causes, as civil-rights workers, feminists, environmentalists, and the like. Insurgents define themselves through a candidate like George McGovern—that is, as McGovernites. The loyalties of the two groups of actors—to their comrades, their leaders, their groups' goals—are distinct and always potentially competitive. These sources of potential tension mark the relationship between movements and parties as an instance of institutional intercurrence, as conceptualized by Karen Orren and Stephen Skowronek.[4]

Social movements, this case also suggests, may have different kinds of relationships with partisan insurgents, ranging from more conflict-laden to more collaborative, depending on the stage of development of the movement. Some attention is paid in the social movement literature to the life-cycle of movements.[5] Since the focus has been on the internal development of movements, however, there remains a need to develop categories pertinent to the *interaction* of movements with other (and more mainstream) political forces. Acknowledging the great diversity of movements, I construct a typology for American political development that considers four types of movements, arrayed at four stages in a political life-cycle: nascent, militant, mature, and aging. Each type of movement will have somewhat different relations with a partisan insurgency.

A *nascent movement* will be recently birthed and still in the process of coalescing. It will tend to lack widely-known leaders or strong organizations. Its fundamental struggle is for recognition and legitimacy. Its enthusiasm may be building, but its expectations of major political gains are still relatively modest.

A *militant movement* is also relatively youthful, but it has a fuller history than a nascent movement and has achieved greater coherence and confidence. Widely recognized by mainstream actors, a militant movement has prominent and vocal leaders, and strong organizations. Its fight is not for legitimacy—that has already been won—but for signature causes, especially involving rights. Moral passions run high in a militant movement, and expectations are grand.

A *mature movement* has been in existence for a substantial time period. Its militant era and signature policy victories lie in its heroic past. It once had strong leaders and organizations, but now it is given to organizational fragmentation and leadership quarrels. Its concerns have less to do with profound causes than with distributive goods, such as political appointments or preferential benefits in public policies. At this stage, the movement is invested in conventional politics and may be hard to distinguish from an interest group.

An *aging movement* has been in existence for many years. Some movements at this stage have never reached their fundamental goals and are likely to witness a decline as adherents die off or drift away. Others have become part of the political

3. Jack A. Goldstone, "Introduction: Bridging Institutionalized and Noninstitutionalized Politics," in *States, Parties, and Social Movements*, ed. Jack A. Goldstone (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 23.

4. Karen Orren and Stephen Skowronek, *The Search for American Political Development* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

5. For example, see Herbert Blumer, "Social Movements," in *Studies in Social Movements*, ed. Barry McLaughlin (New York: Free Press, 1969), 11–22.

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establishment that they challenged in their youthful days. For both leaders and followers in such an established movement, militancy is barely even a memory. While the concern for distributive goods here is similar to that found in a mature movement, the prevailing worldview of these aging movements tends to be conservative.

In the encounters between social movements and the McGovern insurgency, all four of these types are represented: nascent (gay rights), militant (feminists), mature (civil rights), and aging (labor). Their stories reveal two intersecting dimensions in the relationship between mass movements and partisan insurgencies. One dimension is structural: the differing agendas, time frames, and identities of the movement activists and party insurgents. The other dimension is temporal: the differing relationship between activists and insurgents that results as movements encounter insurgencies at different stages of their life-cycle.

SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND McGOVERNITES

McGovern's reception at the women's caucus, the anecdote that began this article, was emblematic of the relationship that developed between his insurgency and movement politics: some genuine warmth and solidarity, but also frequent tensions, moments of mutual disappointment, and even occasions for bitterness and recriminations. The mass movements that supported McGovern for president perceived him as an idealistic leader, considerably more sympathetic to their grievances and aspirations than other white male candidates. But they also regarded him with wariness, suspecting that he and his top strategists were all too ready to sacrifice movement goals to electoral expedience. And while McGovern was well versed in the movement language of "empowerment," in the eyes of movement activists it seemed evident that he continued to run the show and keep members of previously excluded groups in their old role as subordinates. To Bella Abzug, the behavior of McGovern and his strategists at the Democratic convention was "another episode in the continuing political saga of men in power ignoring or underestimating women and abandoning their commitments to them."[6]

The McGovern strategists interpreted the same episodes in a radically different light. They found it hard to comprehend why movement activists could not refrain from the militant demands and outbursts that only diminished McGovern's public standing and ultimately redounded to the benefit of President Nixon. McGovern's political director, Frank Mankiewicz, viewed the relationship as "a serious problem: how to deal with these emerging wild men and women while recognizing our affinity with them—but not seeming too close, because they were crazy, many of them."[7] Campaign manager Gary Hart was equally perplexed:

> It was just bizarre. We were fighting Richard Nixon, and the movement groups kept wanting to push McGovern farther and farther toward their particular interests rather than win the election. And the more we responded to their demands, the more extreme … or more out of control the campaign looked.[8]

The social movements that produced the most perplexity for the McGovern campaign were not the hallmark causes of the 1960s: the civil rights and antiwar movements. In its militant stage, the civil rights movement had created a crisis for the Democrats in 1964 over the issue of seating the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party at the convention; however, by 1972, four years after the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr., civil rights forces were divided and drifting. The antiwar movement was at the center of the Democrats' explosion at Chicago in 1968, both in the convention hall and in the streets outside, but by 1972, with the draft ending and the radical protest wing of the movement a spent force, what remained of the antiwar cause was largely absorbed into the McGovern campaign.

The problematic movements for the McGovernites were new arrivals that had not been present even as recently as the 1968 Democratic convention: the women's rights movement and, to a lesser extent, the gay rights movement. It was in the McGovern campaign that these movements made their first appearance in presidential politics. It was the dawn of a new kind of movement politics—a "politics of identity"—and the initiation of an ongoing dilemma for the Democratic Party—a "politics of culture war." Civil rights forces presented difficulties of their own for the McGovern insurgents, but these were of a type more characteristic of mature movements, pragmatic demands susceptible to conventional political bargaining. Unlike the other three, the labor movement was a fierce adversary rather than a nettlesome friend.

I begin with the feminist movement's relationship to the McGovern insurgency for two reasons. First, as a militant movement, the feminists generated the most explosive and vexing interactions with their ostensible insurgent allies. Second, this relationship serves as a useful point of comparison for the less confrontational relationships between the gay rights and civil rights forces and the McGovernites, and

6. Bella Abzug with Mim Kelber, *Gender Gap: Bella Abzug's Guide to Political Power for American Women* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1984), 34.

7. Interview with Frank Mankiewicz, 28 Feb. 2002.

8. Interview with Gary Hart, 18 Jun. 2002.

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the opposition of organized labor to the McGovern campaign. I have four stories to tell of movement-insurgency conflict, none of which has been extensively narrated before. These narratives are based on archival materials, interviews with participants, memoirs, and contemporary journalistic accounts.

FEMINISTS AND McGOVERNITES

At the 1968 Democratic convention in Chicago, 13 percent of the delegates were women, and the party's platform did not discuss women's issues. Four years later, at the Democratic convention in Miami Beach, 39 percent of the delegates were women, and the party's platform included a fifteen-point Rights of Women plank, everything feminists had requested save a statement on reproductive rights.[9] As chair of the party's reform commission, McGovern reaped credit from women for this remarkably swift increase in their representation. But the driving force for the change was a new feminist organization: the National Women's Political Caucus (NWPC).

Between the two party conventions, a vocal and militant women's movement had erupted unto the scene. The famous Atlantic City demonstration against the Miss America Pageant, which inaugurated the new public face of feminism (and gave rise to the myth of bra-burning) took place only a month after the 1968 Democratic convention. As a new generation of feminists published startling manifestoes and shattered traditional proprieties, the media was fascinated by the most militant groups, highlighting the radicals (the Redstockings) and the antimale separatists (including the colorful WITCH—Women's International Terrorist Conspiracy from Hell).[10] Less noticed was a more conventional political project: to adopt the methods of the pressure-group for the goal of women's equal inclusion in electoral, legislative, and presidential politics. This project attracted the leading figures in the mainstream of the feminist movement, including Betty Friedan and Gloria Steinem. If any individual leader can be singled out in initiating women's organization for political influence, it was Congresswoman Bella Abzug. One of the founders and early activists of the NWPC, Jane Pierson, emphasizes her creative part in launching the group: "So tenacious, so frustrated, and so driven," Abzug was "the engine behind a lot of it."[11]

The NWPC was formed in July 1971, as more than 300 women convened at the Washington Hilton to establish an independent political organization that would advance women's search for equality. The group struck gold with its very first undertaking, as it turned its attention to the reform process already under way in the Democratic Party, the McGovern-Fraser Commission. NWPC won a swift and stunning victory: In November 1971, only four months after the group was founded, a delegation of its leaders met with Lawrence O'Brien, chair of the Democratic National Committee, and secured his agreement to rewrite the party reform guidelines for the upcoming national convention. In place of the existing general language on increasing representation for women, minorities, and youth on each state's delegation, the revised rules now stipulated explicit numerical targets (quotas in all but name). The tripling of female convention delegates from 1968 to 1972 and the progress in woman's political influence that it portended can be traced to this agreement.[12]

As a long-shot insurgent, McGovern was keenly attuned to the rapid emergence of women as an important new constituency. In the hunt for a majority at the Democratic convention, women would, under the new rules, comprise the largest single bloc of delegates. Women's rights were a natural theme for an insurgent campaign that was challenging the retrograde "Establishment center." Moreover, the McGovern campaign believed that a gender gap was developing in American politics. Actress Shirley MacLaine, who took over the role of coordinator for women's issues for the fall campaign, wrote to the campaign leadership: "A study of the attitudes of women suggests that they are a natural constituency for McGovern. As voters, women tend to be more idealistic than men, and more committed to humanistic values."[13]

McGovern himself was not a feminist—few men were this early in the women's rights revolution. But as Amanda Smith, MacLaine's predecessor as the campaign staffer assigned to women's issues, put it, he did possess "a wonderful instinct for fairness."[14] His task of appealing to women was complicated, however, by the candidacy of Shirley Chisholm. Many women in the NWPC wanted to endorse Chisholm on feminist grounds, even though they knew she had no chance to win the nomination.[15] Even Gloria Steinem, a long-time friend

9. On the changes in representation and platform planks from 1968 to 1972, see Jeane Kirkpatrick, *The New Presidential Elite: Men and Women in National Politics* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1976), 84.

