theories and methodologies

The Logic of Emotionality

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I WOULD LIKE TO SUGGEST THAT WE USE THE TERM *EMOTIONALITY* INSTEAD OF *EMOTIONS*. THIS WILL AVOID THE TAXONOMIC IMPULSE AT work when we take specific emotions and name them as objects of our inquiries. These taxonomies render emotions more stable than they are and create a hierarchy of the most talked-about or salient emotions (like melancholy, for queer studies, or fear, for political theory). More abstract than *emotions*, the term *emotionality* can take on the quality of a name and thus allow us to think together with emotionality the way one may think something through with another person. This essay will define *emotionality* as minimally as possible so that its particulars are allowed to shift and change.

I also (with a nod to Sianne Ngai) prefer the ugliness of the word *emotionality* and its pejorative connotations.[1] It is time to reclaim this attribute, which has been used as an insult to exclude voices from the public sphere. When women, queers, and racialized or culturally othered peoples have been called emotional, this has always meant too emotional, indicating an excess or incessantness unbecoming of the well-adjusted citizen. To combat this mechanism of exclusion, we must refuse to other the emotional.

At the same time it is important not to simply celebrate emotion. The point is to wrest emotionality from its dismissal (as incoherent and therefore irrational, as not to be taken seriously, as worthy only of regulation), but to do so without acting as if feelings were sacred. Feelings can be argued with. Emotions may be shaped, educated, cultivated. They don't have to be treated as forces of nature.

How to think of or with emotionality? In my book on Hegel, *Tropes of Transport: Hegel and Emotion*, I describe emotionality as a transformational force that carries one out of oneself and to a different self. Such transports pluralize the subject. *Subject*, in Hegel, means self-mediation or self-relation. It is not synonymous with *person*; the subject of Hegelian self-mediation can be a plant, for example, or a sentence (Hegel, *Phenomenology* 10–11; sec. 12; 54–58; secs. 60–63).[2] Self-relation across transports produces subjects in

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motion and blurs the intrasubjective with the intersubjective. I become other when emotional—"beside myself" (e.g., with rage) or transported to a new state from which I will never return. Do I relate to myself as the same or as another in such cases? Is this an intra- or an intersubjective relation? In a different scenario, I rely on another—another thing or another person—to feel what we tend to describe unhelpfully as "my," "my own," or "my innermost" feelings. When, let's say, I need a shoulder to cry on in order to realize that I am sad, does this involve me in an intersubjective relation or in a resonance that is more intrasubjective? In all these cases, emotionality engages others, such that self and other are not clearly defined and thingness is not opposed to humanness.

In my ongoing work on Kleist's theater, I employ the figure of the mackle to describe Kleist's dramaturgy ("Doublings" and "Forging"). *Mackle*, a printing term, refers to a blurred image resulting from a slight shift of plates during the printing process. If Hegel organizes emotional self-difference temporally (transformations), Kleist presents it spatially (multiple imprints with minor spatial shifts). Kleist proceeds by doublings—doubling the characters onstage, doubling words and names, doubling scenes, isolating and then doubling the basic performative elements of Western theater (the visual and the linguistic), even doubling the entire drama.[3] These doubles trouble identity. They offer different versions of the same and don't line up when superimposed. Thus, Kleist brings to the fore another characteristic of emotionality—namely, that it renders incongruent what it affects (Pahl, "What a Mess"). One experiences emotionality as a troubling self-multiplication and as a strife with oneself.

Emotionality can, thus, be minimally defined as a transformational or jumbling force that puts things or people at odds with themselves. As a result of the recent interest in affect and emotion, the field of literary analysis risks falling back before the deconstruction of the representational and expressive notions of language. The study of emotion has a tendency to read literary texts for representations of emotions. Affect theory invites considerations of text or speech in texts as expression, and this gets often translated into expression of interiority even as affect theory means to counteract notions such as interiority and subjectivity. It is crucial to avoid such backsliding. On the other hand, there is a great potential for innovation, in my view, when the tools that literary scholarship has developed are used to explore textual emotionality. When we focus not on the emotions of literary characters or the author or the readers but on the emotional dynamic that affects the language of the text, we will be able to analyze the text as emotional rather than presume an emotion or affect to be represented or expressed by the text. It may be counterintuitive to locate the emotional dynamic in language rather than in human subjectivity, but this is what I argue here.

