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DO COMPARATIVE AND REGIONAL STUDIES OF NATIONALISM INTERSECT?

The question behind this article evolved from two separate observations. While the expansion of comparative and cross-regional research has been actively promoted by leading scholars of the Middle East (and was later encouraged by such bodies as the Middle East Studies Association and this journal), so has the incorporation of scholarly insights from area studies been urged by leading political scientists as a prerequisite for revitalizing all of the discipline's subfields and institutionally endorsed by the American Political Science Association.[1] Viewed as interrelated, these observations prompted the question framing this text: if the aims of many Middle East scholars and institutions are compatible with the aims of many political scientists and their association, why have they remained largely parallel, as suggested by scholars within both fields?

In attempting to address elements of this question, this article follows an unconventional path by neither employing the common procedure of empirical study nor producing a standardized review essay. Instead, the task undertaken is to examine in some depth why the otherwise compatible aims endorsed by many Middle East scholars and comparative political scientists and sociologists have remained largely parallel. This task is accomplished by juxtaposing central constitutive elements of two vast, yet well delineated, bodies of scholarship and assessing them vis-à-vis each other. The first consists of leading comparative social-science studies of nationalism that provide broad theoretical and conceptual insights into the phenomenon worldwide; the second consists of regional studies of the manifestations of the phenomenon of nationalism in the Arab and non-Arab Middle East. It seems that these bodies of scholarship have neither exchanged thoroughly, nor sufficiently incorporated into each other, their respective insights. To suggest why this is so, this article consists of three parts.

Part I assesses the three core questions that underlie the comparative social-science study of nationalism and the modes through which theoretically minded scholars have attempted to resolve them. Although these questions are almost never posed in such a clear and structured manner in the regional scholarship on nationalism in the Middle East, I attempt to examine them from this vantage point. There is nevertheless little doubt that the incorporation of the core comparative questions into the study of nationalism in the Middle East is a prerequisite for overcoming the relative idiosyncrasy typifying this domain. Part II reverses the previous inquiry: using the disciplinary prism of comparative

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politics, it describes some weaknesses in the regional scholarship on nationalism in the Middle East. I propose that of the leading factors that ghettoize this scholarly domain, two stand out: (1) the absence of meta-historical theorizing and comparative conceptual frameworks within which to address research questions; and (2) the overrating of the explanatory role of ideology, or the ideational realm, in shaping the Middle East's macro sociopolitics. The two-way examination undertaken in the first two parts is concluded in Part III by identifying a theme that offers additional venues to narrow existing gaps between comparativists and Middle East scholars. Titled "Across Nationalisms," this theme has been equally neglected in the comparative and the regional scholarship.

PART I: THE CORE QUESTIONS OF COMPARATIVE SOCIAL-SCIENCE SCHOLARSHIP ON THE PHENOMENON OF NATIONALISM VIS-À-VIS THE STUDY OF NATIONALISMS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

The theoretical scholarship on nationalism is extensive and cross-cuts all academic fields. Since just a third of this article can be devoted to this entire body of scholarship, it is not possible to analyze it vis-à-vis all relevant studies. However, I am fortunate to benefit from the May 2002 issue of *IJMES*, which devoted eleven interrelated articles to the topic. Assuming familiarity with that discussion and using it as a point of departure enables me to set a focused task for the first part of this three-part text. This task is restricted to the three core conceptual questions underlying the comparative social-science scholarship on the global phenomenon of nationalism,[2] questions that are absent in most studies of nationalism in the Middle East.[3] The first question, in Ernest Renan's famous formulation, is "What is a nation?"—namely, the question of definition. The second is, "What is nationalism and how can we understand it?" The third is the question of emergence: "How does a nation come into existence?" To escape circular reasoning, analytical distinction must be kept between the first and the third questions—that is, between the definition of the nation as the phenomenon to be explained and the explanation of the phenomenon.[4] Despite obvious interrelationships among these core questions, I will discuss each separately while bearing in mind the question of nationalism in the Middle East.

What Is a Nation?

Approaching the question of definition concerns sorting out the elements that one understands as necessary and sufficient for constituting "a nation." While some scholars stress the importance of "subjective" components—such as memories, values, consciousness, solidarity, myths, symbols, or will—others emphasize "objective" components such as territory, language, economic resources, bureaucracy, communication facilities, institutions, or the state. Examination of three arbitrarily chosen definitions helps to identify some of the problems that such efforts entail.[5] For Benedict Anderson, a nation is "an imagined political community—and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign."[6] For Yael Tamir, a nation "exhibits both a sufficient number of shared, objective characteristics—such as language, history or territory—and self-awareness of its distinctiveness." More recently, Tamir defined the nation as "a community whose

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members share feelings of fraternity, substantial distinctiveness and exclusivity as well as belief in a common ancestry and a continuous genealogy."[7] Finally, for Anthony Giddens a nation is "a collectivity existing within a clearly demarcated territory which is subject to a unitary administration, reflexively monitored both by the internal state apparatus and those of other states."[8] The central problem arising from this sample of definitions is the difficulty in determining what is not a nation—that is differentiating "nations" from other collectivities. Tamir's dual definition could be applied to all ethnic groups and most religious or kin groups as well as she applies it to nations. In Giddens's definition, the differences between "a nation" and the sum of individuals living within an internationally recognized territorial state are negligible. Finally, the new European Union or the former Soviet Union fit Anderson's definition of the nation, as both are imagined political communities that are inherently limited and sovereign. But in light of the broader argument Anderson superbly unfolds, it is doubtful whether he would have wished this.

In a conceptual article better than many that followed it, Walker Connor identified the problem of a confusing interutilization of key terms such as "nation," "state" and "ethnic group" in the study of nationalism.[9] Yet his solution seems as awkward as that of the scholars he criticized. The claim, first, that a nation is "a self-defined rather than other-defined grouping" is a statement that is better understood in relation to the presence (or absence) of groups' relative power vis-à-vis other groups than one that can differentiate between types of groups. The (ostensibly) other-defined ethnic groups in the world (and the Middle East) do not appear "sufficiently self-defined" not because they do not define themselves as robustly as nations (presumably) do, or because they lack the will to define themselves on a national basis. Instead, ethnic groups appear other-defined solely because their numerical, economic, or political power vis-à-vis groups around them precludes from the outset their (otherwise desired) option to become self-defined nations. Put differently, the distinction between a self-defined and other-defined grouping simply seems epiphenomenal with respect to the question of power.

A second definition offered by Connor—that "a nation is a self aware ethnic group"—is important because it is embedded in many notions of nationhood, most notably in what Anthony Smith termed the conception of "perennialism" and Brendan O'Leary called "naturality theory."[10] A unilinear conception of the nation as being the "conscious stage" following ethnicity echoes modernization theory. While this definition has implicitly informed many studies, important empirical research testifies to its weaknesses. For example, the Druze community in Israel/Palestine is as deeply self-aware or conscious of itself as the neighboring Druze communities in Lebanon and Syria. Likewise, conversion—that is, entry to or exit from these communities—is religiously forbidden and socioculturally difficult (unless one physically moves away from the community). Despite these similarities in self-awareness, the highly politicized Lebanese Druze, according to the definition "a nation is a self-aware ethnic group," would have to be considered a nation while the less politicized Syrian or Palestinian/Israeli Druze would have to be considered an ethnicity. Since the Druze question is too great to deal with here, I will just note that these characterizations are unconvincing.[11]

Notwithstanding this host of truly challenging definitional barriers, it was (and is) erroneous to conclude, as is implicitly done in the majority of studies on nationalism in the Middle East, that the question, "What is a nation?" can be brushed aside without the inescapable cost of ghettoizing the field. Furthermore, it makes little sense to study

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a subject without a commitment to a definition of the chief concept around which it revolves (particularly if one aspires to contribute beyond one's area study). Hence, scholars of Middle Eastern nationalism should immerse themselves in the definitional debate while using the area's immense empirical findings. Until then, scholars of, say, Jewish and Arab nationalism can perhaps adhere to workable definitions of the nation such as "a group of people unified by a common error about their ancestry and a common dislike of their neighbors."[12]

What is Nationalism and How Can We Understand It?

The second core question underlying the comparative social-science scholarship—how to define or understand nationalism—is more straightforward than the first, yet it is still difficult. To explain this, it is worth discussing Ernest Gellner's definition because it is embedded in many newer studies. For Gellner, nationalism "is primarily a political principle which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent." Nationalism thus "can be best defined in terms of this principle."[13] Eric Hobsbawm follows this definition, and John Breuilly works with a similar one.[14]

What the unit is that should be politically and nationally congruent remains unclear. This ambiguity gives rise to a problem resulting from the fact that the phenomenon of nationalism has taken many types and forms. These include political, cultural, class-based, liberal, conservative, fascist, communist, territorial, pan-, linguistic, religious, "civic," primordial, separatist, integrationist, racial, diasporic, colonialist, and more. The differences among these forms of nationalism—and thus the units they promote—are so profound that they might actually be more important than the similarities. The solution that social scientists have devised to the phenomenon's "multiplicity problem" has at times taken the form of typologies and at times the form of classifications.[15] Yet the solution has mostly taken the form of dichotomies. It has been suggested that there are "Western" (voluntaristic) and "Eastern" (organic) nationalisms,[16] or "nation-to-state" and "state-to-nation" routes of nationalism,[17] or "old-continuous" and "new" nations or nationalisms,[18] or "territorial/civic" and "ethnic/genealogical" nationalisms,[19] or "civic" and "primordial" national ties,[20] or "historic" and "non-historic" nations and nationalisms[21]—to mention a few of these dichotomies. Like the majority of theoretically informed social-science studies on nationalism, these, too, have focused on comparing whole instances of the phenomenon while paying little attention to the dynamics that take place within each instance, as well as to the dynamics that take place across—as distinct from within or between—national movements that develop simultaneously in a mutually antagonistic manner (see Part III). The problem is that some of the most critical issues in the study of non-European nationalism cannot easily be accommodated within this comparative research agenda. If pan-Arabism and pan-Africanism, and particular Arab or African nationalisms (such as Egyptian or Ghanaian), cannot be differentiated using Gellner's "principle of nationalism," but instead fulfill it equally and simultaneously, then one may well be conceptually correct yet faced with a dilemma: it appears that the organized sociopolitical bodies that were perhaps most committed to the national project or principle as defined by Gellner were those that were non-nationalist, such as communist, religious, or pan-type movements. Furthermore, a study of the histories of such groups vis-à-vis the dominant nationalist group in many Asian and African countries reveals

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that the dominant nationalist group frequently arrested or assassinated members of the other groups, who were, after all, fellow nationals. On the one hand, Gellner's principle of nationalism allows many mutually antagonistic units to be "politically and nationally congruent" simultaneously; on the other hand, Gellner hardly addresses the issue.

