(p. 110). This could suggest that he tells deliberate lies, but the chapter does not go beyond attributing his well-known selectivity to his love of a moral lesson. Thus, passages of moral instruction are found filling the gaps left by *Hellenica*'s notorious omissions (pp. 75–6: the argument presumes that he could make nothing instructive of the omitted material), and what he calls 'worthy of report' are moral lessons, on leadership in particular, as we know, and involve the narration of insignificant events (p. 82). His digressions, speeches and other narrative features show the same priority.

Xenophon's lessons are then made more briefly to serve the politics of dissent. The morals he promotes are called undemocratic because they are oligarchic, military, and hierarchical—Spartan in a word (pp. 110–11)—and his lessons on leadership are said to endorse the traditional aristocratic military career against the contemporary preference for demagogy. One could say in response that courage in the face of death and loyalty in misfortune, qualities to which the chapter has made specific reference, are certainly not restricted to military life; that it is not unlikely that the democracy itself valued such leadership qualities in their fighting forces; and that in other works Xenophon requires the same qualities of political leaders and of members of the private associations of family and friends.

The chapter on Ephorus also concludes (p. 141) that his 'primary purpose in writing his *Histories* seems to have been the moral instruction of his readers, to show how the collective moral behavior of a society leads to its remaining strong and free, which he achieved through the use of praise and blame, negative example, prefaces, digressions, aphorisms, speeches'—even though, as the author has indicated, very little remains of his prefaces or speeches. A special proof of his interest in moral lessons is found in passages where he is prepared to break his own rule about not dealing with the mythical past. The foundation of the Delphic oracle by Apollo is one instance, and the author continues to pursue the distortion of the 'accurate' record in the interests of moral lessons (p. 119), arguing here and elsewhere that Ephorus does not even try to obtain the accurate version (pp. 121, 128). E.'s view that the freedom of the Aetolians came from their simple and hard life probably has as much truth in it as the similar view in the concluding story in Herodotus about the Persians.

The two main arguments are pursued with the same degree of conviction in the chapter on Theopompus, an easier case, since he made such an issue of praise and blame in his work.

It is useful to have our attention drawn again to the importance of the evaluation of virtue and vice in the fourth-century historians, but whether they deliberately distorted events in order to promote such evaluation is unproven. That they represent the politics of dissent is plausible, but Xenophon at least is a much more complicated case than is allowed here.

University of Auckland V. J. GRAY
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THE NEW OCT DEMOSTHENES

M. R. Dilts (ed.): *Demosthenis* Orationes *I.* Pp. xxxiii + 318. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. Cased. ISBN: 0-19-872168-4.

This volume represents the first of a planned four-volume edition of Demosthenes' speeches, replacing the Oxford text of S. H. Butcher and W. Rennie (1903–31). It is a

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more-or-less direct replacement for Butcher's first volume, although it should be noted that the latter included Dem. 19 *On the False Embassy*, whereas Dilts's ends with Dem. 18 *On the Crown*. In this respect, at least, Butcher has not been completely superseded.

D. brings to his task considerable experience as an editor both of Attic oratory (the recent Teubner edition of Aeschines) and of later rhetorical texts (the scholia to Demosthenes and Aeschines, and, with G. Kennedy, an edition of two Greek rhetorical treatises).

In its format, this volume has a couple of innovative features. First, the text is introduced by an English Preface rather than a Latin *praefatio*. This is neither a complete novelty for the series nor apparently a change of policy by the Press (compare the English introduction to Green's 1999 edition of *Ausonius* with the *praefatio* of Slings's 2003 edition of Plato's *Republic*). Traditionalists may disapprove, but I suspect that many more users of this text will read the preface, or will read it with fuller understanding, than if it had been written in Latin.

In the preface D. provides a succinct history of the text in antiquity, discusses the primary manuscripts and the major editions of the speeches, and sets out the principles that he employed in editing the text. The main point to emerge from his discussion of the speeches' early history is that all four primary manuscripts (SAFY) contain readings that date to antiquity, as shown by the testimonia and papyri. His treatment of the manuscripts is clear and useful, although readers will probably also want to consult the more detailed discussion by MacDowell in the introduction to his edition of Dem. 21. The list of editions is selective and D.'s comments about them somewhat lapidary: about Butcher's OCT we are told only that it 'was a welcome departure from Blass's extreme editorial practice' but that its apparatus was 'flawed'.

