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ARTICLE

"Ossification in the Homeplaces": Reading Heidegger through Lugones

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Abstract

This paper examines central themes in Martin Heidegger's *Being and Time* from the perspective of María Lugones's account of world-traveling. By thus reading Heidegger *through* Lugones rather than vice versa—a methodology I call "centering the margins"—I challenge a tendency in comparative work to approach historically undervalued work through a more canonical voice. I argue that doing so has interpretive consequences that tend to be occluded on a standard comparative approach: (i) a critique of the indexed nature of *Dasein* and the broader Eurocentrism of Heidegger's project; (ii) a more nuanced account of the methodological value of lived experience; and (iii) a problematization of the early Heidegger's recapitulation to a unified account of the self. Rather than ameliorate canonical philosophy by offering specifications to insufficiently differentiated philosophical accounts, turning to the margins on this methodology allows us to see where a canonical philosopher resorts to traditional motifs—the dangers of what Lugones calls "ossification in the homeplaces." The epistemic advantages of marginalization notwithstanding, centering the margins is self-destructive in that the final aim is the dissolution of that dichotomy and the freeing up of new epistemological terrain.

> So I mark this as a beginning, but it is a beginning that affirms a profound term that Maldonado-Torres has called the "decolonial turn". The questions proliferate at this time and the answers are difficult. They require placing, again, an emphasis on methodologies that work with our lives, so the sense of responsibility is maximal. How do we learn about each other? How do we do it without harming each other . . . ? How do we cross without taking over? With whom do we do this work? The theoretical here is immediately practical . . . How do we practice engaging in dialogue at the colonial difference? How do we know when we are doing it? (Lugones 2010, 755)

> [O]ne may see that the no-home, exile position may have provided some perceptual advantages: the one without own flesh; learned them in the rejection of

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> themselves as innovations. Orthodoxies and rigidities may well respond to a desire for safety. The racially/culturally homeless may stir critique and new life that appears to endanger that safety … understand[ing] that orthodoxy is itself dangerous. (Lugones 2003, 161)

Efforts toward a decolonization of academic philosophy have typically involved the expansion of philosophical resources used in both teaching and research beyond the European and Anglo-American canon as a means to challenge the presupposition that the West has a "monopoly over the creation of [academic] forms that count" (Kristal 2002, 73–74). In this context, the comparative method has received renewed attention as a trusted instrument for setting side by side an array of geographically and culturally heterogeneous literatures. Once predominantly an anthropological method that sought to place all the world's cultures along a civilizational hierarchy, comparison now suggests itself as a corrective to Eurocentric, racist, and nationalist exclusions in a variety of disciplines.[1] As Pheng Cheah puts it, "current reflections on the comparative enterprise … see[k] to reverse the epistemic violence inflicted on the cultural other that has resulted from the complicity between knowledge production and colonial/neocolonial domination" (2009, 536).

My interest in what follows is with how the comparative method has been deployed to bring together Latina feminism, on the one hand, and phenomenology, on the other. In a number of generative interventions, thinkers such as Mariana Ortega (2001), Jacqueline Martinez (2014), Andrea Pitts (2020), and Gail Weiss (2008) have taken stock of the phenomenological sensibilities found in the work of Latina feminist philosophers. The comparative method has thus illuminated similarities and points of contrast between, for example, Merleau-Ponty and Anzaldúa; Husserl and Schutte; Husserl and Lugones; and, most relevant for our purposes, Heidegger and Lugones. By reading Latina feminists through foundational phenomenological texts, this body of work has, on the one hand, breathed new life into the phenomenological tradition and, on the other, tapped the potential of phenomenology for the project of Latina feminism. More than this, in urging that Latina feminist thinkers be included not just in the phenomenological movement but in the philosophical canon more generally, it has contributed substantially to the project of expanding the canon and rendering it more representative.

In putting Lugones's thinking alongside Heidegger's, the present paper is deeply indebted to the foregoing body of work. Nonetheless, I think that greater caution is merited vis-à-vis a general tendency in comparative approaches to fold the "diverse" perspectives of, for example, Latina or Africana traditions of thought into the Western "canon." Following a standard comparative approach, one typically begins with the Western tradition and approaches geographically or culturally marginalized philosophers *through* this lens. When it comes to Latina feminism and phenomenology, then, the move is to read Latina feminists with "phenomenological glasses on" (Ortega 2001, 3). The novel insights garnered by comparing these two traditions of thought notwithstanding, the reaffirmation of an often unconscious premise of much comparative work with an extended geographical scope—namely, that the appropriate order of reading is center-to-margin—risks suggesting that Latina feminism either (i) requires legitimation through its similarities with canonical thought or (ii) is itself derivative of these more groundbreaking philosophical approaches. In the process, certain asymmetries are reproduced, and the idea that it is the European tradition that

[1]See on this Melas (2013).

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produces "the highest forms of theoretical reflection" (Gordon 2014, 192) is not finally challenged.

This paper thus proposes a subtle methodological shift: rather than beginning with and thereby recentering the Heideggerian framework, I propose to read the early Heidegger through Lugones's work. In other words, this paper inverts the standard order of reading by deploying a methodology I call *centering the margins*. In centering thought that has been marginalized, the methodology questions and ultimately works to undo the center/margin distinction by treating European philosophy no longer as the inevitable center around which other systems can only orbit, but as one tradition among others. Guided by the decolonial imperative to "provincialize" Europe, as on Chakrabarty's influential formulation, this reading strategy thus challenges European philosophy's self-construction as, precisely, the center (Chakrabarty 2000).

The aim, then, is not to situate Latina feminism—Lugones, in this instance—in a position of epistemic parity vis-à-vis European phenomenology in a broader philosophical hierarchy that remains unchallenged.[2] Rather, in interrogating the methodological Eurocentrism that underlies and circumscribes global knowledge production, the aim is to work toward the generation of new knowledge no longer requiring certification by dint of its similarity to Western thought. This, then, is how I understand the methodology to be decolonial: beyond diversifying the canon by including new voices within it, the ultimate horizon of *centering the margins* is to recalibrate our understanding of what counts as philosophically worthwhile or "canonical" in the first place.[3]

As intimated, in the context of my reading of Heidegger's *Being and time* through Lugones, this methodology opens up interpretive insights less readily available on standard comparative approaches.[4] In the pages to follow, I make three arguments. First, I show that reading the early Heidegger through Lugones encourages a distinctive criticism of Heidegger's ethnocentrism which challenges the presumption that his thinking is "generic" or universal. Second, this criticism allows us to see that beginning from "lived experience"—a commitment shared among Latina feminists and phenomenologists—is more vexed than it is often taken to be: where "everydayness" is permeated by racist and xenophobic commitments, as in Heidegger's time, it is unclear that this methodological commitment is something to be celebrated. Third and finally, reading Heidegger through Lugones rather than vice versa throws into relief the relative epistemic advantage of marginality: in contrast with Heidegger's retreat to traditional orthodoxies where selfhood is concerned, Lugones offers us a more thorough commitment to the constituted nature of selfhood. It is her vision of the self that, I ultimately argue, is thus ultimately the more compelling.

1. Centering the margins

In a co-authored essay with Elizabeth Spelman, María Lugones makes the following claim: "the deck is stacked when one group takes it upon themselves to develop the

[2]This element of the methodology is inspired by Lugones's claim that "our possibilities lie in communality rather than in subordination; they do not lie in parity with our superior in the hierarchy that constitutes the coloniality" (2010, 752).

[3]On the distinction between diversification and decolonization see Gaudry and Lorenz (2018); Maldonado-Torres et al. (2018); Mignolo (2009).

