9

The rejection of apocalyptic foreign policy

Contrary to all expert predictions, however, the States General decided to send Jongstall and Nieupoort back to England, armed with fresh instructions. Hopes and expectations for peace soared. "Is it any wonder that I am fallen from my confidence that there will be no peace," Edward Hyde whined to Edward Nicholas, "and can you ask me the reason, when you tell me your intelligence from England assures you that they will recede from all their extravagant propositions, and that that the people of Holland will grant anything [asked]?"[1] What had precipitated such a dramatic change in the course of events?

Traditionally historians have explained this change by highlighting the conciliatory effect of Cromwell's private meetings with the Dutch deputies.[2] Though there can be no doubt that Cromwell did meet with the Dutch deputies – especially with the republican Beverning – and that he spoke enthusiastically about what the Dutch and English could achieve together if allied, one should not overestimate his enthusiasm for peace without security before the autumn of 1653. In the much-discussed conferences with Beverning in St. James's Park, Cromwell expressed his "opinion that there must be one supreme authority to have the direction of all matters relating to the strict union for mutual defense of both states against all external enemies." To Beverning's protestations that such an alliance would invalidate all other Dutch treaties, Cromwell mockingly replied that the Dutch were willing to cast aside their French allies at Munster in 1648. Beverning concluded that Cromwell "hath no mind to

1 *Faithful Scout*, 21–28 October 1653, p. 1065; *Weekly Intelligencer*, 18–25 October 1653, p. 31; *Mercurius Politicus*, 13–20 October 1653, pp. 2806–2807; *The Perfect Diurnall*, 17–24 October 1653, p. 3082; Whitelocke, *Annals*, BL, Add. 4992, f. 44r; Bordeaux to de Brienne, 24 October/3 November 1653, PRO, PRO 31/3/92, f. 1v; Hyde to Clement, 20/30 October 1653, Bod., Clar. 46, f. 355r; Hyde to Nicholas, 11/21 November 1653, Bod., Clar. 47, f. 63v.

2 This explanation was originally advanced by S. R. Gardiner in *History of the Commonwealth and Protectorate 1649–1656* (New York, 1965), as discussed in Chapter 6. Recently Austin Woolrych has endorsed this view (*Soldiers and Statesmen* [Oxford, 1987]), p. 281.

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moderate anything."[3] In this Beverning had surely gone too far. Cromwell did soften his position on the nature of the coalition. "I am informed underhand," Beverning admitted to Nieupoort, "that if we would agree to an union after the same form as we have in the United Provinces ourselves, that we should be soon agreed." Such a union, Hyde rightly explained to Lord Wentworth, required the Dutch to "consent to an utter suppression of the House of Orange, as well as to the renouncing of any compliance with our master."[4] Cromwell had not committed himself and his political allies to peace at any cost. Instead Cromwell had made it clear to the Dutch that he was ready to contemplate peace should there be evidence of significant change in the Dutch domestic political situation.

The improved prospects of peace derived rather from two parallel developments in the early autumn. In the United Provinces the return of the two deputies from England in August had provoked extensive discussions over the future of the Anglo-Dutch negotiations. Not surprisingly the debates divided along party lines. There is "hard tugging between the Prince's party and the Loevesteen Heeren," observed one Dutch merchant, if the Loevesteen "party get the better of it ... we may happily have peace with England, whereas the other will continue a war in maintenance of consanguinity with him." Peter De Groot, whose father had long suffered for his adherence to the States party, reported to Beverning that the Orangists "do apprehend that in the end some good treaty do not destroy the pernicious maxims which they do foment to the contrary." "The Royal and Orange party endeavor to infuse in [the States General] a diffidence of you," sneered one republican observer, "but the wiser sort laugh at it."[5] The peace "is carried on by them that would extirpate our royal family and the House of Orange," the Presbyterian Royalist James Bence wrote to his fellow Royalist the Marquis of Ormonde. More surprisingly, the republican party succeeded in persuading the States of Holland to vote for the return of the deputies, and the continuation of the treaty. Apparently the Holland regents based their optimism "chiefly" on the grounds "that the Parliament was now inclined to treat without a coalition." The Holland order, in fact,

3 Beverning to Nieupoort, 12/22 August 1653, Bod., Rawl. A5, pp. 123–124; Beverning to Jongstall, 12/22 August 1653, Bod., Rawl. A5, p. 102; Beverning to Lord of Amersongen, 12/22 August 1653, Bod., Rawl. A5, p. 101; newsletter from The Hague, 25 August/4 September 1653, Bod., Clar. 46, f. 205r; newsletter from The Hague, 26 August/5 September 1653, Bod., Rawl. A5, pp. 281–283.

4 Beverning to Nieupoort, 19/29 August 1653, Bod., Rawl. A5, p. 212; Beverning to Jongstall, 19/29 August 1653, Bod., Rawl. A5, p. 211; Hyde to Wentworth, 28 August/7 September 1653, Bod., Clar. 46, f. 215r; Paulucci to Sagredo, 14/24 August 1653, *CSPV*, pp. 115–116.

5 Peterson to Coopman, 9/19 September 1653, Bod., Rawl. A6, p. 183; De Groot to Beverning, 9/19 September 1653, Bod., Rawl. A6, p. 182; intelligence from Holland, September 1653, Bod., Rawl. A6, p. 53; newsletter from United Provinces, September 1653, Bod., Rawl. A6, p. 276. Loevesteen was the name ascribed to the republican party in the United Provinces.

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emphasized "the inconveniences and the impossibilities which the project of coalition" offered by the English entailed. The objection, it is essential to note, was with the mingling of sovereignties, not with a close alliance. In place of the coalition the Dutch deputies were to offer "a near and strict alliance and confederacy between the two states with such uniting of both as hath ever been practiced between any two neighboring sovereign states."[6]

Once the States of Holland had established its position, the Hollanders made every effort to convince the other provinces. They soon despatched "some rhetoricians and logicians to persuade persons refractory out of their affection to the prince." In the States General the deputies of Holland drummed home the necessity of peace. Despite the other provinces' well-known detestation of the English, at least one observer was "confident the Province of Holland will carry the vote against all the rest."[7] Such confidence was not unmerited. Province after province brought in their votes in favor of continuing the treaty, invariably justifying their decision upon the claim that "there are several of the government there [that] are inclined to peace." "All the provinces (even they which had voted so directly for a war and the recalling the two ambassadors at London)," reported one enthusiastic witness with some exaggeration, "agreed that a new trial was to be made by new addresses to the Commonwealth." In fact, only Orangist Groningen stood out, powerless to prevent the return of the deputies.[8] Naturally the other provinces did not approach the renewal of the treaty with the same enthusiasm as that of the States of Holland – that could hardly be expected. Despite the States General's insistence that the deputies

6 Newsletter from United Provinces, 17/27 September 1653, Bod., Rawl. A6, pp. 281–282; Bordeaux to de Brienne, 29 August/8 September 1653, PRO, PRO 31/3/91, f. 88v; extract from secret resolutions of States of Holland, 8/18 September 1653, Bod., Rawl. A6, pp. 84–89; advice of Province of Holland, 8/18 September 1653, Bod., Clar. 46, f. 237r; newsletter from The Hague, 22 September/2 October 1653, Bod., Rawl. A6, p. 339; James Bence to Ormonde, 17/27 November 1653, Bod., Clar. 47, f. 80v.

