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Book Reviews

ARISTOTLE'S CONTEMPORARY RELEVANCE

Jill Frank: *A Democracy of Distinction: Aristotle and the Work of Politics*. (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2005. Pp. xii, 199. $49.00. $19.00, paper).

Jill Frank has written a significant book in which Aristotle is advocated as a guide to address relevant issues in the contemporary debate in political theory. The combination of a serious and original investigation of Aristotle's thought with awareness of contemporary problems is one of the main goals of *A Democracy of Distinction*. The study of Aristotle allows Frank to provide new and insightful perspectives to our conceptions of property, justice, and law.

The Introduction contains a persuasive discussion on the relevance of Aristotle for the contemporary debate. According to Frank, in Aristotle, the tensions between ethics and politics, individuals and community typical of the liberalism-communitarianism debate are overcome. In Aristotle the political community is a harmonious combination of the multiplicity of the citizens and the unity provided by the political structures. Aristotle's political philosophy is a relevant example of a "democracy of distinction," that is, democracy which "requires the practice of virtue by differentiated citizens in order to actualize itself" (p. 15). This is the central thesis of the book: in Aristotle the tensions of a political community are harmonized by the virtuous behaviours of its citizens.

Chapter One, "The Nature of Identity," challenges the traditional view that Aristotle has a pre-political account of human nature; what makes someone a citizen or a slave is his nature or his birth. On the contrary, Frank argues that to be a citizen is the result of an *enegeia*, namely to be exposed and partake in a certain political system. Thus, slaves, although they have the potential to be citizens, do not develop it because of contingent conditions. Frank strengthens her arguments by holding that the Aristotelian expression "by nature" is not correspondent to "necessity" but, rather, to "most of the time." Thus, when Aristotle holds that slavery is by nature he indicates the condition that occurs "most of the time" given some specific circumstances. Frank's reading is strongly substantiated and offers a convincing alternative to the traditional one. However, Frank's argument would have benefited by a consideration of the role of education in the process of becoming a citizen. This would have made clear that for Aristotle, like for most of his Greek contemporaries, the lack of *paideia* is the main impediment to a fully developed man. Frank also does not consider the tension that characterizes Aristotle's account of slavery. Aristotle regards slavery as a historical

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necessity but with arguments that are clearly in contrast with his own conception of human nature. For instance, in *Politics* I, 5 1254 b 16–32, in contrast to his theory of human nature, Aristotle claims that some people are naturally slaves on the basis that they do not fully possess reason, although they apprehend it (cf. O. Gigon, "Die Sklaverei bei Aristoteles," in *La "Politique" d'Aristote: sept exposés et discussions*, ed. R. Stark [Fondation Hardt, 1965], pp. 247–76).

Chapter Two, "The Use of Property," proposes an innovative reading of Aristotle's account of property. Frank proposes a third way between the two common readings according to which Aristotle is either defending a system of private property or arguing for a socialist account. Property is acceptable for Aristotle as long as it is connected to a practice of virtue. Frank articulates her arguments in three steps. Firstly, through a suggestive analysis of the origin of the term *choregia* (necessary possessions), Frank claims that property is valuable not only because it satisfies our basic needs but also because it is a vehicle of a virtuous activity. Secondly, Frank shows that property is both an external and characterological good. To be virtuous is the result of acquiring the *habitus* of holding and using wealth appropriately. Virtue is developed also by the practice of property. Finally, Frank considers the "political use of property" (p. 74). Citizens who use their property virtuously contribute to wealth of the city and benefit those who are in need. This way of redistribution based on virtue is much better than a forced equalization imposed by the political system. In this way the talents of the individuals are not humiliated but highly recognized. Frank's analysis is very stimulating. However, the account of virtue as a result of a practice overlooks the role played by the intellect in the development of virtues and impedes a full appreciation of the complexity of Aristotle's view (cf. P. Gottlieb, "Aristotle on Dividing the Soul and Uniting the Virtues," *Phronesis* 39 [1994]: 275–90).

Chapter Three, "The Virtue of Justice," argues that the virtue of justice is the real bond of the city. Frank focuses on reciprocal justice and notices that when properly guided by *phronesis* (good judgment) it can, first, unify the multiplicity in the city; second, it can help to recognize differences and find unity among them; third, it can guide citizens to the recognition of their limits and the merits of the other. These features make reciprocal justice the element that can harmonize a city, a virtue essentially political. This interpretation does not intend to support the traditional view that regards justice as different from the other virtues; rather, justice is presented as a qualification of virtue.

Chapter Four, "The Rule of Law," challenges the common view according to which the rule of law acts as the reason controlling the desires. Frank argues that the rule of law proceeds from *phronesis* intended as the disposition of following good laws. This makes it irreducible to a paradigm or a static rule. The citizen properly trained and *phronimos* is able to recognize the goodness or badness of a law and act consequently.

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Similarly a good constitution will not consist in a rigid structure but it should be dynamic and able to adapt to the new needs. Frank's emphases on flexibility as a key requirement for good laws is a major contribution to the understanding of Aristotle. However, like in the case of Chapter Three, it is normal to feel quite unhappy about the lack of proper consideration of the role played by the intellect in the deliberation about good laws and constitution.

The final chapter, "The Polity of Friendship," agues that, in contrast to what scholars usually suggest, the key feature of Aristotle's "ideal city" is not homogeneity but a unity capable of maintaining the differences. In Frank's reading political friendship is what bonds the city. This kind of friendship is modelled on "use friendship" and consists in the ability of combining self-interest with common interests and of overcoming conflicts. The role played by friendship is shown to be crucial for the unity of both the ideal city and the so-called "constitutional polity." Frank's analysis is of great interest; however, quite surprisingly, she does not sufficiently consider Aristotle's explanation for the role played by analogy and focal meaning as ways of unifying diversity in friendships (cf. W. Fortenbaugh, "Aristotle's Analysis of Friendship: Function and Analogy, Resemblance, and Focal Meaning," *Phronesis* 20 [1975]: 51–62.).

To conclude, *A Democracy of Distinction* offers not only a very original reading of some notoriously problematic aspects of Aristotle's political thought but also offers a consideration of democracy that would make a stimulating contribution to the contemporary debate in political philosophy.

–Antonio Donato

. . .BUT DON'T OVERDO IT

Andres Rosler: *Political Authority and Obligation in Aristotle.* (Oxford and New York: Clarendon Press: Oxford University Press, 2005. Pp. 298. $74.00.)

The modest title of Andres Rosler's book conceals a more ambitious project. The immediate purpose is to argue that Aristotle systematically considers the grounds and limits of political obligation; the broader claim is that Aristotle addresses the basic questions of modern political and moral theory far more seriously than has traditionally been recognized. Rosler offers readings of the *Nicomachean Ethics* and the *Politics* that stress connections with Kantian ethics and (broadly) liberal politics. He believes that this is necessary if Aristotle is not to become a "self-contained museum piece" (p. 7) within the history of philosophy. We should be grateful for Rosler's efforts to argue for Aristotle's current importance. However, by concentrating on showing Aristotle's intellectual affinities with

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modern approaches, he obscures much of what makes Aristotle distinctive, challenging, and interesting.

Modern political theory often treats political obligation, the "moral requirement to act in accordance with the dictates of political authority" (Rosler, p. 116), as modernity's distinctive problem. In spite of a host of differences, there is considerable agreement among classical liberals, Kantians, and even Aristotelians themselves that investigations into the bases of political obligation are very different from Aristotle's inquiries into how political institutions enhance or retard human flourishing. In response, Rosler attempts to show that Aristotelian moral philosophy demands inquiries into the justification and limits of political authority and that Aristotelian political theory is acutely attentive to these concerns. "Aristotle accommodates the notion of authority in terms that are recognizably modern or recognizably related to modern terms" (p. 101).

As interpreted by Rosler, Aristotle's approach to moral philosophy is quite similar to Kant's. Aristotle does not derive an understanding of human flourishing "from considerations about a human's task imported from outside the moral domain" (p. 56). Aristotle's alleged naturalism in ethics does "not commit him to the view that ethical excellence is a natural *qua* biological process or simply the result of the development of our natural desires" (p. 48). Instead, qualities connected with flourishing are identified as natural on the basis of a rational determination of their value (p. 63). Aristotle's understanding of human flourishing, as the activities of theoretical and practical reason, is said to have clear Kantian overtones (p. 51). Regarding politics, Aristotle is neither hyperindividualist nor communitarian, but a "moderate individualist" (p. 227). Though he assesses political communities in terms of their contribution to individual well being, this condition of well being includes other-regarding acts. Consequently, the obligation to obey political authority follows from a reasonable appreciation of the city's various contributions to well being: habituating the citizens in the virtues, constraining violent appetites to enable more rewarding activities, and facilitating coordination (pp. 183–84, 186–93). This framework also sets limits to obligation. Citizens are not bound to pathological regimes (such as tyrannies); one can even detect a suitably cautious endorsement of political resistance (pp. 251–56).

Though I have reservations about heavily analytic approaches to Aristotle (Rosler's work clearly belongs here), they clearly have their virtues (that Rosler's book shares). Like all good analytic treatments, Rosler's readings compel us to trace and interrogate the intricacies of Aristotle's arguments in ways that can be discouraged by Aristotle's own dense language. In this vein, Rosler provides healthy antidotes against simplistic readings or misreadings. Against the argument that derives human excellence from the distinctively human, Rosler reminds us that humans are also distinctively capable of the most evil things (pp. 55–56). Though Rosler is most comfortable with the analytic tradition of Aristotelian scholarship, he also

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offers insights conducive to literary readings (his assessment of Aristotle's use of the perfect tyranny as a kind of trope—my term—pp. 242–43). For political theorists, Rosler's is another persuasive voice against communitarian interpretations of Aristotle (pp. 167–77), though this case has been made frequently. More generally, one welcomes attempts to connect Aristotle with modern political and moral philosophy. In addition to resisting narrow historical interpretations, Rosler implicitly rejects the moves of Jürgen Habermas and his colleagues to dismiss Aristotle because of his alleged enclosure within a "pre-modern" political culture.

For all of this, however, Rosler fails to convince, at least with respect to the broader purpose. In emphasizing how Aristotle's framework is recognizably modern, he downplays the value of an Aristotelian alternative to modern ethical and political languages. For example, the treatment of moral psychology effectively presumes that the relevant debate is between Kant's moral rationalism and Hume's instrumentalization of reason in service of passion (pp. 120–22). For Rosler, Aristotle's substantial differences from Hume mean that "Aristotle and Kant are on the same side of the fence" (p. 122). This leads to the problematic claim that "the Aristotelian agent does not act from inclination, but from reason (*logos*) in the form of choice (*prohairesis*)" (p. 122). Since Aristotle defines choice as "deliberate *desire*" (*bouleutikē orexis*) (*N.E.* 3.3), Rosler obscures a distinctive Aristotelian contribution to moral psychology. As a political philosopher, Rosler's Aristotle begins by asking "whether there should be political relations at all" (p. 145). Rosler's interpretation thus replaces what Stephen Salkever (*Finding the Mean*, Princeton University Press, 1991, p. 20) calls Aristotle's functionalist or teleological approach with a concern to answer the anarchist challenge (Rosler, pp. 153–54). Instead of considering the complicated and potentially conflictual goods of politics, living, living together, and living well (Salkever, pp. 84–85), the primary focus becomes justifying obedience to the laws. Our thinking about the goods of politics (including ways in which active citizens can contribute to shaping and ordering them through their choices) is reduced to the much narrower question of obedience. Aristotle's political theory can be read in a way that discovers a position on political obedience; it is something else to read it primarily though that lens.

Rosler's Aristotle also aims at firm closure, offering arguments, defending premises and conclusions, and responding to objections. This view obscures the aporetic and multivocal aspects of Aristotle's presentations. Rosler treats "the best city according to prayers" in *Politics* 7 and 8 as a kind of utopia (p. 195), but this regime depends upon unnatural slavery (*Politics* 7.10) in ways that raise significant questions about its justice. Rosler's Aristotle espouses the view that law replaces the passions with direction supplied by the understanding alone (p. 216). Yet Aristotle tempers the confident reliance on the rule of law by noting that all laws come from regimes (*Politics* 3.10); seeing law as understanding without desire may be the legalist's voice, not

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Aristotle's. Regarding authority, is Aristotle's point that we should consider its problems as well as its benefits? It is hard to accept Rosler's verdict that Aristotle sees "something godlike in ruling the state" (pp. 197–98).

Perhaps Aristotle is most instructive when he does not write or speak in ways that are so easily recognizable as modern. For all his good intentions, Rosler risks historicizing Aristotle in a way different from but as problematic as the one he opposes. If Aristotle's perspective is *so* recognizable, why should we value his insights over modern ones closer to our social experiences and conceptual categories? Seeing Aristotle as an early voice reflecting familiar Kantian and liberal concerns may obscure the extent to which his voice can be important just to the degree that it is strange.

–Gerald Mara

SYSTEMATIZING THE UNSYSTEMATIC

George Crowder: *Isaiah Berlin: Liberty and Pluralism.* (Cambridge, MA: Polity Press, 2004. Pp. x, 229. $24.95.)

