it not unfortunately true that very few asylums have a collection of books bearing on asylums or psychological medicine. It might have been supposed that if the small expense involved in such a collection ought not to be paid for out of the rates, some spirited member of the Asylum Committee would present it to the asylum.

Vols. III. and IV. have not yet been published.

Induction and Deduction. By CONSTANCE C. W. NADEN. Edited by R. Lewins, M.D. Bickers and Son.

Constance Naden: Further Reliques. Bickers and Son.

Constance Naden and Hylo-Idealism: A Critical Study. By E. COBHAM BREWER, LL.D. Bickers and Son.

A New Philosophy.

It is a good deal to say of any philosophy that it is new, and though originality be not the chief question in weighing the merit of any system of human thought, it is, at least, in this sense important that it evidences, where it really exists, a rare amount of character and intellectual force, such as may well command the attention of the thoughtful student. That Miss Constance Naden, whose philosophical essays lie before us, was a woman of rare force of intellectual character, no one will deny. That she died untimely, before her work was well begun, is one of those sad incidents of the world's course which we can only regret. But whatever the ultimate value of her philosophical scheme may prove to be, it is well worth the student's while to pause for a moment and examine it with that interest which must always attach to fresh thought.

Her career is sufficiently remembered. The daughter of parents in a narrow way of life at Birmingham, she studied ultimately at Mason College, and advanced to attainments of no mean order in scientific work. She was a personal force in debating clubs and similar fields, and she wrote poems, which became somewhat famous because they attracted the praise of Mr. Gladstone in one of the first numbers of "The Speaker." Her health broke down after a visit to the East, just as she was taking up her life in London, and she died at the close of 1889.

Her main interest, as these volumes abundantly testify, was in the discovery and working out of a philosophical

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scheme of the world of knowledge, which should combine for her mind the merits of the English and the Neokantian systems of thought, and avoid the difficulties of both. It is alleged in Dr. Dale's notice of his friend that the influence of Dr. Lewins upon her mind was a decisive factor in the formation of her system. Dr. Lewins, it is only fair to say, repudiates this theory; but it is not necessary to discuss the steps by which Miss Naden came to her belief. It is evident that she was much influenced at one time by Mr. Herbert Spencer, and that she was by no means unacquainted with the thought of the English Neokantian school, whose chief exponent was the late Professor T. H. Green. But when once the new scheme of the universe had laid hold upon her, she was delightfully dogmatic. "Hylo-Idealism: The Creed of the Coming Day," was her title for an article in "Our Corner," in which she expresses much scorn of all the orthodoxies and rejoices to think that the merit of the "new creed" is "its complete reversal of the theologic standpoint." Yet, after all, it must be confessed that her mastery of style is not what it might be, and that, for lucidity of statement, her essays leave much to be desired. The English philosopher seldom shines in his terminology. From Bacon and Locke until now, everyone has deemed it needful to invent a new diction, which comprises both new-coined words, by no means happily chosen, and old familiar phrases used in a sense whose logical precision and exactness is doubtful. It is not fair to judge Miss Naden by these essays, for she did not live to put her thoughts into any final form, such as she doubtless would have desired to be known by in another age. But the statement, as it stands, is often unsatisfactory enough: and against such terms as "asselfment," we would humbly, but energetically, protest.

The essence of the theory appears to be capable of being stated as an inverted variant of the teaching of Berkeley and Hume. To them Locke's theory of knowledge and his philosophy of "impressions" and "ideas" led straight on to the denial of any knowable matter outside and beyond our consciousness. Since Berkeley had to find a basis to assert the reality of the "outer world," he took refuge in the theory that God might well produce the conscious types, and that, as He would not deceive us, they must be substantially true. Hume, having no scruples, called himself, absurdly enough, a sceptic, and supposed himself to doubt

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whether there were any reality corresponding to these "fictions of the mind" at all.

Miss Naden, on the other hand, is possessed by two currents of thought, which she conceives her theory to reconcile. She is very clear that to us there is no outside world—that every "thing" is a "think," as Dr. Lewins strangely states it—and that, in fact, each man makes his own universe. *Quot mentes, tot mundi,* is her motto. She even goes so far as to affirm, somewhat crudely, that the only creation and the only God are to be looked for in one's own cerebral hemispheres. But she is at the same time equally assured of the effective materiality of the universe. She is quite satisfied of the existence of other things and other beings, and she is prepared to reason about them, not only for intellectual, but for ethical purposes. She supposes, indeed, that the results of the sciences are frankly destructive of all theories of creation or causation which have to do with anything but matter. She takes it as obvious that life and consciousness are themselves only the upshot of "hylic" energies, working themselves out on Spencerian lines. It seems to us that this position involves the same paralogism which Mr. T. H. Green pointed out ten years ago, in his criticisms of Mr. Herbert Spencer. But the first question is, how did Miss Naden reconcile her two cardinal lines of thought? How, if the world is a vision—possibly a mirage or a drunken dream—how can I posit any difference between the real and the unreal, the true and the false? How, in a word, can I *know* anything about it? Are we not referred back to that "scepticism" of Hume, which, however absurd it be in effect, was the necessary outcome of the Lockian system, until Kant made it clear that it was the original misconception as to the nature of knowledge itself which was the *fons et origo mali?*

