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Conceptualising hegemonic legitimacy

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Abstract. What is international legitimacy and whence does it stem? What entities seek it and why, and who grants or withholds it? How might the different meanings of the concept be reconciled? This article argues that Family Resemblance Concept (FRC) methods are particularly well-suited to explicating the complex meanings associated with this multidimensional concept. We start with a basic level definition based on subjective perceptions and beliefs, the normative quality of oughtness, and the idea of consent. We then expand this definition by developing several secondary-level dimensions: shared values, constitutionalism (consisting of two forms of process legitimacy), and outcome legitimacy. At the indicator level, we examine 14 different survey questions asked in international public opinion polls to provide a tentative empirical glimpse of how our FRC version of legitimacy could be operationalised and tested. The paper concludes with a discussion of the usefulness of the FRC scheme in imposing some order on the legitimacy concept and in illuminating the recent legitimacy problems afflicting the United States.

Introduction

Robert Kagan, a prominent neoconservative supporter of the Iraq war, has argued that, '[t]he struggle to define and obtain international legitimacy in this new era may prove to be among the most critical contests of our time. In some ways it is as significant in determining the future of the US role in the international system as any purely material measure of power and influence'.[1] That Kagan assigns to international legitimacy an importance rivalling that of material power reflects a trend in which legitimacy has gained wider currency among scholars and pundits. This renewed interest stems partly from the assortment of legitimacy issues that have surfaced in connection with the EU's integrative processes. More significant in the exhumation of this ambiguous concept, however, have been the numerous controversies provoked by the hegemonic (imperial?) role asserted by the US. For Kagan, it was, 'the circumstances of the Cold War, and Washington's special role in it, that conferred legitimacy on the United States.' It follows that, '[w]hen the Cold War ended, the pillars of US legitimacy collapsed.'[2] A more common view is that America's legitimacy problems instead stem from specific policies and actions undertaken by a unilateralist US since the inception of the Bush administration in January 2001.

These reservations about US legitimacy were compounded by the US response to the attacks of 9/11 and its broader 'global war on terror', and, since the invasion of

[1] Robert Kagan, 'America's Crisis of Legitimacy', *Foreign Affairs*, 83 (2004), p. 67.
[2] Kagan, 'America's Crisis of Legitimacy', pp. 67, 68.

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Iraq in 2003, have risen to a chorus of criticisms, claims of illegitimacy, and efforts to delegitimate the US, or at least its hegemonic role. Despite this wider use it is surely the case that, as Luck observes, '[i]n public and scholarly discourse on US relations with international institutions, few terms are employed with greater frequency or less precision than 'legitimacy'.[3] Recent works have reduced the imprecision significantly,[4] but we nonetheless think that much remains to be done by way of concept formation.

There is more awareness of the traditional use of the term as a kind of approval accorded (or not) by citizens to their national political regimes, but the concept is contested even in this familiar domestic context. The idea of *international* legitimacy, and its subtype, *hegemonic* legitimacy, is much less familiar and well charted. What is international legitimacy and whence does it stem? What entities seek it and why? Who grants or withholds it? What accounts for its variation over time? And, how might the different meanings of the concept – as developed in moral philosophy, legal studies, sociology, anthropology and political science – be reconciled?

This article seeks to address these questions by treating hegemonic legitimacy as a multidimensional, family resemblance concept (FRC), as developed by Gary Goertz.[5] The next section briefly reviews the essential elements of this approach to concept formation. The following section spells out the Janus-faced denotation of the legitimacy concept, which refers both to those who seek legitimacy and those who decide whether to confer it. The full complexity of this concept is addressed in the next section on connotation, which first develops a basic (general) definition and then presents more specific secondary characteristics (or dimensions): substantive, process, and outcome legitimacy. After discussing operational issues, the next section looks at 14 different questions, asked of respondents in the various countries surveyed, which bear on the legitimacy of the US as hegemon, and which suggest potential strategies for operationalising the concept. The paper concludes with a discussion of the usefulness of the FRC scheme in imposing some order on the legitimacy concept and in illuminating the recent legitimacy problems afflicting the US.

Family resemblance concepts

Ludwig Wittgenstein introduced the 'family resemblance' approach to concept formation as part of his critique of essentialism. Just as the members of a family are

[3] Edward C. Luck, 'The United States, International Organizations, and the Quest for Legitimacy', in Stewart Patrick and Shepard Forman (eds), *Multilateralism and US Foreign Policy* (Boulder, CO: Rienner, 2002), p. 47.

[4] The most comprehensive, in-depth treatment is provided by Ian Clark, *Legitimacy in International Society* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). For other recent works on international legitimacy see the special issues of the journals, *Review of International Studies*, 31 (2005) and *International Politics*, 44 (2007) reprinted as a book, David Armstrong, Theo Farrell, and Bice Maiguashca (eds), *Force and Legitimacy in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005);. The former focuses on legitimacy and the use of force, the latter on crises of legitimacy. Also very useful is the exchange between Kagan, 'America's Crisis of Legitimacy', and Kagan, 'A Matter of Record: Security, Not Law, Established American Legitimacy', *Foreign Affairs*, 84 (2005), pp. 170–3; and Robert W. Tucker and David C. Hendrickson, 'Sources of American Legitimacy', *Foreign Affairs* (2004), pp. 18–32, and Tucker and Hendrickson, 'The Flip Side of the Record: The Commitment to Law Is Key to US Legitimacy', *Foreign Affairs*, 84 (2005), pp. 139–41.

[5] Gary Goertz, *Social Science Concepts* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006).

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likely to share a number of characteristics without any single characteristic being common to all members, so too do the referents of some concepts share a number of common, overlapping attributes without any exhibiting all of the attributes.[6] The approach has been applied to political science concepts by Collier and Mahon and, more recently, has been thoroughly explicated by Goertz.[7] Family resemblance concepts (FRC) are *multidimensional* insofar as they involve more than one constitutive meaning, and *multilevel* in that they are comprised – in order of increasing operational specificity – of basic, secondary, and indicator levels. The basic level definition, which is linked in theoretical propositions to other concepts, spells out in general, abstract terms what is cognitively central to the meaning of the concept. For example, as will be discussed in greater detail below, most basic level approaches to legitimacy emphasise the normative quality of *oughtness* that social actors attribute to a rule, institution, or regime.[8]

Consideration of the sources of this normative quality and under what conditions it is likely to be so attributed takes us to the secondary level, where the constitutive dimensions of (international) legitimacy can be spelled out. Briefly, we contend that legitimacy, defined broadly as oughtness, is constituted of the following dimensions:

1. a substantive base of *shared values*
2. *constitutionalism*, encompassing adherence to *open, accessible decision procedures*, and *strategic restraint* in the use of preponderant power
3. successful *outcomes*

At the third, indicator level, each secondary-level characteristics can be operationalised by means of one or more indicators. In the case of hegemonic legitimacy, it is possible in principle to operationalise the extent to which subordinate states comply with the rules generated by, or support the actions of, the actor to whom legitimacy is attributed (or not). Or, as we will demonstrate, cross-national polling provides estimates of how 'global civil society' assesses the hegemon's legitimacy.