Writing a commentary on the work of Isaiah Berlin is surely an intimidating prospect. Berlin is one of those thinkers of whom it can be said that you have to read him to appreciate the texture and meaning of his ideas. His ideas can be categorized and summarized, but their power resides in their articulation, in that distinctive style which has to be read to be felt in all its nuance and power of evocation. Of course, it is true that in a certain sense the same can be said of any thinker, but there is a significant difference between those who can be at least largely accommodated by (competent) analytical summary (say, Aristotle and Locke) and those for whom the medium is a larger part of the message (say, Nietzsche and Kierkegaard). I think of Berlin as the great master of the art of theoretical ventriloquism; his gift for empathetic conveyance of both the particular thoughts and the larger frame of mind of many of the thinkers about whom he wrote is, to my mind, the greatest part of his achievement. But he is thus doubly difficult to write *about*. His style is part of his substance, and is not easily reducible to substantive positions analytically defined. And secondly, his preferred mode of thought is indirect and allusive—he writes about other thinkers, most of them non-liberal or illiberal, and rarely attempts a systematic exposition of his own substantive views. There is a distinct Berlinian view of things, and it is an interesting and even idiosyncratic one: but it comes not in the form of propositions defended, but as an offshoot of the whirlwind tour of various aspects of the European mind that is conducted by the great ventriloquist.

George Crowder might not disagree with what I have said here, but his aim in this book is to define and take the measure of Berlin's liberalism

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through a systematic description and evaluation of his basic substantive commitments. Crowder's achievement is considerable, and yet if one had never read a word of Berlin and was introduced to him through Crowder's analysis, one would suppose him to have been a somewhat haphazard analytical political theorist who, oddly enough, chose the history of ideas as scholarly vehicle for advancing a semi-systematic political theory characterized by the advocacy of liberalism and "pluralism." This is not the way I would choose to try and convey the essence of Berlin's mind, but Crowder is of course under no obligation to employ the interpretive categories that I might have. As a matter of (perhaps regrettable) fact, Berlin's ideas have come to figure prominently in analytical debates, since he has been conscripted into the "defense of liberalism" troops in current ideological skirmishes. Within that context, Crowder is an able, articulate, and admirably clear guide to Berlin's ideas so understood. Crowder's chief interpretive adversary is John Gray, and readers of this work will leave with a clear grasp of what is at issue between Crowder and Gray in terms of the relation between pluralism and liberalism. There is a considerable amount to be said on each side of the debate, and the issue is itself an interesting one, though as I have suggested above, I am skeptical that this debate is the best means of coming to grips with the mind of Isaiah Berlin.

Crowder's view is that while Berlin himself failed to successfully show that liberalism as a political doctrine follows from the thesis of value pluralism, he nevertheless points us in the direction of a connection and his ideas, suitably modified and extended, lead to the establishment of one. A brief review does not provide space to assess carefully each of the steps in Crowder's case. I was not persuaded by his argument that value pluralism does lead to liberalism, but readily acknowledge that his case is plausible and systematically articulated. Interested readers will have to judge for themselves. I do note, however, that a somewhat unfortunate consequence of Crowder's focus on this issue is that he often has to reconstruct and tidy up Berlin's own conceptual formulations. Thus we encounter frequent formulations like the following. "Despite what Berlin himself sometimes says, his better view is that" (p. 132); or, "Once again, he never analyzes it very carefully, but a reasonably coherent picture can be teased out of what he does say" (p. 135); or, "Once more he is neither clear nor consistent, and his texts require careful sifting" (p. 142); or, finally, "Here again, Berlin says now one thing, now another" (p. 143).

At one point, Crowder somewhat exasperatedly notes that: "Even something as basic as Berlin's commitment to liberalism is remarkably inexplicit, although present in the background none the less. There are actually very few places in his entire corpus where he expressly declares a distinctively liberal allegiance" (p. 142). Crowder carries on in spite of such hindrances to analytical argument. But I think we might draw a different lesson from this feature of Berlin's writing. Perhaps it is best to think of Berlin as an exemplary liberal not because he is a candidate (alongside Rawls,

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Dworkin, Kymlicka, etc.) for the title of "Best Analytical Defense of Liberal Ideas in a Professional Philosophical Format," but because he enacted and performed a virtuoso liberal character by means of the spirit and sensibility that infuse his writings. Berlin's generosity toward his subjects, his wide learning and catholic literary interests, and his genuine curiosity about and empathy with the many illiberal subjects with whom he intellectually cavorted, all contribute to his status as a liberal man of ideas. Think Lionel Trilling, rather than an analytic philosopher, as a point of comparison. And when it comes to substantive ideas, Berlin's liberalism is defined more by what he opposed (political utopianism, scientism, fantasies of positive liberty) than by any sustained attempt to ground that which he affirmed through his example. (To be fair to Crowder, he does bring this "negative" aspect of Berlin's views out well.) Indeed, I venture to suggest that some considerable portion of Berlin's attractiveness as an exemplary liberal resides in the fact that he constitutes an alternative model of enactment to that of the analytical philosophical defender of the liberal creed. There is no question that he was a faithful member of the congregation, but he had little taste for theology and an apparent preference for the company of the devil. Berlin never writes as a man trying to decide, or pretending to try to decide, whether he ought to affirm a set of liberal propositions or not. He simply manifests a distinctively liberal character, part of the compelling power of which is its lack of anxiety about itself and its foundations (or lack thereof).

Crowder is at his best when focusing on aspects of Berlin's ideas other than the pluralism/liberalism issue. His account of Berlin's treatment of the Enlightenment and its critics is subtle, illuminating, and provocative. He shows how Berlin reveals to us that we are children of both the Enlightenment and its Romantic critics, and that "our patrimony is mixed in both cases. The Enlightenment has given us freedom and toleration, but also scientism, technocracy and ultimately, through faith in technocratic utopianism, Soviet totalitarianism. From the Counter-Enlightenment and Romanticism we have inherited irrationalism and aggressive forms of nationalism, culminating in the totalitarianism of the twentieth-century fascists. But Berlin believes that the Enlightenment's critics have also bequeathed to us the intellectual antidote to totalitarianism in all its forms, namely the notion of value pluralism"(p. 124). Crowder articulates this view in a compelling form; the insight we gain into our complex inheritance and hence difficult to define future is necessary if we are to navigate that future well.

The book also contains extended discussions of Berlin on positive and negative liberty and of various strands of criticism that have been raised against Berlin. Crowder is not entirely uncritical himself, but the tone is largely one of defending Berlin against criticisms that are shown to be misdirected or incomplete. On the whole, the book is a success. Graduate students and scholars concerned to get up to speed on Berlin and contemporary analytical theory will be the prime beneficiaries. Those simply

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curious about Berlin would be best advised to go directly to the source (my advice: not to the famous "Two Concepts of Liberty" but rather to "Political Ideas in the Twentieth Century," an intellectual tour de force; it is what postmodern political theory would look like if it weren't written by a machine). But in directing the curious to Berlin himself I intend no slap at Crowder. He has written a fine introductory commentary on Berlin. It's just that to do full justice to the unique authorial voice of Isaiah Berlin would require the skills of the master ventriloquist himself.

–Patrick Neal

THE LEFT'S HEROIC AGE

Gary Dean Best: *Harold Laski and American Liberalism.* (New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers, 2004. Pp. 195. $34.95.)

What scholarly analysis dissects, good intellectual biography makes lively. While Gary Dean Best's book is not exactly a biography, he does us the great favor of distilling the American activities and influence of that protean leftist, Harold Laski (1893–1950). Laski taught briefly at Harvard in the World War I era, where he became an intimate of Holmes, Frankfurter, and leading progressive intellectuals. They later opened the doors to Roosevelt and his cadre of advisers. Laski's abundant stream of articles, books, and letters detail an epic struggle with the intellectual currents of the left, while his political maneuvers reveal some fascinating inner workings of progressive politics on both sides of the Atlantic.

The arc of Laski's journey from progressive pluralist to socialist—and then Marxist—comprises a distinctive tour through the heroic phase of leftist politics. Laski never committed to the Communist Party. Unlike many continental intellectuals, he was credited with providing Depression-era Britain with a non-CP alternative. As scholar, columnist, public intellectual, and Labour Party eminence, Harold Laski brandished the rhetoric of class struggle and followed through with political action that changed British politics while reinforcing progressive tendencies in the United States.

Perhaps the most intriguing aspect of the tale is Laski's effort to mount a "civil war" within the World War II struggle against fascism. Laski saw World War II as the main chance to give a final shove to the tottering structure of a capitalism exposed by World War I and undermined by the Depression. As chair of the National Executive Committee of the British Labour Party, Laski exhorted Churchill privately to institutionalize the wartime nationalization of the means of production. Laski was soundly rebuffed in his offer to exchange for such a commitment support for Churchill's postwar premiership. Disappointment with England's timid response to the Depression was

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matched by hope for America under the leadership of "FD" as he called the American president whom he knew from visits and correspondence. Though occasionally appalled by rightward tacks of the Roosevelt administration, Laski was captivated by Roosevelt's charisma and courage.

The British and American elections of 1945 and 1948 brought substantial vindication to Laski's predictions of an electoral class uprising out of the war's ashes. In some fashion, Laski could not stand success and his leftist fulminations against Attlee's and Truman's moderation and Cold War caution cost him his influence in Britain just as the Truman succession removed him from a position of influence in America. His last great book before his untimely passing in 1950 was *The American Democracy*—which, were it wine, would be noted as blending Tocquevillian oak, Brycean berry flavors, and a lot of Marxist tobacco. Ranging broadly through government, the media, commerce, religion, and the professions, Laski analyzes, rhapsodizes, and vilifies in a shower of insights centering on his contempt for "the businessman" with his crabbed, self-serving view of life and his domination of politics. There's still a lot to be learned, even amid the repetition and ideological cant, from Laski's assessment of America's peculiar kind of commoner capitalism. As Best notes, however, Laski had little understanding of economics or of differences among various sectors of the business community.

Best's book is particularly valuable for assembling the American side of a story that has been exhaustively told in Britain. Another advantage is that much of the book consists of excerpts from Laski's own works which saves the reader the task of plowing through incredible stacks of writings.

What is missing in this book is any sustained theoretical analysis such as that found in Marc Stears's *Progressives, Pluralists, and the Problems of the State: Ideologies of Reform in the United States and Britain, 1909–1926* (Oxford University Press, 2002) or more fully in Michael Newman's *Harold Laski: a Political Biography* (Macmillan, 1993). Similarly, there are citations but no real engagement with the literature that assesses Laski's personal development and motivations as in Isaac Kramnick's and Barry Sheerman's *Harold Laski: A Life on the Left* (or my *Economics as Ideology: Keynes, Laski, Hayek and the Creation of Contemporary Politics* [Rowman and Littlefield, 2003]). Still, to have in a compact volume so much of this complex and interesting story is of considerable value.

What Best does offer by way of summation is an observation of Laski's steady migration to Marxism and some telling illustrations of his overreaching and captivity to apocalyptic visions of capitalism's future. Best concludes, predictably, that the fall of the wall in 1989 pretty well demolished whatever edifice Laski may have thought he was building.

Reflecting on Best's conclusion, and refreshed by re-reading Laski's pungent sallies against business-oriented politics, the reader may not be so sure that the fall of the wall rendered Laski irrelevant. Keynes observed to Hayek, upon the publication of *The Road to Serfdom* in 1944, that the

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"greatest danger ahead" for Hayek's cherished free market "is the probable practical failure of your philosophy in the U. S. in a fairly extreme form." While the economic performance of America cannot be gainsaid, there are ominous signs that Laski's political analysis of the excesses of capitalism remains prescient. He foresaw the incompatibility of democracy and an "aggressive nationalism" that would, ostensibly for national security reasons, yield an alliance between the military and corporations bent on nothing so much as "the subordination of labour to financial power" (p. 166). Laski's story illustrates an all too familiar pattern among 20th–century leftist intellectuals: a telling critique of capitalist politics unaccompanied by a sensible alternative.

The recent revival of Laskian pluralism among progressive theorists suggests that Laski scholars are engaged in a significant effort to carry on his lifelong mission of saving progressivism from capitalism without the trauma of violence and repression. If Laski had more faith in countervailing institutions, as his earlier pluralism would have supported, he might have come up with a better analysis of the future of American politics. The new biography of John Kenneth Galbraith by Richard Parker (Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, 2005) demonstrates how much more effective a better-grounded public intellectual can be in shaping American politics.

–Kenneth R. Hoover

DO YOU LOVE HIM BECAUSE I DO?

Rene Girard: *A Theater of Envy: William Shakespeare.* (South Bend: St. Augustine's Press, 2004. Pp. ix, 366. $26.00.) Reprint of New York: Oxford University Press, 1991.

