Beyond Patronage: Violent Struggle, Ruling Party Cohesion, and Authoritarian Durability

Steven R. Levitsky and Lucan A. Way

We explore the sources of durability of party-based authoritarian regimes in the face of crisis. Recent scholarship on authoritarianism suggests that ruling parties enhance elite cohesion—and consequently, regime durability—by providing institutionalized access the spoils of power. We argue, by contrast, that while elite access to power and spoils may ensure elite cooperation during normal times, it often fails to do so during crises. Instead, the identities, norms, and organizational structures forged during periods of sustained, violent, and ideologically-driven conflict are a critical source of cohesion—and durability—in party-based authoritarian regimes. Origins in violent conflict raise the cost of defection and provide leaders with additional (non-material) resources that can be critical to maintaining unity and discipline, even when a crisis threatens the party's hold on power. Hence, where ruling parties combine mechanisms of patronage distribution with the strong identities, solidarity ties, and discipline generated by violent origins, regimes should be most durable.

We apply this argument to four party-based competitive authoritarian regimes in post-Cold War Africa: Kenya, Mozambique, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. In each of these cases, an established single- or dominant-party regime faced heightened international pressure, economic crisis, and a strong opposition challenge after 1990. Yet whereas ruling parties in Kenya and Zambia were organized almost exclusively around patronage, those in Mozambique and Zimbabwe were liberation parties that came to power via violent struggle. This difference is critical to explaining diverging post-Cold War regime outcomes: whereas ruling parties in Zambia and Kenya imploded and eventually lost power in these face of crises, those in Mozambique and Zimbabwe remained intact and regimes survived.

Whereas the end of the twentieth century witnessed a proliferation of democratization studies, the beginning of the twenty-first century saw renewed scholarly interest in authoritarianism. Within this literature, an important body of research focused on the role of political parties in sustaining authoritarian rule. Beginning with Barbara Geddes' finding that single-party regimes are more stable than military regimes or personalistic dictatorships, scholars pointed to a range of ways in which ruling parties enhance authoritarian durability.[1]

Yet as Benjamin Smith observed, party-based authoritarian regimes vary widely in terms of their durability.[2] Whereas some ruling parties provide a foundation for decades of regime stability, others collapse quickly in the face of challenges. This variation was strikingly manifest in the late 1980s and early 1990s, when economic crisis and the end of the Cold War challenged single-party regimes across the world. Where ruling parties possessed cohesive mass organizations, as in Cuba, Malaysia, Mozambique, and Vietnam, regimes often survived these challenges;

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doi:10.1017/S1537592712002861

https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592712002861 Published online by Cambridge University Press

where ruling parties lacked such organizations, as in Madagascar, Malawi, Senegal, and Zambia, economic crises or opposition challenges triggered elite defection and, in many cases, regime collapse. Thus it appears that the key to durable authoritarianism is not the existence of ruling parties *per se,* but rather the character of those parties.

We seek to explain variation in the durability of party-based authoritarian regimes. Regime durability, or the capacity to survive crises, is distinct from stability, or duration in power.[3] Even weak regimes may survive for years if they are not seriously challenged. Thus we focus on ruling parties' capacity to survive crises—such as economic failure or opposition challenges—that threaten their control of the state. Such crises provide a kind of "stress test" that allow us to better evaluate regime durability.

Recent scholarship on authoritarianism suggests that ruling parties enhance elite cohesion—and consequently, regime durability—by providing institutionalized channels for elites to advance their careers and access the spoils of power.[4] These arguments conform to a broader scholarly tendency to focus on the material incentives underlying authoritarian rule.[5] Thus dictators are said to retain power by offering supporters more "rents . . . than they can expect under a different regime,"[6] and they are expected to lose power when they are "no longer able to provide sufficient resources to sustain political support."[7]

Although distribution of the spoils of office—or what we broadly refer to as "patronage" —is an important source of elite cohesion, it is not necessarily the most effective one. Patronage may ensure elite cooperation during normal times, but it often fails to do so during crises. When a patronage-based party's hold on power is threatened by economic crisis, domestic opposition, or external pressure, regimes often suffer defection and, in many cases, collapse. For example, the end of the Cold War saw the demise of numerous Leninist regimes led by highly institutionalized parties. Those that survived were almost invariably based on more than patronage. Indeed, the only Communist regimes that persisted after the collapse of the Soviet Union—China, Cuba, Laos, North Korea, and Vietnam—were led by veterans of violent revolutionary struggle.[8]

Building on earlier scholarship linking authoritarian stability to ruling party and regime origins,[9] we argue that the identities, norms, and organizational structures forged during periods of *sustained, violent, and ideologically-driven conflict* are a critical source of cohesion—and durability—in party-based authoritarian regimes. Although origins in violent struggle hardly eliminate intra-party conflict, they raise the cost of defection and provide leaders with additional (non-material) resources that can be critical to maintaining unity and discipline, even when a crisis threatens the party's hold on power. Hence, where ruling parties combine mechanisms of patronage distribution with the strong identities, solidarity ties, and discipline generated by violent origins, regimes should be most durable.

We highlight this argument via an analysis of four competitive authoritarian regimes in post-Cold War Africa: Kenya, Mozambique, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.[10] In each of these cases, an established single- or dominant-party regime faced heightened international pressure, economic crisis, and a strong opposition challenge after 1990. Yet whereas ruling parties in Kenya and Zambia were organized almost exclusively around patronage, those in Mozambique and Zimbabwe were liberation parties that came to power via violent struggle. This difference is critical to explaining diverging post-Cold War regime outcomes: whereas ruling parties in Zambia and Kenya imploded and eventually lost power in these face of crises, those in Mozambique and Zimbabwe remained intact, and their regimes survived.

These case analyses do not constitute a definitive test of our theory. Rather, they highlight the theory's causal mechanisms and demonstrate some initial plausibility to the claim that authoritarian regimes rooted in violent struggle respond differently to crises than do otherwise similar regimes. As the conclusion shows, however, there is evidence that our claims are generalizable.

Parties, Patronage, and Authoritarian Durability

Political parties have long been viewed as pillars of authoritarian rule.[11] Parties enhance regime stability in a variety of ways. For one, they mobilize support, which is critical to both deterring challenges and defeating them when they arise.[12] Party organizations provide an infrastructure for delivering votes, buying support via clientelism, and when necessary, stealing votes. In some cases, parties play a coercive role, mobilizing local cells or "youth wings" to monitor and intimidate opponents.[13] According to Geddes, they may even deter coups.[14]

Perhaps most importantly, ruling parties foster elite cohesion, which is widely viewed as essential to authoritarian stability.[15] Elite cohesion may be defined as rulers' ability to maintain the loyalty and cooperation of allies within the regime. Where cohesion is high, ministers, allied legislators, and local officials routinely support and cooperate with the government. Internal rebellion and defection are rare, and when they occur, they attract few followers. Where cohesion is low, incumbents routinely confront insubordination, rebellion, or defection, which often contributes to authoritarian breakdown.

Ruling parties are said to enhance regime stability because they encourage elite cooperation over defection.[16] By providing institutional mechanisms to regulate access to the spoils of public office,[17] and by lengthening actors' time horizons through the provision of future opportunities for career advancement, ruling parties "create incentives for long-term loyalty."[18] As long as the party is expected to remain in power, losers in short-term factional struggles will remain loyal in the expectation that

https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592712002861 Published online by Cambridge University Press

they will gain access to power in future rounds. Ruling parties thus generate "collective security," or a "sense among power holders that their immediate and long-term interests are best served by remaining within the party organization."[19] The result is "long-term cohesion . . . and the maintenance of political stability."[20] According to Geddes, even weak parties created by dictators create "vested interests" in regime survival through patronage distribution.[21] Where governing parties are absent, regime elites see fewer opportunities for career advancement from within and are thus more likely to seek power from outside the regime.

Yet institutionalized access to the spoils of public office is ultimately a weak source of cohesion.[22] Ruling parties that are organized strictly around patronage and career advancement may discourage defection during normal times, as long as their hold on power is perceived as secure. However, such parties are vulnerable to crises—such as a withdrawal of external support, economic crises that seriously erode public support and limit patronage resources, large-scale protest, or serious electoral challenges—that threaten their hold on power. When such crises cast doubt upon incumbents' ability to deliver the goods, patronage-based parties are prone to defection.[23] Indeed, if a crisis convinces ruling party elites that continued loyalty *threatens* their future access to power and patronage, it may trigger a band-wagoning effect in which politicians defect *en masse* to the opposition. As one Zambian politician put it, "only a stupid fly . . . follows a dead body to the grave."[24] Thus, patronage-based cohesion may be a source of authoritarian stability in the absence of a serious challenge, but ruling parties that are organized around patronage are vulnerable to any crisis that undermines elite confidence in their ability to retain power or deliver the goods.