[4]On this see Todd (2016).

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theory and then have others criticize it … turf matters. So does the fact of who if anyone has already set up the terms of the conversation" (1983, 579). Challenging the *terms* of the conversation over and above adding a few new voices to an established discussion is a characteristic move in decolonial theorizing.[5] Simple as this formula may sound, the challenges of doing so are considerable. When it comes to philosophy, at stake is dislodging the asymmetrical epistemic authority of the European tradition—an authority that insinuates itself even in work that criticizes Eurocentrism.

To borrow one revealing example from Seloua Luste Boulbina, when it comes to comparative philosophical approaches that set Fanon and Sartre into dialogue, there is a marked preference "[To] make Fanon into a reader of Sartre rather than Sartre into a reader of Fanon" (2019, 269). As a result, Boulbina argues, "Fanon's reading of Sartre … appears essential, while Sartre's reading of Fanon appears inessential. Thus, the same division is reproduced, the same hierarchy, and, in the end, the same coloniality" (Boulbina 2019, 269). As Boulbina goes on to explain, despite the best intentions of those researchers who move toward decolonial philosophy by considering Fanonian thought, reading Fanon through Sartre ultimately risks reenacting the very coloniality that these authors presumably take as their initial problematic. For the implicit suggestion is often made that Fanon is simply a reader of Sartre, and so the non-European world is cast as a *recipient* rather than a *producer* of philosophical knowledge.[6] At issue, then, is what David Kim has helpfully described as a "surreptitious or second-order Eurocentrism" in decolonial and post-colonial theorizing: the reification of European philosophy as the cardinal point of reference in thinking that, from a first-order perspective, subverts Europe's epistemic privilege (2015, 162).

It is in the interest of challenging this second-order Eurocentrism that this paper offers a reading of Heidegger *through* Lugones rather than vice versa.[7] In what follows, I take the "margin" as my interpretive starting point: I begin with the themes that have characterized Lugones's thinking on selfhood and go on to read the early Heidegger's account of *Dasein* and the project of authenticity through this lens. In first explicating Lugones's work absent a Heideggerian interpretive framework, my aim is to join thinkers such as Marisa Belausteguigoitia in "interrupt[ing] the idea of the double as the one that is not allowed to reply/translate back and is instructed mainly to reproduce the original signification" (2014, 119). That is, I seek to conduct a conversation between Lugones and Heidegger in a manner that is careful not to present Lugones as though her work is mimetic vis-à-vis the original "canon." Instead, I allow Lugones to set the terms of the conversation—I unstack the deck—and see what comes out of the work of juxtaposition when methodological habits are challenged.

I call this methodology *centering the margins*, but this designation should be taken with a grain of salt: because I am intentionally treating as pivotal "marginalized" work, the intention is to put pressure on what is considered "marginal" and "canonical" in the first place. The driving insight here is that inclusion in a

[5]See e.g. Mignolo (2009).

[6]As with any generalization, there are exceptions: one can no doubt find comparisons of Sartre and Fanon which resist the suggestion of a unidirectional line of influence. See, e.g., Vogt (2012).

[7]This strategy is inspired by Marisa Belausteguigoitia's pedagogy of the double, which she uses to read Octavio Paz through Gloria Anzaldúa, and the creolizing methodologies associated with the Caribbean Philosophical Association, which have generated, just to name two examples, readings of Rousseau *through* Fanon and readings of Hegel *through* the Haitian revolution. See Belausteguigoitia (2013); Gordon (2014); Monahan (2017); Gordon (1995).

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tradition—for example, Latina feminism within phenomenology accomplished by the generation of scholars mentioned in the introduction—is a *beginning* and not an *end goal* (Gaudry and Lorenz 2018, 221). In addition to diversifying the field of philosophy by appending new voices, a decolonial approach urges a concerted challenge to the "Eurocentri[c] foundations of the field," including less visible forms of Eurocentrism reiterated by ostensibly inclusionary efforts like comparative work with a more global reach (Maldonado-Torres et al. 2018, 65).

I understand *centering the margins* to be in the spirit of Lugones's work and her persistent challenge to the canon/margin binary that inflects so much philosophical theorizing.[8] Lugones's and Spelman's questions regarding theoretical work lie in the background of this inquiry: why this activity, why according to this methodology, and what are the stakes of doing this work from my own position as a white Belgian woman trained mostly within the European philosophical tradition? If the possibility of reinstituting European hegemony looms large for any comparative work that brings together "canonical" (European) thought with marginalized (non-European) thought, this is all the more so when this work is done by someone working out of that European inheritance. Indeed, as I will discuss in the pages to follow, Lugones remarks that "traveling" to other worlds of sense from a position of privilege—for example, the effort on my part to understand Lugones's writing without the lens of the European tradition—requires significant epistemic effort if it is not to slide into imposition and, ultimately, assimilation.

One motivation for deploying the methodology of *centering the margins* is a sensitivity to this sort of risk: it is an attempt to displace my own tradition and take up the challenge of, as Lugones writes, "striving to understand while ... not hav[ing] the authority of knowledge [and] coming to the task without ready-made theories" (1983, 581). It is an attempt to follow the thread of Lugones's writing without a ready-made philosophical filter—which is not the same thing as taking on a view from nowhere. In this way, I see the methodology as being especially germane for those who occupy a social position relevantly similar to my own and who must therefore exercise greater vigilance in their attempts to "travel" to other worlds. This being said, to speak of all of this as an attempt is important, because I do not presume in advance that this will be successful, nor do I recommend *centering the margins* as a fix-all approach. As Lugones reminds us, once we appreciate the need for a decolonial turn, "the questions proliferate and the answers are difficult" (2010, 755). Although I hope the following will bear out the fruitfulness of disrupting practices of placing historically devalued perspectives *behind* a more "legitimate" thinker and thus challenging implicit forms of coloniality,

[8]One might object at this point that Lugones's challenge to the canon/margin binary and to mainstream Western philosophical thinking pushes us in a further direction still, namely, a radical delinking from that inheritance and a refusal to continue to engage with its ethnocentric representatives. This sensibility emerges from essays of Lugones's like "Reading the nondiasporic from within diasporas" (2014) and "On complex communication" (2006), where she underscores that the kind of dialogue she is most interested in is *across* the various limens (or what I am calling "margins") rather than between oppressor and oppressed. In foregrounding another possibility in her work, my claim is not that this is the only methodological strategy one might derive from Lugones's thinking—nor even that it is the most obvious one. Nonetheless, I do think that her work presents the resources for an argument that it *is* propitious to continue to attempt dialogues across asymmetrical positionalities, granting that this requires greater vigilance. As noted, I think such an approach may be especially fruitful for those of us who inhabit—even if never fully—the putative "center" but are interested in the work of displacement. I put forward this methodology as, again, one among others which must be judged according to the risks it courts and the interpretive advantages it offers.

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the methodology is ultimately offered as one example among others.[9] The contribution, then, consists in an invitation to continue pursuing conversations about the eminently challenging but crucial work of decolonizing academic philosophy.

2. Lugones's world-traveler self and the vantage point of marginality

Across her groundbreaking body of work, María Lugones delineates an account of selfhood that begins from the "everydayness" of those who find themselves "outside the mainstream" (Lugones 2003, 9; 1987, 10). In a manner that has by now become familiar within critical-theoretical and decolonial traditions, Lugones's writing takes off from the messy realities of particular lives, eschewing the traditional philosophical taste for the "birds-eye view" (2003, 5). Summing up her methodological approach in her essay "Enticements and dangers", she writes: "I start within the midst of subjects, many of them subjected, but understood in our complexity and possibility . . . my starting point eludes abstraction, that theoretical temptress" (2003, 197). As a number of commentators have pointed out, Lugones's refusal to shy away from a writing that is *for* the marginalized and proceeds directly *from* their lived experience has done much to make visible previously neglected perspectives, and to "help us redefine the conception of subjectivity and selfhood so as to include considerations of gender, race and class, as well as multi-cultural concerns" (Ortega 2001, 4).