St. Augustine's Press has issued the long-awaited reprint of Rene Girard's *A Theater of Envy.* For those Shakespeare scholars not enamored of Stephen Orgel's pornographic Shakespeare or who do not share the new historicists' scorn for any focus on plot or character, this is indeed welcome news. Though chilly silence seems the best characterization of the mysterious reluctance of Shakespeare critics to acknowledge the earlier edition, Girard's analysis of conflict in Shakespeare's plays has nevertheless seemed to predict some more recent criticism that does not much refer to it—I think especially of Kerrigan's *Revenge Tragedy: Aeschylus to Armageddon*, Dubrow's *Captive Victors: Shakespeare's Narrative Poems and Sonnets*, and Woodbridge's 1994 *The Scythe of Saturn: Shakespeare and Magical Thinking*. Of this group of eminent critics, Woodbridge alone really refers to Girard, the Girard of the much earlier *The Scapegoat*; she does not, to my knowledge, refer to this particular study. Girard himself, however, may be said to have anticipated or shaped a hostile view of his work at its inception; his introduction foresees

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a negative reaction to his speaking on Shakespeare, since he is an "outsider." Outsider or not, Girard in fact operates almost exclusively on the basis of excellent close readings of the texts for his assertions. Since his interest is in the way Shakespeare creates conflict for his plots, he can hardly be accused of imposing a religious or moral framework from without.

The book treats the plays and poems, as much as possible, in chronological order. Girard's predilections are nevertheless undisguised: eight chapters on *A Midsummer Night's Dream* (with its famous focus on the problem of choosing "love by another's eye"), six on *Troilus and Cressida*, and five on *The Winter's Tale*. He includes a chapter on Joyce's treatment of Shakespeare in *Ulysses*, discussing the reasons that work triggered his own Shakespearian investigations. It is also one among several undisguised attacks on the closed nature of the critical dialogue on Shakespeare.

Girard begins the book with Proteus's speeches on the inception of his desire for Silvia in *Two Gentlemen of Verona*, laying out in Shakespeare's terms his own well-known theory of mimetic desire: Shakespeare unravels the "myth" of the originality and spontaneousness of love in Valentine's advertisement of his new passion to his childhood friend Proteus and in Proteus's natural adoption of the same passion in imitation of, and eventual rivalry with, his friend. Tarquin's criminal passion similarly arises from a rivalry between Collatine and Tarquin in *The Rape of Lucrece*. These two works are good test cases, in that they display Shakespeare's more youthful attempts at creating drama for the stage and for the page. Clearly, these attempts show two characters desiring the same object. Though the observation may seem banal, Girard repeatedly reminds us critics have long ignored this patent device. That one character advertises his desired object to another, who learns his desire by imitating a friend or colleague, is critical. Girard has called this "mimetic desire," or, more plainly, envy, hence the title of the book. To those not familiar with Girard's theories—and it is now forty years since *Deceit, Desire, and the Novel* introduced them to the world of literary criticism—Girard's focus on this plot device in Shakespeare's plays and sonnets may sound quite foreign. Indeed, he is delighted by Eglinton's exclamation about Stephen's analysis of *Hamlet* in *Ulysses*: "You have brought us all this way to show us a French triangle!" (p. 262). Is Girard's reading of Shakespeare reductive? If this criticism has any validity, it is perhaps in regard to the assessment of *As You Like It*, where he develops an idea of an Aristophanic Shakespeare cynically giving the audience what it wants but hinting at his typical means of constructing conflict. Not taking up those potential dissonances, the playwright dishes up for the audience an overly playful play that never allows itself to venture toward realism (p. 96). It would have been more interesting if Celia had taken up Rosalind's suggestion of "Do you love him because I do!" (I.iii.39). Rightly criticizing an over-emphasis on formalism in many readings of the play, Girard here could certainly nod to Shakespeare the poet, whose delight in sparring with and adopting old forms is certainly characteristic—one thinks of

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Love's Labours Lost. Nonetheless, Girard is not simply hunting up French love triangles in Shakespeare; he is finding in Shakespeare a unifying and dominating artistic vision that reaches from political realms in *Troilus and Cressida* and *Julius Caesar* to the deeply personal in *Othello* and *The Winter's Tale*. It is Shakespeare who is consistent, not Girard, in demonstrating that too much likeness breeds hostility, enmity, and downright hatred. Ulysses' speech on the crisis of degree in *Troilus and Cressida* I.iii is merely one articulation of this recurrent idea. Citing it, Girard claims, "The last and most important word of the entire speech, *emulation*, means mimetic rivalry pure and simple; it is the Shakespearean term for it. Together with *emulous*, it appears seven times in *Troilus and Cressida*. If we read it as mimetic rivalry, we understand why it is portrayed as "pale and bloodless: it insidiously devours the substance of whatever it singles out, leaving only an empty shell" (p. 163).

Reading the character of Hamlet as consumed with emulation in "Hamlet's Dull Revenge," Girard provides us with one of the finest, most original readings of the play since Coleridge's ludicrous specification of Hamlet's problem as "delay" pervaded English and American schoolrooms. Girard mocks this latter reading as well as the popular Freudian one: "If the psychoanalysts could only get the contemporary Hamlet on their couch, if they could only straighten out his Oedipus complex, his specific aboulia would vanish; he would stop shilly-shallying and push that nuclear button like a real man. Almost all critics today stick to the ethics of revenge" (p. 288). Examining Shakespeare's dramatic and rhetorical strategy in providing models and rivals for the Danish prince in Horatio, Laertes, and Fortinbras, Girard gives us a reading that still astonishes with its richness and depth, a reading that accounts fully for the cast of young men with which the playwright has surrounded his central character: "Hamlet watches Laertes leap into Ophelia's grave, and the effect on him is electrifying. The reflective mood of the conversation with Horatio gives way to a wild imitation of his rival's theatrical mourning" (p. 278). This incisive view of that dramatic moment unfolds further: "to embrace the goal of revenge, Hamlet must enter the circle of mimetic desire and rivalry; . . . thanks to Laertes, he finally reaches a hysterical pitch of that 'pale and bloodless emulation' that constitutes the terminal stage of the ontological disease." The stage littered with bodies at the play's end is no tragic cliché, but Shakespeare's moral statement on the action we have seen unfold in the protagonist's brief life.

Tracing this type of emulation through the speaker's self-created predicament in the sonnets and Othello's prompted jealousy, Girard culminates his argument with Shakespeare's daring portrayal of Leontes' self-generated jealousy in *The Winter's Tale* and Prospero's failed revenge in *The Tempest*. Shakespeare mocks his own preoccupations by having Miranda fall asleep at her father's tale of his brother and rival. As Girard imagines this self-aware artist, he takes advantage of the moment gamely to mock his own obsession, drawing his study to a close.

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One may quibble with particular details or isolated interpretations in this book, but the overall thesis is quite persuasive; Girard's seriously moral Shakespeare is certainly more likely in the age of Sidney and Jonson than the Keatsian mystery man, the modern age's blank hero of "negative capability" or, worse, the jaded aesthete who too much resembles a member of today's Modern Language Association. One hopes that many readers will avail themselves of the opportunity to read this profound study of the cohesive art of the man Ben Jonson argued, and Girard demonstrates, was, because of his keen apprehension of the human difficulty, "not of an age, but for all time."

—Theresa M. Kenney

SHADOWLAND

John W. Johnson: *Griswold v. Connecticut: Birth Control and the Constitutional Right of Privacy.* (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 2005. Pp. xii, 266. $35.00. $15.95, paper.)

This clearly written and carefully researched little book adds to a large and useful genre of scholarly writing about the Supreme Court of the United States—the extended case study of a single important decision. Well known earlier examples of such studies include Alan Westin's *Anatomy of the Supreme Court Decision* (the steel seizure case), Barbara Craig's study of *INS v. Chadha*, and Charles Lofgren's study of *Plessey v. Ferguson*.

Johnson gives us the story of *Griswold v. Connecticut*, where, in 1965, by a vote of 7 to 2, the Court struck down a Connecticut statue prohibiting the *use* of artificial devices of contraception (the strictest regulation of birth control at a time when most states regulated the practice to some degree). And while much of the ground Johnson covers was treated by David Garrow in his more comprehensive *Liberty and Sexuality* in 1998, Johnson, operating within a narrower compass, can give us greater richness of detail and some fine vignettes.

For instance, it is noteworthy that the group of "political radicals" who gathered in Margaret Sanger's New York apartment in the early 1900s included Big Bill Haywood and Emma Goldman. (Johnson gives no indication that Haywood was probably a murderer and that Goldman's anarchist protégé, Leon Czolgosz, assassinated a president.) It is also interesting to know that Fowler Harper, the Yale law professor who was the principal legal strategist behind challenges to the Connecticut law leading up to *Griswold*, was an "active member" of the National Lawyers Guild, (although Johnson's identification of this group as "leftist" understates the matter considerably). Johnson's treatment of the interaction of

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law clerks with their justices (and with one another) in the negotiations over the *Griswold* opinions is excellent, even though he unaccountably fails to mention Justice Steven Breyer's alternatively hilarious and chilling recollection of his maneuverings as Arthur Goldberg's clerk, recounted by Jeffery Rosen in the *New Republic* in 1994. And finally, among the many telling details, Johnson reveals that Dr. Lee Brexton, the Yale medical professor who for so long was a guiding gynecological light in the legal assault on the Connecticut law, had long been suffering from "clinical depression, coupled with alcoholism," and was a dying man when *Griswold* came down.

Not only is Johnson an excellent storyteller, he leads his readers crisply and persuasively through the constitutional revolution that *Griswold* initiated. From *Roe v. Wade*, through *Lawrence v. Texas* (decriminalizing homosexual sodomy), to the decision of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in the *Goodridge* case (mandating gay marriage), to the upcoming struggle over the Federal Defense of Marriage Act, it is all there, laid out clearly for the student. It is when Johnson turns from description to analysis that the book disappoints. He comes nowhere close to doing justice to the philosophical, legal, and political issues raised by the course of decisions he describes.

It is telling, for instance, that Johnson blandly accepts the term "privacy" which has been appropriated by supporters of the new substantive due process rights created by the Court over the last forty years. But as Louis Henkin (a sympathetic observer) pointed out early on in an article in the *Columbia Law Review*, the term is inapt. Johnson himself quotes the Oxford English Dictionary which has privacy as "a state or condition of being withdrawn from the society of others or from public attention; freedom from disturbance or intrusion; seclusion." And while this fairly describes the value at the core of the Fourth Amendment, what flows from *Griswold* is something entirely different—it is the assertion of a behavioral autonomy, an individual's capacity cloaked in the authority of the Constitution, to take certain *actions* unencumbered by government. "The right to privacy" has a nice ring to it; who after all, rejects "privacy" as unworthy? But in our constitutional politics of the last forty years it has been a false flag, under which very different sorts of claims have been advanced.

At a philosophical level Johnson simply fails to take seriously the powerful moral and religious arguments that swirl around the autonomies he would protect. In a telling sentence (written about birth control but which Johnson would clearly extend to abortion), he wishes that it had remained a "private medical matter rather than it actually become a very public battleground for morals, religion and government policy." The willingness to regard the most profound issues of sexuality and reproduction, of life and death, as "medical matters" and regret that they have ever been engaged in moral and religious terms leaves this reviewer aghast. Of course Johnson is entitled to his own conclusions to these matters but one wishes that they were advanced by argument rather than dismissal of disagreements as unworthy.

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Nor does Johnson do justice to the continuing debate in constitutional theory over substantive due process—the doctrine on which the newly announced rights purport to rest. He briefly discusses John Hart Ely's famous post-*Roe* article in the *Yale Law Journal*, "The Wages of Crying Wolf." But he seems to conclude that what one makes of Ely's comparison of *Roe* to the long abandoned *Lochner v. New York* (epitomizing the old, bad substantive due process of liberty of contract) depends simply on one's position on abortion!

As to politics, he observes that no one, including the justices of the Supreme Court, envisioned in 1973 how the abortion issue would tear the country apart politically. But there is really very little in the book about the successive political firestorms that have raged over the Court's innovations in the *Griswold* to *Goodridge* progression. And this absence of political background detracts from its value as a case study.

One final thought, not about Johnson's book but about *Griswold* itself. Over the years it has often been put forward by defenders of the "Rights Revolution" in constitutional law as the perfect example of a situation in which the judiciary had to act because the processes of normal, democratic change were irrevocably frozen. The stranglehold of the Catholic hierarchy on the legislative processes of Connecticut was said to be such that the repeal or modification of the 1879 birth control law could never happen. But a moment's serious reflection reveals this as nonsense. No one who lived through the decade from 1965 (the year of *Griswold*) to 1975, who remembers the cyclonic way in which the sexual revolution liberated Americans for better or worse, can believe that had the Court not acted in *Griswold* the Connecticut law would have been in place a decade later. Or even a few years later. The point is this: when public attitudes *really do change* in decisive ways, legislative change will follow upon them. The most that the constitutional adventurism the Warren court bought for birth control advocates in 1965 was a result they wanted a few years before they would have gotten it anyway.

–Richard E. Morgan

FOR, THOUGH CONQUERED, THEY ADORE IT

John M. Coski: *The Confederate Battle Flag: America's Most Embattled Emblem.* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005. Pp. xi, 401. $29.95. $19.77, paper.)

