and Roman army religion. He divides army religion into three categories: official, semi-official, and private. The second is a new category, which is defined as dedications made by officers and their units, and is a conceptually valuable addition. Through an analysis of the Feriale Duranum and other material, the author concludes that the function of official religion was to instill a sense of duty and obligation rather than religious feeling. He sees true religious sentiment as directed to cults, often local or Near Eastern, outside of official military religion. He notes the army's rôle in the spread of certain cults such as Mithraism, and its rôle in transferring them to local populations along with elements borrowed from the military, such as iconography. The mutual exchange of cults and religious elements with the local population is clear. and S. presents an exhaustive and persuasive case. Less compelling is his inference that the sharing of cult indicates close personal connections with civilians. We have little idea of how civilian and military participation in such cults was organized, or how either group related to the other. Mere presence is an insufficient basis for such an important conclusion.

S. presents a detailed picture of the religious life of the military at Dura-Europos. Particularly interesting is his notion of the existence of regimental religious traditions illustrated by the cult of Ammon and III Cyrenaica based at Bostra. However, his argument is occasionally strained, as in the attempt to show civilian participation in the cult of Jupiter Dolichenus. S. in my opinion incorrectly interprets the famous fresco depicting the celebration of religious ceremonies by the tribune Iulius Terentius and his unit from the Temple of the Palmyrene Gods at Dura as a festival in honor of the Palmyrene Gods, rather than (as has been convincingly argued by Pékary) as a celebration of the imperial cult. At times, his desire to show civilian participation and military ties to local cults leads him to force his arguments.

The work also contains an extensive discussion and catalogue of legionary emblems on local coinage. Hoever, his conclusions about these remain uncertain. They cannot always been seen as an affirmation of local ties. Mann has pointed out that they even appear on city coins where no units were stationed.

S.'s monograph is an important contribution to this continuing debate and comes to the same conclusion—that there was a symbiotic relationship between army and local society—as other recent work. It is a detailed and comprehensive discussion of what may be an intractable problem. Institutions are as much mental constructs as anything else, and for the most part we lack an insight into these constructs.

University of Cincinnati MICHAEL M. SAGE

THE ARMY IN SYRIA

N. POLLARD: *Soldiers, Cities, and Civilians in Roman Syria*. Pp. x + 349, ills. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2001. Cased, £31. ISBN: 0-472-11155-8.

This major historical and archaeological study of the army in the east from Augustus to the fifth century focuses on the provinces of Syria, Mesopotamia, and Osrhoene, although including comparative material from other eastern provinces. While P. claims (p. 7) that reality lies between the polarities of modern opinion that the army was either 'integrated' into local society and a force for change, or was 'isolated' and not a force for change, in most areas he inclines to the latter. This is supported by his

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important suggestion that the 'institutional identity' of a soldier largely superseded his previous identities (below).

The first chapter (pp. 35–67) argues that under the principate the Roman army in Syria and Mesopotamia, in contrast from the west and the Balkans, had little effect on urbanization (with the exception of Raphanaea), and that in the main, soldiers and civilians used different temples, places of entertainment, and houses. P. has to rely heavily on evidence from Dura-Europos, the potentially unrepresentative nature of which could be stressed more strongly (cf. p. 44 n. 41). In other cities the Romans followed Hellenistic practices. Dura-Europos had been Parthian, and the possibility must be allowed that here also pre-existing practices continued (the Parthian and Roman garrisons were composed of Palmyrene archers, p. 51 n. 78). Again, Dura-Europos was on the frontier, and was stormed and then abandoned—which makes uncertain any generalizations about things like soldiers policing or guarding gates (cf. p. 47).

The second chapter (pp. 69–81) demonstrates the big impact of army garrisons on urbanism in the east under the late empire as, with the exception of Nisibis, small centres were elevated to cities for strategic reasons.

The use of the army as an agent of imperial control (judicial functions, policing, tax collecting, billeting, and requisitioning) is shown in the third chapter (pp. 85–110) to have increased with the late empire. These formal interactions, however, at all times made the army an institution separate from civilians.

The fourth chapter (pp. 111–67) studies the informal interactions of ethnicity and recruitment, language use, religious interaction, marriage, and veteran settlement. The general conclusion of this thought-provoking chapter is that the 'institutional identity' of a soldier overrode other identities. Space only allows two points to be raised here. A piece of literary evidence could have been used to support P.'s conclusion that 'there was little common ground between soldiers and civilians regarding pagan religion' (p. 149). In his account of the rebellion of Elagabalus, Herodian (5.3.2–12) describes how soldiers from a nearby garrison (presumably Raphanaea, p. 268) went to the temple at Emesa, supposedly to worship, but in reality because they enjoyed watching the future emperor. The implication might be that without the specific attraction they would not have been there.