Lugones's unique understanding of selfhood emerges through her attention to the often disorienting experience of being caught between what she calls multiple, heterogeneous, but always intersecting "worlds of sense": as she puts it, the experience of being a "world-traveler".[10] The fact that a "world" for Lugones is a "world of sense" immediately cues us in to the hermeneutic dimension of Lugones's thinking: a world is, on Lugones's simplest definition, a "community of meaning" (2003, 87, 144). To say that a world is a community of meaning is not to discount the fact that each world is a "tense confluence of local and trans-local histories of meaning" (2003, 220). As Lugones elaborates:

> A "world" in my sense may be an actual society given its dominant culture's description and construction of life, including a construction of the relationships of production, of gender, race, etc. But a "world" can also be such a society given a non-dominant construction, or it can be such a society or *a* society given an idiosyncratic construction. (1987, 10).

Now, for Lugones, to be produced as a self under conditions of oppression is to be keyed in—often painfully so—to the fact that there exist many such "worlds," and that far from being continuous fields of meaning that exist in a pristine harmony with one another, these worlds often offer up conflicting hermeneutic resources for understanding oneself. In other words, Lugones's point is not just that there are different worlds of

[9]Some alternative approaches include (i) a trenchant call for "delinking"—i.e., no longer engaging with his thought in light of his political commitments (see, e.g., Wolin 2014; Faye 2011), (ii) a search for openings in Heidegger's thought to "other beginnings," with a special emphasis on his late interest in East Asian philosophy (see, e.g., Singh 2020; Davis 2016), and finally (iii) a critical investigation into Heidegger's views on translation and what has been called his "ontological nationalism" (see, e.g., Cassin 2016; Haddad 2021).

[10]While Lugones does not use the term "world of sense" in her original 1987 essay, she deploys this term in her later work to capture what is at stake in "world-travelling," in particular in her essay "Hard to handle anger". Cf. Lugones 2003, 103–18.

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sense, but that one is *instantiated*—or, more precisely, *constructed*—as a different person in different worlds. As she writes, it is an experience of being "more than one: having desires, character and personality traits that are different in one reality than another" (1990, 503).

Lugones does not think that being constructed as this or that type of person by the semantic context one inhabits is unique to those who inhabit the margins. Nonetheless, the experience of what she calls "world-travelling," that is, of being aware of a *multiplicity* of worlds and of feeling oneself to be significantly different in different worlds, is something that she takes to be broadly shared among the bicultural and the oppressed.[11] The "epistemic shift" involved in navigating different worlds and hence different selves is, she writes, "part and parcel of our experience and our situation" (2003, 12, 18). While world-traveling is not, then, in principle inaccessible to those who occupy positions of privilege, Lugones's point is that, for the oppressed, world-traveling is "a matter of necessity and of survival" (1987, 11). By contrast, those who feel at ease in the mainstream neither *need* to, nor can they without significant epistemic effort, go over to other worlds: "to travel to the worlds of those who are oppressed but who are categorially isolated from us ... requires acute fluency in the mechanisms of oppression and insight in resisting those mechanisms" (2003, 19).

Lugones famously relates her discovery of world-traveling through a recounting of her own experience of "profound confusion" as she "experienced [herself] as both having and not having a particular attribute," namely, *playfulness* (1987, 9). Recognizing this dissonance between her own and others' perceptions of who she is, Lugones considers the various worlds she inhabits and questions how it is that she can be constituted as playful in some worlds but not in others. This experience of world-traveling, in turn, leads her to articulate a distinctive vision of the self as thoroughly socially constituted:

> The shift from being one person to being a different person is what I call "travel". This shift may not be willful or even conscious, and one may be completely unaware of being different than one is in a different "world". Even though the shift can be done willfully, it is not a matter of acting. One does not pose as someone else, one does not pretend to be, for example, someone of a different personality or character or someone who uses space or language differently than the other person. (1987, 11)

Instead of merely acting or pretending, one *really is* "someone of a different personality or character or someone who uses space or language differently" *than oneself*; the "self" is, paradoxically, different from itself. Thus, what emerges here is a notion of the subject that embraces the ambiguities of a self caught between the different norms, interpretive horizons, and available self-constructions of different "worlds". This notion helps makes sense, for Lugones, of how it is that she can at one and the same time be a playful person, and not be a playful person:

[11]Importantly this does *not* mean that for Lugones there are two worlds, that of the privileged and that of the oppressed. The point is rather that fluency in *more than one world* is broadly shared among those whose identities are marginalized. This comes through already in her early writings but very forcefully in her later essay, "On complex communication", in which she writes: "The different journeys that we have taken to liminal sites have constructed each limen as a different way of life, not reducible to the other resistant, contestatory ways of life" (2006, 83).

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> Given that latins are constructed in Anglo "worlds" as stereotypically intense . . . I can say to myself, "I am intense" and take hold of the double meaning . . . I am a different person than in the "world" in which I am playful . . . I can materialize or animate both images at the same time, I become an ambiguous being. (1987, 12)

Explicitly rejecting the dream of "unity underlying multiplicity"—an issue this paper will return to below—Lugones goes on to conclude: "There is no underlying 'I' that is the 'true' self" (2003, 128).[12] This radical conclusion is one that Lugones returns to throughout her work. Again, she does not believe it is the case that she is *truly* playful but comes to take on other characteristics as accidental in her role as a marginalized person in another world; for Lugones, these personae *are her*, and their contradictory relationship reveals the lack of identity at the heart of selfhood.

There are two elements of this account that are especially interesting from the point of view of this paper. First, Lugones's claim that the world-traveler self may be constructed differently in different worlds leads her to reject any notion that there is an underlying "substratum" of experience, some essential kernel of identity that remains the same from one world to the next. Lugones's notion of the world-traveler is thus a radical version of social-constitutive accounts of identity, whereby the ontological independence of a "subject" standing outside a "world" to which it then freely relates is upended by attention to the everyday experience of those whose identities are marginalized. One's situatedness in the world or indeed in various worlds is irreducible: there is no "I" independently of the constructions proffered by these communities of meaning; there is no "I" apart from its worlds.

Second, part of the power of Lugones's account lies in its grappling with the challenges that accompany being a self that is constantly pulled, to borrow Elena Ruíz's illuminating phrase, in "different hermeneutic directions" (2020, 217). As noted, Lugones speaks from her own "profound confusion" in the hope that those who occupy the margins might resonate with this disorienting experience of navigating multiple versions of selfhood—some of which involve stereotypical constructions of one's identity—and of feeling oneself to be an entirely different person as one travels between worlds of sense. In spite of these challenges, Lugones nowhere suggests that disunification or multiplicity is a problem to be overcome. Indeed, as Linda Martín Alcoff (2020, 208) comments, "what is most arresting here is not so much the multiplicity itself but the positive . . . valence given to multiplicity." As Alcoff goes on: "The contrast is stark with mainstream western philosophy, where a coherent unified self is taken to be the normative goal" (2020, 208). The second element of Lugones's account that I want to highlight, then, is that Lugones's writing goes against the current of mainstream philosophical accounts not merely because she begins from the everyday experiences of the oppressed, but because in doing so, she arrives at a radically different evaluation of a contextualized version of selfhood.

