another, of dark red, marks the veins, &c. Should grey or blue colours be required, it is only necessary to rub some lead pencil powder with a leather stump, and run it lightly over the patches which may be made. One recommendation is that the pictures so produced last an indefinite time without any special pains taken to preserve them. A sketch having been made in this little book, it can be cut out and attached to the history of the case. This ingenious production can be obtained at a trifling cost, which its utility will many times repay. We strongly advise all readers of the Journal who make use of the ophthalmoscope to obtain this sketch-book and to make frequent use of it.

PART III.—PSYCHOLOGICAL RETROSPECT.

1. *French Retrospect.*

By D. Hack Tuke, F.R.C.P.

La Criminalité Comparée. Par G. Tarde. Paris: Felix Alcan, 1886.

It is one of the characteristics of the science of to-day that crime is studied from the standpoint of organization, and takes its place among the scientific and medical, as well as the social and religious, problems of the age. M. Tarde commences with the consideration of the anatomical characters of the criminal type, one in direct contrast to the ideal of Hegel, according to whom the form of the nose is all important in explaining the beauty of the Grecian profile. Between the forehead, where the spiritual expression of the human face is concentrated, and the jaw, where animalism finds expression, the nose appears to Hegel to be the intermediate organ which powerfully contributes to turn the scale in favour of one or the other. It tends, according to him, to render the animal or spiritual nature predominant, according as it is intimately connected, by almost a straight line, with a vertical forehead, or is detached from a retreating forehead, marked with wrinkles, by a broken line, the nose being of the snub order, or even it may be aquiline, and incorporated rather with the mouth and the jaw, especially if these are heavy and prominent (p. 15). The author maintains that the beautiful classical head, forms, by the forehead and rectilinear nose, by the small and gracefully-arched mouth, by the moderate size of the jaw, by the small ear closely applied to the temples, a perfect contrast to the type of the criminal,

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whose ugliness is, indeed, the most marked characteristic. Of 275 photographs of criminals given in Lombroso's *L'Uomo delinquente*, M. Tarde could only discover one beautiful face, and this had a feminine expression; the remainder were mostly repulsive, and the number of monstrosities was very large. *Méfiez-vous des laids encore plus que des glabres!* It seems to M. Tarde that after having sought to explain the criminal physiognomy by *comparing* it to that of the primitive man, always more or less conjectural, one ought to be able to *contrast* it with the ideal type of human beauty which for long has been much better known to us, and in this way to complete or rectify the first interpretation of its characters (p. 16). The expression of the assassin is described as dull, cold, and fixed; while with the thief it is restless, oblique, and wandering. Much stress is laid by Lombroso upon the frequency of the wrinkles on the forehead, and of the development of the superciliary ridge. It is this character which, joined to a retreating forehead, appears to explain the curious resemblance between the Italian criminals and those of France and Germany (p. 16). At any rate, Lombroso's plates reveal an astonishing resemblance between the criminals of different European races.

It is shown that criminals are very subject to disease of the heart, and to various affections of the sight, such as Daltonism and strabismus. In regard to sight, however, the criminal, like the savage, sees to a great distance; he is much more frequently ambidextrous than others. In this respect, as in his great agility, the author compares him to the monkey. He approaches the animal by his insensibility to pain and cold. Rarely is a blush seen on his cheek.

Psychologically, the criminal is represented as resembling the savage rather than the lunatic; and certainly it is true that plots are as rare in asylums as they are frequent in prisons. His intelligence is limited—he can imitate, but cannot invent. As Lombroso says —a man is *born* a criminal, he *becomes* a lunatic.

M. Tarde speaks of the possible attenuation of the criminal virus in the future, and observes that in watching for its departure, the varieties of human nature on which it now feeds, and which, when reunited, compose the criminal type, will not have disappeared in consequence. They will be dispersed and distributed among other types. In awaiting this time, the type which they form loses nothing of its reality from its indestructible permanence being regarded as very doubtful (p. 62).

