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Developing Workers: Coerced and "Voluntary" Labor in Zanzibar, 1909–1970

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Abstract

This article examines the history of both coerced and exploitative labor in Zanzibar between 1909 and 1970 and demonstrates that these terms were used alongside one another drawing on the same pool of laborers, most of whom were descended from slaves. Not only did these forms of labor continue to marginalize the descendants of ex-slaves, but often it was difficult for the laborers to distinguish between the forms of labor that were coerced and voluntary since both were usually couched in the language of government directives for local benefit. Laborers forced to grow food during World War II could eat that food to survive, just as laborers who voluntarily built a school were possibly able to send their children there (although in reality the poorest children usually had to work with their families). Both brought local benefit, and both were seen locally as required work, but only one was defined by international policy as "forced" labor.

> *"The more things change, the more they stay the same."*–Jean-Baptiste Alphonse Karr, 1849.

Introduction

In 1945, a colonial official, Sir Sidney Abrahams was asked to comment on whether Zanzibar's wartime policy of compulsory growing of food crops for individual and communal use fit within the International Labour Organisation's Convention on Forced Labour. Abrahams noted that while it was all well and good to try "to improve the standard of life of the community," using compulsion to do so was forced labor and unacceptable. Abrahams' distinction belies a point that colonizers faced again and again during the colonial period, as well as nationalist governments at independence: At what moment was labor "coerced"? If the government told villagers to build a school for their children, was this a form of forced labor? If the government told a community to build a road so they could bring their clove crops to market more efficiently, was this coerced labor? In these cases the government was classified as making a "request" and argued that the population "voluntarily" complied with the request. However, rural communities often saw such cases as "requests that could not be refused." Does this make them coerced labor? Or simply exploitative? This article examines the history of both coerced and exploitative

International Labor and Working-Class History
No. 92, Fall 2017, pp. 114–133
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doi:10.1017/S0147547917000126

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0147547917000126 Published online by Cambridge University Press

labor in Zanzibar between 1909 and 1970 and demonstrates that these terms were used alongside one another drawing on the same pool of laborers, most of whom were descended from slaves. Not only did these forms of labor continue to marginalize the descendants of ex-slaves, but often it was difficult for the laborers to distinguish between the forms of labor that were coerced and voluntary since both were usually couched in the language of government directives for local benefit. Laborers forced to grow food during World War II could eat that food to survive, just as laborers who voluntarily built a school were possibly able to send their children there (although in reality the poorest children usually had to work with their families). Both brought local benefit, and both were seen locally as required work, but only one was defined by international policy as "forced" labor.

Regardless of ideology, the governments of the Zanzibar Islands in the twentieth century used forced labor by marginalized populations to achieve their production goals. What their production goals consisted of and the means by which they achieved these goals changed over time. The one constant of these goals was the use of landless and economically marginalized people as coerced laborers. Because of the small size of the Zanzibar Islands and the limited mobility of its populations, it is possible to trace the links between ex-slaves and their descendants with coercive policies used by colonial and nationalist governments in the twentieth century. During both the British colonial and independent nationalist governments, policies related to coerced labor existed and were used to pick commodity crops for export, increase local food production, and produce public works such as road work and building construction.

Between 1909 and 1970, Zanzibari governments created policies that used language coded to suggest that government policies were designed to create self-sufficiency and development among marginalized populations rather than complete government production goals.[1] This language was mirrored by international entities, such as the International Labour Organisation (ILO). The ILO created a discursive and legal framework that limited the exploitation of marginalized labor in African colonies but allowed for loopholes that continued to put marginalized populations at the risk of coerced labor "for their own benefit." This article narrates the linguistic and policy frameworks used in the Zanzibar Islands to demonstrate that government officials created policies for international audiences that suggested they were building capacity among communities descended from ex-slaves while actually enforcing policies that limited the resources and mobility of ex-slaves and their descendants for the furtherance of government production goals. The Revolutionary government in 1964 shifted who was targeted by new labor regulations while fashioning policies that echoed colonial efforts to harness Zanzibari labor for the economic development of the State.

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0147547917000126 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Labor in Africa

All colonial powers in Africa were anxious about the shift from enslaved to free labor because they feared the withdrawal of ex-slaves from the labor market, as happened in the Caribbean, Egypt, and India after abolition in those locations.[2] Most colonizers attempted to ameliorate the abolition process in a way that gave them continuing control over labor for the state.[3] In his examination of colonial efforts to control labor in the Zanzibar Islands after 1897, Frederick Cooper wryly noted that colonial officials were actually very effective in producing enough labor for the clove harvests each year, ostensibly their main labor concern.[4] The story of labor in the Zanzibar Islands generally is one focused on commodity production or trade and occasionally incorporates material on labor for infrastructure.[5] The focus on commodities has hidden the issue of agricultural food production and the role of the colonial state in perpetuating forms of coerced labor in the Islands.

Agricultural labor history in Africa is often divided by the abolition process and its immediate aftermath and the post-World War I period.[6] In the past five years, though, scholars have begun tracing the linkages between the history of slavery and the history of industrial and cash crop agriculture across Africa.[7] This article demonstrates, by looking at the longue durée of labor history in a location where slavery had dominated agricultural labor, that links of coercion exist between enslaved workers and the labor of their descendants. In concert with this newer historical trajectory, I show that in the Zanzibar Islands, descendants of slaves were often the coerced laborers used during the colonial period.

Agricultural labor history also often looks at the larger-scale production efforts from the pre- to postcolonial period.[8] A history of resistance in these large scale projects tellingly illustrates the agency of Africans to resist forced labor in colonial states. However, much of this scholarship also illuminates the many ways in which colonial states were successful in exploiting and creating systems of compulsory labor.[9] In the post-World War II period, colonial states found themselves footing a much larger bill for the colonies as development became the justification to remain in Africa.[10] Social services were expensive, and with the increasing oversight of coerced labor, colonial officials had to find new ways in which to fund their development and commodity production goals across Africa. Cost sharing became a new means by which the Zanzibar government "paid" for development—the government would provide materials, and Zanzibari communities would provide labor. In Zanzibar, this form of "voluntary" labor came to underpin all government "development" work.

The joint issues of food security and development during World War II became central to the postwar development policies of both British colonies and postcolonial nations in Asia and Africa.[11] While resistance to these policies continued throughout the colonial era, in many parts of Africa, the new nations of the 1960s and 1970s attempted to institute food security through the implementation of similar forced campaigns and insisted on economically marginalized communities putting in what the British called "cost-sharing" and the

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0147547917000126 Published online by Cambridge University Press

French called a "human investment" to modernize peasant economies.[12] This notion of state development harnessing the labor of the most marginalized people ostensibly for their own "development" continues to perpetuate their impoverishment into the present day. This article draws a link between enslaved labor in the past and development labor used in the nationalist period in the Zanzibar Islands.