10. See Ruth Rosen, *The World Split Open: How the Modern Women's Movement Changed America* (New York: Penguin Books, 2001), 143–260.

11. Interview with Jane Pierson, 29 Jul. 2003.

12. Byron Shafer, *Quiet Revolution: The Struggle for the Democratic Party and the Shaping of Post-Reform Politics* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1983), 460–91.

13. Shirley MacLaine to Sen. George McGovern et al., 25 Jul. 1972, Papers of George McGovern, Seeley Mudd Library, Princeton University, Box 836. (Cited hereafter as "McGovern Papers.")

14. Interview with Amanda Smith, 2 May 2001.

15. Pierson interview.

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and supporter of McGovern, chose to run in the New York primary as a Chisholm delegate.[16]

Facing this obstacle, the McGovern campaign made a series of smart moves in the early stage to attract feminist support. McGovern organizers were directed by Smith to contact NWPC organizers in their states and to "express Senator McGovern's full support for their goal of political equality, solicit their support, offer information on delegate selection, etc."[17] McGovern demonstrated his seriousness about the reform rules when his own delegate slate from Illinois turned out to contain a large preponderance of older white males. As staffer Scott Lilly recalls,

> McGovern blew a gasket and directed that [his workers] go and get people who had circulated petitions to get on the ballot to withdraw so that women and minorities could be put on the ballot. . . . We had to do all this in December, it was around Christmas time, and it was incredibly cold. . . .

The campaign workers "literally would body block people trying to get in the supermarket and then give them a pen to sign a petition. . . . And the ink in the pens would freeze because it was so cold."[18]

McGovern was also far out in front of other male candidates in the symbolic politics of women's rights. In February 1972, he sent a public letter to the president of National Airlines:

> I am astonished that National Airlines is persisting in an advertising program which many women find insulting. I refer, of course, to the tasteless and suggestive "I'm Cheryl, fly me to Miami." . . . An equally personal and more impressive campaign than your present one would be . . . making clear, if indeed it is true, that there are competent women at every professional level of National Airlines. . . . Unless you are changing this program, it will indeed affect my choice of airlines during the coming weeks, when the Presidential Primary will take me often to Florida.[19]

McGovern's threatened boycott of a sexist business brought him kudos from feminists, with one NWPC official thanking him profusely for the "beautiful letter you sent National Airlines."[20]

Once McGovern emerged as the frontrunner for the Democratic nomination, feminists began to demand more of him. They were especially frustrated by his cautious stance on abortion. Feminists thought McGovern was merely playing politics with what was, for them, the transcendent issue for women, taking a hedged position out of a fear of offending traditionally Democratic Catholic voters. They were not aware that the insurgent was personally conflicted about the subject and wanted to downplay it as much as possible.[21] Twenty members of NWPC met with the candidate at his home a few weeks before the Democratic convention to pressure him on their issues. Afterwards, the *Washington Post* reported, the women were "'disappointed' with the stand Sen. George McGovern is taking on abortion and other women's issues and threatened to 'sit on their hands' after the conventions if no candidate is 'taking a leadership role' on those issues."[22]

McGovernites and feminist activists arrived in Miami Beach with preoccupations and emotions that clashed more than they overlapped. For the party insurgents in the McGovern campaign, victory in their long march to the Democratic nomination was so close that they could almost taste it. Yet the "Anybody but McGovern" regulars were girded for their last, desperate stand, and in the showdown vote over the California delegation challenge the McGovern campaign would either triumph or die. If it did survive to take on President Nixon, the last thing it needed was to adopt controversial positions that would deepen the dangerous image of radicalism with which it was already saddled. To the feminists of the NWPC, on the other hand, the story of the convention was about their coming out as a political force. Rooming together at the aptly-named Betsy Ross, a fleabag hotel where the cockroaches were "so big they could carry the chairs," female activists were fired with the "spirit of sisterhood and purpose."[23] Although many favored McGovern's candidacy, the strategic concerns of his campaign were not their concerns.

The jeering of McGovern at the opening meeting of the women's caucus was a preview of what was to come. McGovern had promised at the meeting to back the women's challenge to the gender imbalance of the South Carolina delegation. By the peculiar order of convention business, the credentials fight on South Carolina came up before the credentials challenge on California. McGovern strategists feared that a vote favorable to the South Carolina women, if it fell within a certain numerical range, would open the door to a successful challenge by the stop-McGovern coalition to the chair's previous ruling on the composition of a majority and thus

16. Gloria Steinem, *Outrageous Acts and Everyday Rebellions*, 2nd ed. (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1995), 114.

17. Amanda Smith to McGovern Organizers, Re: National Women's Political Caucus (NWPC), Dec. 1971, Papers of Frank Mankiewicz, John F. Kennedy Library, Boston, McGovern Campaign, Box 28. (Cited hereafter as "Mankiewicz Papers.")

18. Interview with Scott Lilly, 3 Mar. 2003.

19. George McGovern to L. B. Maytag, Jr., 28 Feb. 1972, McGovern Papers, Box 885.

20. Colette Nijhof to Sen. McGovern, 3 Mar. 1972, McGovern Papers, Box 885.

21. Shirley MacLaine, *You Can Get There From Here* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1975), 79–80; Tolchins, *Clout*, 47–48.

22. "McGovern Stand Irks Caucus," *Washington Post*, 27 Jun. 1972.

23. Pierson interview; interview with Phyllis Segal, 8 Jul. 2003.

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prove fatal for the upcoming ballot on California. Calculating from the early tally on South Carolina that the risks were too high, McGovern's chief floor strategist, Rick Stearns, dumped enough votes in a disguised maneuver to scuttle the women's challenge.[24]

When the feminists began to realize what had happened on the South Carolina vote, they were stunned and outraged. As Phyllis Segal of NWPC remembered, McGovern's pledge had been conveniently scrapped in the interests of "realpolitik," and infuriated feminists quickly made plain to the McGovernites their "sense of betrayal."[25] For their part, McGovernites saw the feminists as obtuse to political reality. In Gary Hart's recollection,

> I came back the night after the South Carolina challenge to the hotel about four in the morning, and there sat the late Bella Abzug and Gloria Steinem. And they were angry. We had spent time with them explaining the parliamentary situation—that if we supported the South Carolina challenge and lost, the precedent established would also unseat our California delegation. . . . But they didn't want to hear it. They were focused totally on South Carolina as a symbol, and they could have, it seemed to me, cared less about the nomination. Our focus was on the nomination. We worked for it for over two years, and for them the symbol of South Carolina was more important than the nomination.[26]

A similar situation developed on the following night of the convention as it considered the party's platform. The 1972 Democratic platform had an unprecedented Rights of Women section, calling for a priority effort on behalf of the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA), strong antidiscrimination and equal pay measures, and the appointment of women to high-level positions in every branch of the federal government. However, it omitted the one commitment about which feminists cared most. NWPC activists promoted a minority plank on abortion, conservatively worded so as to substitute "choice . . . in matters relating to human reproduction" for the most politically charged of the three "A" words—"acid, amnesty, and abortion"—with which Republicans had caricatured the McGovern campaign. Fresh from victory on the California challenge and now more in charge of convention dynamics, Stearns and other McGovern campaign strategists again ensured that the feminist position did not prevail on the floor. There was no violation of a pledge in this case: McGovern had never yielded to feminist pressure on the issue of abortion. Yet the feminists were perhaps even more furious over their second defeat than their first, coming as it did on their most deeply-felt concern. It especially enraged them that McGovern's women's rights spokesperson at the convention, Shirley MacLaine, herself pro-choice, appeared on the rostrum to argue against the minority plank. It enraged them as well that the McGovernites granted a right-to-life delegate time to speak against their plank.[27]

Feminist anger at the McGovernites poured out in full public view. Crying with rage, Gloria Steinem lashed at Gary Hart and the other McGovern convention managers: "You promised us you would not take the low road, you bastards."[28] Bella Abzug scolded Shirley MacLaine: "A sister never goes against a sister." MacLaine defended herself: "Sisters have a right to have pragmatic politics as well as personal principles."[29] Bad feelings from the battles over the South Carolina challenge and the abortion plank did not fade away. Writing later about the convention, Steinem put in a dig at Hart as "one of the arrogant young men who have made life miserable for women working in the campaign."[30] In Rick Stearns's recollection, "Abzug never forgave me. I remember being at a luncheon at the issues convention two years later in Kansas City. . . . She and I were at the same table and she made it a point to turn her chair around and sit with her back to me for the entire lunch."[31] McGovern himself was exempted from most of the feminists' persisting anger, perhaps out of respect for his record on the war and party reform and from the need to maintain enthusiasm for his contest with Nixon. Abzug even set aside her feud with MacLaine to co-chair a National Women's Advisory Council for McGovern.

