and is instructive, especially as he introduces nuances and concepts (such as a federacy) that are critical to understanding the way a future Kurdistan can and would relate to a variety of arrangements that Baghdad could present.

It is also important to understand what the people of Kurdistan themselves desire for their political future. Thus, Sophia Wanche's chapter looks at the different federal options and how they relate to the population's wishes. If independence is desired by virtually all Kurds in northern Iraq, as she argues, this desire is tempered by realpolitik and the strategic circumstances that define Kurdistan's geopolitics. Still, the Kurds are unlikely to agree to anything less than a robust federal structure that ensures their separate identity. They have been dedicated to this since the early 1990s, and the United States committed itself to this idea during the 1998 cease-fire negotiations between the two main Kurdish factions, the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK).

John McGarry's discussion of the lessons Canada can (and cannot) offer Iraq is also particularly instructive. Given that Canada is an ethnic federation that has two significant and distinct nationalities and that French, as with Kurdish, is recognized as an official national language, one is tempted to use Canada as a model for understanding the situation in Iraq. The ethnic dimension suggests that Canada has more in common with Iraq than other examples of federalism often advanced, including that of the United States. In other words, Kurdistan is to Iraq what Quebec is to Canada. Yet McGarry argues that undeniable political stability—secured by long-standing and well-established institutional rules—in Canada undermines the comparison often drawn between the two cases.

In the years that have elapsed since the writing of this book, the situation in Iraq has gone from bad to worse, and most importantly, further progress on the final shape of the internal federal boundaries has remained elusive. Peter Galbraith (an acute observer of these developments) and Karin von Hippel elaborate on the lessons learned in the year and a half that had elapsed since the overthrow of the Saddam Hussein regime in Baghdad. Some of the arguments advanced by Galbraith remain valid today. The closer the new Iraq comes to satisfying the basic national desires of its Kurdish citizens through a federal structure, the likelier it is that the Kurdish Regional Government will stay in the union and that Iraq will remain unified. Kurdish PUK leader Jalal Talabani's ascension to the presidency of Iraq has somewhat solidified the Kurds' links with the central government. Talabani has proven to be much less sectarian in Baghdad's politics than his Sunni and Shia interlocutors. The principal authors of this book would have been very satisfied to see Talabani in the president's role, as it would have vindicated some of their recommendations regarding the construction of a just federal arrangement. A federation that truly recognizes the distinctiveness of the Kurds would go a long way to ensuring that they do not secede. President Talabani and other Kurdish politicians in Baghdad have, for the most part, acted as Iraqis first and Kurds second; Kurds are not secessionists by nature.

As with many edited books, this volume suffers from the unevenness of its chapters. It also would have benefited from the inclusion of a chapter on the relationship between Kurdistan and Iran to parallel the chapter on Turkey. Yet such shortcomings notwithstanding, this book is useful in that it provides both analysis and policy guidance. In its dispensation of advice, it subjects itself to an immediate test of relevancy. So far, it has stood the test of time well. The main lesson is that Iraq can remain united if and only if Kurdish aspirations are realized within an internationally recognized federal pact that at the very least will ensure a modicum of democratic governance in the future federal state of Kurdistan.

Japan's Dual Civil Society: Members Without Advocates. By Robert Pekkanen. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006. 280p. $65.00 cloth, $24.95 paper.
DOI: 10.1017/S1537592708080389

— Keiko Hirata, *California State University, Northridge*

How does a state regulate or promote civil society? Does a non-Western, industrialized state play a different role in this regard than that of advanced industrialized states in the West? How does an unconventional form of civil society affect polity? Robert Pekkanen's book touches on these and other questions of great interest to the field of comparative politics.

At the outset, Pekkanen discusses a prominent feature of Japanese civil society: Its small, local groups are plentiful and vibrant, while large, national, independent organizations are few and far between. He characterizes Japanese civil society as having "members without advocates" (p. 3). In his view, the dearth of professional national-level advocacy groups severely limits the impact of Japanese civil society on national policies and politics compared to the civil society sector in many Western democracies.

Pekkanen argues that the main cause of this duality of Japan's civil society is the regulatory framework that the state has created for influencing policy. Considering neighborhood associations (NHAs) as representative of a vibrant local civil society, he explains how the state has fostered NHAs and promoted their activism through institutional support. At the same time, he finds that the state has constrained, with strict regulations, national-level advocacy. This is why, as he explains, Japan's massive social movements of the 1960s and 1970s on environmental and security issues failed to transform themselves into effective national organizations that could exert long-lasting effects.