Non-Material Sources of Cohesion: The Role of Violent Struggle

Ruling party cohesion is highest where regularized elite access to the spoils of power is complemented by other, *non-material,* sources of cohesion,[25] particularly the norms, identities, and organizational structures generated during periods of violent conflict. As Huntington observed, durable party-based authoritarianism is often a "product of struggle and violence."[26] Such struggles most frequently take the form of armed revolutionary or national liberation movements,[27] although as Slater shows, they may also take the form of successful counter-insurgency.[28]

We argue that ruling parties will be most cohesive where they have gained power as a result of a sustained, violent, and ideationally driven struggle.[29] Ideationally driven struggles, or what Jeremy Weinstein calls "activist rebellions," should be distinguished from "opportunistic rebellions" (e.g., Liberia and Sierra Leone in the 1990s), in which activists are recruited primarily via the distribution of selective material benefits.[30]

Origins in violent, ideationally-driven conflict enhance regime cohesion in several ways. First, violent conflict creates enduring partisan identities.[31] Recent research suggests that that enduring partisan identities are often "fired in a kiln of violence,"[32] particularly when violence is prolonged and involves mass mobilization.[33] Strong rank-and-file attachments provide parties with relatively stable support bases, which enhances their electoral performance and—by increasing the value of the party label—discourages elite defection.

Second, violent conflict hardens partisan boundaries. As Adrienne LeBas argues, intense polarization sharpens "us-them" distinctions, strengthening within-group ties and fostering perceptions of a "linked fate" among cadres.[34] Where cadres have participated in prolonged and violent struggle, they are more likely to view party membership in "moral" terms, and to frame choices about cooperation or defection in terms of loyalty rather than material calculus.[35] As African National Congress (ANC) leader Thabo Mbeki put it, "leaving the ANC [would be] like leaving one's mother and father."[36] The polarization generated by violent conflict tends to persist long after the initial seizure of power,[37] effectively "trapping" potential defectors within the ruling party.[38] When the opposition can be credibly linked to a historic enemy, and when abandoning the ruling party is viewed as disloyalty and even treason, the cost of defection will be high.[39] In such a context, ruling party defectors generally fail to mobilize broad support. For example, in Mexico in 1940 and 1952, Nicaragua in the early 1980s, Zimbabwe in 1989 and 2008, and South Africa in 2008, high-profile defectors failed to coax many leaders or activists out of ruling liberation parties.

Third, violent struggle forces parties to create militarized structures and establish military-style internal discipline—characteristics that tend to persist after they gain power. Thus, Frelimo's "military ethos" and discipline persisted into the 2000s,[40] and more than two decades after the end of Zimbabwe's liberation war, John Makumbe observed that ZANU cadres had "still not taken off their uniforms."[41] Such militarization yields greater cohesion than that found in other parties. For example, the Sandinistas' striking internal discipline during the 1980s was attributed to a "political-military structure" forged during the guerrilla war.[42]

Fourth, successful liberation struggles tend to produce a generation of leaders (or in some cases, individual leaders) with extraordinary legitimacy and unquestioned authority, which they can use to unify the party and impose discipline during crises. In China, for example, the generation of the Long March appears to have been critical in forging unified response to the 1989 pro-democracy protests.[43] A group of party "elders" drawn from the revolutionary period acted as a cohesive and self-confident "final court of appeals."[44] The elders possessed the authority to impose unity on the party and provided the Communist

https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592712002861 Published online by Cambridge University Press

leadership with the cohesion and self-confidence needed to risk the high intensity repression of June 1989. As we shall see, liberation leaders (*antigos combatentes*) similarly helped to ensure ruling party cohesion in Mozambique, and ex-ZANU combatants repeatedly closed ranks behind Robert Mugabe during periods of crisis in Zimbabwe.

Finally, violent origins enhance ruling parties' capacity to repress. Parties that come to power via violent struggle usually reconstruct the state's coercive apparatus, purging it of its personnel and filling the ranks with partisan cadres.[45] Thus, the security forces are either re-built from scratch or radically transformed via the infusion of ex-guerrillas. The result is a party-state in which the army, police, and other security agencies are commanded by cadres from the liberation struggle and infused with the ruling party's ideology. In revolutionary Nicaragua, for example, all top military officials were ex-guerrilla commanders who were active in the ruling Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN).[46] These officials were "possessed by a genuine sense of mission that transcended the strictly military. They were defenders . . . of a revolutionary political project."[47] Likewise, all of Zimbabwe's security forces, including the army, police, and intelligence agencies, were led by veterans of the liberation struggle.[48] Such partisan penetration creates a more disciplined coercive apparatus. Security forces run by veterans from the liberation struggle are less prone to coups or insubordination.

A history of armed struggle also yields a generation of leaders and cadres with experience with—and the stomach for—violence. A ruling elite that has experienced violent conflict is more likely to remain united behind coercive measures and, crucially, security officials that are drawn from that elite are more likely to carry out orders to repress. In addition, liberation struggles create a pool of rank-and-file ex-combatants who may be mobilized by the ruling party to intimidate, threaten, and attack regime opposition. In Zimbabwe, for example, ZANU-PF mobilized thousands of war veterans to repress opposition.[49] Likewise, Sandinista activists—most of whom were active in the guerrilla struggle—were mobilized for militias, neighborhood-level surveillance, and thug work.[50]

The effects of violent origins on ruling party cohesion and regime durability are not permanent. Rather, they degrade over time, particularly after veterans of the liberation struggle die or cease to dominate the ruling party. Succeeding generations often lack the legitimacy to impose unity in crisis, as well as experience with (and stomach for) repression.[51] The erosion of revolutionary cohesion was evident in the Soviet Union, where, in the absence of a founding generation equivalent to the Chinese elders or Frelimo's *antigos combatentes,* governments were unable to impose unity when the system began to disintegrate.[52]

The argument that legacies of violent struggle are an important source of authoritarian cohesion converges with those of other scholars—such as Huntington and Smith—who identify early periods of conflict as critical to explaining regime durability. However, we posit a different causal mechanism. Smith argues that strong opposition challenges—along with fiscal scarcity—during a regime's foundational period create incentives for ruling party elites to build robust organizations and broad coalitions, which later serve as the bases for stable authoritarianism.[53] Huntington, who argued—as we do—that revolutionary regimes are more durable,[54] similarly highlights parties' capacity to "mobilize and organize the masses."[55] Although strong party organizations strengthen authoritarian regimes, they are insufficient to ensure regime durability. During crises, mass organizations that lack non-material sources of cohesion may divide or crumble from within. For example, mass Communist Party organizations did little to prevent regime collapse in Eastern Europe in 1989, and as we shall see, ruling parties in Kenya and Zambia were defeated not because they lacked extensive organizations but because those organizations were decimated by defection (and ultimately turned against incumbents). Thus, the mechanism that links early conflict to regime durability is ruling party cohesion.

In sum, ruling parties that emerged out of sustained, ideationally-driven, violent struggle are particularly well-equipped to survive regime-threatening crises. Such parties possess not only the organizational strength highlighted by Smith but also the cohesion necessary to withstand serious challenges. Violent struggle often gives rise to enduring partisan identities, rigid inter-party boundaries, militarized party structures, founding leaderships with a capacity to override factional conflict, and extensive ruling party penetration of the coercive apparatus. Ruling parties that consolidate power in the absence of revolutionary struggle tend to be organized primarily around patronage, which, though an effective source of cohesion during normal times, is often insufficient to prevent defection during crises.

Before turning to the case analyses, two caveats merit note. First, we do not claim that patronage is unimportant as a source of cohesion. All successful ruling parties rely on the distribution of access to the spoils of public office. What distinguishes revolutionary or liberation parties is the *combination* of material and non-material sources of cohesion. Second, cohesion rooted in violent conflict does not guarantee regime stability. Although elite defection is a major cause of authoritarian breakdown, it is hardly the only one. In Nicaragua, for example, the highly cohesive Sandinista regime fell in 1990—despite virtually no elite defection—due to a combination of external pressure and economic crisis.[56] Compared to other party-based authoritarian regimes, however, we expect those rooted in violent struggle to be particularly resilient in the face of crisis.

https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592712002861 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Party Origins, Elite Cohesion, and Authoritarian Durability: Four Cases from Post-Cold War Africa

In the following sections, we illustrate our argument though a comparative analysis of four party-based authoritarian regimes in post-Cold War Africa: Kenya and Zambia, where patronage-based ruling parties suffered defection and eventual defeat in the face of economic or succession crises; and Mozambique and Zimbabwe, where ruling parties and regimes survived despite similar (or worse) crises.

Kenya, Mozambique, Zambia, and Zimbabwe may be treated as "most similar" cases of post-Cold War authoritarianism. All four were poor and predominantly rural African countries with stable single- or dominant-party regimes controlled by the political movement that led the country to independence: the Kenya African National Union (KANU) in Kenya, the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (Frelimo) in Mozambique, the United National Independence Party (UNIP) in Zambia, and the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF).[57] All four ruling parties had stable national organizations and extensive patronage networks,[58] and in 1990, all of them had been in power for at least a decade. Moreover, all four regimes were competitive authoritarian in the early 1990s.[59] Whereas Zimbabwe had maintained multiparty rule since 1980, Kenya, Mozambique, and Zambia adopted multiparty institutions between 1990 and 1992.[60]

Regimes in Kenya, Mozambique, Zambia, and Zimbabwe all faced severe crises in the post-Cold War era.[61] For one, the end of the Cold War brought intense international democratizing pressure. The collapse of the Soviet Union, the emergence of the West as the world's dominant power, and unprecedented Western democracy promotion reduced autocratic room for maneuver in much of the developing world. Indeed, external pressure forced governments in Kenya, Mozambique, and Zambia to end single party rule (and discouraged the Mugabe government from establishing it) between 1990 and 1992.[62] Second, all four governments faced serious electoral challenges, in that ruling parties either lost elections (Zambia in 1991, Kenya in 2002) or faced a real possibility of defeat (Kenya in 1992 and 1997, Mozambique in 1994 and 1999, Zimbabwe in 2002 and 2008). Finally, all four countries faced serious economic crises at some point during the late 1980s and 1990s. Although they varied in severity, each of these crises eroded ruling party support and limited patronage resources, thereby threatening incumbent power.