In what sense can a text be emotional? According to the above definition of *emotionality*, a text is emotional when it is incongruous and (self-)transforming. To look for emotional content or for affectively expressive language—words of sadness, fear, or joy, for example—is not useful because such passages can be perfectly coherent and settled and thus detract from emotional language in the strict sense employed here. The focus needs to be instead on incoherent language. Such language can be found on the level of the word, the letter, the paragraph, the individual work, or the oeuvre. I want to make a case for the analysis of emotional sentences.

The sentence is the linguistic unit that is most vigorously regulated and policed for proper language use. Here the rigid rules of philosophical logic intervene in the flexible system of language to produce the laws of syntax and to separate rationality from emotionality. At the same time, it is on the level

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of the sentence—and because of the rules in play there—that language can become most obviously incongruent and can most palpably affect itself.

In "Who's Afraid of Anacoluthon?" Jan Mieszkowski has argued that language excites and disappoints itself with its rules. By launching a sentence according to a given standard, language stimulates itself. But since none of its rules are absolutely compelling, and since language is incapable of confirming its own pretensions to being a self-realizing system, it also inevitably disappoints itself. Thus, language's attempted self-effectuation takes the form of a self-affection. Sentences are emotional. This is the case whether they turn out regular or not, but it might be particularly fruitful to examine sentences that feature more or less obvious syntactic irregularities because they showcase this dynamic.

Take, for example, the last sentence of Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*, which speaks of spirits—the different manifestations of spirit—as they appear and are reflected to produce absolute spirit or absolute knowledge:

> Ihre Aufbewahrung nach der Seite ihres freien in der Form der Zufälligkeit erscheinenden Daseins ist die Geschichte, nach der Seite ihrer begriffenen Organisation aber die *Wissenschaft* des *erscheinenden Wissens*; beide zusammen, die begriffene Geschichte, bilden die Erinnerung und Schädelstätte des absoluten Geistes, die Wirklichkeit, Wahrheit und Gewißheit seines Throns, ohne den er nur das leblose Einsame wäre; nur—
>
> > aus dem Kelche dieses Geisterreiches
> > schäumt ihm seine Unendlichkeit.
> >
> > (*Phänomenologie* 720; sec. 808)
>
> Their preservation in terms of their free existence appearing in the form of contingency is history, but in terms of their conceptually grasped organization, it is the *science* of *phenomenal knowledge*; both together are conceptually grasped history; they form the recollection and the skull place of absolute spirit, the actuality, the truth, the certainty of its throne, without which ["ohne den"] it would be lifeless and alone; only—
>
> > Out of the chalice of this realm of spirits
> > Foams forth to it its infinity.
> >
> > (*Phenomenology* 720; sec. 808; trans. modified)

Elsewhere I have analyzed the way this sentence folds back on itself until it becomes almost ungrammatical (*Tropes* 83–99). Since everything in the final chapter and, by virtue of this chapter's recapitulating quality, everything in the entire book is cooked and recooked and finally condensed into this one last sentence, it is difficult to find a referent for the relative pronoun in the phrase "without which." The grammatical logic (the most immediate referent is "throne") is at odds with the philosophical meaning (why should spirit be lifeless without this dead symbol?) and with stylistic requirements (the emphasis created by the parallel structure would suggest "the actuality, the truth, the certainty" as referent—but this would call for the plural pronoun *die* rather than *den* in the phrase *ohne den*). While Hegelian philosophy ranks life as the highest value and community among the highest values, it is at pains here to articulate what precisely renders spirit alive and communal ("without which it would be lifeless and alone"). Under extreme pressure to effectuate itself, the sentence breaks off with a dash. This dash isolates the last word written by Hegel alone: "only." Severed from the meaning of the sentence, which celebrates togetherness ("both together"), this signifier of restriction, finitude, and disappointment stands between the semicolon and the dash as a sad and lonely word. From the other edge of the dash two lines of somebody else's poem on friendship drop like tears. This unnamed somebody can easily be identified as Schiller even as Hegel's friendship consists in changing almost every word in this "quotation." If the title of the last chapter of Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*—"Absolute Knowledge"—as

