CrossMark

Hegel's Hyperbolic Formalism[1]

Rocío Zambrana

The *Science of Logic* is perhaps Hegel's most notoriously impenetrable work.[2] Despite well over a century of commentaries as well as the recent proliferation of scholarship, there exists little agreement concerning the text, whether with regard to particular details or the project of speculative logic in general. Nonetheless, the *Logic* has often been regarded as exemplifying totalizing metaphysics at its worst. Contemporary philosophers concerned with overcoming metaphysics have thus sought to show not only the incoherence of speculative logic but also the perils of Hegel's supposedly totalizing philosophy.

In contrast, showing the continuity between Kant and Hegel has been the strategy for establishing a 'non-metaphysical' view of Hegel's speculative logic.[3] Against readings of Hegel as a metaphysical monist who defends the reality of the Absolute Idea developing in nature and spirit, speculative logic is presented as the absolute-idealist successor to Kantian transcendental logic. Hegel's speculative logic is an 'idealist logic', since it aims at expounding the conditions necessary for the determinacy of any possible object of thought. Speculative logic thus clarifies that experience is dependent on non-empirical concepts and, ultimately, on self-consciousness. Along this interpretative line, Hegel's *Science of Logic* offers an account of thinking as a norm-based activity, and of concepts as rules for fixing determinacy. The great insight of Hegel's *Logic* is, on this view, twofold. First, Hegel's notion of the concept [*der Begriff*] is understood as a holistic-inferential system of logical concepts, since it provides an account of conceptual content as determined by every other possible content.[4] Second, Hegel's analysis of the actualization of the concept — of the concept that has 'made itself the foundation', in Hegel's obscure phrasing — provides an account of the fundamental role of authority involved in the process of fixing determinacy.[5] To be bound to a rule is to acknowledge it as having authority over us and at the same time to institute it as authoritative over the states of affairs that we seek to determine. That Hegel spoke of the freedom of the concept is, therefore, crucial.[6] It suggests that determinacy is ultimately a matter of the *authorization* of reason, of establishing one way of fixing intelligibility over against others.

The status of the normative function of Hegel's formal theory of determinacy, however, remains unclear. The normative function is especially relevant, since the last movement of the *Logic* takes us from an account of determinacy as such to a thinking of nature and eventually *Geist* in a *Realphilosophie*. Does Hegel's formal theory of determinacy simply seek to establish *that*

Bulletin of the Hegel Society of Great Britain 61 (2010) 107-130 © the author

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0263523200001099 Published online by Cambridge University Press

determinacy entails norm-based activity? Or does it establish a norm *for* a philosophical thinking of nature and spirit further along in the system? Even the most sympathetic readers of Hegel's *Logic* resist answering these questions on the basis of the radical formality of the *Logic*. Robert Brandom and Robert Pippin, for example, emphatically reject understanding Hegel's theory of determinacy on the formal grounds that Hegel explicitly pursues in the *Logic*.[7] They argue that Hegel's theory of determinacy ultimately refers to his notion of *Geist*. The normative function of the theory is, therefore, tied to the socio-historical revisability of norms: to their progressive correction through historical development and within institutional embodiments of forms of life.

We miss fundamental aspects of Hegel's theory of determinacy, however, when we reject the formalism of the *Logic*. The last chapter of Hegel's *Logic*, I will argue, holds the key to specifying the status of normativity in Hegel's formal theory of determinacy. In his discussion of the absolute idea, Hegel proposes to think of determinacy in terms of the *self-legislation* of reason — as 'pure personality' [*reine Persönlichkeit*] (SL 841/WL 6: 569). Yet the *Logic* comes to an end with a discussion of *absolute method*. Method, Hegel tells us, is the '*self-knowing* [*sich selbst wissende*] *Notion*' (SL 826/WL 6: 550). As a form of self-knowing, I shall propose, method makes explicit what is implicit in the structure of authorization that the idea designates. Straightforwardly, method clarifies the mode of advance of speculative logic by thematizing its two features: beginning [*Anfang*] and dialectics. What is thematised in Hegel's discussion of beginning and dialectics, I will argue, is the inseparability [*Untrennbarkeit*] or *coimplication* of form and content.[8]

The result of the *Logic*, absolute method, thematises the advance of speculative logic through the *syllogism of method*. As I read Hegel, the syllogism of method effectively *collapses* the distinction between form and content which Hegel took issue with most prominently in the doctrine of essence [*Wesenslogik*]. The meaning of this collapse is neither the sheer positivity of the concept nor the sovereignty of reason, but rather the constitutive negativity of form and the necessity of content that follows from it.[9] Form, for Hegel, is nothing but the negation of immediacy. Negation, then, requires content in order to be negation, to negate a fixed determinacy. Conversely, the positive that results from negation is an alternative determination. For reasons that will become clear below, Hegel seeks to establish the inseparability of form and content through a consideration of form rather than content. Hegel's insistence on showing the inseparability of form and content formally leads him to speak of method as 'absolute form' (SL 826, 839/WL 6: 550, 567), and of logic as 'the science of *absolute form*' (SL 592/WL 6: 254). Indeed, as the universal aspect of the idea, method exists 'wholly as form' (SL 825/WL 6: 550). I call this insistence on form Hegel's *hyperbolic formalism*.

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0263523200001099 Published online by Cambridge University Press

The inseparability of form and content provides a framework for understanding the transition from a speculative exposition of determinacy as such to a speculative exposition of the determinacy of nature and eventually spirit that brings the *Logic* to its end. In thematizing the coimplication of form and content, the concept has 'proved itself to be the absolute foundation [*Grundlage*]' (SL 826/WL 6: 550). The concept as foundation, I will suggest, refers to the philosophical perspective that considers the intelligibility of nature and spirit in terms of the coimplication of form and content. The crucial point is that this coimplication *constrains* the normative function of a philosophical thinking of nature and spirit. The negativity of form and the necessity of content thematised in method establish that, for formal reasons, a norm for thinking matters of nature and spirit cannot be fully stabilised. That is to say, the negativity of form and the necessity of content establish that normative authority is fundamentally *precarious*.

This constellation of themes allows for an assessment of the normative function of Hegel's theory of determinacy. I shall evaluate the normative function of absolute method in conversation with Angelica Nuzzo's work on the idea of method in Hegel's *Logic*.[10] While Nuzzo's account provides a reading of method as a norm *for* a philosophical thinking of the real sciences, I argue that method makes explicit the character and status *of* the concepts involved in the intelligibility of nature and spirit.

I. Absolute Idea and Absolute Method

'The absolute idea', we read in the first sentence of the last chapter of the *Logic*, 'has shown itself to be the identity of the theoretical and the practical idea' (SL 824/WL 6: 547).[11] The absolute idea is the last figure of the *Logic* because it designates the collapse of the distinction between subjectivity and objectivity that occurs when we understand determinacy as self-determination.[12] Through an immanent critique of the logic of essence, Hegel has shown that determinacy is more precisely understood as self-determination. The logic of essence represents an attempt to account for the role of reflective positing, which Hegel shows is a self-defeating endeavour when pursued with dualistic assumptions. In assuming that positing and posited are of different ontological orders, the logic of essence cannot make sense of the contradiction that it falls into, namely, that the presupposed and the posited turn out to be interchangeable positions. Rather than a ground that fully stabilises and hence explains the grounded, determiner and determined are in a reciprocal relation to each other.[13] Determinacy, however, is not the result of a blind reciprocal determination of the concept and its other, but rather involves the authorization of reason. Determinacy is ultimately a product of the freedom of the *Begriff*. It is, therefore, necessary to establish the relation between self-determination and *authority*.