Like most English thinkers, Miss Naden, though she knew the Kantians, seems to have missed the fundamental import of their criticism on the English school, and we fancy they would apply to her assertions much the same polemic as that by which, in the view of many of us, they have destroyed the philosophic stability of the schools of Mill and Spencer. Miss Naden's answer to the difficulty seems to be a rough and ready sort of Cartesian argument. No man, she says, can be a sceptic about "hylic" reality without thereby affirming the possibility of argument, and he who affirms any argument, even a sceptical one, affirms

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reason and certainty. "If we can show that *some* reality is presupposed by the sceptic, we have laid afresh the foundations of philosophy." So far the reasoning is sound, and is, in fact, our old friend, the *cogito ergo sum*, in a new dress. But Miss Naden now makes a *salto mortale*, as, indeed, did Descartes himself. Having compelled her Pyrrhonist to affirm the reality of his argument, she interprets that to mean "a course of reasoning in which every step is dependent on the preceding step, while the origin of the whole is some observed group of facts." Obviously, the last item, the observed "facts," is superadded without leave of the Pyrrhonist. So we are obliged, she goes on, "to assume the existence of some active basis of thought, that is, of something which thinks." So much as this the Pyrrhonist might possibly admit, but he would assuredly revolt at what follows. "What we assume of the individual self, we extend analogically to other men, *who are to us other selves*." This is a sudden plunge into a very ordinary and trivial realism; but there is a deeper plunge yet. "Having seen that sensation and motion follow upon excitation of the brain, and are suspended or destroyed by paralysis of the brain, we are justified in restoring our thought cells to their proud creative eminence, and in proclaiming that *they constitute* this 'active basis of thought,' that they think and, therefore, exist." To assume all that this simple-minded argument assumes, one must be already satisfied that the phenomena are real. If, for the sake of argument, you suppose that our cosmic panorama is unreal, that all I have seemed to see and hear, including laboratory experiments, is an interesting dream, in which my professors and my fellow students are merely ghosts in the dream themselves, then I *know* nothing whatever about the relation of sensations and thought-cells. I may amuse myself with fancying a correlation, but certitude or basis for action there is none. Besides, why should we extend "analogically" any fundamental reasoning at all. Analogy is nothing but a guess at best, and a confession of the scepticism against which it is invoked. But Miss Naden is not afraid to use it for a final bridge, by which to reach again the solid foothold of the common world. "From the material proplasm of consciousness," she goes calmly on, "we argue *by analogy* to a material proplasm of the objects of consciousness, and, *therefore, to a real world* which existed before man was and may exist when he is no more."

This is, to us, a very odd basis for philosophy. If she

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were content with saying, as Dr. Brewer puts it, "that every individual is bounded by his own egoity," or as Dr. Lewins boldly says, "*L'Univers c'est moi*," then one could, at least, understand it. But such a theory is condemned to sterility. It rotates on its own axis, in the midst of an eternal void. Ethics cannot exist for it, since there are no others to be regarded, except the shadows of its own creating. Truth and error, reality and unreality, right and wrong, beauty and hideousness, are nothing but the fancies of the hour. If the universe that is the ego, or the ego that is the universe, should happen or choose to change the tastes of its "solipsismal" life, they will be changed, and no good nor harm will come of it. The believers in this creed may assert that they do not change. But if the ways of their dream-life be stable, that is their affair. Mine are very changeable, and I claim the right to have drunken dreams as well as sober ones, when the fit is on.

The truth is, surely, that the test and basis of the whole matter is what test of *reality* one's scheme of philosophy can provide. That our universe is made up of phenomena, all thinking persons will agree. That in some sense it is nevertheless real, is obvious to all who are not in a lunatic asylum, and to many who are. But the explanation of the meaning of that reality is the crux of the philosopher, as the discernment of it is often the test of the lunatic. We will not, here and now, pretend to solve the riddle, though we cannot see that the gifted and forceful girl whose books we have been considering has succeeded. In any case, she was a strong and interesting personality, and her essays contain many fresh and vigorous things which will repay perusal. They are not all concerned with the explanation of the fundamental notions of her system. She discusses the nature of religion and the evolution of the sense of beauty. She discourses on the principles of sociology and of evolutionary ethics, and she defends the Utilitarians against Mr W. S. Lilly. But all her arguments are, on the whole, less interesting than herself.

Psycho-Therapeutics or Treatment by Hypnotism and Suggestion. By C. Lloyd Tuckey, M.D. Third Edition, revised and enlarged. London: Baillière, Tindal, and Cox. 1891.

That a third edition of Dr. Tuckey's book should have been called for in less than three years shows that some little interest is being taken in England in treatment by

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