comme la discipline); le naturaliste (la chasse et l'élevage agricole témoignent d'une relation étroite entre l'être humain et la nature); celui de la tradition (certaines formes d'exploitation animale comme le foie gras ou les combats de coqs sont traditionnelles); l'abili esthétique (certaines pratiques, comme la corrida, sont appréciables en raison de leur beauté artistique); l'économique (l'exploitation d'animaux doit être maintenue sous peine d'entraîner un désastre économique); le thérapeutique (la vivisection permet de soigner les gens) et, enfin, l'alibi éducatif (les cirques et les zoos, par exemple, permettent d'instruire les visiteurs sur le monde animal).

Il dévoile également les stratagèmes utilisés pour tenter «d'entraver notre opposition naturelle à l'exploitation animale», que sont la négation des torts causés, le découpage des responsabilités et la dévalorisation de la sympathie (interprétée comme de la sensiblerie) pour les animaux. En dénonçant tous ces mécanismes de défense de la domination et de l'oppression, l'auteur nous aide à être mieux en mesure de départager les arguments valables des sophismes, de comprendre le conditionnement se trouvant derrière la réticence générale face à la reconnaissance de l'égalité animale et de révéler le caractère défaillant de certains raisonnements mis de l'avant par les opposants au respect.

Éthique animale permet autant au lecteur néophyte de découvrir et de comprendre les principaux enjeux d'une discipline nouvelle, qu'au lecteur initié d'améliorer ses connaissances des idées et des faits. Le livre de Jeangène Vilmer réussit, en dépit du fait que la question animale soit sujette à de vives controverses, à faire la démonstration de la nécessité de modifier largement notre façon de traiter les animaux d'autres espèces.

VALÉRY GIROUX *Université de Montréal*

Mental Causation: A Nonreductive Approach

NEIL CAMPBELL

New York: Peter Lang, 2008, 113 pp.
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Neil Campbell, in his book *Mental Causation: A Nonreductive Approach*, attempts to demonstrate how Donald Davidson's theory of anomalous monism "succeeds at providing an account of mental causation" (p. 5). An exposition of this sort is both timely and valuable, as anomalous monism has largely fallen out of favour as a workable model.

Campbell begins his study by considering and rejecting the Cartesian account of mental causation (p. 9-13). Descartes thinks an immaterial mind interacts with the body, but causal closure suggests that "nothing outside the physical domain can affect the physical domain" (p. 3). Partly for this reason, Campbell argues that we should embrace a physicalist account which locates mental events within the physical domain (p. 9). One such physicalist account is anomalous monism, which states that mental events are token identical with physical events, but mental descriptions of the event cannot collapse into the physical description (p. 22-4).

In Chapter Two, Campbell outlines three objections that anomalous monism faces. The Causal Relevance objection says that on anomalous monism the "mental as mental" (p. 27) does not have causal efficacy. Rather, since causal laws pertain to the physical description

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of the event alone, it is the "mental as physical" (p. 28) which has causal power. The Accidental Connection problem claims that any connection that a mental type has to a physical type will be brute and accidental, for there are no psychophysical laws to necessarily relate them (p. 31). Finally, the Exclusion argument states that an event can have only one sufficient cause (p. 36). Given closure, every event has a sufficient physical cause in terms of its physical properties. Any additional mental cause can be excluded.

Chapter Three presents a detailed reply to the Causal Relevance objection. According to Campbell, this objection springs from a metaphysical picture which Davidson does not endorse (p. 40). Namely, it assumes that events cause *as* mental, or *as* physical. Or, in other words, it assumes that events cause in virtue of physical properties, or mental properties. Davidson, on the contrary, is a nominalist about properties, so he cannot think that events cause in virtue of physical properties or mental properties (p. 43). This objection, therefore, "misfires" (p. 50). For Davidson, events do not cause *as* mental, or *as* physical, they simply cause.

Chapter Four offers a response to the second and third objections. Davidson endorses a version of supervenience which involves predicates supervening on predicates (p. 53). We will, therefore, find a dependency relation between mental and physical descriptions in Davidson's work on interpreting sentences. Ascribing mental predicates to people depends on our physical environment, so the two vocabularies are intimately related (p. 55). We could surely add here that physical and mental predicates are also related because they both describe the same event. As for the exclusion argument, Davidson is immune to this problem on account of his nominalism. Mental descriptions do no causal work, nor do physical descriptions, rather it is bare events that do all of the causal work (p. 63). Davidson rejects the assumptions that generate the exclusion problem. Davidson's nominalism helps him to dodge all of the problems that befell anomalous monism (p. 64).

