6

Successful Conceptual Traveling

Corporatism in Latin America, 1995–2023

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INTRODUCTION

Writing in the mid 1990s in "Trajectory of a Concept," Collier observes that the concept of corporatism would possibly be less relevant moving into the twenty-first century for a number of reasons, including its empirical decline in the region, the dominance of other more relevant concepts in the democratic neoliberal context, and the fact that scholars had already analyzed it in depth (1995: 153).[1]

Indeed, we must ask whether "corporatism" as a concept has gone the way of bureaucratic authoritarianism, largely used to describe a finite period of Latin American political history. Toward the end of the twentieth century into the early twenty-first century, scholars and observers of Latin America widely remarked that corporatism, or the widespread incorporation of civil society groups into state bodies and state processes, was largely incompatible with the neoliberal political economies and democratic regime types that had come to dominate the region. Scholarly works with titles such as "After Corporatism" (Palmer-Rubin 2021) and observations about a delimited corporatist period of the past (e.g., Yashar 2005; Lucero 2008), as opposed to a contemporary "post-corporatist period" (Rossi 2015), were telling in this regard. They suggested that, indeed, the empirical state–society relationship of corporatism was disappearing, and the concept would no longer be relevant to contemporary analysis. Such analyses drew attention to the fact that paradigmatic cases of labor organization and incorporation into the state, such as those associated with Presidents Juan Perón in Argentina and Getúlio Vargas in Brazil, had given way to wide-scale labor exclusion and disempowerment as evidence of the faded phenomenon.

[1] See Chapter 3, this volume.

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I argue that, in fact, corporatism is not dead empirically, conceptually, or theoretically. Rather, I contend that political-economic, regime, and civil-society changes have often led to new forms of corporatism, and with them, the need for conceptual innovation on the part of scholars studying the region. To be sure, I am not arguing that corporatism is the *modal* way that states currently relate to social groups, as it was in mid-twentieth-century Latin America, but rather that it constitutes *one* form of state–societal intermediation at play in the range of contemporary institutional arrangements.

Another contention here is that corporatism has expanded from centrally bringing *economic* or class-based social forces into particular structural relationships with and within the state. We now see a pattern in which salient social groups and organizations from a more diverse set of social domains are a part of such systems. This chapter thus helps elucidate the fact that there can be, and in fact are, multiple modes of interest intermediation that have existed often simultaneously in the same countries since the late twentieth century, that the concept of corporatism ultimately helps make sense of some of these modes, and that often we need to look beyond labor groups to see those multiple modes of interest intermediation.[2]

In this chapter, I illustrate various ways that the concept of corporatism is still quite relevant, even if it exists alongside other forms of interest intermediation that were not present during the mid twentieth century. To begin, I briefly review the creation of diminished subtypes and discuss how their use helps us understand the landscape of contemporary interest intermediation, particularly given the reduced toolbox of post-Third Wave democratic regimes, involving their more limited options in terms of repression. In the following section, I examine two diminished subtypes with illustrative cases where the empirical evidence comes close to fulfilling all characteristics of the root concept of corporatism, albeit still with some divergences.[3] I discuss what I call *liberal sectoral corporatism* with the illustrative case of Indigenous movement incorporation in Ecuador, and what Sebastián Etchemendy and Ruth Berins Collier (2007) have called "segmented neo-corporatism," with the illustrative case of Argentina's wage policy (Etchemendy 2019). Following the discussion of these diminished subtypes and their illustrative cases, in the third section I suggest several other contemporary subtypes, including *societal party corporatism*, *state party corporatism*, and *local societal corporatism*, and briefly present empirical examples of these subtypes and the way their

[2] Interesting to note is the fact that much literature conceptualizing corporatism in the latter half of the twentieth century was concerned with revealing that not all interest intermediation was *pluralist*, where now many scholars are interested in revealing how most interest intermediation is *not* corporatism.

[3] The expression "root concept" refers to the concept that is the point of entry in a given study. The present discussion is about corporatism, so that is the root concept. The expression "diminished subtype" is crucial to this analysis and is discussed in detail in the next section.

