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Discourse markers and the PA/SN distinction[1]

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Many languages have two types of adversative sentence conjunctions (e.g. Spanish, German). These are normally referred to as PA and SN conjunctions. However, while PA conjunctions can be used as discourse markers (DMs) in dialogal discourse, SN conjunctions such as those found in Spanish and German cannot be used in dialogues. Thus the PA/SN distinction does not extend fully to the dialogal realm. Using data from another Spanish DM, I argue that the PA/SN distinction can be extended beyond the monologal realm of sentence conjunction to the realm of adversative discourse markers employed in dialogal discourse. The findings have implications for the question of functional equivalence across different types of discourse.

1. Introduction

Ideological clashes between different viewpoints in discourse are encoded in linguistic structure in the form of adversative expressions, whose meanings provide us with indications as to how these viewpoints relate to one another. The relationships between viewpoints can be of quite different sorts and are often rather complex (Cuenca 1991, Bell 1998, Fraser 1998): a particular viewpoint may be taken as substituting completely for another to which it is opposed; it may merely restrict the applicability of a (partially) opposing viewpoint, so that the two viewpoints each retain some validity; or a viewpoint may present an exception to a more far-reaching claim (e.g. one that is universally quantified), thereby denying the relationship of inclusion between a part and a whole. But whatever the type of adversativity involved, it remains true that linguistic research has tended to focus primarily on sentence-level manifestations of adversative phenomena, to the detriment of adversative relations in connected discourse, ignoring especially aspects of

[1] This paper represents an extension of ideas that originated in chapter 4 of my Ph.D. dissertation (Schwenter 1999). I would especially like to thank Maria Josep Cuenca, Yukiko Morimoto, Salvador Pons, Elizabeth Traugott and Richard Waltereit for comments and many helpful discussions. Two anonymous *JL* referees also provided excellent critical commentary. Prior versions of the paper were presented at the 6th International Pragmatics Conference (Reims 1998) and at The Ohio State University.

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adversativity in conversation.[2] This paper attempts to partially redress this bias, by focusing on two different types of adversativity, and in particular on the discourse markers (henceforth, DMs) that express them in Spanish, at the level of dialogal conversational exchanges.[3]

At the level of sentence grammar, it is well-known that some languages have two (or more) adversative conjunctions, both (or all) translatable into English as 'but'. Typically, the main difference between these conjunctions resides in the kind of contrast imposed by the semantic content of the two forms. The Spanish adversative sentence conjunctions *pero* and *sino* are illustrative of this contrast:[4]

(1) (a) Juan es bajo **pero** fuerte.
'Juan is short but strong.'
(b) Juan no es bajo **sino** alto.
'Juan isn't short but (rather) tall.'

In (1a), *pero* reflects the (speaker's) viewpoint that there is some kind of contrast between the propositions 'Juan is short' and 'Juan is strong', e.g. an expectation that one would not expect a person to possess both characteristics. While the contrast conveyed by *pero* is semantic and uncancellable (a speaker who utters (1a) cannot go on to deny that he or she is presenting a contrast between *bajo* and *fuerte*), it also contributes to pragmatic interpretation by constraining the inferential content drawn from the first conjunct. For instance, in (1a) the proposition 'Juan is short' may implicate in context that he is not physically capable to perform some act, but the proposition 'Juan is strong' would implicate that he is physically capable of that act. On the other hand, in (1b), *sino* introduces a 'correction' to an explicitly-denied viewpoint ('Juan isn't short') in the obligatorily negated first conjunct. The propositional contents of the two conjuncts in this case are therefore presented as standing in a relationship of mutual contradiction:

[2] For a recent overview and classification of the DMs that signal adversative relations in conversational English, see Fraser (1998). For a cross-linguistic survey of such DMs, see Rudolph (1996).

[3] The use of the somewhat unusual term 'dialogal' in this paper is a motivated one. Following Roulet (1984), I assume that there is an important distinction between the actual number of speakers physically participating in an interaction (monologal vs. dialogal), and a given speaker's representation of points of view in a discourse (monological vs. dialogical). This cross-cutting distinction permits the identification of conversational turns that are monologal, involving only one speaker, but dialogical, involving the confrontation of two different points of view. Likewise, two speakers collaborating in conversation often jointly construct a single path of rhetorical argumentation, making their separate contributions basically monological with respect to point(s) of view.

[4] The examples in this paper come mainly from two sources: (i) constructed examples, checked with native speakers of Puerto Rican, Chilean and Peninsular Spanish; (ii) my own 40-hour corpus of colloquial conversational Spanish, collected during 1995–1996 in the city of Alicante, Spain. The latter examples are indicated by (ALC).

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a speaker cannot simultaneously assess an entity as both 'short' and 'tall'. What is more, the implicit positive viewpoint underlying the negated first conjunct – in (1b) 'Juan IS short' – is typically contextually salient, having been asserted or assumed by, or at least attributed to, some other participant in the discourse. It is this implicit positive viewpoint that is refuted in *sino*-sentences like (1b).[5]

In a now classic paper, Anscombre & Ducrot (1977) examine in detail the syntactic, semantic and pragmatic characteristics of the two adversative conjunction-types illustrated in (1), which they label PA (from *Pero*, German *Aber*) and SN (from *Sino*, German *sondern*).[6] They point out that, while not all languages possess two morphologically distinct, lexicalized PA/SN forms (e.g. French has only *mais* and English only *but*), all languages do possess different constructions that allow speakers to express the notions associated with PA (restrictive) and SN (exclusive) adversativity at the sentence level.[7] Taking their observation one step (or more) further, in this paper I will argue that the PA/SN distinction can be extended beyond the monologal level of sentence conjunction, to the use of these conjunctive forms as DMs employed in dialogal discourse. While this observation is not exactly new or significant in the case of PA conjunctions, which have nearly identical and well-known DM uses in dialogues (cf. Schiffrin 1987, Fraser 1998: 310–311, Redeker 1991), it IS new in the case of SN adversativity, since SN conjunctions (like those in Spanish and German) CANNOT be used as DMs in dialogues (see section 2 below). I will show that, in Spanish, there is a different connective form (*si*) which carries out SN functions in dialogal discourse, and therefore that, in this language at least, the PA/SN distinction holds between pairs of connectives – but not the same pairs – in both monologal and dialogal discourse.

The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In section 2, I first provide evidence showing that the distinction between monologal and dialogal discourse is one which is important for the study of DMs. In section 3, I introduce the Spanish adversative DMs *pero* and *si* (both translatable by 'but' in English), and illustrate their principal semantic and pragmatic differences. In section 4, I demonstrate how these differences reflect a distinction that can be assimilated to that between PA and SN adversative forms. In section 5, I provide further evidence to support their classification as PA and SN forms, based on their sensitivity to distinct types of

[5] For more discussion of the semantics/pragmatics of refutation generally, see Moeschler (1982).

[6] See Koenig & Benndorf (1998) for a recent treatment of German *aber* and *sondern* from a pragmatic perspective.

[7] In English, SN uses of *but* can be distinguished from PA uses by (i) obligatory negation of the first conjunct, and (ii) acceptability of *rather* after *but* (Abbott 1972). As pointed out by an anonymous referee, SN *but* also typically occurs with marked stress on the second conjunct (the latter does not necessarily accompany SN *sino* in Spanish).