In "Purity, impurity and separation," Lugones foregrounds this contrast between her vision of multiplicitous selfhood and traditional Western understandings of the self that privilege unity, integration, self-identity, coherence, and purity (2003, 121–48). One of the important accomplishments of this essay is Lugones's turning the evaluative equation of unity with moral goodness and multiplicity with defectiveness on its head. The desire for unity is shown to be bound up with a domineering purity logic rather than regarded as a moral achievement, while the multiplicitous subject is revealed to be

[12]See also Lugones (2003, 11).

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uniquely equipped to engage in moral seeing. Lugones thus insists that embracing multiplicitous selfhood and the flexible vision that accompanies it has deeply positive consequences for one's moral and political outlook. The experience of world-traveling involves a "humbling and honing of perception," a willingness to bear witness to the realities of others, at the same time as it undermines self-importance and an overly rigid commitment to "dangerous orthodoxies" (2003, ix, 159).

For Lugones, moreover, the idea of a unified self is not merely one conception of subjectivity among others, albeit one with deleterious moral effects. Rather, the vision of the self as unified is, Lugones writes, a "fiction" that is "conceptually tied to domination" (2003, 128; 1987, 1). As Martinez unpacks this claim, the idea here is that the maintenance of the self as unified is made possible by inhabiting a position of privilege in such a way that one does not need to world travel, thereby making one's "own sense of the world into a *total world*" (2014, 229). The manner in which one is perceived differently—and indeed constituted as different—by others is not therefore taken to impinge in any significant sense on one's core identity. As Lugones writes, the "remainder becomes of no consequence" (130). Again, while the socially constituted nature of selfhood generalizes, insight into our disunified condition is typically obscured by privilege.

Lugones does not here deploy the language of "reality," but given that she speaks of unity as a "fiction" and of the standpoint of the unified, integrated subject as one that involves "radical self-deception," it would not be a stretch to attribute to her the view that embracing an ambiguous vision of selfhood hits the ontological nail on the head (2003, 128–30). To be a self at all is to be variously constructed across different worlds in a manner that renders one plural, ambiguous, and many-sided, *whether one acknowledges it or not*. As Christine Cuomo has recently remarked of Lugones, then, "the ideal of a unitary, undifferentiated true internal self is an illusory and oppressing fiction that serves domination by preventing us from understanding and utilizing our own plurality" (2021, 272). Lugones's point is thus not merely that the mainstream Western philosophical notion of an integrated, unitary self is fundamentally misaligned with the experiences of the oppressed. Ultimately, we are led to see that the experience of marginalization—the consistent starting point for all of Lugones's writings—is revelatory of the nature of *reality* in a manner that otherwise risks occlusion, inasmuch as it grants insight into the fundamental nature of selfhood as always already plural. In other words, and in an important point to which I will return in the conclusion of this paper, "the unsettling quality of being a stranger in society" affords a distinct epistemic advantage (2003, 143).

3. Lugonesean world-travelers, Heideggerian *Dasein*

In her essay "Purity, impurity and separation," Lugones warns that her own work should not be understood according to a postmodern philosophical framework, even as she grants that there may be resemblances (2003, 121). As already noted, commentators have developed these similarities between Lugones's work and, among others, Heidegger's, noting that Lugones's notion of multiplicitous selfhood is consistent in significant respects with a generally Heideggerian way of conceiving the human. However, the tendency in comparative projects that bring together phenomenology and Latina feminism has by and large been to begin with the former, and to read the latter as specifying or ameliorating phenomenological insights. My aim in the remainder of this

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paper is to map the resemblances between Lugones's work and Heidegger's while resisting the assimilative pull of comparative theorizing.

The preceding section concluded with the suggestion that Lugones's notion of selfhood implies a criticism of Western philosophical understandings of the human subject. As Lugones notes, it is by "beginning in the midst of subjects, many of them subjected," that is, from the lived, everyday experience of those on the margins, that she arrives at a "sense of the subject [which is] not an individual, not 'unitary and centered' and created out of the binaries of Self-Other, Subject-Object'" (2003, 197).[13] Heidegger is explicitly concerned with undoing the traditional Western notion of subjectivity: the project of *Being and time* is indeed nothing other than a *Destruktion* of the Western tradition of metaphysics in which the being of the human has, according to Heidegger, been deeply misunderstood (Heidegger 1962, 44). Much like Lugones, he builds his alternative understanding of the human self out of the phenomenological horizon of *everydayness*. Heidegger's investigation into the self—or, as he puts it, "that entity which each of us is himself," denoted by the term *Dasein*—begins with interrogating how Dasein comports itself in its day-to-day existence (Heidegger 1962, 44).

As Heidegger writes in a letter to Karl Löwith from 1921, "I work by proceeding concretely and factically out of my 'I am'— from out of my spiritual and altogether factical background/milieu/life context; I work from that which is accessible to me from these as the lived experience in which I live" (Heidegger and Löwith 2021, 37). This focus on *everydayness* generates an understanding of the human being as inseparable from its social, cultural, and historical world. The idea of *Dasein* ultimately mounts a radical critique of traditional notions of selfhood (associated especially with Descartes) which depict the self as fundamentally independent from its surrounding context. There are thus clear affinities between Lugones's work and Heidegger's: their theorizing begins with an attunement to lived experience, and the accounts of selfhood engendered out of this attunement put the accent on the constituted and contextualized nature of the self. As we saw above, in the context of Lugones's work this is closely tied up with her determination to devote serious philosophical attention to the experiences of the oppressed. As she writes, "in giving up on the unified self, I am guided by the experiences of bicultural people who are also victims of ethnocentric racism in a society that has one culture as subordinate and the other culture as dominant" (1990, 503). Approaching *Being and time* with this in mind raises the following question: what kind of social subject is Heidegger paying attention to when he goes to the dimension of *everydayness*?

Throughout *Being and time*, Heidegger remarks that *Dasein*'s everyday existence is permeated, or, as he puts it "infiltrated" by the Western ontological tradition. The *world* of *Dasein*— that in terms of which *Dasein* interprets itself—is deeply shaped by the theoretical biases of Western metaphysics, now "hardened" into common sense (Heidegger 1962, 44). There is a certain sense, then, that although Heidegger sometimes presents the analytic of *Dasein* as "general"—that is, not tied to any particular social identity—he nonetheless identifies *Dasein*'s world closely with the cultural and philosophical milieu of twentieth-century Europe. The (singular) world of *Dasein* is thus not just *any* world, but the specific world shaped by the ideas of Aristotle, Descartes, and Kant.

By the time of *Introduction to metaphysics*, Heidegger dispels any would-be residual doubts about the specific character of Dasein's world—and hence the specificity of the "self" of Dasein—by linking the question of Being, and the investigation into *Dasein*

[13]She is here quoting Gerwal (1994, 234).