Labor in Zanzibar

Contrary to the claims made by colonial officials in Zanzibar, the government effectively controlled labor when necessary. However, the government was not effective in persuading ex-slaves to labor in the ways the government *wanted* them to work.[13] A debate developed in the immediate aftermath of abolition between government officials and British missionary abolitionists living in the islands about how to control ex-slave laborers. The government set up a labor bureau specifically to direct ex-slave labor to different private plantations to pick cloves during the harvests.[14] The abolitionist missionaries objected not to controlling where ex-slaves should labor but to making them labor for private profit. Laboring for the state was wholly acceptable because the state "like the abolitionists, continued to see the poverty of the laborer in terms of his own failings" rather than being caught in a system designed to abuse them.[15] A similar thinking was found by Christine Whyte in Sierra Leone and Benedetta Rossi among French colonizers in colonial Niger: When ex-slaves resisted forced labor, "French officials declared them 'backward' and 'not mature yet' for voluntary work."[16] Likewise, Eric Allina makes the case that the Portuguese used the idea of "educating" Africans through labor as a means to justify continuing their policies of forced labor rather than any intention of creating a working class.[17] Linguistically, colonial officials created a link between forced labor and the need to "civilize" ex-slave laborers as a means to justify treating this community as a cheap labor pool.

Once the Labor Bureau was eradicated by missionary interference, colonial officials found the simplest method of coercing labor was to gather "the Masheha, Headmen and people together, and then, after discussing the matter, informing them that they must send a certain number of people … to clove picking."[18] Regardless of whether compulsion was legal at the time, Mr. Last, the collector of the Islands, viewed the coercion of laborers during the clove harvest as the duty of colonial subjects to their government. Mr. Last was focused only on commodity agriculture in 1908; however, other officials made the link between controlling agricultural labor for both commodity and food production. Mr. Rivers-Smith, the new director of education, noted that he believed Africans should be taught Swahili in Arabic rather than Roman characters. His argument was not based on Islam but rather that it would keep the laboring population ignorant of European language skills and keep them doing agricultural labor. As an example to supplement his argument he offered that learning literacy had caused "trouble in the relations with the

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black population of the Southern States of America." His specific reference to ex-slaves in the United States directly ties his expectations that it was ex-slaves in the Zanzibar Islands who needed to be kept on the plantation.[19]

During World War I, officials felt that it was "necessary to provide labor for the carrying on and maintenance of works of public importance and the trade of the Protectorate" and instituted the Native Labour Control Decree and the Regulation of Adult Male Persons Decree of 1917 in order to force more agricultural labor out of the ex-slaves and the indigenous population.[20] After the end of World War I, the Native Labour Control Decree was replaced in 1923 by the Employment of Native Labour Decree, "which gives powers to District Officers … to require the attendance of natives and to order the performance of work of a public nature." In 1927, an administration official noted that no workers had been forced to pick cloves for private landowners using this law; however, the law had been enforced for road building, clove picking on government plantations, and other "needed" agricultural labor projects. By 1927, officials were lumping all Africans into the category of "native" labor; however, they still reserved a particularly dismissive attitude toward the labor of ex-slaves. As one official explained his view in a report,

> With each successive measure adopted for the abolition of slavery, labour troubles increased, the freed slaves being disinclined to do more than was necessary for a bare subsistence, and this attitude had become more and more marked until today those that are left of them and their descendants are the most unproductive members of the community. Fortunately, perhaps, as a result mainly of disease born of immoral habits, they are now rapidly dying out.

Colonial officials discursively delegitimated the marginalized populations in the Islands and made the case that forced labor was the only means by which ex-slaves and their descendants could be "civilized."

In contrast to the 1920s preoccupation with the size of the clove crop and use of regular meetings with local officials to drum up harvest pickers, a new concern occupied government officials in the 1930s—the dropping world price of cloves and the rising labor costs of picking the crop. Between 1928 and 1933 a new worry arose in the Agriculture Department's annual reports. In 1928, officials never once commented on whether enough food reserves or laborers were available for picking the clove crop, yet by 1933 these complaints were raised and continued through the next two decades. What happened in the intervening five years? Several changes occurred: The International Labour Organisation instituted a new Forced Labour Convention in 1930, the worldwide depression had precipitated a decline in the price and market for cloves, and workers brought over from the mainland demanded increasing wages to pay for imported food since they could not grow their own.

The International Labour Organization's Forced Labour Convention banned the coercion of workers for private use in the colonies, but it allowed coerced labor for "public works" that "educated" colonial subjects on how to

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be good workers.[21] The pre-1930 means of gathering workers for picking the clove crop on private land was no longer allowed. Officials before 1930 viewed their recruitment methods as "voluntary" because officials gave quotas to local Zanzibari community leaders for short-term harvesting work that was paid. As long as the workers were paid a regular wage, they were not seen as coerced. The 1930 ILO convention changed that ruling and no longer could officials give community leaders labor quotas for private purposes.[22] All laborers for picking cloves had to voluntarily put themselves forward without any instigation on the part of colonial officials.

By 1933, colonial officials were bitterly complaining about labor. The director of agriculture noted,

> In spite of the fact that large number of labourers—up to 13,000—travelled to Pemba, presumably as clove pickers, labour was difficult to obtain and often troublesome during the harvest. Work was bad, laziness was conspicuous and desertions, before refund of advances, were frequent. … Production costs must be reduced and it will be greatly to the benefit of the industry when growers will refuse to pay uneconomic picking rates, and rather leave their cloves unpicked than yield to the demands of the pickers, who will have to come into line and be content with smaller but still, to them, remunerative rates.[23]

The narrative about labor dramatically shifted in these five years, while laborers were still lazy they were also now uncontrollable and too expensive.[24] Between 1933 and 1937, government officials began the process of laying the groundwork for reasserting control over laborers that had been lost in the aftermath of the ILO convention in order to rein in production costs.

During 1935 and 1936, the smaller clove crops brought a lull in production prices because little labor was needed and most Zanzibaris turned to food production (including some townspeople).[25] Food production was up, temporarily satisfying officials, but by the end of 1936 when the second clove harvest promised to bring a large crop, local laborers refused to pick the crop. They had spent the year growing food and satisfied their household needs by selling their extra food crops to outside pickers rather than pick themselves.[26] A labor shortage ensued and wages yet again increased, much to the chagrin of the director of agriculture. Officials found that local laborers were either willing to harvest cloves and purchase imported food or grow their own food, some of which they sold in the market, but they would not do both. In 1937, officials stated there was a labor shortage but then qualified their statement by saying, "there is no real lack of labour but there is an urgent need for its proper organization and control."[27] Zanzibaris chose whichever agricultural work suited them at the time, which colonial officials found arbitrary and unacceptable. The opportunity to control laborers, in the ways officials wanted to control them, presented itself during World War II.

