LUCRETIUS I–III

E. FLORES: *Titus Lucretius Carus:* De rerum natura. *Edizione critica con introduzione e versione. Volume primo (Libri I–III).* (Istituto Italiano per gli Studi Filosofici: La Scuola di Epicuro, Supplemento 2.) Pp. 317. Naples: Bibliopolis, 2002. Cased. ISBN: 88-7088-414-7.

This edition is announced on the jacket as 'la prima edizione critica di Lucrezio con un apparato esaustivo che dia integralmente conto della tradizione manoscritta umanistica'. So far as it relates to the later MS tradition, that claim is correct, though the apparatus is by no means exhaustive in recording the contributions of previous editors and critics to the establishment and elucidation of the text, as I shall note. It will also be seen that I have considerable reservations as to the quality of the editor's critical abilities. F. has indeed assembled an imposing range of material: in addition to OQGVU and the ninth-century St Gall fragment, he has mustered fifty-five MSS of the fifteenth century, together with the testimony, such as it is, of the Herculaneum papyri. The distinguishing feature of his approach to establishing the text is the independent authority which he ascribes to the Italian branch of the tradition. Most critics, I believe, accept Karl Müller's demonstration that this derives from the Oblongus. F. has argued to the contrary in his monograph *Le scoperte di Poggio e il testo di Lucrezio* (1980), reviewed by me at *JRS* 72 (1982), 220–1. He does not restate the case in this edition, referring readers back to the monograph. In fact, the question is largely of academic interest. As I remarked long ago apropos of the text of Catullus, 'theory has a comfortable habit of not impeding practice when it comes to the point' (*CR* 22 [1972], 213), and F.'s stemmatics make little if any real difference to the construction of the text. When he does base a critical choice on his premiss, the result does not inspire confidence in it. But whether or not one believes in the independence of (P), the lost 'codex a Germanico scriba exemplatus', which represents the MS discovered by Poggio, the choice between the readings of its descendants and those of the *antiquiores* is a matter of editorial judgement, which is a product of linguistic and literary scholarship, critical flair, and common sense. Judgement, I have to say, does not seem to me to be F.'s strong suit.

The most convenient way to assess the merits and failings of the book is to look at it alongside the best and most widely accessible of the editions currently available, that of Martin Ferguson Smith in the Loeb Classical Library (revised reprint 1992). With some exceptions, to be noted, the comparison is generally to F.'s disadvantage. He would indeed have done well to pay more attention to Smith's notes, which would have saved him from wrongly attributing a number of conjectures. I have not thought it necessary to continue my examination further than Book 1.

1.50 F. prints *quod superest, Memmi, uacuas auris mihi teque* eqs.: *Memmi* Sauppe, *mihi teque* F. I will leave *mihi teque* to fend for itself; it is the critical note that calls for remark. In the first place, it is defrauding the reader to make no mention of what most editors print, *uacuas auris animumque sagacem*, from the Veronese scholia on Virg. *G.* 3.3, which antedate OQG by some 400 years. What F. does provide is unhelpfully formulated: it is difficult, if not impossible, to work out from his report how each of the scholars whose conjectures are registered read the verse: what Sauppe proposed, for instance, was *q.s.*, *Memmi, u. a. animumque.* This fault recurs. It is inconsiderate to leave the reader to puzzle out if he can (in fairness to F., he is not alone in this) that all that OQG offer is *quod superest ut* [del. O^1] *uacuas auris*. **66** *tollere* (MSS) preferred to *tendere* (Non. p.662.3 L.). F.'s comment on Nonius, 'ut uaria auctoris lectio quae