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TABLE 6.1 *Cases, contexts, and concepts*

Term[a]	Overall domains	Specific contexts	Distinctive analytic leverage	Associated authors/ citations
Classical Latin American corporatism	Economic forces (primarily labor, but also business, and sometimes peasantry)[b]	• Mid twentieth century throughout Latin America and other regions (e.g., Southern Europe) • Paradigmatic cases of Vargas administration in Brazil (1930–45) and Perón administration in Argentina (1946–55) whereby peak labor federations incorporated into state	Defines corporatist interest intermediation as state structure, subsidy, and control of social groups and movements.[c] Describes state relationship with labor and other economic groups	Schmitter 1974; R. Collier and D. Lehmbruch 1977; Collier 1979; Collier 1995
"Associational neo-corporatism"	Interest groups and associations based on contemporary salient societal cleavages (including informal sectors)	*Chavismo* in **Venezuela** (1998–2013)	• Classical **state** corporatism albeit with less exclusive focus on labor/economic forces • Party in state power helps create structure of societal interests	R. Collier and Handlin 2009; Silva 2017; Etchemendy 2019, 2020, 2021
Societal party corporatism	Interest groups and social movements (coca growers; Indigenous movements, informal workers)	• **MAS party in Bolivia** (2005–15) • **Workers' Party (PT) in Brazil** (2002–16) • **Broad Front (FA) in Uruguay** (2004–19)	• Classical **societal** corporatism albeit with less implicit focus on labor alone • Societal interests structured and organized *prior* to incorporation into party in state power	R. Collier and Handlin 2009; Silva 2017; Etchemendy 2020, 2021; Palmer-Rubin 2021

(*continued*)

TABLE 6.1 (*continued*)

Term[a]	Overall domains	Specific contexts	Distinctive analytic leverage	Associated authors/ citations
"Liberal sectoral corporatism"[d]	Social (movement) organizations based on ethnicity, gender, health status, employment status, etc.	• **Ethnodevelopment policy** in Andean region (Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia) in early twenty-first century • **Brazil's council structure (including CDES)**	• Emphasizes that corporatism can apply to variety of domains or social sectors beyond those defined by role in economic processes • Calls attention to fact that tools of control are limited by procedural democratic norms	Doctor 2007; R. Collier and Handlin 2009; Chartock 2013; Mayka and Rich 2021[e]
"Civic corporatism"	Social (movement) organizations based on various salient social demands	**Brazil:** • AIDS policy • Waste picking • Urban housing	Calls attention to the causal role of civil servants in often creating and maintaining liberal sectoral corporatism	Rich 2019
"Local societal corporatism"	Participatory budgeting; decentralized institutions	Territorial Base Organizations (OTBs) in **Bolivia** (1994–2015)	Official recognition of local organizations and federations as semi-state representatives; subsidies through control of local budgets	Chartock 2013[f]

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"Segmented neo-corporatism"	Income policies, employment policies, some state resource distribution (e.g., civil society organizations as agents of state policy implementation)	**Argentina and Uruguay** wage policy (2005–15)	• Informal liberal corporatism • Closer to classic European "democratic corporatism" (as defined by Katzenstein 1985) • Some de facto monopoly of economic sector representation in state negotiations (even if particular social movement organizations not named in policy) plus concertation[g] regarding income policy	Etchemendy and Collier 2007; Etchemendy 2019, 2021b

[a] Terms without quotation marks are mine or come from studies on the root concept/phenomenon in mid-twentieth-century Latin America (à la Schmitter 1974; D. Collier 1995). Terms with quotation marks are associated with contemporary observations that corporatism is an ongoing phenomenon.

[b] While most of the literature on classic corporatism in Latin America highlights the way that the state structured, subsidized, and controlled *labor* groups, others have pointed out the way that peak *business* associations and *peasant* federations were sometimes part of these relationships (see, e.g., Shadlen 2004; Wuhs 2010).