One factor that made the recriminations flowing between feminists and McGovernites so intense was the close personal ties across the two camps. Nowhere was this more ironic—and more revealing of clashing political identities–than in the story of Eli and Phyllis Segal. As legal counsel to the McGovern-Fraser Commission, it was Eli who gave his wife, then a law student at Georgetown, the inspiration and the access to data to write a research paper on women's under-representation as convention delegates—a document which later became the basis for the NWPC's successful project to rewrite the rules of the Democratic Party for presidential campaigns. At Miami Beach, Phyllis was an NWPC staff member, organizing women whose formidable numbers at the convention owed much to her past work, while her husband was a top McGovern

24. Gary Warren Hart, *Right from the Start: A Chronicle of the McGovern Campaign* (New York: Quadrangle, 1973), 225–27; interview with Richard Stearns, 1 Aug. 2001.

25. Segal interview.

26. Hart interview.

27. "The Outsiders on the Inside," *Newsweek*, 24 Jul. 1972; "Eve's Operatives," *Time*, 24 Jul. 1972.

28. Steinem qtd. in "Outsiders on the Inside."

29. Abzug and MacLaine qtd. in "Eve's Operatives."

30. Steinem, *Outrageous Acts*, 120.

31. Stearns interview.

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strategist coping with the consequences. During the convention, Phyllis relates, the couple remained at "arm's length," with Eli staying at the comfortable headquarters hotel and Phyllis living with her "sisters" at the low-rent Betsy Ross. Helping to spearhead the women's challenge to the South Carolina delegation, she had no inside information from her husband about the maneuvers that the McGovernites were planning and thus "was as totally blown away as everybody else" by their deception. She and her husband "had our words afterwards. The betrayal felt personal as well as political." Her anger was assuaged by her recognition that the motives of the McGovernites were not "malign" and were shaped by the pursuit of the larger goal she and her husband shared: electing McGovern and ending the war.[32]

After their disheartening defeats on South Carolina and abortion rights, the feminists at Miami Beach bounced back with a last-minute effort to promote Sissy Farenthold for the vice presidential slot on the McGovern ticket. Farenthold, who had run a surprisingly effective campaign in the spring for the Democratic gubernatorial nomination in Texas, was in some ways an odd choice for NWPC activists: as Jane Pierson relates, she was a "slow-talking" southern lady who was used to being treated as a "princess."[33] Yet Farenthold had charisma, and feminists saw her as a vehicle, NWPC activist Doris Meissner recalls, for their desire "to assert, in the face of the party hierarchy," women's will and aspirations.[34] With McGovern strategists occupied with their eventual selection of Senator Thomas Eagleton (D-MO), the women organized with dispatch and produced 420 votes for Farenthold, almost a quarter of the total that McGovern's choice received. A symbolic show of new strength on the part of the women, the Farenthold candidacy also had an unintended yet damaging impact on the McGovernites: The length of the convention proceedings on the vice-presidential choice was the principal reason that McGovern's acceptance speech was disastrously delayed until the middle of the night.[35]

Feminists found some satisfaction at the end of the convention when McGovern selected Jean Westwood of Utah as chair of the Democratic National Committee, the first woman to hold such a post in either party. But tensions between feminists and McGovernites continued into the fall. The chief flash point for conflict was gender inside the McGovern presidential campaign. McGovern had more females on his staff than previous nominees, with some of the women holding important positions; however, feminists insisted that there should be complete equality. Sara Ehrman tells a story of a group of militant women, led by Abzug and Steinem, who walked into the campaign headquarters one fall day "in a phalanx" and "were raising hell." The feminists "literally shoved me against the wall and wanted to know where the women in the campaign were."[36]

To McGovernites, especially the men, this demand by feminists was yet another mark of their willful indifference to the insurgents' political needs. "We were fighting for our lives" in the fall, Gary Hart says. But the feminists—and activists from other social movements as well—"began to position themselves apart from the campaign and constantly challenged the campaign." The issue of what Hart calls "quantitative affirmative action" in staffing was particularly "a no win." If the McGovern campaign had said,

> okay, give us ten women to hire, or ten blacks, or ten Hispanics, they may or may not be experienced people and we probably didn't have the payroll to pay them. So we would have had to fire some experienced people to put them on. And then the press would have said, "This campaign is a sponge, it has no backbone, it caves in to everybody, and that's the way, if McGovern were to win, the administration would be run."[37]

Contrary agendas, time frames, and identities drove feminists and McGovernites, despite many shared values and close personal bonds, into recurrent conflict. Understanding the circumstances for the two sides—the McGovernites' increasingly difficult political straits, the feminists' militant awakening in the flush of a great social transformation—sympathy is more warranted than assignment of blame for failures in collaboration. At their principal site of confrontation, Miami Beach, the McGovernites appeared to have the upper hand, dealing the feminists stinging defeats on gender balance in delegations and on abortion rights. Covering the convention for *Harper's Magazine*, radical Australian feminist Germaine Greer, famous for her *The Female Eunuch*, depicted it as an embarrassment for the feminist cause: "The miserable fact was that the women's caucus was not a caucus in any meaningful sense: the McGovern machine had already pulled the rug out from under them." In Greer's account, feminists came to Miami Beach exultant about the arrival of "womanpower," only to be swiftly turned into patsies by McGovern's strategists, who knew that for liberal women there was no alternative but their man. With a sarcastic sentence that begged to be quoted, Greer summed up her indictment of American feminists, who lacked her own radical edge: "Womanlike, they

32. Segal interview. On the importance of Segal's research paper on women's under-representation, see Shafer, *Quiet Revolution*, 470.

33. Pierson interview.

34. Interview with Doris Meissner, 3 Oct. 2003.

35. Tolchins, *Clout*, 49.

36. Interview with Sara Ehrman, 10 May 2001.

37. Hart interview.

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did not want to get tough with their man, and so, womanlike, they got screwed."[38]

It can be argued, however, that rather than getting "screwed," feminists actually came out of these clashes in better shape than did the McGovernites. The McGovernites, as Hart observed, were fighting for survival in Miami Beach and thereafter, and whatever brief triumphs they savored from the convention were soon swept away by the Eagleton fiasco. For feminists, on the other hand, the 1972 convention not only established lasting precedents on women's rights and gender equality but also stimulated a sharpened political consciousness. With women's representation in the selection of Democratic presidential candidates rapidly rising toward parity with men, with many of their goals supported by the party's platform, with a female heading the national committee, with the solidarity and strength displayed in the Farenthold boomlet, feminists moved past their losses at Miami Beach and counted their gains.

Looking back on their encounter with the McGovern campaign, the early NWPC activists recognize a watershed in the political history of the women's movement. For Doris Meissner, the first executive director of NWPC, after the struggles of 1972, women "didn't have to fight these kinds of battles anymore"; from then on, "women had to be at the table," and campaigns were expected to place women "in senior positions."[39] For Phyllis Segal, the experience of Miami Beach was both "enraging and empowering": feminist frustration "became an engine to build the movement," and thus "1972 reflected a time when women started [developing] an independent voice as a political force."[40] As Jane Pierson notes, the 1972 campaign "was a turning point for the women's movement because it became a much more powerful movement after that." Subsequent to 1972, "the Democrats had to deal with women, [and] it changed the party." In the end, she believes, "the McGovern campaign was the ideal vehicle for women."[41]

The story of feminists and McGovernites is suggestive of the relationship between militant social movements and partisan insurgents. As an energetic and visible new constituency, strongly organized and led, a militant movement will offer important political benefits to an insurgent campaign. However, its moral passions and indifference to political calculations also portend conflict with partisan insurgents, who inevitably rank movement objectives below electoral imperatives. In the life-cycle of mass movements, the conflict between movements and party insurgents is thus likely to be at its most intense in the case of a militant movement.

Militant social movements will also pose problems for the presidential campaigns of party regulars. The relationship between the two is likely to be at more arms' length than when insurgents are involved, yet even in this situation the militants may have allies in the party camp. The militant-partisan relationship might be studied in a number of election years. Cases worth examining include the labor movement and the Roosevelt campaigns of 1936 and 1940, the civil rights movement and the Johnson campaign of 1964, and the Christian right and the Bush campaign of 1992.

GAY LIBERATION AND THE McGOVERN INSURGENCY

A mass movement for gay and lesbian rights was even newer to the American political scene in 1972 than was the feminist movement. It took a riot—the physical resistance by patrons of the Stonewall Inn, a gay bar in Greenwich Village, to a police raid in June 1969—to launch the gay liberation movement in America. (In this period the word "gay" was used for both male and female homosexuals.) Once gays began to smash their way out of the closet, however, long-simmering tensions fueled a growing mass movement. With examples of movement-building widely available after the civil rights, antiwar, and feminist struggles of the 1960s, Gay Liberation Fronts sprang up almost overnight around the country (and internationally as well). Gays were another new constituency that was mobilized for political action and impassioned about its goals, albeit less well organized or recognized than feminists. Far more than in the case of feminists, however, whichever presidential candidate could capture gays' allegiance would also assume the risks of identification with the most stigmatized minority in America.