Notwithstanding these similarities, however, regime outcomes varied. In Zambia and Kenya, ruling parties suffered large-scale defection in the face of post-Cold War crises, which resulted in their defeat and removal from power; in Mozambique and Zimbabwe, by contrast, Frelimo and ZANU suffered few defections and remained in power through 2012.

Existing theories cannot easily account for this variation (refer to table 1). Take economic crisis. Economic downturns undermine public support and erode patronage resources, which should encourage elite defection.[63] Yet whereas economic crisis undermined regime stability in Zambia (and to some degree, in Kenya), it failed to do so in Mozambique and Zimbabwe. Indeed, levels of economic crisis do not correlate with regime outcomes in our cases. Whereas Kenya experienced massive elite defection and authoritarian breakdown in a context of relatively mild crisis, Zimbabwe, which suffered the most severe crisis, did not.[64]

A second alternative argument focuses on economic statism. Scholars such as Steven Fish and Kenneth Greene argue that extensive state control of the economy enhances authoritarian durability.[65] Greater government capacity to affect people's livelihood facilitates the punishment of defectors and co-optation of potential opponents. In liberalized economies, by contrast, governments possess fewer resources with which to co-opt elites or prevent their defection. Yet statism also fails to explain our regime outcomes. Table 1 shows the four countries' scores in the Fraser Institute's Level of Economic Freedom index for 1990.[66] All four countries maintained mixed economies, but Zambia—a case of regime breakdown—was clearly the most statist. Although statism might explain regime stability in post-2000 Zimbabwe, Mozambique underwent considerable economic liberalization in the 1980s and 1990s—and the regime nevertheless remained stable.

Third, Howard and Roessler suggest that two factors increase the likelihood of incumbent defeat in competitive authoritarian elections: opposition unity and executive succession (usually triggered by the president's death or retirement).[67] Neither factor appears to explain variation among our cases. Unified opposition existed in Mozambique through the mid 2000s and in Zimbabwe for most of the 2000s—and yet ruling parties survived. And although President Moi's retirement clearly contributed to KANU's collapse in 2002, Frelimo survived a similar succession challenge in 2004.

Another potential explanation focuses on variation in regime openness. It has been argued, for example, that more open regimes are more prone to breakdown.[68] Yet as Table 1 shows, our cases received similar Freedom House scores in 1990. In fact, Zimbabwe was scored as most open, whereas Kenya was scored—together with Mozambique—as least free.

The regimes also vary in age: in 1990, KANU and UNIP had been in power more than a decade longer than either Frelimo or ZANU-PF. Might older regimes have been more vulnerable to breakdown? Both existing theory and available evidence suggest that, if anything, *newer* regimes are more likely to suffer defection and collapse.[69] Diverse scholars—ranging from Huntington to Bueno de Mesquita et al.—have posited a positive relationship

https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592712002861 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Table 1
Explaining post-Cold War regime outcomes in Kenya, Mozambique, Zambia, and Zimbabwe

	Economic Crisis*	Economic Freedom (1990)** 0 = lowest, 10 = highest	1990 Freedom House Score*** (Higher score denotes lower level of freedom)	Opposition Unity	Presidential Succession	Party Origins in Violent Struggle?	Regime Outcome
Kenya	Yes	5.4	12	Yes (2002)	Yes (2002)	No	Breakdown
Mozambique	Yes	5.4	12	Yes	Yes (2004)	Yes	Stability
Zambia	Yes	3.3	11	Yes	No	No	Breakdown
Zimbabwe	Yes	4.8	10	Yes (2000-)	No	Yes	Stability

*Crisis is defined as a year in which per capita GDP contracts by three percent or more or the annual inflation rate surpasses 500 percent. In Kenya and Zambia, only years in which autocratic incumbent remained in power are counted (Source: World Bank World Development Indicators (www.worldbank.org)).

**Taken from Fraser Institute Level of Economic Freedom. See www.freetheworld.com/cgi-bin/freetheworld/getinfo.cgi. Score for Mozambique is from 2003 (no score is given for prior years).

***Scores combine Freedom House's civil and political rights scores, which each range from 1 to 7.

between regime age and durability.[70] Likewise, Bienen and van de Walle's empirical analysis of regime turnover in Africa finds that "the risk of losing power is a decreasing function of time [in power]."[71] Moreover, as we show below, low cohesion in KANU and UNIP was not a product of age; indeed, both parties had histories of elite defection that dated back to the 1960s.

Finally, it might be argued that a violent heritage in general, and not violent party origins specifically, contributes to authoritarian durability. Although it is often difficult to disentangle the two, available evidence suggests that where violent origins do not give rise to a strong ruling party (e.g., post-1947 Pakistan), regimes are less stable. An instructive case is Kenya, which had a violent anti-colonial experience (the Mau Mau rebellion) but was governed after independence by a party (KANU) whose origins lay outside that violence. As we shall see, KANU's limited cohesion undermined regime stability in the post-Cold War era.

We contend that diverging post-Cold War regime outcomes in Kenya, Mozambique, Zambia, and Zimbabwe can be traced to distinct party origins. In Kenya and Zambia, ruling parties gained power without significant violent struggle, and consequently, they consolidated into patronage-based machines that proved vulnerable to crisis in the post-Cold War period. By contrast, Frelimo and ZANU came to power only after years of armed struggle, which gave rise to cohesive party structures that served as the foundation for more robust regimes.

Zimbabwe

Zimbabwe is a striking case of regime stability in the face of unified opposition and profound economic crisis. The government of Robert Mugabe not only remained intact in the face of a strong opposition challenge but was able to mobilize large-scale violence to thwart it. This outcome, we argue, was rooted in the regime's origins in violent liberation struggle, which gave rise to a cohesive ruling party with strong ties to the coercive apparatus.

Party origins and ascent to power. The ZANU government was forged out of an armed liberation movement. Created in 1963, ZANU launched an insurgency against white rule—via its armed wing, ZANLA—in 1966, triggering a civil war that cost 30,000 lives.[72] ZANU/ZANLA was an ideological guerrilla movement aimed at overthrowing white rule and radically redistributing land.[73] In power after 1980, the party was marked by several legacies of the guerrilla struggle. For one, the ZANU leadership was dominated by ex-liberation fighters, many of whom had spent years together in the bush or in prison.[74] As late as 2000, the ZANU politburo was "dominated by Mugabe's lieutenants from the liberation struggle of the 1970s."[75] Party cohesion was reinforced by Mugabe himself. Although he was never fully trusted by ZANLA military commanders,[76] Mugabe's liberation hero status provided him with a special legitimacy. On most matters during the post-independence period, his word "was virtually law" within ZANU.[77] Finally, a culture of "military commandism" remained "deeply ingrained in ZANU-PF practice and political structures."[78] Thus, although ZANU was "riddled with factions,"[79] it suffered "virtually no defections" during its first decade in power.[80]

ZANU's roots in the liberation war also enhanced its coercive capacity. For one, the ruling party maintained a firm grip over the state's coercive apparatus. ZANU and the security forces were linked by "an umbilical cord, formed during the anti-colonial war."[81] The Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA) "evolved out of a national struggle . . . in which the distinction between politicians and soldiers . . . was blurred."[82] Tens of thousands of guerrillas were absorbed into the armed forces in the early

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1980s.[83] Although the ZNA initially integrated Rhodesian and rival ZIPRA guerrillas, a purge in the early 1980s gave ZANU "undisputed mastery" over the army.[84] Led by ex-ZANLA commanders who shared the "bush life" in the 1970s[85] the ZNA became a "highly partisan" army.[86] Indeed, all of Zimbabwe's main internal security agencies—including the army, police, and the Central Intelligence Organization—were led by "war hardened" ex-combatants with close ties to ZANU,[87] and who were "vested in the party remaining in power."[88] These ex-combatants' capacity for violence was unquestioned.[89] As Ibbo Mandaza observed, militarism, which was "so deeply ingrained . . . during the armed struggle, continues to pervade . . . the Zimbabwean state," and the "capacity and potential for violence" remains a "central pillar of the state itself."[90] Finally, ZANU maintained strong ties to rank-and-file war veterans.[91] War veterans' organizations were an "indispensable weapon in the hands of ZANU-PF."[92] They "played a significant role in mobilizing support for the ruling party, often through coercive means."[93] As we shall see, such mobilization was critical to ZANU's repression of emerging opposition in the early 2000s.[94]