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0263523200001099 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Hegel argues that any account of determinacy that places theory and praxis in separate spheres is misleading. When understood on the basis of dualistic assumptions, both theoretical and practical reason generate a problematic teleology. They strive for but can never reach knowledge beyond experience or a good beyond being. In the chapter on cognition earlier in the *Begriffslogik*, Hegel is interested in making explicit what is implicit in a teleological understanding of determinacy. Implicit in the bad infinity of theoretical and practical cognition is the inseparability of theoretical and practical reason.

The problem that Hegel tracks in his discussion of the theoretical idea (read: Kant's theoretical philosophy) is that the concept stands over against an empirical reality that is beyond its epistemic reach (SL 818/WL 6: 542). The task is thus to give an account of the objectivity of form to be applied to an other that is given, that appears as a 'datum' [*eines Gegebenen*], as Hegel repeatedly says (see e.g. SL 786/WL 6: 500). The project of a transcendental deduction, then, is one of bridging the gap between two independent orders by overcoming the idea's mere subjectivity, that is, by establishing the objectivity of cognition. However, on this model, knowledge remains knowledge of the activity of reflective positing, and cannot extend to the object, to 'reality' or 'determinateness' (SL 817/WL 6: 540). The contradiction here, Hegel argues, is that theoretical cognition strives to know a truth that it itself has named unknowable. More precisely, the unknowable is the true.

Hegel moves on to argue that establishing the objectivity of subjectivity requires action [*Handeln*] (SL 818/WL 6: 540). In the context of the *Logic*, this does not mean that theoretical reason needs to be grounded in an account of the social nature of reason. At this hyperbolically formal register, showing the objectivity of subjectivity means showing *that* the source of the normative authority of determinacy is reason itself. Establishing *that* determinacy ultimately requires normative authority is what allows the subjectivity of positing to have objectivity, to have purchase on knowledge. Determinacy is never a simple given, but a product of reason. For this reason, it requires action.

However, with the practical idea we encounter the inverse problem of the one we encountered with respect to the theoretical idea. Practical cognition (read: Kantian morality) attempts to bridge the gap between cognition and its object by overcoming the objectivity of the idea. It does so by establishing the subjectivity of willing. Yet, the idea of the good that drives the will to its actualization is not in itself realizable, since it is itself an 'absolute end' confronted with a world that it takes to be a fundamental limitation.[14] The good that the will is driven to realise is in itself 'the objective', and reality must receive its true being 'through the ends of the good' (SL 821/WL 6: 545). The contradiction here is the following: willing is said to be the locus of objectivity in seeking to realise itself in the world. Yet it is

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0263523200001099 Published online by Cambridge University Press

equally fully limited by reality, because it can never bring about its end —the good— in full. '[W]hat *limits* the objective notion', Hegel writes, 'is its own view of itself. Through this view it is only standing in its own way, and thus what it has to do is to turn, not against an outer actuality, but against itself' (SL 822/WL 6: 546).

This turning against itself is neither a renunciation of the possibility of its actualization nor the debunking of the idea of the good that is intrinsic to goal oriented activity. It is, rather, the realization that determinacy is a result of the authorization of reason, of the actualization of reality in view of some 'good'. If such good is sustained by reasons, then internal to it is its own possible contestation. On the model that Hegel is criticising, practical cognition ends up losing sight of the fact that determinacy is the result of the reciprocal determination of positing/willing and reality, and that willing is also a form of authorizing that is never fully authorised. As a subjective act, it can be contested, revised, and debunked in light of new reasons for taking something in a different manner. Reality, then, cannot be reduced to the sheer determinacy of the will that endows it with actuality in the good that it seeks. The good is not fully objective but rather subjective and hence *revocable*.[15] For these reasons, Hegel argues that 'what is still lacking in the practical idea is the moment of consciousness proper itself' and that '[a]nother way of regarding this defect is that the *practical* idea still lacks the moment of the *theoretical* idea' (SL 821/WL 6: 544).

Theoretical cognition, then, establishes the objectivity of determinacy by thematizing the role of normative authority in fixing determinacy, that is, by recognising its irreducible practical dimension. Conversely, practical cognition establishes the subjectivity of determinacy by thematizing its revisability. Such thematization establishes the irreducible theoretical dimension of determinacy. The coimplication of the theoretical and the practical announces that the truth of determinacy is not only the concept, but also the authorization of the concept: what Hegel calls 'idea'. In *taking* something to be thus-and-so, in establishing its 'truth' through reasons rather than through an appeal to a given, thinking authorises what has normative authority over it.[16] Determinate being is not only reality that is always already concept, but also idea: concept that is authoritative, yet whose authority is an institution that requires reasons to be upheld. The authority of any idea is thus always *precarious*.

The *absolute idea* is the identity of the theoretical and the practical. It, therefore, designates the structure of authorization that I have discussed. The theoretical and practical idea by themselves are 'one-sided, possessing the idea itself only as a sought-for-beyond and unattained goal; each, therefore, is a *synthesis of endeavor*, and an unattained goal' (SL 824/WL 6: 548).[17] As 'rational notion', as *absolute idea*, however, the idea is 'free subjective notion that is for itself and therefore possesses personality' (ibid.). It is the idea that has authorised specific forms of determinacy through an appeal to reason rather than to a given. This is

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0263523200001099 Published online by Cambridge University Press

not to say that the absolute idea eliminates all opposition encountered in theoretical and practical cognition. On the contrary, in designating the structure of authority of reason, the absolute idea 'contains within itself the highest degree of opposition' (ibid.). It represents the gap between cognition and the given with which, as we have seen, both theory and praxis struggle when their inseparability goes unacknowledged. The identity that the absolute idea represents, therefore, is not an elimination of the gap between knowledge and its object or the will and its good, but rather a thinking of both theoretical and practical cognition together.

While the absolute idea is the category that explains the role of normative authority in determinacy, the self-knowing of this structure is *method*.[18] As a form of absolute knowing,[19] method makes explicit what is implicit in the structure of authorization that the idea designates. The syllogism of method thematises the coimplication of form and content implicit in the gap between cognition and its object.

II. The Collapse of the Form/Content Distinction

Earlier in the *Begriffslogik*, Hegel sets out to show that syllogism [*Schluß*][20] is the truth of judgment [*Urteil*].[21] Determinacy, for Hegel, is a result of patterns of rationality or *inferences* rather than ways of unifying subjects and predicates. While I cannot recount the movement from judgment to syllogism here, we should note that the contradiction in the structure of judgment resides in the relation of subsumption between a subject and a predicate. Subject and predicate are considered as two 'self-subsistents' (SL 629, 665/WL 6: 308, 352). Yet the copula, Hegel argues, in fact 'expresses that the subject is the predicate' (SL 628/WL 6: 307).[22] Hegel is here challenging accounts of predication that maintain a fixed subject to which we apply essential or unessential predicates. The copula, however, already reveals that subject and predicate are not self-subsistents: the content or 'essence' of each is tied to the relation between both. In judgment, the copula remains 'empty' because it provides a mere unification between subject and predicate. The syllogism, in contrast, has the totality of the concept as middle term (SL 665/WL 6: 352).[23] The move from judgment to syllogism, then, is a move away from a notion of mediation as unification. The relation between concepts on the model of syllogism is one of inferential patterns that fix determinacy within a system of relations.