As the 1972 primary season opened, gay activists sought to determine the Democratic presidential candidates' positions toward their issues. Forwarding a questionnaire on gay rights to the McGovern campaign, Guy Charles, representing *The Advocate*, a "homophile newspaper," presented a typical case for taking the gay community seriously as a political force:

> The year 1972 marks the first occasion that [homosexuals] have the opportunity, under Gay Liberation, to really unite and be a part of the election process of the country. Gay women and men are already becoming a part of the political scene as campaign workers, party workers, election officials, and even candidates for office. It was shown, during the last Congressional elections in New York, as also on the West Coast, that the Gay vote can help to decide who will go to Washington. . . . [T]he Gay Community . . . is now estimated to

38. Germaine Greer, "McGovern, the Big Tease," *Harper's Magazine*, Oct. 1972.

39. Meissner interview.

40. Segal interview.

41. Pierson interview.

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> be in excess of 10% of the voting population, [and the] voting power of the Gay minority will be shown and felt, as it was in the case of the Black minority.[42]

As a nascent social movement, the gay rights movement lacked a peak organization equivalent to the NWPC for feminists. Several weeks after the McGovern campaign received the questionnaire from *The Advocate*, it was asked to fill out a similar document by another gay liberation representative, the Gay Activists Alliance (GAA). Approaching the campaign, a spokesman for this organization wrote with a trace of irritation about "other assorted questionnaires" from different gay groups.[43] A second GAA member, Bruce Voeller, wrote to the campaign and insisted that this alliance was "the best organized homosexual activists' organization in the nation."[44] Facing these unfamiliar groups and leaders, it was hard for McGovernites to sort out who genuinely spoke for gay activists. Apparently, however, the claims of the GAA were considered compelling, and the McGovern staff completed its questionnaire.

Gay organizations held out the promise of a huge new constituency for a sympathetic presidential candidate. Guy Charles claimed that gays made up more than 10 percent of the electorate, while the GAA spokesman wrote that "as soon as we have the properly completed questionnaire, we will inform America's 20,000,000 gay women and men of the Senator's strong support of the civil rights of one of this country's largest minority groups."[45] These figures on gay demographics, extrapolated from the Kinsey Report, were inflated, but at the time nobody could be sure just how many gay voters there really were.

The McGovern campaign, a long-shot insurgency committed to a liberal vision of equality, could not ignore such pressure or neglect such potential. McGovern's left-center strategy for capturing the Democratic nomination required him to stake out advanced positions on cultural matters. Moreover, from the vantage point of the early nomination game, the climactic primaries would come in California and New York, the two states where gays were becoming a visible political presence. Beyond any political calculations, the openness and participatory spirit of the McGovern insurgency made it difficult for McGovernites to exclude even unpopular groups. Whatever the likely risks of supporting the gay movement, McGovern speechwriter Bob Shrum observes, "we didn't know how not to allow it some space" in the campaign.[46] The expansion—and then the contraction—of that space present another kind of relationship between movement activists and partisan insurgents.

Responding to the growing clamor from an assortment of gay liberation groups, a statement and a list of six proposals was issued on McGovern's behalf—but not directly by the candidate—in San Francisco on 2 February 1972. This document represented his campaign's strongest pledge on gay rights and was a key to the substantial gay support that it subsequently received. Senator McGovern recognizes, the statement reads,

> that certain assumptions of the majority concerning homosexuals have been used as a rationale for harassment and denial of their elementary civil liberties. As for other stigmatized minorities, Senator McGovern pledges the full moral and legal authority of his presidency toward restoring and guaranteeing first-class citizen rights for these individuals.

Of the six proposals that followed, the first was the boldest and most controversial:

> Sexual orientation should cease to be a criterion for employment by all public and governmental agencies, in work under federal contracts, for service in the United States armed forces, and for licensing in government-related occupations and professions.[47]

Remarkable for its time, McGovern's forthright position on gay rights had the desired effect. Ronald Alheim, a gay activist from Albany, New York, took the lead in forming Gay Citizens for McGovern and recruited about forty organizers around the country for the group, which received official recognition from McGovern campaign headquarters.[48] This group was probably the first of its kind for the presidential campaign of one of the major parties. In the course of building support for the California primary, Ann Marcus, the McGovern coordinator for Southern California, found considerable enthusiasm for her candidate in the gay community. She worked with gay activists on producing a brochure, targeted at their community and distributed in the gay bars. McGovern's picture was on the front of the brochure, and Marcus noticed that it had been "ever so slightly doctored. McGovern could have been gay." She made sure that the candidate and his national staff did not see the brochure.[49]

42. Guy Charles to Kirby Jones, 1 Jan. 1972, Mankiewicz Papers, Box 19.

43. [Unk.] to Frank Mankiewicz, 31 Jan. 1972, Mankiewicz Papers, Box 19.

44. Dr. Bruce Voeller to Frank Mankiewicz, 31 Jan. 1972, Mankiewicz Papers, Box 19.

45. [Unk.] to Frank Mankiewicz, 31 Jan. 1972, Mankiewicz Papers, Box 19.

46. Interview with Bob Shrum, 26 Feb. 2002.

47. George McGovern to Dr. Bruce Voeller, 15 Mar. 1972, with attached statement, Mankiewicz Papers, Box 19.

48. Interview with Ronald Alheim, 14 Feb. 2006.

49. Interview with Ann Marcus, 22 Mar. 2002.

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As the McGovern campaign successfully moved from the fringe of the Democratic Party and contemplated a contest with the Republicans, its original left-center strategy dictated a search for safer political ground. The cause of gay liberation was the most unsafe of all—indeed, as Norman Mailer remarked, endorsing this cause in 1972 was "political suicide."[50] At a meeting of the Democratic platform committee in Washington prior to the national convention in Miami Beach, the McGovern forces, in a dominant position on the committee, rejected the inclusion of a plank on sexual orientation (along with a plank on abortion). This plank incorporated some of McGovern's earlier proposals on gay rights, but it went further, urging "repeal of all laws, federal and state, regarding voluntary sex acts involving consenting persons in private, laws regulating attire, and laws used as a shield for police harassment."[51] The vote against the plank was 54-34, with many of the McGovern representatives appearing sympathetic to its sentiments and opposing its adoption only because they had been so instructed by the leadership of the campaign.[52]

Gay activists at the meeting of the Platform Committee managed to keep their issue alive by rounding up enough delegate signatures to qualify a gay rights minority plank for consideration on the convention floor. They traded on the sympathies of some of the McGovern delegates and arranged for logrolls with delegates from other campaigns who were pushing their own minority planks. In an unusual bit of political horse-trading for a nascent social movement, gay activists and delegates supporting George Wallace agreed to provide signatures for one another's planks.[53]

At Miami Beach, the McGovern campaign was again determined to downplay the gay rights issue. Its potential for embarrassing the campaign was underscored by a demonstration by gay activists in Miami Beach's Flamingo Park, at which they held a "kiss-in" on behalf of the minority plank. While there were no prominent gay-rights leaders at the demonstration analogous to an Abzug or Steinem, there was the flamboyant figure of poet Alan Ginsberg, who told the crowd, "I'm an old queen."[54] Moreover, gay political strength was not as evident at Miami Beach as the earlier claims of gay numbers would have suggested. At the Democratic convention, there were separate caucuses for women, blacks, Hispanics, youth, Jews, and senior citizens, but there was no caucus for gays.[55]

The minority plank on sexual orientation was debated on the floor on the second night of the convention in front of the television cameras. The McGovern strategists delayed its consideration to the pre-dawn hours and made sure that the plank was defeated by a voice vote. Nonetheless, words and images of a sexuality not addressed before by a major political party had been broadcast to the nation, and they added an important piece to the emerging portrait of the McGovern campaign as an uprising of the marginal and the strange. Scott Lilly comments on the political impact:

> A lot of the groups that got floor time at that convention were the kind of people that [many Americans] had never seen before. It was the first time that they saw people get up and say they were gay . . . and liked to kiss other men. That's a much less shocking thing today than it was then. . . . [I]n the summer of 1972, people couldn't believe they were seeing some of the things that were on television. And McGovern didn't need to have it on television. He needed to have pictures of the bombs dropping out of a B-28 on television.[56]

The gay rights issue, McGovern aide Barbara Holum points out, was so unfamiliar and unsettling in 1972 that any association with it was "offensive" to old-line Democrats.[57] Even some in the McGovern camp were upset about ties between their candidate and the gay liberation movement. According to Sara Ehrman, at Miami Beach "the South Dakota folks [from McGovern's senate staff] were in a rage about it." George Cunningham, McGovern's senate chief of staff, and another South Dakotan "picked a gay guy up bodily and threw him out of the hotel." The South Dakotans were worried about how McGovern's identification with gay liberation might hurt him back home, but even more important, in Ehrman's view, was the fact that the gay cause "was abhorrent to them."[58]

Gay activists, expecting less than the militant feminists, took their convention defeat more in stride. There were no public eruptions of gay anger comparable to the infuriated reactions of feminist leaders to their defeats on the South Carolina challenge and the abortion rights issue. Nonetheless, the fact that the McGovern insurgency was now holding the gay rights movement at arms' length could not help but diminish the enthusiasm of gay activists for McGovern's presidential candidacy.[59]

50. Norman Mailer, *St. George and the Godfather* (New York: New American Library, 1972), 53.

51. Minority plank on "Sexual Orientation," in Mankiewicz Papers, Box 19.

52. Denis G. Sullivan et al., *The Politics of Representation: The Democratic Convention 1972* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1974), 100.