Breuilly also detours around the political diversity within national movements and the often violent struggles among rival constituents within every nation worldwide. In contrast to nearly all contemporary comparativists, Breuilly does incorporate the Middle East in his study. But in his sixfold classification, pan-Arab nationalism is placed under the rubric of "unification-nationalism which opposes the nation-state"—the nation-state being Egypt or Iraq. At the same time, Egyptian or Iraqi nationalisms are considered anti-colonial and thus must be placed in the category "separation-nationalism which opposes the nation-state"—this time, the nation-state being Britain.[22] But pan-Arab (Egyptian or Iraqi) nationalists, or pan-African (Ghanaian) nationalists, were as anticolonial as Egyptian, Iraqi, or Ghanaian nationalists. In addition, pan-Arab nationalists always were more anti-British than they were anti-Egyptian or anti-Iraqi. Breuilly does note that pan-Arab and pan-African nationalism "existed prior to the establishments of independent African and Arab states" and that he himself is "concerned with their significance later on."[23] I circumvent the question of whether such tailored periodization is permissible, given the broad comparative scope of Breuilly's study and given that the gradual emergence of pan nationalisms outside Europe is critical for such an inquiry. I would still suggest that the solution offered in his classification is too engineered because it disregards the issue of conflicting political aims within the presumably homogeneous nation. A more complete consideration of the phenomenon of nationalism—or the "formation" part in the maxim "national formation"—begs greater attention by theoretically minded comparativists to the diversity within every instance of nationalism.

For these reasons, a useful point of departure for both Middle East specialists and comparativists can be the following definition of nationalism: "the collective undertaking (by peaceful, forceful or violent means) of a group of individuals aiming to unify around a common social, economic, or cultural denominator for the purpose of securing, at a minimum, political self-rule." What are the merits in this definition? To begin with, it is as conceptually inclusive as Gellner's definition. Yet it enables one to devote greater theoretical and comparative attention to the fact that within the nation there are subnational groups that, although fervently opposed to each other, must nonetheless all be considered nationalists. Since I believe that this subject is crucial to the possibility of linking comparative and Middle Eastern studies of nationalism, I want to exemplify its importance while drawing on a well-developed branch of scholarship within studies of nationalism in the Middle East—that is, studies of Egyptian nationalism before the 1952 revolution from above by the Free Officers.[24]

First, Egypt's Marxist and Islamic groups were weaker than the leading secular nationalist group, the Wafd. Since they all meet the definition of nationalism proposed earlier, they must all be considered nationalists. This is notwithstanding the fact that the type of Egyptian self-rule that they worked for—against the colonial power and each other—differed profoundly. Whereas Egyptian Marxists struggled to institutionalize Egyptian society (nation) along class-based lines, the Islamists worked to consolidate the same collectivity along religious lines. As has happened in many colonized and postcolonial countries, these fellow members of the nation—Marxist, religious, and

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"regular" nationalist—often clashed violently. Second, to achieve the aim of a society cemented on class or religious lines, as sought by Egypt's Marxists and Islamists, respectively, the Egyptian working class or the Muslims of Egypt had to secure their political self-rule and, in so doing, exercise a profoundly different type of sociopolitical exclusion with which to demarcate the Egyptian collectivity. Inspected through the proposed definition, the political self-rule of "the workers of Egypt," or that of "the Muslims of Egypt," was a necessary prerequisite for any broader aim (such as the realization of pan-Islamic economic independence or of a classless society). Finally, Egyptian Marxists were more closely linked to regional and international Marxist groups and had more in common with them than they had with various "co-national" Egyptians. Similarly, members of the Society of Muslim Brothers had more in common with politicized Arab and non-Arab Muslims worldwide than they had with co-national Egyptians, whether communist or secular-nationalist.

In contrast to the specialized regional scholarship on nationalism in the Middle East, recent comparative social-science scholarship has devoted insignificant attention to the intense dynamics between subnationalisms within national movements globally. This theoretically conscious scholarship has tended to compare whole instances of national movements. When comparativists did address intranational dynamics, their research was mostly done before the end of the Cold War and was commonly restricted to a single case or country study rather than a comparison of such dynamics in two (or more) countries.[25] Yet this was exceptional; comparative social scientists tended to shy away from cross-regional investigation of subnational dynamics. In the 1990s they preferred to work on the more "luxurious" realm on which comparisons of whole instances of national movements (or states) were advanced.[26] This relative neglect of subnationalism could hardly change the fact that different organized groups within potential or realized nations or states—perhaps especially outside Europe—have distinct conceptions of what their nation is or should be; how and on what basis it should be defined; who it should include (or exclude); and what its designated borders should be. Various methods can be devised to explore these conflicting tendencies theoretically and comparatively within nations. What is now at stake is that the necessity of such an exploration does not seem to require further justification.

While the specialized scholarship on nationalism in the Middle East has rarely posed the defining question "What is nationalism?" in as theoretically structured a manner as the comparative social-science scholarship does, numerous studies on Middle Eastern nationalism certainly targeted creatively the issue of conflicting forces within movements, commonly in single case or country studies. In fact, intranational dynamics seem to be the main issue researched in the regional scholarship, usually in a historical-narrative form with little attention paid to the potential for broader theoretical or comparative implications.[27] Hence, the cross-regional comparative study of subnational dynamics currently holds the greatest potential for narrowing existing gaps between comparativists studying the phenomenon of nationalism globally and regionalists studying Middle Eastern nationalism. The definition of nationalism proposed earlier might help to propel the issue of competing subnationalisms within movements or states closer to the core agenda of the theoretical and comparative research and, in so doing, perhaps improve prospects for a tighter linkage between comparativists and regionalists studying the Middle East. To this end, greater theoretical attention needs to be paid by both scholarly

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communities to sociopolitical interactions of subnational groups within movements across regions.

How Does a Nation Come into Existence?

Of the core questions underlying the comparative study of nationalism, the third—How does a nation emerge?—is the most intriguing. Structured efforts to address the question are twofold. First, they attempt to identify the most decisive realm on which national formation should be understood. The four most prevalent realms are those of consciousness and sentiments; societal transformation; politics and power relations; and ideas and ideology. (As described later, the ideational realm has prevailed in many studies of Middle Eastern nationalism). The second element in theoretically conscious analyses of the question of national emergence consists of a construction (or selection) of an approach to the study of nationalism. Comparativists have employed competing approaches that can be classified in different ways. The most general distinction is between the "primordial" and "constructivist" approaches. Alexander Motyl has greatly advanced this distinction by subdividing both approaches into "extreme," "strong," and "weak."[28] Breuilly has distinguished among the nationalist, communications, Marxist, psychological, and functional approaches.[29] In a recent work he grouped various studies under the categories of "primordial," "functional," "narrative," and "modern" approaches to nationalism.[30] Rather than form yet more classifications, I prefer to assess some outstanding studies of nationalism that, even if they are not the newest, have an unmistakable impact on contemporary scholarship. These studies ultimately represent four ways in which the phenomenon can be addressed. I will pay attention to their implicit or explicit explanation of nationalism outside Europe.

Transformation of Consciousness. The first study I consider is Anderson's *Imagined Communities*. Anderson has chosen to explain the emergence of nationalism by probing the material and institutional mechanisms through which collective consciousness has been transformed. Scholars who choose to emphasize the realm of consciousness tend to concentrate on shifts in a given society in terms of its culture, religion, art, or language. Anderson, however, analyzes the development of vernacular languages, print capitalism, and their institutional containers. Thus, he may be the finest representative of this school. For him, the "third wave" of nationalism—that is, non-European "imagined communities"—emerged primarily as a result of the anti-imperialist act and the input of the indigenous bilingual intelligentsia.[31] There are three main weaknesses in Anderson's thesis when considered vis-à-vis the Middle East. First, despite differences in colloquial Arabic dialects, the population from Egypt to Iraq has been able to communicate verbally, and the literate among that population, a significant minority during the 20th century, use an identical written language. In applying to the Arab Middle East the logic of Anderson's core thesis regarding print capitalism, vernacular language, and literacy as principal factors affecting the consolidation of national identity, a unified pan-Arab nationalism should have emerged in a smoother manner. Yet such nationalism has not emerged as the thesis would anticipate. In spite of the relative homogeneity of the spoken and written language, for most of the past one hundred years competing nationalisms were at play.[32] (Rather than print capitalism, intellectuals, or language, it may be politics

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and power relations that affect most decisively the emergence or consolidation of Jewish, Arab, or any nationalism. I shall shortly return to this theme.)

Second, Anderson has chosen to overlook such factors as the impact of regional socioeconomic processes; power relations between old (and less old) indigenous social classes; the existence of diverse religious and ethnic minorities (rural and urban), which at different conjunctures had distinct interests; or the tensions between rulers from the center and the periphery. There is nothing intrinsically wrong in such choices, but the necessary outcome is that Anderson disregards the possibility that so-called Third World nationalisms did not emerge from a sociopolitical, economic, and legal vacuum. Thus, he cannot but undervalue the importance of domestic and regional factors that affected the formation and outcome of the national project. Of prime importance in the context of the Third World is the absence of peasants in Anderson's account of nationalism. In a 1985 review of *Imagined Communities*, Ranajit Guha became the first to explore this weakness.[33] Even if it is chiefly scholars linked to South Asia's subaltern school who crafted the most rigorous analysis of peasantry–nationalism interrelations,[34] Middle East scholars have added lucid insights to the issue.[35] Non-European peasants (like other subaltern groups, such as women) did not adopt wholesale the model of the nation. Rather, they transformed it in line with pre-existing sociopolitical customs, cosmologies, and religious beliefs. Hence, Anderson's account on the evolution of "empty linear time" seems inapplicable to the sociopolitical and economic setting of many Third World societies. Finally, given that Anderson concludes that Third World nationalism is largely an imitation of European nationalism, Partha Chattejee's question remains: what exactly is left for the Third World to imagine?[36]

Intense Bottom-Up "Sociologism." The second study I consider is Gellner's *Nations and Nationalism*. Unlike Anderson, Gellner has chosen to explain national emergence via the realm of societal transformation. As the result of industrialization, advanced communication, the extension of schooling, mass education, and commercial agriculture, "nationalism is . . . the general imposition of high culture on society where previously low cultures had taken up the lives of the majority." For the intense "sociologism" underlying this thesis, nationalism is an objective product of the industrial society "whose productive system is based on cumulative science and technology."[37] Yet Third World states have recapitulated neither the European experience of state formation nor its various outcomes.[38] That European states were formed in a certain way and later imposed their might on others guarantees that national and state formations in non-European contexts differ. Viewed through this prism, Gellner's thesis is weak on two grounds. First, "scientification," technology, or industrial production have not proliferated in the Third World as in (Western) Europe, yet nationalism spread there. In Gellner's terms, this would mean that the dependent outcome emerged without the presence of its independent prerequisites. Second, Gellner's functional argument inevitably implies that the logic of nationalism cannot be contingent. Rather, it is objectively given to any non-European context. That this argument echoes Anderson's "late imitation" thesis is apparent. More important, it overlooks the possibility that there may be alternative venues to consolidate national identity, culture, and movement in semi and nonindustrialized societies.