Hegel introduces the syllogism of method by repeating the challenge to the modern notion of method that he most famously launches in the Introduction to the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. 'In the cognition of inquiry [*suchenden Erkennen*]', Hegel reiterates in the *Logic*, method is an 'instrument [*Werkzeug*] ... a means standing on the subjective side by which this side relates itself to the object' (SL 827/WL 6:

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0263523200001099 Published online by Cambridge University Press

551). Accounts of determinacy that attempt to clarify their own mode of proceeding and standards for accuracy before beginning their inquiry assume that form and content are of different orders, since they presuppose that their norms of assessment can be settled in abstraction from such content. For Hegel, there is no way to establish the forms to be applied independently of their application or to determine the study of a subject matter without already appealing to assumptions about its content.

In the *Logic*, Hegel pursues his critique by modeling the method of cognition of inquiry and absolute method on the hypothetical and the disjunctive syllogisms respectively. With respect to the cognition of inquiry, method is the middle term that mediates between the subject and the object, which occupy the two extremes of syllogism. So understood, method generates a set of problems akin to those generated by the hypothetical syllogism: 'If A is, then B is; But A is; Therefore B is' (SL 698/WL 6: 394). The problem with the hypothetical syllogism, Hegel argues, is that the subject 'does not unite with itself' (SL 827/WL 6: 551). Because the necessity of the inference is contingent upon the first premise, the subject is merely reasserted; the inference merely expresses in a different way what the hypothesis stated.[24] The premise remains a given — as 'found existing in the subject' (SL 827/WL 6: 551). The problem with the hypothetical syllogism, therefore, is like the problem of the necessity of causality. The necessity of causality resides in the law-like relation between cause and effect, not in the material factors involved. It establishes abstract necessity, a mere law. Thus, it is mere form to be applied to content.[25] For this reason, the hypothetical syllogism is a 'formal syllogism' (ibid.). Similarly, method unites the subject with the conclusion, but it does so as an application of form onto content that does not take into account content but merely asserts what is already contained in form. Method is here mere instrument — external form.

Unlike in the cognition of inquiry, in true cognition [*wahrhaften Erkennen*], method is absolute. In absolute method 'the notion is the middle term only because it has equally the significance of the objective, and consequently in the conclusion the objective does not merely attain an external determinateness by means of the method, but is posited in its identity with the subjective notion' (SL 827/WL 6: 551). Absolute method posits the identity of the objective and subjective. What does this mean? It is helpful to recall the form of the disjunctive syllogism. In the chapter on the syllogism, Hegel explains that in the disjunctive syllogism 'A is either B or C or D; But A is B; Therefore A is neither C nor D or again: A is either B or C or D; But A is neither C nor D; Therefore A is B' (SL 701-2/WL 6: 398). Given his critique of the hypothetical syllogism, one would think that Hegel argues that what occurs in the disjunctive syllogism is a union-with-self of the concept. What is in fact happening in the disjunctive syllogism is the *collapse* of syllogism:

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0263523200001099 Published online by Cambridge University Press

> [T]he truth of the hypothetical syllogism, namely the unity of the mediating and the mediated, is *posited* in the disjunctive syllogism, which for this reason is equally *no longer a syllogism* at all. For the middle term, which is posited in it as the totality of the notion, contains itself the two extremes in their complete determinateness. (SL 702/WL 6: 398)

As disjunctive, the syllogism effectively collapses because no mediation — *understood as the connection between two independent terms* — is occurring. The disjunctive syllogism makes explicit that mediation cannot be consistently thought as the work of a medium of two extremes. Instead, mediation must be thought of as the coimplication of the extremes. When considering the disjunctive form, then, we are speaking of a system of relations within which specific determinations are specified through their location in logical space.[26] This does not mean that Hegel is proposing the full presence of non-mediation, of the concept that has caught up with itself in a static holistic totality. While the disjunctive syllogism is a collapsed syllogism, mediation itself is not cancelled. It is re-described as *determinate negation.* Elements in a syllogism are related to each other by way of relations of inclusion and exclusion via *negation.* The totality thus does not comprise relations between fixed determinations, which would provide the background for individuation. Rather, the totality is nothing but the inferential processes of inclusion and exclusion that fix identity precisely in and through such inferential moves.[27] Negation specifies determinacy of an individual via inferential moves that coextensively institute the totality of relations involved in the inference itself. The middle term is hence 'complete determinateness'; it is not the medium that unites two extremes, but rather the totality of the concept. [28]

Hegel's account of the syllogism is crucial for understanding why the speculative movement of the concept is not teleological. The advance of speculative logic is neither the progression toward a predetermined goal, nor the development of an inherent good. Determinacy is fixed and debunked through the totality of negative *and* positive inferential relations between concepts. Such development does not culminate in the full positivity of the concept. Rather, as we shall see, the totality of positive and negative relations between concepts culminates in the awareness of the constitutive negativity of determinacy in method.

It is no accident that Hegel calls both the disjunctive syllogism and absolute method 'absolute form' (SL 701, 839/WL 6: 397, 567). Both the disjunctive syllogism and absolute method establish the totality of logical space implied by the determinacy of any individual determination. As absolute form,

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0263523200001099 Published online by Cambridge University Press

however, does not method reinstate rather than collapse the distinction between form and content? How does Hegel avoid falling back into a one-sided account of determinacy if the result of the *Logic* is an unequivocal privileging of form over content? There are crucial reasons for siding with form against content at the highest point of the text, at its *result*. Speculative logic can only make explicit the features of determinacy as such through a consideration of form rather than content. It can only work from the side of form because the sense of any content is inseparable from reflective positing.[29] Furthermore, the inseparability of form and content cannot follow from an account of content without form, because we would be unable to establish the necessity of this identity. At best, we would establish the necessity of such unity in an individual, rather than in individuality as such. Yet at this point in the text, in the exposition of its result, Hegel raises the stakes of arguing in favor of form over content. The argument is that the negativity of form requires content in order to proceed as determinate negation in the first place.

The collapse of the hypothetical syllogism is a dissolution of the inadequate distinction between the form of cognition and its content, mediating and mediated.[30] Indeed, the collapse of the syllogism earlier in the *Begriffslogik* provides the transition from the subjective forms of concept, judgment, and syllogism to the objective processes of mechanism, chemism, and teleology. This collapse, Hegel argues, leads to reality as positedness, and hence '*eine Sache*', Hegel says, 'that is in and for itself —objectivity' (SL 704/WL 6: 400). The dissolution of the distinction between subjectivity and objectivity allows us to speak not only of the determinacy of the concept as self-determination, as the result of the reciprocal relation between determiner and determined. It also allows us to speak of the determinacy of the 'other' of the concept as self-determination, as the result of the reciprocal relation between determiner and determined. This means that we can speak of the basic categories of determinacy of objective, natural processes (chemical or mechanical processes) as processes that are *in and for themselves*, rather than as subjectively posited. By making explicit the role of subjective positing, the role of objective determination can thus also be made explicit. This is possible when we abandon models of judgment and inference that are parasitic on a notion of mediation between two extremes that require bridging.

Similarly, absolute method does not follow the logic of mediation qua medium. Method thematises the unity of the mediating and mediated as what has been implicit throughout the *Logic*. Like the collapse of the syllogism that allows for the transition from subjectivity to objectivity, method allows for an understanding of the determinacy of the 'other' of the concept as self-determination — an understanding that, as we will see below, amounts to the passage from speculative logic to the *Naturphilosophie*. For the moment, however, it is necessary to say more about the status of the syllogism of method.

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0263523200001099 Published online by Cambridge University Press

As the self-knowing that brings the *Logic* to its end,[31] method thematises the two features of the advance of speculative logic: beginning and dialectics. The two features of the advance are developed via a discussion of the coextensively analytic and synthetic movement of the concept.[32] Indeed, Hegel speaks of the syllogism of method as containing analysis and synthesis as its premises (SL 830, 836/WL 6: 556, 563).[33] I suggest reading Hegel's discussion of method as the analytic-synthetic movement of the concept as the coimplication of form and content. The movement of the concept is both analytic and synthetic insofar as, in being sheer negativity, the negative movement of the concept requires content.