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World War II and Wartime Policy Changes

When Burma fell in 1942 to the Japanese army, rice imports to Zanzibar stopped, allowing colonial officials the opportunity they wanted to "organize and control" labor. The "Grow More Food" (sometimes called "Plant More Food") campaign was begun, which forced farmers in the Zanzibar Islands to grow food for the local population. Finally officials could push for self-sufficiency from the most marginalized populations. In 1942 officials introduced legislation called the Defence (Land Requisition and Personal Services) Regulations. The legislation allowed for the requisition "of any land required for food crop planting."[28] Initially all males between the ages of eighteen and forty-five who could not prove they had a full-time job were required to plant crops; however, by 1943 even those with jobs had to submit to the Defence Orders.[29] During each season the government would put out an order specifying how much of each crop had to be grown. If men did not have land, they were assigned lots by the government. Any man who tried to evade the Defence Orders was arrested, put into a prison camp, and made to produce food for the urban areas. Moreover, individual orders were allowed under the legislation allowing officials to tailor their production orders to specific regions and people.[30] Registration of laborers started in Zanzibar Town, and by November 1942 this had expanded to the country districts of the islands. Each man was given a registration card that was later used to distribute rations and organize clove harvest labor.[31] Finally, the government had the ability to organize laborers and force them to grow food crops, pick the clove harvest, and control their purchase of imported foods, thereby lowering the production costs of the clove harvests.

Laborers viewed this work as forced labor by the government because they were expected to sell part of their produce.[32] F.B. Wilson bragged, in the *East African Agricultural Journal* in 1944, that "they [Zanzibaris] are providing for their own and their families' full requirements of staple food. They are doing more: they are making a substantial contribution towards the feeding of the 60,000 people in Zanzibar Town."[33] Every man was responsible for outfitting himself with equipment and seeds. "A scheme was inaugurated by which anyone not possessing a hoe or other necessary implement, could work for three days or so and thus earn the price of a Government *jembe*, sold at Sh. 2 each."[34] Some crop starts, such as cassava, were given to growers, but people had to buy their seed rice.[35] By 1944, officials were pleased with their experiment; the town population had been fed, "there has been no famine in any part of the Protectorate," and the bumper clove crop meant "large sums of money were thus brought into local circulation."[36]

In the publicly published documents, such as the Agriculture Department's annual reports, colonial officials spoke of rural populations needing help or advice in learning how to grow foods. Occasionally officials might use a euphemism such as populations in the "tree-crop areas" to indicate their meaning of *who* in particular they wanted to coerce as laborers. However, in private

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government exchanges Zanzibari officials were open about their lack of respect for ex-slaves and their descendants, avoiding coy euphemisms.[37] Just as the official in 1927, quoted earlier, spoke derogatorily of ex-slaves, officials in 1945 continued to describe this population as "lazy," "slothful," and "apathetic."[38] Fergus Wilson, a district agriculture officer and the person who oversaw the Grow More Food campaign, argued that coerced labor needed to be continued after World War II ended because

> They [descendants of ex-slaves] have, quite definitely, not reached the stage in their emancipation and development when it can be left to them to send their children to school, to bring their cattle to the dip, to plant nutritious and life-giving pulse crops and vegetables in addition to their cassava and hopelessly overcrowded banana plants.

Wilson argued that ex-slaves were simply too stupid to be left to their own devices and had to be coerced to work. His rhetoric perpetuated the marginalization of this community in the Islands.[39]

Fergus Wilson's comments also indicate the ways in which colonial officials in the 1940s and 1950s began tying together the concepts of development and forced labor. Marginalized populations could only be taught how to be "developed" or "modern" through coerced labor practices. Likewise, the British resident in 1945, in his argument to the Colonial Office, made the case that "the improvement of social welfare, health, and education, depends very largely on the decision that is made in regard to the continuance of subsistence agriculture." And when he said "continuance of subsistence agriculture," he was speaking of his request to extend the coercion of the Defence Orders indefinitely to make sure rural—that is, slave descended—communities "developed themselves" and their colony through their labor.[40] Fergus Wilson reminded his readers that rural slave descendants had a "slave mentality" and that they were "the most backward and unresponsive people," "the worst nourished section of the population," with "the least capacity for sustained work, and the greatest lack of independence and initiative" and thus *had* to be forced to labor.[41] Both Wilson and the British resident (the highest colonial position in Zanzibar) agreed that the *only* way ex-slaves and their descendants could be modernized is through coercing their labor for their own benefit.

The issue of coercion after the end of World War II and whether coercion of labor "for their own benefit" was actually forced labor became the central question the Colonial Office dealt with when they received the British resident's request to allow the continuation of the Defence Orders. Initially officials in the Colonial Office debated whether the requested extension could be allowed under Articles 7 and 19 of the International Labour Organisation's 1930 Forced Labour Convention. One of the sticking points, as officials saw it, was that the British resident "would require natives to grow food not only for their own and their dependents support but for the general market, to meet the needs of town-dwellers and the community generally."[42] Officials began

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drafting a response to the British resident that told him to get the Sultan to pass an antifamine legislative order and to use that as cover for the coerced labor practices. However, Sir Sidney Abrahams, a former chief justice in several colonies, intervened when the file was passed to him, pointing out that the Zanzibar officials' reading of Article 19 of the ILO Convention was egregiously incorrect and that they could not extend the compulsory labor policy.[43] Abrahams made the case that "cultivation of crops for economic purposes or to improve the standard of life of the community does not, in my opinion, come within the purview of authorization by the Convention, laudable though it may well be in the interests of the community."[44] The Colonial Office passed Abrahams' decision on to the British resident toward the end of 1945, almost a year after he asked, that he could not extend the 1943 Defence Regulations, unless he could prove famine conditions would ensue.[45]

The famine needed by the British resident to keep the Defence Regulations in force materialized during 1945 and 1946, thus enabling the government to continue the planting orders that required that laborers in the countryside provide food for themselves and the towns. Poor weather created a food crisis, and near famine conditions prevailed in much of the Protectorate in early 1946, especially in the towns. In 1946 the rice crop failed, and laborers were resisting picking cloves such that the cost of hiring laborers almost doubled.[46] Being reliant only on local food crops ended up increasing production costs because the weather was not consistent.[47] During 1946 the government gave out rice and other seeds in a desperate effort to improve the food situation. Officials noted that Pembans began eating the sweet potatoes they were forced to grow out of hunger.[48] While the Agriculture Department reports usually put a positive spin on Zanzibaris reactions to the Defence Orders, their comments on Pembans' reluctance to eat sweet potatoes or pulses and other "little resistances" demonstrate that islanders saw this work as coerced, even if it was "beneficial" to them.[49]

From Forced Labor to "Responsible Labor"

By 1947 and thereafter, famine conditions on the islands had subsided, yet Defence Orders requiring the planting of certain crops and the imprisoning of "idlers" continued.[50] Officials noted in 1947 that the "improved food situation provided a reserve from other areas" such that the countryside was still supporting the towns.[51] However, 1947 also brought a significant increase in the picking wages for cloves. Even in Pemba, the doubling of wages in late 1946 had now become the standard wage.[52] Even as officials in the Colonial Office made clear to the British resident that forced labor must be stopped in the islands, Zanzibari officials moved at a snail's pace to pass new legislation. In fact, compulsory planting continued on the islands until 1956, when pressure from the Colonial Office finally stopped the practice. The committee in London in charge of monitoring British colonial adherence to the International Labour

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0147547917000126 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Organisation's Conventions became deeply frustrated with Zanzibar's intransigence over several labor issues, including forced labor.