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conversational implicature (cf. Horn 1984). Concluding remarks are offered in section 6.

2. Connective forms in monologal vs. dialogal discourse: does it matter?

Before beginning the more detailed analysis of the Spanish adversative connective DMs *pero* and *si*, it is first incumbent on me to show that there actually exist essential differences between the use of connectives in monologal vs. dialogal discourse.[8] At first glance, it might appear that 'monologal' and 'dialogal' are just descriptive labels which do not have much theoretical significance, since the functions of a connective form like *and* in monologal (2a) and dialogal (2b) discourse clearly do not appear to differ in any important way:

(2) (a) Martha is happy **and** smart!
(b) A: Martha is happy.
B: **And** smart!

The fact that *and* in (2a) is usually considered a sentential conjunction, but a DM in (2b) (Schiffrin 1987), does not appear to matter much for the form's meaning. Indeed, given the similarities in meaning and function in these examples, it might be argued that the parallelism between connective forms I propose to present in the rest of this paper is not surprising in the least, since one would EXPECT that a given connective will have similar, if not identical, uses in both monologal and dialogal discourse.

However, there are two problems with this position, which I will take up in turn below. First of all, there DO exist connectives whose behavior differs in monologal vs. dialogal discourse. Second, and more importantly for present purposes, the distinction between PA and SN adversative expressions has been assumed to hold ONLY AT THE MONOLOGAL, SENTENTIAL LEVEL, due principally to the impossibility of using SN conjunctions at the dialogal level. That is, while the same PA forms (e.g. *pero*) are used in similar fashion in both monologal and dialogal discourse – in the latter case, primarily in utterance-initial position – SN forms are restricted to the monologal level only. This restriction to monologal discourse is actually predictable, since a syntactic requirement of SN conjunctions is that the preceding clause (uttered by the same speaker) contain an overt instance of negation, as is illustrated in (1b) above (for more details, see below).

Though not often mentioned in the literature on DMs, one does not actually have to look far to find pairs of connective forms which behave

[8] I am extremely grateful to an anonymous *JL* referee for many insightful, perhaps even brutal, comments which helped clarify the ideas presented in this section.

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similarly in dialogal discourse, but differently in monologal discourse. For instance, consider the contrasts between the English forms *then* and *so* – both well-known in their function as DMs (Schiffrin 1987, Blakemore 1988) – in the following examples (# = pragmatic infelicity):

(3) (a) A: I'm tired. **So**/#**Then** I'm going to bed.
(b) A: I'm tired.
B: **Then**/**So** go to bed.

As (3a) shows, in the monologal example only *so* is possible as a marker introducing the consequence which follows from the speaker's prior assertion about being tired. The use of *then* in this monologue would be pragmatically infelicitous. In contrast, in a dialogue like that shown in (3b), speaker B is free to reply with either *then* or *so*, with very little meaning difference between the two. While it would not be appropriate to give here a full analysis of the distinct behavior of *then*/*so*, one might venture that the difference is related to the source of the premise to which *then*/*so* are anaphoric: whereas *then* requires that the premise be asserted by someone other than the speaker who utters *then*, *so* is not restricted in this way, and can link either same-speaker or different-speaker premises and conclusions. A similar contrast can be found in Spanish between *entonces* and *pues*, both translatable as 'then', and considered interchangeable in many contexts (e.g. conditional sentences). As argued by Portolés (1989), these forms differ principally in that the former is 'polyphonic' (cf. Ducrot 1984), requiring access to a premise which cannot be identified as that of the speaker, while the latter does not exhibit this constraint. As a result, their behavior in monologal discourse is much more similar than their behavior in dialogal discourse.

Another example, this time taken from Spanish, illustrates that the converse situation may also hold: a given DM may be acceptable at the monologal level, but nevertheless pragmatically infelicitous in dialogal contexts. This is the case of the contrastive DM *en cambio* 'in contrast', which is fine in the monologal version (4a) (from Portolés 1998: 254), but odd in the dialogue example (4b).

(4) (a) En verano Alicia va siempre en autobús. **En cambio**, en invierno prefiere el metro.
in summer A. goes always in bus in contrast in winter prefers the subway
'In the summer Alicia always goes by bus. In contrast, in winter she prefers the subway.'
(b) A: En verano Alicia va siempre en autobús.
'In the summer Alicia always goes by bus.'
B: #**En cambio**, en invierno prefiere el metro.
'In contrast, in winter she prefers the subway.'

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That the difference in felicity between (4a) and (4b) is not due to the propositional content expressed in these examples is made clear by the dialogal example in (4c) below. Here, the use of the PA form *pero* at the beginning of B's turn converts this utterance into one which is perfectly natural and, indeed, one which conveys a contrastive meaning very similar to that expressed in the monologal (4a) above:

(4) (c) A: En verano Alicia va siempre en autobús.
'In the summer Alicia always goes by bus.'
B: **Pero** en invierno prefiere el metro.
'But in winter she prefers the subway.'

Again, then, there exist DMs, like *pero*, which are used with similar meanings/functions in both monologues and dialogues, but there also exist others, like *en cambio*, which are restricted to one or the other type of discourse.

Let us move on now to the more specific issue of SN conjunctions like Spanish *sino* and German *sondern*. As I noted in section 1 above, the primary function of these conjunctions is to introduce a correction of some (aspect of a) viewpoint which has been denied in a preceding negated clause. This link between negation and correction, and therefore SN conjunctions, has been summarized recently by Rudolph in her survey of contrast and adversativity in four European languages (1996: 314; emphasis added):

> The function of correction is characterized by special connectives in German (*sondern*) and Spanish (*sino*), whereas in the other two languages it is expressed by the main connectives English *but* and Portuguese *mas*. IN ANY CASE CORRECTION IS BOUND TO A NEGATION IN THE PRECEDING CLAUSE, WHICH CANCELS THE FOLLOWING PART OF THE UTTERANCE, SO THAT THE CORRECTIVE ADVERSATIVE CLAUSE CONTAINS A SUBSTITUTION OF THE FOREGOING AND CANCELLED PART.

Implicit in this view of correction, then, is the monologal nature of the process: it requires that the same speaker negate the content of the first clause, and then present a correction of that content in the second clause; moreover, both clauses nearly always (barring interruptions) form part of the same act of utterance. Rudolph's position on the nature of correction is corroborated by the fact that SN conjunctions, like Spanish *sino*, cannot be used in utterance-initial position to respond to an interlocutor's utterance (cf. Koenig & Benndorf 1998: 379, who show that the same constraint holds for German *sondern*). As the examples below illustrate, the impossibility of using the SN form in such a context is not at all sensitive to the kind of correction involved: corrections of propositional content as in (5a) (*alto* 'tall' vs. *bajo* 'short'), and of scalar strength as in (5b) (*alto – altísimo* 'very tall'), are both disallowed.

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(5) (a) A: Juan es alto.
'Juan is tall.'
B: ***Sino** es bajo.
'But he's short.'
(b) A: Juan es alto.
'Juan is tall.'
B: ***Sino** es altísimo.
'But he's very tall.'

Unlike its PA counterpart *pero* (see (4c) above and many more examples below), the SA conjunction *sino* is ungrammatical when used in dialogal contexts like those illustrated in (5).