FRCs are quite different in several important respects than the better-known 'necessary and sufficient conditions' approach to concept formation. The latter, as exemplified in the work of Sartori,[9] requires that each dimension of a concept be present and operative for a concept to apply. If there are three dimensions (X, Y, Z) then all three (X AND Y AND Z) are necessary. Since they are all 'necessary', if one dimension is absent, the concept does not denote the referent in question. Also, if one dimension is 'sufficient', then the others cannot be considered necessary. Put differently, concepts formulated in 'necessary and sufficient' terms do not permit substitutes – if one dimension can substitute for another, then neither is necessary.

[6] Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, 3rd edn (London: Blackwell, 1968), nos 65–75. For a useful discussion of Wittgenstein's notion of family resemblances, see Michael Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1996), pp. 71–3, 89–91.

[7] David Collier and James E. Mahon, Jr, 'Conceptual 'Stretching' Revisited: Adapting Categories in Comparative Analysis', *American Political Science Review*, 87 (December 1993), pp. 845–55, and; Goertz, *Social Science Concepts*.

[8] Richard M. Merelman, 'Learning and Legitimacy', *American Political Science Review*, 60 (1966), pp. 548–61; Thomas M. Franck, 'Legitimacy in the International System', *American Journal of International Law*, 82 (1988), pp. 705–59; Ian Hurd, 'Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics', *International Organization*, 53 (1999), pp. 379–408.

[9] Giovanni Sartori, 'Guidelines for Concept Analysis', in Giovanni Sartori (ed.), *Social Science Concepts* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1984), pp. 15–85.

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FRCs, in contrast, are not comprised of necessary conditions; they focus instead on specification of the conditions under which multiple dimensions are substitutable for each other: X OR Y OR Z (OR any two of three).[10] This feature has important implications for moving up and down what Sartori calls the 'ladder of abstraction.'[11] A concept cast at a very high level of generality (the basic level of FRCs) will denote a large number of real-world referents. Because it is unable to discriminate among these cases, the concept is not likely to be very useful. The meaning and the discriminatory power of the concept can be sharpened by adding more secondary characteristics (or connotations). But, so long as we are operating in the realm of necessary and sufficient conditions, the denotation of the concept correspondingly shrinks – eventually, if you add enough connotations, to zero (as in the case of an 'ideal type' concept). Because of the substitutability of their secondary characteristics, FRCs do not give rise to this tradeoff. Indeed, adding more meanings to the connotation of a FRC can result in a more extensive denotation, that is, more real world referents to which the concept applies rather than fewer.

The point is not that FRC is a superior way to deal with all social science concepts. The traditional necessary and sufficient conditions method may be better suited to some concepts, for instance, those which have few secondary dimensions that are truly essential to their meaning. FRC is likely to be a better approach for concepts with more constitutive meanings. Such concepts are likely to be misformed and to provide less theoretical and empirical content if treated as necessary conditions.

The balance of this paper aims to demonstrate that the concept of hegemonic legitimacy is better formed by means of the FRC approach. It is certainly a multidimensional concept, comprised of various secondary-level characteristics. Yet if all of these characteristics were treated as necessary conditions, the resulting concept would denote an empty set, that is, no real world instances would meet such stringent requirements. At the same time, narrowing the conceptual focus to only one or a few of these secondary-level characteristics is bound to yield partial and thus misleading results. For example, a claim often heard in the lead-up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq was that such an intervention would be legitimate internationally only if supported by the UN Security Council (UNSC). This line of reasoning treats the UN imprimatur as a necessary condition for which there are no substitutes. Instead, we regard UNSC approval as but one among multiple sources of hegemonic legitimacy, none of which is necessary but which are substitutable for one another. As Goertz puts it, 'concept structure has important downstream consequences on the empirical coverage of the concept.'[12]

[10] The substitutability of multiple constitutive meanings, not all of which are 'necessary', is far from common social scientific practice. It is not unique, however, to the FRC approach. In the context of formulating 'substantive requirements for the legitimacy of global governance institutions', Allen Buchanan and Robert O. Keohane, 'The Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions', *Ethics and International Affairs*, 20 (2006), p. 424, recognise that, 'there might be extraordinary circumstances in which an institution would fail to satisfy one or two of them, yet still be reasonably regarded as legitimate. They further suggest that their 'three substantive requirements are best thought of as what Rawls calls 'counting principles': the more of them an institution satisfies, and the higher the degree to which it satisfies them, the stronger its claim to legitimacy.' See John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), pp. 415–16.

[11] Sartori, 'Guidelines for Concept Analysis'.

[12] Goertz, *Social Science Concepts*, p. 10.

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Denotation

What kinds of real world referents does the legitimacy concept denote? We maintain that it has a Janus-faced denotation. One face denotes as referents: actors who need and seek legitimation (for instance, states, IOs) or; ideas, ideologies, norms, rules, policies or actions (for instance, neoliberalism, reciprocity, use of force) for which legitimacy is claimed by actors who are not necessarily seeking it for themselves.[13]

The second face simultaneously denotes those who bestow it (or do not), for instance, the relevant domestic, international or transnational constituencies, audiences, or 'dispensers of legitimacy' in Steffek's apt phrase.[14] Taken together, the dual denotation underscores the sense in which legitimacy refers to a kind of social relationship between those claiming it and those conferring it. The most common use of legitimacy arises in a domestic political context wherein governments (the first face) seek legitimacy from their citizens, some of whom (the second face) believes that their national government is the rightful source of authoritative rules and laws. Legitimacy at this level involves another, external aspect – formal diplomatic recognition by other states of a government as the sovereign representative of its peoples.[15] External recognition lends an international dimension to this familiar use of the concept and provides a necessary foundation for external relations. It is usually extended reciprocally as a pro forma matter but is sometimes withheld or retracted. But this use corresponds to what we mean by *international* legitimacy in only a nominal sense.