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which is preparatory to it, explicitly to Europe, and, within Europe, to the German people (Heidegger 2000).[14] In sharp contrast to Lugones, then, Heidegger's unraveling of the dominant Western notion of selfhood does not proceed from attending to liminal communities of meaning. Quite the opposite: Heidegger is writing explicitly from the *center*—his thinking on Germany during this period hearkens back to a vision of Germany as geographically and metaphysically at the heart of Europe. This is brought out most emphatically in *Introduction to metaphysics,* where Heidegger writes: "We lie in the pincers. Our people, as standing in the center, suffers the most intense pressure—our people, the people richest in neighbors and hence the most endangered people, and for all that, the metaphysical people" (2000, 41). As this quote suggests, this geographical positioning brings with it a peculiar sort of responsibility vis-à-vis a metaphysical questioning understood to be the special prerogative no longer of Europe, but increasingly of Germany given its special (but never fully explained) affinity with the Greeks.[15]

Lugones's and Heidegger's shared methodological starting point—lived experience or *everydayness*—thus plays out very differently in each of their thinking, and this is a fact that has not received sufficient attention in standard comparative accounts—a point to which I return below. Nevertheless, as already intimated, from out of this variegated horizon Lugones and Heidegger do develop strikingly similar accounts of the self. According to Heidegger, when we look into how *Dasein is* in its everydayness, we find that *Dasein*'s being is inseparable from the world that it inhabits: *Dasein* operates *essentially* in the state of "being-in-the-world." It is only when we put on our theoretical hat and take the "birds-eye view," to deploy Lugones's term, that the self appears as fundamentally distinct from the world. In day-to-day experience, by contrast, *Dasein* is quite literally immersed in its dealings with the world and the beings which populate it, be they things or other selves (1962, 80–82, 107, 150, 163, 220).

Throughout *Being and time* and other writings, Heidegger helpfully uses the language of "dispersal [*Zerstreuung*]" to characterize the manner in which *Dasein*'s "selfhood" is not necessarily its own, wrapped up in some bundle "inside" the self, but is rather, in an essential manner, *dispersed throughout the world* by being caught up with entities and the other *Dasein* "outside" of it (1962, 83, 167, 441; 1992, 138). Tellingly from the perspective of a Lugonesean account of the multiplicity of the self, Heidegger goes on to take stock of the manner in which *Dasein*'s dispersion into the world takes the form of "multiplicity" and even "disunity": to be a *Dasein* is to be dispersed into a "manifold of relations" (1992, 333). Rather than conceiving of *Dasein* along the lines of a unitary, closed-off and integrated subject that would need to "venture a leap," as it were, into an external world in order to encounter objects or other minds, Heidegger's understanding of *Dasein* dissolves the subject–object and subject–other distinction characteristic of Western metaphysics.

[14]Heidegger in his later work explicitly acknowledges the possibility of other "great beginnings" of ontological thought, other than the Greek. This reaffirms, however, the peculiarity of the European world and its hermeneutic situation. In "A dialogue on language," Heidegger claims that "in spite of all assimilations and intermixtures," i.e., the global dominance of European systems of thought borne along by globalization, it is still an open question whether "it is necessary and rightful for Eastasians to chase after the European conceptual systems," whether indeed even the use of European languages does not involve an illicit entry of European metaphysical notions into "worlds" (my word) to which they "remain alien" (Heidegger 1959, 1–56).

[15]For discussions of Heidegger's Eurocentrism see Bernasconi (1995) and Gasché (2009).

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For Heidegger, the discovery that the being of *Dasein* in its "everydayness" is Being-in-the-world is not a naïve experiential datum of which philosophical contemplation might later disabuse us. To the contrary: Heidegger insists that Being-in-the-world and the multiplicitous dispersion characteristic of it "belongs" to *Dasein*'s very essence (1962, 84). This is not to say that the horizon of everydayness will always grant access to the fundamental nature of *Dasein*; in fact, there are many ways in which Heidegger thinks that the perspective of everydayness may be quite misleading. Nonetheless, by looking at *Dasein* in its everyday mode, Heidegger does think that we have landed upon something that mainstream Western philosophical notions consistently miss in their "fanciful idealizations" of a "pure 'I'" (Heidegger 1962, 272).

4. Reading Heidegger through Lugones: problematizing universality and everydayness

The preceding section undertook an initial reading of the early Heidegger *through* Lugones rather than vice versa. One result of this is simply to highlight that there *are* indeed similarities between their thinking: in addition to a shared methodological commitment to lived experience or *everydayness,* Heidegger joins Lugones in rejecting the notion that selfhood is some substantial core or substratum, standing apart from the rest of the world. As noted, these similarities have been pointed out, with philosophers taking stock of the "convergence between world-travelling and traditional phenomenological areas of study" (Pitts 2020, 347). What, then, is substantively different on the methodological approach recommended here? This section throws into relief how *centering the margins* results in different phenomenological insights than those that have so far been offered by engaging a direct dialogue with Mariana Ortega's rightly influential comparative account of Lugones and Heidegger, which follows a standard comparative methodology.

That both Lugones and Heidegger begin from lived experience has been pointed out in the literature; indeed, this common methodological commitment has constituted the inspiration for work that has brought into dialogue not merely Lugones and Heidegger, but Latina feminism and phenomenology more broadly. When comparing these dimensions of their work, however, it quickly becomes apparent that Heidegger's account of *everydayness*, unlike that of Lugones, does not pay any special attention to the experience of marginality. Following a standard comparative approach, commentators have parsed this distinction between Heidegger and Lugones in terms of the "generality" or even universality of the Heideggerian account, which Lugones and other Latina feminists then supplement with important specifications. Ortega thus writes:

> While Heidegger painstakingly explains major ontological, existential characteristics of a self … he unfortunately does not explain the specific … situations that are of concern for the self that is "there" … His primary interest remains in fundamental ontology, in finding general ontological characteristics of human beings … Latina feminists, however, underscore the ontic, the specific material characteristics and conditions of human beings … who have to navigate their various social identities. (2016, 53)

The picture that emerges here is one which juxtaposes the general applicability of European phenomenology with the more specified and particularistic versions of

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phenomenology we might find in non-European philosophy. There is no doubt that this interpretation gets something right: Heidegger is *not* interested in thinking through a differentiated account of *Dasein* which factors in the significance of marginalized identities. However, when we approach *Being and time* equipped with Lugones's interest in the significance of social positionality, we are primed to be more attentive to what kind of social subject Heidegger is in fact describing—in a manner that casts doubt on the idea that Dasein is in fact generic. As we saw in the preceding section, bringing these concerns to *Being and time* shows up that the apparent generality of the Heideggerian self is only a pseudo-generality: Heidegger is discussing the European—and, ultimately, the German—self.

Reading Heidegger through Lugones rather than vice versa thus resists the suggestion that Heidegger—our "canonical" philosopher—simply offers a universal account of the self. Ortega's account seems to encourage this sort of move, leading to the conclusion that the Heideggerian account of selfhood offers a "general ontological characterization of human beings" while Latina feminism turns our attention to "specific material conditions" (Ortega 2016, 53). One upshot of bringing Latina Feminism into conversation with phenomenology, on this view, is that Latina feminists contribute a more sociopolitically conscious and differentiated account. As Ortega writes in a 2021 retrospective on *In-between*, this sort of supplementation of Heidegger by Lugones enables us to "move Heidegger's discussion forward so that it can be better attuned to the lived experience of marginalization and liminality" (2021, 449). The comparative approach thus does the ameliorative work of making visible the *distinctive* experiences of "selfhood" of those marginalized subjects who are otherwise slotted into the generic vision that phenomenologists proffer.

And yet, the very association of the West with universality and the "rest" with particularity is itself a colonial logic—one that we can see gets perpetuated in comparative accounts that begin with Western philosophy and move outwards to non-Western accounts as specifications of the universal insights contained in the Western canon.[16] The inverted order of reading encourages attention instead to what "canonical" thought is implicitly or explicitly excluding, illuminating the extent to which Heidegger's version of selfhood is equally if not more specific than that found in Lugones. *Centering the margins* thus puts a distinctive decolonial spin on Luce Irigaray's (1999) influential argument that a feminist perspective gives the lie to the supposed universality of Heidegger's ontology.[17]

A second upshot at this point in the analysis is an opportunity to engage a more nuanced thinking regarding the methodological value of everydayness. This shared starting point is, again, one of the bridges that connects Lugones's writing with Heidegger's. As Ortega writes, "Even though the Heideggerian account and those provided by Latina feminists originate in widely different social, political and economic situations ... both types of accounts are important for the development of a self which attempts to do justice to our experience, which takes into consideration the various contexts that contribute to making us who we are" (2001, 3). Ortega is thus clearly attuned to the fact that Heidegger's context—Germany in the era of National Socialism—renders him a suspect resource for any theory with emancipatory ends. As she writes:

[16]On this see Melas (1999) and Diagne (2013).