7 Peterson to Coopman, 23 September 1653, Bod., Rawl. A6, p. 265; Letter from The Hague, 29 September/9 October 1653, Bod., Rawl. A6, p. 432.

8 Extract from Register of Overijssel, 24 September/4 October 1653, Bod., Rawl. A6, p. 398; Extract from Register of States of Gelderland, 24 September/4 October 1653, Bod., Rawl. A6, pp. 396–397; De Witt to Beverning, 30 September/10 October 1653, Bod., Rawl. A6, p. 461; newsletter from The Hague, 6/16 October 1653, Bod., Clar. 46, f. 314r; newsletter from The Hague, 6/16 October 1653, Bod., Clar. 46, f. 315r; Vryberge to Van De Perre, 7/17 October 1653, Bod., Rawl. A7, p. 43; newsletter from The Hague, 14/24 October 1653, Bod., Rawl. A7, pp. 129, 144–145; extract from notes of Zeeland, September 1653, Bod., Rawl. A6, p. 395; De Witt to Beverning, 7/17 October 1653, Bod., Rawl. A7, p. 40; newsletter from United Provinces, 14/24 October 1653, Bod., Rawl. A7, p. 137; newsletter from the United Provinces, 28 October/7 November 1653, Bod., Rawl. A7, pp. 262–263; De Bruyne to Van De Perre, 28 October/7 November 1653, Bod., Rawl. A7, p. 272; Peterson to Coopman, 4/14 November 1653, Bod., Rawl. A8, p. 26 newsletter from The Hague, 10/20 November 1653, Bod., Clar. 47, f. 61r; newsletter from The Hague, 13/23 October 1653, Bod., Clar. 46, f. 335v.

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not conclude "anything beyond the 36 Articles," they had at least kept open the possibility of peace.[9]

There were parallel and reinforcing developments in England in the early autumn of 1653. From the beginning of September the Dutch deputies began sending reports that England "is inclined and well resolved to treat." From "their intimate friends," Beverning and Van De Perre had heard "that England now desires nothing more than an accommodation, and the friends advise them to make use of that opportunity." "I hope we shall not let slip this fair opportunity," Beverning hinted to De Witt, "now the humors here are so well disposed." "This state omits nothing to bring this war with Holland to a conclusion," agreed the French ambassador Bordeaux in the middle of October.[10] This new attitude was not manifest only in popular opinion. "Parliament, Council of State, and Lord General Cromwell, desire more than ever a peace with this state," reported one commentator. When the Venetian resident pressed the well-connected Sir Oliver Fleming on the possibilities of peace, he responded: "I fancy it will come." "The Lord General himself is more moderate," Beverning wrote to De Witt. "Those of the government were much inclined to treat and ... Cromwell had with great oaths protested that he desired nothing more and that he was willing that the word coalition should be no more named, by which he never understood to have any superiority over this state, but only thereby to live in the better correspondence with one another," Van De Perre's son reported on his return to The Hague in October.[11]

The English had not abandoned their war aims; they had not decided to "accept of a shitten peace" as one Royalist observer thought. Though "the general is hugely inclinable to [peace], if anything (that he calls reasonable) will serve the Dutch," it was well known that "otherwise he resolves to make a vast treasure (however he comes by it) to carry on the war with vigor." Rather, Cromwell and his political allies had become more enthusiastic about the possibilities of an Anglo-Dutch alliance. It was in this

[9] Newsletter from The Hague, 11/21 October 1653, Bod., Rawl. A7, p. 100b; newsletter from The Hague, 12/22 October 1653, Bod., Rawl. A7, p. 100c.

[10] Newsletter from United Provinces, 30 September/10 October 1653, Bod., Rawl. A6, p. 448; Van de Perre to de Bruyne, 30 September/10 October 1653, Bod., Rawl. A6, p. 471; intelligence from The Hague, 3 October 1653, Nickolls, *Original Letters*, p. 104; Beverning to Nieupoort, 7/17 October 1653, Bod., Rawl. A7, p. 46; Beverning to De Witt, 7/17 October 1653, Bod., Rawl. A7, p. 48; Bordeaux to de Brienne, 13/23 October 1653, PRO, PRO 31/3/91, ff. 110r, 112v; newsletter from The Hague, 14/24 October 1653, Bod., Rawl. A7, pp. 129–130; Bordeaux to de Brienne, 17/27 October 1653, PRO, PRO 31/3/91, f. 116r; newsletter from The Hague, 20/30 October 1653, Bod., Clar. 46, f. 359r.

[11] Van De Perre to Max Teelinck, 9/19 September 1653, Bod., Rawl. A6, p. 184; intelligence from The Hague, 16 October 1653, Nickolls, *Original Letters*, p. 104; Paulucci to Sagredo, 20/30 October 1653, *CSPV*, p. 141; newsletter from United Provinces, 9/19 September 1653, Bod., Rawl. A6, p. 160; Bordeaux to de Brienne, 19/29 September 1653, PRO, PRO 31/3/91, f. 100r; newsletter from The Hague, 29 September/9 October 1653, Bod., Clar. 46, f. 300r; newsletter from The Hague, 13/23 October 1653, Bod., Clar. 46, f. 335r.

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context that Beverning received the proposal for a vast Protestant alliance against all nations that "received the Council of Trent." In the proposed treaty each commonwealth would always "be governed by their own laws independent from one another." But there was to be a joint navy and a permanent Anglo-Dutch board of arbitrators.[12] At least some English politicians were looking forward to an Anglo-Dutch alliance with the same enthusiasm which lay behind the 1651 mission of St. John and Strickland.

The Dutch deputies attributed the altered English attitude to the political decline of the religious radicals. "The credit of Major General Harrison and of the Anabaptists doth lessen," Van De Perre wrote to his fellow Zeelander De Bruyn, "which may be held for one of the chiefest reasons of the ... change and melioration." "It is certain," Beverning agreed, "that the credit of Harrison and that faction of Anabaptists is now going down, who have been most against us."[13] No doubt, the reemergence of the ideological divisions between the radicals and their more moderate colleagues was a significant development. But why had that happened? Why had Cromwell suddenly become so optimistic about the possibility of putting an end to the war, and the conclusion of an Anglo-Dutch alliance? Indeed, how had the Holland republicans been able to persuade their compatriots to continue the peace negotiations? The answer to these questions lies in the sudden transformation of Dutch politics in the late summer and early autumn of 1653.

The death of the Orangist Vice-Admiral Van Tromp off the Texel in August 1653 proved a decisive setback for the Orangist cause. An ideological struggle immediately began over the appointment of Tromp's successor. "There is great canvassing at The Hague about the creation of a new Admiral," the *Mercurius Politicus* informed its readers, "touching which point they are not able to pitch yet upon any one person that might give content to all parties, but they are much divided." "The death of Admiral Tromp has somewhat upset matters in Holland," the Venetian ambassador Sagredo had learned from his Parisian vantage point, "and produced division among the provinces."[14]

After much dispute Jacob van Wassenaer, Lord of Opdam, accepted the

[12] Newsletter from London, 10/20 October 1653, Bod., Rawl. A7, p. 534; newsletter from London, 14 October 1653, Bod., Clar. 46, f. 346r; newsletter from United Provinces, Bod., Rawl. A7, p. 140; newsletter from London, 7 October 1653, Bod., Clar. 46, f. 328r; newsletter from The Hague, 29 September/9 October 1653, Bod., Rawl. A6, p. 458; Bordeaux to de Brienne, 24 October/3 November 1653, PRO, PRO 31/3/92, f. 1v. This proposal has been linked by Gardiner to the undated proposal advanced by Vermuyden, *History of the Commonwealth*, Vol. III, pp. 48, 50. This identification has been accepted by Austin Woolrych, *Soldiers and Statesmen*, pp. 283–284. Although the two proposals are very similar, the emphasis on the fear of universal monarchy in the Vermuyden proposal suggests that it may date to December or early January.