"Nationalism as Politics." A third possible way to address the question of national emergence is to emphasize the realm of politics and action over the realms of

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consciousness and societal transformation. Theoretically minded social scientists who opt for this realm focus on organizations, parties, or movements that justify their political raison d'être and action by reference to what they portray as the general interest (the "national" interest) to harness popular support. Attention is placed on the dynamics of power relations and the asymmetries characterizing them. Breuilly is the political scientist who has most consistently employed this approach, emphasizing the political character of nationalism. First and foremost, he treats nationalism as a form of politics:

> Before trying to theorize about the "real" purpose or cause of this form of politics—before trying to go "behind" nationalism in search of some non-political base which supposedly gives rise to nationalism—one should try to work out precisely what is the form of politics we call nationalism, its political context and . . . modes.[39]

Other approaches in general—certainly the two assessed earlier—treat nationalism as the expression of something "deeper" or "other" than politics. This can be a set of ideas materialized, an economic or social structure, or the product of technological or cultural formation. It is futile to contest the claim that nationalism is linked to nonpolitical changes by which modernity is characterized, such as urbanization, industrialization, literacy, printing, or secularism. Hobsbawm's proposition is unhelpful precisely because of its infinite scope: "nations and their associated phenomena must . . . be analyzed in terms of political, technical, administrative, economic and other conditions and requirements."[40] Breuilly is correct to argue that "to focus upon culture, ideology, class, or modernization is to neglect the fundamental point that nationalism is, above and beyond all else, about politics and politics is about power . . . and control of the state."[41] Breuilly's main objective is to identify the conditions in European and non–European contexts under which three forms of nationalism have emerged: secessionist, reformist, and unification. For him it is the nature of the state and the nature of the (elite) competition for control over its institutions that conjoin to produce the triple configuration of worldwide nationalisms. But Breuilly's comparative study presupposes the existence of the nation. "[T]here exists a nation," he postulates, "a special group which is set apart from all other groups; political identity and loyalty are . . . with and to the nation [that] should have political autonomy, normally in the form of a sovereign state."[42] As long as Breuilly's objective remains similar to that of the majority of contemporary social scientists—to compare instances of whole national movements—there is nothing wrong in establishing such a point of departure. But as I have explained, it is the cross-regional comparative investigation of *subnational* dynamics that now embodies the greatest potential to link regional Middle Eastern and comparative studies of nationalism. While Breuilly's insistence on the nationalism-as-politics approach is, in my opinion, the best, his methodological presuppositions hinder this objective. It is, however, the ideational approach to the question of national emergence that brings us to the regional scholarship on nationalism in the Middle East.

PART II: THE IDEATIONAL REALM AND THE SCHOLARSHIP ON NATIONALISMS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

A fourth possible way to explain the emergence of nationalism, in contrast to Anderson, Gellner, or Breuilly, is to focus on the realm of ideas, doctrines, or ideology. Scholars who emphasize this realm tend to concentrate on publications, columns, and essays of

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nationalist intellectuals and the way they are disseminated to the population to affect its behavior. These scholars rarely consider the opposite—that these writings may not actually be disseminated to the population at large in a manner that is sociopolitically consequential. In the context of the comparative–regional intersection sought after here, the ideational approach becomes important because it was adopted in many studies of Arab and Jewish nationalism. Interestingly, the only scholar with the Middle East as a principal regional focus who has made it into comparative anthologies on nationalism is Elie Kedourie, an eminent adherent of the ideational approach who has applied it to Europe and Asia–Africa.[43] Here, I explain why I find it suitable to assess in this ideational context the scholarship on nationalism in the Middle East. This assessment has one limitation: I bypass studies tracing the origins of Arab or Jewish nationalism prior to the 20th century to what is customarily termed "precursors," such as Muhammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab (1703–91), the originator of the Wahhabi movement; the kosovar Rabbi Yehudah Alkalai (1798–1878), an admirer of the Greeks' successful bid for national self-determination against the Turks; Muhammad ʿAli (1769–1849) and his son Ibrahim Pasha, who attempted to consolidate an Egyptian-based empire; Rabbi Zvi Hirsch Kalisher (1795–1874), who incidentally helped to purchase lands around Jaffa; the Islamic modernist reformers Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1839–97) and his student Muhammad ʿAbduh (1849–1902); and Moshe Hess (1812–75) and his famous book *Rome and Jerusalem*. I circumvent even more protonationalist (Zionist or Arab) "precursors" such as ʿAbd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi (1849–1902), Peretz Smolanskin (1842–85), Rashid Rida (1865–1935), Moshe Leib Lilinblum (1843–1910), Négib Azoury (d. 1916), and Leo Pinsker (1821–91).[44] Interesting as the writings and histories of these men are, it is clear why most discussions about them fall within this fourth, ideational approach to the study of nationalism. In the case of Jewish nationalism, there was hardly any Zionist presence in Palestine before the 20th century, which means that no discussion other than on ideas is possible. In the case of Arab nationalism, the issue is evidently more complicated. Yet there is still "a lack of any clearly developed theory of Arab nationalism though there were efforts in this direction,"[45] let alone a consolidated national collectivity. Hence, the aim of Part II is to examine, via the prism of comparative politics, how scholars of nationalism in the Middle East during the past four decades or so have explained the period between, roughly, the end of World War I (the breakdown of the Ottoman Empire and the issuing of the Balfour Declaration) and the 1967 Arab–Israeli War.

Leading scholars have observed that the study of Arab history has not taken full advantage of insights offered in theoretical work on nationalism.[46] Regardless of whether this understates the case, it is worth adding that this observation can be applied to many studies of the non-Arab Middle East—or, at least, that of European Jewish nationalism in pre-1948 Palestine and its subsequent consolidation in Israel. Albert Hourani's *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age,*[47] Sylvia Haim's *Arab Nationalism: An Anthology,*[48] Majid Khadduri's *Political Trends in the Arab World: The Role of Ideas and Ideals in Politics,*[49] and Elie Kedourie's *Nationalism in Asia and Africa* best exemplify the approach to nationalism that puts its trust in the ideational realm.[50] With regard to the content of their books, the authors differ in their aims and the weight they assign to themes linked to the development of Arab nationalism (such as Europe's influence, the Arabic language, the Islamic religion, and secularism). Variations also exist, such as those between Haim and Hourani, in terms of the interpretations of the nationalist "precursors" they consider.

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Yet when compared in terms of the syntax of their studies, the differences among these authors are minor.

First, nationalism is associated with writings of intellectual ideologists (and with neither societal transformation nor mechanisms that produce transformation of consciousness). Second, nationalism is "a *doctrine* invented in Europe."[51] These notions lead their adherents to advance a double-diffusion model: (1) a diffusion of ideas from European intellectuals to Western-educated Arab intellectuals; and then (2) a diffusion of ideas from Arab intellectuals to the predominantly illiterate population at large, which (ostensibly) ripens in a mass collective action on a "national" basis.[52] This top-down ideational effect is more assumed than empirically established.[53] To illustrate: about 17 percent of Egypt's population could actually read the opinionated liberal or conservative ideological columns written by the small nationalist intellectual class in the 1930s and 1940s.[54] Therefore, only this minority could even consider whether the liberal intelligentsia experienced a "crisis of orientation."[55] Let us make the entirely unlikely, maximal assumption that all literate Egyptians read all the texts by the rainbow of national intellectual writers. Is it plausible that these still predominantly unread texts truly had such decisive causal impact on the anticolonial struggle of the masses constituting the Egyptian national movement? I suspect that these (unread) national op-eds and other writings could not, and did not, have such a top-down material effect. But even if they did, this link necessitates solid empirical proof to establish the cause-and-effect relationship, which cannot be assumed as self-evident (as some ideational studies of Egypt in the 1930s and 1940s assume). Either way, Kedourie adds another element that crystallized nationalism in Third World contexts: alienation of Western-educated indigenous intellectuals—George Antonius being a classic example—who were discriminated against and humiliated in their homelands by colonial administrators.[56] Imitation of Western ideas is added to psychological resentment as a result of colonial racism.

Granted, part of these notions is plausible, because there was some influence of European ideas. There was some double diffusion, and there certainly was blatant colonial racism. Yet the problem of scholars who subscribe to the ideational approach occurs once the understanding of nationalism as ideas is extended to nationalism as politics. "To see nationalist politics as the work of intelligentsias . . . can easily be shown to have little value. Nationalist politics are frequently dominated by other groups . . . [and thus] . . . has to be related to far more complex changes than the diffusion of a doctrine from its intellectual creators to broader populations."[57] Nationalist ideas cannot be equated with nationalist politics, and the latter cannot be accounted for using the double-diffusion model. While the books of Haim, Hourani, Khaddouri, and Kedourie came out between 1960 and 1970, the question is whether the approach taken by post-1970 studies on nationalism in the Middle East has changed.

A New Narrative?

