(1977) that the Way of Doxa should be taken seriously as cosmology. His argument that the principles of Day and Night are both manifestations of being and identical in their complementary difference (and thus consistent with the Way of Truth) seems at odds with the description of being as μουνογενές (fr. 8.4) and πᾶν ὁμοῖον (fr. 8.22). In the end, S. seems to underestimate the radical nature of Parmenides' rationalism.

Among the many virtues of S.'s work are the thoroughness of his textual analyses and his sensitivity to intertextuality. S.'s general thesis, however, stands in need of further clarification and argument. It is not clear exactly which Platonic view of the senses is being opposed to the Presocratic writers. For Plato to say that perception does not give knowledge in a strong sense is compatible with the idea that common-or-garden knowledge is based on sense perception (cf. e.g. D. Scott's interpretation of the theory of recollection in *Recollection and Experience* [Cambridge, 1995]). Certainly, it is hard to find preplatonic precedents for the way Plato draws the perception/knowledge distinction in some dialogues, but that may be more because of the strength of the concept of knowledge developed there than because perception is seen as inadequate to everyday cognitive tasks. Plato might well have written of a general, as did Thucydides (4.116.1), that he 'perceived (ᾔσθετο) that his people abandoned the fortifications and saw (ὁρῶν) what was happening'. Indeed, in the *Republic* he did write that we perceive (αἰσθανόμεθα) that an artisan has no time for being ill (406c6) and that a man trained in μουσική 'is quick to perceive (αἰσθάνοιτο) any defect or ugliness in art or in nature' (401e2–3).

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MIND–BODY

J. P. Wright, P. Potter (edd.): *Psyche and Soma. Physicians and Metaphysicians on the Mind–Body Problem from Antiquity to Enlightenment*. Pp. xii + 298. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000. Cased, £45. ISBN: 0-19-823840-1.

Few concepts have been so constant through time, and yet so difficult to define, as the soul, and its relationship to the body. The present collection of articles traces the debate on the soul among European physicians and metaphysicians from the fifth century B.C. to the nineteenth century. B. Gundert opens with a discussion of the relationship between bodily and psychic functions in the Hippocratic Corpus, and concludes that Hippocratic medicine did not have a perception of the soul as an entity independent from the body, but rather a unitary perception of nature that encompassed mental and bodily functions. T. M. Robinson attempts to follow the development of Platonic theories and perceptions of the soul. He understands the contradictions and changes of direction in Plato's theories as the result of a life-time 'wrestling with the problem', and 'a splendid memorial to his (sc. Plato's) intellectual honesty'. P. J. van der Eijk explores the connection between bodily and psychic functions in Aristotle. He argues that although Aristotle mostly had in mind a set of functions, 'a form of pattern', when he spoke about the soul, at times he seems to imply that the *psyche* was a separate entity residing somewhere in the body. H. von Staden explores the perceptions of the soul in Hellenistic medicine in an excellent article that allows the reader to understand very clearly the evolution of the theories

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from Herophilos to the Stoics and Galen. T. K. Heckel investigates the body–soul relationship in Saint Paul from the point of view that Paul's theology did not appear as a complete system, but developed step by step as the Apostle responded to questions by the members of the early Church, in particular the Corinthians. Heckel in a methodologically interesting approach tries to reconstruct this development taking into account the historical context. G. Matthews discusses the concept of the soul in Augustine. He argues that Augustine first came up with the theory that the soul knows what a soul is simply by knowing itself. E. Michael traces in Renaissance theories of the soul a continuation of lines of thought found in scholastic philosophy, a revival of ancient perceptions, and the foundations of modern theories of body, soul, and mind. S. Voss explores the body–soul relationship in the medical theories of Descartes. He bases his work on the thesis that 'Descartes' medicine rests squarely on two Archimedean points: the metaphysics of the soul and the physics of the heart', and elaborates on this thesis in a thoroughly documented analysis. T. M. Lennon presents the discussion of the subject in Bayle and the late seventeenth century, and concludes that Bayle, after considering the contemporary dialectics of the mind, finds that none of the proposed theories is philosophically acceptable. F. Duchesneau, after studying the controversy of Stahl with Leibniz, concludes that Stahl introduces a new concept of the organism, with the soul operating all the functions of a living being, while Leibniz, as he tries to overcome the weaknesses of Stahl's concept of the soul, attempts to discover the formal foundation of the organism. R. Rey discusses reactions to Stahl's psychosomatic perception of a human being in eighteenth-century medicine, and in particular the views of the vitalists, and concludes that 'the vitalists proposed a more integrated approach, which reflected an awareness of the complexity of the interaction between the different components of a human being'. F. Azouvi discusses the concepts of *physique* and *moral*, as a potential replacement for the body–soul dualism in nineteenth-century thinking. I found particularly challenging his final words that the twentieth-century term 'psychosomatic' does not reflect a monist view of the body–soul relationship but an inherent dualism.