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postea repulsa est', reveals what turns out to be something of a King Charles's Head, but that, probable or improbable, is not the point. What F. has failed to appreciate is that, as Smith notes, Nonius' citation specifically illustrates an idiomatic use of *tendo*. (The distinction between specific and non-specific citations by grammarians is not always sufficiently attended to by critics.) This is in fact a characteristic example of Lucretius' synaesthetic exploitation of metaphor: see C. Catrein, *Vertauschte Sinne. Untersuchungen zur Synästhesie in der römischen Dichtung* (2003), 103–4. **122** *permanent* from two late MSS and Politian. An obstinate crux. Smith thought this 'an attractive proposal'; but, given Lucretius' intense preoccupation with the materiality of phenomena, the sense of the verb would seem to tell against it. It is true that *permaneo* + *quo* is anomalous (the parallels cited by the commentators will not wash); the point is nothing if not moot. Safer perhaps to leave *permaneant* suspiciously alone, but I do not blame F. for not playing safe. **190** *crescendoque*: a humanistic correction of the grammatically solecistic *crescentes*, which editors generally accept. Even by Lucretian standards, as Bailey acknowledges (*Prolegomena*, i.95), the anomaly is exceptional, and here too F.'s choice is defensible. However, he should not have passed over in silence the other attempts that have been made to solve the problem. **215** *quaeque* (O^2(P)) preferred to *quicque* (Lambinus); in view of *quicquid* O, *quidquid* CG a perverse decision dictated by stemmatic dogma. (That two lines later (P) restores *e*, omitted by OQG, does not reinforce its 'authority' here.) **276** *Corus* Preiger, hit upon independently by Bailey. I should be inclined to play safe here, as does Smith, with *uentus* (Markland), but *Corus* is tempting and deserves an airing in the text (I think it was George Goold who said somewhere that this is the best way to test a good conjecture fairly). **282** *quod* is attested by four of the Italian MSS, including L, and certainly offers a simple solution, though there is no obvious explanation of the corruption that must be postulated. F. mentions neither *quam* (Lachmann), which has won general acceptance (the tautology, *pace* Bailey, takes a bit of swallowing, however), nor *quom* (Woltjer). **294** The transmitted *rapidique* (*-isque* Q) saddles Lucretius with another solecism such as that at 190; F. fails to mention *rapidoque rotantia* (Pius + Lambinus), likewise passed over by Bailey but printed by Smith, a neat and poetically convincing solution. **309** Not to mention *dispargitur*—presumably dismissed (if noticed) as too trivial to bother with—is to ignore a central feature of Lucretius' argumentative technique. Here, too, F. would have been well advised to follow up Smith's reference to Friedländer's important article in *AJP* 62 (1941), 16–34 = *Studien zur antiken Literatur und Kunst* (1969), 337–53, not included in F.'s bibliography. When at 2.1135 he prints *dispargit*, it is because it is what the MSS offer, not because the rhetoric calls for it. **321** *speciem*: '*aciem* Diels inutil.'; '*specimen* Nencini' would have been more to the point. **334** Neither Bentley's deletion of the verse nor the fact that in O it is written over an erasure is mentioned, so implicitly brushing aside the problem posed by *quapropter*. **357** *hand* <*ulla*> *haec* F. Rather than postulating this somewhat unlikely omission, it is more economical to provide *fieri* with a subject by reading *quae* for *quod* with Giussani in line 356. The plural then picks up the whole of the preceding list of phenomena. F. complicates matters by printing *quod, si* (Brieger) in that verse, which provides *fieri* with its subject but flies in the face of Lucretian usage by construing *quod* as relative. In Lucretius (and, I suspect, generally) *quod si*, *quod nisi* always = 'but if', 'but if . . . not'. (Smith unfortunately falls into this trap.) Another red herring has been drawn across the trail by OQG's *ualerent* for *fieri*. I do not see how F. makes out that this 'demonstrat ante *fieri* aliquid excidisse'. It would have been more to the point to report Bernays's *corpora quaeque ualerent* in 356. **412** *haustis* (Lambinus) . . . *amnis* O^r [*sic*], giving an unnatural and very unlikely