[17]See also Chanter (2001).

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> My intertwining of Latina feminism and Heideggerian existential phenomenology might be problematic not only for purists but for those who are aware of the terrible political views held and defended by Heidegger. I am aware that engaging Latina feminism with his account of human beings might consequently not be considered to be the politically correct choice. Yet my use of Heideggerian phenomenology as I develop my view of multiplicitous selfhood does not constitute an endorsement of his political or personal views but rather an engagement with valuable phenomenological insights from his description of the self as *Dasein*. It is also a rethinking, a reorientation of his work. (2016, 3)

I am sympathetic to the disidentificatory resonances of Ortega's interest in holding on to what remains worthwhile in a work such as Heidegger's. Nonetheless, I worry that this could lend support to a not uncommon idea among critical phenomenologists that everydayness is *simply* a valuable phenomenological tool. While the emphasis on lived experience has been galvanizing to critical phenomenology—indeed to disciplinary philosophy as a whole—what is sometimes missing from these accounts is a critical discussion of the fact that the type of context one begins from is significant. As a result, classical phenomenologists like Heidegger are regularly celebrated for their contributions regarding the philosophical significance of everydayness without a sufficiently critical eye toward the fact that when Heidegger's factical situation informs his work this is spectacularly problematic. The situation in Heidegger studies is ultimately not much different: while there has been a recent bout of discussion about whether Heidegger's political commitments inflect his philosophical output, the connection between this eventuality and Heidegger's methodological emphasis on facticity and lived experience has been left underexplored.[18]

Reading Heidegger through Lugones points us in a different direction. Lugones is clear that what makes *her* lived experience such an epistemically fruitful starting point is the experience of marginality. As she writes in a passage quoted in the section above, it is "the unsettling quality of being a stranger in society" that enables the sharpness of vision which accompanies her ontological investigations into the nature of selfhood and reality (2003, 143). The idea that the condition of exile is productive of insight not readily available to those who are simply at home in their world has been put forward by Seloua Luste Boulbina. As she writes, "what is difficult at the affective level is intellectually stimulating . . . Migrations are occasions or opportunities for thought . . . 'the *condition* of exile . . . has facilitated the boldest realizations, in destabilizing subjects' adherence to a unique community'" (2019, 272). As Boulbina makes clear, it is key not to entertain a thoughtless fetishization of marginalization—the condition of marginality is difficult and not to be reproduced—an important point to which I return below. This is underscored in Lugones's insistence that inhabiting the intersection of multiple worlds is not a matter of abstract choice—a construal which would smuggle in, as she writes, "an implicit reference to a liberal conception of the subject" (2003, 185). Still, there is an extremely important insight about the manner in which the experience of marginality—of inhabiting many worlds at once, of moving between "tense, disjunctive overlapping oppressive and liberatory contexts" and being aware of it—is conducive to ontological realizations less readily graspable by those comfortably in the center (2003, 190).

Beginning with Lugones brings into focus her commitment to theorizing from everydayness as part and parcel of a philosophical project concerned with equipping

[18]An exception is Fried (2013).

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socially marginalized subjects with the theoretical tools to better understand their experience. Looking at Heidegger with this Lugonesean concern in mind, we are primed first of all to the absence of such a concern in his work. More than this, however, we gain a more refined picture of the value of everydayness as a methodological starting point. Specifically, we see that it is not everydayness *simpliciter,* but the day-to-day experience of marginality, that is the launching pad for Lugones's enduringly compelling reflections. As Lugones herself warns, those writing comfortably from the "home places" may by contrast become captive to "orthodoxies and ossification" (2003, 161). The following section examines how this charge may be leveled at Heidegger, interrogating Heidegger's recapitulation to a unified account of selfhood by Lugonesean lights.

5. Ossification in the home-places

Much like that of Lugones, Heidegger's alternative conception of selfhood carries an important hermeneutic dimension. According to Heidegger, the fact that Being-in-the-world belongs to *Dasein*'s very essence has consequences for how *Dasein* interprets itself, for it means that Dasein draws its self-understanding from the world around it (Heidegger 1962, 70). As Heidegger writes, it is on account of Dasein's "dissemination into a multiplicity" that it interprets its own being in terms of the world around it, and inevitably "identifies" with the *entities* with which it interacts on a day-to-day basis (1992, 138). More interesting for our purposes are the hermeneutic consequences of a further dimension of Being-in-the-world that has been mentioned in passing: not so much *Dasein*'s interactions with *entities*, but rather its absorption into others. For Heidegger, Being-in-the-world is always at the same time a "being-with": "the world is always the one that I share with others," and this means that *Dasein* only interprets its own being in terms of entities, but also in terms of the others alongside whom it exists (1962, 154–55).

In light of Heidegger's insight that to be a self at all means to be dispersed in the world, the notion of "others" takes on a unique significance. As Heidegger elaborates, "by 'Others' we do not mean everyone else but me," in such a way "that one must then seek some way of getting over to the Others from this isolated subject" (1962, 154). And he goes on: "They are rather those from whom, for the most part, one does *not* distinguish oneself" (1962, 154). In other words, *Dasein*'s everydayness is marked by a thoroughgoing sociality, to such an extent that "others" play a pivotal role in making the "selfhood" of *Dasein* what it is. Just as Heidegger rejects the notion of a bare subject standing apart from the world, so too does he deny that one can make sense of an isolated 'I' without others.

The fact that *Dasein* does not differentiate itself from the others it "is-with" has implications for how *Dasein* interprets its own being. *Dasein* tends to understand itself according to the dominant theories and conceptions of what Heidegger calls the "They" (*das Man*), the undifferentiated mass of others with whom *Dasein* shares the world. As Heidegger elaborates: "Th[e] everyday way in which things have been interpreted is one into which Dasein has grown in the first instance, with never a possibility of extrication . . . In no case is a Dasein untouched and unseduced by this way in which things have been interpreted" (1962, 213). That is to say, *Dasein* tends to understand both itself and the nature of Being as such according to the "vague average understanding" circulated by the others with whom it shares a world (1962, 25). As the language of seduction suggests, this is not understood by Heidegger to be a positive phenomenon. *Dasein*'s Being-with others—in itself a neutral and irreducible fact of *Dasein*'s essential Being-in-the-world—

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means that its possibilities for self-interpretation have been "taken over" (1962, 167). Heidegger indeed speaks of the "dominion" of the "They" and of the manner in which *Dasein*'s interpretation of the world and of itself is "prescribed" and "dictated" (1962, 164–67).

From the point of view of the interpretation of Lugones offered in the first section of this paper, the unmistakably negative characterization of the hermeneutic consequences of *Dasein*'s dispersed Being-in-the-world is striking. In sharp contrast with Lugones, Heidegger's recognition in division one of *Being and time* that selfhood is *constitutively* dispersed does not prevent him from suggesting that this condition is to be overcome. This is made clear in division two, where Heidegger looks into how *Dasein* might attain some kind of "unity" and form a "whole", thereby achieving "authenticity [*Eigentlichkeit*]" or its own proper selfhood (1962, 279–84).