[c] While corporatism remains a contested concept, much of the literature on Latin American politics has accepted this definition. Those working in the European politics literature, however, often include in the definition both the actual social sectors this model generally applies to as well as ideological underpinnings and policy-making processes.

[d] Collier and Handlin's (2009) description of their concept of "Statal Web" bears some resemblance to this concept, even if not given a corporatist moniker.

[e] I created this term for this chapter, whereas the works cited here discuss applicable phenomena as a form of corporatism without the "liberal sectoral" label attached.

[f] Roper (2003) shows evidence of this diminished subtype of corporatism without naming it as such.

[g] Schmitter (1974) and D. Collier (1995) discuss concertation as belonging to a different root concept than corporatism – policy making. This contrasts with Katzenstein (1984, 1985) and others observing corporatism in Europe in the later twentieth century, who incorporate concertation into their very definition of "democratic corporatism."

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formation adds distinctive analytical leverage in the study of interest intermediation. The final section places the diminished subtypes of corporatism in the context of the emerging literature on new modes of incorporation in the region, where I discuss the need to (1) look to the changing political, social, and economic context to understand this conceptual innovation; (2) notice *multiple* modes of state–society linkages existing simultaneously; and (3) look beyond economic class incorporation to find these various modes.

Table 6.1 provides an overview of the cases and comparisons that are the foundations of this analysis. The table enumerates the noteworthy spectrum of contexts in which the idea of corporatism has proved to be a valuable analytic tool.

CONCEPTUALIZING DIMINISHED FORMS OF CORPORATISM

Among the central contentions of this chapter is that using corporatism to recognize contemporary dynamics between state and society helps us understand what we have observed even after the era of paradigmatic corporatism, even if what currently exists does not exactly mirror phenomena to which the term was applied in previous historical periods. I thus agree with a key argument of Collier's "Trajectory of a Concept": that creating diminished subtypes can make the use of corporatism as a concept more elucidating than harmful. As Collier discusses, diminished subtypes fundamentally differ from classical subtypes of a root concept (see also D. Collier and Levitsky 1997).[4] Whereas in classical subtypes, the use of adjectives adds *specificity* to the root concept with all of its definitional dimensions, the added adjectives of diminished subtypes show where it does *not* conform to the original set of dimensions of the classical subtype (D. Collier 1995: 149). Indeed, with most of the adjectives I (and the other scholars who use them) add to contemporary forms of corporatism, I claim not that these represent corporatism *plus* some more specific dimensions; rather, they represent corporatism *minus* some indicators of the root concept.[5] Using the root concept of corporatism to illustrate some of the linkages between states and civil society in Latin America can nevertheless help us understand these relationships more fully, both descriptively and analytically.

Thus, throughout the beginning of the twenty-first century, there remain (and we have seen new forms of) linkages between state and society that conform *for the most part* to Schmitter's widely used definition of corporatism whereby "Constituent units are organized into a number of singular,

[4] See Chapter 2, this volume.

[5] In "Trajectory of a Concept," Collier makes it clear that the root concept by itself leaves open the idea that corporatism looks different empirically in various countries, that the monopoly could be explicit or indirect, that it can be quite segmented, etc. In other words, the original conceptualization leaves a lot of room for both classical and diminished subtypes to be formed.

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compulsory, noncompetitive, hierarchically ordered and functionally differentiated categories, recognized or licensed (if not created) by the state and granted a deliberate representational monopoly within their respective categories in exchange for observing certain controls on their selection of leaders and articulation of demands and supports" (1974: 93–94). Or, as R. Collier and D. Collier (1979) summarize,[6] there exist relationships between the state and civil society that include *structuring* of interest groups, *subsidies* to those groups, and a degree of *control* by the state of those groups.