In 1949, the Zanzibar government reported to the ILO Committee in the Colonial Office that they realized the rule was in contravention of the 1930 Convention, but they just had not had the time to adopt new legislation.[53] Four years later, the British resident wrote to the secretary of state, asking if they could give Zanzibar a model on which to base new legislation that would still allow for a limited compulsory labor force "in order to stimulate the production of food crops and discourage too exclusive a reliance on the clove."[54] At the same time as the British resident asked about how to continue compulsory labor, the Zanzibar government was also fighting over the length of contracts for indentured laborers from India (the ILO required contracts be no more than two years, and Zanzibar wanted the contracts to last four years) and workmen's compensation. In 1951, an inspector was sent out to Zanzibar to look at the compliance with ILO policies on the part of the government. The issue of workmen's compensation and accidents was raised, along with concerns about inspection of conditions on plantations and factories.[55] Thus, the metropolitan government was deeply concerned with making at least the appearance of cooperation with ILO policies. Within the correspondence on the three issues, the Colonial Office did not give the British resident on Zanzibar an answer about compulsory labor for a full year.

The ILO Committee in the Colonial Office demonstrated its total exasperation with Zanzibar in several documents, noting that "Zanzibar's reports are neat and tidy but … are almost complete re-prints of previous reports even down to the same errors." They complained that Zanzibar continued to refer to various "draft" ordinances that had passed six years previously. And they finally noted in 1957 that the Committee "trusts that twelve years after the termination of hostilities the Government will at last bring about the abolition of these wartime regulations, which are incompatible with the Convention."[56] The Zanzibar Government reported that it had finally complied with the ILO Convention by revoking the Defence Regulations of 1943 on May 23, 1957. No longer would a policy of government coercion of labor exist on the islands. As the Committee noted in 1960, the labor reports from Zanzibar continued to "nearly always contain something startling & something tantalizing and usually one or two extraordinary items."[57] Clearly, concerns over compulsory food planting were not the only violation of labor conventions that Zanzibar practiced.

In the minds of colonial officials, their continuation of the Defence Orders well past 1945 was not an arbitrary action. In the later 1930s a mysterious disease began attacking clove trees and killing them. By 1947, Sudden Death, as it came to be called, had killed half of the clove trees on Zanzibar Island. With so many trees hit in 1947, the faith of clove tree owners and colonial officials was severely shaken.[58] Sudden Death, along with the failure of food crops because of weather, exacerbated the long-held mentality among colonial officials that islanders needed to be self-sufficient and that the only way to do this was to

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make the Islands more productive through compulsory agricultural labor.[59] In the early 1950s, scientists in the islands figured out the cause of Sudden Death, but sufficient treatment options took another decade of work, prolonging officials' concerns about the economy of the islands.

Thus the multiple concerns about the economy, from the fears of the boom-bust cycle of monocrop agriculture, Sudden Death, and limited food security weighed on the minds of colonial officials who in the mid-1950s had to abolish the Defence Orders. These concerns showed up in the five-year development plan written for 1955—1959. After saying the economy of Zanzibar was "fundamentally unstable," officials complained:

> … Zanzibar suffers perhaps from excessive but well-intentioned paternalism; Whereas the bulk of the population pays no direct tax most of the social services are provided free … in Zanzibar it has resulted in some lack of a proper sense of responsibility towards expenditure on social services … it appears desirable to try to adjust the balance as between direct and indirect sources [of tax/income for govt] not only in order to secure greater stability in the revenue position but also because I believe it will result in a fairer incidence and a greater sense of responsibility.[60]

While laborers could no longer be forced to support themselves, officials needed to find new ways to make the majority of the population in the Islands "responsible." By using the language of "responsibility" officials discursively reinforced the perception that communities descended from slaves (i.e., the rural population) were incapable of becoming developed on their own.

The language and idiom of development became the central means by which colonial officials in the late 1950s and early 1960s engaged with labor on the islands. "Self-help" was the means by which labor was engaged for development, and yet this language was not new. The annual report of 1928 mentioned several buildings and projects where the local population "volunteered" their labor.[61] In 1944, the British government imposed a new program in their colonies called "mass education." The purpose of mass education was to harness the "voluntary" labor of rural, marginalized populations to bring economic development to the colonies.[62] Zanzibar would be modernized through the labor of rural communities provided at no cost to the colonial government. Christine Whyte notes a similar discursive shift in Sierra Leone, where in the "post-war period 'communal labor' was gradually replaced by 'community development,' a scheme that also relied on the coercion of labor."[63] In 1948 Makunduchi was chosen as the model village of the mass education program for Zanzibar.

Initially government officials saw positive change occurring in Makunduchi. "The Committee" (i.e., colonial-run) in charge of the program gave "preference to projects where the local community was willing to contribute to the cost either in money or, even better, by the provision of free labour or other service."[64] Within a year, the community began to rebel against the

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implementation of government projects. The social welfare officer reported in 1950 that "it appeared that there was more cooperation by the villagers [in Makunduchi] in measures of social betterment, but later experience has shown that this co-operation was entirely superficial."[65] Within three years of declaring mass education as the solution to development in Zanzibar, officials were so frustrated by obstructions from the community that the "Social Welfare Co-ordinating Committee decided in February 1951, that there should be no further expansion of Government services in the area until such time as a more co-operative attitude might be forthcoming from the inhabitants."[66] Yet again, colonial officials reported that rural people were the problem, not the requirement by the government that they work "for their own betterment." Harkening back to earlier infrastructural projects in the 1920s, such as road building, laborers in the Islands were asked to "contribute their share" of the cost of development by "volunteering" their labor. By actively treating rural communities, especially those descended from former slaves, as a problematic pool of free labor rather than seeing the economic system exploiting them, colonizers in Zanzibar created a system of labor usage that perpetuated the economic oppression of the most marginalized communities. These communities, such as the villagers in Makunduchi, were well aware of this problem and actively resisted programs that defined their "development" for them.

In looking at the roles of coerced and "voluntary" labor during the postabolition colonial period (1909–1963), two points emerge. Firstly, no matter how rural populations reacted to colonial policies, those descended from enslaved people were consistently viewed as lazy and incapable of changing by colonial officials. Secondly, rural populations clearly were doing significant work reproducing their communities through food production, producing profit for the colonial government through commodity production, and development of infrastructure through "voluntary" labor. The examples given earlier of colonial denigration of former slaves and their descendants culminated in the 1960 Economic Development Report commissioned by the government. In the report the authors, Selwyn and Watson, repeatedly noted, "The farming community consider that Government should give them more assistance. This attitude is in our view part of the general lack of initiative which we have encountered throughout the whole economy."[67] Selwyn and Watson's blame of the economic problems of the islands on the unwillingness of Zanzibaris to labor beyond their personal necessity, even when they owned the land they farmed, echoed complaints of earlier agricultural officials who clamored for compulsory agricultural labor. In a section titled "Lack of Initiative," Selwyn and Watson complain, "The amount of effort which the individual farmer puts into agricultural production is determined in the last resort mainly by the nature, intensity and order of his wants." Yet again, laborers in the rural areas were "lazy" and lacked "responsibility."