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well as the posture of its last sentence and some of its signifiers, suggests a triumphant ending to this monumental book, the odd syntax of the final sentence exposes the difficulties and conflicting pulls that the text encounters as it is releasing (relinquishing and publishing) its rule(s).

Another example, from *Phenomenology*'s section on conscience, in which Hegel discusses the "beautiful soul," evil, and forgiveness, features torn rather than convoluted syntax. Sentences that want to or are supposed to take the shape of judgments (like "I am bad" or "You are vile") remain incomplete. The pure and aloof "beautiful soul," the protagonist of this last section of the chapter on spirit, "repels . . . community" by throwing mere shreds of judgments—only the predicates—at its counterpart (594; sec. 667). "In crying out 'base,' 'vile,' and so on," the beautiful soul keeps the other at a distance and turns into the "hard heart" (590; sec. 663, trans. modified). I have described elsewhere how *Phenomenology* presents us here with a dance of shared speech in which the less-principled acting consciousness catches the predicates that the hard-hearted beautiful soul throws around in jolty propositions such as "bad! . . . it's me ["ich bin's"]" or "vile! . . . it's me ["ich bin's"]" (*Tropes* 199–204). "Ich bin's" can be translated as "I am so," thus approximating the judgments "I am bad" and "I am vile," but it can also be heard as a sign of familiarity (Hegel, *Phenomenology* 594; sec. 667; trans. modified). One answers the question "who is it?" with "it's me" only within the horizon of a trusted intimacy. Launched as a projectile, to keep the other at a distance, the sentence ends up affecting itself and feeling itself by articulating dependence, performing complementarity, and expressing trust. In both of these Hegelian examples—the torn and the convoluted—we can see that emotionality is shared or divided and shares or divides what it affects, that the incongruous or troubled sentence is not produced by one speaker alone, and that the intersubjective overlaps with the intrasubjective.

Kleist brings bodies that speak on the stage. While playwrights usually do so, Kleist's theater stands out because the relation of the visual and the linguistic is not one of subordination but one of mutual affection. Body and speech double each other. This self-affection or internal interference of the Kleistian theater unsettles our ability to identify the action, characters, and meaning of the play. Rather than stage circumscribed emotions or arouse them in the spectators, Kleist's theater is structurally emotional. It presents an incongruous and dissonant structure.

In this emotional structure, sentences—some more obviously than others—follow an unusual logic. Let us consider an example from Kleist's version of the *Amphitryon* material: "Ich kann's euch darthun, Herr, wenn ihr's begehrt. / Mein Zeuge, mein glaubwürdiger, ist der / Gefährte meines Mißgechicks, mein Rücken" ("I can show you, sir, if you want me to. / My witness, a trustworthy one, is my / companion in misfortune, my back" [2.1.732–34]).[4] To unpack the logic of this sentence, we need to first elucidate the structural mackle of this play. The Greek myth already employs doubles: Amphitryon is doubled by Zeus, who sleeps with Amphitryon's wife, Alcmene, in the guise of her husband, and the union produces the twin brothers Iphicles (Alcmene's son by Amphitryon) and Heracles (her son by Zeus). The myth presents a mortal and a divine version of husband-father and son, organizing a doubles' hierarchy, which Kleist subtly undoes. To analyze how Kleist disturbs the hierarchy, let's turn to the double that consists of Amphitryon's servant, Sosias, and Jupiter's assistant, Merkur.[5]

Merkur has adopted the shape of Sosias and keeps watch at the gates of Amphitryon's palace while Jupiter enjoys Alcmene's company inside. Sosias is approaching, sent by Amphitryon to let Alcmene know that her husband will return home the following day.