The creation of diminished subtypes of corporatism here draws attention first to the fact that the structuring, subsidy, and control differ in strength and formality from earlier paradigmatic cases of corporatism in Latin America (particularly in the degree and form of *control* by the state over societal groups). Their creation secondly points to the fact that many, but not all, scholars find corporatism's use as a concept more enlightening than the creation of wholly new concepts to understand various existing state–society arrangements. Indeed, other concepts have been created to understand the "post-corporatist" landscape of state–society relations, as in the creation of concepts such as the associational network, or "A-Net," which Handlin and R. Collier (2009) use to understand more informal contemporary interest representation formations. However, again, many scholars argue that using corporatism "with adjectives" provides more analytical leverage than starting the conceptualization of contemporary forms of interest intermediation from scratch.

LIBERAL SECTORAL CORPORATISM IN ECUADOR

Perhaps the closest contemporary subtype of corporatism to both the root concept and to the empirically modal form of interest intermediation of twentieth-century Latin America comes in what I call *liberal sectoral corporatism*.[7] While the adjective "liberal" as applied to corporatist relationships is itself contested,[8] here I follow the tradition of using the term to refer to civil liberties as a defining attribute of democracy and to denote the fact that post-Third Wave electoral democracies are largely limited in the types of

[6] See Chapter 12, this volume.

[7] In this subtype, the linkages between state and society show quite clear state structure and subsidization of certain civil society sectors and groups, most of which had become powerful representative organizations *prior* to their incorporation into the state, thereby also aligning with most of the dimensions of "societal corporatism," according to Philippe Schmitter's definition of that classical subtype (1974).

[8] Here I follow Gerhard Lehmbruch (1977), who uses "liberal corporatism" to denote a subtype whereby the state *does not use repression* to control the relationship between state and society in corporatist arrangements. This is in contrast to the way that some other influential works examining European cases use the adjective "liberal," such as when Peter Katzenstein (1984, 1985) uses the term to specify corporatist relationships that are taking place in the context of liberal *economies* (as opposed to social democratic political economic paradigms).

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control that they can and do use to limit the activities of societal groups that are part of corporatist relationships. Indeed, in cases of this diminished form of corporatism, structuring and subsidy often coexist with protest against the state by the very federations that have been brought in to exercise quasi-state functions (Handlin and R. Collier 2009; Chartock 2011, 2013; Rich 2020). Adding the adjective "sectoral" draws attention here to the fact that across the region, corporatist forms of interest intermediation have expanded to include sectors that reflect the most salient contemporary social cleavages, in addition to, and sometimes rather than, organized labor and the various forces of the economy (see Table 6.1).[9]

In the case that most clearly illustrates the addition of both adjectives "sectoral" and "liberal" – Indigenous incorporation in late twentieth- and early twenty-first-century Ecuador – the *structuring* and *subsidizing* of these groups came quite close to that seen in mid-twentieth-century Latin American state–labor relations, while the *control* the state was able to exercise over the groups was far more limited and, when it existed, informal in nature.[10] Specifically, liberal sectoral corporatism in the case of Ecuador was particularly in evidence when it came to the creation, and especially the implementation, of policies that targeted Indigenous community marginalization, that did so with a recognition of culture, and that mandated oversight and participation on the part of Indigenous communities themselves, or so-called ethnodevelopment policy (Chartock 2011, 2013).[11]

The Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador (CONAIE) came together "from below" over decades, far before any formal relationships it would eventually come to have with the Ecuadorian state (Yashar 2005). By the late 1980s, CONAIE helped to create the most significant laws impacting Indigenous communities, aiding in the establishment of two ministry-level bureaucratic agencies that oversaw all intercultural bilingual education and ethnically targeted development funds in the country (Chartock 2011, 2013). Credibly claiming to represent approximately 75 percent of Indigenous communities in the country at the time, CONAIE was formally codified as having a leadership role over these bureaucratic agencies within the policies that established these new arms of the state (Brysk 2000: 73n14; Van Cott 2005: 99; Chartock 2013). By the time the agencies were implementing the

[9] Indeed, sectors that have been part of such relationships have included groups identified by gender, health status, and land and home status, among others. See, for example, Mayka and Rich (2021) on Brazilian councils. Rich's (2019) conceptualization of "civic corporatism" also highlights some similar attributes, though with a focus on the formation of these relationships by way of civil servants (see Table 6.1).