Division two insists on the possibility of a radical self-appropriation or individualization on the part of *Dasein*, a seizure of what is proper (*eigentlich*) to *Dasein* and consequently a turn away from its worldly embeddedness. Seen through a Lugonesean lens, the resonances of the German term *eigentlichkeit* strike at the heart of the issue: to pursue a project of *eigentlichkeit* would mean to focus on that which is one's own (*eigen*). The relevant contrast here is not so much "*Unechtheit*" but "*Fremdheit*"—to become *eigentlich* is to turn away from the strange, to reject the foreign which informs and is taken to distort one's self-perception. This is markedly distinct from Lugones's world-traveler self, for whom it is precisely the experience of *travel* and contact with the strange that animates her self-construction. We here arrive at a deep gulf that separates Lugones's thinking from that of Heidegger as it is presented in *Being and time*. The predominant affect undergirding Lugones's writing is playfulness in travel, a willingness to be substantially transformed by one's movement between various worlds of sense. Heidegger's *Being and time*, by contrast, is finally characterized by a strong sense of *homesickness* and an aversion to the foreign.[19]

This is brought to the fore in Heidegger's discussions of authenticity. For Heidegger, in order to be "authentic," *Dasein* "must first *gather itself together* [zusammenholen] from the *dispersion* and *disconnectedness*" that constitute its mode of Being-in-the-world (1962, 441–42).[20] Heidegger links this overcoming of multiplicity with the anticipation of death, writing that:

> Death is a possibility of Being which Dasein itself has to take over in every case. With death, Dasein stands before itself . . . when it stands before itself in this way, all its relations to any other Dasein have been undone. *This ownmost non-relational possibility is at the same time the uttermost one.* (1962, 294)

In death, Heidegger writes, *Dasein* is "individualize[d] down to itself": its relations with other people and with the world are severed in the process of *Dasein*'s becoming its own self (1962, 308). Heidegger further suggests that, inasmuch as *Dasein* takes on an authentic relation to its own mortality, something about the very nature of *Dasein* becomes apparent. As one commentator summarizes Heidegger's view, "dying offers an experience of the human condition . . . the isolation of death reveals Dasein as it truly is" (Dreyfus 1991, 312). That *Dasein* has *eigentlichkeit* as an essential possibility thus

[19]For discussions of the theme of home in Heidegger, see Harries (2016), Casey (1993), and Young (2001).

[20]Translation modified.

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suggests that its dispersal is an interim condition to be overcome. When seen from the perspective of Lugones's positive valorization of her multiplicity and her resistance to the idea that it should be overcome in a project of self-unification, Heidegger's turn to a project of self-unification in division two of *Being and time* is conspicuous.

Heidegger's turn to authenticity has generated a great deal of discussion, for it raises a difficult interpretive question as to how the understanding of *Dasein* propounded in division one, namely, the insight that *Dasein* is *essentially* dispersed, should be rendered consistent with authenticity conceived as the overcoming of disunification. In particular, the suggestion that the "ownmost" and "uttermost" possibility of *Dasein* is *non-relational* has struck many commentators as puzzling, for it amounts to saying that *Dasein*, as finite, is fundamentally oriented *away* from dispersion. As Charles E. Scott has put it, the impression made by division two is that "Dasein in its most proper possibility is not finally defined by its linkage to people or things" (1993, 70). This, however, appears to be a not entirely coherent retreat from the social-constitutive account of selfhood whereby multiplicity is *essential* to the being of *Dasein*—an account which, I have argued, Heidegger shares with Lugones.[21]

From a Lugonesean perspective, what is interesting here is not so much how these two dimensions of *Being and time* may be rendered coherent as the fact of the interpretive puzzle itself, namely, that division two makes apparent a Heideggerian commitment to an ideal of selfhood that division one had apparently left behind. The fact is that Heidegger, in spite of the radical break with modern visions of selfhood precipitated by his claim that *Dasein* is essentially absorbed by its relations with entities and other *Dasein*, does ultimately give in to a self-reappropriative movement toward "ownness."

When all is said and done, then, *Being and time* seems to join the ranks of Western philosophical accounts of selfhood whereby "the goal [is] an integrated self" (Ruíz 2020, 218). Lugones's trenchant criticism of the misguided Western philosophical celebration of unity outlined above thus applies, perhaps surprisingly, to Heidegger. We have thus arrived at a third distinctive interpretive result of *centering the margins*: what comes to light is a Lugonesean critique of Heidegger's capitulation to what she identifies as a "purity logic"—a desire for, and belief in, unity being the underlying ground of multiplicity (Lugones 2003, 121–47). In the context of *Being and time*, the ultimate meaning of *Dasein* lies with its possibility for becoming whole, of quieting the influence of dominant societal interpretations in an act of self-integration which overcomes dispersal. Heidegger thus "shrinks back"—to borrow the terms of his criticism of Kant—from the social ontological insights offered in division one.

Seen through the lens of Lugones's steadfastness vis-à-vis not merely the ontological aptness but the positive ethico-political dimensions of multiplicity, Heidegger's interest in self-integration—whether or not it may be rendered consistent with the first part of *Being and time*—can thus be viewed as a recapitulation to mainstream, Western

[21]Those that have attempted to maintain the coherence of *Being and time* are many, as are the directions that such salvaging operations have taken. Scott (1993) has attempted to show that the nature of death is precisely such as to undermine the very meaning of the "ownmost" and "uttermost"; others have pointed to Heidegger's insufficiently rigorous distinction between the neutrality of everyday being-in-the-world and the *inauthentic* modes of being-in-the-world that lead to conformism, arguing that authenticity requires the overcoming of the latter but not the former (Chanter 2001; Bernasconi 1993); and others still have lamented that Heideggerian authenticity, while certainly desirable, is ultimately impossible given Heidegger's insistence that being-in-the-world is essential to *Dasein* (Dreyfus 1991; Carman 2000).

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philosophical accounts of selfhood. For all his caution vis-à-vis the Western ontology that has sought to determine the "subject" as a substantial thing, as the unifying ground of a multiformity of experiences, Heidegger ultimately remains enthralled with the vision of "integral selfhood" that pervades Western metaphysical thinking.

It will be instructive to once again place this methodological result into direct dialogue with what we get from Ortega's account. According to Ortega, one of the advantages of placing the Lugonesean and Heideggerian conceptions of the self into conversation is the possibility of supplementing the "world-traveler" self with Heideggerian insights. Specifically, the claim is that Lugones's account raises a difficult question regarding the identity of the "self" who travels between worlds: if the Lugonesean self is *entirely* constituted by the worlds through which she travels—such that she *really is* a different person in different worlds—it is unclear how there is a singular self doing the traveling. The turn to Heidegger then addresses this problem, for "Heideggerian elements can help us explain how a world-traveler can still be thought of as a self, even though there is no appeal to a transcendental subject or an ego-pole" (Ortega 2001, 17). On this view, Heidegger's notion of *Dasein*, and especially his appeal to mineness, "makes it possible for me to be aware of my own Being" (2001, 17) and thus fills in the conceptual lacuna opened up by Lugones's suggestion that there is no persistence of identity between worlds. This fusion of Lugonesean and Heideggerian insights underlies Ortega's own vision of selfhood, which maintains a certain identity in multiplicity by insisting on *existential* rather than *ontological* pluralism (2016, 89). The result is an account of selfhood that, in line with Ortega's strategic reading, supplements Lugones's insights into the multiplicitous nature of selfhood by drawing sustenance from the Heideggerian framework where such sustenance is to be found.