The author acknowledges that "the regulatory framework can change at historical crossroads" (p. 8) and demonstrates that many laws either restricting or facilitating

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nongovernmental organizations were created at two key junctions: 1) during the U.S. occupation of 1945–52, and 2) during the 1990s and early 2000s, when Japanese politics became fluid following the end of the "1955 system" and one-party dominance. Yet despite the recent removal of some legal barriers to advocacy groups, in Pekkanen's view the basic foundation of the regulatory framework has remained intact. He also suggests that recent legal changes have done little to alter the essential dual nature of Japanese civil society, with local civic activism flourishing while national activism remains dormant.

Pekkannen's approach to the subject resembles that of Susan Pharr ("Conclusion: Targeting by an Activist State: Japan as a Civil Society Model," in Frank Schwarz and Susan Pharr, eds., *The State of Civil Society in Japan,* 2003). Both Pekkanen and Pharr emphasize the uniqueness and continuity of Japan's civil society and the role of the state in shaping its development. For example, like Pharr, Pekkanen argues that the state has monitored and steered civic life in Japan with a variety of policy tools targeted at specific groups.

Most intriguing is Pekkanen's discussion of democracy. He suggests that, with its approach to civil society, Japan has created "a particular kind of democracy that is at once weaker and stronger than democracies in other nations" (p. 8). Referring to works by Robert Putnam (*Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community,* 2000) and Theda Skocpol ("Advocates Without Members: The Recent Transformation of American Civil Life," in Theda Skocpol and Morris P. Fiorina, eds., *Civic Engagement in American Democracy,* 1998), Pekkanen argues that civil society in the United States and Japan are at opposite poles: The United States has strong, highly focused national interest groups but little social capital, whereas Japan has few such national groups yet has abundant social capital. In his view, Japanese civil society supports democracy by generating social capital and promoting community building, while avoiding America's problem of "destructive" polarization (with the middle of the political spectrum dropping out of the debate). It is interesting that Pekkanen wonders whether we should stop thinking of Japan as a poor imitator of America's dynamic civil society but instead consider whether Tokyo, not Washington, "has gotten civil society right" (p. 187).

In the debate between institutionalists and culturalists, Pekkanen falls decisively on the side of the former. Throughout the book, he emphasizes how Japan's regulatory framework—established at the end of the nineteenth century and largely in place today—has shaped the development and nature of civil society in Japan. He thus argues against the view that Japanese cultural attitudes, such as an emphasis on the collective and an underdeveloped concept of volunteerism, have played an important role. Although he is somewhat dismissive of the role of a national *culture,* he does attempt to acknowledge the role of *ideas.* For example, he briefly notes that ideas about civic activism and the role of civil society were shaped over time by the regulatory framework (p. 169), suggesting that such ideational factors may be incorporated into his institutionalist explanation. Elsewhere, he mentions the role of ideology in shaping the writing of the 1897 Uniform Civil Code—the foundation of the regulatory framework—and in maintaining the framework in the post–World War II era. However, in each of these cases, he fails to analyze in depth how ideas intersect with political forces and outcomes that shape civil society. His arguments may thus prove unpersuasive to social constructivists, who would claim that ideological values are what give rise to institutions in the first place.

The book is exhaustively researched and filled with diverse and compelling data. At the same time, its wordiness and repetitiveness prove an unnecessary distraction from the underlying message. In summary, despite minor flaws, *Japan's Dual Civil Society* offers important insights supported by rich empirical detail. Pekkanen offers the most in-depth exposition to date of the dual nature of Japanese civil society and the institutional forces that shaped its development. Those interested in the role of the civil society in Japan or in other Asian or non-Western countries will find this book a valuable addition to their collection.

The Politics of Free Markets: The Rise of Neoliberal Economic Policies in Britain, France, Germany, and the United States. By Monica Prasad. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006. 280p. $57.00 cloth, $23.00 paper.
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— Vivien A. Schmidt, *Boston University*

This is an ambitious book, and an important one. It asks one of the key questions of contemporary political economy: how to explain the rise of neoliberal economic policies in advanced industrialized countries. It answers this question by considering the rise of neoliberal policies in four countries—Britain, France, Germany, and the United States—in three policy areas—taxation, welfare, and industrial policy. Although the book's main focus is on important moments of policy change in the 1970s and 1980s, it considers these in the light of the preceding postwar period and uses them to illuminate more recent events. It notes that although in retrospect it may seem natural that the United States and the UK would have become neoliberal and France and Germany not, this was not at all obvious at the time. Much the contrary, since both the United States and the UK in the 1970s had more progressive tax policies, more egalitarian welfare states, and more anti-business industrial policies than France or Germany. The puzzle, then, is how to explain the transformations in all four countries, which left the United States and the UK

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