What kinds of actors, then, are dually denoted when we modify the legitimacy concept with the adjective 'international'? One prominent type of actor that raises frequent legitimacy issues is IGOs,[16] the legitimacy of which is bound to be problematic as, 'it is not immediately clear who forms the constituency that could

[13] Although not concerned with denotation per se, Hurd provides a fascinating study of how a single action – the US invasion of Iraq – triggered legitimacy crises at three levels of denotation. First, by attempting to justify the invasion in terms of a right to preventive use of force against the alleged Iraqi threat without demonstrating that the threat was imminent, the US created a crisis of legitimacy of the existing norms on preemptive/preventive war. Second, by taking action widely perceived to be outside of prevailing rules and norms, the US created a crisis in the legitimacy of its own hegemonic power. Third, the invasion also risked a crisis of legitimacy in, 'the basic constitution of the international system, from a hegemonic order to something else', Ian Hurd, 'Breaking and Making Norms: American Revisionism and Crises of Legitimacy', *International Politics*, 44 (2007), p. 206.

[14] Jens Steffeck, 'The Legitimation of International Governance: A Discourse Approach', *European Journal of International Relations*, 9 (2003), p. 57. See Christian Reus-Smit, 'International Crises of Legitimacy', *International Politics*, 44 (2007), p. 164 for the idea of a 'social constituency of legitimation, the actual social grouping in which legitimacy is sought, ordained, or both'.

[15] For the notion of 'recognitional legitimacy', see Allen Buchanan, 'Recognitional Legitimacy and the State System', *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 28, 1 (1999), pp. 46–78. See Mlada Bukovansky, *Legitimacy and Power Politics* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002) for the transformation of political legitimacy that accompanied the shift from monarchical to popular sovereignty brought about by the American and French revolutions.

[16] Hurd, 'Legitimacy and Authority'; Buchanan and Keohane, 'The Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions; 'John-Marc Coicaud and Veijo Heiskanen (eds), *The Legitimacy of International Organizations* (New York: UN University Press, 2001); Leonard Seabrooke, 'Legitimacy Gaps in the World Economy: Explaining the Sources of the IMF's Legitimacy Crisis', *International Politics*, 44 (March/May 2007), pp. 250–68.

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regard international organisations as legitimate or illegitimate.'[17] Is the appropriate constituency, or audience, the (society of) states, which are at the same time the members of the IGO – what the English school terms international society? Or does a great power subset of these states comprise the relevant audience? Or, are the dispensers of legitimacy to be found in an emergent transnational entity, a 'global civil society' comprised of cosmopolitan citizens whose beliefs and perceptions about the legitimacy of IGOs are aggregated and mobilised largely by non-governmental organisations (NGOs)?[18] The representativeness and accountability of NGOs raise more legitimacy issues. Matters are further complicated by the fact that IGOs (as well as NGOs) in certain circumstances can be denoted by both faces of legitimacy: claiming it (consider the legitimacy of UN PKO) and/or conferring or withholding it (UNSC approval of humanitarian intervention).

In addition to state-based institutions and NGOs, international legitimacy is a relevant property for states that, either collectively or singly, claim for themselves an extraordinary systemic role, above and beyond simply being a member of this system. Such a role typically involves responsibility for maintaining the stability of the international order. Henry Kissinger, for example, with reference to the 19th century Concert of Europe, avers: 'An order whose structure is accepted by all major powers is "legitimate".'[19] Note the 'great power chauvinism': only major (great) powers count toward legitimacy, while lesser powers are not factored into the legitimacy calculus. A contemporary equivalent might be the G7/8, which also informally arrogates to itself various responsibilities, mostly in relation to the world economy. And, like the Concert of Europe but unlike IGOs, no administrative apparatus is entailed.

That brings us to the denotation of particular interest to this paper: the historically small number of states that have attempted to build and maintain a hegemonic order. Alternative conceptions of hegemony differ in terms of the importance they assign to legitimacy. In Mearsheimer's version of realism, since hegemony derives from material capabilities, legitimacy is not a relevant consideration.[20] Gramscian understandings, in contrast, regard a significant measure of consent as an essential element of hegemony, as do many liberals.[21] Liberals and some realists emphasise another

[17] G. C. A. Junne, 'International Organizations in a Period of Globalization: New (Problems of) Legitimacy', in Coicaud and Heiskanen (eds), *The Legitimacy of International Organizations* (2001), p. 191. Similar issues arise in consideration of the legitimacy of international regimes, which may not entail formal organisations. See, for example, Robyn Eckersley, 'Ambushed: The Kyoto Protocol, the Bush Administration's Climate Policy and the Erosion of Legitimacy', *International Politics*, 44 (2007), pp. 306–24.

[18] For an excellent treatment of how international legitimacy relates to the older conception of international society and the emergent phenomena of world society, see Ian Clark, *International Legitimacy and World Society* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).

[19] Henry Kissinger, *American Foreign Policy* (New York: W. W. Norton 1977), p. 145.

[20] John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: W. W. Norton).

[21] For a seminal work in the modern Gramscian approach to international legitimacy (usually cast in terms of consent) and its application to hegemony, see Robert Cox, *Production, Power and World Order* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987). The liberal approach has been most thoroughly developed in the work of G. John Ikenberry, 'Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Persistence of American Postwar Order', *International Security*, 23 (1998–99), pp. 43–78; Ikenberry, *After Victory* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 2001), and; Ikenberry and Charles A. Kupchan, 'The Legitimation of Hegemonic Power', in David P. Rapkin (ed.), *World Leadership and Hegemony* (Boulder, CO: Rienner, 1990), pp. 49–69. For a conceptual survey of hegemony, including the importance of legitimacy, see David P. Rapkin, 'The Contested Concept of Hegemonic Leadership', in Rapkin (ed.), *World Leadership and Hegemony*, pp. 1–19.

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dimension of hegemony that is related to legitimacy: provision of global public goods. We use the term hegemony in a way that is *a priori* neither strictly pejorative nor wholly positive. Rather, hegemonic behaviour can be located along a continuum between coercive and exploitative, at one extreme, and benevolent, or at least benign, at the other. Hegemons whose behaviour is consistently located toward the coercive/exploitative end are likely to lack legitimacy. Indeed, they should be described in other terms, such as outright dominance or modern empire, political forms not involving legitimacy.[22]

As suggested earlier, recent events in world politics have focused attention on questions of hegemonic legitimacy.[23] That hegemons should need and seek legitimacy, and that they are thus among the entities denoted by the first face of the concept, is not a novel claim: '[T]he search for legitimacy is particularly applicable for those states whose power accords them a unique hegemonic status in world politics'.[24] The second face of hegemonic legitimacy is complex, as it may entail the granting of legitimacy by domestic, international, and transnational audiences. As for international audiences, the traditional legitimacy constraints on would-be hegemons are posed by the international society (of states). The mechanisms by which international society's consent is expressed and aggregated, however, are seldom visible, not always studied as such, and thus are not well understood. This is also the case for how consent is withheld by certain audiences, for instance, by balking, delegitimation strategies, or balancing (hard and soft, internal and external).