Crisis and regime response. ZANU faced little opposition during the initial post-Cold War period, as its repression–and later absorption—of the rival Zimbabwe African People's Union in the early 1980s resulted in nearly two decades of *de facto* single-party rule.[95] However, challenges emerged in the late 1990s as economic stagnation and an unpopular war in the Congo generated public discontent and rising protest.[96] The Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) spearheaded a wave of protest in 1997 and 1998.[97] In 1999, the ZCTU joined with church and civic groups to create the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), thereby creating the kind of cohesive opposition party that scholars have linked to successful transitions.[98] Indeed, the MDC quickly emerged as a "formidable electoral threat."[99] The government's electoral vulnerability was made manifest by the surprising defeat of its proposed constitutional reform in a 2000 referendum. The defeat "shook ZANU-PF to the core."[100] With the 2000 parliamentary and 2002 presidential elections looming, the ruling party faced a "real possibility of losing power."[101]

Unlike KANU and UNIP, however, ZANU suffered few defections in the face of rising opposition.[102] Rather, party and security officials closed ranks around Mugabe,[103] which facilitated a strategy of polarization and repression. The mobilization of war veterans was central to this strategy.[104] In early 2000, the government launched a radical land reform, which was accompanied by a wave of violent land invasions that were led by war veterans and coordinated with state officials.[105] The land invasions became a "frontal assault" on the MDC, as war veterans broke up opposition rallies, attacked MDC supporters, and "cordoned off large areas of the rural constituency from opposition politicians."[106] During the 2000 parliamentary campaign, war veterans and ZANU "youth brigades" engaged in large-scale violence and intimidation, closing off large parts of the countryside to the MDC.[107] The repression helped ZANU narrowly win the 2000 parliamentary election.

The effectiveness of ZANU's repressive strategy was rooted, in part, in its guerrilla origins. For one, ZANU explicitly framed the land invasions in terms of the liberation struggle, labeling the campaign the "Third Chimurenga" (the liberation war was known as the Second Chimurenga), linking the MDC to British colonialism and white Rhodesians, and attacking MDC supporters as "sellouts" and "traitors."[108] The hardening of partisan boundaries effectively "trapped" potential ZANU defectors within the party.[109] Thus, whereas in Zambia the MMD benefited from a "cascade" of UNIP defections in 1991, there were virtually no defections from ZANU to the MDC in 2000.[110] In addition, the army relied heavily on the mobilization of ex-combatants, whose loyalty was unquestioned.[111] As one war veteran put it, "This country was won through the loss of blood and not elections. . . . We are married to this country and Mugabe. We are going to support Mugabe until we bury him."[112]

Mugabe faced another challenge in the 2002 presidential election. In a context of international isolation and a deteriorating economy, public support for the government eroded. Indeed, surveys showed MDC candidate Morgan Tsvangirai with a large lead.[113] Nevertheless, ZANU and the security forces again "rallied round Mugabe,"[114] which allowed him to steal the election through violence and rigging. During the 2002 campaign, paramilitary forces broke up opposition rallies and abducted and tortured hundreds of MDC supporters.[115] On election eve, the government reduced the number of polling places in MDC strongholds, preventing hundreds of thousands of people from voting.[116] Mugabe's victory was rejected by Western powers, deepening the regime's international isolation, but ZANU and the security forces remained intact. Post-election protest plans fizzled in the face of repression.[117] In 2003, the MDC launched a "final push" against Mugabe, in which it engaged in unprecedented mass action and called on members of the security forces to defect; no such defections occurred, however, and the protests were met with a "frightening intensification of state repression."[118]

After 2002, Zimbabwe suffered an unprecedented economic collapse. GDP declined by more than 40 percent, and the country descended into one of the worst hyperinflationary spirals—inflation reached 231 million percent in 2008—in history.[119] In this context, support for ZANU evaporated, even in its rural strongholds.[120]

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Economic crisis, strong international pressure, and a cohesive opposition generated ample theoretical reason to expect regime collapse. Nevertheless, both ZANU and the coercive apparatus remained intact.[121] Security officials—most of them ex-liberation fighters—ascended to the top echelons of the government,[122] and repression intensified. In 2005, Operation "Drive out Rubbish" displaced hundreds of thousands of people from the homes in the MDC's urban strongholds.[123]

Notwithstanding his advancing age and eroding support, Mugabe stood for re-election in 2008. Yet with the exception of ex-Finance Minister Simba Makoni, who left the party to launch an independent presidential bid, there were "no major defections."[124] Makoni, who was vilified as a "sell-out," failed to attract rank-and-file ZANU support and won only eight percent of the vote.[125] Tsvangirai appeared to win the 2008 election in the first round, but massive falsification of the results forced a runoff.[126] The security forces again closed ranks behind Mugabe, launching a wave of violence that forced the MDC to withdraw from the race.[127] Although ZANU and the MDC eventually formed a "unity government" in which Tsvangirai became Prime Minister, ZANU retained control of the presidency and the coercive apparatus through 2012.

It has been argued that ZANU and security officials were united primarily by patronage, and specifically, by access to ill-gotten wealth in Congo and other illicit activities.[128] Likewise, regime leaders' implication in violence may have reinforced elite cohesion by raising the cost of losing power.[129] Yet there is little reason to think that complicity in violence and other illicit activities is sufficient to prevent elite defection. In the absence of nonmaterial ties, regime elites implicated in violence and other criminal activity may seek to protect themselves in the face of regime crises by abandoning the sinking ship and negotiating a deal with the opposition. This occurred, for example, in Serbia in 2000. Despite (and perhaps *because* of) their extensive involvement in violence and corruption under Slobodan Milosevic, leaders of the notorious Red Berets militia struck a deal with the Serbian opposition on the eve of the 2000 "Bulldozer revolution," and their defection helped ensure Milosevic's fall.[130] Likewise, implication in corruption or violence failed to secure elite cohesion in the Philippines in the 1980s, Indonesia in the 1990s, and Ukraine in the 2000s. Finally, as we will show, powerful Kenyan regime elites defected in 2002 despite being implicated in violence and corruption.

Due to Mugabe's advanced age and poor health, ZANU's future was uncertain in 2012. Nevertheless, Zimbabwe is a striking case of regime durability. Despite more than a decade of international isolation, one of the world's deepest economic crises, and a strong and cohesive opposition, the ZANU government avoided the kind of elite defection seen in Zambia and especially Kenya, where the opposition was weaker and the economic crisis less severe. As *Africa Confidential* observed in late 2002, "In 22 years of independence, no more than a handful of [ZANU] politicians have defected."[131]

Mozambique

Mozambique is another case of regime durability rooted in a history of a violent anti-colonial struggle and civil war. Frelimo's legacy of violent struggle limited elite defection, which enabled it to survive internationally-supervised elections in 1994, a close (and possibly stolen) election in 1999, and a presidential succession in 2004.

Party origins and ascent to power. Like Zimbabwe, single-party rule in Mozambique was rooted in armed struggle. Created in 1962, Frelimo led a violent insurgency against Portuguese rule from 1964 until 1974. During the 1960s, Frelimo evolved into a Marxist guerrilla movement whose cadres were "renowned in Africa for the strength of their ideology [and] the rigor of their training."[132] Although the insurgency failed to defeat the Portuguese militarily, Frelimo's armed operations contributed to the "war weariness" that helped inspire Portugal's 1974 military coup and subsequent retreat from colonial rule.[133] Frelimo experienced another round of violent conflict after independence, as an insurgency led by the Rhodesian/South African-backed Mozambican National Resistance (Renamo) plunged Mozambique into a 17-year civil war that caused an estimated one million deaths.[134]

As in Zimbabwe, origins in violent struggle enhanced ruling party cohesion. Like ZANU, Frelimo was "profoundly influenced by the experience of the independence struggle."[135] The liberation war transformed Frelimo from a "loosely organized nationalist front" into a disciplined vanguard party.[136] Decades of violent conflict gave rise to a strong "military ethos"[137] and a "leadership deeply committed to the idea of unity."[138] This culture of discipline persisted even after Frelimo abandoned its Marxist ideology in the 1980s.[139] The civil war against Renamo further hardened partisan boundaries, trapping potential defectors within the ruling party. Renamo, which became the main opposition party after the 1992–94 transition, had been aided by Rhodesia and (white) South Africa during the civil war and was thus viewed by Frelimo supporters as having betrayed the cause of African liberation. For ruling party politicians, then, the prospect of being labeled a traitor raised the cost of defection.

Another important legacy of the liberation struggle was the predominance of ex-guerrilla fighters (*antigos combatentes*) in the Frelimo leadership. For years, Frelimo's "most dedicated militants [sprang] from those directly involved in the armed struggle."[140] In 1989, nine of ten politburo members were veterans of the liberation struggle,[141] and through 1995, all party general secretaries were *antigos combatentes.*[142] Viewed as "guarantors of superior ethics,"

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the *antigos combatentes* were "accorded unquestioned leadership and privileges," and they remained influential in the party leadership into the 2000s.[143] Finally, the security forces—created by Frelimo at independence—were closely linked to the ruling party.[144] Although the army was restructured after the 1992 peace accords, the police, which served as the regime's main internal security force, maintained "a strong *esprit de corps*" and a "sense of solidarity rooted in a history of political struggle.[145]

Crisis and regime response. The end of the Cold War posed a severe threat to Frelimo. Most Soviet-backed regimes in sub-Saharan Africa collapsed in the initial post-Cold War period.[146] Mozambique had been among the region's most Soviet-dependent states, and the withdrawal of Soviet assistance—in the midst of a civil war—contributed to a severe economic crisis in the 1980s.[147] Desperate for aid, Mozambique turned to the West.[148] Under "immense pressure" from the international community,[149] the Frelimo government adopted a multiparty constitution and entered peace negotiations with Renamo. The 1992 Rome Accords legalized Renamo and called for internationally-supervised elections, which were held in 1994.