John M. Coski could not have chosen a more fitting time to publish a handsome, well-written, and scholarly work. Nor is there a more qualified expert to investigate the Confederate battle flag's history since Coski is the Historian and Library Director of the Museum of the Confederacy,

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Richmond, Virginia. At the time of writing this review, the House of Representatives had just passed a constitutional amendment making it a felony to desecrate the United States flag. Symbols can mean much more than rationally perceived actualities. Thus, criminalizing symbolic vandalism suggests how Americans—at least some of them—seek to hallow a simple piece of cloth. But then the phenomenon has so often arisen in other contexts. Witnessing a burning cross on a suburban lawn might justifiably arouse fury, consternation, and fear. With remarkable insights, Coski splendidly reveals this translation of symbol into highly emotional realms throughout the history of the Confederate battle flag from its inception to the present day.

The author explains that the origin of the Confederate flag hardly predicted its later sanctification. William Porcher Miles, a former fire-eating South Carolina congressman, chaired the Confederacy's Flag Committee. Amidst raucous clamors for one design or another, Miles vetoed one suggestion because its resemblance to the Stars and Stripes would result in confusions on the battleground. For their commands, Generals P. G. T. Beauregard and Joseph Johnston adopted the St Andrew's cross motif—the "saltire." The original white background was changed to red to prevent it from appearing as a flag of truce. Nonetheless, white had signified to its sponsors the stainless purity of race for which the Confederacy was founded. With modifications, the starred St. Andrew's cross became the Rebels' battle flag.

From the start, Coski challenges the current neo-Confederate notion that state rights was the sole motive for disunion. Instead, resistance to the threat of slavery's abolition was the chief motive for disunion. Until more recent times, this interpretation continued to be firmly avowed during and long after the war. The Rebel banner was meant to represent that rationale—but also state rights by which the system of bondage was supposed to be guarded. Coski proposes the two justifications as virtually inseparable. In any event, the troops steadfastly pledged to protect the colors during battle. "Defending the flag was tantamount to defending home and hearth, honor and principle," writes the author (p. 32). Recklessly the troops might rush to save it from enemy abuse. Coski's stirring, often moving accounts of flag-holders' valor enlivens the story.

Stacking arms and surrendering tattered standards in 1865, Coski observes, did not signify any loss of honor and sense of Southernness but instead meant that the units bearing them were extinct. Father Abram Ryan so implied in his once famous "The Conquered Banner." Most every post-Civil War Southern pupil had to memorize the poem (including this reviewer's father). But despair and proud grief soon gave way to resistance. Under the Rebel ensign, Ku Klux Klaners and other guerilla outfits bloodthirstily crushed black voting and sense of independence. In the evolution of the "Lost Cause" movement, a major contribution sprang from such post-Civil War societies as the Sons of Confederate Veterans and the Kappa Alpha college fraternity in the late nineteenth and early twentieth

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centuries. They all made the banner sacred in ritual and celebration. Alarmed by a Southern super-nationalist resurgence, Northern patriotic organizations soon lobbied for greater public use of the stars and stripes. Union veterans objected to shameless displays of the Rebel insignia at commemorations. When Grover Cleveland ordered captured banners in federal hands returned, Yankee outrage forced the president to capitulate. Curiously, the Spanish-American War in 1898, we learn, did not entirely reconcile the sections in common endeavor. The Confederate veteran General Joe Wheeler at San Juan Hill shouted to his men, "Boys, give the 'damn' Yankees h—"(p. 71). Coski discloses that in the First and Second World Wars, Korea, and Vietnam, Southern soldiers discovered their differentness in contact with Northerners and sometimes requested Confederate flags from home to stress their white solidarity. On Southern military bases in the early 1950s, the flag was so prominently displayed that a visitor might assume a ghostly reincarnation of Rebel warriors had settled in.

Moving from the military scene, Coski masterfully sketches the Confederate banner's role in national affairs. For instance, with colors aloft, the Dixiecrats in 1948 boldly sought the presidency but won only four states. The pennant's resurrection, however, stimulated a momentary fad that some considered a telling protest against federal encroachments that diminished state autonomy. In the 1960s tumult, the flag was bound to figure with even greater intensity than ever before. Civil Rights activists loudly complained about its segregationist implications. Coski points out, however, that in the George Wallace campaign of 1968, as elsewhere, the Confederate emblem was often paired with the United States flag. The coupling represented segregation's consistency "with both southern and American values" (p. 145). Skillfully, Coski demonstrates that throughout the era flag-bearing anti-segregationists incited confrontations over school and university desegregation. Most particularly, he recounts the Arthurine Lucy case in Alabama; the North Little Rock High School episode; and James Meredith's struggle at the University of Mississippi.

Protests against Confederate displays grew ever more strident in the late 1960s just when black voting power was changing the political landscape. Major Southern journalists also editorialized against the segregationists' use of the flag to represent "'bigotry' or 'racism'" (p. 159). While, contrarily, state legislatures criminalized any profanation of the Rebel banner, it appeared with impunity on beach towels, tattooed skins, women's tennis shorts, and "rednecks'" leather jackets. True believers objected but without effect. In fact, as Coski points out, the neo-Confederates entertained two conflicting goals: to have the flag honored, not cheapened, but also they sought to lend it universal visibility.

For the vigorous Confederate heritage movement, that paradoxical double-purpose has been successful. State and local politics have provided wreaths of honor for the banner. On the other hand, African Americans consider it no less vile than the Nazi swastika. The NAACP has waged

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campaigns in Mississippi, Alabama, South Carolina, and Georgia to have the flag denied official recognition. The results are mixed at best. In 2001 a Mississippi referendum to retain an 1894 Confederate-style flag passed handily, even in black-majority counties. Apparently whites were more keenly aroused than African Americans. In all four Deep South states, Coski points out, the same issue is involved: should the emblem be replaced with a flag that represents all state citizens or should tradition, however mythical, prevail? "Neither constitutional law, ethics, nor history suggests unambiguous answers to the question of what *should* be done" (p. 269). As he might have noted, at the heart of the matter is the question of power. After all, the Union victory of 1865 meant that the Republican interpretation of the Constitution was morally correct—by force of arms. In our current peacetime democracy, the matter can only be settled by majority rule. Courts—federal or state—cannot stifle or settle so passionate a controversy so long as the battle flag carries the symbolic weight of a bloody war. That encounter destroyed an incipient nation and struck off the shackles of an enslaved race. Coski's study offers no incontrovertible solution. Yet, we are grateful for his thorough, compelling dissection of the issue.

–Bertram Wyatt-Brown

CIVIL LIBERTY, COMMUNAL SAFETY

Peter Baldwin: *Disease and Democracy: The Industrialized World Faces AIDS.* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005. Pp. xii, 465. $44.95.)

Although seemingly a historical account of European and American public policies against AIDS, Peter Baldwin's *Disease and Democracy* is that but much more: it probes into the nature of public policy and political action, with its actors of interest groups, public opinion, and governmental agencies; it raises questions of political theory with the dilemma of how to reconcile individual liberty with communal safety as well as explore the roles of citizenship and responsibility in a liberal democracy; and it offers a synthetic and historical analysis of the vast literature on AIDS in the context of comparative public policy. By looking at each country's domestic traditions of public health policy, Baldwin examines how these differences account for the divergent responses towards AIDS among the industrialized countries of Europe and the United States. Against the rational choice theorists, Baldwin sides with the path dependency social scientists who claim that initial decisions are more important than later ones, because the past narrows future possibilities and increases the costs of subsequent changes. For Baldwin, path dependence continues to structure public health policy, providing an explanation why, when confronted with the same epidemic,

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some countries favored a more state interventionist approach to AIDS, while others opted for voluntary, consensual tactics.

When compared to other epidemics, AIDS seems exceptional in that techniques of voluntary behavioral change instead of quarantines and sanitation were developed for this chronic disease. However, a closer examination reveals that western countries' initial response to AIDS was similar to their nineteenth-century responses to smallpox, cholera, and syphilis. Surprisingly, countries that traditionally concerned themselves with the protection of civil liberties, such as the United States and Sweden, implemented interventionist policies, while countries that customarily have subordinated individual rights to the state, like France and Germany, adopted a much more laissez-faire approach. But as the United States, Sweden, Bavaria, and to a lesser extent Austria, continued in their traditional approach of mandatory testing and reporting, contact tracing, and protection of the borders, these countries eventually recognized the ineffectiveness of these techniques and abandoned them for the consensual tactics of educating the public to avoid risky behavior and transmission. The universal mobility of modern life, the dormant nature of the virus, and the ethical and legal questions of discrimination all had made traditional state interventionist techniques such as compulsory quarantines impractical and expensive.

To account for the variation in countries' responses against AIDS, Baldwin looks at the structures already established in those countries: existing health, marital, and discrimination legislation; employment practices and protection; the treatment of prisoners and prostitution; the nature and extent of health insurance coverage; and public attitudes and governmental agencies. Furthermore, which populace was most afflicted with AIDS—whether it was gays, drug-users, prostitutes, or hemophiliacs; the white middle-class or ethnic and racial minorities—and their sexual practices also played a role in determining public health policy. Finally, prompted by the bacteriological revolution in biomedicine, the civil rights movement, and the sexual revolution, public health as a whole shifted from quarantine and sanitation to an individualized, democratized approach, whereas individuals were responsible for their own safety by their sexual and recreational choices. Instead of employing collective, behavioral control, the state's role was one of education to persuade the public to change its behavior; or, as Foucault has pointed out, to shift external controls to internal ones. In spite of the problems inherent in this strategy—Should school children be taught to use condoms? Should needle exchange programs be implemented?—this voluntary, consensual approach ultimately came to dominate western countries' public health policy towards AIDS.

In addition to past public policies and the demographic, geographic, and political structures of a country (what Baldwin terms geoepidemiological factors), the book also looks at the roles and relationships among interest groups, the medical community, and the state in the formulation of public health policy. In all countries, the epidemic's victims, especially gays,

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formally participated in policy decisions, although the nature and extent varied according to each country's geoepidemiological and political structures. Public opinion was diverted by politicians and medical experts into legislative committees and bureaucratic agencies so as to insulate public health policy from populist forces. And the state played its role in public policy decisions with a great variation among countries, depending whether the state was unitary or federal, the roles of court and litigation, and the relationships among the welfare state, employment practices, and civic organizations. But in spite of the vast differences among interest groups, public pressure, and political choices in these countries, all of them, except non-Bavarian Germany, resorted to the strategies and tactics that they had employed in their previous encounters with past epidemics.

Ultimately this diversity of responses to the same epidemic in countries with similar cultures and political systems can be traced to the unique nature of the epidemic, a country's geoepidemoiological structures, and the politics of public health, biotechnology, and privacy. Here we have the controversies of confidentiality, civil rights and liberties, and communal safety, all of which Baldwin explores throughout his book with precision and objectivity. But the crucial dilemmas raised by AIDS are whether liberal democracies can provide collective goods for its citizens, who now see themselves more as individuals rather than citizens; and whether the First World can continue to ignore the Third World plight without harm to itself. These questions, and others, are more explored than answered, but highlight the unique nature of AIDS and the obstacles politicians, medical experts, and the public must confront in their formulation of public policy against this epidemic. With the explosion of new discoveries in biomedical research, along with the outbreak of pan-epidemics like SARS, these questions will not lose their political currency any time soon. As the first comparative analysis of western public health policy on AIDS, *Disease and Democracy* shows how these countries have confronted past and current epidemics with success and failure in public policy and raises the right political questions we need to ask and to address so as to help guide us in the future.

–Lee Trepanier

THEY SEEN THEIR OPPORTUNITIES

Yan Sun: *Corruption and Market in Contemporary China*. (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2004. Pp. xi, 239. $21.00.)

Though it is popularly agreed that corruption has become a festering sore that threatens the health of China's economy and stability, few have offered empirical diagnosis of the cause and nature of this infection.

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Previous works, by such authors as Alan Liu and Julia Kwong, were confined to rough sketches of corruption under socialist China, based largely on scattered anecdotal evidence and media reports. Sun's book focuses on corruption in reform China and draws its source from prosecuted corruption cases found in legal casebooks and the *Dangfeng Lianzheng*, a monthly digest of corruption reports published by the CCP's Discipline Inspection Committee. Her cogent analysis built upon detailed case data is a welcome contribution to a problem of intense but under-examined interest.

In her book, Sun questions the relationship between economic liberalization and corruption in China. She poses several compelling puzzles: First, given arguments that partial reforms would create loopholes for corruption, why do Russia and the former Soviet states which implemented thorough "big bang" reforms suffer more debilitating corruption than China? Second, given the prevalent assumption that corruption is detrimental to growth, why does China continue to exhibit spectacular growth despite corruption? Third, given revisionist views of the utility of corruption to modernization, why have other corrupt post-socialist states fared much more poorly than China? In short, China is an anomalous case in which the pursuit of partial reforms has led concurrently to growth and corruption. The implicit questions then are how this coexistence came about and whether it can be sustained.