The most promising second-face denotation of international legitimacy involves the constraints posed by world society, what Ruggie terms, 'a newly emerging global public domain that is no longer coterminous with the system of states.'[25] Moreover, 'the global public sphere is increasingly visible, effective, articulate, and strengthened by the expansion of democracy.'[26] Students of legitimacy have begun to explore the implications of these developments. One such implication is that, as Hurrell notes, '[t]he politics of legitimacy are played out to an increasing range of audiences.'[27] Another, more specific implication is that, 'We should expect NGOs and public opinion to become more consequential players in generating acceptance or rejection of legitimacy claims.'[28] Before examining the importance of global public opinion

[22] See David P. Rapkin, 'Empire and Its Discontents', *New Political Economy*, 10 (2005) for the argument that the United States exercised a largely legitimate form of hegemony for much of the post-World War period, but more recently has discounted or discarded altogether legitimacy concerns in a bid for a kind of empire.

[23] Hurd, 'Breaking and Making Norms'; Rapkin, 'Empire and Its Discontents', and; Bruce Cronin, 'The Paradox of Hegemony: America's Ambiguous Relationship with the United Nations', *European Journal of International Relations*, 7 (2001), pp. 103–30. The differences between international legitimacy and hegemonic legitimacy are straddled by the phrase, 'US foreign policy legitimacy', as used by Shirley V. Scott and Olivia Ambler, 'Does Legality Really Matter? Accounting for the Decline in US Foreign Policy Legitimacy Following the 2003 Invasion of Iraq', *European Journal of International Relations*, 13 (2007), pp. 67–87; and by Nayef Samhat and Rodger A. Payne, 'American Foreign Policy Legitimacy and the Global Public Sphere', *Peace Review*, 18 (2007), pp. 251–9.

[24] Samhat and Payne, 'American Foreign Policy Legitimacy', p. 252.

[25] John G. Ruggie, 'Reconstituting the Global Public Domain – Issues, Actors, and Practices', *European Journal of International Relations*, 10 (2004), p. 509.

[26] Samhat and Payne, 'American Foreign Policy Legitimacy', p. 259.

[27] Andrew Hurrell, 'Legitimacy and the Use of Force: Can the Circle Be Squared?', *Review of International Studies*, 31 (2005), p. 24.

[28] Martha Finnemore, 'Fights About Rules: The Role of Efficacy and Power in Changing Multilateralism', *Review of International Studies*, 31 (2005), p. 205.

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to the task of assaying legitimacy, the next section uses FRC methods to spell out the complex conceptual characteristics of the hegemonic variant of international legitimacy.

Connotations

Although there are some continuities of meaning, especially at the basic level, 'principles of legitimacy evolve historically: they are not fixed.'[29] We would not expect, for instance, our current conception of early 21st century hegemonic legitimacy to be identical to that appropriate to British hegemony in the 19th century, or even to the more proximate instance of the US after WWII.[30] If the specific meanings of hegemonic legitimacy are not transhistorically constant, nor do they evolve independently of the states and other actors who seek legitimacy or are enabled or constrained by it. As Clark emphasises, hegemony is a contested political process.[31] This process consists of legitimation efforts by hegemonic actors claiming legitimacy for their activities, and may also be countered by delegitimation, that is, efforts to deny or undermine legitimacy claims.[32] With these points in mind, we turn to the specific meanings connoted by the concept of hegemonic legitimacy.

Basic level definition

Suchman, who focuses on the legitimacy of business organisations, offers a broad general definition: 'Legitimacy is a generalised perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs and definitions'.[33] Similarly, Hurd, addressing the legitimacy of a state-based IO, defines legitimacy as 'the normative belief by an actor that a rule or institution ought to be obeyed.'[34] For Nossel, '[i]nternational legitimacy is a measure of the acceptability and justifiability of a state's actions in the eyes of other states and their citizens.'[35] This sampling of definitions converge on (1) the idea that legitimacy is an intersubjective property that stems from *perceptions or beliefs* of one actor about another and, as Reus-Smit stresses, is therefore inherently social;[36] (2) the central quality of *oughtness*, expressed above by the terms proper, appropriate, acceptability and justifiability. A legitimate actor is one who, owing to this quality of oughtness, is recognised as the rightful wielder of power, exerciser of authority, maker and interpreter of rules, or user of

[29] Clark, *Legitimacy in International Society*, p. 13.
[30] We expect basic level definitions will travel the furthest across time, space, and other denotations, for example IOs or NGOs; secondary characteristics less so, and; indicator-level definitions to be the least generalisable.
[31] Clark, *Legitimacy in International Society*. See also Bukovansky, *Legitimacy and Power Politics*, pp. 39–40 for a related view of hegemony as a 'legitimacy contest'.
[32] For a useful discussion of delegitimation as a strategy of opposition, see Stephen M. Walt, *Taming American Power* (New York: Norton, 2005), pp. 160–78.
[33] Mark Suchman, 'Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional Approaches', *Academy of Management Review*, 20 (1995), p. 575.
[34] Hurd, 'Legitimacy and Authority', p. 381.
[35] Nossel, 'Going Legit', p. 30.
[36] Reus-Smit, 'International Crises', p. 159.

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force, and who thereby warrants support and compliance.[37] (3) To these two meanings we add *consent*: if an actor believes a hegemon to be the appropriate, rightful maker of rules and expresses its consent directly or indirectly, that actor in effect confers legitimacy upon the hegemon.

As Clark observes, '[i]t had long been held by political theorists . . . that legitimacy resided in any political relationship only if marked by consent', but there has been a shift toward consensus rather than consent owing to the, 'many difficulties with the notion of consent, and the highly problematic nature of what counts as reliable evidence for its expression.' We are sceptical, however, that '[c]onsensus provides a different, and less demanding criterion for the creation and maintenance of legitimacy [than] the (hard to specify) ''act'' of political consent.'[38] Indeed, consent can be considered the 'activity form' of consensus (a state or condition), suggesting that this is a distinction without much of a difference, at least not a sharp difference.[39] Though we cannot resolve the issue here, we do, however, find consensus more problematic from an operational standpoint, principally because it is often interpreted as requiring unanimity, which is definitely not a decision rule we think relevant to hegemonic legitimacy. There are bound to be operational difficulties in trying to determine what constitutes consent, when an actor has consented and, overall, who has consented and who has not.[40] As Brilmayer observes: 'The consent that exists in many circumstances is not explicit; it is tacit, inferred, or implied.'[41] We do not go quite so far as Joffe, for whom, 'consent is another word for legitimacy', but we do agree that, '[a]t a minimum, consent spells acquiescence, a green light: farther up the scale, it delivers partners'.[42]

Another meaningful distinction is between *contemporaneous* and *ex ante* consent: the former 'is given at roughly the same time as the . . . action in question', while the latter 'consists of prior generalised consent to norms of conduct'.[43] *Ex ante* consent

[37] Hurd, 'Legitimacy and Authority', frames this sense of legitimacy – rules or actors that deserve to be followed – with two other motivations for compliant behaviour, coercion and self-interest, to form a three-part Weberian categorisation of 'modes of social control'.