[13] Van De Perre to De Bruyne, 30 September/10 October 1653, Bod., Rawl. A6, p. 472; Beverning to De Witt, 30 September/10 October 1653, Bod., Rawl. A6, pp. 464–465.

[14] *Mercurius Politicus*, 25–31 August 1653, p. 2701; Sagredo to Doge and Senate, 30 August/9 September 1653, *CSPV*, p. 124; newsletter from The Hague, 25 August/4 September

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post of Lieutenant-Admiral of Holland, making him Tromp's heir as *de facto* leader of the Dutch naval war effort.[15] No greater victory for the republican cause could have been imagined. Early in the summer Opdam was heard to exclaim "the devil take all those who are for the Prince of Orange." He was well known to be "a complete Hollander, yea a head" and "an arch enemy of the Orange party and the King of Scots." This was no passing political fancy. In the 1660s Sir Henry Bennet's notorious spy Colonel Bampfield noted that Opdam "is very deeply engaged in the interests of Monsieur De Witt and that party."[16] Not surprisingly the Orangists had left no stone unturned to prevent Opdam's nomination. "The Prince's party do cross and endeavor all what they can to hinder the Lord of Opdam from accepting the charge of admiral," wrote one of Thurloe's many Dutch informants."[17]

Opdam immediately began to refashion the Dutch navy in his own image. The transformation of the Dutch fleet was as sudden as it was dramatic. Ship after ship was renamed after a suitable republican virtue in place of the traditional names of the Princes of the House of Orange. This newly republicanized fleet under Opdam's leadership did not seek to give battle at every opportunity as Van Tromp had done. In order "not to give any cause of a new provocation for a revenge by a new engagement," Opdam decided in October to deploy his fleet in the Sound. Later that month when some hotheads had proposed to blockade the Thames, the admiralty of the Province of Holland prevented the scheme on the grounds that it "might give offense to the English and hinder the treaty of peace whereof there was now so good appearance" – hardly a decision they would have taken had Tromp been admiral.[18] All of the hopes of the Royalists "are squashed,"

1653, Bod., Clar. 46, f. 205r; newsletter from United Provinces, 20 August 1653, NMM, WYN/7/11.

15 *Mercurius Politicus*, 22–29 September 1653, p. 2765; Letter to Van De Perre, 26 August/5 September 1653, Bod., Rawl. A5, p. 268; newsletter from The Hague, 8/18 September 1653, Bod., Clar. 46, f. 258r; extract from Register of States of Holland and West Friesland, 12/22 September 1653, Bod., Rawl. A6, p. 227; Herbert H. Rowen, *John De Witt, Grand Pensionary of Holland, 1625–1672* (Princeton, 1978), pp. 194–195.

16 Van Ruyven to Hyde, 16/26 June 1653, Bod., Clar. 45, f. 495r (my translation); newsletter from United Provinces, 9/19 September 1653, Bod., Rawl. A6, pp. 98–99, 143; Peterson to Coopman, 15 September 1653, Bod., Rawl. A6, p. 265; Royalist newsletter, 16/26 September 1653, Bod., Rawl. A6, p. 272; Letter from Van Ruyven, 1/11 September 1653, Bod., Clar. 46, f. 220v; Bampfield to Bennet, 7/17 July 1663, PRO, SP 84/167, f. 186. On Bampfield's fascinating career, see John Loftis and Paul H. Hardacre, *Colonel Joseph Bampfield's Apology* (Lewisburg, 1993).

17 Newsletter from United Provinces, 9/19 September 1653, Bod., Rawl. A6, pp. 161–162; V. Hoogh to Van De Perre, 9/19 September 1653, Bod., Rawl. A6, p. 178; newsletter from The Hague, 18/28 September 1653, Bod., Rawl. A6, p. 306; newsletter from The Hague, 2/12 September 1653, Bod., Rawl. A6, pp. 49–50.

18 Rowen, *John De Witt*, p. 197; newsletter from United Provinces, 14/24 October 1653, Bod., Rawl. A7, pp. 140–141; newsletter from The Hague, 27 October/6 November 1653, Bod., Clar. 47, f. 15r; newsletter from United Provinces, 28 October/7 November 1653,

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wrote one very perceptive newsmonger. "As Tromp by his impudence or malice was the cause of the war," concurred another, "so likewise it is hoped that Opdam (a true Hollander) will be the cause of peace."[19]

Gaining control of the post of admiral was only the first of a whole series of political victories for the States party in the autumn of 1653. Enckhuysen, whose Orangist leaders hoped to "have given example to other towns and consequently to have cried up the Prince of Orange for captain," was the first target of the newly invigorated States party's political strategy. The republicans, after sneaking nine companies of foot soldiers into the city, proceeded to lead a counter-revolution against the newly seated Orangist magistrates, and retake the North Holland town.[20] Just as the Orangists had hoped the political revolution in Enckhuysen would spearhead an Orangist offensive throughout Holland and ultimately throughout the United Provinces, so the States party was certain that its success in Enckhuysen would set a powerful precedent. This "doth satisfy all men," asserted one observer, "that Holland will continue in the condition they are in at present and never submit themselves to the prince or the said count [William] as his lieutenant nor suffer themselves to be destroyed by tumults." The demise of Enckhuysen's Orangists "who were the ringleaders of the Orange faction," mourned one Royalist, "will prejudice our expectations and dash our hopes."[21]

The combination of the recapture of Enckhuysen and the establishment of a republican admiral consolidated the power of De Witt and the States party. "Since the reducing of Enckhuysen," the *Weekly Intelligencer* was able to inform its readers in early November, "the Orange party have much languished, and are now quite down." "The Holland faction against the noble House of Orange rule all the rest," whined one Orangist. "The Orange party is quite down, and they only in power who seek peace," ran one oft repeated report.[22]

Bod., Rawl. A7, pp. 258–260; Letter to Jongstall, 28 October/7 November 1653, Bod., Rawl. A7, pp. 269–270.

19 Newsletter from United Provinces, September 1653, Bod., Rawl. A6, p. 275; newsletter from United Provinces, 9/19 September 1653, Bod., Rawl. A6, p. 144.

20 *Several Proceedings*, 8–15 September 1653, pp. 3277–3278; *Mercurius Politicus*, 8–15 September 1653, p. 2731; Whitelocke, *Annals*, 20 September 1653, BL, Add. 4992, f. 36r; Robert Stone to Sir Walter Vane, 9/19 September 1653, Bod., Rawl. A6, p. 175; Bisdonner to Dutch Ambassadors, 9/19 September 1653, Bod., Rawl. A6, pp. 171–172; newsletter from United Provinces, 9/19 September 1653, Bod., Rawl. A6, p. 159; newsletter from The Hague, 9/19 September 1653, Bod., Rawl. A6, p. 97; newsletter from The Hague, 8/18 September 1653, Bod., Clar. 46, f. 258.