Surveying and characterizing the scholarship on Arab nationalism written between the 1950s and the 1990s, Israel Gershoni has distinguished between an old narrative (which includes the four books just discussed) and a new narrative, which he says evolved in the early 1970s. "By treating previously unresearched topics, citing new evidence and employing innovative methodologies," he argues, the scholars who gave rise to the

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new narrative enabled "a thorough rethinking of the history of Arab nationalism [from 1920 to 1945]."[58] From the disciplinary vantage point of comparative politics, the claim proposed in the remainder of Part II is this: while Gershoni has flawlessly identified the problems in the approach taken by the historians of ideas who indeed dominated what he terms the pre-1970 "old narrative," he may have overrated the change brought about by what he terms the "new narrative." More important, even if one disagrees and argues that Gershoni has not overstated this change, he may have still erred in identifying and characterizing this change conceptually. To explain this, I ask and answer three questions vis-à-vis Gershoni's thesis.

Question 1: Was there indeed a shift in historiographic paradigms between scholars associated with the "history of ideas approach" and those associated with the "new social history of the Annales school"?[59] My answer is a guarded yes. Rereading the studies classified under the new narrative reveals that about a quarter continue to focus on ideology and its (alleged) dissemination to the mostly illiterate populations at large.[60] In so doing, the syntactic line of argumentation employed (not to be confused with its content) does not differ so significantly from the approach of the old scholars assessed earlier. In terms of explanatory status, ideational factors in these new studies outweigh political, economic, or social factors (although they do not displace them). Furthermore, intentionally or not, Gershoni himself seems to support this conclusion in arguing that during the 1920–45 period, Arab nationalism "moved from the intellectual periphery to the cultural and political center" and thus provides "an outstanding case-study in processes of intellectual formation, ideological dissemination, social reception, and political institutionalization of an idea."[61] Perhaps even the pre-1970 old narrators did not summarize as concisely the top-down causality on which their idealist thesis of national emergence rested.

Before I move to the second question about the characterization of the new, post-1970 studies, it is worth adding that the overrating of the explanatory role of the realm of ideology in the study of nationalism in the Middle East might represent a wider trend in Middle East studies. As a former editor concluded, *IJMES*' "dominant topic has certainly been 'political thought and ideology,' to which we could add several articles under the heading of 'political Islam.' Ideology (religious and secular) accounts for almost one-quarter of the articles published by *IJMES* [from 1994 to 1999]."[62]

Similarly, in an exchange in *IJMES* on the relevance of Anderson's imagined-communities thesis to the Middle East, the otherwise disagreeing protagonists continue to overrate the explanatory weight of opinionated writings of ideologists in affecting the working and forms of the Egyptian national movement while simultaneously marginalizing sociopolitical and economic factors. Key idealist-informed terms include individual ideologists' "articulation" and "formulation" of nationalist "perspective," "terminology," or "discourses." The protagonists seem to have sidelined, even if unevenly, the chief explanatory element—print capitalism—on which Anderson's thesis of national formation rests. While one side highlights the ideological work of intellectuals, the other overemphasizes the role of territory and the state.[63] Both are secondary to Anderson's print capitalism and his emphasis on institutional containers (censuses, maps, museums, etc.) that underlie national formation. Either way, the idiom "imagined communities" was meant to be neither a catch phrase (as it has been during the past two decades) nor a concept allowing for even a small group of individuals, regardless of geography, simply

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to decide to imagine itself via ideological discourse into something collective out of pure will.

Hence, phrasing such as "Hasan al-Banna was the key figure in the formulation of the new imagined community of the Muslim Brothers"[64] seems problematic. An ideational or discursively based approach does not appear to be the "imagining" Anderson advanced. Rather, the dependent outcome that the all-in-all neo-Marxist Anderson termed "imagined community" can come into existence only if the objective presence of some major material, technological, and institutional mechanisms conjoin to make possible the bottom-up transformation of collective consciousness. At any rate, de-ghettoizing the study of nationalisms in the Middle East—perhaps like the study of the area generally—seems to require further relaxation of the explanatory role assigned to the ideational realm in shaping the macro-sociopolitics of the region.

Question 2: In what sociopolitical context were the new, post-1970 studies written? This question is prompted by the claim that "the new narrative evolved in the 1970s and 1980s when Arab nationalism was in retreat. Just as the [pre-1970] old narrative had developed in the glow of Arab nationalism's political heyday, contemporary events on the ground again impinged on historians' reflections on the past. A more generous view of historians' integrity would attribute the change to the greater distance from the formative period of Arab nationalism, as well as to the benefits of a quieter atmosphere enabling a less charged and possibly more neutral discussion of the subject."[65] Was this indeed the case?

Rather than giving a guarded yes, my answer is "perhaps," because there seems to be another, significantly more decisive sociopolitical context shared equally by the pre-1970s old narrators and post-1970s new narrators. This context seems to override Gershoni's dichotomous description. Let us acknowledge candidly the shortcomings shared by many scholars of the Middle East. Whether it was during the 1950s and 1960s or during the 1970s and 1980s; whether it is the old or new narrators, it seems that one of the more consequential contexts within which studies on Arab (or Jewish) nationalism have been written is the context of the Israeli–Arab conflict. For better or worse, this context has unleashed an "Israeli-prone" school or side and an "Arab-prone" school or side that splits the scholarly community (even if this split must be understood loosely since each "school" does have internal divisions that are nevertheless weaker than the general one). If the Arab–Israeli conflict has been so decisive, then the claims concerning "the retreat or glow of Arab nationalism's political heyday" or "contemporary events on the ground" or "a greater distance from the formative period" or "a quieter atmosphere" seem secondary when juxtaposed to the conflict that has tortured the region unabatedly and that has manifested itself, with more or less subtlety, in the scholarly writing on many of its associated subjects, including Arab (and Jewish) nationalism. As exemplified next, this appears to have been the case equally before and after 1970 with regard to the old and new narratives. It is worth adding that such interaction between intense sociopolitical context and written academic texts is far from unique to the Middle East.[66]

Broadly put, the Israeli-prone school or side has preferred to portray the Arab world as fragmented and provincial. It has tended to highlight the "artificiality" of Arab nationalism, stressing the salience of non-national, parochial, and primordial loyalties such as religion, tribe, ethnicity, and sect. Even articles' titles, such as "Arab Nationalism:

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Mistaken Identity" and "Arab Unity: A Nonexistent Entity"[67]—reflect these notions. As Giacomo Luciani and Ghassan Salame have dryly remarked, the "demise of pan-Arabism is recorded time and again as if some found pleasure in constantly writing its obituary."[68] However, the Arab-prone school or side stressed the opposite—that is, the commonalties and unifying factors shared by Arabs regardless of "non-national" loyalties or states. In addition, as far as its analysis of Zionism and Israel is concerned, diametrical arguments about national "artificiality" have been advanced that, in terms of syntax, have mirrored those of the Israeli-prone school or side.[69]

Accordingly, within the invention-of-tradition school, scholars superbly expose the conscious search of various Arab states for a "usable" past through a meticulous analysis of archeology, culture, and art.[70] Such studies could have been extended comparatively to include, say, the obsessive Zionist search for a "usable" Jewish past in Arab Palestine, but for whatever reason, they have not. Similarly, one study correctly emphasizes that nationalism was imposed on Iraq and that the state is not a nation-state.[71] It seems that European Jewish nationalism in pre-1948 Palestine, or post-1948 Israel, could easily have been the object of a similar line of argumentation. Yet such comparative dimensions, which alone can open possibilities for conceptual and theoretical traveling to non–Middle East scholars, have seldom been explored. On the continuum's other end, Abdelwahab Elmessiri's *The Land of Promise*[72] and Roger Garaudy's *The Case of Israel*[73] unveil economic and sociopolitical inner mechanisms linked to the formation of Zionism/Israel that have rarely been addressed as meticulously in the more traditional scholarship. But neither presents as penetrating an analysis of the formation of Arab nationalism. Only a handful of scholars have succeed in engaging in a simultaneously thorough analysis of Zionism/Israel and the Arab world.[74]

A related factor that seems to testify further to the limits of the distinction between old and new narratives, and the dichotomous contention concerning their producing sociopolitical contexts, is that equally intense disputes divide not only old and new narrators but also the new narrators themselves. An example of the former is the dispute concerning why, when, and by whom Egyptian Arab nationalism originated, as argued, on the one hand, in Elie Kedourie's "Pan Arabism and British Policy"[75] and Nadav Safran's *Egypt in Search of Political Community*, and on the other hand, in Ralph M. Coury's "Who 'Invented' Egyptian Arab Nationalism?" For the former two, both classified as old narrators, Egyptian Arab nationalism largely originated in religious motives of the Egyptian Palace and thus did not manifest itself before 1943. For the latter, a "new" narrator, the "rigid dichotomization between an Arab Islamic orientation of the Palace and a secular liberal and [non-Arab] Egyptian orientation of the Wafd . . . is false." In addition, "[T]he growing interest of various forms of Arab unity . . . reflect new political and socioeconomic developments within Egypt and the Arab world and are not best understood . . . in terms of dynastic ambitions or the reassertion of . . . Islamism."[76]

Yet an example of an even greater dispute (in terms of its scope and scholarly implications for the study of the whole Middle East) concerns the role that Jewish nationalism played (or did not play) in the formation of Arab nationalism as argued in Yehoshua Porath's *In Search of Arab Unity*[77] and in Bassam Tibi's extended introductory chapter in the 1989 edition of his *Arab Nationalism* (1971).[78] For the former, classified as a "new" narrator, "the effect of the developments in Palestine during the years 1936–39 stands as perhaps the single most important factor which contributed to the growth

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of pan-Arab ideology, to the feeling of solidarity among the Arab peoples and to the attempt at shaping a unified general Arab position and policy."[79] For the latter, a "new" narrator as well the actions of early Arab nationalists "cannot only be explained by the Palestine issue and it is completely wrong to reduce Arab nationalism . . . to a response to Zionism." Furthermore, "[I]f the findings of this book on Arab nationalism in which I do not deal with [the Palestine question] are correct, then Porath must be wrong."[80] To sum up this section, mutually exclusive narratives and fundamental disagreements split the "old" and "new" narrators of the formation of Arab nationalism as much as they split the "new" ones. When coupled with the claim that the Zionist–Arab conflict is a decisive context affecting the writing on Arab (or Jewish) nationalism, and that this was the case equally before and after 1970, these issues add doubt to the validity of the distinction between "old" and "new" itself.

Thus far, the answer to the first question posed vis-à-vis the characterization of the post-1970 new scholarship is a reserved yes, while the answer to the second question is perhaps. But it is the last question that perhaps embodies the greatest implications for the relative idiosyncrasy typifying the study of nationalism in the Middle East and the possibility to de-ghettoize this scholarly domain.