[38] Clark, *Legitimacy in International Society*, pp. 162–3.

[39] For this distinction, as well as a broader conceptual overview, see George J. Graham, 'Consensus', in Giovanni Sartori (ed.), *Social Science Concepts: A Systematic Analysis* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1984), pp. 89–124. For another thorough treatment of consent and consensus, see P. H. Partridge, *Consent and Consensus* (London: Macmillan, 1971).

[40] See David Beetham, *The Legitimation of Power* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1991), p. 95 for discussion of what he terms the 'expressive modes of consent . . . whereby the subordinate demonstrate their commitment to a regime by voluntary actions supportive of its policies'.

[41] Lea Brilmayer, *American Hegemony* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994), p. 108.

[42] Joseph Joffe, *Uberpower* (New York: Norton, 2006), p. 207. Graham, 'Consensus', p. 93, points out that that *acquiescence* is among the dictionary definitions of the noun consent.

[43] Brilmayer, *American Hegemony*, pp. 66–7; see chapters 4–6, provides an extensive overview of consent theory from a legal standpoint, including hypothetical consent as well as the contemporaneous and ex ante varieties. Though not using the term 'consent', Hurd, 'Legitimacy and Authority', p. 398, makes a similar distinction in his discussion of the legitimacy of IGOs: actors may proceed on a case-by-case basis and consider legitimacy 'at each decision point' (that is, insist on contemporaneous consent) or become habitual 'rule-following agents' (that is, provide ex ante consent). These distinctions correspond in their main contours to that between *specific* and *diffuse* legitimacy made by Gary Coglianese, 'Globalization and the Design of International Institutions', in Joseph S. Nye, Jr. and John D. Donahue (eds), *Governance in a Globalizing World* (Washington, DC: Brookings, 2000), p. 312. Nathan Gardels, in 'The Rise and Fall of America's Soft Power', *New Perspectives Quarterly*, Winter (2005), p. 12, applies this distinction to the contemporary US case: '[T]he legitimacy of American action in the world today can no longer be assumed. It must be earned each and every time for the foreseeable future'.

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is likely to be enjoyed by a hegemon that has built up a stock of taken-for-granted legitimacy.[44] Situations in which contemporaneous consent is demanded indicate a hegemon that has damaged its reputation for credibility; engendered distrust among followers concerned that it is using its position narrowly to advance its national interests at expense of others, or; is seeking legitimacy for a particularly problematic action or norm (for instance, torture, preventive war). In other words, its status as a legitimate hegemon is tenuous and contingent. To continue the US example, any US bid to use force against Iran or Syria would likely be subject to contemporaneous consent since the US 'balance' in the bank of *ex ante* consent appears to have been depleted since the invasion of Iraq.

In sum, our basic level definition of hegemonic legitimacy focuses on actors' perceptions and beliefs regarding the oughtness or appropriateness of a hegemons' role, the rules it formulates, and the specific actions it undertakes. Positive evaluations, or approval, can be considered a form of consent which, in turn, is tantamount to conferring legitimacy.

Secondary level characteristics: sources of legitimacy

The traditional literature on legitimacy in law and politics has emphasised two principal sources: substantive and procedural. *Substantive* legitimacy derives from the normative substance of the principle, rule, action or policy in question. 'Substantive refers to values and which, or which combinations, are to be privileged at any one moment.'[45] This criterion of normative correctness or desirability rests on a foundation of shared end-values, goals, core principles and collective understandings, in terms of which any new initiative or action needs to be justified. Kane writes about moral capital in terms that apply equally well to substantive legitimacy: 'Political agents and institutions must . . . establish a moral grounding . . . by avowing their service to some set of fundamental values, principles and goals that find a resonant response in significant numbers of people' (or other, more aggregated audiences).[46] For Nossel, '[l]egitimacy, a kind of moral capital, reflects a collective judgment that the exercise of power, through a policy or action, is valid even if it is unpopular.' And when a hegemon's 'purposes are well-founded, openly articulated, and broadly consistent with its professed values, the use of power toward those ends is generally judged legitimate'.[47] But, to the extent to which values diverge between hegemonic claimant and its constituencies of legitimacy-dispensing followers, it becomes more difficult to find a basis for legitimate action.

Procedural approaches emphasise decision process as the basis of legitimacy, as in Franck's oft-cited formulation: 'The legitimacy of a rule, or of a rule-making or rule-applying institution, is a function of the perception of those in the community concerned that the rule, or the institution, has come into being endowed with

[44] Or 'pool of consent' in Partridge's terms, *Consent and Consensus*, p. 27. With reference to the cognate concept, 'moral capital', John Kane, *The Politics of Moral Capital* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001) p. 27, speaks of leaders building a 'repository of trust'.
[45] Clark, *Legitimacy in International Society*, p. 3.
[46] Kane, *The Politics of Moral Capital*, p. 10.
[47] Nossel, 'Going Legit', p. 30.

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legitimacy: that is, in accordance with right process'.[48] Ikenberry uses the concept of *constitutionalism* to elaborate at some length the variety of institutional and behavioural constraints that make up the process dimension of hegemonic legitimacy.[49] Ikenberry argues that the postwar Western liberal order under US hegemony displayed 'constitutional characteristics . . . a structure of institutions and open polities that constrain power and facilitate 'voice opportunities', thereby mitigating the implications of power asymmetries and reducing the opportunities of the leading state to exit or dominate'.[50] We suggest that Ikenberry's constitutionalism can be usefully partitioned into two separate (though connected) sub-dimensions of process legitimacy: Process1 refers broadly to open, accessible decision-making; Process2 involves different forms of strategic restraint.