Hegel's characterisation of method as analytic-synthetic recalls his critique of Kant's distinction between analysis and synthesis laid out most prominently in the chapter on cognition. There, Hegel is mostly interested in Kant's distinction as a matter of explication [*Entwicklung*], as a question of the extension of knowledge in synthetic judgment.[34] Once again, Hegel frames the problem, on the one hand, as the inconsistency of subjective idealism, which represents analysis as a sheer positing that leaves the thing-in-itself beyond it, and, on the other hand, as the inconsistency of realism, which characterises determinacy as simply apprehended (ibid.). These two positions express but fail to realise that determinacy is 'a positing that no less immediately determines itself as a presupposing' (ibid.), that determinacy is already something 'complete in the object' as well as 'posited by subjective activity'. Because positing and presupposing are reciprocally related, analysis is at the same time synthesis. What does this mean?

Let me first recall that Hegel's extension of Kant does not attempt finally to bridge the gap between mind and world by performing a deduction of the existence of objects of thought or the rationality of being in itself. It aims at making explicit the role of reflective positing and, ultimately, of the authority of reason in the self-determination of the concept *and* its other. Along these lines, Pippin suggests that we bear in mind that Hegel's extension of Kant's idealism is based on the claim that a transcendental deduction fails to give an account of a possible object of thought. In aiming at giving an account of the conditions of possibility of experience, Kant only provides an analysis of the notion of an apperceptive subject. However, the account of apperceptive judging presupposes a 'nonanalytic claim about the proper way to understand the relation between spontaneous human thought and objectivity' (Pippin 1989: 252). The very notion of the *a priori*, Hegel argues, presupposes that pure concepts are appropriate to provide determinacy to an object of thought, and hence to the 'other' of thought. Analysis of the concept is also its synthetic extension, since specifying what is contained in a concept that is assumed to be able to provide the determinacy of objects of thought is also an explication of the way in which it provides such determinacy to the 'other' of thought. For Hegel, then, the fact that the analysis of

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0263523200001099 Published online by Cambridge University Press

the concept turns out to *extend* our understanding of it calls into question a strict distinction between the analytic and the synthetic.[35] The determinateness of what is merely found and is to be analysed, *whether sheer positing or apprehended determinacy*, suggests that it is already related to the other (SL 793/WL 6: 510). The explication of the concept is, therefore, also its extension; its extension is but an explication of what is contained in it or — more precisely — presupposed by it. An account of determinacy thus entails an account of both reflective positing *and* 'reality' or 'determinateness'.

In the discussion of absolute method, analysis is the 'immediate relationship to its other' (beginning), and synthesis 'the relation of the differentiated term as such to the term from which it is differentiated' (dialectics). The point of discussing beginning once more at the end of the *Logic* is to examine how the advance of speculative logic got underway, and what was necessary for such an advance to be carried forward in the first place.[36] In order to *arrive* at the account of determinacy the *Logic* offers immanently — without appeal to a first principle or given — the beginning must have been 'deficient' (SL 829/WL 6: 554). Making explicit what is implicit in determinacy is possible because the purported immediacy and stability of the beginning turned out to be already in relation to an other, hence not immediate at all.[37] Rather than taking the deficiency of the beginning as a sign of arbitrariness given the limitation of human knowledge, absolute method knows the incompleteness of the beginning to be necessary 'because truth only comes to be itself through the negativity of immediacy' (SL 841/WL 6: 569). The crucial point here is that absolute method thematises this negativity as a necessary feature of determinacy. Negativity shows that the movement of the concept requires content; its relation to its other is precisely what maintains it.[38]

In being 'infected' with negativity (SL 829/WL 6: 554), the concept itself *requires* content. The advance of speculative logic depends on more than the movement generated by negativity; it depends on the content through which negativity finds traction as a *relation* of qualitative or quantitative opposition (in the logic of being) or *interchangeability* of ground and grounded (in the logic of essence). Negation requires content in order to be negation, to negate what is a fixed determinacy; and the positive that results from negation is an alternative 'determination' or content. Analysis is, therefore, described as the negative, and synthesis as the negative of the negative, which represents a return to immediacy, to 'determinateness'. In thematizing the constitutive negativity of form, the necessity of content has been demonstrated throughout the *Logic*: 'Its [the concept's] determinateness as content is no longer something merely picked up, but something deduced and proven' (SL 838/WL 6: 566).[39] While in the *Logic* the content is specified philosophically, with reference to determinacy as such, the

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0263523200001099 Published online by Cambridge University Press

necessity of content compels the movement from a philosophical exposition of determinacy to an exposition of the determinacy of nature and eventually spirit.

III. Normativity in Hegel's *Logic*

The necessity of content that follows from the constitutive negativity of form provides a framework for understanding the transition to the *Naturphilosophie* at the end of the *Logic*. Method allows the passage from the speculative exposition of determinacy as such to the speculative exposition of the determinacy of nature and spirit, where conceptual content refers to categories such as space, time, motion, life, and so on.[40] The transition is important, since it will allow us to specify the status of the normativity of method.

'On the new foundation constituted by the result as the fresh subject matter', Hegel writes, 'the method remains the same as with the previous subject matter. The difference is concerned solely with the relationship of the foundation as such' (SL 838/WL 6: 566). It is this relationship that is crucial. It indicates that, at this point in the text, method, the self-knowing of the idea, is not only a retrospective redescription of the advance of speculative logic. Method is also prospective. The prospective movement of method is a *way* of thinking the determinacy of objectivity that contains the central insight of speculative exposition, namely, the constitutive negativity of form and the necessity of content that follows from it. In collapsing the form/content distinction, method becomes a method *of* thinking nature and spirit in a *Realphilosophie*.

While method will offer a way of thinking matters of nature and spirit, the passage to nature and spirit is tied to the structure of authorization discussed under the banner of the absolute idea. The transition between the *Logic* and the *Naturphilosophie* is, in fact, not a transition *per se*, not an *Übergang*, but rather a 'free release' [*frei entläßt*] of the idea. Qua logical, the idea is 'enclosed within pure thought' (SL 843/WL 6: 571).[41] In order to examine something other than itself — that is, other than pure thinking— the idea requires an 'unclosing' that Hegel characterises in terms of *freedom*. The idea '*freely releases* itself' and 'by reason of this freedom, the form of determinateness is also utterly free — the externality of space and time exist on its own account without the moment of subjectivity' (SL 843/WL 6: 572).[42]

How should we understand the free release of the idea? Many commentators have argued that, as a free act, the release should be understood as a decision, an *Entschluß*. The status of decision, however, has been widely disputed.[43] Hegel has been read (perhaps most famously by Marx) as proposing that speculative thought is in some way the creator of nature. In this vein, the free act of decision has been cited by critics of Hegel as evidence for his theological or

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0263523200001099 Published online by Cambridge University Press

ontotheological commitments. It has also been read as the logical grounding of nature, insofar as the presuppositionless exposition of determinacy shows that being is nothing less than nature itself (Houlgate). Along this line, the return to a discussion of the idea at the end of the *Logic* would establish the rationality of being itself. More recently, as we will see in detail in a moment, it has been argued that the decision refers to the choice of finite thinkers to think according to reason, thus establishing the normative character of speculative logic (Nuzzo). Finally, it has also been suggested that the transition to the *Naturphilosophie* represents a normative distinction (rather than an ontological divide) between an account of phenomena that refers to their ontological status and an account that refers to their status as phenomena of nature (Pippin).