In discussing the principles that underlie his text, D. addresses four issues. The first is the relative weight to be attached to manuscripts S and AFY respectively. He accepts the arguments of Bühler that the markedly longer recension in AFY of the *Third Philippic* is *not*, as had been argued by Irmer, superior to that of S, but does not expressly commit himself to the general superiority of S. The second question is the extent to which hiatus should be allowed in the text. Against the practice of earlier editors, who were persuaded that Demosthenes consciously avoided it, D. allows hiatus where two primary manuscripts (as defined at p. xvii n. 34) do so, but adopts the reading without hiatus where they disagree. The third section announces his decision to provide an *Apparatus testimoniorum*, the second innovative aspect of this edition. This apparatus lists 'fragments of ancient manuscripts or papyri, which date from the first to the fifth/sixth centuries, and quotations of the orations from authors dating from the first century BC till the end of the fourteenth century AD' (p. xviii). The last section explains the construction of the critical apparatus. Of particular note is D.'s decision to restore to the text certain forms that are used in the primary manuscripts but that previous editors had emended, in the mistaken belief that they were not current in Demosthenes' day: here the evidence of fourth-century inscriptions has persuaded D. to restore the manuscript forms.

The preface is followed by a list of *Fragmenta Papyracea* containing eighty-four items (by comparison Butcher lists only nine papyri for the corresponding speeches), and a *Compendia Auctorum* providing abbreviations for the numerous, often obscure, authors cited in the two apparatuses. Readers who do not immediately recognize such exotica as Syrianus Sopater Marcellinus' *Scholia ad Hermogenis status* will find themselves referring to it constantly. Useful as it is, the *Compendia Auctorum* is not complete, or at any rate the principle applied in compiling it is unclear to me. Whilst

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the reader could reasonably be expected to work out that 'Luc. J. Tr.' (1.1) represents Lucian's *Ζεὺς Τραγωιδός*, the abbreviation 'Prol. Ulp.' (1.7 etc.) certainly needs to be explained (it refers to Ulpian's *Prolegomena*, printed in Volume 1 of D.'s *Scholia Demosthenica*). There are others too (e.g. 'Ammon.' at 1.8: which of the seven writers named Ammonius listed in the *TLG* is meant?) which it would have been helpful to have had explicated in the *Compendia*.

D. differs from Butcher in not printing texts of the ancient *hypotheses* to the speeches. He also accepts the Demosthenic authorship of Dem. 10 *Fourth Philippic*, though he still regards Dem. 13 as spurious.

Judged purely by the number of changes, D.'s text is a radical departure from that of Butcher. In the short speech Dem. 16 *For the Megalopolitans* I noted no fewer than forty-three differences. Most of these, however, involve either the restoration of *scriptio plena* where Butcher had sought to remove hiatus, or the restoration of forms emended by previous editors on the ground of alleged anachronism. In two places (§1 *πολῖται* and §17 *χάριν*) words deleted by Butcher are restored. At §3 D. prefers the original reading of S (*δείξω*) to that of the other manuscripts, the corrector of S, and *Exordium* 8; at §17 he follows SFY (*ἵν' ἐπειδὰν*) against A; at §28 he restores *ἔτι*, the reading of all but a single later manuscript, which had been deleted by Butcher, presumably to avoid hiatus. The one other difference of substance seems to be the result of a slip: at §2 D. prints the otherwise unattested word *Ἀττικιστῶς* as the unanimous reading of the manuscripts, whilst reporting *ἀττικιστί* as the reading in the parallel *Exordium* 8. All other editors I have consulted, Butcher included, report the manuscript reading as *Ἀττικῶς*.

My overall impression of D.'s text is consistent with my account of that of speech 16. He has clearly set out to return where possible to the manuscript readings, primarily by allowing hiatus and by reinstating wrongly emended 'late' forms, and has thereby produced a text that is probably much closer than any of its predecessors to what Demosthenes actually wrote. The *apparatus criticus* is full and clear, and D. shows excellent critical judgement. In short, his text is, an one would hope, a marked improvement over that of Butcher and his successors (most importantly Fuhr's Teubner and Croiset's Budé).

