FIGURES

2.1 Five-sevenths and six-sevenths cores in one dimension 56
2.2 Change of core in one dimension under five-sevenths and six-sevenths majority 57
2.3 Core of a unicameral legislature under qualified majorities and lack of core under simple majority 59
2.4 Constitutional core of a bicameral legislature 61
2.5 Constitutional core with two-thirds majority in both chambers and a majority of states (Mexico) 62
2.6 Core with alternative constitutional provisions 63
2.7 Large core produces smaller win-set, no matter where the status quo (SQ) is 64
2.8 Outcomes of a referendum 67
2.9 Referendum outcomes as a function of agenda setter 68
3.1 New constitutions do not come with new levels of constitutional rigidity 86
3.2 Summary of the number of countries that changed their constitution and the difference in rigidity scores 87
3.3 Correlations between amendment frequencies and the World Values Survey (WVS) and V-Dem Variables (variables used by Blake et al. [2023] in bold) 95
4.1 Constitutional core of Italy under Article 138 101
4.2 Constitutional core of Chile, three-fifths, and president 104
4.3 Constitutional core of Chile and two-thirds without president 105
4.4 Constitutional core of Chile with all alternatives 106
5.1 House and Senate support for constitutional amendments in Mexico from 2000 to 2013 by topic, coalition, and number of articles affected 143
5.2 Congressional support for constitutional amendments in Mexico from 2000 to 2013 145
6.1 Constitutional rigidity and amendment size and/or rate 155
6.2 The effect of constitutional rigidity on the rate of all amendments (amendments of constitutions in effect in 2013 in all democratic countries) 156

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. UNIVERSIDAD AUTONOMA METROPOLITANA, on 15 Nov 2026 at 04:53:40, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009597234

6.A.1.1 The effect of constitutional rigidity on the rate of fundamental amendments (amendments of constitutions in effect in 2013 in all democratic countries) 163
6.A.1.2 The effect of constitutional rigidity on the rate of significant and fundamental amendments (amendments of constitutions in effect in 2013 in all democratic countries) 163
7.1 Writing and revising the constitution game 173
7.2 Amendment frequency and log length 177
7.3 Time inconsistency and log length 178
7.4 Scope and details in 187 countries 181
7.5 Log GDP and log length 184
7.6 Corruption and log length 185
8.1 Legislative core: the court can make any statutory interpretation inside it 202
8.2 Constitutional core larger than legislative core: any constitutional interpretation within the constitutional core stands 203
8.3 Low constitutional rigidity is a necessary condition for low judicial independence 208
8.4 The win-set of the status quo subject to constraints on judicial decision-making 208
8.5 The win-set of the status quo subject to constraints on judicial decision-making, with uncertainty 210
8.6 The effect of constitutional rigidity on court strikes 215

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. UNIVERSIDAD AUTONOMA METROPOLITANA, on 15 Nov 2026 at 04:53:40, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009597234