53. Alheim interview.

54. "Outsiders on the Inside."

55. Sullivan et al., *Politics of Representation*, 44–58.

56. Lilly interview.

57. Interview with Barbara Holum, 27 Feb. 2002.

58. Ehrman interview.

59. Alheim interview.

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During the fall campaign, there was some alarm among gay activists about even further backtracking on McGovern's part toward their issue. Two leaders of Gay Citizens for McGovern sent the candidate an urgent telegram in mid-October 1972, requesting clarification about McGovern's "apparent retraction" a few days earlier of the six-point program on homosexual rights originally issued in February. They warned McGovern that because word of this supposed retraction was spreading, "gay support for your candidacy is rapidly deteriorating in major urban centers."[60] But by this point in the fall, the McGovern campaign was so deeply in trouble on other fronts that it did not worry much about the potential defection of gay voters. Gay discontent barely registered in the memories of the McGovern campaign's high command. With so much else marring McGovern's political standing against Nixon, Frank Mankiewicz observes, at least "the gay and lesbian issue was nascent" enough that it did not become a major headache for the campaign.[61]

From a contemporary standpoint, the McGovern campaign may appear instrumental and timid in its relationship with the gay-rights movement, pulling close to the movement as it sought the Democratic nomination and then distancing itself as it moved toward the center for the fall election. Considering how nascent the gay cause was in 1972, however, and even more importantly, how politically explosive it was, the very fact of the relationship remains historically important. Ronald Alheim of Gay Citizens for McGovern ascribes the candidate's early support for gay rights to "political convenience." Nonetheless, he concludes, McGovern was "more progressive" on issues of sexual orientation than other political leaders of the era, "even some [elected officials] who were closeted gays."[62]

The McGovern campaign did not make gay rights one of its banner concerns, but it did grant the gay cause its initial recognition in a presidential election. In a slim paperback handed out by the campaign, *McGovern: The Man and His Beliefs*, gays come at the end of a list of oppressed groups. "I hope for the day," reads the quote from McGovern, "when we do not need to specify that 'Liberty and Justice for ALL' includes blacks, Chicanos, American Indians, women, homosexuals, or any other group. ALL means ALL."[63] This was a cautious recognition and a tentative first step, but gays were now on the civil-rights map in presidential politics. This fateful political move, like so many others that remain seminal to the enduring identity crisis of the Democratic Party, began with the McGovern campaign.

The story of gay activists and McGovernites is suggestive of the relationship between nascent social movements and partisan insurgents. As a significant source of potential votes for an insurgent candidacy, a nascent movement is likely to be recognized and even courted by partisans. Yet because a nascent movement has limited legitimacy and organization, an insurgent campaign, especially if it takes off, will feel freer than in the case of a militant movement to back away from the relationship. The insurgency will not want to alienate members of a nascent movement entirely; however, it will increase its distance from the movement the more that symbolic association with activists' controversial agendas and identities threatens electoral harm.

Nascent social movements have played a role in a number of presidential campaigns, whether by insurgents or by regulars. Insurgents are more likely to welcome nascent movements, but if the movement claims to speak for a large voting bloc, regulars will also pay heed to them. Cases worth examining include the civil-rights movement and the Truman campaign in 1948 and the New Right and the Reagan insurgency of 1976.

"BROTHER McGOVERN"

By 1972, the African-American civil-rights movement was in a very different state compared to the new identity movements among women and gays. The latter two movements cared as much about what was in the platform (the abortion plank for women, the sexual orientation plank for gays) as about their political representation. But with the landmark achievements of the civil-rights struggle behind it, the African-American movement was primarily focused on representation in 1972, with activists determined to obtain real positions of power from the Democratic presidential nominee. The relationship between McGovernites and black activists was hardly free of stresses and tensions, but the differences between the two sides, revolving principally around distributive political goods, were more easily negotiated than were the controversial policy issues around which feminists and gays pressed their demands on the campaign.

Hoping for the power of black unity, African-American leaders instead floundered in factionalism during the Democratic presidential selection process. Shirley Chisholm was the first black candidate to run for the presidential nomination of a major party, but her campaign drew more support from feminists than from black activists. Chisholm could not obtain the endorsements of major black political organizations. She blamed the resistance to her candidacy within her own community on the sexism of the

60. James Foster and Dr. Frank E. Kameny to Sen. George McGovern, 18 Oct. 1972, Mankiewicz Papers, Box 19.

61. Mankiewicz interview.

62. Alheim interview.

63. Shirley MacLaine, ed., *McGovern: The Man and His Beliefs* (New York: Artists and Writers for McGovern, 1972), 57.

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established black leaders; they complained that she did not consult them before announcing for the presidency and predicted—correctly as it turned out—that she would attract scant electoral support and tarnish the image of a formidable black voting bloc. Among the black organizations, there was little agreement beyond the rejection of Chisholm's candidacy. The Congressional Black Caucus could not reach a consensus on whom to support in 1972, nor could the more nationalist Black Political Convention, which convened that spring and issued a long list of mostly militant demands.[64]

Winning black support was an uphill struggle for the McGovern insurgency during the nomination process. McGovern possessed a strong Senate voting record on civil-rights legislation, he was its foremost leader on issues of hunger, and he could claim a close bond with Robert F. Kennedy, a revered martyr to the black community. But his record was unfamiliar to this community, and his most prominent stand, in passionate opposition to the war in Vietnam, placed him at a distance from the domestic priorities of most African-Americans.

Recognizing that he would have to devote considerable efforts to drawing black votes in the primaries, McGovern made Yancey Martin one of his first campaign staff hires in 1970. Martin had been Deputy Director of the Democratic National Committee's Minorities Division and, before that, head of the black caucus among Community Action Program directors in the War on Poverty. He brought to the campaign his wide contacts in a national network of black political activists. That McGovern was not well known to the members of this network was, Martin says, actually a plus, because it allowed him to argue that the senator from South Dakota was an "empty vessel" on minority issues who could be filled in by the black leaders who got behind him. Martin coached McGovern on the niceties of black politics—that, for example, it was imprudent to arrive at a black gathering flanked only by white aides because it conveyed disrespect for black capacities.[65]

As long as Senator Edmund Muskie of Maine, the initial Democratic frontrunner, was McGovern's main worry, his lack of minority appeal was a minor matter—Muskie was no stronger than McGovern in black America. Once Hubert Humphrey became the competition, however, McGovern was at a considerable disadvantage. Humphrey boasted (often) of one of the brightest and longest civil-rights records in American politics, and many black politicians, who had made large strides during the Kennedy-Johnson era, were enthusiastically backing him. Even as the McGovern insurgency took off after its win in the Wisconsin primary, Humphrey's stellar reputation in the black community threatened to prove a potentially fatal weakness for the McGovernites. A field report from the Michigan primary tersely highlighted the problem that McGovern encountered in all of the early contests: "Black support: Humphrey clearly strongest among rank-and-file. McGovern relatively unknown."[66] After the Michigan primary, *New York Times* reporter R. W. Apple, Jr., pointed out that the question of black support still hung ominously over the McGovern insurgency:

> Can Senator George McGovern, whose political base is a state with only 1,844 blacks, whose personal style is the very antithesis of soul, sell himself to the black electorate? So far, the answer is no. In Miami, Pittsburgh, Baltimore, the Hough district of Cleveland—almost everywhere he has tried, except Boston—Mr. McGovern has failed to make major inroads into the black support of Senator Hubert Humphrey.[67]

Yet McGovern did have a valuable asset in his bid to increase dramatically his share of the black vote for the climactic primaries in California and New York. Several of the younger black leaders, closely associated with the glory days of the civil-rights movement, endorsed him and campaigned for him: Julian Bond, Jesse Jackson, Coretta Scott King. For California, McGovern also had the early endorsement of the state's rising black political star (and a former attorney for civil-rights demonstrators in San Francisco), Willie Brown. As Gary Hart observes, "The whole country was split along generational lines. . . . Younger blacks were angrier about the war . . . and much more vocal on civil rights."[68] With the backing of these younger leaders, "Brother McGovern," as Jesse Jackson dubbed him, could campaign in the black community as a leader of greater contemporary relevance than the outdated Humphrey.[69] Fashioning McGovern publicity for the California primary, media adviser Charles Guggenheim emphasized that handbills and fliers targeted at the black community should emphasize that "the 'with it' Blacks are behind McGovern. 'Why Jesse Jackson thinks McGovern is our man.' 'Why Julian Bond thinks the old leadership can't move it anymore'."[70]

64. "Voting Black?," *Newsweek*, 12 Jun. 1972; Shola Lynch, "Chisholm '72: Unbought and Unbossed," Realside Productions, 2005.

65. Hart, *Right from the Start*, 14–15; interview with Yancey Martin, 9 Mar. 2006.

66. Laird Harris to Scott Lilly, Joe Grandmaison, and Steve Robbins, Re: Michigan Primary, n.d., McGovern Papers, Box 868.

67. R. W. Apple, Jr., "McGovern Continues to Lag in Bid for Black Votes," *New York Times*, 19 May 1972.

68. Hart interview.

69. Jackson qtd. in "McGovern Works for the People," brochure for the black community, n.d., personal files of Ted Pulliam.