The irony of this narrative was not lost on rural communities in the Islands. They knew they were doing a lot of work (picking cloves several months during

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the year, growing food crops that took months to grow, and laboring "voluntarily" on various government projects). And communities certainly saw some of this work as valuable to them. Clove picking allowed them to earn cash, which they used to buy a variety of items, imported food being just one of them.[68] While the Makunduchi community resisted the "model village" approach of mass education, surrounding villages happily worked with the government to share the cost of boring holes for wells since fresh water was a constant problem in the rural areas of both islands.[69] Rural communities on Pemba Island, when asked in 2002 about their experiences under British colonialism, offered a mixed reaction. Their responses were colored by their lives under the Revolutionary government after 1964. However, many of the farmers recollected their parents as being "self-sufficient" in terms of food, contrary to colonial reports of the time.[70] One man in his eighties recalled that "life under the British administration was no good especially for the Swahili."[71] This reference indicates the memory of discrimination by colonial officials continued to linger for that individual. The specific language used to justify controlling the labor of ex-slaves and their descendants, and other working-class groups on Zanzibar certainly shifted over time. However, the rhetoric remained consistent in attributing the problems of the Zanzibar economy—many of which were caused by outside forces beyond Zanzibar, such as world markets and world wars—to the inability of marginalized laborers to understand the value of (their) labor and their social responsibility to labor for all sectors of Zanzibari society (including the colonizers).

Coercive Labor Policies after the Revolution

After the revolution of January 1964, the new government of Zanzibar propagated an ideology of "nation building" (*kujenga taifa*), which paralleled the mainland *ujamaa* project.[72] Community members were encouraged to "build the nation" through their voluntary work for the state and join in the new president's ideas of discipline that would help Zanzibar become modernized.[73]

> Zanzibar's nationalist government … enforce[d] citizens' compliance with nation building. Zanzibar's miniscule size made communications relatively easy, at the same time that the clove boom on international markets during most of the revolutionary period (1964–80) gave the Zanzibari government unusual resources with which to mobilize the labor of their citizens.[74]

Yet again, rural communities in the islands were expected to both produce commodities for the state's profit and offer their "voluntary" labor for the benefit of food security and development. Similar to the experience under colonialism, the response of Zanzibaris to the government's calls for nation building were mixed.

In urban areas of the Zanzibar Islands, many of the nation-building projects involved building housing. However, urban youth were also sent to rural camps to farm for the nation. Initially, recruits to these camps were volunteers

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and were usually political party members.[75] Thomas Burgess argues that the Zanzibar government, "expended considerable resources in an attempt to create a new generation for whom hard physical labor would be a deeply felt need, an essential condition of an honorable life."[76] While the rhetoric of agricultural labor for the state remained the same, the target of this rhetoric had changed a little. Ali Sultan Issa, a leader in the early revolutionary government of Zanzibar, recollected that even as these young men "voluntarily" worked on the farms, many nearly starved to death.

In the rural areas, the new citizens of the nation of Tanzania were encouraged to become self-reliant in their food production. On the mainland Julius Nyerere famously encouraged villagization as a means to create self-reliance among rural populations.[77] In Zanzibar, and especially Pemba (which had not initially supported the Zanzibar Revolution of 1964), peasants were not moved into villages because of the existing population density.[78] Ali Sultan Issa recalled that in 1968 President Karume "decided that the country had to become self-sufficient in food production. … The only way to get our people to produce food themselves, he thought, was to stop importing rice, sugar, and flour, to put our people on rations."[79] Only people in urban areas were given rations, and even these were kept small in order to "stimulate local production of the rationed commodities, while saving foreign exchange."[80] Once again, the rural population of the Islands was forced to both feed themselves and the urban dwellers of their nation.

The imposition in the late 1960s of coerced labor by the national government, along with rationing to encourage food self-sufficiency, echoed the colonial efforts of the early 1950s. The economy of Zanzibar was not under attack, no famine existed, the price of cloves was booming in the late 1960s, but the new government wanted to "discipline" the laborers of the nation. The difference between the colonial and nationalist governments was the target of government policies. During the colonial period it was the descendants of ex-slaves who were "backward" and "lacking in a sense of responsibility" to their communities. By the nationalist period all people in the society had to learn to work hard as citizens of the new state. Part of this logic comes from the impetus of the Revolution itself. The Revolution overthrew the colonized elites, those whose wealth had been generated through the labor of primarily rural people; thus, the elite now had to learn how to work. The Revolutionary government fashioned a system where everyone worked for the state, not just those descended from enslaved people. Rural populations were still marginalized under the Revolutionary government, but so was everyone else (not connected to the government). Marginalization was no longer associated with descent, as under the colonial government, but instead upon location. Moreover, the Revolutionary government had conflated the two categories of forced and voluntary labor—the labor in most cases was definitely coerced but was classified by the government as "voluntary."[81]

The developmental discourse during the nationalist period called for all citizens of the state to participate in building the new nation. Development was

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directly tied to the nation state and the patriotic duty of citizenship to work for the better of all citizens. The Revolutionary government argued that everyone, even schoolchildren, had to help build the economy of the state in order for success.[82] The colonial and Revolutionary governments discursively framed development as the practices of self-reliance, self-sufficiency, and increasing the production of the state economy. However, the discourses differed in the role of citizenship as central to the developmental discourse of the Revolutionary government. During the colonial period, only marginalized communities and the "workers" were responsible for helping to bring in the wealth of the state; after 1964 all citizens, regardless of their economic or social status, were part of the development project of the state.

Conclusion

The unwillingness of ex-slaves in Zanzibar to fit their work patterns to the desires of the British colonizers required colonial officials to create policies that coerced labor from ex-slaves and their descendants. Colonial officials proceeded over the next fifty years after abolition to vilify ex-slaves and their descendants, suggesting that they could never modernize. From the 1927 complaints that "freed slaves" and their "descendants are the most unproductive members of the community" to the 1960 discussion of Zanzibari squatters (primarily descendants of ex-slaves) as lacking "responsibility" for both the colony's economy and development demonstrates a consistent rhetoric that perpetuated the marginalization of rural communities. Yet, most of the commodity production that brought economic value to the colonial state was produced by these same supposedly "unproductive" rural populations. By defining rural communities as unproductive and irresponsible toward their own development, colonial officials created a narrative that justified their policies that forced rural communities to share the costs of economic development for the state in ways urban communities were not.

Regardless of whether laborers were subjects (during the colonial period) or citizens (during the revolutionary period), both governments used coerced labor for the benefit of state needs. The governments successfully found justifications for using forced labor during events they classified as extraordinary, such as war, famine, or nation building. The success of the governments in creating coercive labor policies that evaded international labor protocols against forced labor encouraged the continuance of such practices. Thus, the idea that marginalized communities have to share the cost of their development, through their labor, has continued in various development policies into the present. And just as British officials ignored the wide variety of work that marginalized communities did to survive, through commodity and food production as well as with development labor, the discourse continues into the present-day to perpetuate a mythology of ungrateful, lazy rural people who do not work for their own benefit or that of their state.

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NOTES

1. The 1897 Abolition Order in Zanzibar required that slaves apply for their freedom from the government. In 1909 the government issued a complete abolition order that ended the status of slavery in the Islands. Thus, some policies regarding ex-slave labor began before 1909.