21 Newsletter from United Provinces, 9/19 September 1653, Bod., Rawl. A6, pp. 139–141; newsletter from The Hague, 9/19 September 1653, Bod., Rawl. A6, p. 98; Royalist Letter, 2/12 September 1653, Bod., Rawl. A6, p. 34.

22 *Weekly Intelligencer*, 1–8 November 1653, p. 47; Letter from United Provinces, 14/24 October 1653, Bod., Rawl. A7, p. 179; *Perfect Diurnall*, 31 October–7 November 1653, p. 3092; newsletter from Rotterdam, 28 October/7 November 1653, Bod., Rawl. A7, pp. 266–267; *A Perfect Account*, 2–9 November 1653, p. 1184; newsletter from Delft, 18/

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All discussion of aiding Charles Stuart was quickly ended. In fact, the republican party prohibited the royal exile from entering the territory of the United Provinces. Middleton's plea for Dutch aid to the Scots Highlanders was "rejected upon this ground, because the two states are upon a treaty for peace, which peace the merchant and mechanic here groans after." So complete was the victory of the States party that in late December it was decided to tax the Prince of Orange like any other citizen, prompting his mother to weep "three hours together seeing her authority wholly annulled by that means."[23]

By reestablishing its political control in Holland, and ultimately in the entire United Provinces, then, the States party had once again made peace a real possibility. The Orangists no longer had the political clout to demand the recall of the deputies in London, or to insist that the States General provide support for British rebels; nor could they any longer count upon an Orangist navy to wreak havoc on the peace process by a daring military assault. The English moderates now could similarly be confident that a peace with the United Provinces would not immediately be nullified by an Orangist revolution. "England will now perceive," observed one newsletter-writer perceptively, "that they need not fear anything from the King's party or Prince of Orange who are and will be kept all under by the States of Holland and the naval strength being in the hands of Holland, England must believe that Holland will take care that they be not hereafter opposed in the peace which they will make."[24]

When Jongstall and Nieupoort returned to London from the United Provinces in October, they brought with them a newfound optimism, a belief that the altered political circumstance made peace a real possibility. In the first official conference between the Dutch deputies and the English commissioners since July, the Dutch emphasized the necessity of peace among God's people, among Europe's liberty-loving republics. "The merciful God we hope will preserve and keep us from the abomination of the Medianites killing by their own swords, and from the punishment of Israel," prayed the Dutch deputies, "when Ephraim did rise against

28 November 1653, Bod., Rawl. A8, p. 188; John Adams to ?, 18/28 November 1653, Bod., Rawl. A8, p. 193; *Mercurius Politicus*, 29 September–6 October 1653, p. 2780.

23 *Mercurius Politicus*, 8–15 September 1653, p. 2731; newsletter from Paris, 7/17 December 1653, Rawl. A9, p. 42; Letter from Rotterdam, 23 September/3 October 1653, Bod., Rawl. A6, p. 333; *Mercurius Politicus*, 29 September–6 October 1653, p. 2780; newsletter from United Provinces, 28 October/7 November 1653, Bod., Rawl. A7, p. 261; newsletter from The Hague, 29 October/8 November 1653, Bod., Rawl. A7, pp. 295–296; *A Perfect Account*, 2–9 November 1653, p. [1180]; Thurloe to Whitelocke, 21 January 1654, Sigismund Freiherrn von Bischoffshausen, *Die Politik des Protectors Oliver Cromwell in der Auffassung und Thätigkeit seines Ministers des Staatssecretürs John Thurloe* (Innsbruck, 1899), p. 157; newsletter from United Provinces, 30 December/9 January 1653, Bod., Rawl. A9, pp. 204–205; newsletter from Paris, 14/24 January 1654, Bod., Rawl. A10, p. 246.

24 Newsletter from United Provinces, 9/19 September 1653, Bod., Rawl. A6, p. 141.

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Manasseh, Manasseh against Ephraim, and both together against Judah." Against the image of this fratricidal war, the Dutch offered a more optimistic vision, a vision of a great Protestant alliance. "Let us rather unite God's people, be as one body, and march as one man," they suggested, "that England as formerly be a nursing mother of brave men to maintain our good true liberties, and the United Provinces a bulwark to this Commonwealth against all who shall presume to disturb the constitution of your government, and the just interest of both nations. So that those that attack your liberty may be regarded as attacking our government, and those that shall provoke our state, as if provoking yours." The first article of the Anglo-Dutch alliance, the deputies thought, should be for "the propagation of the holy Gospel, with the protection of the profession of the same faith." Characteristically the security the Dutch offered was that of a great international Protestant alliance – which would include France "in regard of the free exercise of the reformed religion there."[25] The English commissioners must have been astounded with this new Dutch enthusiasm for the Protestant cause. "The Dutch pretend a great desire to agreement," reported the *Several Proceedings of State Affairs* enthusiastically, "they say in private, they will join with England offensive and defensive, if agreement be had."[26]

The return of the Dutch deputies, coupled with the enthusiastic reports from their first two conferences with the English commissioners after their return, convinced everyone that peace was imminent. "You may be confident," one newsletter-writer informed his audience, "unless the Dutch be bound up by other interests, they and we shall agree." "The Dutch negotiations seem to be progressing favorably," agreed the Venetian resident. Peter De Groot had already ordered the best Rhenish wine to celebrate the conclusion of peace. "Most men" in the United Provinces, reported the *Mercurius Politicus*, conclude "that a peace will be made between the two Commonwealths." The Dutch, Hyde glumly agreed, "promise themselves a peace with the rebels." "Charles Stuart and his

[25] Dutch deputies to Council of State, 28 October 1653, PRO, SP 105/98, ff. 28v–29; Dutch deputies to Council of State, 2 November 1653, PRO, SP 105/98, ff. 29v–30. This evidence calls into question Simon Schama's assertion that "the superficial religious affinities between the Puritan Commonwealth and the Dutch Republic did nothing to palliate the bitter maritime disputes that produced the first Anglo-Dutch war in 1651. When Cromwell cited such affinities three years later [*sic*] to justify his startling proposal for a Godly union of the two republics, he was greeted with incredulous amazement in The Hague." Simon Schama, *Embarrassment of Riches* (Berkeley, 1988), p. 96. Obviously the amazement was with the proposal of republican fusion, not with the common Protestant cause. Indeed I hope to make clear elsewhere that it was precisely the emphasis on the rhetoric of Protestant internationalism in the first half of the seventeenth century which precluded the development of a true nationalism.

[26] *Several Proceedings*, 27 October–3 November 1653, pp. 3390–3391.