Question 3: Was a notable or widespread employment of conceptual tools introduced in the theoretically minded scholarship on nationalism to the study of Arab nationalism by the regional scholarship that Gershoni identified as new when read vis-à-vis the old studies?[81] I think that the answer to this third question is neither a guarded yes nor a perhaps, but probably a no.[82]

Gershoni's unfolding of the new narrative rests on a thematic linking of twenty articles and nineteen books about diverse aspects related to the formation of Arab nationalism.[83] These studies are assigned under a single meta-historical roof because they constitute a paradigmatic shift with regard to the study of Arab nationalism. As far as I can tell, examination of these thirty-nine studies via a disciplinary prism of comparative politics indicates that (1) all but two studies were most likely written by scholars trained as historians and working from within history departments[84]; (2) with the exception of three additional studies, the remaining thirty-four exclude definitions or discussions of key terms such as "nation," "nationalism," "nation-state," or "state" (which should not be considered self-explanatory)[85]; (3) none of these seem to introduce what can be described as a guiding theoretical or conceptual framework for answering their respective research questions[86]; and (4) of the thirty nine post-1970 new studies, thirty-four do not mention, via quoting or bibliographic listing, the theoretically minded comparative studies or scholars of nationalism on which Gershoni's characterization of the new narrative and his co-authored introduction rest.[87]

Having raised these points, I want to emphasize that there is nothing wrong with these truly lucid thirty-nine studies, all the more so given that all were written by leading scholars of the Middle East. There is, in addition, no question at all regarding their indispensability for the work of all successive historians and comparativists of the Middle East alike. Gershoni is correct to argue that these studies have treated "previously unresearched topics and cited new evidence" and perhaps slightly less correct to say that they have employed "innovative methodologies." But Gershoni is not so correct to conclude that these studies have enabled "a thorough rethinking of the history of Arab nationalism."[88] The necessary condition for a thorough rethinking of the

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emergence and consolidation of any sociopolitical collectivity, including that of Arab nationalism, is precisely that found in the nonregional studies Gershoni highlights: a clear theoretical and conceptual framework within which the empirical evidence is placed and by which it is tested, interpreted, and, ideally, elucidated. Put differently, even access to all sociopolitical, economic, and cultural journals, dailies, pamphlets, documents, data, or memoirs, coupled with fully uncensored Public Records Office and regional archives cannot in themselves deliver such a good. Even such an ideal research setting could at best produce a facilitating condition for such an aim as a thorough rethinking of the formation of Arab (or Jewish) nationalism. If one could conjoin these necessary and facilitating conditions—that is, innovative theoretical framework with solid empirical evidence—then one might produce the sufficient condition for the thorough rethinking of the formation of Arab (or any) nationalism.

Gershoni appears to have projected the collective hopes shared by many scholars of nationalism in the Middle East into past scholarship. In so doing, he may have mixed what ought to be with what is. The "struggle" of primary-source citations and counter-citations among various historians of Arab nationalism concerning who said or wrote what to whom and when, whether it was in a remote party meeting, lost lecture, hidden op-ed column, classified British report, neglected conference, or new memoir, falls within the facilitating requirement specified earlier. Gershoni seems to have overrated the change that has been brought to the study of Arab nationalism by what he termed the "new narrative" for one main reason. Whereas new evidence based on primary sources has certainly surfaced since 1970, it still seems that no theoretical or conceptual innovation (resembling that developed in the non-regional studies he applauded) has been fashioned, or applied, by the otherwise excellent studies on which his meta-historical characterization rests.

This seems to mirror the chief factors producing the somewhat idiosyncratic character of the domain of Middle East studies. Only shared theorizing, meta-historical frameworks, and conceptualization can link scholars of diverse geographical areas and de-ghettoize their discussions to make them meaningful, and hence possibly useful or applicable, for the efforts of colleagues of other regions. To endorse conceptual traveling does not imply that the sole aim of an integrated comparative research program is to apply universal conceptual categories across regions and periods. It is true that "there is simply no substitute for detailed and contextualized knowledges of specific regions—including their languages, histories and cultures" and that "no solid comparative or conceptual understanding of the world—past or present—can be built without this foundation."[89] It nevertheless seems that there really is not a serious shortage in such contextualized, specialized forms of knowledge as far as the Middle East is concerned, while there certainly is a shortage of fertile theorizing, conceptualization, and comparative outlook that either originates from the region or involves it. Accordingly, rather than a meta-historical conceptualization of past scholarship, Gershoni's thesis can perhaps be better read as a guiding research plan on Arab nationalism for the new millennium. So far as the study of nationalism in the Middle East is concerned, the insights offered in comparative scholarship on the phenomenon of nationalism seem to await more complete incorporation. I conclude this article by identifying a theme that is equally neglected in the comparative and regional studies of nationalism—a theme that can perhaps open additional venues for narrowing the gap between these studies.

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PART III: ACROSS NATIONALISMS

As discussed, theoretically minded social-science studies on nationalism have tended to compare whole instances of national movements while devoting little attention to comparative examinations of subnational dynamics within movements. Conversely, studies on nationalism in the Middle East—which are largely dominated by narrative historians—have tended to focus on intranational dynamics in single-country studies. But if nations are configurations of sociopolitical collectivities, then they are organized (or collapse) as a result of interactions not only within and between competing movements (or states), but also across them. Comparative and regional studies alike have ignored this aspect.

Irrespective of the definitions one employs to address the core questions "What is a nation?" and "What is nationalism?", unintended alliances are sometimes formed between opposing forces across otherwise unbridgeable divides. Examples include radical feminists and Christian evangelists concerning the question of pornography; Hamas and the Israeli settlers concerning the rejection of the 1993 Oslo Accords; and right-wing Danish nationalists and left-wing Danish Marxists concerning the oppositional voting on the establishment of the European Union. Similarly, national movements tend to develop simultaneously; they are often formed in relation to rival movements (rather than in the isolation that all nationalists fantasize about). That is why dynamics across subnational groups are especially consequential for the study of nationalism, regardless of an area.

There are several possibilities for interactions of subgroups across a national divide. They may be intentional, unintentional, or structural and are not deterministic, random, or teleologically preordained. For example, a cross-national intentional alliance between secular Muslim and Hindu groups in Pakistan and India might have implications for the national outcome in South Asia. Similarly, a cross-national alliance—unintentional or structural—between militant Hindus and Muslims in Kashmir (both of whom claim greater Kashmir exclusively as their own) might affect the outcome in the region by frustrating possibilities for a settlement. It is out of the diversity within each and every nation, yet also out of the effects across subnational groups, that configurations of national collectivities arise (or disintegrate). It is out of the collective interactions and struggles not only within and between but also across such organized forces that nations emerge (or fall) irrespective of whether the nation is imagined, potential, or real. I close with (1) a brief historicizing of the explanatory fruitfulness that an investigation across nationalisms has for the study of the Middle East; and (2) the mode via which theoretical insights extracted from the Middle East can assist Europeanists and comparativists to understand modern European politics more rigorously.

The pre-1948 Arabized-Jewish Communities and the Dynamics across Jewish and Arab Nationalisms

Until the conclusion of the first Israeli–Arab War in 1948 there were some 750,000 indigenous Jews living in nine Arab states. Most of these Jewish communities had lived in the region continuously for many centuries. Between the 1920s and the 1940s, the intensifying conflict between the European Zionists and Palestine's indigenous Arabs

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negatively affected the sociopolitical position of these Jewish communities.[90] Their position became more complex than that of other indigenous minorities precisely because the Palestine conflict was between Jews and non-Jews. (Had there been, for example, a British-sponsored Coptic Zionism or Nestorian Zionism in Palestine, then similar repercussions probably would have affected Egypt's Copts or the Nestorians of Iraq.)

During these years, the fundamental distinction between Jews and Zionists eroded further and further throughout the region. This slow, elusive process worked to the exclusive advantage of the European Zionists, who for various reasons had an interest in making the terms "Jew" and "Zionist" synonymous. The first reason was to create the impression that Zionism was the majority stance among world Jewry (while Zionists at the time were actually a significant minority among all Jews, whether African, Asian, or Euro-American). The second reason was to persuade international powers of their "obligation" to recognize Jewish nationalism as the sole solution to the (European) Jewish question that allegedly expressed the wishes of the majority of Jews worldwide.

A core factor in the post-1948 triumph of the European Zionists resulted from their success in furnishing some of their fiercest Arab enemies across the national divide with their self-made conceptions, terms, and logic. From the late 1930s onward, a growing number of "radical" secular or religious Arab nationalists began to identify non-Zionist indigenous Jews as constituting a potential Zionist fifth column. In Egypt, important subnational movements, such as the Muslim Brothers and Misr al-Fatat, embraced, for all intents and purposes, the Zionist conflation between Judaism and Zionism. In Iraq, the pseudo-secular, pan-Arab Istiqlal Party effectively became the most xenophobic of all organized Arab movements toward indigenous Jews.

The identification between Jews and Zionists practically culminated in an unintentional collaboration across the Jewish and Arab national movements between Zionist forces that aimed for the ingathering of Jews to Palestine and several of their presumably fiercest Arab opponents whose actions increasingly aimed at pushing indigenous Jews out of Arab societies and states (without having a concrete final destination in mind). Neither the European Zionists in Palestine, nor the illegal emissaries they installed throughout the region beginning in 1942, nor the minority of Arabized Jews who collaborated with them were profoundly aggrieved by this exclusionary development within Arab nationalism. This development simply worked to the advantage of European Zionism in materializing its principal dictums—that is, *hisul ha-galut* (liquidation of the exile) and *ʿaliya* (emigration) to Israel. Hence, the consolidation of a hegemonic identification between Jews and Zionists was a double-edged enterprise running back and forth across the Jewish and Arab national movements. Although initially advanced by the European Zionists, the identification was duplicated and nourished by important Arab subgroups across the national divide.

The unintended alliance structurally formed across the Arab–Zionist national divide between the "enemies" considerably affected the direction that the phenomenon of nationalism in the Middle East followed in the post-1950s period. Israel doubled its population and demographically became much less "European" than it had been. In the Arab world, competing subgroups within the Arab national movement that advanced more inclusionary bases for collective identity and self-determination—such as regional, linguistic, and class-based—were seriously fractured by, and had to respond to, the region's relative politicization of religious affiliations (initially Judaism and later Islam).