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After a strenuous nocturnal hike through the forest, Sosias runs into his double. In the course of a heated verbal exchange, Merkur ends up clubbing Sosias for reasons that depend on perspective: Merkur, who is there to shield the divine tryst, needs to put an end to Sosias's insistent attempts to deliver his message. Sosias, who is deeply disturbed to encounter another Sosias, needs a physical jolt.

The scene of Sosias's hitting upon and being beaten by another "I" excites itself (to use Mieszkowski's analytic terminology) by launching itself according to two sets of rules—one is linguistic and concerns first-person discourse, the other has to do with the shape of a body and the identity of a person and regulates subject formation through self-discipline. These two sets of rules may be considered as corresponding to the Lacanian symbolic and imaginary orders. But the confusion here is increased, in comparison to Lacan, by the fact that Kleist resists any hierarchy and even clear distinction between the two orders when he doubles (body) image with language.

Our being subject to language involves a gap between the signifier *I* (the subject of the enunciation) and the signified (the subject of the statement). Kleist stages this self-difference as a doubling of bodies.[6] What is proper to language—that the first-person pronoun *I* can shift from enunciation to statement and from one physical individual to another—merges with the mirror relation, characteristic of the imaginary, as two identical-looking individuals face each other.

Against these doublings, one tries to take charge of one's unity. The uniformity of the subject can only be achieved by (self-)discipline, and this discipline requires subordination. The god or master subject beats into shape mortal flesh. This standard of subject formation gets subtly derailed (and thus disappointed, but also solaced) by the other paradigm of subjectivity, first-person speech. The first-person pronoun indexes a unique individual in the present instance of discourse; in the next instance it can be usurped by another subject. The one who says "I" thus comes across others who occupy the same place and realizes that "I" is many. Interestingly, Sosias does not identify with his mirror image, nor is he flattered by its divine countenance. But what safeguards him against imaginary misrecognition is not a resolute embrace of symbolic negativity (as one school of Lacanians would recommend to patients): image and word are so thoroughly contaminated with each other in Kleist that the symbolic cannot protect against the imaginary. Rather, with disarming literalness, Sosias takes his mirror image to be another Sosias and another "I." Sosias accepts self-difference without having to resolve it by introducing a hierarchy (between the divine and the mortal, the real and the fake, or the self and the other).

Instead of establishing an illusory unity of hierarchically organized elements, Sosias falls apart. When Sosias physically encounters the other "I," his body disintegrates, and so do his sentences: "I can show you, sir, if you want me to. / My witness, a trustworthy one, is my / companion in misfortune, my back." Sosias can provide physical evidence of his self-discipline; he can show the traces on his bruised back. But in this show-and-tell, his back turns out to be not quite his anymore. The apposition of the two elements of theater—spectacle and discourse—affects the bodies given to see and the sentences given to hear. The organism—the hypotactic organization of the body—unravels when Sosias addresses his back as if it were a separate character: a witness. As painful as it is, such unraveling also produces relief by providing companionship and support—a "companion in misfortune." Similarly, Sosias's sentences are chopped by insertions and jumbled by inversions. His speech is disarticulated by the strikes of too many commas. In this comedic version of the drama of self-formation and self-articulation, disintegration spreads

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rampantly and is loudly lamented, but Sosias also seems to find some pleasure in the sociability that the nonunified self affords.