2. For official concerns in Zanzibar, *Correspondence Respecting Slavery in Zanzibar* (London, 1895). This book includes letters from Rennell Rodd, Consul General at Zanzibar, December 31, 1893, arguing that abolition was not feasible at the time. Also a letter from the Earl of Kimberly to Mr. Hardinge (newly appointed Consul General to Zanzibar), November 27, 1894, citing abolition from India and Egypt. For examples of other empire concerns about abolition and loss of labor, see Christopher Schmidt-Nowara, "Empires against Emancipation: Spain, Brazil, and the Abolition of Slavery," *Review (Fernand Braudel Center)* 31 (2008): 101–119. This article is in a special issue that has a number of other articles of interest for this topic.

3. There are many, many scholars who have written about this issue across the continent. For a few examples, see Eric Allina, *Slavery by Any Other Name: African Life under Company Rule in Colonial Mozambique* (Charlottesville, VA, 2012); Carolyn Brown, "Testing the Boundaries of Marginality: Twentieth-Century Slavery and Emancipation Struggles in Nkanu, Northern Igboland, 1920–29," *The Journal of African History* 37 (1996): 51–80; Trevor Getz, *Slavery and Reform in West Africa: Toward Emancipation in Nineteenth-Century Senegal and the Gold Coast* (Athens, OH, 2004); Martin A. Klein, *Slavery and Colonial Rule in French West Africa* (New York, 1998); Elisabeth McMahon, *Slavery and Emancipation in Islamic East Africa: From Honor to Respectability* (New York, 2013); Richard Roberts, *Litigants and Households: African Disputes and Colonial Courts in the French Soudan, 1895–1912* (Portsmouth, NH, 2005); Rossi, *From Slavery to Aid.*

4. Frederick Cooper, *From Slaves to Squatters: Plantation Labor and Agriculture in Zanzibar and Coastal Kenya, 1890–1925* (New Haven, CT, 1980), 69. *Africa*, No. 8 (1899), *Correspondence Respecting the Status of Slavery in East Africa and the Islands of Zanzibar and Pemba* (London, 1899), 34–35; Cooper, *From Slaves to Squatters*, 94. As Cooper notes, the vice consul of Pemba said that every landless "native" had to work—this would refer most closely to the former slave population of the island.

5. Ibid.; Erik Gilbert, *Dhows and the Colonial Economy of Zanzibar 1860–1970* (Athens, OH, 2004); Elisabeth McMahon, "Becoming Pemban: Identity, Social Welfare and Community during the Protectorate Period" (Ph.D. diss., Indiana University, 2005); Abdul Sheriff, *Slaves, Spices and Ivory in Zanzibar: Integration of an East African Commercial Empire into the World Economy, 1770–1873* (Athens, OH, 1987); Abdul Sheriff and Ed Ferguson, *Zanzibar under Colonial Rule* (Athens, OH, 1991); Timothy Welliver, "The Clove Factor in Colonial Zanzibar 1890–1950" (Ph.D. thesis, Northwestern University, 1990).

6. For examples of the moment of abolition as labor history, see Jan-Georg Deutsch, *Emancipation without Abolition in German East Africa c.1884–1914* (Athens, OH, 2006); Robin Law, Suzanne Schwarz, and Silke Strickrodt, eds., *Commercial Agriculture, the Slave Trade and Slavery in Atlantic Africa* (Rochester, 2013); Thaddeus Sunseri, *Vilimani: Labor Migration and Rural Change in Early Colonial Tanzania* (Portsmouth, 2002). For post-World War I labor history, see Frederick Cooper, *Decolonization and African Society: The Labor Question in French and British Africa* (Cambridge, 1996); Judith Heyer, Pepe Roberts, and Gavin Williams, eds., *Rural Development in Tropical Africa* (New York, 1981); Monica M. van Beusekom, *Neogtiating Development: African Farmers and Colonial Experts at the Office du Niger, 1920–1960* (Portsmouth, 2002). For books that offer exceptions, see Martin Klein's book, *Slavery and Colonial Rule in French West Africa* (Cambridge, 1998) includes a chapter that tells the story of labor from the 1920s into the 1970s.

7. Benedetta Rossi, *From Slavery to Aid: Politics, Labour, and Ecology in the Nigerien Sahel, 1800–2000* (New, 2015); Christina Whyte, "Freedom but Nothing Else": The Legacies of Slavery and Abolition in Post-Slavery Sierra Leone, 1928–1956," *International Journal of African Historical Studies* 48 (2015): 231–50 (as well as the other articles in this special issue).

8. Gareth Austin, *Labour, Land and Capital in Ghana: From Slavery to Free Labour in Asante, 1807–1956* (Rochester, 2005); Bernard Moitt, "From Pack Animals to Railways: Transport and the Expansion of Peanut Production and Trade in Senegal, 1840–1940," *Outre-Mers: Revue d'Histoire* 88 (2001): 241–67; Jan S. Hogendorn, *Nigerian Groundnut*

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Exports: Origins and Early Development (Oxford, 1979); J.S. Hogendorn and K.M. Scott, "The East African Groundut Scheme: Lessons of a Large-scale Agricultural Failure," *African Economic History* 10 (1981): 81–115; A. G. Hopkins, *An Economic History of West Africa* (New York, 2014); Jeanne Marie Penvenne, *Women, Migration and the Cashew Economy in Southern Mozambique, 1945–75* (Oxford, 2015); Van Beusekom, *Negotiating Development*.

9. Kwabena O. Akurang-Parry, "Mobilization and African Response to the Compulsory Labour Ordinance in the Gold Coast (Colonial Ghana), 1875–1899," *Transactions of the Historical Society of Ghana* 4/5 (2000): 83–104; Allina, *Slavery by Any Other Name*; Alexander Keese, "Hunting 'Wrongdoers' and 'Vagrants': The Long-Term Perspective of Flight, Evasion, and Persecution in Colonial and Postcolonial Congo-Brazzaville, 1920–1980," *African Economic History* 44 (2016): 152–180.

10. Jutta Bolt and Ellen Hillbom, "Long-Term Trends in Economic Inequality: Lessons from Colonial Botswana, 1921–1974," *Economic History Review* 69 (2016): 1255–84; Obi Iwuagwu, "Rural Development in Eastern Nigeria: An Assessment of Colonial and Post Colonial Development Plans in the former Owerri Province, 1946–1976," *Lagos Historical Review* 6 (2006): 118–32.

11. Paul Chuba Agba, "A Configurational Analysis of the Diffusion Models and Media Strategies Used in the 'Operation Feed the Nation' (OFN) Campaign in Nigeria 1976–1979" (Ph.d. diss., Indiana University, 1980); R.V. Bhuskute, "Tribals, Dalits and Government Lands"; S.L. and W.S., "Shiv Sena Enters Rural Politics: Campaign against Dalits in Marathwada Villages," *Economic and Political Weekly* 21 (1986): 66–67; Priya Lal, *African Socialism in postcolonial Tanzania: Between the Village and the World* (New York, 2015); Leander Schneider, *Government of Development: Peasants and Politicians in postcolonial Tanzania* (Bloomington, IN, 2014); Barbara Thomas, "State Formation, Development, and the Politics of Self-help in Kenya," *Studies in Comparative International Development* 23 (1988): 3–28.