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[party]," ran one report from Paris, "had never more fear that a peace will be made between both Commonwealths than they have at present."[27]

Unfortunately, as soon as the English presented their proposals for peace, all of this optimism vanished almost as quickly as it had reappeared. The meeting of the Dutch deputies and English commissioners of 18 November opened with Cromwell delivering a long speech in which he explained that since the Dutch "had refused the coalition, and mingling of sovereignties," the two republics were now "to be considered as distinct in interest, and as having peculiar rights and privileges belonging to each other," the delimitations of which would be adjusted in the treaty.[28] When the English commissioners submitted their written draft of the treaty, it became clear just how broadly they conceived of the English "peculiar rights." The Orangist deputies may have bristled a bit at Articles 6, 8, 9, 10, and 12 which prevented either nation from aiding or harboring the other's rebels or exiles. But the real conflict lay elsewhere. The English insisted that in addition to the ships and goods seized during the war – which "shall be accounted, and be taken as part of satisfaction and reparation for the charges and damages" which England "had been put unto" – "the States General shall pay unto the Commonwealth such further sums" as shall be decided by arbitrators. The Dutch, then, were to be blamed for causing the war, and to pay accordingly. All Dutch ships were to "strike their flag, and lower their topsail" when passing any English man-of-war, paying their "respects due to the said Commonwealth of England to whom the dominion, and sovereignty of the British sea belongs." The two corollaries of this premise were stringent indeed. First, the English suggested that the Dutch "men of war not [exceed] such a number as shall be agreed upon in the treaty" – a number commonly rumored to be forty to the English sixty. Second, the Dutch were to lease for twenty-one years the right to fish in the British seas. The final, and most telling, English demand was that "neither the said States General of the United Provinces nor the particular states of any of the United Provinces shall at any time hereafter make, constitute, or appoint William Prince of Orange grandchild to the late King of England, nor any of his line, captain general, Stadholder, or commander of their armies or forces

[27] Newsletter from London, 4 November 1653, Bod., Clar. 47, f. 43r; Paulucci to Sagredo, 10/20 November 1653, *CSPV*, p. 147; newsletter from The Hague, 3/13 November 1653, Bod., Clar. 47, f. 41r (Beverning); Van De Perre to Lord Bruin, 11/21 November 1653, Bod., Rawl. A8, p. 102; De Bruin to Van De Perre, 18/28 November 1653, Bod., Rawl. A8, p. 183; De Groot to Beverning, 18/28 November 1653, Bod., Rawl. A8, p. 167; *Mercurius Politicus*, 10–17 November 1653, p. 2873; Hyde to Kent, 11/21 November 1653, Bod., Clar. 47, f. 65r; newsletter from Paris, 2/12 November 1653, Bod., Rawl. A8, p. 5.

[28] Council of State to Dutch deputies, November 1653, PRO, SP 105/98, f. 41; Jongstall to William Frederick, 18/28 November 1653, Bod., Rawl. A8, pp. 170–172 (identifies Cromwell as delivering the above cited speech).

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at land."[29] The English, opined the French ambassador after reading a copy of the draft treaty, "continue to negotiate with a greater air of superiority than any prince had ever done with that state."[30]

Despite the obvious toughness of the terms which the English offered, they do not reveal an attempt to seize control of the vast Dutch trade network. "There hath not yet been anything spoken of in any of the conferences of the business of the Indies," Nieupoort revealed to a fellow Hollander – hardly what one would have expected had the war been about the control of trade. In fact, the Dutch were granted some mercantile advantages. Articles 13 and 20 specifically guaranteed free trade between the commonwealths for inhabitants of each state. While the twenty-third article provided that all Dutch citizens "being of the reformed religion" would have the complete rights of a British citizen when in British territory. Although the Navigation Act was not explicitly repealed, it is hard to see what force it could have retained with these provisions.[31]

The Dutch deputies, however, were more concerned with the haughty political claims implicit in the treaty than with the potential economic benefits they might reap. They objected to the clause demanding payment for fishing because it usurped their ancient right by putting the Dutch "out of an immemorial possession without cause, or reason, having always enjoyed the freedom of fishing." The English claim to be able to search any Dutch vessel in the British seas was "against the practice of our country, and subject to a thousand disorders and disputes, and injurious in the point of dominion and sovereignty." But, the two English demands which provoked the most indignation were those limiting the number of Dutch men-of-war and excluding the Prince of Orange. "We are so far from it," the Dutch deputies said of the proposed naval limitation, "that we should esteem ourselves unworthy of the goodness and favor of God, whereby his Divine Majesty hath blessed the endeavors of our superiors in the lawful preservation of their liberty, if we did but enter thereupon in a conference." The place of the Prince of Orange in the Dutch polity, all four Dutch deputies protested, "is a point absolutely appertaining to the disposition of the said states wherein with no more reason or equity the lords of this government are to meddle, than we in their elections in the like occurrences in this nation."[32] The Dutch deputies had certainly made it clear that they

[29] Draft treaty, 18 November 1653, PRO, SP 105/98, ff. 32–36; newsletter from The Hague, 3/13 November 1653, Bod., Clar. 47, f. 41r; newsletter from London, 12 November 1653, Bod., Clar. 47, f. 72r. These newsletters confirm the 60 : 40 ratio of the respective navies.

[30] Bordeaux to de Brienne, 26 November/6 December 1653, PRO, PRO 31/3/92, f. 46 (my translation).

[31] Nieupoort to Lord Hans Van Loon, 2/12 December 1653, Bod., Rawl. A9, p. 5; draft treaty, 18 November 1653, PRO, SP 105/98, ff. 32–36.

[32] Dutch deputies to Council of State, 22 November 1653, PRO, SP 105/98, ff. 38–39. These discussions were reported with varying degrees of accuracy by the French and Venetian representatives. See Bordeaux to de Brienne, 26 November/6 December 1653, PRO, PRO

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were more concerned about protecting the sovereignty of the United Provinces than in expanding its trade.

The Dutch deputies were both amazed and furious at the "unreasonableness, extravagancy and unsufferableness" of the English propositions. Instead of advancing a compromise treaty, they fumed, "all is set down and propounded according to the inclination, and meaning of this government and to their greatest advantage." By this they did not mean, as historians have too often assumed, that the English had sought their own economic advantage. Rather the Dutch were concerned that the English had done everything possible to derogate from their status as a sovereign nation. "How many times hath his Excellency and the lords praised our ancestors who with so much zeal and vigor fought for the liberty of their country," they asked, "and how is it possible that they should now have the opinion that the posterity is grown so base that they should suffer themselves without reason, or necessity to be deprived, or frustrated of so notable a part thereof?" Though they had rejected the union because the "supreme power and constitution of our government only could not admit of such an unpracticable alteration," they still hoped for a coalition "for all other interests and advantages such as by the blessing of God, both nations do enjoy."[33] Instead the English had offered them virtual slavery. "We conceive it neither for the service nor the reputation of the state that we stay longer here," the Dutch deputies consequently explained to the Greffier, informing him that they would set sail for the United Provinces within five days.[34] The peace negotiations, it seemed, had reached their final impasse.

By late November the mood of informed political observers, which had been so optimistic only two months previously, was now dark indeed. "We are like to have a bloody summer and very dangerous," the Canary merchant John Paige informed his business partners. "Yesterday hopes of an adjustment were said to be on the wane and today the negotiations are reported as quite at an end," the Venetian resident in London explained to his compatriot in Paris in early December, "so the war will be resumed with greater bloodshed and animosity than ever, to the enormous inconvenience and detriment of all Europe." "There was never less probability of peace by this treaty than at present," observed a London-based newsletter-writer.[35]

31/3/92, ff. 46v–47r; Bordeaux to de Brienne, 1/11 December 1653, PRO, PRO 31/3/92, ff. 62v–64r; Bordeaux to Servien, 5/15 December 1653, PRO, PRO 31/3/92, f. 77r; Bordeaux to de Brienne, 5/15 December 1653, PRO, PRO 31/3/92, ff. 74r–75r; Paulucci to Sagredo, 2/12 December 1653, *CSPV*, p. 156.

33 Dutch deputies to Greffier, 25 November/5 December 1653, Bod., Clar. 47, f. 114r; Dutch deputies to Council of State, 22 November 1653, PRO, SP 105/98, ff. 38–39; Dutch deputies to Council of State, 25 November 1653, PRO, SP 105/98, ff. 39v-40.