Commenting on an earlier version of this paper, an anonymous referee pointed out to me that English *rather*, employed on its own, could be considered the SN counterpart to PA *but* in English. While this may indeed be true at the monologal level of discourse, the most relevant point for the purposes of my analysis is that, even assuming that it is the English SN-equivalent, *rather* cannot be used in dialogal contexts to express the adversative meaning it conveys as an SN expression in monologues. Compare the monologal example in (6a), where *rather* is grammatical and felicitous, to the dialogues in (6b) and (6c), where B's responses show that the use of *rather* is impossible in both utterance-initial and non-initial position.

(6) (a) John isn't tall, but **rather** short.
(b) A: John is tall.
B: (***Rather**) He's short!
(c) A: John is tall.
B: But (***rather**) he's short!

As the responses in (6b) and (6c) show, *rather* acts just like Spanish *sino* and German *sondern* with regard to its distribution: it cannot be used to carry out SN functions – what Rudolph calls more generally 'correction' – in a dialogal context. Thus, there is an important generalization to be drawn from these data, which has apparently been so obvious to most scholars that it has not even merited mention in the literature: while PA conjunctions are used with the same or similar functions in both monologal (one speaker) and dialogal (two speakers) discourse, SN conjunctions are ONLY used in monologal discourse and CANNOT be used with SN functions in dialogues. The main reason behind this discrepancy is, again, that SN conjunctions have a specific grammatical constraint: they require that the preceding clause carry overt negation.

In conclusion, the evidence provided in this section illustrates that there exist genuine differences in the behavior of at least some connective forms in monologal vs. dialogal discourse. While the default case may be that a connective displays a similar meaning/function in both types of discourse, there are other cases which illustrate clearly the importance of taking

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dialogal/monologal context into account. A specific example where this is necessary can be found in SN conjunctions, which are restricted to use in monologal discourse, as a result of their grammatical specifications. However, as I will show below, this should not be taken to mean (as it has been taken by researchers like Rudolph, and implicitly by many others) that SN FUNCTIONS (e.g. correction) cannot be expressed by connective forms at the dialogal level. Indeed, Spanish has a connective DM (*si*), formally related to, yet nonetheless distinct from, the SN conjunction *sino*,[9] which is used precisely for the purpose of carrying out SN adversative functions in dialogal discourse.

3. ADVERSATIVE DMS IN DIALOGAL DISCOURSE

In colloquial conversational Spanish, there exists a clear contrast between the connectives *pero* 'but' and *si* (derived from 'if'),[10] used in utterance-initial position with adversative meaning. This distinction is a rather subtle one from the point of view of semantics/pragmatics, but it is also a rather significant one for determining the direction of the ensuing discourse, since the kind of 'opposition' expressed by the two connectives differs greatly:

(7) (a) [Context: A is trying to convince B to hire Juan for a linguistics position.]
A: Juan es inteligente.
'Juan is intelligent.'
B: **Pero** no sabe nada de lingüística.
but NEG knows nothing of linguistics
'But he doesn't know anything about linguistics.'

(b) [Context: A is trying to convince B to hire Juan for a linguistics position.]
A: Juan es inteligente.
'Juan is intelligent.'
B: **Si** no sabe nada de lingüística.
'SI he doesn't know anything about linguistics.'

It is crucial to grasp the different pragmatic interpretations of these two examples because, from the standpoint of what is expressed by their propositional content, they are entirely equivalent. Indeed, both expressions could be removed from their respective examples without changing the propositional content of B's response in the least – this semantic (but not

[9] It should be noted that native speakers of Spanish do not recognize the formal connection between *sino* and *si*, viz. that both are derived from the canonical conditional conjunction *si* 'if'.

[10] Probably the most plausible English translation for *si* in this use would also be 'but'. However, in order to highlight the difference between *pero* and *si*, I have chosen to leave *si* untranslated throughout the paper.

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pragmatic) optionality is good evidence for their status as DMs (Fraser 1999, Schourup 1999).[11] In example (7a) with *pero*, speaker B concedes (perhaps for the sake of argument) that 'Juan is intelligent' and asserts that despite Juan's intelligence 'he doesn't know anything about linguistics'. The function of *pero* is that of introducing an argument that is stronger than the one put forth by A (Ducrot 1980); more explicitly, then, B's response can be understood as conveying 'while it is true that Juan is intelligent, and that this is an argument in favor of hiring him for the position, it is also true that he doesn't know anything about linguistics, and this is a stronger argument for NOT hiring him'. Thus, (7a) would be appropriate in a situation where B wanted to show agreement with A's explicitly-stated viewpoint, but nevertheless wanted to introduce another viewpoint which would have greater argumentative force than that of A.

In example (7b) with *si*, speaker B likewise asserts 'he doesn't know anything about linguistics'. But instead of accepting the viewpoint offered by A, B's *si*-marked reply denies the RELEVANCE (in the Gricean sense) of A's position. In other words, it does not matter to B whether Juan is intelligent or not – this piece of information is immaterial to the issue at hand. Indeed, the force of *si* is to signal that the proposition it marks is the ONLY one relevant among those under consideration. This does not mean that speaker B necessarily believes that Juan is not intelligent, though this would be a normal conversational implicature licensed by B's utterance. Rather, it only indicates the refusal on speaker B's part to consider the premise 'Juan is intelligent' as an argument in favor of hiring Juan for the linguistics position. As I have noted in previous research (e.g. Schwenter 1998), the pragmatic function of *si* in such examples can be characterized as being one of 'refutation'. A good English paraphrase for B's *si*-marked response in (7b) might be 'irrespective of what you say/think, he doesn't know anything about linguistics, and THIS is what's relevant to the issue at hand'.

Now, given the differences in interpretation between the two DMs in dialogal examples like (7), it is not difficult to see the parallels between them and their sentence-level adversative conjunction counterparts in (1) above. In the case of *pero*, the parallelism in morphological form is obvious. Beyond that, the parallelism in meaning/function is also quite evident: potential inferences arising from the first conjunct of (1a) and from A's utterance in (7a) are limited by the second conjunct in (1a) and B's reply in (7a), respectively, both of which are introduced by *pero*. Such parallel examples thus lend further support to the widely-held view (Portolés 1995,

[11] Both *pero* and *si* reflect what Schourup (1999: 232) considers to be the three necessary characteristics of discourse markers: they express connectivity, namely, they indicate 'the relationship of the basic message to the foregoing discourse' (Fraser 1996: 186); they are optional with regard to the syntax of the host sentence; and they contribute nothing to the truth-conditions of the proposition expressed by the utterance.

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Porroche Ballesteros 1996) that the meaning of the lexeme *pero* is, in essence,[12] the same across monologal (sentence conjunction) and dialogal (discourse marker) contexts: it introduces an argument Q that points toward a conclusion anti-oriented to that of a previously asserted argument P, and ranks Q as stronger, i.e. as the 'victorious' argument among those in competition (Anscombre & Ducrot 1977).