My intention here is not to quarrel with this vision—I accept much of it—but, again, to throw into relief the distinctive insights that emerge from the pairing Lugones/Heidegger on the methodology of *centering the margins.* As this section has argued, in addition to allowing us to problematize Heidegger's presumed universality and his appeal to lived experience, beginning with Lugones provides a revitalized critical view on Heidegger's retreat to a unified version of the self. We gain an understanding of Heidegger's "shrinking back" from his social ontological insights as connected to his situatedness within the hearth offered by the center. We thus see that we might in addition supplement Heidegger's ultimately conservative thinking on the self with Lugones's exilic resistance to a version of the self as *eigentlich* and unified. I believe this more critical perspective to be one piece of a broader disidentificatory reading; the foregoing upshot is thus intended as compatible with Ortega's project, particularly in her later writing, to hold together a vision of the self that is one with the need to resist unification. My claim has been that when we read Heidegger through Lugones, the accent falls on the latter leg of this attempt rather than the former. To the extent that Heidegger might still be utilized to supply an understanding of selfhood that responds to puzzles regarding the continuity of identity, this must be accompanied by a greater critical weariness vis-à-vis the way that Heidegger falls back into step with the Western metaphysical tradition.[22] Ultimately, in reading Heidegger through Lugones we come to

[22]In *In-between*, Ortega confronts critical misgivings about her appeal to Heidegger from a decolonial perspective, admitting that Heidegger's view remains "relentlessly Eurocentric and thus still tied to what decolonialists call the modern/colonial matrix of power" (2016, 115). She goes on: "Given that my own view is linked to Heideggerian thought, it remains linked to certain aspects of modernity" (2016, 115). Ortega notes, however, that Western modernity and its philosophical tradition is not uniform and has encountered

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see that, beyond ameliorating canonical philosophy by offering important specifications to insufficiently differentiated philosophical accounts, one upshot of placing the "margin" into conversation with the "canon" is that we recognize places where our canonical thinker resorts to a privileging of traditional motifs.

6. Disorientation

This paper offered a reading of some key features of the early Heidegger's account of *Dasein* from the vantage point of Lugones's work on multiplicitous selfhood. While the proximities between Lugones's thinking and that of Heidegger have not escaped the notice of commentators, comparisons between the two have tended to follow a reading strategy whereby the "marginal" thinker is approached by way of the "canon." Heeding Elena Ruíz's warning that "we should constantly guard against Eurocentric methodological biases that legitimate the ideas of women of color by placing them neatly within a preexisting framework designed and licensed by male philosophical privilege" (2016, 430), this paper has inverted this traditional order of reading. The driving hypothesis of this paper has been that, besides contributing to a decolonial strategy of centering "marginalized" perspectives, this methodology might enable certain interpretive insights. I have shown that approaching Heidegger's account of *Dasein* with Lugones's concerns in mind does indeed open up (i) a decolonial feminist take on the Eurocentrism built into Heidegger's supposedly undifferentiated account of *Dasein*, (ii) a refined picture of the methodological value of everydayness, and (iii) a revitalized critical perspective on Heidegger's recapitulation—with his account of authenticity—to a vision of unified selfhood. I thus argued that *centering the margins* encourages us to supplement Heidegger's notion of *Dasein*, especially its integrative tendencies, with the adamantly social ontology found in Lugones's work.

To conclude, I want to make explicit that the interpretive results of *centering the margins* provides a distinctive conceptualization of the methodological value of bringing the "margin" into conversation with the "canon." Rather than merely highlighting the distinctive experiences of oppression in a manner that traditional philosophical accounts would do well to take into account, the reading of Heidegger via Lugones suggests that the perspective of the margin has a decisive critical advantage. That Lugones remains dedicated to her insight that multiplicitous selfhood is a positive phenomenon makes salient Heidegger's retreat from his radical reconceptualization of the "self," and the extent to which Heidegger, in spite of so many precautions, remains captivated by the mainstream philosophical account of selfhood as aiming at integration—understood as a turn away from the strange. It thus seems to be the fascination with a singular *home* and a *proper place* in the world that leads Heidegger to repeat the metaphysical gestures of which he is otherwise so critical.[23] Lugones, on the contrary, remains committed to a

resistance from "within," locating Heidegger's work as a moment of meaningful resistance that is immanent to this tradition. In bringing Lugones into dialogue with Heidegger, I am likewise more convinced of the fruits of continuing to work with rather than simply against the European tradition. This being said, the methodology of *centering the margins* complicates the idea that Heidegger is simply a critic of this tradition—when we begin with Lugones, we see more clearly that he ultimately falls into step with its dominant conception of selfhood, at least in the context of *Being and time*. The methodological divergence between Ortega and myself, then, is not whether we read Heidegger with Lugones at all but *how* we do so.

[23]One might think here of Bonnie Honig's claim that "the dream of home is dangerous, particularly in a postcolonial setting, because it animates and exacerbates the inability of constituted subjects—or nations—

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watchfulness vis-à-vis traditional orthodoxies. She writes: "one may see that the no-home, exile position may have provided some perceptual advantages: the one without home may have learned to see orthodoxies and ossification in the homeplaces" (2003, 161). As this quote from Lugones suggests, there is a distinct epistemic advantage incurred by inhabiting a marginalized social position.

While such an insight follows naturally enough from the reading strategy employed in this paper, it also puts pressure on the idea of *centering the margins*. In beginning with Lugones's thinking and thus treating as "central" a philosopher who has been marginalized, doesn't this very strategy inhibit the resistant potential of the margins? Put otherwise, if the ultimate arc of such a project is to center the margins, wouldn't this imply a multiplication of the "homeplaces" and all the attendant orthodoxies? The other "leg" of the dilemma is no less thorny, however, for the suggestion in all of this has, again, not been to fetishize and ultimately generalize the condition of marginalization—itself a product of colonization. How then can we square an emphasis on the epistemic generativity of marginalization while insisting that marginalization is not to be replicated?[24]

To think through if not exactly resolve this dilemma, I will call once again upon Lugones. In "Toward a decolonial feminism", Lugones locates a certain tension in Mignolo's work between his interest in dialogue between subaltern and hegemonic perspectives, on the one hand, and his claim that the transcendence of the colonial difference can only be effected by the subaltern (2010, 752). In speaking to this tension, Lugones comments: "if dialogue is to be had with the modern man, his occupation of the colonial difference involves his redemption but also his self-destruction" (2010, 752). And later: "so indeed, the transcending can only be done from the perspective of subalternity, *but toward a newness of be-ing*" (2010, 753).[25] As Lugones suggests here, what decolonization announces is not on the order of a re-entrenchment of the center/margin or hegemon/subaltern dichotomy, albeit with a reversal of the roles. Decolonization rather propels us beyond these dichotomies toward a new epistemological terrain.

Similarly, *centering the margins* neither aims to position thought that has been denigrated atop a philosophical hierarchy, as the putative center, nor does it seek to cast European philosophy into the position of the marginalized "other." Taking inspiration instead from Fanon's remark that "there is a point at which methods devour themselves" (2008, xvi), *centering the margins* is self-destructive in that it ultimately aims to unravel this very distinction. The transformation that is sought is therefore less a cartographic or epistemological reversal and more a kind of *disorientation*—a loss of our familiar conceptual bearings with respect to what is philosophically pivotal and what is merely supplementary.[26] Such a disorientation implies forgoing the comfort of the homeplace without advocating a reproduction of the conditions of oppression.

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to accept their own divisions, and it engenders zealotry, the will to bring the dream of unitariness or home into being" (Honig 1994, 585).

[24]I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer at *Hypatia* for raising this set of questions.

[25]My emphasis.

[26]The idea of decolonization as a kind of disorientation is owed to Boulbina (2019).

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