In my view, the transition from nature to spirit does not amount to an ontological grounding of nature,[44] but rather to normative distinctions that articulate ontological *commitments* along philosophical, natural, and eventually socio-historical lines. However, this transition is not a full determination of the other of the concept —nature— by thought. As I read Hegel, he speaks of the passage as a 'free release' in order to avoid suggesting such full determination. As the comprehension of the coimplication of form and content, method is the determinate moment of the *Logic* that spells out the fundamental negativity of determinacy. It, therefore, shows why specific determinations of nature (ways of accounting for phenomena as natural) or spirit (ways of accounting for socio-historical practices) require the *authorization* of reason. The free release of the idea thus refers back to the autonomy of reason. Indeed, the freedom of the idea that takes us from a philosophical to a *realphilosophische* account of determinacy refers to the authority of ways in which the determinacy of nature or spirit is fixed. A critical account of determinacy within a *Realphilosophie* cannot appeal to a given, but must establish the authority of specific determinations through an appeal to reason. As we will see, however, Hegel's discussion of absolute method suggests that a critical account of determinacy must grapple with the consequences of the negativity of form for the authority of specific contents (of ways of understanding nature or social institutions). The most significant consequence, I will argue, has to do with the constraints that such negativity places on the normative authorization of reason. It is at this point, then, that we can assess the function of absolute method for a thinking of nature and spirit.

Angelica Nuzzo is among the few scholars who have provided a systematic interpretation of Hegel's idea of absolute method. In an important essay entitled 'The Idea of Method in Hegel's *Science of Logic*', Nuzzo argues that the task of the final movement of the *Logic* is to develop a notion of philosophical knowledge that includes both the knowing that has been at work in the *Logic* and the knowledge of the real sciences (Nuzzo 1999: 5-6). Method provides a norm for philosophical thinking along epistemic and ontological lines, which provides a

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0263523200001099 Published online by Cambridge University Press

normative perspective from which to engage the real sciences. As the universal aspect of the idea, Nuzzo argues, method is both the ontological modality of being and the epistemological modality of cognition. As a modality of knowing, 'method is the way in which all subjective knowledge works insofar as it implies a self-knowing of reason', and as a modality of being, 'it expresses the substantiality of things, their objective, immanent and rational structure'.[45]

Thinking in terms of the strictures of method, Nuzzo maintains, is 'thinking and living in the dimension of truth and freedom' (Nuzzo 1999: 8). To live in the dimension of truth and freedom is to be an embodied, finite thinker[46] who can approach knowledge of nature and spirit from a *Vernunftig* rather than *Verständlich* perspective.[47] It is to submit finite knowing and acting to the 'infinite power' of reason; that is, to consider finite knowing and acting as moments of the process of the 'final unity of reason'. This type of assessment can only take place from the philosophical perspective laid out in the *Logic*, where logical determinations have been clarified. Method, in this way, 'describes the *form* in which the self-knowing *idea itself is in our thinking*'.

Nuzzo highlights the opposition that for Hegel is contained within the absolute idea. To engage in philosophical knowing is to overcome the resistance of the finite that is intrinsic to the infinite unfolding of reason.[48] The opposition between the finite and the infinite power of reason allows not only for an anti-teleological account of reason, but also for an anti-deterministic one.[49] While finite knowing and acting find their truth in recognising that they are a moment within the unity of reason, rational assessment by finite thinkers is not an 'automatic' necessity. The standpoint of method, of reason, is not immediately given: the 'finite must relate to reason through the method in order to be true' (Nuzzo 1999: 7). Thinking in terms of method, therefore, represents a *decision* of finite thinkers to take on the project of philosophical knowing that can, in turn, guide a critical investigation of nature and spirit. Relating to reason, Nuzzo argues, is thus to be understood as a free *choice* that not only must be taken in order to begin philosophical inquiry, but must also be continuously renewed.[50] This free choice, furthermore, represents an 'obligation'. To decide to undertake a commitment is to follow the imperative that such a commitment entails. Whoever is committed to truth must be responsible for following the strictures of method, for following the imperative to think in terms of the necessity of reason rather than the contingency of an isolated moment of reason. Method is, therefore, not a set of rules that facilitate the achievement of a given goal. It is the 'imperative that prescribes at every new level of the process how to set a new goal and invent the means to reach it' (Nuzzo 1999: 8). Indeed, the commitment to the dialectical method must be continuously renewed, since at any point finite thinkers have the choice to give up the attempt to think and live according to reason. The lesson of

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0263523200001099 Published online by Cambridge University Press

method is, accordingly, 'not *that* reason will necessarily be victorious over its otherness, but that *if* reason wants to succeed in the task of knowledge of the world and action in it, it *must* follow the prescriptions of the method' (Nuzzo 1999: 9). Absolute method is thus the norm *for* what knowledge can become when finite thinkers engage in speculative philosophy. It is not a mere description of the idea within our thinking; it is a demand to think and live according to the strictures of method, which is to say, to think and live within reason.

My reading inverts the roles that Nuzzo allocates to the absolute idea and absolute method. Rather than providing a norm *for* the thinking of nature and spirit, method, in my view, makes explicit the formal features *of* the concepts and norms with which we articulate nature and spirit. To be sure, Nuzzo does not argue that method represents *a* norm but, rather, the demand to assess the finite in light of its position within the unity of reason. However, there are several reasons why it is the absolute idea that should be understood as designating the imperative to think in terms of the authority of reasons, while method should be understood as making explicit what is implicit in the process of authorization.[51]

The main reason why I resist characterising method as normative has to do with the *constraints* that the coimplication of form and content places on the normative function of philosophical thinking in a *Realphilosophie*. The significance of method, I have argued, resides in the fact that it thematises the constitutive negativity of form and the necessity of content that follows from it. Method makes explicit that dialectics — the inseparability of the positive and the negative[52] — is the central feature of *form*, not merely an effect (or defect) of content. Such constitutive negativity transforms the way in which we think of the authority of reason. It follows from the negativity of form that any content is never fully stable or fixed, that is, it is never fully authorised.

Specifically, making explicit the coimplication of form and content changes how we understand the authority of concepts that play central roles in discourses of nature and spirit. Given the negativity of form, the authority of concepts that play an organising role in articulating the intelligibility of nature and spirit must be thought in terms of their irreducibly dialectical character. Method *informs* a critical thinking of nature and eventually spirit, since it makes explicit the constitutive negativity of the concepts that articulate the determinacy of nature and spirit. Yet it does not provide a norm for thinking nature and spirit, since it explains *that* the authoritative hold of *realphilosophische* concepts can lose their grip; indeed, it explains *that* such a grip cannot be fully secured in the first place. For this reason, however, specific forms of thinking nature and spirit require the authorization of reason. Thus, method thematises that the authority of specific forms of determinacy can always lose their grip, that they are institutions to be maintained, and hence that they are fundamentally precarious.

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0263523200001099 Published online by Cambridge University Press

To sum up, then, as the inseparability of the theoretical and the practical, the absolute idea denotes the structure of authorization at work in determinacy. It explains the relationship between normativity and authority. Yet the constitutive negativity of form that method thematises has consequences for how one understands the normative function of the idea, since it clarifies that a unifying norm or normative standpoint of reason cannot be fully stabilised. It follows that the constitutive negativity of concepts shows that normative thinking of nature and spirit must refer to the specificity of the *content* of the real sciences. Method thus provides an explanation of why the assessment of given forms of determinacy must refer to their content, namely, to what is upheld as authoritative within the context of the real sciences.