As for the parallels between discourse marker *si* and the adversative conjunction *sino* (derived from *si*+*no* 'if not'), they too share an important formal similarity: both contain the conditional marker *si*. From the standpoint of function, both forms force us to interpret the second segment (the one introduced by the marker or conjunction) as a correction of the first segment, with the result that only the second member retains argumentative value and relevance to the following discourse (cf. Portolés 1996: 213). What most obviously differentiates the two lexemes is the sense of denial of some prior point of view that each gives rise to. An explicit negation (with *no*) of the first conjunct is required by *sino*: indeed, the conjunction cannot be employed when this first conjunct is not made explicit.[13] By contrast, dialogal corrections introduced by *si* do not occur with negation, because it is the marker itself that conveys the instruction to interpret the viewpoint it introduces as a denial of the relevance of some prior viewpoint which is accessible in the discourse context.[14]

Two linguistic co-occurrence tests help corroborate the contrastive analysis of dialogal *pero* and *si* outlined above. Specifically, these tests illustrate how *pero* signals acceptance of a prior viewpoint, but introduces another which is stronger in argumentative terms. For *si*, the tests show that this DM is incompatible with the overt acceptance of a prior viewpoint, as would be expected given its function, described above, of denying the relevance of a prior viewpoint which is salient in the discourse. The first test concerns the ability of each DM to combine with affirmative particles that occur in turn-initial position. In short, the test shows that *pero* can freely combine with such particles, while *si* cannot. Thus, in (8a), *pero* is fine with an initial *sí* 'yes'

[12] There are more complexities to the use of *pero*, especially in dialogal contexts (Briz 1993), which are being glossed over here. In broad terms, *pero* '[p]uede ir al principio de la cláusula para anunciar alguna restricción al sentido general de lo que se ha dicho antes' [may appear at the beginning of the clause to present some restriction toward the general sense of what has been said before] (Gili Gaya 1961: 282; my translation). However, since I am only interested in those dialogal contexts where *pero* contrasts with *si*, a marker which does not display such a broad class of functions, these complexities are not relevant for my purposes.

[13] Koenig & Benndorf (1998: 379) note that the same holds true for the German SN conjunction *sondern*.

[14] While it is most often the case that the *si*-marked utterance denies the relevance of a prior proposition, it will be shown below that it is not always propositional content which is targeted by this utterance.

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of affirmation, but affirmative *sí* cannot appear in collocation with adversative *si*, as (8b) shows.

(8) (a) [Context: A and B talking about María's chances of passing an exam.]
A: María es inteligente.
'María is intelligent.'
B: **Sí**, pero no sabe estudiar.
yes but NEG knows study-INF
'Yes, but she doesn't know how to study.'
(b) [Context: A and B talking about María's chances of passing an exam.]
A: María es inteligente.
'María is intelligent.'
B: #**Sí**, **si** no sabe estudiar.
'Yes, SI she doesn't know how to study.'

A potential objection to the application of this test might be the following: the infelicity of (8b) is not due to semantic/pragmatic (in)compatibility, but rather to the phonological clash between stressed *sí* and unstressed *si*, which are segmentally identical. However, this objection does not appear to be valid, given that other expressions conveying affirmation, like *vale* or *de acuerdo* (both meaning 'OK'), or *claro* 'sure, right' can combine unproblematically with *pero*, but not at all with *si*:

(9) (a) A: María es inteligente.
'María is intelligent.'
B: Vale/De acuerdo/Claro **pero** no sabe estudiar.
'OK/Sure/Right, but she doesn't know how to study.'
(b) A: María es inteligente.
'María is intelligent.'
B: #Vale/#De acuerdo/#Claro **si** no sabe estudiar.
'#OK/#Sure/#Right, SI she doesn't know how to study.'

In general, then, *pero* allows the coexistence of two opposing points of view, i.e. two propositions which constitute arguments for opposite conclusions (such as María passing vs. failing an exam). In contrast, *si* marks the viewpoint it introduces as the exclusively relevant viewpoint, and discards its competitor(s) as irrelevant: in (8b) and (9b), only the proposition 'María doesn't know how to study' is relevant for the discourse, and specifically for the inferences which B is inviting A to draw on the basis of the *si*-marked utterance (e.g. that María will fail the exam, since she doesn't know how to study).

The second co-occurrence test shows that concessive DMs, like *sin embargo* 'however, nevertheless', combine unproblematically with *pero* in dialogues, but are impossible with *si*. These DMs allow the coexistence of

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competing viewpoints (cf. Portolés 1995), that is, in (10a) speaker B does not necessarily dispute the validity of the proposition 'Marco is intelligent'.

(10) (a) A: Marco es inteligente.
'Marco is intelligent.'
B: **Pero, sin embargo,** ha suspendido el examen.
but nevertheless has failed the exam
'But, nevertheless, he failed the exam.'
(b) A: Marco es inteligente.
'Marco is intelligent.'
B: **Si,** #**sin embargo**, ha suspendido el examen.
'SI, nevertheless, he failed the exam.'

Again, the distinct acceptability of these two examples provides good evidence in support of the claim that *pero* is compatible with concessive interpretations that permit competing viewpoints to coexist in the discourse, while *si* does not allow such coexistence.

The preceding differences between *si* and *pero* provide speakers with a basis for selecting one or the other marker in a particular discourse context, as the following naturally occurring example (11a), and its contrast with the constructed (11b), illustrate.

(11) (a) [Context: L and M are watching a sad movie; L notices M is crying.]
L: Oye, ¡no hace falta llorar!
hey NEG make lack cry-INF
'Hey, there's no need to cry!'
M: **Si** da pena.
SI gives sadness
'SI it's sad.' (ALC)
(b) [Context: L and M are watching a sad movie; L notices M is crying.]
L: Oye, ¡no hace falta llorar!
'Hey, there's no need to cry!'
M: **Pero** da pena.
'But it's sad (lit. 'gives sadness').'

It is important to note the effect that replacing *si* with *pero*, as in (11b), would have here. Since *pero* indicates acceptance of (some aspect of) a prior point of view, the response in (11b) would leave open the interpretation that M has chosen to cry despite agreeing with L's viewpoint that there is no necessary justification for crying. The *si*-marked response in (11a) does not allow such an interpretation, instead asserting that 'the movie is sad' is the only relevant proposition in this context, and thereby offering justification for M's behavior (i.e. crying). The choice between the two DMs thus provides speakers with an economical means for expressing exactly how their own

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points of view are oriented with respect to others that are salient in the discourse.

To summarize the discussion in this section, it has been shown that a clear contrast obtains between the dialogal uses of the DMs *pero* and *si*, based on each marker's semantic/pragmatic instructions for interpreting what follows with respect to what preceded (cf. Blakemore 1987). While both forms mark the viewpoint they introduce as argumentatively superior to another, the orientation they signal toward that competing viewpoint differs greatly. In the case of *pero*, a non-exclusionary contrast between two viewpoints is expressed, so that some prior viewpoint is superseded, in argumentative terms, by that introduced by *pero*. In the case of *si*, the viewpoint it introduces 'corrects' some prior viewpoint accessible in the discourse context by denying its relevance to the situation under discussion.

4. Extending PA/SN beyond conjunction

4.1 *SN functions in dialogal discourse*

As noted above, the Spanish sentence conjunctions *pero* and *sino* represent two types of adversative expression which are found to be lexicalized in some languages (e.g. German, Hebrew) but not in others (e.g. English, French). From a strictly syntactic point of view, the most obvious difference between the two conjunctions is that *sino*, but not *pero*, requires overt negation of the first conjunct, as shown in the contrast between (12) and the negated (13).