12. Rossi, *From Slavery to Aid*, 17.

13. Cooper, *From Slaves to Squatters*, 69.

14. Africa, No. 8 (1899), *Correspondence Respecting the Status of Slavery in East Africa and the Islands of Zanzibar and Pemba* (London, 1899), 34–35; Cooper, *From Slaves to Squatters*, 94. As Cooper notes, the vice consul of Pemba said that every landless "native" had to work. This would refer most closely to the former slave population of the island.

15. Cooper, *From Slaves to Squatters*, 65.

16. Christine Whyte, "Freedom But Nothing Else": The Legacies of Slavery and Abolition in Post-Slavery Sierra Leone, 1928–1956," *International Journal of African Historical Studies* 48 (2015): 231–50; Rossi, *From Slavery to Aid*, 18.

17. Allina, *Slavery by Any Other Name.*

18. NAUK FO 403/395 Further Correspondence, No. 39, Inclosure no. 2 Mr. Last to Mr. Cave, May 23, 1908, 86.

19. NAUK FO 403/395 Further Correspondence, 57.

20. NAUK CO 618/41/12 Labor in Zanzibar 1927.

21. An exception was made for Africans in colonial militaries or penitentiaries.

22. Daniel Roger Maul, "The International Labour Organization and the Struggle against Forced Labour from 1919 to the Present," *Labor History* 48 (2007), 477–500.

23. Zanzibar Protectorate, *Annual Report on the Department of Agriculture for the year 1933* (Zanzibar, 1933), 4.

24. Between 1927 and 1937 increasing efforts were made to control alcohol consumption in the islands, especially on Pemba in order to have better "control" over the population. See NAUK CO618/42/4 Liquor decree of 1927; NAUK CO618/54/22 Methylated spirit on Pemba 1932; NAUK CO618/69/12 Native Liquor Regulation 1937.

25. For a note on townspeople going to the country to work, see Zanzibar Protectorate, *Annual Report on the Department of Agriculture for the year 1936* (Zanzibar, 1936), 1.

26. Importing labor from the mainland was costly because the government paid the laborers transportation, and sometimes Tanganyikan and Kenyan authorities objected because it deprived their colonies of labor.

27. Zanzibar Protectorate, *Annual Report on the Department of Agriculture for the Year 1937* (Zanzibar, 1937), 2.

28. Fergus B. Wilson, "Emergency Food Production in Zanzibar," *East African Agricultural Journal* 10 (1994): 93.

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29. Wilson, "Emergency Food Production in Zanzibar," 93; See also Zanzibar Protectorate, *Annual Report on the Department of Agriculture for the Year 1943* (Zanzibar, 1943), 1.

30. Wilson, "Emergency Food Production in Zanzibar," 93.

31. Wilson, "Emergency Food Production in Zanzibar," 95; For more on rations in Zanzibar during World War II, see Fair, *Pastimes and Politics*, 46–51.

32. Wilson notes that it was very hard at first to impose the orders because people assumed the government was going to take all of their produce rather than make them sell part of it. Between the arrests of "idlers" and government propaganda Islanders quickly learned that they had no choice about growing food.

33. Wilson, "Emergency Food Production in Zanzibar," 93.

34. Wilson, "Emergency Food Production in Zanzibar," 94.

35. For examples see Zanzibar Protectorate, *Annual Report on the Department of Agriculture for the year 1947* (Zanzibar: Government Printer, 1947), 10; 1948, 6; 1949, 8.

36. Wilson, "Emergency Food Production in Zanzibar," 100.

37. Using the term "tree-crop" is a clear marker for ex-slave because most of the people who lived in the clove plantation areas were descendants of either slaves or owners. Ex-slaves and their descendants were the vast majority of the population in many of these regions. However, a casual reader would not understand this distinction. The term "Swahili" was used as well. Laura Fair argues that by the 1920s, the identity of Swahili was code for an ex-slave or his/her descendant. Laura Fair, Pastimes and Politics: Culture, Community, and Identity in Post-Abolition Urban Zanzibar, 1890–1945 (Athens, OH: 2001).

38. NAUK CO 618/82/6, Local Food Production. Compulsory Cultivation of Land.

39. NAUK CO 618/82/6, Local Food Production. Compulsory Cultivation of Land. "Compulsory Measures in Relation to Future Development of the Rural Peoples of Zanzibar," a note by F.B. Wilson, MBE, district agricultural officer. Notably, Wilson wrote a report in 1938 on rural education in Zanzibar making recommendations on how to improve rural education. He references that report in his "Note" included in this file as justification of why he "understood" the rural people and their needs.

40. NAUK CO 618/82/6, Local Food Production. Compulsory Cultivation of Land. Letter from British Resident, January 10, 1945.

41. NAUK CO 618/82/6, Local Food Production. Compulsory Cultivation of Land. "Compulsory Measures in Relation to Future Development of the Rural Peoples of Zanzibar," a note by F.B. Wilson, MBE, district agricultural officer.

42. NAUK CO 618/82/6, Local Food Production. Compulsory Cultivation of Land. Minutes on the file, March 21, 1945.

43. NAUK CO 618/82/6, Local Food Production. Compulsory Cultivation of Land. Minutes on the file, September 14, 1945.

44. NAUK CO 618/82/6, Local Food Production. Compulsory Cultivation of Land. Minutes on the file, August 28, 1945.

45. NAUK CO 618/82/6, Local Food Production. Compulsory Cultivation of Land. Letter dated October 8, 1945, from the Colonial Office to the British resident, No. 85 Confidential.

46. Normally laborers would work to pick cloves so they could purchase food; however, in early 1946 imported food was still scarce, thus laborers would have been earning money but still unable to buy food. Many decided to stick to their food crops rather than earn cash they could not eat.

47. Zanzibar Protectorate, *Annual Report on the Department of Agriculture for the Year 1946* (Zanzibar, 1946), 3, 5, 8. An addendum included in the file NAUK CO 618/82/6 but never referred to by any of the minutes included an analysis from 1944 (with no identifiable author) that argued that producing food self-sufficiency in the Zanzibar Islands would increase production costs for the clove harvest and that it was more efficient to keep local laborers tethered to a cash economy with cheap imported food.

48. Zanzibar Protectorate, *Annual Report on the Department of Agriculture for the year 1945* (Zanzibar: 1945), 4.

49. Zanzibar Protectorate, *Annual Report on the Department of Agriculture for the year 1946* (Zanzibar, 1946), 8; Wilson, "Emergency Food Production in Zanzibar," 100; NAUK CO 618/82/6, Fergus Wilson's report noted that an effort to make townspeople grow rice nine miles from their homes completely failed and that people planted when it worked to their benefit.