Sun's arguments are twofold. First, she argues that corruption witnessed in present-day China is a unique product of liberalization in a transitional economy, rather than an unfolding of pre-reform organizational weaknesses, as suggested in Lu Xiaobo's *Cadres and Corruption*. The reform era has created new opportunities and incentives for corruption, while simultaneously eroding the disincentives, that is, checking mechanisms, against corruption. Second, while corruption had not undermined growth in the initial phase of reform and might in fact had served to enhance efficiency, it would, over time, puncture the wheels of reform as China moves toward full marketization. To put the author's thesis succinctly, reform and growth led to corruption, but corruption would ultimately undermine the foundation of its birth.

The author structures her book around four main distinctions: types of corruption, regional and temporal variation, and incentives for versus disincentives against corruption. Chapter 1 provides a detailed "phenomenology" of reform-era corruption based on categories of corruption reported in casebooks and official publications. Chapters 2 and 3 argue that both transactional and nontransactional types of corruption are uniquely shaped by conditions of market transition, and that revisionist theories of the economic efficiency and social integration functions of corruption apply in the first (1978–1992) but not second (1992–present) period of reform. Chapter 4 examines three distinct regional models of corruption: independent kingdoms and local corruption chains, coastal regions and

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organized smuggling, underdeveloped regions and poverty-derived schemes. Finally, Chapter 5 discusses how various checking mechanisms against corruption have been progressively undermined by reform policies of decentralization and increased local autonomy. The thread that runs through the book is an argument of the weakening administrative power of the central state, the rise of local "first-in-command" officials, accompanied by the "lateral" and "vertical" expansion of corruption over time (p. 195).

How then do Sun's arguments answer the puzzles she had posed? In comparison to other postsocialist states, China has managed to avert institutional breakdown while moving steadily towards a market economy by adopting two sequential phases of reform—a "two track system" in the early period and aggressive marketization after Deng's Southern Expedition in 1992. Rent-seeking opportunities in the initial phase served as inducements for cadre support of reforms, while the extent of corruption was checked by partial state control over the mixed plan and market economy. It was in the second stage of reform that corruption widened exponentially and began to enact a heavy toll on economic efficiency and political legitimacy. Or in the author's words: "In the short run, the uneven distributional implications of corruption may aid reform and growth through unintended and informal mechanisms. Over time, however, these mechanisms may take on a life of their own and undermine the central state's ability to implement its developmental policies, discipline its staff, enforce its regulatory infrastructure, and fundamentally transform the economy" (p. 20). The author shies from stating explicitly what therefore to expect of China's future, but the implicit conclusion is that reform and growth will suffer in the long run, unless effective measures are taken to mitigate the harm of corruption.

While Sun makes a convincing case for the effects of reform on the nature and extent of corruption, she is less credible in arguing the reverse. Her argument of the detriment of corruption to China's reform hinges on demonstrating that the central state has indeed lost its ability to monitor and discipline its local agents. However, the author's account of such defective control is supported, ironically, by case studies of corrupt local officials who were ultimately punished by the central authority. Besides, Sun does not address counter-evidence of the "comeback" of the Party and central government, as witnessed in such policies as implementation of the Administrative Litigation Law in 1990 and fiscal recentralization in 1994. The shift of power between central and local governments seems to be more of a see-saw than linear pattern.

Moreover, it needs to be taken into account that while China may be facing acute corruption, so too are many other developing economies. On the Transparency International Corruption Index in 2004, China ranked 71 out of 145 countries, on par with Saudi Arabia, slightly below Thailand, but above India, Russia, and Vietnam. In China, however, the corruption problem tends to take on hyperbolic tone, reflecting either popular anxiety

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over the frenzy of growth and social change or the relative willingness of Chinese citizens to speak up about corruption. What Sun, as well as many other scholars of Chinese corruption, has presented is a rather one-sided account of flourishing corruption that ignores the pockets of progress in institution building. An alternative approach might be why corruption *has* been averted and monitoring successful in certain instances, but why such success cases could not be replicated across China. In other words, if reforms are indeed increasingly creating opportunities for corruption and eroding disincentives against it, as Sun proposes, then the more intriguing question is perhaps not why corrupt officials exist, but rather why the rest remain uncorrupt.

Despite the several puzzles that remain in her book, Yan Sun has opened a door to further empirical research on Chinese corruption. In particular, she encourages other scholars to pursue studies of corruption in rural China and at lower administrative levels, which are not well represented in her data. Future work in this area would definitely take her book as a key starting point.

–Yuen Yuen Ang

THE DESPOT IN FULL

Robert Service: *Stalin: A Biography.* (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2005. Pp. xviii, 715. $29.95.)

This is a new biography of Stalin. Compared with previous biographies, the main innovation is the stress on the many-faceted nature of Stalin. Service's Stalin is a despot, poet, robber, intellectual, gangleader, lover, political streetfighter, editor, troubleshooter, revolutionary, father, conspirator, diplomat, and warlord, at different times in a long and varied life.

The book is divided into five parts. The first part deals with Stalin as a revolutionary. It stresses Stalin's importance in Bolshevism before Lenin's return to Petrograd (now St.Petersburg) in April 1917. The second part concerns Stalin's activities as one of the Party's leaders between April 1917 and the defeat of the Left Opposition in 1927. The third part is about 1928–38, the years of terror-economics, terror-politics, and mass-murder. The fourth part concentrates on Stalin's role as war-leader in World War II. The fifth part analyzes the 1945–53 period when the USSR developed nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles and Stalin wrote on linguistics and political economy. The book is divided into 55 relatively short chapters. This makes it easy to read. Many of the individual chapters will be useful for classroom use.

Service has an excellent knowledge of the sources for a life of Stalin. He has studied relevant archival files, a huge range of published literature,

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some relevant unpublished works, interviewed people who knew Stalin personally, and visited his dachas in the south. A number of the sources he uses were unknown to previous Stalin biographers.

There are a number of small mistakes. The First Five Year Plan was not "completed a year ahead of schedule" (p. 274). The national income did not nearly double in the First Five Year Plan (p. 274). Stalin did not aim to turn the USSR into a "megalith" (p. 299) (possibly 'monolith' is meant). The Ukrainian grain delivery quota was not halved in August 1932 (p. 312) (it was reduced by 11%). Ordzhonikidze's suicide did not happen "in the course of" (p. 349) the February-March (1937) plenum (it happened before the plenum opened). The victims of the "national operations" in 1937–38 were not "foreigner[s]" (p. 351). (Most of them were Soviet citizens.) Tovstukha was not "Lenin's aide" (p. 356) (he was Stalin's aide). In the late 1930s the USSR did not "recover its position" (p. 380) as a great power. (It gradually acquired a status comparable to that of the Russian Empire.) Stalin did not become Chairman of Sovnarkom in 1939 (p. 395) (this happened in 1941). The idea that in 1945–53 eastern Europe was "supplied [by the USSR] with oil and other natural resources below world market prices" (p. 517) confuses the Stalin and Brezhnev periods. In the late Stalin period, it was Poland that supplied the USSR with cheap coal. It is not true that in 1945–52 the Politburo did not meet (p. 527). His treatment of the 1947 famine is poor (p. 498). Ukraine was not the worst affected republic. (In absolute number of victims Russia was, and relatively Moldova.) The number of victims was not "millions" (p. 498). (It was in the range 1.0–1.5 million.) Lenin's letter to Stalin demanding an apology was dictated on 5 March 1923 (not 1922 as printed on p. 592). No doubt specialists will find more mistakes. However, considering the enormous range of issues discussed in the book, its factual accuracy is very good. The above-mentioned mistakes can easily be corrected in a second edition.

In a number of places the interpretation is an over-confident rendering of a doubtful source. For example, Service's account of the June (1937) plenum rests heavily on not very reliable evidence. What actually happened then remains unclear. Similarly, his account of an emergency Central Committee meeting on 4 March 1953 which simply appointed Malenkov as Chairman of the Council of Ministers (p. 585) conflicts with other eyewitnesses and the documentary evidence.

Some of Service's interpretations are controversial. He plays down Khlevniuk's interpretation of the causes of the 1937–38 terror, arguing that Stalin "would probably have felt impelled towards terror even without the pressures of the international situation" (p. 348). He states that "For Stalin the supreme criterion of political judgement was the need to protect and enhance his personal power" (p. 338), a repetition of the pre-archival interpretation of Leonard Schapiro (who is unmentioned). The Binner-Junge interpretation, with its attention to the social and ideological goals of the terror, is not mentioned.

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Service very sensibly argues that although Stalin was a despot he was not omnipotent. He depended on the information he received and was unable to eliminate patron-client groups. Service also provides a good explanation of the origin and meaning of his pseudonym Koba (pp. 28–29).

The chapter on terror-economics correctly stresses Stalin's industrial and military goals, his achievements in these respects, and the role of terror in implementing his economic policies. However, it gives remarkably little attention to Stalin's war against the peasants. According to Churchill's well-known account, in August 1942 Stalin told Churchill that for him the stresses of the war with Germany were much less than those of collectivization, which had been "a terrible struggle." Nevertheless, the latter gets little space compared with the war or even the terror of 1937–38 (the number of victims of which were much less than those of 1930–33).

Some academics may ignore this book since it is "only biography," covers many subjects rather superficially, and has not got the depth of a monograph. In this connection, it should be noted that biography is a popular genre. Hence this book will be read by many people who would never read a monograph. Furthermore, because it is written by a scholar familiar with the scholarly literature, this book is actually a good way of conveying the results of academic research to a broad public. In addition, in view of the importance of Stalin for understanding the twentieth century, a biography of him is fully justified.

Critics may worry about the ethics of this kind of book. Stalin was a mass-murderer, but Service gives attention to his love life, his children, his fondness for singing, billards, and gardening, and his taste for bananas and fish. However, these things too were part of his life and deserve a place in a comprehensive biography. Furthermore, it is not the case that this book is bereft of ethical evaluations. On the contrary, it is full of them. For example "Stalin was as wicked a man as has ever lived" (p. 345).

One personal point will strike many readers as strange. Service writes that "Stalin did not suffer from a psychosis (which is the word nowadays preferred by doctors for madness)" (p. 343). He was "a deeply disordered personality" (p. 344) but sane. His second wife, however, was "mentally unstable" (p. 10), and suffered from "some kind of schizophrenia" (p. 289). This seems an odd way to describe a young woman married to a man much older than herself who was a foul-mouthed killer, flirted with other women, and was indifferent to her hope of a career outside the home. It is not only feminists who will find the idea that Stalin was sane but his second wife was not, rather strange.

The book leaves a number of issues, both personal and political, unclarified. Service is unable to explain convincingly why Stalin falsified his date of birth. It is also left unclear why he dropped out of the Tiflis Theological Seminary. In addition, Service is unable to answer the vexed question of precisely what Stalin was planning at the beginning of 1953.

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Despite the above reservations, this well-informed and sensible book, which combines human interest and high politics, is undoubtedly the best biography of Stalin to date in English or Russian. It is comprehensive, balanced, and based on an excellent knowledge of the sources. It deserves many readers. It will be useful not only for individual readers but also for classroom use.

–Michael Ellman

POLITICAL SCIENCE AND TESTOSTERONE

Stephen Peter Rosen: *War and Human Nature*. (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2005. Pp. vii, 211. $29.95.)

In *War and Human Nature*, Stephen Rosen offers a fascinating account of what psychology and neuroscience have to tell us about the effects certain heritable traits and environmental circumstances have on decision making. He makes an excellent case that emotional responses to problems deeply and unconsciously affect how the brain finds solutions, and that human biology complicates decision making in ways not predictable by models of utility maximization. The innovation he offers is to apply these insights to political behavior. His three objectives are to restore the relevance of the notion of an innate human nature to social science; to demonstrate and supplement the insufficiency of rational choice models of decision making; and to establish the usefulness of interpreting politics through the lens of cognitive and behavioral biology. He succeeds admirably in achieving the first two, but the case for the third falls short.

Rosen begins with a description of how "emotional arousal" (p. 40) affects memory and cognition. In states of emotional arousal the brain pairs incoming sense data with the emotional response these data elicit, forming a memory pattern that the brain will selectively recall when either the sensory or the emotional circumstances are repeated. This allows the brain to interpret similar situations very rapidly; rather than having to calculate all aspects of every dangerous situation anew, the brain recalls sensory/fear patterns to allow for a quick response. This pattern recognition and emotional arousal can occur unconsciously, affecting what sorts of information "stand out" for us. The less time and information we have, the more our analyses of problems will be influenced by these patterns. We may respond hastily, reaching conclusions on the basis of past experience rather than a complete examination of all relevant information. This can be good or bad depending on the perspicacity of the pattern guiding our judgment. But it means that our decisions in crucial moments will be influenced by emotional factors unaccounted for by rational choice models.

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In the subsequent chapter Rosen discusses status seeking. Some people respond to status challenges by wrathfully punishing the challenger; behavioral biology calls this "dominant behavior" (p. 73) and Rosen describes research of this phenomena among primates. Not surprisingly, success in punishing status-rivals feels good, and is attended by increased levels of testosterone. The subjective pay-off can lead high status males to punish imagined rivals beyond what would be useful; status becomes an end in itself, inspiring nonutilitarian, "irrational" decisions. In groups with "unstable social hierarchies" (p. 73), the competition for status stimulates this behavior in high status males even further.