(12) Mario es bajo **pero**/***sino** fuerte.
'Mario is short but strong.'

(13) Julia no es alta **sino**/***pero** baja.
'Julia is not tall but short.'

Beyond the syntactic differences, these examples also show how the meanings of the two conjunctions differ. Note, however, that the semantic differentiation of the two adversative conjunctions is not due (only) to the obligatory syntactic negation in the first conjunct of *sino* sentences, for although negation CAN appear in the first conjunct of *pero* sentences, the overall counterargumentative meaning of this conjunction differs from the corrective meaning of its counterpart *sino*. This is especially clear in examples that contain scalar predicates like the quantifiers *algunos* and *todos* (cf. Kovacci 1986):

(14) No vinieron todos, **pero** vinieron algunos.
NEG came all but came some
'Not everybody came, but some people came.'

(15) No vinieron todos, **sino** algunos.
'Not everybody but rather some people came.'

(16) *No vinieron algunos, **pero** vinieron todos.
'Some didn't come, but all came.'

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(17) No vinieron algunos, **sino** todos.
'Not some but rather all people came.'

Though both (14) with *pero* and (15) with *sino* are possible, their meanings are quite different. First, (14) concedes that 'not everybody came' and asserts that 'some came', and furthermore presents the latter proposition as a pragmatic argument in favor of a conclusion opposed to the conclusion implicated by 'not everybody came'. By contrast, (15) is strictly a correction of the quantifier *todos* by a weaker quantifier on the same scale (*algunos*). But, whereas *no … sino* can be used for any kind of 'substitution', independent of the scalar relationship between the predicates involved, *pero* cannot be used in a sentence like (16), since the conjunction forces the negation to be interpreted as applying to the propositional content (see Horn 1989). That is, the only possible reading of (16) is that which assigns a truth value of F to the proposition 'some came', but a value of T to the proposition 'all came'. However, since the proposition 'all came' unilaterally entails 'some came', the end result is a contradiction. Indeed, the only way a negative sentence with these two conjuncts can be interpreted is as a (metalinguistic) denial of the upper bound implicated by *algunos* 'some', i.e. 'no more than some', followed by a 'correction' (*todos*) introduced by *sino*, which cancels this implicated upper bound, as in (17).

As already noted above, there are a number of striking parallels between the semantics/pragmatics of the SN adversative conjunction *sino* – which cannot be used as a dialogal discourse marker – and the dialogal uses of the DM *si*. These parallels are evident both at the level of morphological form and at the level of discourse function. Nevertheless, one might ask whether some more direct connections between the two forms can be made. The answer to this question is an affirmative one.

Perhaps most strikingly, there are many uses of *si* in dialogues that can be directly paraphrased by *sino* (but NOT by *pero*) when these dialogues are reconstructed as monologal discourses. Thus, conversational examples of metalinguistic correction like (18a), where what is corrected is R's 'incorrect' pronunciation of the word *medicina*, can be paraphrased at the sentence-level as in (18b) with *sino*, but not with *pero*, which could only be used felicitously to convey the unintended interpretation that the two competing pronunciations map onto different referents.

(18) (a) R: No encuentro mi medicina [medeθina].
NEG find my medicine
'I can't find my medicine ['incorrectly' pronounced].'
L: **Si**/#**Pero** es medicina [mediθina].
SI is medicine
'SI it's medicine ['correctly' pronounced].' (ALC)
(b) No es [medeθina] **sino**/#**pero es** [mediθina].
'It's not [medeθina] but rather [mediθina].'

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As noted by Anscombre & Ducrot (1977: 28) and also Horn (1985, 1989), the negative *no* in (18b) has the metalinguistic function of denying the appropriateness of the 'incorrect' pronunciation, not that of negating any aspect of the propositional content associated with this pronunciation.[15] This type of 'metalinguistic' negation is not possible with PA conjunctions like *pero*, which 'necessarily [involve] the descriptive use of negation' (Horn 1989: 407) when a negated first clause is present. As (18a) shows, this difference carries over to the contrast in acceptability between *si* and *pero* in dialogal contexts; however, now the two forms are not distinguished by the type of syntactic negation they permit/require, but rather by the type of pragmatic objection they can present (cf. Koenig & Benndorf 1998, and the discussion in section 5 below). See again in this respect the contrast between (16) and (17) above.

Similarly, when the objection made by a *si*-prefaced utterance concerns certain types of implicated content, a response prefaced by *pero* is anomalous. A good example illustrating this difference is (19a), in which M objects to and corrects the upper bound implicated (via Grice's Quantity 1 maxim) by H. As the monologal, sentence-level version of (19a), given in (19b), illustrates, two conjuncts expressing the equivalent content could not be joined by *pero*, but rather only by *sino*:

(19) (a) [Context: H and M are talking about their son, whose math teacher has just sent home a note about his poor performance in the class.]
H: Pues, parece que va a suspender matemáticas.
well seems that go to fail math
'Well, it looks like he's going to fail math.'
M: **Si**/#**Pero** va a suspenderlas todas.
SI go to fail-them all
'SI he's going to fail all of them.' (ALC)

(b) No va a suspender matemáticas **sino**/*__pero__ todas (sus asignaturas).
'He's not (only) going to fail math but rather all (his classes).'

Once again, the negation in (19b) is of the Hornian/Ducrotian metalinguistic sort, objecting not to the propositional content of 'he's going to fail math' (which both speakers in (19a) took to be true), but to a potential scalar quantity implicature, licensed by H's utterance, that their son is going to fail math and ONLY math. Thus, the function of both *si* in the dialogal example and *sino* in the monologal one is to contravene the upper bound of this implicature by making a stronger assertion that entails the weaker 'he's going to fail math'.

Finally, in cases of (pseudo-)logical contradiction between opposing points of view, *si* is a felicitous option but *pero* is not, as shown in (20a),

[15] More recently, Geurts (1998) has called these 'form denials'.

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where it is not logically possible (one assumes) for the entertainer in question to be both a male and a female at the same time. Once again, the choice between PA/SN adversative sentence conjunctions is clear, as illustrated in (20b): *sino*, not *pero*, is the only grammatical option.

(20) (a) [Context: Talking about a female impersonator who is performing on TV.]
H: Ésa es una tía.
'That is a woman.' (*tía* = lit. 'aunt', slang for 'woman' in Spain)
M: ¡**Si**/#**Pero** es un tío!
'SI it's a guy/man!' (*tío* = lit. 'uncle', slang for 'man' in Spain) (ALC)
(b) No es una tía **sino**/***pero** un tío.
'It's not a woman but (rather) a guy/man.'

In sum, what has been shown in this section is that dialogues with the discourse marker *si* like those in the preceding (a) examples are crystallized in monologal form into the sentence-level construction [*No X sino Y*] in the (b) examples. These dialogues are incompatible with monologal sentences in which *pero* is the adversative conjunction. These results, along with the contrastive evidence presented in section 3 above, lead to the classification of Spanish PA/SN forms in monologal and dialogal types of discourse presented in table 1.