Passing over criminal statistics, we pass on to some observations made by the author under the head of "Suggestion and Responsibility." In regard to hypnotism, M. Tarde observes that it is a phenomenon so exceptional that the legislator is justified in taking no account of it. A prisoner who should make it an excuse for having committed a murder under an irresistible influence originating in an order received some days or months before, should be obliged to bring forward proofs of such an exception (Binet and Feré). It is related of a hypnotic subject that when asleep he received the order to display

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his fingers on the nose of a bust of Gall. He was awakened, and he acted in conformity with this order, of which, however, he remembered nothing ; but in order to conceal from himself the irresistible influence, he hastened to say that the bust was "disgusting." If an order is given to the same subject to fire a revolver at her brother she will obey the command after she is aroused. Here, again, so far from being at a loss to account for the act, she would explain it by saying that she had killed her brother because he had wronged her, or from some other motive. A monomaniac, in a similar way, who obeys an invincible idea is never at a loss, according to M. Tarde, to give reasons to justify his insane act ; but this is putting it a little too broadly, for the plea urged by the patient may be its irresistibility. The original source of the impulse is, however (as the author says), a cerebral lesion, whilst in the foregoing examples the determining cause is an external order communicated by hypnotism, but the two cases are analogous. The sole difference, according to this view, between the suggested conduct of the somnambulist when awake and the ordinary conduct of men (as when a person defends his politics in a *café* with eloquence and sincerity he does so not in consequence of the good reason he alleges, but in consequence of family and personal influences acting upon a certain docile organization) consists in this, that the suggestions which the normal man obeys are much more numerous, and much less external—two characters intimately connected, and which give to him a false impression of autonomy. But by a series of transitions; hypnotism under these two relations is associated with ordinary life. Both Dr. Liébault and Dr. Beaunis have been struck with the logic of the hypnotised and the rapidity of their productions. All these characteristics combined render a hypnotic subject, with his head full of suggestions from innumerable sources from his childhood, nowise different, according to our author, from a reasonable and free man, especially if among these innumerable suggestions there are certain strongly-rooted and more powerful ones to which the others are subordinate. M. Delbœuf has attempted to show that the hypnotic dream, like the ordinary dream, is sometimes a spontaneous reproduction of facts perceived when the subject is awake, and more frequently their arrangement is determined according to a certain logic, and induced by an external stimulus such as words, gestures, sounds, odours, muscular sensations, &c. Hypnotism, then, is only—like dreaming—a simplification. What is truly wonderful at bottom is not the dream—not the hypnotic suggestion—but the state of normal waking, which is itself a state of hypnotism or dreaming so immensely complexed, and at the same time so harmoniously co-ordinated. Without carrying this original idea into the details adopted by the author, we must add some of the consequences in regard to the penal law which result from this hypothesis. The responsibility of the hypothetical subject, absent in the beginning, will go on increasing in proportion as his suggestions sink so deeply within (s'intérioriseront), that the hypnotised and the hypnotisers become identified in him.