34 Dutch commissioners to Greffier, 25 November/5 December 1653, Bod., Clar. 47, f. 114r.

35 Paige to Paynter and Clerke, 18 November 1653, Steckley, *John Paige*, p. 99; Paulucci to Sagredo, 9/19 December 1653, *CSPV*, pp. 157–158; newsletter from London, 3 December 1653, Bod., Clar. 47, f. 129r; newsletter from London, 9 December 1653, Bod., Clar. 47,

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Political prognosticators had reached similar conclusions on the other side of the North Sea. De Witt told the States General in early December that the chances of peace were "no better than desperate." The "wiser sort" in Delft "expect no success of the treaty." The gossip in Rotterdam was that "all hopes of an accommodation are laid aside, and that our Ambassadors had desired leave of the Council of State to return home *re infecta*." Throughout the United Provinces, the *Perfect Account* confirmed, "many do now begin to despair."[36] Perhaps more importantly, Dutch political pessimism was accompanied by a new military build-up. The States General stepped up naval recruiting, placed orders for new men-of-war, and even began to contemplate providing aid to the Scots.[37] No wonder one Royalist was able to report triumphantly that "there is little hope of peace between the Hollander and the English rebels."[38]

Contemporaries marveled at the sudden change in the fortunes of the Anglo-Dutch peace. "The treaty between the two republics is subject to many revolutions," admitted the French ambassador. "This peace which all England and all Holland did not doubt would be concluded," he confided to another Parisian correspondent, "is now blocked by some unknown motives."[39] What, in fact, had happened to the negotiations? Why had the English, who had promised to moderate their position in the early autumn, insisted on such hard terms?

It was certainly not because the radicals had captured the committee conducting the negotiations with the Dutch. In fact, that committee changed too frequently and too dramatically to have established any continuity or coherent sense of policy. Even if it had, the members who are known to have taken an active role were predominantly Cromwellian moderates.[40]

f. 150r; *Weekly Intelligencer*, 6–13 December 1653, p. 84; *Faithful Scout*, 2–9 December 1653, p. 1240; *Several Proceedings*, 1–8 December 1653, p. 3467.

36 Newsletter from The Hague, 8/18 December 1653, Bod., Clar. 47, f. 135r; Jongstall to his wife, 25 November/5 December 1653, Bod., Rawl. A8, p. 238; newsletter from Delft, 18/28 November 1653, Bod., Rawl. A8, pp. 186–187; *A Perfect Account*, 30 November–7 December 1653, pp. 1210, 1216; *Mercurius Politicus*, 9–16 December 1653, pp. 3136–3137 (Rotterdam); *Mercurius Politicus*, 22–29 December 1653, p. 3150 (Rotterdam), p. 3149 (Hamburg); *Perfect Diurnall*, 19–26 December 1653 (hopelessly mispaginated) (Hamburg); Beuningen to Dutch Deputies, 30 December/9 January 1653/54, Bod., Rawl. A9, pp. 214–215.

37 The evidence for this new build-up is vast. I only provide a sample here. Newsletter from The Hague, 17/27 November 1653, Bod., Clar. 47, f. 78r; newsletter from United Provinces, 18/28 November 1653, Bod., Rawl. A8, p. 150; Whitelocke, *Annals*, 30 November 1653, BL, Add. 4992, f. 59r; newsletter from The Hague, 1/11 December 1653, Bod., Clar. 47, f. 121r; Whitelocke, *Annals*, 8 December 1653, BL, Add. 4992, f. 59v; Whitelocke, *Annals*, 14 December 1653, BL, Add. 4992, f. 60v.

38 Luke Whittington to Ralph Parker, 11 December 1653, *CSPD*, p. 297.

39 Bordeaux to Servien, 5/15 December 1653, PRO, PRO 31/3/92, f. 77r (my translation); Bordeaux to de Brienne, 26 November/6 December 1653, PRO, PRO 31/3/92, f. 47v (my translation).

40 The committee at various times included Norton, Wolsley, Ashley Cooper, Lawrence, Tichborn, Cromwell, Strickland, Moyer, Montague, Carew, Jones, Pickering, Howard,

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Nor does the evidence suggest that Cromwell had again veered back into agreement with the radicals about the conduct of the war. Observers of every ideological predisposition were in agreement that Cromwell continued in his support of the peace throughout the autumn. The Dutch commissioners reported that Cromwell's most trusted friends repeatedly assured them of his good inclinations. Edward Hyde was certain in early December that Cromwell "hath a good mind to compose that difference which hath cost them so much money and blood." Indeed so obvious was Cromwell's desire for peace, that rumors abounded that he had signed a private treaty with the Dutch deputies.[41]

"Having gained Cromwell, they conclude the matter done," one newsletter sagaciously said of the Dutch, "notwithstanding the multitude that is against it. I doubt me they are in the right, for if we mistake him not he is *dominus factotum*." It is this observation that Cromwell was only the leader of a faction which holds the key to understanding the perplexing developments of November and December 1653.[42]

Party animosity dominated the activities of the Nominated Parliament in the autumn. "The two cabals or factions in the Parliament do struggle very much for the upper hand of one another," commented one observer of the Nominated Parliament, "the general and his cabal or faction receiving so much opposition from his adverse party that he cannot do what he would. Harrison and his party do rail and preach every day against the general and the peace with Holland. So that it is thought and believed that they are both embroiled and their cabals or factions ready to make a separation in the House of Parliament." "I find Cromwell gives Harrison leave to make a party against him," marveled Robert Harley. "O England, how great are thy divisions in thy own bowels," lamented one sympathetic to the Nominated Parliament.[43]

Cromwell's profound disappointment in the Nominated Parliament was

Bennet, and Viscount Lisle. Of these men, Woolrych *Commonwealth to Protectorate*, has classified only three – Moyer, Carew, and Bennet – as radicals. Day's proceedings, 14 July 1653, *CSPD*, p. 26; day's proceedings, 29 October 1653, *CSPD*, p. 223; *Several Proceedings*, 17–24 November 1653, p. 3432; newsletter from The Hague, 24 November/4 December 1653, Bod., Clar. 47, f. 109v; Beverning to De Witt, 18/28 November 1653, Bod., Rawl. A8, p. 175.

41 Richards to Stoneham, 23 September 1653, Bod., Rawl. A6, p. 334; Bordeaux to de Brienne, 5/15 December 1653, PRO, PRO 31/3/92, f. 74v; Hyde to Rochester, 11/21 November 1653, Bod., Clar. 47, f. 68r; Jongstall to William Frederick, 11/21 November 1653, Bod., Rawl. A8, p. 105; Jongstall to William Frederick, 18/28 November 1653, Bod., Rawl. A8, p. 168; Hyde to Nicholas, 2/12 December 1653, Bod., Clar. 47, f. 128r; Hyde to Rochester, 25 November/5 December 1653, Bod., Clar. 47, f. 115r; Hyde to Clement, 2/12 December 1653, Bod., Clar. 47, f. 120r; Hyde to Rochester, 2/12 December 1653, Bod., Clar. 47, f. 123r.