Discourse Type	PA-Forms	SN-Forms
Monologal	*pero*	*sino*
Dialogal	*pero*	*si*

Table 1
Spanish PA/SN adversative expressions, by discourse type

4.2 *The case of* pero si*: a problem?*

Up to this point, no mention has been made of the fact that, for most speakers of Spanish (including Peninsular and Latin American varieties), the utterances introduced by *si* in the examples above could also be introduced by the COMBINATION of the two connectives in question, i.e. by *pero si*. Indeed, it has often been pointed out (e.g. by Acín Villa 1993–94; Almela Pérez 1985;

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Fuentes Rodríguez 1998; Montolío 1996, 1999)[16] that the *pero si* combination can appear in utterance-initial position with a refutational function:

(21) A: Juan es inteligente.
'Juan is intelligent.'
B: ¡**Pero si** no sabe nada de lingüística!
'PERO SI he doesn't know anything about linguistics!'

(22) [Context: A and B are lovers who are quarreling.]
A: § mira ↓ yo te quiero// y cre- y creo que lo SABES/// pero NO/# no puedo DEMOSTRÁRTELO ↓ o sea no no puedo dedicarte todo lo que tú necesitas
'look I love you// and I thi- and I think you KNOW it/// but NO/ I can't DEMONSTRATE IT TO YOU I mean I can't give you all that you need'
B: **pero si** yo no te pido que me lo demuestres
'PERO SI I'm not asking you to demonstrate it to me'
(Grupo Val.Es.Co 1995: 83)

The pragmatic difference between an example like (7b) without *pero* and an example like (21) with *pero* is that the latter conveys a stronger sense of opposition toward A's viewpoint.[17] This increased opposition may be due to a wide variety of pragmatic factors, but in an example like (21) what is strongly implicated is that A already knew that Juan doesn't know anything about linguistics.[18] In (22), B's response is made on the assumption that (A believes that) B wants A to demonstrate his love for B. B's response thus functions to contravene the expectation that A is assumed to hold. Though this aspect of A's point of view is left implicit in (22), B's assertion denies and corrects the implicated assumption.

Given the arguments advanced above, in section 2, for differentiating *pero* and *si*, one might expect the combination of both forms to lead to a more 'hedged' or attenuated version of an utterance introduced by *si* alone. However, native speaker intuitions about such examples are in agreement that the *pero si* combination actually expresses a STRONGER objection than does *si* on its own. Thus, a 'hedging' analysis of *pero si* does not appear to be warranted. Such an analysis also seems implausible given the fact that *pero si* behaves just like *si*, and NOT like *pero*, with regard to the two co-occurrence tests presented in section 3 above. That is, *pero si* cannot appear

[16] Montolío (1996: 332) claims that such uses of *si* in declaratives are 'characterized by their ability and tendency to be preceded by *pero*' (my translation). However, the vast majority of examples from my 40-hour Alicante corpus of colloquial conversational Spanish occur without a preceding *pero*.

[17] As the exclamation marks imply, an example like (21) is typically, but not always, uttered with exclamatory intonation.

[18] Clearly, this description of what *pero* adds to (21) does not correspond well to the meaning described for it above. The explanation behind this discrepancy will be given below.

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either in combination with affirmative particles like *sí* or *claro*, or with concessive adverbials like *sin embargo* 'however, nevertheless' or *a pesar de eso* 'in spite of that', as the infelicity of B's responses in (23) (cf. (21)) illustrates.

(23) (a) A: Juan es inteligente.
B: #Sí/#Claro, **pero si** no sabe nada de lingüística.
(b) A: Juan es inteligente.
B: #**Pero si** sin embargo/a pesar de eso no sabe nada de lingüística.

These results suggest that *pero si* is best analyzed as a REINFORCED, not a hedged, version of the marker *si*.

Moreover, with respect to the substitution test illustrated in section 4.1 above, the *pero si* combination acts exactly like *si* does alone. That is, a dialogal example containing utterance-initial *pero si* in a reply can be converted into a felicitous monologal example occurring with *sino*, but not with *pero*, as shown by (18a′) and (18b′):

(18) (a′) R: No encuentro mi medicina [medeθina].
'I can't find my medicine ['incorrectly' pronounced].'
L: **Pero si**/#**Pero** es medicina [mediθina].
'PERO SI it's medicine ['correctly' pronounced].'
(b′) No es [medeθina] **sino**/#**pero es** [mediθina].
'It's not [medeθina] but rather [mediθina].'

Again, what the addition of *pero* in this combination does in an example like (18a′) is simply reinforce the speaker's opposition towards what their interlocutor has said or implied. As noted by Montolío (1999), the *pero si* combination is virtually fossilized as a single lexical item, and the contribution of *pero* here does not correspond to the meaning of PA *pero* as described above. In other words, the *pero si* combination should be taken as a strengthened variant of SN *si* which, therefore, also contrasts with bare PA *pero*. In sum, then, the fact that *pero* and *si* can and do appear in combination does not cause problems for the analysis presented here.

5. SENSITIVITY TO PRAGMATIC IMPLICATURE

The classification of 'but' expressions displayed in table 1 above can be supported to an even greater extent by taking into consideration the sensitivities these expressions show to different kinds of conversational implicature.[19] Koenig & Benndorf (1998) use evidence from the German adversative sentence conjunctions *aber* and *sondern* to argue that (neo-)Gricean pragmatic principles may actually be encoded by the semantics

[19] The discussion in this section is taken, with some revisions, from Schwenter (2000).

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of individual lexical items. The authors follow Horn's (1984, 1989) reductionist classification of Grice's original maxims (1975), in which some of them are reduced to two general pragmatic principles, labeled Q and R (Horn 1989: 194).[20] The primary characteristics of the principles are summarized in table 2 (ibid.).

The **Q** principle	The **R** principle
Make your contribution SUFFICIENT:	Make your contribution NECESSARY:
Say as much as you can (given both QUALITY and R).	Say no more than you must (given Q).
LOWER-BOUNDING principle, inducing UPPER-BOUNDING implicata.	UPPER-BOUNDING principle, inducing LOWER-BOUNDING implicata.
Collects Grice's QUANTITY_1 maxim and $\text{MANNER}_{1,2}$.	Collects Grice's RELATION maxim, QUANTITY_2, and $\text{MANNER}_{3,4}$.

Table 2
The Q and R principles

Typical examples of Q-implicatures are those arising from scalar contrasts between lexical items, for example, that which holds between the English quantifiers *all* and *some*. These implicatures impose an upper bound on interpretation, LIMITING this strictly to 'what is said'. Thus, if I tell you that *I saw some of your friends at the party*, I will typically implicate, and you will infer, that I didn't see all of your friends at the party. Strictly speaking, however, this utterance is consistent with seeing all of your friends at the party, since it is not contradictory to say *I saw some, in fact all, of your friends at the party*. In other words, the 'not all' meaning normally expressed by *some* is cancelable in context, and therefore a conversational implicature (Grice 1975).

On the other hand, typical R-implicatures are those that derive from our stereotypical expectations about 'how the world works'. Unlike the limiting nature of Q-implicatures, R-implicatures actually ENRICH interpretation beyond 'what is said'. To take a rather well-known example (cf. Carston 1993), if I tell you that our friend John *took out the key and opened the door*, I will typically implicate, and you will infer, that John used the key to open

[20] Horn does not include Gricean Quality ('be truthful') in his reduction of the maxims since he considers it to be 'primary and essentially unreducible' (Horn 1989: 194).