Given the incoherence of his discourse, Sosias cannot be recognized as authentic and sovereign. Amphitryon doesn't believe a word Sosias says and calls his speech "marklos-albernes Gewäsch" ("drivel, feeble claptrap" [2.1.764]). In response, Sosias is right to complain that someone who was more together, someone who had successfully shaped himself into a sovereign and imposing figure, would probably be taken more seriously: "Weil es aus meinem Munde kommt, / Ist's albern Zeug, nicht werth, daß man es höre. / Doch hätte sich ein Großer selbst zerwalkt, / So würde man Mirakel schrei'n" ("from my mouth / it's idiot's stuff, not worth listening to. / But if some hero had beaten himself up / they would cry miracle" [766–69]). The ironic self-assessment—"not worth listening to"—points to the banality of subjectivity's common predicament. In the process of subject formation, we all lose our integrity and we all find companions in the "I." We are falling apart because of the self-reflection that constitutes us as subjects while it renders our constitution impossible. And none of us can forever identify with the subject of a singular speech act. We all beat ourselves up to be coherent. That is to say, we perform the emotional labor of covering over the paradoxes of self-reflection and of speaking in the first person. Kleist foregrounds these incongruities, but he also shows that each story is different and worth attending to.

To avoid creating the impression that emotional syntax always unravels, let us now turn to an example of dense syntax, rich rhetoric, and concrete diction, this time from Kleist's *The Prince of Homburg*. The prince of Homburg has been sentenced to death by the elector of Brandenburg for disregarding the elector's military orders and prematurely winning a victory for Brandenburg. The prince considers the elector a father figure and, when he hears of his condemnation, the prince rushes to the elector's wife to beg for her help. On his way to her, he happens to see the grave that has already been dug for him. On the verge of a breakdown, the prince counteracts the father figure's perfectly correct judgment with the following imperfect verbal construction:

> O meine Mutter!
> . . . . . .
> O laß mich Deine Knie umfassen, Mutter!
> . . . . . .
> O meine Mutter
> . . . . . .
> Du scheinst mit Himmelskräften, rettenden,
> Du mir, das Fräulein, deine Frau'n, begabt,
> Mir Alles rings umher, dem Troßknecht könnt' ich,
> Dem schlechtesten, der Deiner Pferde pflegt,
> Gehängt am Halse flehen: rette mich!
>
> O my mother!
> . . . . . .
> O let me clasp your knees, mother!
> . . . . . .
> O my mother . . .
> . . . . . .
> you appear ["scheinst"] with heaven's powers, to save,
> you me, the lady Princess, your women, endowed,
> and everything around, one of the menials in your baggage train I could,
> the lowest, who cares for your horses,
> hung about the neck implore: save me!
> (3.5.965–66, 971, 973–77; my trans.)

Kleist experiments with organizing language around sexual signifiers other than the phallus—in particular, the breast and the anus. This passage employs his breast language. Simon Richter has argued, in *Missing the Breast*, that eighteenth-century German literature fashions a breast-centered culture that includes efforts to materialize the breast in text or, rather, to materialize a text as breast, whereby this body part becomes so overde-

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termined that it ceases to "reliably signify the female" (17).[7]

In the prince of Homburg's speech to the electress, the capital letter *O* appears by itself three times in rapid succession to paint the round breast. The lips, pursed to make the sound *o*, are ready to receive the nipple. Alliteration affords aural pleasure, and the repeated alliteration on *m* (*meine Mutter*) also expresses oral satisfaction (in German, the *m* sound works like "yum"). With the overdetermined phrase "Du scheinst" (which means "you seem" but can also mean "you shine"), the prince launches into hypotyposis. What follows makes the mother appear; it produces a shining image of the mother in words. In addition to offering rich, vivid, picturesque language, the sentence syntactically forms a breast. Each insertion—and there are many in this one sentence—curves the syntax and contributes to the fullness and density of the breast. The repeated evocations of female and maternal figures ("mother," "lady," "women") and of gestures of maternal intimacy ("cares for" and "hung about the neck") paint a scene of physical proximity to the breast and build the texture of the linguistic breast. The kernel of intimacy—"you me"—can be found somewhere in the middle. It is charged by the glorification of the "you"—"you shine with heaven's powers"—and intensified by a first syntactic curlicue in the form of an insertion—"rettenden" ("saving"; here "to save"). This tight roundness opens when the depiction and scope of the motherly is extended to the princess, to the electress's female entourage, to everything around the electress, to her baggage train, to the lowest of her servants, and to the horses. With the menial of the baggage train ("dem Troßknecht"), the image of the mother takes a queer turn. It blends the female with the male (*Knecht* refers to a male servant), the maternal with the military (*Troß* is used only in the military context), and the most exalted ("heaven's powers") with "the lowest." Everything gets syntactically pressed and visually squeezed into the image of a child hanging around the mother's neck—until the sentence-breast squirts: "save me!" With his speech, the prince has produced a little jet of saving milk.