This book is focused on the fields of philosophy, metaphysics, and medical literature; it is not intended to offer a complete account of beliefs and perceptions on the body–soul relationship. Surprisingly, the reader will find very little concerning the Presocratics in this collection, even though much of the theory of later centuries is deeply rooted in the works and teachings of Anaxagoras, Pythagoras, Diogenes of Apollonia, and others. Perhaps less surprisingly, there is hardly a word about the body–soul relationship in the rest of Greek literature, with the exception of a recurring reference to Homer (*Od.* 11), which is treated rather casually. However, the same Homeric perception of the soul as a pale ghost in Hades is a standard theme in Modern Greek Folk poetry. Since this poetry was composed by people who probably could not read *at all*, never mind read Homer, it seems that the belief of a soul as a pale remain of one's former self persisted in Greek popular tradition through the centuries. I point this out because it underlines one serious issue: this book is an exploration of the views of a scholarly minority from antiquity to the nineteenth century, not of mainstream beliefs in ancient Greece and thereafter. For the perceptions of the ordinary man one should turn to sources such as Greek drama, poetry, novel, and perhaps even satirical literature of the late antiquity (e.g. Lucian).

These remarks are not intended to be critical. They are simply observations pointing out the fact that this is a focused collection, with very specific interests and objectives. As such, it can make a valuable contribution to this complex and endless debate, and

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allow readers to tidy up their thoughts on the body–soul relationship. It certainly helped me to put my thoughts in order on several aspects of this vast subject.

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LEGAL ANTHROPOLOGY

S. JOHNSTONE: *Disputes and Democracy: the Consequences of Litigation in Ancient Athens*. Pp. xiv + 207. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1999. Paper, $17.95. ISBN: 0-292-74053-0.

The study of the limited body of Athenian legal cases tends to be of two types: detailed analysis of individual speeches, or examination of Athenian law as a system. Johnstone offers something distinctively new to the second of these debates. Underneath a rather unpromising cover (an inexplicable negative shot of a corner of the Parthenon) this lucid and enjoyable book uses the theory of disputes from legal anthropology to advance a model of the Athenian legal process, offering ideas about the nature of individual involvement in litigation, Athenians' understanding and interpretation of the law, and the rhetorical strategies through which litigation contributed to the citizens' identity as members of a democracy.

J.'s starting point is to accept that 'the law' was not an agreed unity to which litigators and juries were subject; it was instead created by the speeches of the orators in court and the decisions of the jury. This seems to me very convincing: our interpretation of orators discussing the meaning and scope of laws is based on an assumption that everyone knew what the law was, but even after the codification of the laws there was no central text, and a speaker's job was to find or define the laws which were relevant to the specific case.

The first three chapters each advance a radical idea arising from this premise. The first addresses how the speakers expected the jury to judge the scope or application of particular laws: J. describes the way in which the concept of the lawgiver was invoked in order to allow the laws to be read as a coherent code, written by a single person, and hence interpreted in the light of the lawgiver's supposed intentions. Thus in Hyperides 3, he suggests, the prosecutor is able to argue that the thrust of other laws on unjust contracts supports his claim that his opponent has acted illegally, even though he is not actually in breach of any law. The second chapter examines the effect of litigation on legal narratives: by choosing to pursue litigation, prosecutor and defendant had to cast events into a predecided form—there must be a single event recognized as a crime, perpetrated by one male citizen on another. Hence the rhetorical stories told by litigants may elide actions and actors in the original events, focusing on one action in a continuous feud, or placing a man centre stage. This in itself is not new, but J. extends the idea, with an image of ongoing disputes being reshaped for legal presentation, explaining the many forensic speeches which set out not to answer the charges, but to define what the case is actually about.

The third chapter concerns challenges (here called 'dares'), and J. addresses the apparent paradox whereby challenges made to torture slaves for decisive evidence were not accepted in any known case. He offers a novel interpretation of challenges, not as rhetorical strategies, but as serious attempts by one party to bring the process of litigation to an end. This explains why challenges do not always seem satisfactory in resolving the case from a legal point of view—the aim was to allow both parties to save

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