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the door (instead of, for example, kicking the door in), despite the fact that nowhere in my utterance is this information made explicit. Again, note that this utterance is compatible with other interpretations, since it is perfectly felicitous for me to say *John took out the key and opened the door by kicking it in*. Thus, the 'stereotypical' interpretation is cancelable, and therefore also a conversational implicature.

Koenig & Benndorf (1998) go on to show in particular that the semantics of the German adversative sentence conjunctions *aber* and *sondern* are differentially sensitive to the Q and R principles. Not surprisingly, their Spanish counterparts, the conjunctions *pero* and *sino*, show exactly the same distribution with regard to these implicature types. Consider the contrasts in (24) and (25).

(24) Juan no es alto **sino**/***pero** altísimo.
'Juan isn't tall but very tall.'
(25) Ana barrió el patio y limpió la cocina, **pero**/***sino** no en ese orden.
'Ana swept the patio and cleaned the kitchen, but not in that order.'

In (24), where *sino* but not *pero* is possible, arising from the underlying non-negative assertion *Juan es alto* 'Juan is tall' there is a potential Q-implicature that the speaker does not believe (or does not have sufficient evidence to assert) that Juan is more than just 'tall'. The function of *no* in (24) is to deny the 'assertability' (Horn 1985) of *alto*; note that it does not deny the TRUTH of this adjective, rather, it objects to the lower bound that it implicates via Q-implicature ('tall and no more than tall'). The function of *sino* is that of introducing a correction (*altísimo*) which contravenes the upper bound set by the use of the scalar adjective *alto*. As the example shows, the use of *pero* here would be impossible.

As regards (25), where *pero* but not *sino* is possible, a fairly uncontroversial R-implicature arising from this utterance is that Ana performed the actions in the same order as they were mentioned in the utterance. Such an interpretation involves enrichment of the conjunction *y* 'and' to a more informative, temporally sequenced, reading along the lines of 'and then'. The function of *pero* here is to introduce new information ('not in that order') that cancels the potential R-implicature.

A problem with the analysis of (25), however, is that *sino* could be seen as an ungrammatical option not only because the type of implicature being canceled is an R-implicature instead of a Q-implicature, but also, and perhaps primarily, because there is no explicit negation of the first conjunct. Therefore, it is unclear which factor determines the ungrammaticality of *sino* in (25). To test the behavior of *sino* with R-implicatures, then, it is necessary to consider an example in which the first conjunct is negated, as in (26).

(26) María no es alta **pero**/#**sino que** sabe jugar muy bien.
'María isn't tall, but she knows how to play very well.'

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In the context of choosing players for a basketball team, the utterance in (26) would be used to argue in favor of choosing María, despite her lack of height. A potential R-implicature from the first conjunct of (26) is that María doesn't know how to play basketball (well): indeed, a stereotypical expectation about short people is that they don't play basketball well at all. While *pero* is perfectly acceptable introducing information to contravene this implicature, *sino* is not. Indeed, to the extent that it is possible, felicitous use of *sino* in (26) would force a very different interpretation, namely, a correction of the implicit proposition *María es alta* 'María is tall'. Thus, in (26) we now have clear evidence showing that *sino* is not compatible with R-implicatures.

Given the foregoing evidence, one might argue that *pero* and *sino* are accessing R-implicatures and Q-implicatures directly, and that this information forms part of their inherent lexical semantics. However, there is a crucial problem for Koenig & Benndorf's analysis – a problem which they themselves recognize in their paper (1998: 379) – when it is applied to the conjunctions *pero* and *sino*, as well as to the German forms they studied. While *pero* (= *aber*) accesses R-implicatures directly, it is not the lexical semantics of *sino* (= *sondern*) alone that is sensitive to Q-implicatures. Rather, it is the whole *no … sino* construction (German *nicht … sondern*), since the explicit negation of the first conjunct with *no* is obligatory in order for *sino* to be grammatical, as shown in (12) above.

However, the contrast between the discourse connectives *pero* and *si* in dialogal contexts DOES seem to be partially regulated by the distinction between Q- and R-implicatures, as the data presented below illustrate. Obviously, *si* in this use does not require a prior negation as *sino* does, and thus it seems plausible to say that it encodes a sensitivity to Q-implicatures as part and parcel of its lexical semantics. Consider the examples in (27) and (28), where R+> means 'R-implicates' and Q+> means 'Q-implicates':

(27) L: Ana barrió el patio y limpió la cocina. (R+> 'in that order')
'Ana swept the patio and cleaned the kitchen.'
A: **Pero**/#**Si** limpió la cocina primero.
'But she cleaned the kitchen first.' (ALC)

(28) M: Creo que te han tintado **mal** el pelo.
think that you have dyed bad the hair
'I think they dyed your hair poorly.' (Q+> 'no worse than *mal*')
B: ¡**Si**/#**Pero** me lo han tintado **fatal**!
SI me it have dyed fatally
'SI they dyed it horribly!' (ALC)

Example (27), a naturally occurring example, illustrates what has already been said for *pero* in its use as an adversative conjunction at the sentential level: it is perfectly compatible with R-implicatures. The contrast in (28)

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shows, however, that it is *si*, not *pero*, that can be used felicitously when the objection proffered is to a Q-implicature. M's utterance in (28) Q-implicates that *mal* is the strongest word applicable to describing the dye job on B's hair, but B herself contravenes the implicated upper bound and provides a stronger negative characterization: *fatal* entails *mal* in (28), but not vice-versa.[21]

Further naturally occurring examples from the Alicante corpus confirm the correlation between *pero* and R-implicature, on the one hand, and *si* and Q-implicature, on the other. Once again, it is important to notice how each DM is infelicitous when paired with the other's implicature-type. In other words, the meaning of each form appears to be specified not only for its positive sensitivity to one type of implicature but also for its negative sensitivity to the other type of implicature.

(29) U: Patricia comió la pizza. (R+> 'she ate all the (remaining) pizza')
'Patricia ate the pizza.'
L: **Pero**/#**Si** no se la comió toda.
but NEG REFL it ate all
'But she didn't eat it all.' (ALC)

(30) A: Su hermano tiene como cinco perros. (Q+> 'no more than five')
'Her brother has like five dogs.'
L: **Si**/#**Pero** tiene por lo menos ocho.
'SI he has at least eight.' (ALC)

In (29), L concedes that her mother did indeed eat some of the pizza, but objects to the (potential) R-implicature that she ate all of the (remaining) pizza.[22] While her *pero*-prefaced response is perfectly felicitous given the context, a response prefaced by *si* would have been odd. In contrast, the response introduced by *si* in (30) – objecting to the upper bound Q-implicated by *cinco* 'five' – is impeccable, but the use of *pero* here would have resulted in infelicity.

At both the monologal and dialogal levels, then, there are strong links between linguistic forms and types of pragmatic implicature. Nevertheless, it is important to point out that the relationship between implicature-type and individual utterances is not as fixed as one might surmise from the examples

[21] The fact that in these examples we are dealing with (in)felicity as opposed to (un)grammaticality is mainly a function of the discourse contexts in which they appear: in dialogues like (27) and (28) it is not accurate to say that a given reply is strictly ungrammatical since in another context the reply would be a perfectly acceptable one. It should also be noted that some speakers' intuitions on dialogal examples are gradient, in the sense that they find some examples marked as infelicitous to be much less acceptable than others. Nonetheless, the overall patterns of preference regarding the choice of *pero* or *si* are very robust across all the examples presented in this section.