[10] Handlin and R. Collier's (2009: 311) discussion of the relationship between organizations of unemployed workers in Argentina in the first decade of the 2000s echoes similar observations.

[11] Others discussing the ways that outsourcing policy implementation has created new forms of state–society relationships include Handlin and R. Collier (2009), Etchemendy (2021b), and Mayka and Rich (2021).

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law, Indigenous communities had to be a part of CONAIE in order to work with these state agencies and receive the benefits and services they provided.[12] In definitional corporatist fashion, the relationship saw the social movement organization become a quasi-state entity.

Thus, CONAIE held a virtual monopoly over representation of its stated constituency, controlled multimillion-dollar budgets, and was ensured robust membership by virtue of the fact that all who interacted with these state agencies needed to be part of the Indigenous federation. While, again, liberal corporatism precludes certain types of state repression, Ecuadorian elected officials nevertheless managed to use the relationship to exact more informal types of control over Indigenous groups. For example, when CONAIE leaders vocally opposed President Lucio Gutiérrez's (2003–05) turn toward neoliberal policy, Gutiérrez used the agencies over which CONAIE had power to split the federation's leadership, thereby weakening the federation itself.[13]

This liberal sectoral corporatist relationship lasted from the late 1980s until the early 2010s, meaning that even under formal democratic rule, and even at the height of neoliberal policy making, Ecuador was not fully pluralist but instead contained various forms of interest intermediation defining its state–societal relationships.

"SEGMENTED NEO-CORPORATISM" IN ARGENTINA AND URUGUAY

Cases such as ethnodevelopment policy implementation in Ecuador forced scholars to recognize that earlier styles of Latin American corporatism were in fact not dead, just coming in a different form and including different groups. Similarly, certain types of more classical state–*economic sector* relationships in the Southern Cone in the early twenty-first century have shown that European-style "neo-corporatism" or "democratic corporatism" remains relevant, and so too do debates between scholars defining the term "corporatism" based on the European versus Latin American experiences.

In work regarding the inclusion of labor and business sectors in state processes in Argentina (Etchemendy and R. Collier 2007; Etchemendy 2019) and Uruguay (Etchemendy 2019), Etchemendy and others have argued that there exists "segmented neo-corporatism," whereby some South American peak

[12] CONAIE's role in the laws guiding these agencies changed over time, as did various iterations of the laws regulating them, with other federations coming to play a role in the management of the institutions. Nevertheless, there remained a near-monopoly of representation within the agencies (Chartock 2013).

[13] Leftist president Rafael Correa (2007–17) used the corporatist relationship to weaken CONAIE even more dramatically. Thus, Correa went through a series of steps to diminish the power of the agencies over which CONAIE had control until these sites of incorporation were essentially nonfunctional and no longer gave CONAIE a privileged place within the state (Martínez Novo 2021).

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labor and business organizations have partnered with the state to establish policies and processes that affect their constituencies. Though not necessarily codified into law as the representatives of their members or constituencies, these peak level organizations nevertheless have effective monopolies of representation, serve on specific councils within these states, and are functionally differentiated, in the sense of being representative of specific sectors.[14] Etchemendy (2019) thus describes how these characteristics definitional of corporatism have operated in Argentina and Uruguay, with the most powerful labor and business representatives dealing with trade-offs regarding wage policy and related processes.

Though differing in many ways from the sectoral liberal corporatism described earlier in the case of Ecuador, the two forms nevertheless share various components. Thus, just as in sectoral liberal corporatism, there is far less capacity for states to control these societal organizations and sectors, and Etchemendy and others make explicit the fact that labor and business organizations remain autonomous from the state, enough so that they can and do challenge (including organizing protests against) government processes at times, without repression (Etchemendy 2019: 1439).