Instead of expressing the prince's psychological state, the sentence affects the speaker. Not quite on purpose but with the awareness of a sleepwalker, he puts before his eyes and in his mouth an object that gives comfort.[8] The breast sentence saves the prince.[9] Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick points to the mutual effect of repair when she clarifies, in her seminal essay "Paranoid Reading and Reparative Reading," that the "reparative impulse . . . is additive and accretive. . . . It wants to assemble and confer plenitude on an object that will then have resources to offer to an inchoate self" (150). Beyond plenitude, the breast provides the prince with a much needed detour. The swelling of the sentence into a breast (curling in phrase-lump after phrase-lump) offers relief from all-too-straightforward subjective purpose and instrumentality. The syntactic object and the hypotypotic scene cover again the abyss that opened when the prince stared into his grave and disperse the speaker's attention that would otherwise lead directly to death. With its roundness, roundaboutness, and opacity, breast language escapes urgency even in the most urgent situations.

Attention to the incongruence of the textual material saves readers from facile or ideological notions about the fullness of speech. The *O* is full and empty at the same time. Death resonates even where language seems closest to the breast. Clinging to the world in all its richness, somebody—the "me," the prince, or the menial—is already executed: "hung" by the neck. Fullness overlaps with emptiness and death with life in the emotional, overdetermined, dense tissue of this linguistic breast.

Despite interesting results, the study of incoherent sentences raises the question of selection. Are we overanalyzing the text

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when we assign significance and meaning to its incongruities? When is a given sentence worth analyzing, and when do we chalk irregularities up to the writer's incompetence? The diagnosis of linguistic and logical incompetence gives license for dismissal. Even such towering figures as Hegel and Kleist are not immune to being discounted, like Sosias, as producers of "drivel, feeble claptrap." To avoid facile and harmful judgments, especially in response to uncanonized speech, we need analysis that is more, not less, careful. Nevertheless, there can be no guarantee for the protection of every utterance. Dismissals have their place, but they say more about the dismissers than the dismissed.

Nothing inherent in any irregular sentence tells us whether the author simply didn't master the rules or is creating or responding to different rules and laboring to educate us about them.[10] In the case of ordinary speakers we might take incoherent sentences as expressions of emotion and analyze them as such. But this can easily become condescending. We tend to expect that canonized authors are neither confused nor emotional when they propose a different way of seeing the world and a different grammar and logic to go along with it. But this expectation reproduces the traditional and objectionable view of emotionality that sets it up as the lack of rationality and that defines rationality as freedom from emotionality. And then there is the problem of the hierarchy of emotions. We know that Hegel was experiencing an existential crisis as he wrote *Phenomenology of Spirit*—his career was stalling, he had been without a paying job for several years, his apartment was ransacked by the French during the Battle of Jena, and his landlady was pregnant with his child (Pinkard 221–30). He probably drew on his personal experience of despair as he articulated the "path of despair" that is *Phenomenology* (Hegel 73; sec. 78). And yet, before we call Hegel emotional and despairing, we rather believe the more heroic story that he completed *Phenomenology*, as his student Eduard Gans put it, "under the thunder of the battle of Jena" (Pinkard 229).[11] Hegel fueled this legend, perhaps partly to excuse what he feared were the book's shortcomings. But such anxieties of authorship are beside the point.