[22] This implicature is tied closely to the use of the definite article *la* 'the' in the NP *la pizza* 'the pizza'. Indeed, the implicature would most probably not arise if the definite article were removed from U's utterance.

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presented above. Indeed, depending on the particular discourse context, as well as other factors such as intonational cues, a given utterance could give rise to EITHER a Q- or an R-implicature. Nevertheless, the two connectives' patterns of acceptability remain the same, as shown in (31a, b).

(31) (a) A: Roberto está escribiendo la tesina. (Q+> 'not his dissertation')
'Roberto is writing his (bachelor's) thesis.'
B: **Si**/#**Pero** es su tesis doctoral.
'SI it's his doctoral dissertation.'
(b) A: Roberto está escribiendo la tesina. (R+> 'he's very smart')
'Roberto is writing his (bachelor's) thesis.'
B: **Pero**/#**Si** no es muy inteligente.
'But he's not very smart.'

A's utterance in (31) could give rise to a Q-implicature like that shown in (31a), or to an R-implicature like the one in (31b).[23] However, as the judgments for each example imply, the felicitous use of *pero* or *si* is once again dependent on the type of implicature being objected to by speaker B.

It has been pointed out to me (José Camacho, p.c.) that the use of *si* instead of *pero* could be made felicitous in an example like (31b) if the negation were not present in B's reply. Indeed, an alternative dialogue like (32) is also a possibility.

(32) A: Roberto está escribiendo la tesina.
'Roberto is writing his (bachelor's) thesis.'
B: **Si**/#**Pero** es muy inteligente.
'SI he's very smart.'

Though this is a constructed example, it is most plausibly situated in a discourse context in which the intention of A's utterance is to convey some degree of surprise about Roberto's writing the thesis, and specifically to convey that this information runs counter to speaker A's expectations. B's response targets this aspect of A's utterance, and provides a correction that removes the potential for surprise about Roberto's actions. In more general terms, what this example illustrates is that *pero* and *si*, while clearly sensitive to implicature-type (as shown above), are not restricted to appearing ONLY when R- and Q-implicatures, respectively, are at issue. There are clearly other kinds of implicit information (e.g. pragmatic presuppositions) conveyed in discourse, and speakers often respond to these too. Therefore, speakers will employ a given DM depending on their communicative intentions (e.g. concession vs. refutation) at that moment in the discourse. In (32), where the

[23] Actually, A's utterance in examples (31a, b) would permit both the Q- and the R-implicature to arise simultaneously. However, the connective employed by speaker B will still be determined by WHICH implicature is targeted in his reply.

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most accessible interpretation is one in which speaker B is attempting to correct (some aspect of) speaker A's assumptions about Roberto, *si* (or *pero si*) is felicitous, but *pero* is not.

Across different types of connective expressions, then, we see that the classification of forms given in table 1 above also corresponds to sensitivity to implicature type. Table 3 summarizes this relationship between linguistic forms and pragmatic implicatures. The adversative sentence conjunction *sino*, as noted above, is not on its own accessing Q-implicatures, but rather does so as part of the *no … sino* construction. Nonetheless, I have included it in parentheses in table 3 to further highlight its semantic/pragmatic similarity to the discourse connective *si*. The symbols + and − should be interpreted as 'positively sensitive to' and 'negatively sensitive to', respectively.

	Q-IMPLICATURES	R-IMPLICATURES
pero	−	+
(*sino*)/*si*	+	−

Table 3
Spanish adversative DMs, by sensitivity to implicature-type

The parallelism between the adversative forms (*pero* and *sino*) used in monologues and those used in dialogues (*pero* and *si*), argued for in section 4 above, is strengthened by the data and analysis in this section, which demonstrate that the distinction between the Spanish forms is at least partially linked to the distinction between Q- and R-implicatures.[24] Going beyond the correspondences between linguistic forms and implicature-types, the data presented in this section actually provide BETTER examples of what Koenig & Benndorf (1998) sought to illustrate in their discussion of the German adversative sentence conjunctions. As noted above, one of these authors' main purposes was to show that the encoded meaning of lexical items can be sensitive to pragmatic implicatures, and specifically that this meaning 'can make reference to and distinguish between R-based and Q-based implicatures' (Koenig & Benndorf 1998: 366). However, in their study

[24] As pointed out by an anonymous referee of this paper, the differential behavior of PA and SN forms with respect to implicatures exists independently of Horn's model of Q- and R-implicatures. While I agree with this observation, I have chosen to adopt this model for two reasons. First, it corresponds well to the types of implicatures at issue and therefore allows predictions to be made regarding DM/implicature pairings. Second, the same model was employed by Koenig & Benndorf (1998) in their study of similar phenomena in German, and thus my adopting it allows for explicit comparison of their findings with mine.

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this goal was ultimately met in only partial fashion, just as it was here when only considering the contrast between *pero* and *sino* at the sentence level. What I have shown is that the meaning of *si* is DIRECTLY accessing Q-implicatures and rejecting R-implicatures, in contrast to its adversative counterpart *pero*, whose lexical semantics is the opposite of *si* with respect to these implicature-types.

6. Conclusion

In this paper, I have shown that the distinction between PA and SN adversative connectives, previously thought to be restricted exclusively to the contrast between monologal sentence conjunctions, can be further extended to the contrast between adversative discourse markers functioning in dialogal contexts. Presumably, the reason why this extension of PA/SN to the dialogal realm has not been made previously is a failure to look beyond the well-known sentence conjunctions which encode PA/SN to other connective forms which perform similar functions in dialogues. In general, then, the analysis in this paper can be taken to imply that more attention needs to be given to the usage possibilities of connective forms in monologal and dialogal discourse: as argued in section 2 especially, these possibilities are not always the same.

An obvious research question to be addressed now is whether this extension of the PA/SN distinction can also be made in other languages, both in those which possess separate PA/SN sentence conjunctions as well as in those which do not. This question is an important one, since it has implications for the larger issue of functional equivalence (and equivalents), both within and across languages (cf. Waltereit 2001). For instance, native speakers of German have told me that many of the dialogal uses of *si* detailed in this paper would most likely be carried out by a conjunction such as *doch* in utterance-initial position, given the impossibility, noted above, of using the SN conjunction *sondern* in dialogal contexts. By contrast, native (American) English speakers who have attended presentations of this material tend to agree that the most normal way to express SN adversativity in dialogal contexts in this language would be to utter an initial *no* followed by an explicit correction of the interlocutor's viewpoint. Japanese, on the other hand, possesses a contrast between two adversative DMs, *demo* (Onodera 1995) and *datte* (Mori 1994), whose use in dialogues resembles quite closely the PA/SN contrast described above for Spanish *pero* and *si*. Thus, a given language may not display a neat distinction between two DMs like Spanish does, but it will still have some other means of carrying out the functions allocated to PA and SN forms in languages that have such functions. What we can say for sure, then, is that PA and SN constitute labels for adversative pragmatic functions which speakers need to employ from time

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to time in discourse, but only some languages provide formal devices which conventionally encode these functions.

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