The hallmark of *process1* legitimacy is that the hegemon maintains relatively open foreign policy decision-making characterised by transparency, decentralisation and many points of informal access. Internationally, the hegemon promotes participatory modes of decision-making and seeks to accommodate other powers and their interests. Referring to the procedural arrangements set up under hegemonic auspices in the immediate postwar period, Deudney and Ikenberry contend that, '[t]aken together, these constitute a dense system of routinised channels for consultations, exchanges of views, dispute resolution, and consensus building'.[51] Such 'penetrated' arrangements allow opportunities for participation by non-hegemonic constituents, providing them a voice in consultations with the hegemon's policymakers. According to Tucker and Hendrickson, within this consultative framework, 'US leaders took close account of the vital interests and perspectives of their allies'.[52] Such processes should bolster hegemonic legitimacy. As Beetham contends, a 'type of action expressive of consent is that of taking part in consultations with the powerful'.[53] In Deudney and Ikenberry's terms, '[s]uch processes endow the [asymmetric] relations with a degree of acceptability in the eyes of subordinate powers'.[54]

The *process2* dimension of constitutionalism, *strategic restraint*, entails reducing returns to hegemonic power, self-imposed limits on the hegemon's autonomy, and reassurances that it will not exploit its superordinate position or trample others' interests in pursuit of its own. A key strategy for accomplishing strategic restraint is 'institutional binding', in which states link themselves, 'together in mutually constraining institutions . . . Examples of binding mechanisms include treaties, international organisations, joint management responsibilities, agreed-upon standards and principles of relations',[55] (as well as adherence to international law).[56] One

[48] Franck, 'Legitimacy in the International System', p. 711.
[49] Ikenberry, 'Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Persistence of American Postwar Order', and Ikenberry, *After Victory*.
[50] Ibid., p. 45.
[51] Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry, 'Realism, Structural Liberalism, and the Western Order', in Ethan B. Kapstein and Michael Mastanduno (eds), *Unipolar Politics* (Columbia University Press, 1999), p. 111.
[52] Tucker and Hendrickson, 'Sources of American Legitimacy', p. 22.
[53] Beetham, *The Legitimation of Power*, p. 93.
[54] Deudney and Ikenberry, 'Realism', p. 111.
[55] Ikenberry, *After Victory*, pp. 40–1.
[56] See Tucker and Hendrickson, 'Sources of American Legitimacy', pp. 19–21, for a brief but useful discussion of the (uneven) emphasis on international law in the postwar period.

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controversial, and recently prominent, strategic restraint issue involves use of force, and the question of whether a hegemon refrains from using it if others' consent is not forthcoming.

The pairing of substantive and procedural sources is probably the most common approach to defining legitimacy. Ikenberry and Kupchan distinguish between the process orientation of rational-legal (Weberian) foundations of legitimacy and approaches emphasising the importance of shared values and norms.[57] Similarly, for Hurd, '[t]he actor's perception [of legitimacy] may come from the substance of the rule or from the procedure or source by which it was constituted'.[58] And, Nossel's[59] distinction between rules (process) and rectitude (resting on shared values) as sources of legitimacy fits squarely within this approach.

More recent work on the concept has been explicitly multidimensional, adding new (or expanding existing) secondary characteristics. Scharpf's critical analysis of democracy in the European Union draws a distinction between input and output legitimisation.[60] *Input legitimisation*, which falls into the process category, focuses on methods for the aggregation of individual preferences, rhetorically emphasises participation and consensus, and can be summed up as 'government by the people'. 'Government for the people', or what Scharpf terms *output legitimisation*, is based on performance insofar as it 'derives legitimacy from its capacity to solve problems requiring collective solutions because they could not be solved through individual action, through market exchanges, or through voluntary cooperation in civil society'.[61] Translated into a hegemonic context, this performance- or effectiveness-based source of legitimacy, which we term *outcome legitimacy*, stems from the use of hegemonic power to achieve successful outcomes, and thereby passing the 'test of effective results.'[62] Successful outcomes might be in terms of diffuse systemic properties (peace, stability or equilibrium)[63] or they can be more specific and concrete (effective military interventions, serving as the engine of global economic growth). As David D. Caron argues in the context of international organisations, '[s]uccessful outcomes will go far in painting over perceived defects in the process of decision'.[64]

From another perspective, outcome legitimacy can derive from provision of global public goods, an activity long associated with the concept of hegemonic leadership.[65] In Nye's terms, US grand strategy 'must focus on providing global public goods', not just because the US reaps the benefits of the goods themselves, but also because of,

[57] Ikenberry and Kupchan, 'The Legitimation of Hegemonic Power', pp. 52–53.
[58] Hurd, 'Legitimacy and Authority', p. 381.
[59] Nossel, 'Going Legit', p. 34.
[60] Fritz W. Scharpf, *Governing in Europe* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
[61] Scharpf, *Governing in Europe*, p. 11.
[62] See Finnemore, 'Fights About Rules', pp. 199–203, for a discussion of effectiveness and the legitimacy of using force. See also Ian Clark, *International Legitimacy and World Society*, pp. 329–330, for a general discussion of the relationship between legitimacy and effectiveness.
[63] See, for example, Tucker and Hendrickson, 'Sources of American Legitimacy', p. 23, for a discussion of 'Washington's success in preserving peace and prosperity within the community of advanced industrialised democracies'.
[64] 'The Legitimacy of the Collective Authority of the Security Council', *American Journal of International Law*, 87 (1993), p. 562. Caron goes on to add: 'It is ultimately the process, however, that may allow participants who are somewhat distrustful of one another to believe in and support the organization'.
[65] Rapkin, 'The Contested Concept of Hegemonic Leadership'.

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'the way they legitimize our power in the eyes of others'.[66] In a variety of ways, then, '[l]egitimacy and effectiveness are deeply intertwined'.[67]

These three dimensions of legitimacy – substantive, process and outcome – have seldom been joined in a single conceptual framework.[68] Hurrell adds two others – specialised expertise and rational communication and persuasion – to the three dimensions of legitimacy that we have already discussed. In Hurrell's terms: 'Institutions and the norms and rules they embody are legitimate to the degree that those centrally involved possess specialist knowledge or relevant expertise'.[69] This claim may well be valid in the short-term, but we think such expertise is better understood as a component of the problem-solving capacities associated with outcome legitimacy. If the legitimacy-seeking actor proves ineffective in solving problems, specialised expertise will sooner or later count for naught with the relevant constituencies. In sum, specialised knowledge and expertise figure into international legitimacy, but we do not think they constitute an independent dimension.

Hurrell's fifth type of legitimacy draws upon Habermas' theory of communicative action, which emphasises the importance for legitimacy of truthfulness and distortion-free communications, providing reasonable justifications, and engaging in deliberation and persuasion.[70] Indeed, there is a growing body of work extending the application of communicative action theory from national to international legitimacy.[71] Although laden with practical obstacles to implementation, the prescriptive potential of this approach seems highly promising and worthy of further scholarly effort. That said, Habermasian communicative action strikes us as quintessentially procedural, fitting squarely within and enhancing our understanding of the process dimension rather than amounting to another, separate dimension.