The work of those studying segmented neo-corporatism not only documents the continued empirical relevance of the concept of corporatism but implicitly revives debates about what is to be included in definitions of the root concept of corporatism itself. Thus, while I follow Schmitter (1974), D. Collier (1995), and R. Collier and D. Collier (1979), among many others, in limiting the root concept's definitional characteristics to those describing *institutional* characteristics of the state–society relationship (i.e., structure, subsidy, and control), those reviving the concept of neo-corporatism (or what others studying twentieth-century northern and western Europe have called "democratic corporatism") implicitly suggest that political scientists ought to add more than institutional aspects to the root concept. They thus follow Katzenstein's (1984) classic works on countries such as Austria and Switzerland when he argues that the term *corporatism* (1) necessarily refers to economic sector inclusion; (2) includes what Schmitter, Collier, and others have instead referred to as "concertation," or the bringing together of various sectors for the purpose of policy-making; and (3) includes an ideology or culture of cooperation between sectors. Collier in "Trajectory" explicitly argues that at least 2 and 3 should in fact *not* be considered part of the root definition of corporatism. Regardless of the conceptual debate that recent work on segmented neo-corporatism revives, most importantly for this chapter, it shows the continuing relevance of the concept.

[14] As an alternative to their moniker, we might indeed call this subtype *informal liberal corporatism*, as the peak organizations are generally not written into law the way that they might have been in twentieth-century class corporatism, nor even in the way that Indigenous organizations have been in ethnodevelopment laws in Ecuador.

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VARIETIES OF CORPORATISM IN TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY LATIN AMERICA: A FURTHER LOOK AT TABLE 6.1

The liberal sectoral corporatism of Ecuador and segmented neo-corporatism of Argentina and Uruguay from 2005 to 2015 perhaps come closest to the root concept(s) of corporatism that helped analyze the empirical reality of Latin America and parts of Europe's twentieth-century-modal type of interest intermediation. Yet scholars observing contemporary Latin America have noticed and/or documented diminished subtypes in other contexts as well.[15] While this short chapter precludes a full exploration of these other subtypes, I include several of these in Table 6.1.

As Table 6.1 shows, the incorporation of interest groups into governing *parties* has meant that both Venezuela under Chavista rule and Bolivia under MAS leadership have been the sites of corporatism. The Venezuelan subtype comes closer to the paradigmatic "state" corporatism, whereby the state has a heavy hand in shaping, if not creating, civil society groups. By contrast, the Bolivian subtype comes closer to "societal" corporatism, where such groups exist prior to their incorporation into the state (Handlin and R. Collier 2009; Silva 2017; Etchemendy 2021a). While much of the twenty-first-century Brazilian council structure fits conceptually within the liberal sectoral corporatist category applied to Indigenous movement incorporation noted earlier, Jessica Rich (2019) has argued that an even more specific label of "civic corporatism" should be applied to similar phenomena when we see the involvement of bureaucratic entrepreneurs in creating such relationships. Finally, decentralization reforms alongside local participatory policies have meant that countries such as Bolivia saw a type of local corporatism taking shape in some sectors, where local councils were sometimes fully constituted by particular interest federations (Roper 2003; Chartock 2013).

Table 6.1 also highlights variations that can aid in future research on corporatism and state–society intermediation more broadly. Thus, among the characteristics that differentiate the various subtypes in Table 6.1 are the following:

(1) The **segment of civil society** with the corporatist relationship to the state. This involves newly salient sectors, such as Indigenous movement representatives in Ecuador, versus traditional corporatist sectors, such as labor federations in Uruguay.
(2) The **setting** of the corporatist relationship involving national-level interest intermediation, as in much of Brazil's council structure, versus local-level interest intermediation, as in Bolivian OTBs.

[15] While in most of the examples cited in Table 6.1 and/or the text that follows, the authors have *explicitly* drawn the connection to corporatism, this is not the case for all.

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(3) The **role of specific political parties**. This involves continuous mediation through one political party, as in Venezuelan corporatism, versus lack of formal connection to a particular party, as in ethnodevelopment policy implementation in Ecuador.