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expression. This is one of the places where (P) might seem to have come into its own with *magnis*, adopted by most editors; curious that F. for once is deaf to its merits. **434–5** If the transmitted order of the verses is kept, *augmine* in 435 poses a problem. F. is not alone in not transposing, but he glosses over the difficulty by translating *augmine* as 'estensione'. That can mean either 'extent' or 'extension', but, as Bailey points out, the Latin word can only mean the latter. **439** The old editors punctuated after *uacuum*, rightly: the sense is 'that empty thing which we call void'. Cf. 1.507 *spatium, quod inane uocamus* (so, correctly, in F.). **469** *certis* F. for *terris*, which I would agree, *pace* Bailey et al. (cit. Smith ad loc.), is barely defensible; the word simply cannot sustain the rhetorical contrast signalled by *aliud . . . aliud*. Apart from palaeographical plausibility, F.'s conjecture has nothing to be said for it. His translation is a free paraphrase, and 3.617, which he cites in support, rather tells against him; nor can *locis* be plausibly understood from *locus* at 472, as he suggests. For once, he provides a full roll-call of other attempts to mend the line, none very persuasive. A case, I would say, for the obelus. **473** *forma . . . amore* OQG; but the double ablative, in this highly literary context, is surely unlikely. Lucretius' style has been called 'rugged' and the like (I think usually without justification), but he should not have uncouth writing foisted on him, when the remedy—Wakefield' s tentatively offered *amoris*—is so simple and elegant. **491** No mention of *feruentia*, ascribed by editors to Marullus (but see below). **657** *inesse* 'L^1 in ras. Pius Wakefield'. F.'s translation 'esservi a se contrarie' evades the difficulty posed by the compound verb, which imports an unwanted ambiguity. Wakefield likewise dodges the difficulty by paraphrasing 'multa esse sibi contraria sentiunt'. Of the array of corrections on offer, Merrill's *quae sint* (rec. Smith) is as good as any and better than most, but I am inclined here too to plump for the obelus. **669** *ex* (P) preferred to *e* (Lachmann), contrary to Lucretian usage; cf. above on 215. **703** *summam* (P) satisfied the older editors, but as Bailey says it is at best a stopgap. The desired opposition is provided by *alium* (Q^2) or *aliud* (Smith), but that entails taking *ignis* as acc. pl., an anomaly which cannot be simply shrugged off. The word picks up *ardoris* from 702 and refers to fire as the element, for which the singular is surely mandatory? **744** *rorem* (Christ) for MS *solem*, rightly; this is much better than keeping *solem* and reading *imbrem* for *ignem* (Bailey, rec. Smith). As Smith remarks, 'A reference to the four elements is needed'; but whereas *sol* is not in this sense a synonym for *ignis*, *ros* is so used at l. 777. **747** *facient* has indeed overwhelming MS support, but what conceivable point is there in the variation of tense? **752** *quisse* F. This is rhetorically effective after *quis* in 751, but how can the perfect tense (cf. 5.1045) be justified? Was F. deterred from suggesting *quire* by the even greater rarity of its attestation? N.–W. iii 626 can only cite Gell. 11.9.1 *non quire*. **873a** The lost verse postulated by critics is now tantalizingly represented in the Herculaneum papyrus by four letters, on the basis of which F. has produced and installed in the text <*inde suis e*>*x uir*<*ibus haud rebus sibi mixtis*>. His objection to Suerbaum's <*haud e*>*x uir*<*ibus indigenis consistere possunt*>, that it does not fit the letter-spaces available, may be well taken; but Suerbaum's effort at least scans credibly. However, all such supplements belong in the apparatus. **1044** *morari* (O^2Q^2G) rightly preferred to *morare* (CQ). Smith unaccountably prints *morare* here, *morari* at 2.333; how probable is it that Lucretius should have vacillated between archaism and current usage with this common verb?

To complete the account of F.'s personal contribution to the establishment of the text, I append the passages in Books 2–3 where his own conjectures are adopted. **2.98** *conlata*: this is merely a feebler equivalent of the transmitted *confulta*, which is faultless. *Vtrum in alterum . . .?* **305** *effugere ex omni* <*prorsum*> *quicquam* 'dubit'. Is the positioning of *prorsum* defensible? **623** *ferae* (for *metu*), coll. Maec. fr. 5.1

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Blänsdorf (p. 279 Courtney). That neatly disposes of the awkwardness of the two ablatives, which Bailey's parallels (1.473 [see above], 2.18) do nothing to palliate, but the corruption is not easy to explain. If that can be swallowed, *fero* is also a possibility. **3.150** *laetitiaue*: gratuitous tinkering; for *-que* used disjunctively we need look no further afield than 3.198, where F. correctly renders it 'o'. **614** *sed haud ire*: unmetrical, as is the conflation of Büchner + Brieger offered at 2.422. **962** *rebus concede*, 'arrenditi alia realtà'; after *rerum* at 960 in a totally different sense, this seems improbable.

A minor but distracting orthographical problem is that of the treatment of prepositional prefixes in compounds. Editorial practice is generally to reproduce the spellings of the oldest MSS, when they are of a respectable age, as are OQG. That gives rise to completely pointless variations such as *adsiduo*/*assidue*; *derrasse*/*deerrarunt*; *immixtis*/*inmixta*, *inmixtis*; *inpia*/*impia*, and so on. Whether the unassimilated prefixes in the case of Lucretius are evidence for anything but the vagaries of Carolingian scriptoria may admit of discussion, but they can hardly reflect ancient usage, let alone authorial preferences. These are purely graphic conventions, puzzling to students and of no literary significance, and there is much to be said for silently normalizing the lot, as Bailey does. I certainly see no rationale in printing *opteritur* at 1.79 from a correction in a MS of 1466, I suppose on the strength of *optineat* at 3.989.