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50. For information on the end of the famine and the continuing imprisonment of "idlers," see Zanzibar Protectorate, *Annual Report on the Department of Agriculture for the Year 1947* (Zanzibar, 1947), 4. For Defence Orders through 1956, see report 1948–1956, Zanzibar Protectorate, *Annual Report on the Department of Agriculture for the Year 1948* (Zanzibar, 1948), 31–33; 1949, 39–40; 1950, 29; 1952, 23; 1953, 22; 1954, 25; 1955, 26; 1956, 26–27.

51. Zanzibar Protectorate, *Annual Report on the Department of Agriculture for the year 1947* (Zanzibar: 1947), 10.

52. Ibid., 8.

53. NAUK CO 859/700 Social Services Depts: International Labour Conventions Applications to the Colonies—Zanzibar.

54. NAUK CO 859/345 Labour Legislation in Zanzibar.

55. NAUK CO 822/662 Report of Labor Advisor 1952.

56. NAUK CO 859/1055 International Labour Conventions Application to Colonies 1957.

57. NAUK CO 859/1532 Labour Department Annual Reports Zanzibar, 1960–62. From the context, the reader can see the negative connotation meant by the authors of the report toward the Zanzibar Government.

58. G. E. Tidbury, *The Clove Tree* (London, 1949).

59. I emphasize making Pemba more productive because during the war the government "aimed at making the rural population almost independent of external supplies of staple foods and to provide, in addition, a substantial surplus of some staples including fruit for consumption by the non-producing population of about 60,000 people in Zanzibar Town." Zanzibar Protectorate, *Annual Report on the Department of Agriculture for the year 1944* (Zanzibar, 1944), 2.

60. NAUK CO 822/980 Notes on the Zanzibar development plan 1955.

61. Zanzibar Protectorate. *Administrative Reports for the Year 1928* (Zanzibar, 1929), 35.

62. Zanzibar National Archives (hereafter ZNA) AB1/46 SECRETARIAT. *Community Development/Mass Education in African Society.* Report by the Advisory Committee on Education in the Colonies. December 1947–October 1957.

63. Whyte, "Freedom But Nothing Else," 231.

64. ZNA AB1/46 SECRETARIAT. Community Development/Mass Education in African Society. Report by the Advisory Committee on Education in the Colonies. December 1947–October 1957. Conference draft report of the subcommittee on Mass Education and Development Planning. Many postcolonial development projects were run at the local levels by committees that negotiated the national needs for local consumption and translated local objections to the national level. For examples, see Rossi, *From Slavery to Aid,* 215–24; Kate Skinner, "Who Knew the Minds of the People? Specialist Knowledge and Developmentalist Authoritarianism in Postcolonial Ghana," *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 39 (2011): 297–323; Lal, *African Socialism in Postcolonial Tanzania* 46–47. Lal implies, rather than specifically talks about, how committees came to run many of the aspects of national development.

65. Zanzibar Protectorate, *Annual Report on the Department of Social Welfare for the year 1950* (Zanzibar, 1950), 12–13.

66. Zanzibar Protectorate, *Annual Report on the Department of Social Welfare for the year 1951* (Zanzibar,1951), 3.

67. NAUK CO 822/2566 Development Plan for Zanzibar 1960–64, Report on the Economic Development of the Zanzibar Protectorate by P. Selwyn and T.Y. Watson, CMG.

68. Officials on Pemba beginning in 1895 noted that with every boom in the clove market "piece goods" (cloth) purchases boomed as well. In the early years the Vice Consul, Dr. O'Sullivan-Beare, complained about the wastefulness of pickers buying cloth, but by the 1940s when laborers refused to pick cloves and the price began rising, one official noted that perhaps bringing in more cloth would get laborers to work.

69. Zanzibar Protectorate, *Annual Report on the Department of Social Welfare for the year 1951* (Zanzibar, 1951), 13; Annual Report on the Department of SocialWelfare for the year 1952 (Zanzibar, 1952), 19; Annual Report on the Department of SocialWelfare for the year 1959 (Zanzibar, 1959), 10, for examples.

70. Oral interviews (my IRB clearance in 2002 required that I not name the individuals. I have kept a list of all ID numbers with the names if needed for reference): ID 011 (male farmer) October 29, 2002; ID 013 (male farmer) October 29, 2002; ID 022 (male farmer) October 30,

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2002; ID 029 (male farmer) October 31, 2002. Surveys conducted in Chwale, Shengejuu, and Ukunjwi.

71. Oral interview ID 033 (male farmer) October 31, 2002.

72. The Zanzibar Islands were a separate country from the mainland (Tanganyika) at independence in December 1963. In April 1964 the mainland and islands joined to become Tanzania. No vote was held about the merger. It was negotiated between Julius Nyerere and Abeid Karume. Julius Nyerere was the president of Tanzania. After the merger, Tanzania had two vice presidents, one of whom was the president of Zanzibar. This role was first filled by Abeid Karume.

73. Thomas Burgess, "Cinema, Bell Bottoms, and Miniskirts: Struggles over Youth and Citizenship in Revolutionary Zanzibar," *The International Journal of African Historical Studies* 35 (2002): 289–90.

74. Ibid., 289.

75. G. Thomas Burgess, *Race, Revolution, and the Struggle for Human Rights in Zanzibar: the Memoirs of Ali Sultan Issa and Seif Sharif Hamad* (Athens, OH, 2009), 117–18, 204, 208–209.

76. G. Thomas Burgess, "To Differentiate Rice from Grass: Youth Labor Camps in Revolutionary Zanzibar," in *Generations Past: Youth in East African History*, ed. Andrew Burton and Helene Charton-Bigot (Athens, OH, 2010), 221.

77. There is a large literature on the making of *Ujamaa* villages in Tanzania. See Priya Lal, *African Socialism in postcolonial Tanzania*; Leander Schneider, *Government of Development*; Michael Jennings, *Surrogates of the State: NGOs, Development, and Ujamaa in Tanzania* (Bloomfield, CT, 2008); Goran Hyden, *Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania: Underdevelopment and an Uncaptured Peasantry* (Berkeley, 1980), among many other books and articles.

78. For more details on Pemba's position after the Revolution, see Nathalie Arnold, "Wazee Wakijua Mambo! Elders Used to Know Things! Occult Powers and Revolutionary History in Pemba, Zanzibar" (Ph.D. diss., Indiana University, 2003); Anthony Clayton, *The Zanzibar Revolution and its Aftermath* (Hamden, CT, 1981); Esmond Bradley Martin (London, 1978); Elisabeth McMahon, "Becoming Pemban: Identity, Social Welfare and Community During the Protectorate Period" (Ph.D. diss., Indiana University, 2005).

79. Burgess, *Race, Revolution, and the Struggle for Human Rights in Zanzibar*, 127.

80. George Triplett, "Zanzibar: The Politics of Revolutionary Inequality," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 9 (1971): 615.

81. Thomas Burgess, "Youth and the Revolution: Discipline and Mobility in Zanzibar, 1950–80" (Ph.D. diss., Indiana University, 2001), 289–96, 340–46.

82. Ibrahim Fokas Shao, *The Political Economy of Land Reforms in Zanzibar: Before and After the Revolution* (Dar es Salaam, 1992), 63. Primary and secondary school children were forced to pick cloves in 1976 in order to bring in the clove crop.

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