While there are other sources of variation among contemporary forms of corporatism in need of future research and analysis, the forms here show that, in almost all cases, earlier authoritarian forms of control are off the table.

It is thus clear that a number of diminished subtypes of corporatism have characterized the relationships between states and societies in Latin America since the turn toward neoliberalism and democracy, making corporatism a trend that should continue to be on the scholarly radar if we want to understand these relationships thoroughly.

CORPORATISM IN THE CONTEXT OF NEW MODES OF INCORPORATION IN LATIN AMERICA

Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, scholars of Latin America have noticed and analyzed the way that states have begun to incorporate new (and old) actors into the political process in new (and old) ways.[16] Much of this scholarship has insightfully documented the important observation that alternative modes of interest intermediation are not mutually exclusive within or between countries in the region, a fact that was even true when more structured and regionwide forms of corporatism abounded.[17]

That said, there is a perhaps natural tendency to assume that because the "century of corporatism" may be over, all forms of interest intermediation must be post-corporatist, an idea belied by the evidence cited earlier. In an effort to juxtapose the "new" forms of incorporation and inclusion to the "old" mode of corporatism, there has also been a tendency to conflate various concepts with corporatism, concepts that do not align with Schmitter's or Collier's definitions. Thus, there has been a tendency to (1) discuss corporatism as incorporation into a *nongoverning party* (a process that has certainly led to corporatism at times, although not itself a form of interest intermediation between *state* and society); (2) describe corporatism as a form of civil society participation (which by itself it is not); and (3) define twentieth-century corporatism solely as state corporatism, as a nod to states holding power relative to social groups. This is misleading conceptually

[16] See, e.g., Garay (2016) and volumes by R. Collier and Handlin (2009) and Kapiszewski, Levitsky, and Yashar (2021).

[17] Frank L. Wilson summarizes mid-twentieth-century interest intermediation as follows: "[T]he presumed polar opposite forms of interest representation [pluralism and corporatism] turn out to exist alongside each other in the same country with some groups using corporate forms of action and other groups using pluralist forms" and "[t]he same groups may at one point use corporatist forms only to use pluralist forms at another time or place" (1983: 110).

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and empirically. Conceptually, the state/societal distinction concerns the origins and timing of social groups' organization, not the balance of power. Empirically, many twentieth-century corporatist cases featured groups whose organization predated their ties to the state and are examples of societal corporatism. There has also been a tendency to claim that because the forms of interest intermediation particular scholars are examining are noncorporatist, corporatism must be a thing of the past. The analysis and evidence given here serves as an important reminder that simply because all forms of interest intermediation in the current period are not corporatist, and even if most are not, that does not mean that corporatism has died out as a relevant form of incorporating societal actors into the state.

CONCLUSION

I have argued that, contrary to the interpretation offered by several scholars, the concept of corporatism is still relevant in discussing states and societies after the turn to neoliberal economies and democratic regimes in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. Indeed, the chapter documents various subtypes of corporatism that have arisen across various country cases in the region and shows that scholars specializing in quite different countries, interest group areas, and policies have noticed this as well.

Using corporatism as a concept not only helps us understand some of the relationships between states and societies, but it also helps us to locate explanatory factors for the arrival of such relationships, their strength, their continuation, and their disappearance. For example, studies of earlier iterations of corporatism suggested that when social movement organizations were strong vis-à-vis the state, these groups received more subsidies than control and vice versa (R. Collier and D. Collier 1979). The same appears to be true in more contemporary subtypes of the relationship (Chartock 2013).

If one causal connection is clear within this analysis alone, it is that major changes in politics, society, and the economy have meant that the empirical form in which corporatism *could* arrive would necessarily be different from those that had come before, and that this has also forced scholars to adapt, rather than throw out, the valuable concept of corporatism. Thus, specific changes such as the dominance of democracy (or at least of elections), the appearance of social movements in realms such as ethnicity and gender, and the shift to neoliberal economies have led scholars to use adjectives such as "informal," "sectoral," and "civic" to make new use of a classic concept of comparative politics.

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