The apparatus to a critical edition should be as judiciously constructed as the text itself. F.'s apparatus falls some way short of satisfying this requirement. It does indeed provide full reports of the half-dozen Italian MSS chosen to represent the lost (P), and it takes account of what the Herculaneum papyri have to offer. But it is also encumbered with what Housman called the lees of the renascence, variants—sometimes unmetrical, as at 1.23 *animabile* LD—of no critical significance which belong, if anywhere, to repertories of scribal delinquency (what George Goold called babble from the padded cell), such as Havet's. The evidence of the early editions is not reported precisely, and often, as I have noted, the notes are obscurely or unhelpfully framed. There is one innovation of some interest, the virtual disappearance of Marullus from the apparatus: a striking *damnatio memoriae*, if one remembers the prominent place accorded to him by Munro in his account of the textual history of the *DRN*. Most of the corrections hitherto ascribed to him are now reported by F. from the MSS, notably from the same second hand in Monac. Lat. 816 (before 1475) and Laur. 35.25 (before 1450). The question of priority turns on complicated problems of dating, and F. understandably presents his findings as provisional. Another novelty worth noting is the reassignment, as a consquence of Deufert's researches, of a number of corrections to Cippellarius (Cipelli), unhonoured and unsung by Pökel and Sandys, e.g. at 1.591 *immutabilis*, formerly credited to Lachmann. To pass now to details, again only from Book 1. **29** The testimony of Priscian (*GLK* 2.7–8) not mentioned. **50** As I noted above, a note calculated to baffle the enquirer. **111, 873–4** *al.* The notes are wrong end foremost; the lemma should come first. **125** *et fundere*, one of the few variants common to QG of critical interest, not reported; see Housman, *CP* 179. **159** No note on *nihilo* (*nilo* Lachmann, as reported by Ernout), whereas at 156 the unmetrical *nihil* is religiously recorded. **314** *occulte*: Q's *occulto* is reported, but without mention of Servius, Isidore, and Charisius. **759** Reid's *uenenum* is not reported. Miscellaneous inaccuracies include 'Turnèbe' (his name in French was correctly de Tournebu, as was pointed out by Ingram Bywater, *JP* 33 [1913], 88), 'Ferguson-Smith', and some unorthodox Latin at 1.155, 276nn. The bibliography omits Goold's important reconstruction of the archetype and Reynolds's account of the tradition in *Texts and Transmission.* The translation is clear, but, as can be seen from the examples quoted, cannot always be trusted to represent honestly what appears in the text.

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It has therefore to be said that, though it contains material which it has cost F. considerable pains to collect and which will be of value to future critics and editors, this is not the authoritative plain-text edition which might have supplanted Martin's Teubner (now, it seems, out of print). For practical purposes, Smith's Loeb is still the most consistently helpful guide to what Lucretius wrote. Whether Volume II of F.'s edition will give cause to modify these judgements remains to be seen.

Cambridge E. J. KENNEY

A NON-DIDACTIC LUCRETIUS?

L. RUMPF: *Naturerkenntnis und Naturerfahrung. Zur Reflexion epikureischer Theorie bei Lukrez.* (Zetemata 116.) Pp. 285. Munich: Verlag C. H. Beck, 2003. Paper, €59.90. ISBN: 3-406-51181-3.

More than a quarter of Lorenz Rumpf's revisionist monograph on Lucretius is taken up by a methodological preface (Chapters 1 and 2). R. declares his dissatisfaction with recent approaches to the *DRN* (e.g. those of D. Clay, M. Gale, and D. Sedley), which offer contextualized readings of the poem and view it as primarily didactic, that is, geared toward teaching Epicureanism. In R.'s opinion, such interpretations, which explain the text by continually referring to something external, are in danger of missing features inside the poem that contribute to its complexity and cannot be ascribed to its presumed didactic function. R. himself therefore proposes to offer an 'immanent' reading of the *DRN*, one that proceeds in a deliberately naive manner and endeavours not to make use of any contextual knowledge. (In making the case that such an approach is viable, R. refers to the universalist linguistic theory of J. Searle, claiming that all texts, even those from different periods and cultures, are in their essence immediately understandable on account of all humans' shared linguistic and cultural competence.) The focus of R.'s approach is on the structure of meaning created by the text itself, not on the presumed authorial intention, and his goal is to uncover tensions within the poem and to complicate the view of Lucretius as a straightforward teacher of Epicureanism. While R. distances himself from the old-style 'anti-Lucrèce chez Lucrèce' approach, he is avowedly in search of 'further voices' in the *DRN* (pp. 30–1, with reference to R. O. A. M. Lyne's book on the *Aeneid*).

R. puts his method to the test in the interpretation of individual passages in Chapters 3–8 and summarizes his findings in the final Chapter 9. He comes to the conclusion that Lucretius is not simply reporting Epicurean doctrine but—in the very way in which he represents it—subtly reflecting and enlarging on it, and at points even contradicting and deconstructing it. In particular, Lucretius appears to hint that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts, that is, that (contrary to Epicurean orthodoxy) there is more to the world than atoms and void. In R.'s opinion, Lucretius shows a remarkable interest in the surface structure of the perceptible world, and repeatedly seems to dwell on the individual, whether it be an individual phenomenon, such as Mt Etna, an individual person's life, or our individual world—even though, according to his own teaching, the individual is insignificant *vis-à-vis* both the infinity of the whole and the microstructure of atoms. Lucretius would thus stress the importance of the individual subject and its relation to the world and to advocate not only 'Naturerkenntnis' but crucially also 'Naturerfahrung'.

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