The 1992–94 transition posed a major challenge to Frelimo. The economy, which had recovered in the late 1980s, suffered a drought-induced downturn in the early 1990s,[150] and Renamo, which was effectively a unified opposition, posed a serious electoral threat.[151] Unlike Kenya and Zambia, however, the transition to multiparty rule and competitive elections did not trigger significant ruling party defections. In the 1994 election, President Joaquim Chissano defeated Renamo leader Alonso Dhlakama by a margin of 53 percent to 34 percent. Although Frelimo won only a narrow legislative majority, the party's iron-clad discipline—reinforced by the predominance of the "historic generation"—allowed it to retain control of parliament.[152] Thus, unlike Benin, Madagascar, or Zambia, where weak ruling parties cost presidents control of the legislature, Frelimo's internal discipline meant that "parliament's oversight function on government [was] almost nonexistent."[153]

The 1999 election—which again pitted Chissano against Dhlakama—posed another challenge to the regime. The race was close, which may have led Frelimo to steal the election.[154] After Chissano was declared the winner, Renamo rejected the results and launched a boycott of parliament, and in November 2000, opposition street demonstrations were violently repressed. The Frelimo-dominated police carried out orders to repress in a disciplined manner.[155]

Frelimo reconsolidated power in the 2000s, despite two significant challenges. First, by 2000, the government had undertaken a sweeping economic liberalization program, including large-scale deregulation and privatization.[156] These reforms "severely weakened the ability of the state to exercise strategic guidance over the economy,"[157] which should have limited Frelimo's ability to pre-empt or co-opt opposition.[158] Second, in 2001, President Chissano—abiding by term limits—announced that he would not seek re-election in 2004. Yet unlike Kenya, where presidential succession threw KANU into crisis, Frelimo's succession was remarkably smooth. The Central Committee selected Armando Guebuza, a member of the "historic generation," as Frelimo's presidential candidate, and the party quickly rallied behind Guebuza.[159] Thanks in part to a growing economy, Frelimo won the 2004 elections easily. In 2009, Guebuza was re-elected in a landslide, leading *Africa Confidential* to observe that "Frelimo's grip over the country is now total."[160]

In sum, Frelimo survived the transition to multiparty rule despite a unified opposition, economic liberalization, and a presidential succession. Two decades after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Frelimo had regained its dominant party status. This resilience was rooted in strikingly high levels of elite cohesion, which can be traced back to Frelimo's origins as an armed liberation movement.

Zambia

Zambia is a case of a patronage-based ruling party that collapsed in the face of economic crisis and a strong opposition challenge. The United National Independence Party (UNIP), which ruled Zambia since independence, was a patronage-based machine without roots in violent struggle. Led by founding President Kenneth Kaunda, the Zambian regime was relatively stable during the Cold War period. However, massive defection to the opposition crippled the ruling party and contributed to Kaunda's overwhelming defeat in the 1991 election.

Party origins and the ascent to power. Although UNIP led Zambia to independence, it was not born of violent struggle. UNIP was founded in the late 1950s when Kaunda and other African leaders left the moderate African National Congress to build a stronger party with a more hard-line anti-colonial strategy.[161] UNIP grew rapidly, and by 1960, it was the dominant African party in Northern Rhodesia (later Zambia).[162]

UNIP's ascent to power was relatively easy. Zambian independence was achieved "without serious economic or political dislocation."[163] The de-colonization process was negotiated and, with minor exceptions, non-violent.[164] Given the British government's openness to independence after 1959, Kaunda had no need to turn to violent struggle. Instead, he focused on negotiating independence and mobilizing support for UNIP in the British-run 1962 and 1964 elections.

UNIP thus won power in 1964 without having developed the ideologically-committed cadre or internal solidarity that characterized ZANU and Frelimo. Rather,

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the ruling party was a "coalition of factional interests."[165] Lacking alternative sources of cohesion, Kaunda relied heavily on patronage to sustain a "maximum coalition" that encompassed "as wide a range of ethnic, regional, and ideological groups as possible."[166] Intra-party cohesion was low from the outset. Indeed, UNIP suffered a series of internal rebellions and "overt schisms" in the 1960s and 1970s.[167] In 1967, for example, distributional conflicts among ethno-regional leaders triggered an internal rebellion that "almost shattered UNIP,"[168] and in 1971 the party split when UNIP stalwart Simon Kapwepe left to form the United Progressive Party (UPP). Now "on the verge of becoming a minority party,"[169] UNIP imposed single-party rule.

UNIP's ties to the coercive apparatus were weaker than in Zimbabwe or Mozambique. Having ascended to power peacefully, UNIP did not seek to radically restructure the post-colonial state. The Zambian Defense Force (ZDF) was neither created nor commanded by liberation veterans, but rather was initially led by British officers before undergoing a slow "Zambianization" beginning in the late 1960s.[170] Thus, in contrast to Mozambique and Zimbabwe, where the security forces remained under the command of liberation veterans with deep roots in the ruling party, UNIP only weakly penetrated Zambia's security forces. Indeed, "ethnic balancing" weighed more heavily than partisan ties in the distribution of top military appointments.[171] UNIP's control over the security forces was precarious. The Kaunda government confronted six coup attempts between 1964 and 1990, including uprisings in 1980, 1987, and 1988.[172]

Crisis and regime response. Like many other African governments, the Kaunda administration fell into crisis in the 1980s amid a steep economic decline. GDP contracted by nearly 20 percent between 1981 and 1986, reducing living standards to 1967 levels.[173] Bankrupt, the government grew increasingly dependent on international financial institutions, and in 1990, IMF-backed austerity measures triggered urban riots.[174] Although the economy remained highly statist (in 1990, Zambia ranked 109th out of 113 countries on the Fraser Institute's Economic Freedom Index), Kaunda quickly lost the ability to contain opposition. With weak ties to the military and no history of violent struggle, the government "lacked the will for, or the means of, repression,"[175] and as a result, protest quickly evolved into a large-scale democracy movement. In July 1990, civil society groups, led by the Zambian Central Trade Union (ZCTU), formed the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD).[176] The emergence of a viable (and unified) opposition triggered a "bandwagon effect,"[177] as a "cascade" of government officials and national and local party leaders jumped to the MMD.[178] Although Western democratizing pressure was more limited than in Kenya, Mozambique, or post-2000 Zimbabwe, the government's inability to contain internal dissent or repress protest left it little choice but to call multiparty elections for 1991.[179]

Unlike Zimbabwe, Mozambique, and even Kenya, the Kaunda government did not survive the transition to multiparty rule. Amid a fiscal crisis, UNIP's patronage machine "ran out of fuel,"[180] and in the absence of the kind of polarization that "trapped" ruling party politicians in Zimbabwe and Mozambique, the cost of elite defection was minimal.[181] Thus, ruling party branches suffered a "mass exodus of officials" prior to the 1991 election, leading to the "disintegration of UNIP party structures."[182] These defections strengthened the opposition, as numerous UNIP politicians brought their resources, experience, and constituencies to the MMD.[183] Consequently, although the playing field remained skewed in UNIP's favour, MMD candidate Frederick Chiluba overwhelmingly defeated Kaunda in the 1991 election.

In sum, Zambia is a striking case of how quickly and thoroughly patronage-based ruling parties may unravel in a context of crisis. When UNIP's ability to deliver patronage eroded and a viable opposition emerged, politicians defected from the once-dominant party in droves, bringing a quick end to two decades of single party rule. Thus, even though the Zambian regime faced weaker external democratizing pressure than did regimes in Kenya, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe, it was the first to collapse.

Kenya

Kenya is another case of an established patronage-based party that suffered large-scale defection and eventual defeat in the post-Cold War period. Although President Daniel arap Moi managed to narrowly win re-election in 1992 and 1997, the succession crisis triggered by his retirement brought a wave of defections that contributed directly to KANU's defeat in 2002.