Consequently, the relation of the new subject matter (nature) and subsequent subject matters (spirit) to the foundation — to method — is one that takes into account the constitutive negativity of authoritative concepts. The coimplication of form and content establishes that the determinacy of nature and spirit involves the authorisation of reason, yet such authority is never given or secured. The normative function of Hegel's formal theory of determinacy, therefore, resides in establishing *that* specific forms of determinacy must be authorised by reason. The point of Hegel's hyperbolic formalism is that — for *formal* reasons — authorisation must be understood as constitutively precarious. Authorization must reckon with the lack of finality and stability of any given form determination with which nature and spirit is articulated.

Rocío Zambrana
The New School for Social Research
zambrana.rocio@gmail.com

Notes

[1]This paper was presented at a symposium on the closing argument of Hegel's *Science of Logic* hosted by the Society for Systematic Philosophy and held at the 2009 Meeting of the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association. I would like to thank Richard Dien Winfield for his kind invitation to participate in the symposium. I am deeply grateful to Jay Bernstein, Richard Bernstein, Karen Ng, Angelica Nuzzo, and Martin Hägglund for helpful comments on and incisive questions about this essay.

[2] Abbreviations:
PG: Hegel (1969c), cited by page number.
PS: Hegel (1977), cited by paragraph number.
SL: Hegel (1969b), cited by page number.
WL: Hegel (1969a), cited by volume and page number.

[3] The term 'non-metaphysical' is Klaus Hartmann's 1977. See also especially Pippin 1989 and 2008, Pinkard 1979, 1988, 1996 and 2002, Brandom 1991 and

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0263523200001099 Published online by Cambridge University Press

2005, and Longuenesse 2007. Although these Hegel scholars have argued that Hegel's idealism must be read as extending rather than rejecting Kant's brand of idealism, their positions cannot be neatly assimilated.

[4] Brandom 1991 and 2005.

[5] Pippin 2008.

[6] For example, Hegel writes that '[w]ith the Notion ... we have entered the realm of freedom' (SL 582/WL 6: 250).

[7] See Brandom 1991 and 2005, and Pippin 2008.

[8] In my view, the term 'coimplication' is appropriate here and throughout insofar as the inseparability of form and content is not to be understood as an elimination of the distinction between them, but rather as their reciprocal relation that changes the identity of each through its entwinement with the other. For an analogous conceptual move, see Putnam 2002, where he argues that the entanglement between fact and value collapses the purported dichotomy between them.

[9] See Hägglund 2010, who pursues a formally similar argument. I would like to thank Hägglund, with whom I had inspiring discussions about the arguments in this essay.

[10] Nuzzo 1999; see also Nuzzo 2005, 2006 and 2007.

[11] The exposition of the idea is an exposition of the concept of life and of theoretical and practical cognition as the presuppositions of the freedom of the concept. The absolute idea is thus also a return to life. For reasons of space and focus, I shall only examine Hegel's exposition of theoretical and practical cognition.

[12] See Winfield 2006 for an alternative gloss on self-determination as reciprocal determination between determiner and determined. Although my account differs from Winfield's, my characterisation of determinacy as a reciprocal determination between determiner and determined is indebted to his work.

[13] The discussion of the idea in the last section of the *Logic* is, for this reason, a return to a discussion of the relation between the subjective notion and objectivity. The idea 'has not merely the more general meaning of the *true being*, of the unity of Notion and *reality*, but the more specific one of the unity of *subjective Notion* and objectivity' (SL 758/WL 6: 465).

[14] Thus, the world is thought of as 'the evil or the indifferent, the merely determinable, whose worth does not reside in it' (SL 821/WL 6: 545).

[15] The subjective moment in Hegel's account of morality is not an assertion of a moment of full subjectivity or some version of an ineffable experience —a view he famously rejected via his critique of conscience and romantic irony. On the contrary, it is a recognition that subjective reasons are always contestable and in contestation.

[16] Earlier in the text, Hegel states that the idea must give itself reality: 'It must certainly be admitted that the concept as such is not yet complete, but it must rise to the idea which alone is the unity of the concept and reality; and this must be shown in the sequel to be the spontaneous outcome of the nature of the concept itself. For the reality that the concept gives itself must not be received by it as something external but must, in accordance with the requirement of science, be

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0263523200001099 Published online by Cambridge University Press

derived from the concept itself' (SL 587/WL 6: 257). The concept gives itself reality insofar as any content is fixed through an appeal to the authority of reason. Reason is what, ultimately, settles specific ways of fixing determinacy over others. See Pippin 2008: 34, 98 and 101.

[17] Furthermore, reality, essence, and concept, within which the structure of authority of reason remains merely implicit, lead to 'error, confusion, opinion, endeavor, caprice, and transitoriness' (SL 824/WL 6: 548).

[18] '[M]ethod', Hegel writes, 'has emerged as the *self-knowing Notion that has itself*, as the absolute, both subjective and objective, *for its subject matter*' (SL 826/WL 6: 550).

[19] Hegel writes: '[S]pirit cognises the Idea as its *absolute truth*, as the truth that is in and for itself, the infinite Idea in which cognition and action are equalised which is the *absolute knowledge of itself*' (SL 760/WL 6: 468). Nuzzo has provided a compelling rubric for understanding the status of 'absolute' in Hegel. She points out that the most significant uses of the term 'absolute' in Hegel are adjectival rather than nominative (e.g., absolute knowing, absolute spirit, the absolute idea). 'In Hegel's speculative philosophy', Nuzzo writes, '"absolute" is not the highest *ens* of an ontology, but rather the term that designates the way in which the structures of thinking, cognition, and knowing function once they are grounded in the speculative method' (Nuzzo 1999: 14).

[20] Some helpful discussions of Hegel's notion of *Schluß* include: Rinaldi 1992, Winfield 2006, Stern 1990 and Burbidge 2004. See also Redding 1996 for an excellent account of the relation between *Schluß* and *Anerkennung*. Of course, Brandom's work on Hegel is the most sustained and sophisticated reconstruction of Hegel's emphasis on syllogism over judgment. Longuenesse 2007 (chapter 6) argues against syllogism in favour of judgment.

[21] With the apodictic judgment, the copula is 'impregnated', that is, subject and object correspond to each other in content (see SL 662/WL 6: 349). 'Through th[e] impregnation of the copula the judgment has become syllogism' (SL 663/WL 6: 350).

[22] Cf. Hegel's discussion of the speculative proposition in the Preface to the *Phenomenology of Sprit*, especially PS 63/PG 59. On speculative propositions, see Surber 1975, Sallis 1997, Lau 2006 and Nuzzo 2006.

[23] There is of course much to say about all of the forms of syllogism that Hegel discusses —existence, reflection, and necessity— and about the fact that there is no syllogism of the concept. In the interest of focus, I will only discuss the collapse of the syllogism that the transition from the hypothetical syllogism to the disjunctive syllogism prompts and that leads to a consideration of objectivity.

[24] See Burbidge 2004: 155.

[25] See Winfield 2006: 125, and Burbidge 2004: 155.

[26] See Brandom 1991 for an incisive version of Hegel's holism.

[27] For a discussion of the problem of strong versus weak holism in Hegel and Brandom, see Pippin 2005.

[28] For this reason, the disjunctive syllogism does not yield a blind infinity that fails to specify the determinacy of any individual because it attempts to account for an

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0263523200001099 Published online by Cambridge University Press

infinity of relations of exclusion (the problem encountered in the *Seinslogik*). The form of the disjunctive syllogism establishes that determinacy is fixed — rather than made impossible — by a totality of relations of inclusion and exclusion. The threat of bad infinity is, furthermore, dispelled by the necessity of content that follows from the collapse of the syllogism, and which allows for an explication of objectivity.