From the preceding survey of the literature on the meanings of legitimacy we extract the following reduced list of items, each of which is a constitutive dimension (or secondary level characteristic): substantive/shared values, process1 – open decision making, process2 – strategic restraint and outcomes/effectiveness.

Table 1 fits these dimensions of hegemonic legitimacy into the FRC organisational template, thereby reducing a large amount of complex information from a wide array of different disciplines and approaches, while also retaining enough comprehensiveness to cope with the multidimensionality of the concept.[72] The next section pushes these secondary characteristics in the direction of operationalisation.

[66] Joseph S. Nye, *The Paradox of American Power* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 143–4.
[67] Finnemore, 'Fights About Rules', p. 188.
[68] An exception is Daniel Bodansky, 'The Legitimacy of International Governance: A Coming Challenge for International Environmental Law?' *The American Journal of International Law*, 93:3 (July, 1999), p. 612.
[69] Hurrell, 'Legitimacy and the Use of Force', p. 22.
[70] Jurgen Habermas, *Communication and the Evolution of Society* (Boston, MA: Beacon, 1979), and Habermas, *The Theory of Communicative Action* (Boston, MA: Beacon, 1988).
[71] For explicit attempts to introduce communicative action reasoning and deliberative processes to questions of international legitimacy, see Steffek, 'The Legitimation of International Governance'; Jennifer Mitzen, 'Reading Habermas in Anarchy: Multilateral Diplomacy and Global Public Spheres', *American Political Science Review*, 99 (2005), pp. 401–17; and Corneliu Bjola, 'Legitimating the Use of Force in International Politics: A Communicative Action Perspective', *European Journal of International Relations*, 11 (2005), pp. 266–303.
[72] Two prominent applications of the legitimacy concept to the recent American case can easily be fit into the FRC dimensions we have specified. Each application presents a four-part definition and thus is more complex than most approaches to international legitimacy. Tucker and Hendrickson, 'Sources of American Legitimacy', identify four 'pillars' of US legitimacy in the post-World War II

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Basic level	Secondary level	Indicator level
Legitimacy Perceptual Oughtness Consent	**Substantive**: Shared values and norms	Differences based on policies or values? Like/Dislike US ideas on democracy? Like/Dislike American ways of doing business?
	Constitutionalism: Process1 Open, accessible decision-making Transparency Informal access Opportunities for participation, voice Consideration of others' interests	Takes into account interests of others? Were leaders misinformed about Iraq and WMDs or did they lie about it? Trustworthiness of the US after the Iraq invasion?
	Constitutionalism: Process2 Self-restraint Reduced returns to power Moderation in policy Adherence to International Law Institutional Binding	US Role in the World? US as World Policeman?
	Outcome legitimacy: Performance Test of effective results Successful outcomes Provision of global public goods Security, stability, equilibrium, economic growth, employment, equity	Opinion of the US? US influence in the world? US presence in the Middle East? Has war in Iraq made the world safer or more dangerous? US policies and N–S gap? US leadership in human rights?

Table 1. *Overview of international legitimacy as a family resemblance concept*

Indicator level: operationalising legitimacy

There are several approaches to devising observable indicators of hegemonic legitimacy. Each requires identifying the actors who confer legitimacy and then determining which of their words or deeds can be taken as conferring or withholding it. Thus, if we aim to determine whether the *state* actors that populate international society regard a hegemon as legitimate, we might focus on their votes in IOs on initiatives proposed by or related to the hegemon and its behaviour. For example, we could examine patterns of compliance across a number of votes in the UN General Assembly or UNSC. Alternatively, for a rough and ready measure, the size and

period: (1) adherence to international law; (2) consensual modes of decision-making; (3) moderation in policy, and; (4) success in preserving peace and prosperity. Note that the first two of these fall into the Process1 category, the third reflects strategic restraint (Process2) and the last is an example of outcome legitimacy. The substantive dimension is not included in their conceptualisation. Walt, *Taming American Power*, pp. 160–78, lists four possible sources of international legitimacy: (1) conformity with established procedures, allows others to participate in the decision-making process; (2) positive consequences, broadly beneficial for others; (3) conformity with moral norms, and (4) consistency with the 'natural' order, which equates to a belief that the US deserves its position of primacy. Note that the first clearly fits in the Process1 category; the second taps outcome legitimacy, and; 'conformity with moral norms' reflects substantive legitimacy. 'Consistency with the natural order' seems to reduce to acceptance of the US position at the top of the international hierarchy. This meaning doesn't conform to any of the secondary characteristics we have covered, though it might be interpreted as a basis for acquiescence (as a weak form of consent).

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composition (which countries are in, which are out, number of troops sent, financial resources committed) of the so-called 'coalition of the willing' assembled for the 2003 invasion of Iraq could be compared with that put together for the earlier invasion in 1990–91, with that formed for nonproliferation purposes, or with trends in global public opinion (see below).

Alternatively, there are various ways to tap the legitimacy attributed to the hegemon by the civil societies of follower states or by the emerging and still amorphous global civil society mentioned earlier. It is possible to track elections to determine the extent to which the hegemon's behaviour and the national government's support of it emerged as an important, or even decisive, campaign issue, for example, since 9/11, *inter alia* Germany, Turkey, South Korea, Spain, Italy, and, most recently, Australia. To what extent has it been the case that, '(f)or foreign leaders, standing alongside US policy has often appeared to be the ''kiss of death'' '?[73] Similarly, the size and frequency of mass demonstrations in which people protest the hegemon's policies and/or their leaders' support for them could be examined.

The most promising way to assess global civil society perspectives on hegemonic legitimacy is by means of public opinion surveys: '[T]he spread of public opinion polling and the continued growth of global media networks that transmit such findings almost instantly [have] provided an opportunity for citizens in countries everywhere to make their views known not only to their own political leaders but to officials in other governments'.[74] Ideally, such polls would ask various questions that tap directly into the dimensions of hegemonic legitimacy we have identified; in contrast, the state-based measures we suggested provide only a basis for broad-gauge inferences about overall legitimacy but not for finer distinctions among substantive, process and outcome legitimacy. Also, global polls will hopefully ask identical questions in the same large, representative sample of countries over multiple time points, thereby permitting analysis of trends, before-and-after comparisons (for example, end of the cold war, 9/11), and cross-regional comparisons.