However, the text is not entirely free from blemishes. A partial examination revealed slips at 5.16 (*συμμαίχαι* for *συμμαχίαι*), 8.70 (*τριηραρίχας* for *τριηραρχίας*), and in the *apparatus testimoniorum ad* 18.35 and 18.38, where 'PSI XIV 1345' should read (as correctly *ad* 18.28) 'PSI XIV 1395'. Moreover, whilst I welcome the addition of an *apparatus testimoniorum*, I have some reservations about the way in which it is presented. First, as mentioned above, some abbreviations are left unexplained. Secondly, a rather clumsy (computerized?) justification of the text makes it hard in places, especially at the beginning of the most-quoted speeches, to see where one entry ends and the next begins. Thirdly, some of the references are incomplete. At 1.20, for instance, the reference 'Ph. s.v.' applied to a whole clause requires the reader to guess that the entry in Photius' *Lexicon* for *σύνταξις* is meant. Whilst one appreciates the need for concision, here it is arguably taken too far. There is also an inconsistency in the citation of Demosthenes' *Exordia* sometimes as 'Ex.' (as at 1.1), sometimes as 'D. Ex.' (13.1). None of this is a serious impediment to using the apparatus, but it does give an impression of slight untidiness. Lastly, I wonder how complete the list of testimonia is. At any rate, a search for the opening words of Dem. 1 using *TLG* revealed a further match in the anonymous commentary on the *Ars Rhetorica* of Dionysius Thrax. Further investigation of the *TLG* database is likely to reveal more previously unnoticed testimonia.

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But I do not wish to end on a carping note. This new text is a fine achievement, and readers of Demosthenes will look forward eagerly to the regular appearance of the remaining three volumes.

York University, Toronto JEREMY TREVETT
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HOW WE READ PLATO NOW

J. ANNAS, C. ROWE (edd.): *New Perspectives on Plato, Modern and Ancient*. (Center for Hellenic Studies Colloquia 6.) Pp. xii + 270. Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 2002. Cased, £32.95. ISBN: 0-674-01018-3.

For half a century of more, most commentary on Plato, at least in the English-speaking world, has assumed a standard paradigm which divided the dialogues into three chronological groups. The early dialogues give a vivid picture of the historical Socrates. Although these generally end on a note of uncertainty, influential scholars have claimed to find within them a coherent 'philosophy of Socrates'. The middle period dialogues are more positive and give a central rôle to the theory of Forms. But the late or 'critical' dialogues cast doubt on that theory. In recent years this way of reading Plato has been subjected to criticism from several quarters There has been no consensus on a new paradigm, but many scholars would agree in emphasizing the need to take account of form as well as content in interpreting Plato. Some have been influenced by developments in literary theory and others by a re-evaluation of the styles of interpretation employed by ancient platonists. The present volume, which derives from a colloquium on 'Plato and Socrates: Approaches to the Interpretation of Plato's Dialogues', covers many of the key issues in this debate. It contains seven papers, each of them paired with a substantial commentary.

The assumption that the key to interpreting Plato's dialogues lies in understanding the author's intellectual development is relatively modern. C. C. W. Taylor, writing on 'the Origins of our Present Paradigms', shows how this way of reading Plato originated with Romanticism. It was 'modified rather than subverted' by the advent of stylometric methods which seemed to establish in an objective way the order in which the dialogues were written. Most twentieth-century scholars placed a good deal of weight on these methods in arguing for their developmental interpretations. But, as Charles Kahn shows in his paper on 'Platonic Chronology', it is questionable whether they were entitled to do this. Although it is possible to divide Plato's dialogues into three stylistic groups, these do not correspond very closely to those required by the standard paradigm.

Annas defends a style of interpretation for which she finds precedent in ancient commentators such as Plutarch. It is based on the principle that for Plato 'Even the boldest claims are still subject to argument'. The reader should thus accept such claims, 'not because of Plato's authority, but on the basis of the understanding of Plato she has achieved as a result of her own use of reason and argument'. Consequently there is no need to invoke development to explain how Plato could write dialogues of *ad hominem* argument, such as those commonly assigned to his 'Socratic'

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