Party origins and ascent to power. KANU, which ruled Kenya from independence, was not founded in violent struggle. The anti-colonial Mau Mau rebellion was defeated by 1956, seven years before independence, and de-colonization consequently took place "on the terms of the British."[184] Although many Mau Mau veterans joined KANU during its formative phase,[185] the party leadership remained solidly in the hands of moderates, such as Jomo Kenyatta, who were not active in the rebellion.[186] Kenyan independence was thus negotiated by moderate and conservative politicians, and the 1963 transition was an elite-led process that involved little violence or mass mobilization.[187] Indeed, ex-British loyalists quickly gained ascendance in the colonial state,[188] whereas Mau Mau veterans "played relatively little part in Kenyan politics" after 1963.[189]

Notwithstanding Kenya's violent anti-colonial past, then, neither KANU nor the post-colonial regime was born of

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violence. KANU, which was created in 1960, represented a coalition of diverse ethnic and ideological groups.[190] Kenyatta quickly sidelined former Mau Mau activists[191]—a tendency that was reinforced by the 1964 merger with the conservative Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU). Rather than an ideologically-driven liberation movement, then, KANU was a "loose conglomeration of local notables,"[192] which relied on "patronage—and patronage alone—to hold together a fractious coalition."[193] Like UNIP, KANU suffered several early defections and schisms, most notably the 1966 departure of a group of MPs to form the Kenya People's Union.[194] Moi, who succeeded Kenyatta as president in 1978, centralized and strengthened KANU's party structures.[195] Nevertheless, the party remained a "fragile"—and thoroughly patronage-based—coalition in the 1980s and 1990s.[196]

Kenya's security forces were not forged of violent struggle. Unlike ZANU and Frelimo, KANU did not radically restructure the coercive apparatus it inherited from colonial rule. The army was initially led by British officials and underwent only a "slow and gradual Africanization."[197] Ethnic ties, rather than guerrilla roots, were the primary criterion for distributing top military posts.[198] Although civilian control was solid compared to many African regimes,[199] ruling party penetration of the armed forces was considerably weaker than in Zimbabwe and Mozambique. Indeed, KANU governments faced coup attempts in 1964 and 1982 and coup plots in 1971 and 1978.[200]

Crisis and regime response. Kenya's single-party regime fell into crisis at the end of the Cold War.[201] Moi, who had been a staunch US ally during the Cold War, became a target of Western conditionality.[202] At the same time, the government faced substantial domestic opposition. In 1990, amid growing calls for multi-partyism from church and civic groups, ex-KANU barons Charles Rubia and Kenneth Matiba joined opposition leader Oginga Odinga to launch the Forum for the Restoration of Democracy (FORD).[203] The government's crackdown on the emerging democracy movement triggered Western sanctions: in November 1991, donors suspended $350 million in assistance.[204] Isolated and facing a deteriorating economy, Moi legalized opposition and called multiparty elections for 1992.[205] The transition to multipartyism generated a crisis within KANU. Due to Moi's unpopularity and FORD's emergence as a viable opposition, "all predictions were that [KANU] would lose" multiparty elections.[206] The prospect of defeat triggered a "massive political re-alignment," as ruling-party politicians began to defect *en masse* to the opposition.[207] It was KANU's "darkest hour. No one knew who was loyal or who was about to defect."[208]

Although a combination of repression, electoral manipulation, and opposition division allowed Moi to narrowly win re-election in 1992 and 1997,[209] KANU weakened over the course of the 1990s. Patronage resources dried up in a context of slow growth and persistent donor pressure, which fed growing internal dissent and eventually "broke the KANU coalition apart."[210] In this context, Moi's announcement that he would not seek re-election in 2002 triggered a succession crisis. Moi's retirement "dissipated his patronage-bound support" and threw KANU into disarray, as party barons jockeyed to succeed him.[211] Moreover, Moi's choice of Uhuru Kenyatta, the inexperienced son of Jomo Kenyatta, as his successor "irreparably split" KANU.[212] Barons such as Vice President George Saitoti, General Secretary Raila Odinga, ex-General Secretary Joseph Kamotho, ex-Foreign Minister Kalonzo Musyoka, and Local Government Minister William Ole Ntimama, who have been described as "arguably the most valuable KANU leaders,"[213] abandoned the party. They joined other opposition forces in the National Alliance Rainbow Coalition (NARC), which backed the presidential candidacy of Mwai Kibaki. The NARC's emergence as a viable—and united—opposition triggered a bandwagoning effect. KANU politicians, sensing that the "political tide had turned,"[214] began to "defect to the new party in droves."[215] By late 2002, at least half of the 1990s-era KANU elite had joined the NARC.[216] Several leading defectors had been implicated in violence and other criminal activities in the 1990s.[217] Rather than remain wedded to the regime, however, they "sought out the most likely victor, in order to maintain their positions of influence."[218]

The wave of defections decimated KANU. The departure of Odinga and other ethno-regional barons cost the ruling party several key ethnic electorates—including the Luo, Luhya, and Kamba—"in one fell swoop."[219] Ruling-party defections also strengthened the opposition by allowing the NARC to "borrow" KANU's organizational structures.[220] Ex-KANU barons delivered vast financial and organizational resources to the opposition.[221] And crucially, several of them controlled militias responsible for "ethnic violence" in opposition strongholds in the 1990s, which meant that, unlike Zimbabwe, the ruling party lost much of its coercive capacity.[222] Kibaki won the election in a landslide, putting an end to nearly four decades of KANU rule.

In sum, KANU's patronage-based machine proved relatively robust during normal times, but it lacked the cohesion to survive a succession crisis. Although Kenya's economic crisis was considerably milder than those in Zambia and Zimbabwe,[223] and although external pressure was less intense than in Mozambique in the early 1990s or Zimbabwe after 2000, the succession crisis triggered by Moi's retirement triggered a devastating wave of ruling party defections. These defections were "probably the single most important" factor behind the 2002 transition.[224]

https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592712002861 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Conclusion

We have sought to explain variation in the durability of party-based authoritarian regimes. Whereas the recent literature focuses primarily on parties' capacity to regulate access to power and patronage, we argue that patronage is neither the only nor the most effective source of party cohesion. Although institutionalized patronage may generate cohesion during normal times, pure patronage-based parties are vulnerable to crises generated by economic downturns or strong opposition challenges. By contrast, ruling parties that combine patronage with non-material sources of cohesion, particularly a shared history of violent struggle, tend to be more disciplined, less prone to defection, and more capable of repression in the face of crisis.

Although this article is best viewed as a hypothesis-generating exercise, an initial look at the comparative evidence suggests that our theory may be generalizable. In post-Cold War Africa, for example, nearly all of the party-based authoritarian regimes that emerged out of violent, ideologically-driven conflict (e.g., Angola, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Uganda) survived through 2011. Likewise, origins in violent struggle appear to explain why some communist regimes survived the collapse of communism. Virtually all communist regimes maintained the kind of institutionalized ruling-party structures that are said to foster authoritarian stability. However, most regimes in Eastern Europe did not emerge out of a prolonged violent struggle.[225] All of these regimes collapsed. By contrast, the communist regimes that survived 1989—China, Cuba, Laos, North Korea, Vietnam—were all led by parties grounded in armed struggle. Regime cohesion and survival was particularly striking in Cuba and North Korea, where externally-dependent states confronted severe economic crises in the wake of the Soviet collapse, and in China, which faced large-scale opposition protest in 1989.[226] In each of these cases, a cohesive party with extensive interlocking ties to the coercive apparatus provided governments with effective tools for confronting these challenges.

More generally, of the 41 regimes that Geddes classifies as single party, and which existed in 1989,[227] 12 were rooted in prolonged, violent, and ideationally driven struggle.[228] Nine of these regimes remained in power as of 2012.[229] Of the three regimes that were no longer in power, two collapsed for reasons other than elite defection (state failure in Albania, heavy external pressure in Nicaragua) and a third, South Yemen, ceased to exist after Yemeni unification in 1990. By contrast, of the 29 single-party regimes that existed in 1989 and were not rooted in prolonged violent struggle, only eight survived through mid-2012.[230] Obviously, a simple bivariate correlation does not demonstrate causality. However, these data, together with evidence from case studies, suggest that origins in violent struggle plausibly contributed to authoritarian durability after the Cold War.

We conclude with four points. First, regime durability, or the capacity to survive crises, should be distinguished from duration in power.[231] Like the Dodo, which survived for thousands of years on a protected island but quickly became extinct when confronted by predators, regimes may survive for many years in a favorable environment (i.e., one characterized by a growing economy or strong external support), but quickly collapse when faced with a serious challenge. Studies that focus on regime longevity miss this critical dimension. Although crises are difficult to measure and compare, they allow us to distinguish regimes that survive due to abundant resources (e.g., Botswana) or strong external support (e.g., Jordan, communist Bulgaria) from those with the robustness to survive crises (e.g., Cuba, Zimbabwe).

Second, contra most rational choice analyses of authoritarian party formation,[232] our analysis suggests that the most durable party institutions are rarely the product of leadership choice. Cohesive party structures are almost always exogenous to regimes; they are frequently rooted in war, liberation struggles, and other polarizing conflicts. Autocrats do not choose such parties; they either come to power with them or they inherit them. Moreover, rulers who come to power without cohesive mass parties cannot build them from scratch. Rather, they must generally choose between a patronage-based organization (e.g., Putin, Shevardnadze in Georgia) and no ruling party at all (Yeltsin, Lukashenka in Belarus).

Third, revolutionary cohesion has a "best-before" date. The effects of violent origins diminish over time, particularly with the disappearance of the generation that participated directly in the armed struggle. Once this founding generation passes from the scene, revolutionary or liberation parties tend to evolve into more standard, machine-like organizations in which the spoils of office are the primary source of elite cohesion (e.g., the Mexican PRI). When that transition occurs, ruling parties must find alternative bases for stability. One of these is obviously economic growth (e.g., China and Vietnam). Another is institutionalized mechanisms of leadership succession. Here an important difference emerges between the Mozambican and Zimbabwean cases: whereas Frelimo took steps toward institutionalizing succession in the 2000s, ZANU did not—and the party's looming succession poses a clear threat to regime stability.