[29] See Pippin 2008: 102: 'Hegel can be seen to be making a point similar to the one made by Sellars in a linguistic context, that the objective grasp of a concept is nothing other than the mastery of the correct use of a word, and hence, in Brandom's extension of this Sellersian claim, that the sense of any possible not-I, let us say, any objective content is inseparably linked to the structure of our asserting and inferring and justifying practices (our *Setzen*, let us say)'.

[30] 'In the consummation of the syllogism', Hegel writes in the chapter on syllogism, 'where objective universality is no less posited as totality of the form determinations, the distinction of mediating and mediated has disappeared. That which is mediated is itself an essential moment of what mediates it, and each moment appears as the totality of what is mediated' (SL 703/WL 6: 399).

[31] Insightful discussions of the notion of *das Ende* in Hegel include Houlgate 2005, Winfield 2009, Rose 1981, and Nuzzo 2005. Nuzzo rightly stresses the significance of *self-knowing* for an adequate understanding of the notion of an end of both phenomenological exposition (with the figure of absolute knowing in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*) and speculative exposition (with the figure of the absolute idea in the *Science of Logic*). As will become clear in what follows, I take Nuzzo's suggestion that the self-knowing of cognition is precisely what is at stake in 'ending' logical exposition in a different direction. I argue that the notion of the end of logic has to do with thematising the role of normative authority for determinacy, and the precariousness of such authority. I, therefore, give an expressivist reading of method, albeit in a non-Brandomian sense, since I argue that method makes explicit the structure of authorization analysed under the banner of the absolute idea yet understood in light of the inseparability of form and content.

[32] This introduces a crucial yet huge topic —the analytic-synthetic distinction. I shall address Hegel's engagement with this issue locally, only with respect to the discussion at hand. For helpful if eclectic discussions of this topic, see Pippin 1989, Longuenesse 2007, Winfield 2006, Stern 1990, Rockmore 2005 and Redding 2007.

[33] Method is analytic insofar as it 'find[s] the further determination of its initial universal simply and solely in that universal' (SL 830/WL 6: 556). 'But the method is no less *synthetic*', Hegel adds, 'since its subject matter, determined immediately as a simple universal, by virtue of the determinateness which it possesses in its very immediacy and universality, exhibits itself as an other'.

[34] The problem tackled by analytic and synthetic cognition is, in Hegel's words, the problem of '*explication* of what is already in the object, because the object is itself nothing but the totality of the notion' (SL 788/WL 6: 502). See Kant A7/B11. For a helpful discussion of the distinction in the first *Critique*, see Proops 2005.

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0263523200001099 Published online by Cambridge University Press

[35] There is much more to say about Hegel's critique, especially concerning the self-corrective movement of the concept which, for Hegel, is an additional way in which the analysis of the concept is also its extension. For reasons of space and focus, I do not discuss this here.

[36] The significance of beginning resides in the very strategy that Hegel pursues in the *Logic*. I agree with Pippin when he argues that the *Logic* advances by way of *reductio*. Speculative logic shows the impossibility of immediacy and hence the irreducibility of mediation (see Pippin 1989). The truth of the *Logic*, what it has made explicit, is that implicit in being is not only essence but also concept. However, the truth of being is not only concept, but also idea: concept that is authoritative. Along these lines, Hegel argues that the 'forthgoing' movement of speculative exposition, the 'further determination' of speculative logic is 'also a withdrawal inwards, and the greater extension is equally higher intensity' (SL 840-41/WL 6: 569). Hegel describes such intensity as 'pure personality [*reine Persönlichkeit*] which solely through the absolute dialectic which is its nature, no less embraces and holds everything within itself, because it makes itself supremely free —the simplicity which is the first immediacy and universality' (SL 841/WL 6: 569). The movement of the concept is pure personality, highest intensity, insofar as it appeals only to itself, to the self-legislating character of reason, for its authority.

[37] This first dialectic has been the subject of great debate within Hegel scholarship. See Dieter Henrich's 'Anfang und Methode der Logik' (1971). See also, for example, Tugenhadt 1976 and Michael Rosen's 1982 engagement with it; see also Rohs 1974 and John McCumber's 1993 engagement with it; Michelet 1876 and the discussion of his position in Rinaldi 1992; see also Gadamer 1982, Haas 2000, Winfield 1988, Burbidge 1988 and 2007.

[38] 'The universal', Hegel writes, 'first, considered in and for itself, shows itself to be the other of itself' (SL: 833-34/WL: 6: 560).

[39] The German reads: '*ihre Bestimmtheit als Inhalt ist daher nicht mehr ein bloß Aufgenommenes, sondern* Abgeleitetes *und* Erwiesenes' (WL 6: 566).

[40] Or, further on in the system, subjective and objective *geistige* categories, such as sentience, self-feeling, habit and so on, all the way to the categories of abstract right, morality, and ethical life.

[41] The German reads: '*diese Idee noch logisch, sie ist in den reinen Gedanken eingeschlossen*' (WL 6: 571).

[42] The crucial passage reads in full as follows: 'The idea, namely, in positing itself as absolute *unity* of the pure notion and its reality and thus contracting itself into the immediacy of *being* is the *totality* in this form—nature. But this determination has not issued from a process of becoming, nor is it a transition, as when above, the subjective notion in its totality becomes objectivity, and the subjective end becomes life. On the contrary, the pure idea in which the determinateness or reality of the notion is itself raised into notion, is an absolute liberation [*absolute Befreiung*] for which there is no longer any immediate determination that is not equally posited and itself notion; in this freedom, therefore, no transition takes place. ... The passage is understood rather in this manner, that the idea *freely releases* itself in its absolute self-assurance and inner poise [*daß die Idee sich selbst* frei entläßt,

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0263523200001099 Published online by Cambridge University Press

ihrer absolut sicher und in sich ruhend]. By reason of this freedom, the form of determinateness is also utterly free—the externality of space and time exist on its own account without the moment of subjectivity [*die absolut für sich selbst ohne Subjektivität seiende* Äußerlichkeit des Raums und der Zeit]' (SL: 843/WL: 6: 572).

[43] See, for example, Marx 1976: 102, Wallace 2005: 269, Inwood 1992: 195ff., Houlgate 2005: 106ff., Nuzzo 1999, and Pippin 2008: 112.

[44] It is, of course, of great significance that Kant considered space and time as pure forms of intuition rather than as categories themselves (as Aristotle had). Doing so allowed him to reject an idealism that asserts the capacity of thinking to *create* the spatio-temporal. But it is for the same reason that, in my view, Hegel placed space and time as categories of nature, not as forms of intuition (or even categories of thought) thus restricting the status of speculative knowing to a dialectics of positing and posited, rather than to projection onto or apprehension of pure being. See Hegel (1970). For reasons of space and focus, I cannot develop this thought here.

[45] 'Method', Nuzzo argues along these lines, 'is knowledge of things in their truth and the objective truth of things' (Nuzzo 1999: 7).

[46]. Nuzzo argues that, in characterising the absolute idea as the unity of life and cognition, Hegel's method of philosophical thinking refers to the 'embodied finite knowledge that has run thoroughly through all the logical determinations as determinations of its own ... knowledge in order to eventually identify with the self-conscious form of the idea' (Nuzzo 1999: 3).

[47] Concerning the relation between *Vernunft* and *Verstand*, see Nuzzo 2007.

[48] 'The otherness of the finite is that of a solid obstacle which hinders with a *real* opposition the universal affirmation of reason' (Nuzzo 1999: 8). See Nuzzo's discussion of *Unterwerfung*, Nuzzo 1999: 8.

[49] See Nuzzo 1999: 8-9.