70. Charles Guggenheim to Gary Hart et al., 9 May 1972, Mankiewicz Papers, Box 15.

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In the California primary, McGovern finally caught up with Humphrey in the competition for black votes, with the two running about even. Humphrey was ahead in the black community in Los Angeles, but McGovern took the preponderant share of black votes in the Bay Area. McGovernites ascribed their candidate's victory among Bay Area blacks to talent and organization. As Eli Segal and Sandy Berger reported to headquarters in a review of McGovern's California primary campaign,

> The effort in the North was far superior to the effort in the South, largely because of the presence of Willie Brown as a clearly identifiable and respected leader. In fact, there was considerable canvassing in the Northern black areas, while there was virtually none in the South.[71]

The Humphrey camp had a rival hypothesis to explain McGovern's new success among blacks: desperately short of funds, their campaign could not match the McGovernites in the "street money" distributed in the Bay Area.[72]

With the "Anybody but McGovern" party regulars mustering their forces for a last ditch effort at the convention, the McGovern camp looked to uncommitted black delegates as a bloc of votes that might put its candidate over the top on the first ballot. In this situation, Walter Fauntroy, the delegate to Congress from the District of Columbia and the head of the Congressional Black Caucus' task force for the convention, took on the role of power broker. Fauntroy entered into negotiations with McGovern strategists, making it apparent that his interest in backing the insurgent was less ideological than it was pragmatic. As he told a *Washington Post* interviewer, "If we have enough of a bloc to put one [candidate] over and not the other, we will go with the one who could win it."[73]

McGovern did not neglect more ideological black leaders in this period. Meeting with the three cochairs of the National Black Political Convention, he expressed sympathy with its long list of policy demands.[74] But the principal action in lining up black support was elsewhere. As the estimated number of uncommitted black delegates swinging to McGovern fluctuated in a context of considerable uncertainty, McGovern and his top aides offered assurances both to Fauntroy and to state black delegates that support at the convention would be rewarded in a McGovern administration. Thus, McGovern told uncommitted black delegates from Louisiana that he would not allow the state's two white senators to veto his nominations to the federal bench.[75] Negotiations with Fauntroy were ultimately successful, with the black power broker offering more than forty delegates in hand and the prospect of adding another sixty or so later.[76] Just what Fauntroy received from the deal was, unsurprisingly, vague in press accounts, but *Newsweek* later reported that it "included steeply increased Federal patronage for blacks in five key states and the nation's Capital—with the jobs being handed out by black convention delegates from those states who were loyal to McGovern."[77]

The deal between the McGovernites and Fauntroy was shaky, however, and it almost fell apart at the convention amid the swirling dynamics of black politics. Appearing before a session of the Black Caucus, Shirley Chisholm passionately appealed to black delegates not to sell their votes and to stand with her for the first ballot. In one of many ironies in an exceptionally ironic political year, Chisholm appealed to black idealism to reject a self-interested bargain with an insurgency known for its own brand of idealistic liberalism. Amid the emotions of the moment, she received a more favorable response than she had from African-American voters in the spring. Her maneuver threatened to wreck McGovern's hopes for a first-ballot victory and throw wide open the contest for the nomination; however, the McGovern campaign squelched her scheme by arranging an endorsement from California Congressman Ron Dellums, heretofore Chisholm's most eloquent champion among black leaders.[78] A left-liberal ideologically close to the McGovernites, Dellums likely was concerned that Chisholm's gambit played into the hands of the party regulars out to stop McGovern.

Too divided to have much impact on the nomination or the party's platform, black leaders found a vulnerable spot in McGovern at the very end of the convention, in an incident that foreshadowed the difficulties later Democratic presidential nominees, such as Walter Mondale and Michael Dukakis, would have in the face of black pressures. Since Larry O'Brien had earlier indicated to McGovern that he did not want to stay on as chair of the Democratic National Committee (he had second thoughts about this during the convention), McGovern rewarded a key supporter and pleased the feminists by picking Jean Westwood for the position. His choice for vice chair

71. Eli Segal and Sandy Berger to Gary Hart and Frank Mankiewicz, Re: Report on California Primary, 18 Jun. 1972, McGovern Papers, Box 845.

72. Interview with Max Kampelman, 19 Sept. 2005.

73. Richard E. Prince, "Fauntroy Sees Blacks Giving McGovern Aid," *Washington Post*, 8 Jun. 1972.

74. Austin Scott, "Black Convention Chiefs Call Meeting with McGovern 'Positive'," *Washington Post*, 23 Jun. 1972.

75. William Greider, "Sen. McGovern Seeks Support of La. Blacks," *Washington Post*, 21 Jun. 1972.

76. Stephen Green and Austin Scott, "Negro Bloc Backs McGovern," *Washington Post*, 24 Jun. 1972; Austin Scott, "Fauntroy Says He Has Pledges to Assure McGovern Victory," *Washington Post*, 26 Jun. 1972.

77. "Outsiders on the Inside."

78. Marie Brookter with Jean Curtis, *Here I Am—Take My Hand* (New York: Harper & Row, 1974), 135–37; Lynch, "Chisholm '72"; Sullivan et al., *Politics of Representation*, 44–51.

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of the DNC was Pierre Salinger, JFK's press secretary and an early adviser to McGovern. When the presidential candidate presented his choices to a meeting of the national committee, however, black members objected to seeing a white woman but not an African American elevated to party leadership and proposed that Basil Paterson of New York be substituted for Salinger. McGovern and Salinger were both stunned by the black rebellion but saw no option except to accede to the switch. Two Kennedy men, O'Brien and Salinger, were thus replaced by representatives of the feminist and black movements, a change that hardly warmed the hearts of already disgruntled Democratic regulars. McGovern's failure to insist on his way at the DNC was, Frank Mankiewicz acknowledges, "a weak moment," a signpost of how dependent the antiwar insurgent was on a black electorate whose enthusiasm for him was far from certain.[79]

The fractiousness characteristic of a mature social movement brought several headaches to the McGovern staff during the fall campaign. Although the McGovernites had backed Jesse Jackson against Mayor Richard Daley in the battle over seating the Illinois delegation at the Democratic convention—and paid a considerable price for its choice—Gary Hart recalls Jackson leading a protest outside the McGovern campaign headquarters; Hart can't remember "whether it was [about] an issue, or an appearance, or a number of hires."[80] Shirley Chisholm complained loudly that the McGovern campaign was snubbing her by omitting her from its roster of black speakers.[81] And Yancey Martin, McGovern's original black aide, prepared a letter of resignation after the Democratic convention because he had come under fierce attack by rivals among McGovern's black supporters. Worried that the departure of his top black staffer would only compound the public-relations disaster of the Eagleton affair, McGovern prevailed on Martin to stay on through election day.[82]

Despite these problems, the McGovern campaign managed to mount a reasonably effective appeal to black voters. The prominent civil-rights leaders supporting McGovern were dispatched to black communities in the large states to drum up enthusiasm for "Brother McGovern." A fragment of transcript from a tape recording of Willie Brown, relating an interchange in Houston, captures the panache with which he made the case for McGovern to the "brothers" on the street. Brown told his listeners that "no black man can justifiably support Richard Nixon." A man in the crowd

> had to be convinced even further. I said to the brother, "You know, for the first time in our lives we are trying to elect a human being to the Presidency—a peoples' candidate." He said, "How do you mean that, brother?" I said, "Can you imagine anybody making a homemade sign that says 'Viva Nixon,' or 'Right on, Nixon.' Can you imagine that—no way, no way?" And the way I closed on the brother . . . was, I said, "Brother, can you imagine any day of the week, or month, or year when Richard Nixon will come out on the streets and say to the brothers, give it to me? No way. No way. But with George McGovern, now there is a man."[83]

African-American voters came through for "Brother McGovern" in the end, at least compared to other traditional Democratic constituencies. A Gallup Poll in September, taken after McGovern's worst month of the fall campaign, found that blacks were much less likely to have held his miscues against McGovern than other Democrats.[84] African-American votes in November accounted for about 20 percent of McGovern's national total. Reflecting his support from younger black leaders, he polled especially well among college-educated blacks and blacks under the age of thirty.[85] On the other hand, Nixon doubled his minuscule support in the black electorate over 1968, and turnout was down in ghetto precincts.[86] The commitments that the Democratic Party had made during the 1960s on racial justice helped to carry McGovern with African-American voters (although they helped Nixon more with whites), as did the support of major black figures like Julian Bond and Willie Brown. In addition, McGovern's brand of left-liberalism was more appealing to blacks than it was to most whites. The McGovern campaign navigated a difficult course through the currents of black politics, but it had an easier time negotiating with civil-rights leaders than with feminists and gay activists.

The story of civil-rights forces and McGovernites is suggestive of the relationship between mature social movements and partisan insurgencies. Since the mature movement is less interested in controversial

79. Mankiewicz interview. For conflicting perspectives on the black rebellion at the DNC meeting, see George McGovern, *Grassroots: The Autobiography of George McGovern* (New York: Random House, 1977), 218–20; and Theodore H. White, *The Making of the President 1972* (New York: Atheneum, 1973), 190–91.