Finally, our analysis highlighted the importance of non-material sources of regime stability. Recent scholarship has focused on the role of material incentives in sustaining authoritarian rule. Thus, authoritarian durability is said to be rooted in autocrats' differential capacity to distribute resources and career opportunities in a manner that rewards loyalty.[233] Although the distribution of material resources is a critical component of authoritarian durability, it is hardly the only one, and in times of crisis, it may not be the most important one. Broadening

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analyses of authoritarianism to incorporate alternative bases of regime stability—of which a legacy of violence is one—constitutes an important area for future research.[234]

Notes

1 See Geddes 1999; Smith 2005; Magaloni 2006, 2008; Brownlee 2007; Gandhi 2008; Levitsky and Way 2010; and Reuter and Gandhi 2011; Svolik 2012. Also see the classic work of Huntington 1968, 1970.
2 Smith 2005.
3 Grzymala-Busse 2011.
4 See Geddes 1999; Brownlee 2007; and Magaloni 2008.
5 See Wintrobe 1998; Geddes 1999; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Lust-Okar 2006; Magaloni 2006, 2008; Greene 2007; Blaydes 2011; Reuter and Gandhi 2011; and Svolik 2012. For a critique, see Slater 2009.
6 Wintrobe 1998, 336.
7 Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003, 26.
8 An exception to this pattern is Albania, where—despite the continued dominance of veterans of armed struggle—the regime collapsed in 1991, largely due to state weakness.
9 See in particular Huntington 1968; Smith 2005; and Slater 2010.
10 Competitive authoritarian regimes are civilian regimes in which formal democratic institutions exist and are widely viewed as the primary means of gaining power, but in which incumbents' abuse of the state places them at a significant advantage vis-à-vis opponents. In other words, competition is real but unfair. See Levitsky and Way 2010.
11 See, for example, Huntington 1968, 1970.
12 Magaloni 2006; Levitsky and Way 2010.
13 Widner 1992, 8.
14 Geddes 2005.
15 See Geddes 1999 and Brownlee 2007; see also O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986.
16 Geddes 1999; Brownlee 2007; Magaloni 2008; Svolik 2012.
17 The "spoils of public office" encompasses a variety of benefits, including political power, patronage resources, and policy influence or agenda-setting power; Brownlee 2007, 215. For the sake of simplicity, we use the term "patronage" to refer to these benefits.
18 Brownlee 2007, 13; also Geddes 1999, 129, 131, Svolik 2012.
19 Brownlee 2007, 39. Similarly, Magaloni 2008 (716) argues that autocrats who rule through parties "can more credibly guarantee a share of power . . . over the long run to those who invest in the existing institutions."
20 Brownlee 2007, 13.
21 Geddes 2005, 5–6.
22 Slater 2010 makes a similar point.
23 In such cases, defection will be less threatening to individual politicians' "elite status" (Brownlee 2007, 12), since loyalty yields no benefits if the ruling party loses power.
24 Quoted in Ihonvbere 1996, 70.
25 On non-material sources of party cohesion, see Schurmann 1966; Hanson 2010; Slater 2010; and LeBas 2011.
26 Huntington 1970, 13–14.
27 Huntington 1968, 424–425.
28 Slater 2010.
29 We define sustained violent struggle as one in which armed conflict (guerrilla struggle, civil war) persists for at least one year. We score parties as having emerged out of violent struggle if they gain power through violent struggle, including military overthrow (e.g., Cuba), direct transfer of power following a liberation war (e.g., Mozambique), and an electoral victory immediately following a successful liberation war (e.g., Zimbabwe). We also include cases in which large-scale military conflict occurs within five years of the party's seizure of power (e.g., North Korea 1950–53). We exclude cases (e.g., Afghanistan) where parties never gain sufficient control over the country to establish a national political regime. We define struggles as ideational where they are aimed at a clearly defined public goal—including national independence, freedom from white rule, or radical social transformation. Finally, parties are scored as rooted in violent struggle only as long as veterans of the original conflict remain alive and influential in the ruling party's dominant coalition. Thus, ruling post-revolutionary parties in Mexico and the Soviet Union are *not* scored as rooted in violent struggle in the 1980s.
30 Weinstein 2007.
31 Kalyvas 2006; Balcells 2012.
32 Branch 2009, 47.
33 For example, Laia Balcells' 2012 study of post-civil war Spain found that experience fighting on one side or the other had a significant impact on postwar partisan identities. Likewise, mobilization and repression in the aftermath of Perón's overthrow strengthened Peronist identities and gave rise to a powerful Peronist subculture. See James 1988; see also Kalyvas 2006.
34 LeBas 2011, 44–46.
35 LeBas Ibid., 46–47.
36 Quoted in Han 2009, 29.
37 In some cases (e.g., Russia, Mozambique, Nicaragua), post-revolutionary conflict resulted in new civil wars.
38 LeBas 2011, 46–47.

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39 In post-independence Namibia, for example, SWAPO referred to opposition as "traitors" who sought a return to "white government like that of the Boers during the liberation struggle"; Bauer 2001, 44.
40 Alexander 1997, 3.
41 Makumbe 2001, 79.
42 Prevost 1991, 107; Gilbert 1988, 49–53.
43 Nathan 2001.
44 Nathan 2001, xvi.
45 See Skocpol 1979. We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this point.
46 Gilbert 1988, 52.
47 Cajina 1997, 125.
48 Kriger 2000, 446.
49 Kriger 2003a.
50 See Walker 1991, 84–86 and 2003, 147–149; Miranda and Ratliff 1993, 189–195.
51 This argument is broadly similar to Jowitt's 1992 discussion of the corruption and loss of a "combat task" in Leninist regimes.
52 Beissinger 2002.
53 Smith 2005.
54 See Huntington 1968, 424–425 and 1970 13–15. For arguments linking authoritarian durability to early periods of counter-revolutionary violence, see Slater 2010 and Slater and Smith 2010.
55 Huntington 1970, 14.
56 Levitsky and Way 2010, ch. 4.
57 Per capita GDP in 1990 ranged from $182 in Mozambique to $839 in Zimbabwe (World Bank World Development Indicators). These levels are all well below those at which democratization is considered likely.
58 All four cases are coded as single party by Geddes 2003, 227–232.
59 Levitsky and Way 2010.
60 Although the four regimes maintained distinct international alliances during the Cold War (Kenya was strongly pro-West, whereas Mozambique was backed by the Soviet Union), their international positions converged in the late 1980s. Thus, Levitsky and Way 2010 (372–375) score all four cases as "high" in terms of Western leverage (or vulnerability to Western pressure) and "low" in terms of linkage (or ties) to the West.
61 We treat these crises as exogenous to the origins and trajectories of political regimes. The end of the Cold War was clearly an exogenous shock, and given that economic crisis hit regimes of all types in the 1980s and early 1990s, there is little reason to think that such downturns were related to regime origins.
62 Levitsky and Way 2010, ch. 6.
63 Geddes 1999; Reuter and Gandhi 2011.
64 We measure crisis as a year in which GDP per capita declines by at least three percent or inflation surpasses 500 percent. By this measure, Zimbabwe suffered 13 years of crisis after 1990, whereas the Moi government in Kenya faced two years of (far less severe) crisis. See World Bank World Development Indicators (www.worldbank.org).
65 Fish 2005; Greene 2007.
66 The Fraser Institute has no score for Mozambique until 2003, so we use that year's score. Although Mozambique was more statist in 1990 than in 2003, the fact that it liberalized considerably in the 1990s without experiencing regime change weakens the argument that statism was critical to sustaining authoritarian rule.
67 Howard and Roessler 2006. In their analysis of African transitions, Bratton and van de Walle 1997 (198–200) similarly argue that opposition cohesion increases the likelihood of regime transition.
68 See, for example, McFaul 2005, 7–8.
69 Although Jowitt's 1992 theory of Leninist regimes posits their corruption and growing vulnerability over time, his theory applies only to revolutionary regimes and is thus not relevant to cases such as Kenya and Zambia.
70 Huntington 1968 (423) links party age to institutionalization and regime stability. Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003 (100, 302) argue that the probability of authoritarian breakdown declines over time as incumbents gain greater knowledge of their allies' preferences and retain only the most loyal followers. Also see Svolik 2012, 238.
71 Bienen and van de Walle 1989, 7; also 1991.
72 Du Toit 1995, 103–107.
73 Chung 2006; Tendi 2010, 75–79.
74 Stoneman and Cliffe 1989, 35; Meredith 2002, 34.
75 *Africa Confidential,* November 10, 2000, p. 1.
76 Tekere 2007.
77 Chikuhwa 2004, 140.
78 Tendi 2010, 151.
79 *Africa Confidential,* April 15, 1995, p. 5.
80 Nordlund 1996, 287, 305.
81 *Africa Confidential,* May 30, 2003, 5; see also Alao 1995.
82 Alao 1995, 115.
83 Kriger 2003a, 131.
84 Evans 1992, 239; Kriger 2003a, 132–138.
85 Alao 1995, 115–116.
86 International Crisis Group 2005, 12.
87 Weitzer 1990, 142–143.
88 Kriger 2003a, 198.
89 Kriger 2003a.
90 Mandaza 2007,13.
91 Kriger 2003a, 183.
92 Mandaza 2007, 18.
93 Raftopoulos 2003, 229; Kriger 2003a.
94 Kriger 2003b, 104.