Having re-established anomalous monism as a viable model of mental causation, Campbell turns to the model of explanation that arises from anomalous monism. He argues that mental explanations are distinct from causal explanations (p. 65). Mental explanations "[improve our] epistemic situation" (p. 76) by appealing to rationality and normativity (p. 78). On the contrary, causal explanations provide understanding by appealing to the regularity of generalizations (p. 79). We can, then, have two different explanations for one event. Jaegwon Kim, however, argues that there can be no more than a single explanation for a given event (p. 83). This principle of explanatory exclusion, however, faces a problem. Namely, it is founded on the principle of explanatory realism, which states that the content of an explanation is the objective causal relation between two events (p. 84). But, this means that it doesn't matter how these events are described, non-equivalent descriptions will still state the same thing (p. 84). And this, in turn, means that the statement 'the event that caused the collapse of the bridge caused the collapse of the bridge' says the same thing as the statement 'the hurricane caused the collapse of the bridge.' The problem is that the former provides no epistemic advance, so it cannot be an explanation, even though it is on Kim's explanatory realism. A Kimian could respond to Campbell by saying that these statements do not refer to the same properties of the event, so they do not state the same thing. Alternatively, it is not clear that undermining explanatory realism suffices to invalidate explanatory exclusion. We could, for example, still appeal to Ockham's razor to dismiss multiple explanations of one event.

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In sum, *Mental Causation* is a clear and thorough defence of anomalous monism. It leaves anomalous monism on a stronger footing than it began with, and clearly articulates the reason why anomalous monism is immune to the common objections raised against it. There are, however, several reasons to pause before returning to the Davidsonian account. First of all, the central line of defence Campbell uses is to claim that Davidson is a nominalist. Whether or not Davidson is a nominalist is a contested issue. Not only does Davidson continue to speak of properties (Davidson, 1993, p. 7), but his critics assume he believes in properties (Kim, 1993, p. 21). Given what is riding on Davidson's acceptance of nominalism, a strong case that Davidson is a nominalist would be beneficial. Campbell mentions several texts where Davidson insists that we must speak of mental descriptions rather than properties (p. 40; p. 44), and an argument that Davidson understands supervenience in terms of predicates (p. 53). But this evidence is not overwhelming. He could have addressed why Davidson continues to speak about properties when he actually only has predicates in mind. He could have also pointed to additional texts where Davidson acknowledges his nominalism.

More profoundly, many will find Davidson's theory unsatisfactory for the precise reason that Campbell offers up as vindication for the theory. Namely, many think that properties do exist, and many think the discussion surrounding mental causation can only be understood in terms of the causal status of mental properties. Davidson, however, solves the problem of mental causation by simply saying that properties don't exist. Campbell, likewise, responds to the various objections by relying on the fact that properties don't exist. Surely, many who include properties in their ontology will consider this question-begging. Granted, the possibility of providing a successful account of mental causation is one motivation for abandoning properties. However, properties have numerous other benefits: they serve nicely as theory-independent counterparts to our predicates and generalizations, which generates a robust realism. They also help to explain the recurrences found in nature, while property instances serve as truthmakers for our sentences. Perhaps Campbell is aware of some of the appeal of properties, for he confesses "Kim's thesis is more exotic than Davidson's and does not require one to accept what might seem an unpalatable nominalism" (p. 58). Campbell, therefore, could have strengthened his case by discussing the virtues he sees in nominalism.

These issues notwithstanding, Campbell offers up a spirited and persuasive reply to those who dismiss anomalous monism with too much haste. His vindication of anomalous monism represents a significant advance in the discussion on mental causation.

DWAYNE MOORE *Wilfrid Laurier University*

The Philosophy of Edmund Husserl: A Historical Development

J. N. MOHANTY

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The caliber of Mohanty's work is well known among Husserl scholars; the depth of his insights, his amazing clarity concerning even the most perplexing of materials, and his dedication to be as objective as possible with Husserl's ideas and the comments or interpretations offered by critics, are all things we come to expect of Mohanty and all are

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