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The strength of subnational liberal and Marxist groups in Egypt and Iraq struggling to institutionalize Arab self-determination on a firm interreligious basis, for example, correlated negatively with the strengthening of separatist Jewish nationalism. It is unclear how the latter could have aided the democratic, multireligious Arab cause.

Across Serbian and Croatian Nationalisms

To enhance the study of European politics via Middle East-based theoretical insights such as those outlined earlier, it is worth recalling the initial breakup of Yugoslavia while limiting the focus to the evolving conflict between Serbia and Croatia. Rogers Brubaker's analysis of the conflict highlights "the complex interplay of three overlapping and mutually intensifying processes: the nationalization of the Croatian incipient state; . . . the increasing disaffection, and nationalist mobilization, of Serbs in the ethnic borderlands of Croatia; and the development of a radical and belligerent 'homeland' stance in the incipient Serbian state."[91] Two processes heightened the politicization of the Croatian Serbs: the radical "homeland" stance of Serbia and the nationalizing Croatian movement (especially under Franjo Tudjman) that attempted to assert ownership and control over the territory and institutions of Croatia through a process of Croatization of the state's economy, language, and cultural symbols. These parallel developments evoked fear among Croatian Serbs, induced militant mobilization, and eventually led to an armed rebellion against the Croatian regime. When the plight of Kosovar Serbs became known, it was seen as a threat to minority Serbs everywhere. After Tudjman's election, this threat was seen as acute in Croatia, which was portrayed as the fascist successor to the Ustasha state. Serbia, under Slobodan Milosevic, had no reservations about encouraging Croatia's borderland Serbs to oppose the new Croatian regime and the Croatian bid for independence. The Croatian Serbs were later provided with arms for these purposes. Serbian claims to speak for Croatian Serbs, by challenging Croatian sovereignty and reinforcing fears of aggressive Serb hegemony, helped push the Croatian government toward a stronger assertion of sovereignty in the rebellious borderlands and to a more uncompromising position regarding the form of independence it demanded.

Reading this historical brief against the previously sketched Middle East sequence, it is possible to think of the Croatian Serbs as structurally occupying a sociopolitical position roughly comparable to the one to which the Arabized Jews were relegated in the 1940s (particularly when Zionism/Israel began to "speak" for them as Serbia spoke for the Croatian Serbs and when Israel and Arab states began their respective Judaization and Arabization projects similar to the Croatization process mentioned earlier). Notwithstanding these similarities, differences are also evident. Most striking, the Arabized Jewish communities were never a part of any secessionist struggle within Arab states as Croatian Serbs (eventually) were within Croatia. Precisely in this context, investigation across the Serbian and Croatian national movements—comparable to the one outlined earlier in relation to Jewish and Arab nationalisms—might help to understand the Serb–Croat matrix. Such a quest seems absent in Brubaker's account, which concludes candidly:

> I have had to limit my discussion to a general sketch of the interplay between the incipient Serb national minority in Croatia, the incipient Croatian nationalizing State, and the incipient Serbian

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homeland, locked in an intensifying spiral of mistrust, misrepresentation and mutual fear. I have had to ignore . . . also the struggles *among* competing stances internal to the minority, nationalizing state, and homeland.[92]

Indeed, Brubaker notes in passing that intransigent opposition to Croatian independence prevailed among village and smalltown Croatian Serbs while it was hardly present at all among Zagreb's cosmopolitan Serbs. Yet, like subnational dynamics, subethnic struggle within a given minority cannot be ignored, because it is crucial for a full understanding of the national outcome in the region one studies. A paradigmatic example is the serious rift that always existed between the minority among Iraqi Jewry who committed themselves to the "external Jewish homeland" in Palestine and the majority of non-Zionists among them—liberals, Marxists, or religious orthodox—who opted, as Iraqi citizens, for allegiance to the Iraqi state. It seems plausible to suggest that an analysis of the sequence of events surrounding the Croatian Serb minority community, positioned at the edges of both Croatian and Serbian nationalisms and situated in a volatile border zone between them, can shed explanatory light on the subsequent national outcome in the region. A complementary analysis within and across Croatian and Serbian nationalisms via the Croatian Serbs, comparable to the one outlined earlier with regard to Jewish and Arab nationalisms via the pre-1948 Arabized Jews, is likely to deepen studies of the outcome of the Serb–Croat conflict and the consolidation of national collectivities in the former Yugoslavia.

CONCLUSION

This article suggested why aims endorsed by Middle East scholars and comparative social scientists have remained parallel, as pointed out by scholars within both fields. The task was carried out by juxtaposing constitutive elements of two bodies of scholarship—that is, comparative studies on nationalism that provide broad theoretical and conceptual insights on the phenomenon worldwide and regional studies of nationalism in the Middle East—and assessing them vis-à-vis each other. In addition, the mutual assessment of these bodies of scholarship epitomized the somewhat idiosyncratic character of the area study of the Middle East, which frustrates communication via the disciplines with theorists and scholars of other regions. The three-part discussion leads to three tentative conclusions.

First, de-ghettoizing the study of nationalism in the Middle East, and possibly the study of the Middle East generally, seems to require a further relaxation of the explanatory role assigned to the ideational realm in shaping the region's macro sociopolitics. Three economic transactions by the five richest indigenous clients of Bank Misr probably had a greater impact on the Egyptian national movement than a full year of op-eds in the liberal, conservative, and religious dailies combined (all the more so given that the majority of Egyptians living during the 1917–67 period could not, and did not, read these otherwise intriguing texts). Similarly, one successful or failed operation by young Palestinians linked to the Tanzim, Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, or Hamas probably generates more international and domestic impact on the Palestinian national movement and struggle than a year of brilliant writing by, say, the late Edward Said or other intellectuals of his caliber. This is truly far from arguing that popular or scholarly writings, the present article included, lack political effect. Rather, it is only to

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place intellectual and ideological activity in its proper perspective and assign it correct explanatory weight.

Second, de-ghettoizing the domain of Middle East studies seems to require firmer engagement in comparative research based on explicit commitment to (1) theory formation and metahistorical frames of reference; and (2) clear definitions of terms employed that might appear self-explanatory (such as "state," "nation," "nationalism," or "nation-state"). Only shared definitions, theorizing, and conceptual frameworks with which to address research questions can link scholars across diverse areas and make their studies meaningful and useful for their non-regional colleagues. "The danger of untheorized history is that it either smuggles in unacknowledged definitions and concepts or substitutes ill-focused narrative for clear analytical description and explanation. Theory which cannot be used in historical work is valueless; historical work which is not theoretically informed is pointless."[93] Dominated by narrative historians, the scholarship on Middle East nationalism principally confronts the latter problem—that is, shortages of fertile theorizing, conceptualization, and comparative outlooks (rather than a shortage of primary sources, for example). In this context, a recent metahistorical characterization of the scholarship on Arab nationalism—concluding that a new narrative emerged between the 1970s and 1990s—seems doubtful, as insights offered in the comparative and theoretical scholarship still await deeper incorporation into the study of nationalism in the Arab (and non-Arab) Middle East.

Third, comparative social-science studies on nationalism customarily focus on comparisons of forms, types, or instances of the phenomenon but rarely include the Middle East in their accounts. In the few studies where the Middle East has been incorporated, this was done in a referential rather than substantive manner. Furthermore, since theoretical social-science studies mostly have compared whole instances of national movements, while specialized studies on nationalism in the Middle East have tended to examine dynamics within national movements in single-country studies, it is the cross-regional comparative study of subnational dynamics that now seems to contain the greatest potential to narrow gaps between comparativists studying nationalism globally and regionalists studying nationalism in the Middle East. Yet whether in the Middle East or elsewhere, comparative and regional studies alike have devoted insufficient attention to the dynamics across nationalisms that develop simultaneously in a mutually antagonistic manner. The Middle East can become a paradigmatic domain for the comparative study of dynamics across movements. By this, I can think of the modes via which Jewish and Arab nationalisms, foremost subnational forces competing within them, have shaped each other's path to self-determination in the 20th century.

NOTES

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[1]These Middle East scholars include Leonard Binder, ed., *The Study of the Middle East* (New York: Wiley, 1976); Lisa Anderson, "Policy Making and Theory Building: American Political Science and the Islamic Middle East," in *Theory, Politics and the Arab world*, ed. Hisham Sharabi (New York: Routledge, 1990), 52–80; Mark Tessler et al., ed., *Area Studies and Social Sciences: Strategies for Understanding*

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Middle East Politics (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999); Ian S. Lustick, "The Quality of Theory and the Comparative Disadvantage of Area Studies," *MESA Bulletin* 34 (winter 2000): 189–92. See also Rashid Khalidi, "Is There a Future for Middle Eastern Studies?" *MESA Bulletin* 29 (1995): 1–6; and *IJMES* 2000 Call for Papers encouraging comparative and cross-regional research, available at: http://w3fp.arizona.edu/mesassoc/Onlinenews/submissions.htm.

For the political-science side see J. Harbeson, C. Maclintock, and R. Dubin, "'Area Studies' and the Discipline: Towards New Interconnections," *Political Science and Politics* 4 (2001): 787–88, 789–811 (which includes six essays on the topic, by Peter J. Katzenstein, Valerie Bunce, Goran Hyden, Michael C. Hudson, Lucian W. Pye, and Guillermo O'Donnel). See also www.apsanet.org/about/international/areastudies.cfm concerning the Area Studies Liaison Group.

[2]For better or worse, space limitations impose constraints on my ability to assess here additional theoretical contributions on nationalism that originate *outside* this domain in such disciplines as comparative literature, political theory/philosophy, or cultural studies. It follows that the intersection sought after in this article is chiefly between (1) comparative sociology and political-science studies on nationalism; and (2) specialized regional studies on nationalism in the Middle East.

[3]Michael C. Hudson's *Arab Politics: The Search for Legitimacy* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1977), 33–39, is one example of atypically theoretically minded studies.

[4]On why many studies ultimately fail to establish this distinction, see Alexander J. Motyl, *Revolutions, Nations, Empires* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 90–97.

[5]For more complete elaborations of definitional difficulties, see K. W. Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1966): chap. 1; A. D. Smith, *Theories of Nationalism* (London: Duckworth, 1971), chap. 7.

[6]Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities* (London: Verso, 1991), 6.

[7]Yael Tamir, *Liberal Nationalism* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993), 66; and idem, "The Enigma of Nationalism," *World Politics* 47 (1995): 425.