80. Hart interview.

81. Austin Scott, "Snubbed by McGovern, Mrs. Chisholm Says," *Washington Post*, 21 Sept. 1972.

82. Yancey Martin to Sen. McGovern, 20 Aug. 1972, McGovern Papers, Box 836; Martin interview.

83. Transcript of Willie Brown, Reigner—Reel No. 2, Willie Brown file, McGovern Papers, Box 822.

84. George Gallup, "Black Voters Favor McGovern by Ratio of More than 4 to 1," *Washington Post*, 23 Sept. 1972.

85. Arthur H. Miller et al., *A Majority Party in Disarray: Policy Polarization in the 1972 Election* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Institute for Social Research, 1973), 77, 84.

86. "The Landslide: How and Why," *Newsweek*, 13 Nov. 1972; Lanny J. Davis, *The Emerging Democratic Majority: Lessons and Legacies from the New Politics* (New York: Stein and Day, 1974), 192.

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policies than in distributive benefits, relationships between it and insurgents can mainly be handled through negotiations in behind-the-scenes forums. From the standpoint of the party insurgents, the most difficult calculation is with whom the campaign should negotiate. Who are the real leaders of the mature movement that can deliver delegates or voters? Such calculations are hard enough—but preferable to negative symbolic association with a nascent social movement or explosive public confrontation with a militant one.

Mature social movements tend to be as comfortable negotiating with regulars as with insurgents. Having gained a place in the party, they are poised to bargain with any contenders for the presidential nomination who will offer them attractive appointments or benefits. Cases worth examining here include the labor movement and the Kennedy campaign in 1960, the women's movement and the Mondale campaign in 1984, and the Christian right and the Bush campaign in 2000.

THE MEANY MACHINE AND THE McGOVERN CAMPAIGN

The feminist, gay rights, and civil rights movements were important but often troublesome allies of the McGovern insurgency. A fourth movement, organized labor, was an outright opponent. The principal organization in the labor movement, the AFL-CIO (American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations), was unable to block McGovern from capturing the Democratic presidential nomination for 1972. But it was able to wound his candidacy grievously.

Organized labor was a quintessential aging social movement by 1972. Its longest-lived institution, the AFL, had been founded in 1886. The president of the AFL-CIO, George Meany, was nearly as old, having been born in 1894. Meany's chief political lieutenant, Al Barkan, was sixty-three. If organized labor had once been a militant force in American politics, it had become, by 1972, a conservative gerontocracy. Joseph Golden, author of an unauthorized biography of Meany published in 1972, told a television interviewer: "[Y]ou look at the AFL-CIO executive council and it looks like an old folks home. The average age is way above sixty. . . . I could talk to labor people for hours on end without ever hearing one fresh idea."[87]

Organized labor was an integral partner in a political establishment, the New Deal Democratic coalition, that was itself aging by 1972. Militant labor had joined the coalition at its inception, bringing its vast electoral potential to FDR's political formation, along with headaches for him from John L. Lewis and sit-down strikers. A mature labor movement, guided by "statesmen" such as Sidney Hillman, had negotiated for mounting benefits for labor from the liberal state. By the 1960s, the AFL-CIO, under the leadership of Meany, was a familiar partner for Democratic presidents. And as the Democratic Party coalition imploded during the 1960s under the twin pressures of racial conflict and the war in Vietnam, organized labor emerged as the strongest remaining bastion in its establishment. It was Meany and his associates who stood behind Hubert Humphrey's presidential candidacy in 1968, gained him the Democratic nomination although he had not run in a single primary, and supplied the manpower and money that almost allowed him to close a once-huge gap and pass Richard Nixon by election day.[88]

The conservatism of its age and its established status ensured that the AFL-CIO would be a fierce foe of the McGovern insurgency in 1972. Humphrey was again Meany's preferred candidate, and once frontrunner Edmund Muskie faded and the McGovern campaign took off, the labor hierarchy pushed Humphrey into the breach. The senator from Minnesota, an old friend and next-door neighbor to McGovern, could not defeat his insurgency, but he could defame it, badmouthing McGovern as an impractical radical in the critical California primary contest. After McGovern's five-point win over Humphrey in California, it was the AFL-CIO's Al Barkan who took the lead role in organizing a challenge to California's winner-take-all primary rules. The California challenge nearly cost McGovern the Democratic nomination, and even though it was ultimately rejected on the floor of the Democratic national convention at Miami Beach, it expanded the rift in the party as the fall election season began.

Immediately after McGovern won the Democratic presidential nomination, Meany called a special meeting of his executive council. Under his prodding, the AFL-CIO decided, for the first time since the two labor federations merged in 1955, not to endorse the Democratic candidate for president. Proclaiming a policy of neutrality between McGovern and Nixon, on the grounds that the labor rank-and-file disliked both men, Meany enforced it vigorously until election day, cracking down on state and local labor federations that attempted to rebel against the union hierarchy and support McGovern.[89]

Meany's was a peculiar definition of "neutrality." Before the election season began, he had been a vociferous critic of President Nixon's wage-price controls as biased toward business and had resigned in

87. Transcript of *The Today Show*, 24 Oct. 1972, in Meany Files, George Meany Memorial Archives, Silver Spring, MD, Box 130. (Cited hereafter as "Meany Files.")

88. Taylor E. Dark, *The Unions and the Democrats: An Enduring Alliance* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999), 80–83.

89. Minutes of the Executive Council, AFL-CIO, 19 Jul. 1972, Meany Archives, Box RG4-007.

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protest from the president's Pay Board when it slashed wage gains that unions had negotiated with management. Once McGovern was nominated, however, Nixon's recent sins against working people, indeed the dubious labor record of his entire career, were no longer of great concern to Meany, who happily went golfing with the president and members of his cabinet.[90] Meanwhile, the AFL-CIO president refused to meet with McGovern and would not even take his phone calls. Instead, he went out of his way, in speeches before labor assemblages and on a national television broadcast, to denounce the Democratic nominee.

Hostility to the McGovern insurgency on the part of the AFL hierarchy was over-determined, a compound of concerns over power, policy, and culture. The success of the McGovern insurgency represented a major blow to the power of the AFL-CIO leadership. Rarely in American history had a major group suffered such a rapid decline in power as did organized labor between 1968 and 1972. In the earlier year, the AFL-CIO had appeared at the peak of its influence within the Democratic Party. Over the next four years, however, organized labor's political stock crashed. By opening up the nomination process to new forces, the McGovern-Fraser reforms closed down the backroom venues in which organized labor had been dominant. AFL-CIO leaders were at sea in the new process, and their inept strategy of putting forward non-committed labor delegates in primaries and caucuses was easily trumped by McGovern insurgents. Organized labor came to the Democratic convention of 1972 with its numbers reduced and its influence minimized. It had little say on the party's platform and had no hooks in the party's nominee. For Meany and Barkan, the man responsible for bringing organized labor so low was George McGovern.[91]

If the political loss to labor seemingly weighed most heavily with Barkan, the ideological threat of McGovern mattered more to Meany. Although far closer to McGovern than to Nixon on most economic issues, Meany disliked McGovern's stands on busing and welfare; however, it was McGovern's views on foreign policy that drove Meany to despise the candidate. An anticommunist of the old school and a fervent advocate of the war in Vietnam, Meany was horrified by the collapse of the Cold War consensus. He was almost as unhappy with President Nixon for his opening to China as for his wage-price controls. Compared to Nixon, however, George McGovern and the antiwar forces he led were beyond the pale. Appearing on *Face the Nation* on the Sunday before Labor Day, 1972, Meany shot one of the most feared darts in American politics at a candidate struggling to recover from the Eagleton disaster:

> When I look at a man who's a candidate for the presidency of the United States, I've got to look at him not only as a trade unionist, but as an American. And frankly, when I read the things that George McGovern stands for … and I find out that he's become an apologist for the communist world, I just … [He did not complete the sentence].[92]

AFL-CIO researchers, presumably at Meany's direction, compiled and circulated an anonymous photocopied document, "Let's Look at the Record," that painted McGovern in even more alarming tones than did Republican campaign materials. The tenor of this document can be gleaned from such section headings as "Blind Trust in Moscow," "Russia Peaceful, So Let's Reduce Our Arms," "Capitulation to and Apologies for Hanoi" and "All Out for Castro."[93]

McGovernites offended Meany as much as did their leader. To a labor chieftain born in 1894, the baby boomers of the McGovern insurgency and the social movements associated with it were insulting the most revered values of authority and propriety. Even before the Democratic convention, as an unnamed labor official told the *Washington Post*, "McGovern smells to [Meany and his associates] of kids and beards."[94] The convention itself sent the labor hierarchy into even greater paroxysms of cultural disgust. After it ended, Barkan traveled to labor gatherings to warn them against any affiliation with the "kooks and nuts" of the McGovern campaign who had seized the Democratic Party.[95] It fell to Meany, speaking before a convention of the United Steelworkers,

90. On the Meany-Nixon relationship, see Archie Robinson, *George Meany and His Times: A Biography* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1981), 304–20; and Allen J. Matusow, *Nixon's Economy: Booms, Busts, Dollars, and Votes* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1998), 158–63, 196–97, 211–12.