[50] See: 'At every stage of its development reason has to renew its commitment to the dialectical method. At every point, in the process of its actualization through the absolute method, reason has the *freedom* of choosing whether to continue the struggle with its otherness or to give it up' (Nuzzo 1999: 9).

[51] Although we cannot locate the normative function of speculative logic in method, we can do so with respect to the absolute idea. Most straightforwardly, speculative exposition corrects accounts of determinacy that exclude an acknowledgment of the logic of self-determination as self-legislation. This corrective movement is internal to the failures of the logics of being (read: realism) and essence (read: foundationalism) examined in the *Logic*.

[52] In the words of the *Phenomenology*, 'the negative belongs to the content itself, and is the positive' (PS 59/PG 3: 56) or, in the words of the *Logic*, 'the positive aspect is nothing else but the inner negativity of the determinations' (SL 56/WL 5: 51).

Bibliography

Brandom, R. (1991), *Tales of the Mighty Dead: Historical Essays on the Metaphysics of Intentionality*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0263523200001099 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Brandom, R. (2005), 'Sketch of a Program for a Critical Reading of Hegel: Comparing Empirical and Logical Concepts', *Internationales Jahrbuch des Deutschen Idealismus* 3.

Burbidge, J. (1988), *On Hegel's* Logic: *Fragments of a Commentary*. Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press.

Burbidge, J. (2004), 'Hegel's Logic' in Gabbay and Woods (eds.), *The Rise of Modern Logic: From Leibniz to Frege*, vol. 3 of *The Handbook of the History of Logic*. Maryland Heights: North Holland Press.

Burbidge, J. (2007), *Hegel's Systematic Contingency*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Gadamer, H.-G. (1982), *Hegel's Dialectics: Five Hermeneutical Studies*, trans. P. Christopher Smith. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Haas, A. (2000), *Hegel and the Problem of Multiplicity*. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.

Hartmann, K. (1977), 'Hegel: A Non-Metaphysical View' in Alasdair MacIntyre (ed.), *Hegel: A Collection of Critical Essays*. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.

Hägglund, M. (2010), 'The Arche-Materiality of Time: Deconstruction, Evolution, and Speculative Materialism,' in Derek Attridge and Jane Elliott, ed. *Theory after 'Theory'*. London: Routledge.

Hegel, G. W. F. (1969a), *Wissenschaft der Logik*, vols. 5 and 6 of *Werke in zwanzig Bänden*, ed. E. Moldenhauer and K. M. Michel. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag.

Hegel, G. W. F. (1969b), *Science of Logic*, trans. A. V. Miller. Amherst, NY: Humanity Books.

Hegel, G. W. F. (1969c), *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, vol. 3 of *Werke in zwanzig Bänden*, ed. E. Moldenhauer and K. M. Michel. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag.

Hegel, G.W.F. (1970), *Philosophy of Nature: Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences (1830), Part II Hegel's Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences*. Trans. A.V. Miller. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hegel, G. W. F. (1977), *Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. A. V. Miller. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Henrich, D. (1967), *Hegel im Kontext*. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag.

Houlgate, S. (2005), *Introduction to Hegel: Freedom, Truth, and History*, 2nd ed. London: Blackwell.

Houlgate, S. (2006), *The Opening of Hegel's* Logic. West Lafayette: Purdue University Press.

Inwood, M. (1992), *A Hegel Dictionary*. London: Blackwell.

Kant, I. (1965), *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Norman Kemp Smith. New York: St. Martin's Press.

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0263523200001099 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Lau, C.-F. (2006), 'Language and Metaphysics: The Dialectics of Hegel's Speculative Proposition' in Jere Surber (ed.), *Hegel and Language*. Albany: SUNY Press.

Longuenesse, B. (2007), *Hegel's Critique of Metaphysics*, trans. Nicole J. Simek. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Marx, K. (1976), *Capital: A Critique of Political Economy*, trans. Ernest Mandel, vol. 1. London: Penguin Books.

McCumber, J. (1993), *The Company of Words: Hegel, Language and Systematic Philosophy*. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.

Michelet, K.L. (1876), *Das System der Philosophie als exacter Wissenschaft*. Berlin: Nicolaischer Verlag.

Nuzzo, A. (1999), 'The Idea of "Method" in Hegel's Science of Logic—a Method or Finite Thinking and Absolute Reason', *Bulletin of the Hegel Society of Great Britain* 39-40.

Nuzzo, A. (2005), 'The End of Hegel's *Logic*: Absolute Idea as Absolute Method' in David Gray Carlson (ed.), *Hegel's Theory of the Subject*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Nuzzo, A. (2006), 'The Language of Hegel's Speculative Philosophy' in Jere Surber (ed.), *Hegel and Language*. Albany: SUNY Press.

Nuzzo, A. (2007), 'Dialectical Reason and Necessary Conflict: Understanding and the Nature of Terror', *Cosmos and History* 3: 2-3.

Pinkard, T. (1979), 'Hegel's Idealism and Hegel's Logic', *Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung* 33: 2.

Pinkard, T. (1988), *Hegel's Dialectics: The Explanation of Possibility*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

Pinkard, T. (1996), *Hegel's Phenomenology: The Sociality of Reason*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Pinkard, T. (2002), *German Philosophy 1760-1860: The Legacy of Idealism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Pippin, R. (1989), *Hegel's Idealism: The Satisfactions of Self-Consciousness*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Pippin, R. (2005), 'Brandom's Hegel', *European Journal of Philosophy* 13: 3.

Pippin, R. (2008), *Hegel's Practical Philosophy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Proops, I. (2005), 'Kant's Conception of Analytic Judgment', *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 20: 3.


Putnam, H. (2002), *The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy and Other Essays*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Redding, P. (1996), *Hegel's Hermeneutics*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0263523200001099 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Redding, P. (2007), *Analytic Philosophy and the Return to Hegelian Thought*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Rinaldi, G. (1992), *A History of Interpretation of the Logic of Hegel*. Lewiston: The Edwin Mellon Press.
Rockmore, T. (2005), *Hegel, Idealism, and Analytic Philosophy*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Rose, G. (1981), *Hegel Contra Sociology*. New Jersey: Humanities Press.
Sallis, J. (1997), 'Hegel's Concept of Presentation: Its Determination in the Preface to the Phenomenology of Spirit', in John Stewart (ed.), *The 'Phenomenology of Spirit' Reader: Critical and Interpretive Essays*. Albany: SUNY Press.
Stern, R. (1990), *Hegel, Kant and the Structure of the Object*. London: Routledge.
Surber, J. (1975), 'Hegel's Speculative Sentence', *Hegel-Studien* 10.
Tugenhadt, E. (1976), 'Das Sein und Das Nichts,' in Vittorio Klostermann, ed. *Durchblicke: Martin Heidegger zum 80 Geburstag*. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
Rohs, Peter. 1974. 'Das Problem der vermittelten Unmittelbarkeit in der Hegelschen Logik,' *Philosophisches Jahrbuch* 81.
Rosen, M. (1982), *Hegel's Dialectics and Its Criticisms*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Wallace, R.M. (2005), *Hegel's Philosophy of Reality, Freedom, and God*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Winfield, R. D. (2006), *From Concept to Objectivity: Thinking Through Hegel's Subjective Logic*. London: Ashgate Publishing.
Winfield, R. D. (2009), 'The End of Logic', paper presented at the Society for Systematic Philosophy, held at the Annual Meeting of the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association.

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0263523200001099 Published online by Cambridge University Press



The **Hegel Society of Great Britain** has a new website:

http://hegel-society.org.uk/

- you can find information about the activities of the Society, including details about the annual conference,
- information about the Bulletin, including contents of past issues and subscription details and more...

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0263523200001099 Published online by Cambridge University Press