[8]Anthony Giddens, *The Nation-State and Violence* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1987), 116.

[9]Walker Connor, "A Nation Is a Nation, Is a State, Is an Ethnic Group, Is a . . . ," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 1 (1978): 377–400.

[10]A. D. Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986), 12, 157; Brendan O'Leary, "On the Nature of Nationalism: An Appraisal of Ernest Gellner's Writings on Nationalism," *British Journal of Political Science* 27 (1997): 193.

[11]See Kais Firro, "The Druze in and between Syria, Lebanon, and Israel," in *Ethnicity, Pluralism and the State in the Middle East*, ed. M. J. Esman and I. Rabinovich (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1988), 185–200.

[12]This definition appears in Karl Deutsch, *Nationalism and Its Alternatives* (New York: Knopf, 1969), 3, who says that it is "a rueful European saying."

[13]Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983), 1.

[14]John Breuilly, *Nationalism and the State* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993); Eric Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

[15]K. Symmons-Symonolewicz, "Nationalist Movements: An Attempt at a Comparative Typology," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 7 (1965): 221–30.

[16]Hans Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism* (New York: Macmillan, 1945); and idem, *Nationalism: Its Meaning and History* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1955); John Palmenatz, "Two Types of Nationalism," in *Nationalism: The Nature and Evolution of an Idea*, ed. E. Kamenka (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1976).

[17]Smith, *Ethnic Origins*, 136–37.

[18]Hugh Seton-Watson, *Nationalism, Old and New* (London: Methuen, 1965); and idem, *Nations and States* (London: Westview Press, 1977).

[19]Anthony Smith, *National Identity* (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 1991), chap. 1, 181.

[20]Edward Shils, "Primordial, Personal, Sacred and Civil Ties," *British Journal of Sociology* 7 (1953): 113–45.

[21]See Charles C. Herod's elaboration in *The Nation in the History of Marxian Thought* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976).

[22]Breuilly, *Nationalism and the State*, 3, 149–56, 281–88.

[23]Ibid., 16.

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[24]I can mention a few of the studies supporting the following brief: Jacques Berque, *Egypt: Imperialism and Revolution* (London: Faber & Faber, 1972); Afaf Lufti Al-Sayyid-Marsot, *Egypt's Liberal Experiment 1922–1936* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977); Ralph M. Coury, "Who 'Invented' Egyptian Arab Nationalism?" *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 14 (1982): 249–81, and 14 (1982): 459–79; Joel Beinin and Zachary Lockman, *Workers on the Nile* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1987); I. Gershoni and J. Jankowski, *Egypt, Islam and the Arabs: The Search for Egyptian Nationhood* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), and idem, *Redefining the Egyptian Nation: 1930–45* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).

[25]For example, Adamantia Pollis, "Intergroup Conflict and British Colonial Policy: The Case of Cyprus," *Comparative Politics* 5 (1973): 575–99; Charles W. MacMillion, "International Integration and Intra-National Disintegration: The Case of Spain," *Comparative Politics* 13 (1981): 291–312; Anthony Marx, "Race, Nation and Class Based Ideologies of Recent Opposition in South Africa," *Comparative Politics* 23 (1991): 313–28.

[26]To sense this tendency, juxtapose Marx's "Race" and *Making Race and Nation* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

[27]To the studies listed in n. 24 one can add Nadav Safran's *Egypt in Search of Political Community* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1961) and Rashid Khalidi's *Palestinian Identity: The Construction of Modern National Consciousness* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997). More theoretically conscious studies include Mahmoud Hussein's *Class Conflict in Egypt* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1973); Philip Khoury's *Syria and the French Mandate: The Politics of Arab Nationalism 1920–1945* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1987); and Beinin and Lockman, *Workers*.

[28]Motyl, *Revolutions*, 84.

[29]Breuilly, *Nationalism and the State*, 405–21.

[30]John Breuilly, "Approaches to Nationalism," in *Mapping the Nation*, ed. Gopal Balakrishnan (London: Verso, 1996), 146–74.

[31]Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 113–40.

[32]See also Zakaria Abuhamdia, "Speech Diversity and Language Unity: Arabic as an Integrating Factor," in *The Politics of Arab Integration*, ed. G. Luciani and G. Salame (London: Croom Helm, 1988), 33–53.

[33]Ranajit Guha, "Nationalism Reduced to 'Official Nationalism,"' *Asian Studies Association of Australia Review* 9 (1985): 103–108.

[34]Such as Gyan Pandey, "Peasants Revolt and Indian Nationalism: The Peasants Movement in Awadh, 1919–22," in *Subaltern Studies I*, ed. Ranajit Guha (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1982), 143–97; idem, "The Prose of Counter-Insurgency," in *Subaltern Studies II*, ed. Ranajit Guha (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1983), 1–41; Sumit Sarkar, "The Conditions and Nature of Subaltern Militancy: Bengal from Sawadeshi to Non-Co-operation, c. 1905–22," in Guha, *Subaltern Studies III*, 271–320; Partha Chatterjee, *The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Post-Colonial Histories* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993), chap. 8.

[35]Such as Iliya Harik, *The Political Mobilization of Peasants* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1974); Edmond Burke, "Rural Collective Action and the Emergence of Modern Lebanon," in *Lebanon: A History of Conflict and Consensus*, ed. N. Shehadi and D. Mills (Oxford: I. B. Tauris, 1988); Nathan Brown, *Peasant Politics in Modern Egypt* (New Haven, Conn,: Yale University Press, 1990); Reinhard C. Schulze, "Colonization and Resistance: The Egyptian Peasant Rebellion, 1919," in *Peasants and Politics in the Modern Middle East*, ed. F. Kazemi and J. Waterbury (Miami: Florida International University Press, 1991), 171–202; Zachary Lockman, "Imagining the Working Class: Representations of Society and Class in Egypt before 1914," *Poetics Today* 15 (1994): 157–90; J. Beinin, *Workers and Peasants in the Modern Middle East* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

[36]Chatterjee, *The Nation and Its Fragments,* 4.

[37]Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, 57, 39.

[38]Charles Tilly, *Coercion, Capital and European States* (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1992), 195.

[39]Breuilly, *Nationalism and the State*, 14.

[40]Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism*, 10.

[41]Breuilly, *Nationalism and the State*, 1.

[42]Ibid., 2, 3; Breuilly, "Approaches," 148.

[43]Elie Kedourie, *Nationalism* (London: Hutchinson, 1960); and idem, *Nationalism in Asia and Africa* (New York: Meridian, 1970). Although Gellner also studied the Middle East, he is not as identified with the study of the region.

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[44]For Arab nationalism before World War I, see R. Khalidi, L. Anderson, M. Muslih, and R. Simon, ed., *The Origins of Arab Nationalism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991).

[45]Elie Chalala, "Arab Nationalism: A Bibliographic Essay," in *pan Arabism and Arab Nationalism*, ed. E. Tawfic and E. Farah (London: Westview, 1987), 19.

[46]Rashid Khalidi, "Arab Nationalism: Historical Problems in the Literature," *American Historical Review* 5 (1997): 1363–64; J. Jankowski and I. Gershoni, ed., *Rethinking Nationalism in the Arab Middle East* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997): xiv. The analysis concentrates on scholarship in English; studies in Arabic and Hebrew necessitate another article.

[47]Albert Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962).

[48]Sylvia Haim, *Arab Nationalism: An Anthology* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962).

[49]Majid Khadduri, *Political Trends in the Arab World: The Role of Ideas and Ideals in Politics* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1970).

[50]Studies on Zionist ideas are numerous, A sample includes the classic Arthur Hertzberg, ed., *The Zionist Idea* (New York: Atheneum, 1959); Shlomo Avineri *The Making of Modern Zionism: Intellectual Origins of the Jewish State* (New York: Basic Books, 1981); and Gideon Shimoni, *The Zionist Ideology* (Waltham, Mass.: Brandeis University Press, 1997). Although the discussion that follows assesses the scholarship on Zionism indirectly, all the arguments presented apply to this literature.

[51]Kedourie, *Nationalism*, 9; idem, *Nationalism in Asia and Africa*, 28 (emphasis added).

[52]It is fair to mention that, in "How Should We Write the History of the Middle East?" *IJMES* 23 (1991): 128, Hourani acknowledges the limitations of his 1962 study: "it now seems to me to have been wrong in laying too much emphasis upon ideas which were taken from Europe."

[53]Studies that make the most compelling case about ideas embodying causal properties are those that concentrate on the diffusion of *economic* knowledge: see Peter Hall, ed., *The Political Power of Economic Ideas: Keynesianism across Nations* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1989).

[54]Charles D. Smith, "'The Crisis of Orientation': The Shift of Egyptian Intellectuals to Islamic Subjects in the 1930s," *IJMES* 4 (1973): 382–410.

[55]Ibid.; Safran, *Egypt in Search*.

[56]Kedourie, *Nationalism in Asia and Africa*, 83–92.

[57]Breuilly, "Approaches," 147.

[58]Israel Gershoni, "Rethinking the Formation of Arab Nationalism in the Middle East 1920–1945: Old and New Narratives," in Jankowski and Gershoni, *Rethinking Nationalism*, 4. While Gershoni's article could not address studies that came out after its publication in 1997, the present article principally communicates with studies that came out before its 2002 submission.

[59]Ibid., 13.

[60]For example, William Cleveland, *The Making of an Arab Nationalist: Ottomanism and Arabism in the Life and Thought of Sati al-Husri* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1971); I. Gershoni, "Arabization of Islam: The Egyptian Salafiyya and the Rise of Arabism in Pre-Revolutionary Egypt," *Asian and African Studies* 13 (1979): 22–57; idem, *The Emergence of pan-Arabism in Egypt* (Tel Aviv: Shiloach Center, 1981); idem, "The Emergence of pan-Nationalism in Egypt: pan-Islamism and pan-Arabism in the 1930s," *Asian and African Studies* 16 (1982): 59–94; idem, "Egyptian Intellectual History and Egyptian Intellectuals in the Interwar Period," *Asian and African Studies* 19 (1985): 333–64; idem, "The Evolution of National Culture in Modern Egypt: Intellectual Formation and Social Diffusion, 1892–1945," *Poetics Today* 13 (1992): 325–50; Phebe Marr, "The Development of Nationalist Ideology in Iraq, 1920–1941," *Muslim World* 75 (1985): 85–101; Ernest C. Dawn, "The Formation of pan-Arab Ideology in the Interwar Years," *IJMES* 20 (1988): 67–91; Nimrod Hurvitz, "Muhibb al-Din al-Khatib's Semitic Wave Theory and the Emergence of pan-Arab Ideology in the Interwar Period," *Middle Eastern Studies* 29 (1993): 118–34; Reeva Simon, *Iraq between the Two World Wars: The Creation and Implementation of a Nationalist Ideology* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986); idem, "The Teaching of History in Iraq Before the Rashid Ali Coup of 1941," *Middle Eastern Studies* 22 (1986): 37–51.