P.'s concept of the 'institutional identity' created by the army opens up intriguing potential research, although the evidence falls outside the focus of his book. Ramsay MacMullen's 'The Legion as a Society' (*Changes in the Roman Empire* [Princeton, 1990], pp. 225–35), not used by P., could be taken as a starting point for an investigation of what might be called the semiotic self-fashioning of soldiers under the empire. In at least the late empire soldiers were tattooed on their hands (Veg. 1.8, 2.5; Aetius 8.12). Art historians regularly refer to the military styling of the hair and beards of third-century emperors (e.g. J. Elsner, *Imperial Rome and Christian Triumph* [Oxford and New York, 1998], pp. 59, 61). A pretend soldier could be exposed by not wearing the correct shoes (Petr. *Sat.* 82). A special belt was the mark of a soldier (Suda, s.v. *αὐθεντήσαντα*; CD 75.1.1–2). Both the belts and the daggers worn on them were decorated (Herodian 2.13.2, 8, 10). Even off-duty soldiers might wear swords (Apul. *Met.* 9.39). Their silvered scabbards and belts made a ringing sound (Pl. *NH* 33.152). Poses on tombstones suggest distinctively military gestures (cf. M. C. Bishop and J. C. N. Coulston, *Roman Military Equipment* [London, 1993], p. 100). Groups of soldiers developed their own slang (Caes. *BG* 7.5). It probably was not just their ethnic origins which could make them speak in a way which might mark them out both from civilians

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(CD 75.2.6) and soldiers from other armies (Tac. *Hist.* 2.37). Soldiers looked, sounded, and moved differently from civilians.

Chapters 5 and 6 use Keith Hopkins's model of cash taxes and trade from *JRS* 70 (1980), 101–25 to organize material on the army and the regional economy. For the principate (pp. 171–211) P. downplays the cash injected into the local economy by the army, and shows that the archaeological evidence does not support (although it does not rule out) Hopkins's case for an increase in production. For the dominate (pp. 213–39), when an increase in supplies in kind and *fabricae* further reduced the armies cash imput, P. demonstrates that, contra Hopkins, the evidence points to an increase in trade. P. does not cite Hopkins's reworking of his model in *Kodai: Journal of Ancient History* 6/7 (1995/6), 41–75.

The final chapter (pp. 241–50) looks at the army's rôle in economic exploitation (timber and stone quarries) and investment, pointing out that most army building was for military reasons.

After a brief conclusion (pp. 251–4), two appendices provide very useful catalogues of sites (pp. 257–303).

Here P. gives us an army in the east largely 'isolated' from the civilian population by its 'institutional identity', which stands in marked contrast with Richard Alston's 'integrated' army in Egypt (*Soldier and Society in Roman Egypt* [London, 1995]). As P. notes (p. 166 n. 213), the very different conclusions can be explained either by the different types of evidence surviving from the two areas or by regional differences (more non-local troops in Syria, and/or Ptolemaic dispersed military settlements having promoted greater integration than urban colonial settlements in Seleucid Syria). Whichever is right (and a third possibility exists that one scholar is wrong), the publication of a second important work on the theme will ensure further lively debate on 'the army and society'.

Lincoln College, Oxford/University of Warwick HARRY SIDEBOTTOM

PALMYRA

U. HARTMANN: *Das palmyrenische Teilreich.* (Oriens et Occidens 2.) Pp. 532, pls. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2001. ISBN: 3-515-07800-2.

A book of more than 500 pages devoted to twelve years of Roman history; a book with a title that cannot be rendered sensibly in any language but the author's own; a book retaining so clearly its past as a dissertation that many pages devote more space to footnotes than text, might not appear an appetizing proposition. That would be, in this case, wrong. This is a very good book.

H.'s case is that the dynasts of Palmyra should not be seen as usurpers in the traditional sense in that they had no obvious ambitions to establish themselves as rulers of the empire, or even as rulers of an independent state. They were not driven by a desire to establish some sort of Semitic empire of their own; rather, they were, and would have remained, content to maintain the interests of Palmyra within the framework established after the capture of Valerian. In H.'s view they were driven into rebellion by the aggressive policy of Aurelian, who wished to end their anomalous position within the empire. He is correct that there were major differences between the Palmyrene regime and the *imperium Galliarum.* The latter arose out of a direct challenge to the authority of the reigning emperor, and involved the assumption of the

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