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Thus it is, according to M. Tarde, that the acts accomplished by a man in the period of transition between the deep ordinary dream and the being completely awake will involve more and more responsibility. Legislation seems to place itself unconsciously at this standpoint when it regards a father or a master as to some extent responsible for the act committed by a boy. It is not forgotten by the writer that the responsibility of such an act has relation, not to this act itself, no longer changeable, but to the possible acts of the same nature, or equally mischievous ones, which it is our object to render less probable in future. To prevent the repetition of a criminal act, whether by the perpetrator himself or by another, it is necessary to strike at its causes, as much as possible, within or outside him ; but it behoves us to attack differently the moral or social causes which require the exercise of the will and physical or physiological causes. The penalty, so far as the treatment is social, ought to be restricted to the first causes. A doctor orders a somnambulist to assassinate someone whom he detests, a crime which he commits when awake. Whose will is to blame? The doctor's. The social cause of the act is here quite external to the agent. To prevent the return of similar acts it will not suffice to shut up the doctor in prison, decapitate him, or prevent him hypnotising this or some other subject. It becomes necessary to place the somnambulist in an asylum, and to withdraw him from the influence of certain criminals who would try to make him their docile instrument. However, if the homicidal somnambulist is placed in an asylum and not in a prison, although in committing an assassination he is himself regarded as free and capable of having acted otherwise, why do we not place his hypnotiser in a prison rather than an asylum? He himself, it is true, in suggesting the criminal act to the hypnotised, believes himself to be autonomous, but, according to our author, he is himself deceived. He has yielded, like the somnambulist, to an internal impulse, and what matters it that it has not passed through a medium, but an *ensemble* of hereditary instincts deposited in his cerebral cortex and derived from his ancestors? *Voilà la question*. In short, what is clearer than that the true cause of the act—that is to say, of the order of assassination—is not external to the agent, *i.e.*, the hypnotiser, but is internal and peculiar to himself. In fact, it is not a question of liberty, but of identity. All this seems very theoretical, but the author maintains that it is eminently practical, namely, that in order to act upon social causes it is necessary to employ social agencies. The depraved will—the permanent source of fresh crimes which the hypnotiser carries within him—in what does it consist if the physiological conditions are put aside? The reply is that it consists in beliefs, and desires, and at first in a more or less favourable opinion of himself which the criminal entertains. This pride must be broken by public opinion of a precisely opposite character, an energetic blame, which, communicated by imitation, always weakens at bottom to some degree, and always causes a terrible blow. Society must simply decide whether

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the cause of the punishable act is included within the area of that unity which is designated social. And what is that? Now-a-days it is the individual, the special organization *en bloc*, without establishing any distinction between the organs which compose it, and notably between the different parts of his brain.

M. Tarde's next chapter is devoted to criminal geography, which contains many interesting statements, for which, however, we have not space in this retrospect.

The subsequent chapter treats of homicide and suicide, the relation between which is intimate, though at first sight they would seem to stand far apart.

The future of crime is considered with much care by the author, who concludes that if all civilization were once fixed in a moral groove, and able to expel all kinds of immorality contrary to its principle, and if in consequence, demoralisation in an old society could only proceed from inoculations of a virulent kind, by contact with what is foreign to it, it follows that the stability of a civilization, as well as a special morality born within itself, would only exist at the beginning and the end of civilized humanity: at the beginning when the town-centres of civilization were separated from each other by considerable distances, so that each could preserve itself intact; at the end when, after the long period of wars and revolutions, of conquests and of purifications, which we call history, a single and unique State, a single and unique Civilization, will exist upon the earth. Such is our author's ideal of the future. Whether he really brings us any nearer to its attainment, many will be disposed to doubt. Tennyson should study M. Tarde.

In the last section, which discusses civilization and falsehood, the author contemplates the religion of the coming age. What is to be done, he says, when the torrent of faith which falls upon men is dried up? Well, science appears. We hail it. However, in order to be a true belief—faith in which implies invariable altruism—we ought to be not only penetrated with the importance of certain truths, but also to be persuaded that to know them is the greatest good, and to be ignorant of them the greatest evil, and that to bear witness to them by acts is the first and sovereign duty of man. The religious man is full of such a faith. How long a time will elapse before scientific or philosophical truths become the objects of such convictions? In the meantime, calmly awaiting a durable and definite philosophical synthesis, in the presence of which humanity at last is at peace and exempt from crime as from all other evils, we are to console ourselves with belonging to our present age, and we are not to expect that we can purchase too dearly, even at the price of all our faults and crimes and lies, light and new discoveries, if at least the most respectable delusions are not, in our estimation, the most dangerous truths. Ethics and æsthetics are traceable in the end, from M. Tarde's point of view, to logic. Unfortunately man is not, after all, a logical animal. And what of women?

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