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95 Nordlund 1996.
96 Saunders 2007.
97 Saunders 2001; LeBas 2011.
98 Howard and Roessler 2006.
99 Tendi 2010, 156.
100 Meredith 2002, 165–166.
101 Makumbe 2002, 89.
102 See *Africa Confidential,* December 20, 2002, p. 1.
103 Kriger 2000a, 198–199.
104 Ibid., 191–208.
105 Alexander 2003, 100–103; Kriger 2003b, 104.
106 Raftopoulos 2001, 17; Meredith 2002, 172.
107 Meredith 2002, 173–180.
108 See Kriger 2003a, 197 and Tendi 2010, 40–49, 154–156, 225–226.
109 LeBas 2011, 180, 192.
110 LeBas Ibid., 217, 182–183.
111 Kriger 2003a, 198–199.
112 Quoted in Kriger 2003a, 197.
113 See *Africa Confidential,* August 10, 2001, p. 4; *Africa Today,* January 2002, p. 15.
114 *Africa Today,* April–May 2002, p. 21.
115 Blair 2003, 245–249.
116 Makumbe 2002, 97.
117 Raftopoulos 2002.
118 LeBas 2006, 206.
119 See Moss 2007 and http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7660569.stm.
120 Human Rights Watch 2008.
121 *Africa Today,* April–May 2002, 21; see also International Crisis Group 2005, 10–12.
122 Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2006.
123 Bratton and Masunungure 2006.
124 Tendi 2010, 256.
125 Tendi 2010, 256.
126 *Africa Research Bulletin,* March 2008, 17448–17449; April 2008, 17484.
127 Tendi 2010, 256–262.
128 See Raftopoulos and Compagnon 2003, 28 and Bauer and Taylor 2005, 188.
129 An anonymous reviewer described this cohesion as "defensive solidarity."
130 Pond 2006, 214.
131 *Africa Confidential,* December 20, 2002, p. 1.
132 Weinstein 2007, 73.
133 Henriksen 1983, 210.
134 Manning 2002b, 38.
135 Carbone 2003, 5.
136 Henriksen 1983, 213.
137 Alexander 2007, 3.
138 Finnegan 1992, 111.
139 Kempton 1991, 21.
140 Henriksen 1983, 216.
141 Finnegan 1992, 111.
142 Manning 2005, 231.
143 Carbone 2003, 5; Manning 2005, 234.
144 Seegers 1996, 145; Malache, Macaringue, and Borges Coelho 2005.
145 Rauch and Van DerSpuy 2006, 112.
146 The leading African recipients of Soviet aid in the late 1980s were Ethiopia, Congo-Brazzaville, Mozambique, Madagascar, and Angola; Lawson 1988, 509. Of these, only regimes in Angola and Mozambique—both of which were revolutionary in origin—survived the Soviet collapse.
147 Kempton 1991, 8, 17. The withdrawal of Soviet aid cost Mozambique approximately $150 million—or 10 percent of GDP—a year; Plank 1993, 410. GDP declined by 37 percent between 1981 and 1986 (World Bank World Development Indicators).
148 Plank 1993.
149 Harrison 1996, 20.
150 Lodge, Kadima, and Pottie 2002, 198.
151 Manning 2002b.
152 Manning 2002a, 67–69; 2005, 234–235.
153 Lala and Ostheimer 2004, 33.
154 Manning 2002b, 195. Independent observers raised "serious doubts . . . regarding the probity of the [vote] counting process"; Manning 2005, 241. Simultaneously, the number of invalidated ballots in the election was more than twice the size of Chissano's official margin of victory; see Manning 2002b, 195.
155 Manning 2002a, 79.
156 Pitcher 2002.
157 Poppe 2009, 35.
158 Greene 2007.
159 De Brito 2007.
160 *Africa Confidential* 6 November 2009.
161 Mulford 1967; Scott 1976, 47–48.
162 Mulford 1967, 151–174.
163 Ibid., 338.
164 Exceptions include a brief but occasionally violent campaign of civil disobedience in 1961. UNIP leaders' role in this violence is unclear. See Mulford 1967, 151, 198–204, 320.
165 Tordoff 1988, 9.
166 Baylies and Szeftel 1992, 78.
167 Larmer 2008, 100.
168 Pettman 1974, 233.
169 Bates and Collier 1993, 122.
170 Haantobolo 2008, 138–142.
171 Lindemann 2011, 14–16.
172 Mwanakatwe 1994, 176; Ihonvbere 1996, 88–89.
173 LeBas 2011, 148.
174 Bratton 1994; Rakner 2003, 53–65.
175 Bartlett 2000, 444.
176 LeBas 2011.
177 Ihonvbere 1996, 69–70.

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178 LeBas 2011, 217.
179 Ihonvbere 1996, 90.
180 Bratton 1994, 123–124.
181 LeBas 2011.
182 LeBasIbid., 216.
183 Ihonvbere 1996, 65; LeBas 2011, 216.
184 Throup and Hornsby 1998, 8.
185 Branch 2009, 185–191.
186 Ibid. British claims notwithstanding, ties between Mau Mau radicals and Kenyatta were weak. See Widner 1992, 51–53.
187 Ogot 1995.
188 Branch 2009.
189 Widner 1992, 149.
190 Ibid., 61.
191 Branch 2009, 193.
192 Hyden 1994, 90.
193 Slater and Smith 2010, 23; see also Widner 1992, 56–57.
194 Decalo 1998, 195.
195 Widner 1992.
196 LeBas 2011, 231; Throup and Hornsby 1998.
197 Tamarkin 1978, 300.
198 Tamarkin 1978, 300–301; Decalo 1998, 221, 244–245.
199 Decalo 1998.
200 Goldworthy 1986, 107, 112–113; Decalo 1998, 237.
201 Throup and Hornsby 1998.
202 Schmitz 1999.
203 Throup and Hornsby 1998, 57–59.
204 Clinkenbeard 2004, 245–258.
205 Throup and Hornsby 1998, 84–88.
206 Holmquist and Ford 1994, 7.
207 Decalo 1998, 260.
208 Throup and Hornsby 1998, 105.
209 See Throup and Hornsby 1998, 244–246, 454–462.
210 Clinkenbeard 2004, 421, 307, 322.
211 Ndegwa 2003, 150.
212 Mutua 2008, 90; Odhiambo-Mbai 2003, 72–80.
213 Mutua 2008, 90.
214 LeBas 2011, 238.
215 Odhiambo-Mbai 2003, 80–81.
216 *Africa Confidential,* 20 December, 2002, p. 1.
217 Brown 2004, 333; Branch 2011, 249.
218 Branch 2011, 248.
219 Ajulu 2003, 14.
220 LeBas 2011, 238.
221 Anderson 2003, 331–334; Brown 2004, 333.
222 Brown 2004, 331, 333.
223 LeBas 2011, 163.
224 Ndegwa 2003, 150.
225 The only East European Communist regimes grounded in sustained violent struggle were Albania and Yugoslavia, and in Yugoslavia, veterans of the World War II partisan struggle were no longer dominant in the regime leadership in 1989–1991. In Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania, there was little guerrilla activity prior to the 1944 Soviet invasion; in Germany, Communist-led opposition did not take the form of significant partisan warfare; although partisan resistance was widespread in Poland, the partisans had no ties to the Communist regime established in 1947. Finally, in Czechoslovakia, communists played an important role in the failed Slovak National Uprising in 1944, but the uprising lasted for only a few months, was not aimed at seizing national power (there was virtually no partisan activity in the Czech republic), and was only indirectly related to the Soviet-sponsored communist seizure of power in 1948; see Seton-Watson 1956.
226 On the resilience of the Chinese regime, see Heilmann and Perry 2011.
227 This includes all cases scored by Geddes as military/single party and personalist/single party regimes; see Geddes 2003, 227–232. We exclude Afghanistan because rulers there failed to establish national control and thus no regime could be said to exist.
228 These are Albania, Algeria, Angola, China, Cuba, North Korea, Laos, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Vietnam, South Yemen, and Zimbabwe. For operationalization, see note 29. Note that we exclude cases of violent origins in which the founding generation was no longer alive or influential in the party leadership in the 1989–1991 period (e.g., Mexico, Soviet Union). Regimes founded in the 1940s vary on this dimension. Whereas veterans in Albania (Ramiz Alia), China (Deng Xiaoping), and North Korea (Kim Il Sung) continued to lead the party in the 1989–91 period, veterans were no longer influential in the party leadership in Taiwan and Yugoslavia.
229 These are Algeria, Angola, China, Cuba, Laos, Mozambique, North Korea, Vietnam, and Zimbabwe.
230 These are Botswana, Cambodia, Gabon, Malaysia, Myanmar, Singapore, Syria, and Tanzania. Of these, Malaysia and Singapore were rooted in what Slater 2010 calls counter-insurgency "protection pacts" and were thus not exclusively patronage-based.
231 Grzymala-Busse 2011.
232 See, for example, Geddes 2005 and Magaloni 2008.
233 See, in particular, Wintrobe 1998; Geddes 1999; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; Lust-Okar 2006; Magaloni 2008; Blaydes 2011; Svolik 2012.
234 Recent work in this area includes Slater 2009, 2010; Hanson 2010; Heilmann and Perry 2011; and LeBas 2011.

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