A chapter on war termination defends Clausewitz's account of how the will of an enemy may be broken, marvelously describing the chemistry and psychology of distress and "learned helplessness" (p. 114). He then returns to the issue of testosterone, investigating finally the behavior of tyrants.

Rosen argues that tyrants tend to be short-term thinkers less capable of delayed gratification, more given to punishing challengers, and therefore less likely to have subordinates who are willing to tell them bad news. Their decisions will therefore fluctuate in response to near-term costs and opportunities, their focus on the present will be reinforced by the dangers of being hated, and their decisions will tend to go uncorrected by bad consequences. Tyrants will tend to rise in situations of instability that reward short-term opportunism and dominant behavior, and will be constrained only by near-term costs, such as the immediate military capabilities of other nations.

Rosen's account raises perhaps the most pressing question in our profession today: How are we to apply science to politics? While this is a careful and thoughtful book, there are three difficulties that Rosen does not adequately address. First, his argument has to proceed by means of analogy; in each chapter he describes scientific investigations of non- or subpolitical domains, and then pairs them with accounts of political behavior drawn from history or political theory. The latter are meant to illustrate the former. Whether or not they do, however, cannot be answered by the scientific investigations themselves, whose validity is limited to their original domains. Rosen acknowledges this and makes no claim to offer scientific proofs about politics, but he doesn't address how this problem limits the descriptive and propaedeutic adequacy of his account. Science can't tell us if the models fit. As a result the biological accounts stand stubbornly apart from the political ones, as parallel narratives. We learn about the blood chemistry that attends status seeking. This is supported by his citations of Thucydides and Xenophon, but does not refine or advance their teachings, let alone approach their subtlety and rigor. His description of brain pathology *goes along with* Clausewitz, but to learn about war we still need to consult Clausewitz. It's a bit like reading about the physiology of Van Gogh's hands.

Secondly, because Rosen begins with scientific models formulated in the subpolitical realm and has to get politics to fit them, he tends to stay on

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the level of the obvious and at times oversimplifies. We already knew that tyrants punish rivals, and it is questionable whether desire for glory is adequately captured by the notion of dominant behavior. Likewise his Xenophon tells us only what the social psychologists tell us about the desire for status; his Plato tells us only what the psychologists tell us about delayed gratification. There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio.

Finally, some of the concepts used by the behavioral sciences appear to be borrowed from political life without sufficient scrutiny, and then narrowed for ease of measurement. These concepts then pass through empirical analyses like letters through the mail, acquiring quantitative valences; an internal critique is needed to open them. For example, dominant behavior is defined in terms of challenges to status. What "status" means for humans and what counts therefore as a challenge are both unclear. Rosen focuses on the subjective pay-off of successful dominance, that is, its power to affect decision making. But don't we need to understand more about the appeal of dominance than its power? For example, to understand decision making we would need to understand how the desire for status differs from and is related to other desires, such as the desire for glory after death or the desire for reputation for virtue. We would need to understand that desire within a framework of a larger understanding of the soul, for what that desire means is entirely dependent on one's political psychology; a Marxist or Freudian will understand that desire very differently from a Platonist or a Thucydidean. Empirical evidence can be suggestive in ways that support or undermine such frameworks, but I'm not sure it can generate them.

Nevertheless one should not lose sight of the fact that Rosen demonstrates the limits of his approach precisely by showing its strengths. His analysis carries far reaching implications for foundational issues, for the political is rooted in and limited by the subpolitical. What does his account of dominant behavior suggest about the sociality of human nature, for example? By keeping the limits of his approach in mind we can gain from the wealth of information his book makes available to us. What he offers gives our discipline much that we must account for and assimilate.

–Borden Flanagan

THE REALIST TRADITION

Richard Ned Lebow: *The Tragic Vision of Politics: Ethics, Interests and Orders*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. Pp. xvii, 405. $75.00. $27.00, paper.).

In this smart and sophisticated piece of scholarship, Richard Ned Lebow attempts to recover the "fundamental unity" (p. 257) of the classical realist

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tradition through an analysis of Thucydides, Karl von Clausewitz, and Hans Morgenthau, framed by the concept of tragedy. For contemporary North American International Relations (IR) scholars, these thinkers—like Althusser's early Marx—generally are consigned to a "prescientific" period in the discipline's development. They are ritually invoked but rarely made serious objects of study. By contrast, Lebow works in the original Greek and German, he is rigorously attentive to the wider philosophical, cultural, and historical context within which his thinkers wrote, and he provides a critical account of the often deeply flawed interpretation of their work found in IR and elsewhere. The stand-alone studies of the three thinkers, which make up the heart of the book and comprise its most successful contribution, are far and away the best brief accounts available and should be included in graduate syllabi. If IR regularly had produced scholarship of this quality, it would not have reduced itself to the current sterile debate between neo-realism, neo-liberalism, and a constructivism shorn of its critical heritage.

Lebow's core claim is that classical realism involves a continual mediation between ethics, interests, and wider social and international orders. Interests should be formulated within a language of justice appropriate to historical context. In doing so, power is exercised in a fashion considered legitimate by domestic and international audiences. Such legitimate authority is less costly to exercise than reliance on brute force and economic incentive alone. More importantly, it sustains rather than corrodes the domestic and international order within which a great power exists and flourishes. The great sin—and great temptation—for great powers is hubris, believing that they can 'do what they will' while the weak 'suffer what they must'. A great power's rise is marked by the respect and legitimacy others rightfully accord it, as for Athens when it defended Greece from the Persians or the U.S. in the wake of the Second World War. The moment of decline and tragedy begins when a great power's leaders believe they can bend others to their will through fear, force, and bribery alone, operating outside any ethical context, as for the Athenians of the Melian dialogue or Nixon's and Kissinger's conduct of the Indochina conflict. Such hubris easily leads to over-extension and defeat.

Contemporary neo-realism eviscerates this classical tradition, reducing it to instrumental conceptions of interest and power as material capability, and does so in the name of social science, imagining it has superseded the classical thinkers. This reductionism and hubris are what exercise Lebow, and it is what he has successfully exorcised to a degree. It should be impossible to claim that "realism" is opposed to "ethics" or that the stunning narrowness of Kenneth Waltz's *Theory of International Politics* (McGraw-Hill, 1979) somehow represents a scientific advance over a thinker such as Morgenthau. Contemporary IR, for example, has few conceptual resources to address the fragility of social and political order in the face of power, a well-developed theme in Lebow's accounts of Thucydides, Clausewitz,

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and Morgenthau and one centrally related to questions of war and peace, questions at the heart of the discipline.

Those familiar with classical realism will recognize much of what Lebow has to say to this point, but he pushes his analysis further. He argues that in different ways each of the three thinkers was concerned with modernizing processes and their potential for destructive conflict as old and new orders collided. Modernizing Athens clashed with traditional Sparta, while revolutionary France upended *ancien regime* Europe. Profoundly influenced by Weberian understandings of rationalization (in ways Lebow is not fully cognizant of), Morgenthau faced off against the runaway scientism of modern culture as well as that of a discipline that revered him as a grandfather but failed to read him attentively. Lebow here opens up space for a realist social theory of world politics, one in which historical change and the clash between modernity and tradition are central. He stands here at some remove from the spare world of strategic interaction constructed by Waltz or that of the cyclical rise and fall of great powers imagined by Robert Gilpin.

Lebow, however, does not develop the space he opens as productively as might be the case. He supplements his conceptual armory of Greek tragedy with a constructivist focus on social identities and sketches out an "ontology" in which collective and individual agents are situated within a tension between autonomy and community. Lebow's footing here is much less sure, and his Amero-centric focus more evident in his reduction of social science to positivism and his relatively poor grasp of continental thinkers. A focus on modernization might have led him to the conceptual resources of the great sociological trio, Marx, Weber, and Durkheim, each of whom were concerned centrally with core aspects of modernity and modernization. Instead, he engages in the somewhat quixotic exercise of using fifth-century BCE Greek terms to address the clash of modernity and tradition in world politics.

It is not that these terms are not useful and enlightening. Rather, Lebow perhaps does not take seriously enough his own conceptual innovation. To introduce modernization to realist accounts of world politics is a major step forward, but modernization in ancient Greece is not what it is in modernity. Here, skepticism must be registered at Lebow's overdrawn claim of the "fundamental unity" of classical realism as found in Thucydides, Clausewitz, and Morgenthau. These last two worked within different but distinctly modern contexts, and finding similarities among all three comes at the cost of failing to attend to their great differences. Moreover, emphasizing their similarities also risks obscuring what they cannot provide: a serious social theory of modern world politics. Capitalism merits little discussion in Lebow or in his three thinkers; in more or less limited fashion, we get a glimpse of rationalizing processes through Morgenthau, but we are far better advised to turn to Weber himself. At a minimum, taking modernization and its disruptive and violent consequences seriously means turning to those thinkers who deal

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with imperialism, North-South relations, and the clash between the West and the rest. It is on such ground that a proper theory of world politics can be constructed, both for purposes of understanding and praxis.

The overall point here is that modernity and modernization must be given historical and social content on a world scale and their meaning critically interrogated, as Lebow does so well for the concepts employed by his three thinkers. The failure to take the sociology of modernity seriously, especially its understanding of mass society, modern power, and processes of subjectification, is evident in a rather unsuccessful analogy that Lebow draws in conclusion. He argues that contemporary "[g]lobal popular culture" (p. 377) may provide something of a functional equivalent to Athenian theater as a space for public debate, education, and edification. It is perhaps just a little tragic that a fine piece of scholarship should conclude on such a note.

–Tarak Barkawi

REVELATION AND POLITICS

Irvine H. Anderson: *Biblical Interpretation and Middle East Policy: The Promised Land, America, and Israel, 1917–2002.* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2005. Pp. x, 188. $39.95.)

As a theologian with an interest in politics, I offer here some comments to an author who is a political scientist and is attempting to examine certain theological concepts that he believes have shaped Middle East policy. I do not doubt Anderson's reading of the purely political forces that have held sway in formulating policy. However, I have serious reservations over his thesis, which is to take the Christian scriptures—classically understood as being the Old and New Testaments—as a guiding document for public policies on the development and sustenance of Israel as the Jewish national homeland initially promised to Abraham's descendents by God. I have three major reasons for this judgment.

First, I found Anderson's focus on use of biblical narrative by "fundamentalist" movements in America to be treated in the most cursory way. He passes over the ways in which biblical theology is often usurped and twisted, to say nothing of the transformation of the text into a political weapon. Instead, he describes how fundamentalists lift up certain passages from Genesis, Joshua, Daniel, and Revelation to establish connections between God and Israel and the importance of Israel for everyone else. He reads these books apart from the rest of the canon, not unlike the fundamentalists he describes.

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For the purpose of his study, a fundamentalist is one who goes beyond mere evangelicalism, which claims that scripture is authoritative and leads to individual salvation. Fundamentalism, by contrast, is a mode of biblical interpretation that holds that the text is not simply inerrant "in matters of faith and morals," it is also "a literal historical record" (p. 105). The contrast, I am afraid, is artificial. Quite apart from the common impulse to trust the text as being a datum of revelation, both the evangelical and fundamentalist are time-bound, that is, they construct their biblical hermeneutic against the backdrop of history. Recognition of this problem, so ably articulated by the late Hans Frei of Yale University in his book *Eclipse of Biblical Narrative*, places the biblical interpreter squarely in the clutches of post-Enlightenment culture, which is freighted by variegated traditions of British and American evangelicalism and fundamentalism.

What are we to make of Anderson's perspective on fundamentalism? It is found among mainline Protestants, especially Presbyterians, Methodists, Baptists, Seventh Day Adventists, and others. These groups and their peculiar minority subgroups tend to invoke a somewhat nebulous brand of millennialism—a general view of the not-so-distant return of Jesus Christ to earth accompanied by signs, including the coalition and conversion of some 144,000 Jews who will herald the end time. Of course, this view does not predominate, but there is a general perception among most Christian traditions that the importance of Judaism in the divine plan lies in its connection to the land of biblical Palestine. The Jews have a "Promised Land" and are deserving of rights to it; but the people of the new covenant are also drawn to Jerusalem because many consider it to be the doorway to redemption. Anderson does not critique these notions, but attempts to give them explanatory force for the kinds of decisions made over the creation of the State of Israel.

Second, Anderson finds that certain policymakers have "biblical predispositions" toward Judaism. In my view, there is insufficient connection made between some isolated references to the personal acceptance of biblical texts, or mere familiarity with them, and the rationale for their application in the policy realm. President Truman is a case in point. For most of his adult life, his biographers contend, Truman maintained membership in the Baptist church and knew his Bible well. This, Anderson claims, is one reason for his acknowledgment of the State of Israel in 1948 and a significant factor in the West's subsequent support of a Jewish state. To suggest that one's own personal reading of the Bible influences the direction of national foreign affairs is, I suppose, plausible, but it is hardly relevant or, in any case, well established. The truth is, we really have no way of knowing the extent to which the Bible had any direct or indirect impact on U.S.-Israeli relations, let alone a given individual's embrace of Zionism. Moreover, to highlight Truman's religiosity while ignoring the presidencies of religious men like John Kennedy, Jimmy Carter, and Ronald Reagan seems to open the author's method to some doubt. A predisposition is no guarantee that statecraft will be predictable.