91. Dark, *Unions and the Democrats*, 83–91. Meany and Barkan also held a previous political grudge against McGovern. They disparaged him as a double-crosser for a 1966 incident: McGovern had promised to vote in favor of cutting off a conservative filibuster against a labor measure to repeal Section 14B, the notorious right-to-work provision of the Taft-Hartley Act, and then had switched his vote, which would not have affected the outcome, out of concern for the fallout among his state's voters. Although the labor leaders' persisting ire about this incident appears genuine, it hardly explains their all-out resistance to McGovern's candidacy. McGovern had apologized to Meany for the vote switch as a mistake in an otherwise impressive pro-labor voting record for a senator from a farm state with few union members. Furthermore, under Meany, the AFL-CIO had endorsed both Kennedy (1960) and Johnson (1964) even though their transgressions against labor interests in the Senate were far more consequential than McGovern's. See Robert Sam Anson, *McGovern: A Biography* (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1972), 142–43.

92. Transcript of *Face the Nation*, 3 Sept. 1972, McGovern Papers, Box 731.

93. AFL-CIO Department of Legislation, Meany Archives, Box 77.

94. Qtd. in Peter Milius and David S. Broder, "AFL-CIO Ponders McGovern, *Washington Post*, 19 Jun. 1972.

95. Barkan qtd. in *John Herling's Labor Letter*, 19–26 Aug. 1972, 4. Labor journalist Herling was often critical of Meany. Copies of his

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to express most vividly the revulsion of a cultural conservative at the new social movements that had displaced organized labor on the floor of the convention:

> We listened for three days to the speakers who were approved to speak by the powers-that-be at the convention. We listened to the gay lib people—you know, the people who want to legalize marriages between boys and boys and legalize marriages between girls and girls. . . . We heard from the abortionists, and we heard from the people who look like Jacks, acted like Jills, and had the odors of Johns about them.[96]

The war that Meany and Barkan were waging bewildered and frustrated McGovern and his campaign strategists. They made repeated overtures to Meany—but were rebuffed each time. Their bewilderment and frustration were shared by many labor leaders who were not part of the Meany machine. Protests against the AFL-CIO policy of neutrality continued to mount for weeks after it was announced, and, in the next month, many leaders of national and international unions, which were not bound by the AFL-CIO edict as were the state and local labor federations, formed the National Labor Committee for McGovern-Shriver. The dissenters represented mainly industrial, service sector, and public employee unions in the AFL-CIO, thirty-five in all, along with the independent—and progressive—United Auto Workers (UAW), which had thrown its support behind McGovern in the spring.[97]

Although Meany and his associates could not hold all of organized labor behind their opposition to the McGovern campaign, their crusade against the insurgency was powerful enough. In the early primaries, McGovern had surprised observers with his strong showing in blue-collar communities. After Humphrey and other allies of labor began to denounce him as a radical, however, his support among working-class voters began to tumble. Meany's overt hostility after the Democratic convention deepened the political damage. As Carl Wagner, a McGovern organizer who specialized in working-class communities, counted the cost, "the AFL-CIO and Meany taking no position on this race dramatically influenced the perception of McGovern."[98] In the end, defections by blue-collar voters from the Democratic presidential ticket in 1972 were unprecedented since the beginning of the Great Depression. Although the McGovern insurgency's own errors and the machinations of the Nixon campaign were contributing factors, the opposition of the AFL-CIO hierarchy was central to this defection, the single most devastating electoral blow to McGovern's candidacy.

The story of organized labor and the McGovern insurgency is suggestive of the relationship between aging social movements and partisan insurgencies. Some aging movements gradually decline and become marginal factors in the political environment. Should an aging movement become part of the political establishment, however, it is likely to view partisan insurgents with alarm as threats to both its power and its values. Possessing legitimacy from its past victories, an aging movement of this kind retains enough influence with followers to wound the upstarts who have challenged it. The establishment that it defends might be crumbling, but it can still try to take the insurgents down with it.

Organized labor represents perhaps the most dramatic case of an aging social movement. Other aging movements, in a more advanced state of decline, have less purchase with presidential campaigns and are mostly relegated to the sidelines. Thus, the far-right anticommunist movement, a powerful force in the Goldwater campaign of 1964, was a minor irritant for the Nixon campaign in 1972 (and was soon supplanted by the more credible neo-conservatives who rallied to Reagan). The social movements associated with the 1960s, including the civil rights and feminist movements, could be facing a similar fate today, as their clout in the Democratic Party begins to shrink.

CONCLUSION

Some McGovernites recognized that mass movements could be a hindrance as well as a boon to an insurgent campaign, especially if it had a serious shot at the presidency. It was imperative, these strategists believed, that the boundary lines between movements and insurgents remain distinct and that the campaign not be captured for purposes that undercut its electoral aims. In his own organizing for the non-primary states, Rick Stearns notes, he was careful not to construct a coalition of "already organized groups" because the inevitable result would be that those "with the most radical agendas" would set the tone. "I always put a premium," he recalls, "on trying to recruit into the campaign people who were there for George McGovern and not because they were looking to empower whatever group it was they were associated with." Yet Stearns regrets that as the campaign grew more successful it increasingly made

Labor Letter newsletter, a rich source of information on organized labor's political activities, can be found at the Meany Archives.

96. George Meany, "Address before the 16th Constitutional Convention of the United Steelworkers of America, Las Vegas, NV, 18 Sept. 1972," Meany Files, Box 83.

97. Howard D. Samuel, "The Year the AFL-CIO Didn't Endorse a President," (unpub. mss. in author's possession). Samuel was executive director of the pro-McGovern labor coalition. I obtained a copy of his manuscript from his family.

98. Interview with Carl Wagner, 26 Feb. 2002.

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the mistake of trying to "bring into the fold already organized institutional groups. And they obviously brought into the agenda positions that were sometimes harmful to McGovern."[99]

It was during the period in which the McGovern campaign grew from a small band of outsiders to become the presidential ticket of the Democratic Party that the conflicts between party insurgents and movement activists grew most intense. To Gary Hart, movement activists were baffling in their shortsighted behavior:

> Each special-interest group or caucus seemed to want to possess the campaign. There seemed to be an unwillingness to accept the fact that the McGovern campaign was an entity unto itself, that we solicited support (which was long withheld in crucial periods) from many quarters—blacks, Chicanos, women, youth—and made a supreme effort to seek involvement and participation in decision-making, but that we were not the creation or creature of any group.[100]

These mass movements could not, Hart lamented, accept it that the McGovern campaign was not their movement, indeed not a mass movement at all.

With its trademark openness, the McGovern campaign unintentionally put on display some of the classic stresses in the relationship between sympathetic social movements and partisan insurgencies. Even as the two forces coalesced in the service of shared goals, the fact that their basic objectives were not at all the same led them to circle each other warily. The activists in the mass movements never doubted their own idealism. The McGovernites at times resisted them in the name of pragmatism, yet they believed that this was necessary for the electoral pursuit of the highest ideals of liberalism. Perhaps the most fitting emblem for the relationship between the two was the heated exchange on the duties of "sisters" between Bella Abzug and Shirley MacLaine on the convention floor in Miami Beach. Movement activists like Abzug wanted to see McGovern in the White House, but their loyalty was to their own cause. For party insurgents like MacLaine, sometimes torn between personal values and political commitments, loyalty had to be given to the latter regardless of the discomfort.

In the clashes between seemingly natural allies in the McGovern camp and the feminist, gay, and black movements, we can view some of the structural sources of dissonance between movement activists and partisan insurgents. While movements might believe that insurgent campaigns are effective vehicles for advancing their agendas, partisan insurgencies are after electoral victory and cannot be reliable vehicles even for causes toward which they are sympathetic. Movement objectives stretch well beyond the parameters of campaigns, but insurgents have to look to the short-term imperatives of forging a winning coalition at the polls. Movements and insurgencies construct alternative identities and loyalties, and in a tug of war between the two, activists on each side will go with the group that is primary to their political self-definition.

The case of the McGovern campaign also allows us to view the temporal dimensions of the relationships between movements and insurgencies. Nascent movements will draw attention from insurgencies if they offer the prospect of a new voting bloc, but insurgent campaigns that develop other bases of support may move to an arms' length relationship should the potential costs of symbolic closeness outweigh the benefits of direct alliance. Militant movements, with their strong organizations and leaders, promise greater payoffs but also greater problems for an insurgency. Their passionate pursuit of controversial policies confronts insurgents with a dilemma: placate the movement at the risk of alienating other important constituencies or disappoint the movement and risk its very public wrath. Mature movements embroil insurgents in intricate and sometimes costly negotiations, but the quiet arrangement of distributive benefits is less of a strain than the visible confrontations with more youthful movements. Aging movements, if they have made their way over time into the existing party establishment, pose the prospect of rearguard resistance to insurgency.

Encounters between social movements and partisan insurgencies—or, for that matter, with regular party campaigns—have been a recurrent phenomenon in American political development. I have mentioned in passing a number of historical cases that might be studied in light of the propositions about conflicts between movements and partisans presented in this article. But the conflicting pulls of attraction and repulsion between movements and partisans are also evident in the contemporary political situation. On the Republican side, a case in point is the ongoing relationship since the 1976 campaign between evangelical Christian groups and Republican presidential aspirants. On the Democratic side, the movements of the 1960s are now mostly mature or aging ones, yet there are still flashes of militancy in the gay-rights movement and intimations of a nascent immigrant-rights movement among Hispanics. Social movements will naturally gravitate to presidential campaigns, particularly insurgencies, so long as they offer support for movement agendas. Yet along with the energy and enthusiasm they bring come the structural and temporal conflicts of movement-insurgency relationships.

99. Stearns interview.
100. Hart, *Right from the Start*, 222.

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