[61]Gershoni, "Old and New Narratives," 4.

[62]R. Stephen Humphreys, "From the Editor," *IJMES* 31 (1999): 505.

[63]Charles D. Smith, "Imagined Identities, Imagined Nationalisms: Print Culture and Egyptian Nationalism in Light of Recent Scholarship," *IJMES* 29 (1997): 607–22; Israel Gershoni and James Jankowski, "Print Culture, Social Change, and the Process of Redefining Imagined Communities in Egypt: Response to the Review by Charles Smith of *Redefining the Egyptian Nation,*" *IJMES* 31 (1999): 81–94; C. D. Smith, "Cultural

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Constructs' and Other Fantasies: Imagined Narratives in *Imagined Communities*; Surrejoinder to Gershoni and Jankowski's 'Print Culture, Social Change, and the Process of Redefining Imagined Communities in Egypt,"' *IJMES* 31 (February 1999): 95–102. Smith's reading of B. Anderson seems to me more faithful to the original.

[64]Gershoni and Jankowski, "Print Culture," 82.

[65]Gershoni, "Old and New Narratives," 11.

[66]See, for example, Neal D. Houghton, "The Challenge to Political Scientists in Recent American Foreign Policy: Scholarship or Indoctrination?" *American Political Science Review* 52 (1958): 678–88; Mark Kesselman, "Order or Movement? The Literature on Political Development as an Ideology," *World Politics* 26 (1973): 139–54.

[67]M. Kramer, "Arab Nationalism: Mistaken Identity," *Deadalus* 122 (1993): 171–206; M. Klein, "Arab Unity: A Nonexistent Entity," *Jerusalem Journal of International Relations* 12 (1990): 28–44.

[68]Giacomo Luciani and Ghassan Salame, "The Politics of Arab Integration," in *The Arab State*, ed. Giacomo Luciani (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 394.

[69]This characterization, and the discussion that follows, do not imply a symmetry between Jewish and Arab nationalisms, because they historically embody inverse relations to Western powers. The issue at stake is the limit of scholarly analyses of the phenomenon of nationalism in the region.

[70]Emmanuel Sivan, "The Arab Nation-State: In Search of a Usable Past," *Middle East Review* (1987): 21–30; Amatzia Baram, "Territorial Nationalism in the Arab World," *Middle Eastern Studies* 26 (1990): 425–48.

[71]R. Simon, "The Imposition of Nationalism in a Non-Nation State: The Case of Iraq during the Interwar Period 1921–1941," in Jankowski and Gershoni, *Rethinking Nationalism*, 87–104.

[72]Abdelwahab Elmessiri, *The Land of Promise* (New Brunswick, N.J.: North American, 1980).

[73]Roger Garaudy, *The Case of Israel* (London: Shoroul International, 1985).

[74]Examples of such studies include Maxime Rodinson, *Israel and the Arabs* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1968); Joel Beinin, *Was the Red Flag Flying There?* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990); Zachary Lockman, *Comrades and Enemies* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996).

[75]Elie Kedourie, "pan Arabism and British Policy," in *The Chatham House Version and other Middle-Eastern Studies* (Waltham, Mass.: Brandeis University Press, 1970), 213–35.

[76]Coury, "Who 'Invented,"' 250. My claim is *not* that the differences among scholars discussed can, or should, be reduced to differences in political outlooks. I only point to some intriguing correlations. That different research strategies are also at play is self-evident.

[77]Yehoshua Porath, *In Search of Arab Unity* (London: Frank Cass, 1986).

[78]Bassam Tibi, *Arab Nationalism* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989).

[79]Porath, *In Search*, 162.

[80]Tibi, *Arab Nationalism*, 20, 216.

[81]I mean those theoretically rigorous scholars, including H. Kohn, K. Deutsch, A. Smith, J. Armstrong, B. Anderson, E. Gellner, J. Breuilly, E. Hobsbawm, or Lia Greenfeld, whose theoretical tools are highlighted by Jankowski and Gershoni in *Rethinking*, introduction and chap. 1.

[82]Studies to which this characterization does not apply are those that integrate theory. They include the collection *Rethinking* that Gershoni's "Old and New" opens. Still, important theoretically informed studies are not discussed in Gershoni's "Old and New," including Hussein, *Class Struggle*; Berque, *Egypt*; Hudson, *Arab Politics*; Harik, *The Political Mobilization of Peasants*; S. Amin, *The Arab Nation: Nationalism and Class Struggle* (London: Zed, 1978); Beinin and Lockman, *Workers*; Brown, *Peasant Politics*; and Kazemi and Waterbury, *Peasants and Politics*.

[83]Excluded from this summary are Albert Hourani's brief commentary "How Should We Write the History of the Middle East?" and his ambitious synthesis *History of the Arab Peoples* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

[84]The exceptions are the political scientists Tibi (whose *Arab Nationalism* also emphasizes the ideational realm) and Ann M. Lesch, whose *Arab Politics in Palestine, 1917–1939: The Frustration of a National Movement* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1979), 13–22, does situate Palestinian nationalism among other national movements while drawing on studies by such comparativists as Rupert Emerson, Karl Deutsch, and Lucian Pye.

[85]Still, the exception exhibited by these three studies is moderate. Cleveland, *The Making*, briefly cites two of the comparativists of his time: Kohn, on page 88, and Rustow, on page 144. In their *Egypt*, Gershoni

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and Jankowski devote the preface to approaches to nationalism (pp. vii–xiv); they rely extensively on Shils' overrating of the role of intellectuals (mainly pp. 78–80), list studies by Smith and Gellner (p. 276); and mention in passing Geertz's anthropological emphasis on ideas and symbols (p. 276). In their *Redefining* it is mainly the concluding chapter that combines theoretical insights—often incompatible—from Anderson's conception of "imagined communities," Gellner's "intense sociologism," and Smith's thesis of *ethnie*. Studies by Geertz and Hobsbawm are also mentioned.

[86]But David Commins's "Religious Reformers and Arabists in Damascus, 1885–1914," *IJMES* 18 (1986): 405–25; and Vernon Egger's *A Fabian in Egypt* (New York: University Press of America, 1986), integrate productively comparative-oriented concepts. Khoury's *Syria and the French Mandate* demonstrates eloquently the value of historical sociology to the study of the Middle East.

[87]On these theoretically minded scholars see n. 81. The five scholars whose studies fall outside this characterization (two of them were mentioned in n. 85) alter moderately my contention. While Dawn, "The Formation," lists only Hans Kohn, both Gershoni, "The Emergence," 90, 92, and Simon, *Iraq*, 21, use a few of Kohn's insights to clarify the "Eastern" type of nationalism. Gershoni, "The Evolution," 326, uses Geertz to define "culture" and lists Gellner and Smith. The remaining studies constituting the new narrative (and that have not been touched on) can indeed be linked, in varying degrees, to the social history of the Annales School. They include Philip S. Khoury, "Divided Loyalties: Syria and the Question of Palestine, 1919–39," *Middle Eastern Studies* 21 (1985): 324–48; Yehoshua Porath, *The Emergence of the Palestinian Arab National Movement 1918–1929* (London: Frank Cass, 1974); idem, *The Palestinian Arab National Movement, 1929–1939: From Riots to Rebellion* (London: Frank Cass, 1977); Ralph Coury, "Egyptians in Jerusalem: Their Role in the General Islamic Conference of 1931," *Muslim World* 82 (1992): 37–54; Michael Eppel, "The Hikmat Sulayman-Bakir Sidqi Government in Iraq, 1936–1937, and the Palestine Question," *Middle Eastern Studies* 24 (1988): 25–41; idem, *The Palestine Conflict in the History of Modern Iraq: The Dynamics of Involvement* (London: Frank Cass, 1994); Thomas Mayer, "Egypt and the General Islamic Conference in Jerusalem in 1931," *Middle Eastern Studies* 18 (1982): 311–22; idem, *Egypt and the Palestine Question 1936–1945* (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 1983); idem, "Egypt and the 1936 Arab Revolt in Palestine," *Journal of Contemporary History* 19 (1984): 275–87; James Jankowski, *Egypt's Young Rebels* (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1975); idem, "Egyptian Responses to the Palestine Problem in the Interwar Period," *IJMES* 12 (1980): 1–38; idem, "The Government of Egypt and the Palestine Question, 1936–39," *Middle Eastern Studies* 17 (1981): 427–53; Itamar Rabinovich, "Inter-Arab Relations Foreshadowed: The Question of the Syrian Throne in the 1920s and 1930s," in *Festschrift in Honor of Dr. George S. Wise* (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University, 1981), 237–50; Ahmed M. Gomaa, *The Foundation of the League of Arab States* (London: Longman, 1977); Khaldun S. Husry, "King Faysal I and Arab Unity, 1930–1933," *Journal of Contemporary History* 10 (1975): 323–40; Muhammad Muslih, *The Origins of Palestinian Nationalism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997); Richard P. Mitchel, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969); P. J. Vatikiotis, *Nasser and His Generation* (London: Croom Helm, 1978); I. Gershoni, "The Muslim Brothers and the Arab Revolt in Palestine, 1936–1939," *Middle Eastern Studies* 22 (1986): 367–97.

[88]Gershoni, "Old and New Narratives," 4.

[89]Joel Beinin, *MESA Newsletter* 24, 2 (2002).

[90]This analysis across nationalisms draws on *Nationalism at Its Edges: Arabized Jews and the Unintended Consequences of Arab and Jewish Nationalisms (1917–1967),* a book manuscript in revision based on my Columbia University dissertation (2001).

[91]Rogers Brubaker*, Nationalism Reframed* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 70; the following brief of the Serb-Croat matrix is based on pages 69–76.

[92]Ibid., 75 (emphasis added).

[93]Breuilly, "Approaches," 146.

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