42 Newsletter from The Hague, 28 October/7 November 1653, Bod., Rawl. A7, p. 284.

43 Sir Walter Vane to Mons. Chantillot, 25 November 1653, Bod., Rawl. A8, p. 265; Robert Harley to Sir Robert Harley, 2 November 1653, BL Loan 29/177, f. 37r; William Parker to Mr. Fielder, 4 November 1653, Bod., Rawl. A8, p. 76; newsletter from London, 24

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well known. "He is more troubled now with the fool, than before with the knave," sneered one Royalist newsletter-writer.[44] Indeed so concerned had Cromwell become with the Harrisonian radicals, and with their obvious ties to the hot preachers at Blackfriars, that he despatched Peter Sterry with several other ministers in early December "to oppose spirit to spirit, and to advise Feak and the rest to obedience as the most necessary way to bring in the Kingdom of Christ." Predictably enough, the radicals scoffed, insisting that they were "unable to reject the inspiration of the Holy Spirit."[45]

Despite, or perhaps because of, their overwhelming defeat in the elections for a new Council of State in early November, the radical members of the Nominated Parliament dominated the debates and votes of the House in November and early December. "The faction of Harrison and the Blackfriars men growing very high," lamented Sir Walter Vane, the other party was not "able to do in the Parliament what they please." "The Anabaptistical party," agreed another observer, "are very prevalent in the House." Every indication, then, seems to support Woolrych's claim that in the face of newfound radical organization and assertiveness "the moderates were leaving the field to their antagonists." It was almost certainly this radical presence which exerted influence on the Council of State, and the commissioners negotiating with the Dutch. "How can distractions be avoided," asked one purveyor of news, "for the Parliament voting one way and the Council directing another." In the end, at least in the Dutch negotiations, Parliament prevailed. "The Anabaptists in Parliament were the hindrance of the peace," remarked one political pundit, "and the faction appeared the most prevalent in the House so it was found necessary to dissolve the Parliament to bring that faction under." "That body rather favored the continuance of the war," agreed the Venetian resident Paulucci. "The confusion and distraction in England is so great," concluded Edward Hyde, "that Cromwell could not bring his people to those condescensions which were necessary towards a peace, but insisted on all their old insolent demands."[46] The English negotiators had gotten tough with the Dutch because the newly dominant radical party had forced them to do so.

November 1653, Bod., Clar. 47, f. 113r; Bordeaux to de Brienne, 17/27 November 1653, PRO, PRO 31/3/92, f. 36v.

44 Newsletter from London, 2 September 1653, Bod., Clar. 46, f. 230v. This sort of assessment had become a commonplace of Royalist political analysis. See Hyde to Rochester, 29 September/9 October 1653, Bod., Clar. 46, f. 303r; Hyde to Wentworth, 16/26 September 1653, Bod., Clar. 46, f. 279v; newsletter from London, 16 September 1653, Bod., Clar. 46, f. 274v.

45 Newsletter, 2 December 1653, Bod., Rawl. A9, p. 9; Bordeaux to de Brienne, 1/11 December 1653, PRO, PRO 31/3/92, f. 65r (my translation); for the ties between the radical preachers and the Harrisonians see Woolrych, *Commonwealth to Protectorate*, pp. 287–288, 325.

46 Bordeaux to Mazarin, 7/17 November 1653, PRO, PRO 31/3/92, f. 11; Sir Walter Vane to Sir John Sayers, 25 November 1653, Bod., Rawl. A8, p. 237; Royalist Letter, 2 December 1653, Bod., Rawl. A9, pp. 9–10; Woolrych, *Commonwealth to Protectorate*, pp. 314–315;

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These developments in Parliament and at the negotiation table need to be placed within the wider context of a radical offensive in the late autumn of 1653. Pamphlets, broadsides, and sermons created a spirited if not always unified attack upon the Cromwellian moderates. The tithe-supported clergy, fumed the radical William Dell, "have made themselves, contrary to God's command, lords and masters in the Church of God," thereby setting "wide open the floodgates to Antichrist and his kingdom to break in upon the world and to overflow it." John Rogers demanded that the Parliament throw "down the standing of lawyers and priests." "It is not enough to change some of the laws, and so to reform them (as is intended by most of you) according to the rule of the fourth monarchy, which must all to pieces," Rogers told members of the Nominated Parliament in his immense but widely disseminated *Sagrir*, "O no! that will be to poor purpose, and is not your work now, which is to provide for the fifth [monarchy]." This could only happen, he explained if the laws of the nation became one with the "Word of God." "The expectation of our present governors was at first very great but some think their proceedings are very little answerable," wrote one radical expressing a common sentiment, but "the Lord whom we seek, whom we desire shall suddenly come to his temple."[47] The religious radicals soon tapped into the anti-Cromwellian rhetoric developed the previous summer during Lilburne's famous show trial. By September "barbarous libels" and "infamous pictures" defaming "our noble General" were "thrown about in great quantities." In one of these libels Cromwell was accused of "not having the fear of God before his eyes" and endeavoring "to make us his lord and masters his perpetual slaves and vassals." By December Cromwell had become in the eyes of the Blackfriars men "the man of sin, the red dragon, and many other Scripture ill names."[48]

Naturally the religious radicals did not ignore the Dutch War. "Now those that so passionately desire a peace with this country may see their error in the work of the Lord," argued one radical after a North Sea storm had severely damaged the Dutch fleet, demanding that the English "continue their good resolution to extirpate the whore of Babylon and idolatry." The

newsletter, 9/19 December 1653, Bod., Rawl. A9, p. 53; newsletter from The Hague, 13/23 January 1654, Bod., Clar. 47, f. 303r; Paulucci to Sagredo, 15/25 December 1653, *CSPV*, p. 161; Hyde to Clement, 9/19 December 1653, Bod., Clar. 47, f. 154r.

47 Paulucci to Sagredo, 20/30 October 1653, *CSPV*, p. 141; William Dell, *The Tryal of Spirits* (London, 1653), Thomason: December 1653, pp. 8–9; John Rogers, *Sagrir Or Doomes-Day Drawing Nigh* (London, 1653), Thomason: 7 November 1653, sig. A4, pp. 2, 122, 137; Mary Cary, *The Resurrection of the Witnesses and England's Fall from (The Mystical Babylon) Rome* (London, 1653), Thomason: 14 November 1653, *passim*; Letter to Lieutenant Hickermight, 17 October 1653, Bod., Rawl. A7, pp. 185–186.

48 Newsletter, 9/19 September 1653, Bod., Rawl. A6, pp. 185–186; Richards to Stoneham, 23 September 1653, Bod., Rawl. A6, p. 334; newsletter from London, 16 September 1653, Bod., Clar. 46, f. 274r; "Proclamation by the Supreme Lord the free born People of England," BL, Thomason MSS: late September 1653, TT: E714 (7); newsletter, 2 December 1653, Bod., Rawl. A9, p. 9.