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Third, Anderson's book in fact has very little to do with biblical interpretation or its centrality to the political enterprise in the United States or to Christian-Jewish relations in America. Indeed, so much of the book focuses on the development of the Sunday school movement in Britain and events leading up to and away from the Balfour Declaration, that one wonders if the author should have concentrated on England's policies toward the Promised Land of the Jews. When Anderson does focus on the American context, it is often difficult to see the relation between biblical interpretation on things like regional stability in Palestine and the Saudi peninsula or strategic advantages of supporting Arabs during the Cold War. The motivations for such policies seem very far removed from the biblical texts and their meanings.

To Anderson's credit, he does amass a significant body of polling data on contemporary American Protestants that suggests that within American culture there are tendencies to support Israel based on surface readings and inculcation of certain biblical stories. These are translated into political action by groups huddled under the umbrella of the Religious Right (pp. 108–110) or lobbying agencies such as the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (pp. 115–118). They have been assisted in cementing pro-Israel sentiment by, among other things, the Intifada itself, Hezbollah, Hamas, and Osama bin Laden. In the case of bin Laden, his anti-Christian (and hence, anti-biblical) rhetoric has stoked the fires of antipathy toward Islam and made things like Israel's security wall or the American "Patriot Act" seem to be both reasonable and necessary.

What little there is to commend Anderson's project, though, suffers under the weight of certain sins of omission. Though it is the largest single denomination in America there is very little reference made to Catholic support for Israel—though this is perhaps understandable given their tacit non-interventionism during the years of National Socialism in Germany and the anti-Jewish broadcasts of Father Charles Coughlin at home. Anti-semitism in America is never even mentioned; one wonders how influential the Bible has been on that subject. The leading American religious movement to promote understanding between faiths in the period Anderson studies—the National Conference for Christians and Jews (now the National Conference for Community and Justice)—is overlooked. Additionally, some of Anderson's assertions are false or tendentious. For instance, President Woodrow Wilson was not the head of Princeton Theological Seminary, but Princeton University (p. 61); use of the phrase "terrorist bands" (p. 71) as the author applies them to Arabs in 1936 would not have been part of the lexicon of the British, American, or Jewish participants in the struggle for Palestine at that time. It is owing to such infelicities that, Anderson's effort notwithstanding, the field of inquiry in this area remains wide open.

–Patrick J. Hayes

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TERROR AND DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE

Mark Sidel: *More Secure Less Free? Antiterrorism Policy & Civil Liberties after September 11.* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2004. Pp. 218, $27.95.)

Nicholas Jackson O'Shaughnessy: *Politics and Propaganda: Weapons of Mass Seduction.* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2005. Pp. viii, 264. $34.95.)

These two works take very different approaches to analyzing and understanding government and politics during the "War on Terror." Both provide comparative information on the United States and Britain. One approaches these topics from the perspective of constitutional law and civil liberties, the other from the perspective of communications and marketing.

The question posed in Mark Sidel's title is central to debates about the appropriate balance between security and openness in democracy. The work assumes that the waves of antiterrorism policy in the United States (and in Britain, Australia, and India) tip the balance too far toward government surveillance and the suspension of civil liberties. The main value of the work is as a first cut into the complicated topic of antiterrorism policy. Sidel's primary goal is to show that the continued pursuit of antiterrorism and national security policies after the "Patriot Act" has had chilling effects in civil society and that it has engendered strong resistance from ad hoc coalitions of traditional civil liberties advocates (especially the American Civil Liberties Union), libertarian organizations, and conservative interest groups associated with the political right.

The book is organized into six chapters and a brief conclusion. The opening chapter builds a historical context of government policies that have limited civil liberty and political dissent during national emergencies in the United States. The narrative ranges from the Sedition Act of 1798 through the "Patriot Act." This overly brief narrative is disappointing. Sidel fails to address a key question: Does contemporary antiterrorism policy break in important ways from policies undertaken in previous eras? The combination of an "imperial presidency," information age technology, and a "war" that is without a definitive end may be a recipe for the end of the modern republic. Sidel's summary of the judicial review of the treatment of detainees by the current Supreme Court (pp. 18–24) gives one the impression that the United States has made considerable progress in the protection of civil liberties since the Korematsu decision (p.7). If so, what is all the fuss about?

The next two chapters are the core of the work. As the Bush administration has sought to promote "Patriot Act II" and other aspects of the "second wave" of antiterrorism policies they have met politically effective coalitions of interest groups. These coalitions are often led by the ACLU, but include opinion leaders and interest groups on the political right. When national coalitions were successful in defeating federal initiatives like the Terrorism Information and Prevention System (p. 43) and Total Information

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Awareness (p. 50), the national government turned to the states in the hope of creating similar capacities via state initiatives. In case studies from California, Michigan, and New York, Sidel demonstrates that a pattern of coalition building similar to that at the national level impeded the devolution of surveillance and data mining policies to the states.

Chapters 5 and 6 illuminate the chilling effects that antiterrorism policies have had in the nonprofit sector and the academic community. Lobbying organizations for nonprofit charitable foundations were slow to react when the Justice Department began investigations and prosecutions of Muslim charities based in the United States after the attacks on September 11, 2001 (p. 90). Only when the Treasury Department issued "voluntary guidelines" for American nonprofits and philanthropic organizations engaged in international donations did the broader nonprofit sector mount serious opposition to the federal actions.

The chilling effects were felt more immediately in the academic community. The Bush administration's tightening of access to student visas and its mixed signals about federally funded research (especially its backtracking from a Reagan-era directive that promised no restrictions on the conduct and reporting of unclassified federally funded research, p. 130), have resulted in many students choosing to attend universities in other countries and have created confusion for scientists and universities who engage in federally funded research.

In a subsequent comparative chapter, Sidel discusses terrorism policies in Britain, Australia, and India. The main conclusion from the comparisons is that in each country a rush of legislation was enacted after the attacks on September 11, 2001 and the Bali bombings, and that legislation has been followed by waves of antiterrorism and security policy. In addition the ability of civil libertarian groups and conservative forces to build coalitions in opposition to the government is more evident in the United States than in the other cases.

Nicholas Jackson O'Shaughnessy is a specialist in political marketing from Great Britain. His work revives and redefines the concept of propaganda as a tool for contemporary political analysis. He must overcome the colloquial use of the concept as a term of opprobrium directed at techniques used by totalitarian governments (p. 2). One thing that this account lacks is a clear and simple statement of a definition. Instead the reader is introduced to the concept through the questioning of existing definitions, the identification of its essential components (p. 65), and the explanation of its integuments (p. 110). Since the focus of the book is political propaganda, it is worth noting that O'Shaughnessy sees the construction of an enemy, of an "other" to be dehumanized, as an integral part of the concept. This makes the argument problematic. If the term "propaganda" is to be used in an ethically neutral sense, one must then accept the notion that the dehumanization of other people is sometimes an acceptable strategy of persuasion. The author clearly does not.

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O'Shaughnessy then turns to three sources of propaganda in contemporary society, interest groups that he labels "single issue groups," political parties engaged in negative advertising, and the use of symbolic politics by governments (especially by Tony Blair and the Labour government in Great Britain). These cases all suggest a lack of familiarity with American political science, or perhaps hostility toward the concept of rationality that dominates political science research (p. 55). The reader hears clear but unacknowledged echoes of Murray Edelman's concept of the symbolic use of politics, Sidney Blumenthal's "permanent campaign," and the work of a host of scholars. This is not a damning criticism of the work but it reveals the extent to which the author is more persuaded by arguments from psychological and sociological perspectives than he is by the rationalist perspective of contemporary political science.

The final sections of the book deal with the use of propaganda in the "War on Terror." In fact the author means to argue that the war is propaganda in itself. The attack on the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001, is just an extension of the Al-Qaeda marketing campaign of Osama bin Laden. The appearance by President Bush on the deck of a United States aircraft carrier is the symbolic end of a symbolic war against a symbolic enemy. Herein lies the power of O'Shaughnessy's analysis. In an age dominated by visual imagery we must be aware of the way that governments and other political actors seek to control and manipulate through propaganda. Nevertheless, there is something unsatisfying about this account of propaganda. Despite O'Shaughnessy's defense of the term as a neutral tool of analysis, it seems impossible to separate it from its ethically negative connotations.

Both of these works raise important questions about the nature of contemporary democratic government, and that is a significant contribution in itself.

–Paul J. Cornish

OLD LESSONS NEVER LEARNED

Anthony James Joes: *Resisting Rebellion: The History and Politics of Counterinsurgency.* (Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 2004. Pp. 351. $35.00.)

The alliterative title of *Resisting Rebellion* precisely describes its message. Though Joes's explicit aim is "identifying valid counterinsurgency methods" (p. 7), he is ultimately unable to offer a foolproof technique. Instead we find maxims drawn from experience, limited by the contingencies of the cases from which they are drawn. Hence, we do not learn definitively what causes, or how to *defeat* rebellion. This is not a weakness,

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except for those who make burnt offerings to Theoretical Parsimony, and those oblivious to the inevitable ambiguities of practical judgment.

Joes is not anti-rebellion. Sometimes he sympathizes with insurgents, but he writes under an assumption that America will be called upon to intervene in a counterinsurgent role in an increasingly conflict-ridden world. He frankly acknowledges "a concern to save American lives, as well as the lives of the civilian populations among whom [counterinsurgent] methods will unfold" (p. 7). For Joes, then, a value-neutral political science would be otiose. The book is dedicated to his former students at the U.S. Army War College.

Joes's assumption of a conflict-ridden world will strike some, like Fouad Adjami or John R. Bowen, as unduly pessimistic. Joes points to Huntington's *Political Order in a Changing World*, and could point to recent literature, both popular and scholarly, for support. Whether the future is one of "clashing civilizations," a struggle between "jihad" and "McWorld," or a "coming anarchy" probably makes little difference to Joes's analysis, since he is concerned with "resisting rebellion" *tout court*. Still, since he stresses the political dimensions of counterinsurgency such as establishing civilian security and reconciling rebels to society, Joes's assumptions might have been made more explicit, as the difficulties of counterinsurgency seem to be exacerbated where civilian order and reconciliation are difficult to achieve.

The book's subtitle is also revealing. Joes gestures toward social scientific standards, seeking, for example, "replicable and non-trivial aspects common to successful or unsuccessful insurgencies and counterinsurgencies" (p. 7), but the book is historical and political. It is political in a double sense: one of its central theses is that insurgency is a political phenomenon; and, it seeks politically useful lessons to be drawn from an investigation of historic cases of counterinsurgency that "will range across five continents and from the eighteenth century Vendée to twenty-first century Chechnya" (p. 7).

The book is not, however, a "critical" history in F. H. Bradley's sense. Rather, it exemplifies the saying that knowledge of a tradition is "unavoidably knowledge of its detail: to know only the gist is to know nothing" (Oakeshott, "Political Education," in *Rationalism in Politics*, Liberty Press, p. 63). If the traditional past is "a vast storehouse" of useful images (Oakeshott, *On History*, Basil Blackwell, 1983, p. 39), it is unsurprising to find Joes seeking "an inventory of valid principles" (p. 103). This, then, is a detailed exploration of a practical past. For Joes, our traditional knowledge of insurgency/counterinsurgency has been hidden by the misleading but commonplace belief that insurgency is a Cold War (and later) phenomenon. He seeks to expand the field of relevant cases radically.

He provides "a comparative analysis of the counterinsurgency strategies of" the British, the French, the "Soviets/Russians, and others," including the United States, China, Portugal, and Japan (p. 6, cf., pp. 218–31). He goes beyond these major cases, discussing examples of insurgencies and counterinsurgencies in Mexico, the Philippines, Kashmir, El Salvador, Colombia,

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Vietnam, Tibet, Sudan, Afghanistan, Manchuria, and many others. The broad range of his study enables him to mount the implicit claims that insurgency and counterinsurgency are nothing new; and that European powers and their colonial offspring have a deep well of experiential knowledge from which to draw, if they will but look into it with clear eyes.

A reader can feel simultaneously awed by Joes's learning and mildly frustrated by the unevenness of its presentation. Several major cases are revisited in most chapters; some are infrequently and briefly mentioned. Oddly, in one of the most important chapters of the book, on "The Requirement of Rectitude," there is no case study, though several examples are touched upon, and a table is offered. By contrast, "Establishing Civilian Security" (chapter 6) has thirteen cases, the chapter on loyalists, ten. Perhaps Joes aims to inspire the kind of practical judgment required in politics, since a table is useless to anyone who does not know what its brief entries mean.