The problem of condescension or excuse or of tweaking emotional valences in accordance with accepted notions of social identity and the problem with the unavailability of the author's intent (the only standard for judging whether or not the author made a mistake) are taken out of the equation if we focus on textual rather than authorial emotionality. An inconsistent sentence might be worth analyzing whether or not its writer was generally (in)competent or temporarily (not) up to the mark. Whether or not to dismiss the text, smooth over irregularities, or engage in closer analysis is determined by the reader's interest, not by the writer's competence. So, we have to ask ourselves, what do we gain from putting in further hermeneutic effort? Amphitryon, for example, might have been better able to respond to his own duplication had he not declared Sosias non compos mentis.

If we attend to the emotionality of texts on the level of the sentence we can expand the horizon of the reasonable and the logical. Our world would be a better place if we developed more and stronger modes of thought that accept and work with incoherence. The natural and technological sciences have already expanded logic to integrate vagueness and uncertainty (e.g., complexity theory and the epistemological approaches behind big-data analysis), but we need the humanities to contribute here. The old philosophical logic of the Western tradition still reigns supreme throughout the humanities. This logic was developed partly to discipline or avoid emotionality. It ended up serving the less-than-nuanced condemnation, exclusion, and repression of emotionality and emotional people. Western philosophical logic takes the sentence as its basic operative unit. It regu-

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lates the construction of sentences, providing rules for building judgments and joining them into syllogisms. To move our logic, we therefore need more familiarity with emotional sentence structures and more analysis of the specificities of their incoherence. Then we will be able to accommodate in what we have come to accept as rational or logical the specific logic of emotionality—the disturbance and incongruence that it brings. By attending to textual emotionality on the level of sentences, we can trace, develop, and encourage different rules for rationality from a humanities perspective.

Notes

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1. With *Ugly Feelings*, Ngai expanded the category of aesthetic emotions to include unprestigious, weak, and nasty feelings. "If *Ugly Feelings* is a bestiary of affects, . . . it is filled with rats and possums rather than lions" (7). Her study transforms the philosophical-aesthetic field by eroding the moral, aesthetic, and therapeutic purchase of grand passions and ennobling feelings.

2. I quote from Terry Pinkard's translation of *The Phenomenology of Spirit* and indicate when modifications were necessary to reproduce the German syntax as closely as possible.

3. For the last two points, see Klotz; Allemann.

4. Quotations from David Constantine's translation of *Amphitryon* have been modified to reproduce the German syntax as closely as possible.

5. That Kleist uses the Roman gods in this Greek context is another instance of doubling.

6. When Sosias explains to Amphitryon that he was prevented by the other Sosias from carrying out Amphitryon's order, he shifts from speaking as "I" (the subject of the enunciation) to referring to "I" as an object (the subject of the statement) to thematizing the subject of the enunciation: "I, yes. An I that has / knowledge of all our confidentialities / . . . / Entirely like the I talking to you" ("Ich, ja. Ein Ich, das Wissenschaft / Von allen unsern Heimlichkeiten hat, / . . . / Dem Ich vollkommen gleich, das mit euch spricht" [2.1.660–63]).

7. See, in particular, ch. 4, "Wieland's Busted Tropes" (104–36).

8. The prince enters the play as a sleepwalker, and he never seems to wake to full presence of mind—except, perhaps, for the moment when he receives the death sentence.

9. Thereby text assumes a role that the characters are unable or unwilling to play and that we don't see if we pay attention only to human emotion (to the prince's despair as he realizes that the elector has given him the death sentence, to his urgent need for his motherly protection, to his frustration as his elective mother gives him a less-than-compassionate welcome and scolds him for his lack of composure).

10. The only indicator that inconsistency was purposely constructed might be exaggeration—the pointed and repeated use of incongruity. But, then, exaggeration is often taken as a sign of bad taste, so that the author's incompetence tends to reenter at the level of taste even if the author escaped the charge at the level of grammar.

11. Hegel provided similar descriptions (Pinkard 229, 256). In fact, *Phenomenology* was not completed until at least January 1807 (230), while the Battle of Jena took place on 14 October 1806.

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