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time had come to begin the crusade against Antichrist. "His Excellency the Lord Jesus hath sent out his summons to other nations also," insisted John Rogers, "and the blade of that sword (whose handle is held in England) will reach to the very gates of Rome ere long." The United Provinces were to be the first stop on the glorious march. "Woe! woe then be to thee O Flanders full of blood! and Zeeland and Holland full of treacheries! (as if this were the way of the war to Rome)," warned Rogers, "Alas ! Alas! weep thou unhappy Babylon!" Mary Cary agreed that God favored England because "now in England there are a more considerable number of the faithful servants, and witnesses of Jesus Christ, than in any kingdom in the world." Since the time had now come "to begin that great work of overcoming the Beast, and of destroying (the great Babylon) Rome," Cary offered "a word of caution to the Dutch, Danes, French and all other nations of Europe, to caution them to beware how they do ever henceforward make war against ... the commonwealth of England." Indeed the "Anabaptist faction" was widely known to "have decried all peace with the Princes and states of the world." No wonder one of Thurloe's intelligence gatherers thought that the radicals "will make us stink in the nostrils of all the godly abroad."[49]

The Cromwellian moderates did, belatedly, defend themselves against this radical assault. The clamor of the radicals for liberty of conscience, the moderates claimed, was really a covert plot "to establish their several parties, and exclude all others from power and interest in the nation." "Their common hate and detestation to the persons of all men of other beliefs" was quite ironic, maintained the Cromwellian polemicist John Hall, "since nothing in the world can be more Antichristian than to force the consciences and beings of other men under their own sway and domination." Even worse, the religious logic of the radicals led inevitably to anarchy. Their "chief work is to preach and advance Christ's personal reign here on earth, being the ancient error and foppery of the chiliasts or millinaries, huffed and exploded out of the Church of Christ in the very infancy thereof," pointed out one moderate; such doctrines could now only lead "to the destruction of the magistracy of England." "Such a tenet," agreed Hall, "cannot consist with the very being of a civil magistrate." The author of *Sedition Scourg'd* thought such "an irregular and dangerous liberty" would either cause a return to civil war or reduce England "under its former tyranny." In short these "ill made brains, and disturbed fancies, strongly tinctured with an hypochondriac melancholy"

[49] Letter from The Hague, 4/14 November 1653, Bod., Rawl. A8, pp. 45–46; Rogers, *Sagrir*, sig. A2r, pp. 15–18, 133–134; Cary, *Resurrection*, pp. 49–50, 132–133; Richards to Stoneham, 23 September 1653, Bod., Rawl. A6, p. 334; intelligence to Thurloe and Cromwell, 16 November 1653, Bod., Rawl. A8, p. 129.

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were asking Englishmen "to quit our discourse, our natural reason, our experiences drawn even from common sense."[50]

This confrontational language made peaceful resolution of the ideological struggle impossible. Not surprisingly, then, the conflict was not confined to pamphlet wars. In July a woman preaching at Somerset House "was like to be stoned by the multitude, had not a guard fetched her away." This led the noted conservative Independent William Strong to preach "boldly at Westminster against the liberty of the times which opened the way to Popery." Those were fighting words. The battle ultimately broke out at St. Paul's in October when "an anabaptistical soldier was preaching." A group of apprentices began throwing stones at the soldiers who responded with their pistols. Ultimately Colonel Whalley and Alderman Tichborn were able to quell the riot, but not until "some heads were broken." Subsequently such attacks occurred with increasing regularity. So threatening had the situation become that in early November Cromwell called a conference – attended by leaders of various religious groupings, such as John Owen, Stephen Marshall, Philip Nye, Henry Jessey, and Thomas Harrison – to "persuade them that hold Christ the Head, and to the same in fundamentals, to agree in love." Cromwell had pleaded in vain; less than a month later *A Perfect Account* reported several congregations "have not only been disturbed, but several mutinies have been raised to breach of the peace of this Commonwealth."[51]

Not surprisingly this situation led many observers to conclude that the Nominated Parliament, a Parliament now torn apart with divisions, could not continue much longer. "Here is a general change foreseen," the Dutch deputies optimistically informed the States General in November. "Certain it is, without some quick remedy of prevention, the frame of government must needs fail, when the main pins are drawn out of the hearts of the people, by those harangues of sedition," thought one of Thurloe's intelligencers. "If the Parliament sits out its appointed

[50] Intelligence to Thurloe and Cromwell, 16 November 1653, Bod., Rawl. A8, pp. 130–131; [John Hall], *Confusion-Confounded* (London, 1654), pp. 3–8; *Strena Vavasoriensis: A New-Years Gift for the Welch Itinerants* (London, 1654), Thomason: 30 January 1654, p. 5; *Sedition Scourg'd* (London, 1653), Thomason: 20 October 1653, p. 8.

[51] Newsletter from London, 22 July 1653, Bod., Clar. 46, f. 113r; newsletter from London, 29 July 1653, Bod., Clar. 46, f. 130r; for Strong see Tai Liu, *Puritan London* (Newark, 1986), p. 114; A. N. to Lord Inchiquin, 16 October 1653, Bod., Rawl. A7, p. 182; *Weekly Intelligencer*, 11–18 October 1653, p. 24; Paulucci to Sagredo, 20/30 October 1653, *CSPV*, p. 142; newsletter from London, 21 October 1653, Bod., Clar. 46, f. 363r; *Mercurius Politicus*, 13–20 October 1653, p. 2795; *Weekly Intelligencer*, 25 October–1 November 1653, pp. 37–38; *Several Proceedings*, 27 October–3 November 1653, p. 3391; *A Perfect Account*, 16–23 November 1653, p. 1193.

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term," concurred the Venetian resident Paulucci, "it will be a wonder."[52]

It was not a great surprise, then, when a group of moderate members of Parliament resigned the sovereign power of the Nominated Parliament on the morning of 12 December. This should not, however, minimize the magnitude of the event. This resignation marked the final failure of the Parliament of Saints. The religious radicals were irrevocably stripped of their political power. "Major Harrison and his pulpit beaters are all eclipsed," attested one witness to these exciting developments. Though Christopher Feak and Vavasor Powell "cannot forbear their excesses," Thurloe was sure by late December that "to think they have a party or can make one, is vain."[53] The possibility of forging a millenarian consensus had been "rudely shattered."[54] Never again would a powerful group of men within the political nation advocate the establishment of a government which would prepare for the rule of Christ on earth. It was a measure of just how close these men had come to power in the late autumn that they were able effectively to obstruct the Anglo-Dutch peace process, paving the way for their preferred policy of a millenarian crusade, a crusade for which the United Provinces were to be the beachhead. Although the foreign policy of the Protectorate, and subsequently of the Restored Monarchy, would at times be quite aggressive, it was always couched in the language of national interest. The Harrisonian radicals, by contrast, had wanted take the eschatological struggle to the very gates of Rome, had wanted to wage and win the war for universal and eternal truth.

[52] Dutch Ambassadors to States General, [15] November 1653, Bod., Rawl. A8, p. 126; intelligence to Thurloe and Cromwell, 16 November 1653, Bod., Rawl. A8, pp. 129–130; Paulucci to Sagredo, 2/12 December 1653, *CSPV*, p. 155; Bordeaux to de Brienne, 8/18 December 1653, PRO, PRO 31/3/92, ff. 83v-84r (my translation); Bordeaux to Servien, 5/15 December 1653, PRO, PRO 31/3/92, f. 78; Hyde to Nicholas, 18/28 November 1653, Bod., Clar. 47, f. 93; Hyde to Richard Browne, 6 December 1653, Christ Church, John Evelyn MSS 10, f. 34r; John Langley to Sir Richard Leveson, 3 December 1653, SRO, D593/P/8/2/2.

[53] Henry Hart to Mr. Wilkey, 27 December 1653, Bod., Rawl. A9, p. 165; Thurloe to Whitelocke, 29 December 1653, Bischoffshausen, *Politik*, p. 150; Letter to Mr. Rider, 14 December 1653, Bod., Rawl. A9, pp. 66–67; Paulucci to Sagredo, 15/25 December 1653, *CSPV*, p. 160.

[54] John Patrick Laydon, "The Kingdom of Christ and the Powers of the Earth" (Cambridge, Ph.D. thesis, 1977), p. 432.

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