On the tactical and strategic front, Joes's findings seem uncontroversial: We need to understand that insurgent forces can lose every battle and win the war, because they are engaged in "a kind of attrition against the regime" (pp. 10–11). Intelligence is crucial to rooting out mobile, stealthy insurgents hiding among a civilian population. Providing civilian security is essential. A loyalist element in the population provides an "indigenous anti-insurgency." Eliminating foreign support for insurgents is a priority, including blocking access to foreign bases of operation. Religion and ideology are powerful motivators and must be considered in any counterinsurgent strategy. Rectitude is a requirement of any successful counterinsurgency; and, along with rectitude, amnesty in the treatment of prisoners is an effective practice. All these conclusions separately seem sensible; they are illustrated in the book with numerous well-chosen examples.

However, just as Joes offers no general theory of insurgency/counterinsurgency, he fails to offer—in the nature of things he cannot offer—any general plan of advice. Any of these many factors can play against the others so that the whole set of considerations has an "easier said than done" quality. How do you convince a population of your good intentions when they adhere to a different religion, or while you are building thousands of "blockhouses," cutting up their territory to sweep out insurgents? How do you cut off foreign sources of support at the same time that you provide civilian security? or display rectitude or grant amnesty while also using the necessary severity? or more precisely, when can you be sure that your prisoner, once released, will not rejoin his fellows, or that the enemy will not employ "false defectors" (p. 167) to infiltrate or supply disinformation?

Another problem stems from Joes's tactical, instrumental thinking about the "moral" and "political" dimensions of counterinsurgency: "The Benefits of Rectitude" summarizes one chapter; the title of the next is "The Utility of Amnesty." One wonders whether those motivated by the "benefits of rectitude" will conduct themselves in a way that wins the respect of the civilians among whom they operate; or, how such utilitarian conduct will

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be viewed in tribal, honor-based societies. Still, Joes's point is well taken; he never loses sight of the fact that firepower and funds will not win a "small war." He also espouses a non-utilitarian standard of ethical conduct, repeatedly stressing loyalty and abandonment, praising without consideration of costs or benefits those who do not abandon their friends, and blaming those that do (pp. 110, 115, 123, 127, 138, 141, 144).

On the political front: Joes argues that counterinsurgency requires an acceptable political solution in which justice is served, peace is established, the insurgents reintegrated into society, and legitimate elections are held to allow the people a method of expressing their will politically (pp. 24–29, cf. p. 233). However, Joes's attention to sufficient force levels and his advocacy of "clear and hold" tactics strongly suggest that achieving a political solution, which includes securing the civilian population, must very often require a massive commitment of troops. Yet he is also critical of the U.S. military's traditional preoccupation with overwhelming force (p. 6), and praises the British use of "flying columns" in the Boer War (p. 245), and the Marines' advisor units in Vietnam (pp. 115–16, 121, 181–4).

On the most controversial front, Joes debunks three prominent myths: that Afghanistan was the "Soviet's Vietnam," that our Vietnam was inherently unwinnable, and "the myth of Maoist revolution." The first debunking tries to free us from inappropriate comparisons to another country; the next tries to free us from a self-defeating myth about our failures. The third attempts to free us from a false belief about the nature of revolution: Our fight is never with "a people," but with aspiring elites exploiting instability for political gain. Thus, the successful counterinsurgent strategy must both stabilize and secure the country, and address the people's legitimate political grievances; these done, the guerillas' *raison d'être* evaporates.

Joes is especially concerned with the destructive (because incorrect) myth of Vietnam. Here, Joes is unlikely to persuade, even in spite of a spirited appendix on "A Strategy for a Viable South Vietnam." Interpretive armies clash by night, replaying a war that it has become cliché to declare irrelevant. Only in the fantasies of an historically unconscious people can an event barely thirty years old have no relevance to current affairs, so *kudos* to Joes for trying to reexamine the (so it is known) mother of all quagmires.

The discussions of Vietnam are refreshingly contrarian. However, Joes's larger project is to resuscitate America's traditional knowledge of insurgency and counterinsurgency. In this sense, the less controversial parts of the book are more valuable. Joes succeeds in showing that when we enter future conflicts, we are not entering new terrain. We have our own experience as "insurgents" in the Revolutionary War, our engagements in the Philippines, the Greek Civil War, the Huk rebellion, Vietnam, Afghanistan, and other cases to help us understand how to proceed. We can also draw from the experience of other nations, provided we do not make misleading analogies, as we have with the Soviets in Afghanistan, or misread a movement, as we have in China, Cuba, and elsewhere.

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The book has had the fortune (good or bad remains to be seen) to be published in 2004. Joes has written about these subjects for years, and it is likely that much of the book was drafted before the current campaign in Iraq began. Nevertheless, Joes includes a two-page Epilogue on Iraq, giving the book a topicality that otherwise would have remained entirely coincidental. Perhaps Joes will someday address Iraq at length, and revisit all his recommendations—the need for legitimate elections, civilian security, peace and justice, rectitude, amnesty, the usefulness of blockhouse lines, the control of outside support, the importance of intelligence, the role of elites, and separating leaders from their followers.

Resisting Rebellion's value goes well beyond understanding or ameliorating any present conflict. Joes has ambitiously tried to chart a course of conduct for the United States into an indefinite future by presenting the reader with a rich tapestry of historic images evoking past experience. Joes accepts without sentimentality or regret our current position in the world, and might well have said, *Spartam nactus es, hanc exorna*.

–Corey Abel

LOVING THE BOMB

Peter Goodchild: *Edward Teller: The Real Dr. Strangelove.* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004. Pp. xxv, 469. $29.95.)

Peter Goodchild's *Edward Teller: The Real Dr. Strangelove* is an engaging book that takes the reader to the junction of politics and science via the life of Edward Teller. In a 469-page book, we are efficiently led through Teller's childhood, such that by page 47, it is 1939, Teller is 31, and he is concerned about keeping research on fission secret so it does not get used by Nazi Germany. Putting world politics above science politics, he successfully fought against the scientific norm of publishing one's discoveries. By this time, Teller has studied under or worked with many of the greats in physics: Leo Szilard, Werner Heisenberg, Niels Bohr, Hans Bethe, Enrico Fermi, and Robert Oppenheimer—among several others. These are probably familiar names to the readers of this review, maybe because work on the atomic bomb bound many of them to work that was itself of major historic importance. Yet it is hard to read along and not think: is there such a great cohort of physicists today? Why not?

We also begin to get a sense of Teller's personality: helpful to colleagues, gentle, very hard working, determined, egotistic, and angry when frustrated. As World War II progresses, and the Cold War begins, we learn in often great detail about Teller's four main contributions and/or controversies. First, Teller was the driving force in building the hydrogen bomb—many times

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more powerful than the atomic bombs that destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Unlike many colleagues after the bombing of Japan, he immediately turned his mind to the Russians, and the need to continue improving atomic bomb technologies. Perhaps the most important scientist on the project, Teller was devoted to scientific progress and deterrence at any price, and pursued the H-bomb project without second thoughts.

Second, Teller testified in 1954 before the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission that Oppenheimer should not be trusted with nuclear secrets. This helped bring Oppenheimer's career to an end, and enraged many fellow scientists who defended Oppenheimer and thought he fell victim to a McCarthy-esque witch hunt. Indeed, Oppenheimer is so well covered that this occasionally detracts from the focus of the book. However, as the author of *J. Robert Oppenheimer: Shatterer of Worlds* (Houghton Mifflin, 1980), Goodchild has a lot to say.

Third, Teller's zeal for nuclear weapons was found in his opposition to the Limited Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty of 1963 that banned testing in the atmosphere, outer space, and under water. Teller was not alone in opposing the ban. However, after 500 atmospheric tests totaling 430 megatons of explosive power (Data from the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists website at <<http://www.thebulletin.org/article_nn.php?art_ofn=mj96norris>>), increasing public outcry about atmospheric tests, and increasing evidence about the harm of fallout, Teller's strident support for continued testing is indicative of his unwavering priorities. Teller's enthusiasm for nuclear bombs extended into "Project Plowshare" in which bombs would be used for digging canals and making diamonds. Similarly, Teller came to the defense of the nuclear industry after the Three Mile Island crisis.

Finally, Teller was instrumental in persuading President Reagan (and his advisors) to bolster U.S. efforts to pursue missile defense. This culminated in Reagan's March 23, 1983 speech announcing the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), or "star wars." It may be something no one can answer, but I still want to know more about why Reagan made his surprise SDI speech. Were there no more people to interview? Documents to obtain under the Freedom of Information Act? Maybe it is beyond the scope of a biography, but tying Teller even more directly to the decision would have been a coup for Goodchild who relied mostly on newspaper and other open sources in this section. That said, political scientists and historians will find this a useful book when delving into the history of the atomic bomb, the Cold War arms race, and the origins of the Strategic Defense Initiative. Teller went on to be a proponent of several missile defense technologies, especially the improbable x-ray laser which would use a nuclear bomb to power multiple x-ray lasers, precisely aimed to knock out numerous warheads or missiles at once.

This book has several strengths. First, it enjoys the science Teller worked on (if not the atom weapons). Those with an interest will learn about bomb design and other technical issues Teller confronted. There are

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even three short appendices on the history of quantum physics, the history of fission, and scientific formulas for atomic reactions. This is not a psycho-social biography. The focus is on Teller's science, and especially his influence on politics. Caveat emptor though: another review of this book (Jeremy Bernstein, in *The Nation*) says that "Goodchild's scientific misunderstandings are too numerous to mention them all." Second, this book is fairly objective, even though Goodchild admits it is hard to be objective about Teller. Goodchild is rightfully skeptical about Teller's recountings of events, which increasingly veered into the self-serving. However, there is no sense that Goodchild was out to do a hatchet-job. Third, the reporting is fairly thorough and well-documented. Goodchild interviewed forty friends, family, and colleagues of Teller, and Teller himself over the course of four afternoons. The author also exploited a number of archival libraries throughout the United States and in London.

In the end, was Edward Teller the real Dr. Strangelove? It depends on what one means by Dr. Strangelove. There are four meanings of Dr. Strangelove that may apply: the overall film, and three of its characters: Dr. Strangelove, General Buck Turgidson, and General Jack D. Ripper. In thinking about the film, its general theme is to underscore, in an absurdly comedic rendering, the seriously absurd nuclear standoff between the Soviet Union and the United States. In 1964 when the film was released, the United States had almost 31,000 nuclear weapons, while the Soviets had just over 5,000. Reality closely mimicked the doomsday device in the film (stockpiles peaked in 1986, with U.S. holdings of 23,000 and the Soviets at 41,000 <<http://www.thebulletin.org/article_nn.php?art_ofn=nd02norris>>). When most people think of the film, this is probably the first overall reaction: Kubrick has used comedy to help make us aware that we really do face a doomsday device. However, there is little comedy in Edward Teller from what Goodchild recounts. So if Teller is not Dr. Strangelove the film, is he Dr. Strangelove the character?

Dr. Strangelove, the character, is from the "Bland" (Rand) corporation and is the quintessential early Cold War civilian analyst. Aside from his comedic and perhaps suggestive battle to control his Nazi past, Strangelove is a rational, and utterly unemotional calculator. That rationalism is both the solution to and cause of the absurd cold war. If everyone were rational, nuclear war would not happen. Yet it is through rational small steps that the world got up to 65,000 nuclear weapons (we are now at about 20,000). That said, it was Strangelove who most thoroughly understood the tragedy. Dr. Strangelove rejected the doomsday device. Dr. Strangelove figured out how to save a nucleus of humanity. In contrast, Teller was so enthusiastic about nuclear weapons that he is no Dr. Strangelove. From concocting improbable "civilian" reasons to pursue new nuclear weapons designs to advocating the X-ray laser, Teller was a nuclear enthusiast, much more than he was a strategist.

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Teller was also consumed with hatred for the Soviet Union. Here, he deserves some credit. As a member of the card-carrying arms-control community in the early 1980s when President Reagan launched the SDI, I joined my colleagues in dismay and scoffing when President Reagan called the Soviet Union an Evil Empire. But it was. The familiar facts are that the Soviets killed 20 million of their own citizens, and ran a horrible authoritarian government over its 70 years. Now we know they raped 2 million East German women during their occupation. But the most evil thing of all is that they employed 60,000 people to develop biological weapons after signing the Biological Weapons Convention. I can imagine nothing worse on earth than a massive offensive biological weapons program. Many people think Teller (and Reagan) were paranoid, and one can differ over how to have dealt with the Soviets, but the Soviet Union was evil (while filled with mostly normal, life-loving, constructive people). Teller was also more astute than many of his comrades in keeping secrets from the Nazis.

Teller is really the next two characters: the militaristic Turgidson and paranoid Ripper. Dr. Strangelove knew a doomsday device was crazy; Turgidson wanted a U.S. doomsday device: "Gee, I wish we had one of them doomsday machines." In his enthusiasm for things nuclear, one can almost imagine Teller wanting such a thing despite its ... redundancy. To a lesser extent, we can see some Ripper in Teller. And even though the Soviets were evil, and far worse than an often expedient or worse U.S., Teller did in fact pursue policies such as missile defense and opposition to the test ban which were arguably counterproductive during the Cold War.

The bottom line is that this is a fine book with a misleading title. Comparing Teller to the rational, calculating character of Dr. Strangelove is an insult to Dr. Strangelove.

–Dan Lindley

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