Presently, not all of these criteria are met. One problem, for our purposes, is that there is scant international polling data before 9/11, thus precluding comparison of the perceived legitimacy of the Bush administration with that accorded to its predecessors. Also, there are few polling questions that have been asked multiple times since the Bush administration took office, making it difficult to track trends or assess the impact of the 9/11 attacks or the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Finally, even for

[73] Center for Strategic and International Studies, CSIS Commission on Smart Power. (Washington, DC: CSIS Press, 2007), p. 19. Democracy promotion thus can have some unwanted consequences for the legitimacy-seeking hegemon: 'the expansion of a free citizenry through the spread of democratisation can further raise the threshold of legitimacy for the United States', Samhat and Rodger Payne, 'American Foreign Policy Legitimacy', p. 252. As democratisation, and thereby also systematic surveys of citizens' preferences, diffuse more widely, governments may find their latitude to support unpopular US policies increasingly constrained, even when they are otherwise inclined to do so. Consider in this regard Turkey's refusal, in the face of strong domestic opposition, to allow the US to launch its invasion of Iraq from Turkish territory. Note also the recent election in Australia, where the incumbent Howard (Liberal-National) government ignored at its own peril public opposition to the country's alignment with the US on the war in Iraq and ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, only to engender a backlash which resulted in the election of the Rudd (Labour) opposition.

[74] Ronald Brownstein, 'Court of Public Opinion Becomes Key Battleground', *Los Angeles Times* (13 March 2003).

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those questions that have been asked across multiple time points, they are not always asked of the same sample of countries; and, the samples tend to be small. In consequence, global polling does not yet provide the dense and complete data cube we would like to have to systematically 'test' our approach to hegemonic legitimacy. Enough indicators are available, however, to suggest what such an exercise would look like and to allow a brief, preliminary sketch of how US legitimacy has been perceived over recent years. The next section enumerates the indicators we use and reports the results.

An empirical glimpse

The indicators are summarised in Table 1 and reported in the tables that follow.

Values

Three indicators – one at a single time point, and two more at two time points – address the substantive/shared value dimension of legitimacy:

Indicator 1: when there are differences between our country and the US do you think these differences occur because we have different values than the US or because we have different policies than the US?

It has been widely observed that the Bush administration's summary dismissal (before 9/11) of collective action aimed at addressing global problems that others regard as important (for instance, climate change, the ICC, various arms control issues) corroded the sense of shared values, at least among western allies. Kagan, who has described the US and Europe as unlike as 'Mars and Venus', claims that '[a] great philosophical schism has opened within the West'.[75] Similarly, Fukuyama asserts that, 'an enormous gulf has opened up in American and European perceptions about the world, and the sense of shared values is increasingly frayed'.[76] Differences between the US and Western Europe are especially important insofar as they are allies and 'old democracies' thought to represent more cohesively 'Western values'.

The responses in 2002 to Indicator 1 reflect a broad consensus (encompassing all seven regions, including Europe) that policy differences matter more than value differences in accounting for divergences between the US and the rest of the world. It is commonly observed, however, that subsequent events and revelations concerning US human rights practices – Abu Ghraib, treatment of detainees at Guantanamo, torture, renditions – have resulted in wider differences with the US on value grounds.

Indicator 2: which of these come closer to your view? I like American ideas about democracy, or I dislike American ideas about democracy.

The claim of wider differences is borne out by the responses to Indicator 2, which directly addresses the popularity of American ideas concerning democracy, a key aspect of recent US legitimation efforts and the basis of an image it has been keen to

[75] Kagan, 'America's Crisis of Legitimacy', p. 66.
[76] Fukuyama Francis, 'The West May Be Coming Apart', *The Straits Times* (10 August 2002).

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project. In 2002 majorities in all regions – except the Middle East and an evenly split Western Europe – expressed favourable attitudes toward American ideas about democracy. Overall, 50 per cent of the respondents responded favourably and 37 per cent unfavourably. But by 2007 these numbers had reversed: 49 per cent voiced their dislike and only 39 per cent expressed positive appraisals of American democratic ideas. Among the regions, only in Africa did a majority (72 per cent) of respondents like American conceptions of democracy. A sizeable majority (58 per cent) of those polled in Western Europe disliked American ideas on democracy, twice those who liked these ideas.

Indicator 3: which of these comes closer to your view? I like American ways of doing business, OR I dislike American ways of doing business.

A similar pattern, though with narrower differences, emerges in response to this question – whether respondents like or dislike American business practices. We suspect that negative responses reflect perceptions, perhaps stylised, of American business practices as ruthless, returns-driven, shareholder capitalism, and as contrasted with the emphases on economic security and egalitarianism associated with stakeholder capitalism in Europe and elsewhere. Here we find that overall a plurality of 45 per cent expressed favourable views of American ways of doing business, with 40 per cent expressing dislike in 2002. By 2007, however, this pattern had switched, with a plurality (45–41 per cent) registering its dislike. Responses were mixed across the regions, with a majority (56–26 per cent) in Western Europe reporting negative views of American business practices.

It is difficult to say much on the basis of such limited evidence, but people in the rest of the world, notably among the other Western democracies, seem to think they share core values with Americans less than they used to, thus lending very tentative support to the notion of a trans-Atlantic fissure posited by Kagan and Fukuyama. These results are far from conclusive, however, and it could well be that value differences are not as wide as often claimed, leaving open the possibility that changes in US leadership and policies could reverse the divergence between the US and elsewhere, especially Europe. Future surveys will hopefully provide longitudinal data on a wider range of core values and across more countries.

Process 1: there are three indicators of the process1 dimension of international legitimacy. The first of these hits the secondary-level meaning squarely, and is tallied at five time points between 2002 and 2006:

Indicator 4: in making international policy decisions, to what extent do you think the US takes into account the interests of countries like [yours]?

In 2002 a sizeable majority (57–37 per cent) of respondents worldwide believed the US did not take into account their country's interests. By the time the next survey was conducted in June 2003, after the invasion of Iraq, the ratio of negative-to-positive responses had climbed to 65–31 per cent; reached 67–24 per cent after the invasion of Iraq in 2004; fell back to 65–29 per cent in 2005, and again to 63–31 per cent in 2007.

The responses to this survey question are consistent with a chorus of anecdotal criticisms. For example, referring to the importance of consultations with allies and of taking their interests into account, Chancellor Gerhard Schroder noted in an interview: 'In the past it was always said: Before we do anything, we will consult with

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our principal allies . . . But consultation cannot mean that I get a phone call two hours in advance only to be told, 'We're going in.' Consultation among grown-up nations has to mean not just consultations about the how and when, but also about the whether'.[77] Similarly, with reference to the Bush doctrine's assertion of a norm change facilitating preventive war, a French diplomat complained: 'We found out about the Bush Doctrine by downloading it from the White House website . . . The Doctrine has much to recommend it, but that is not the way to communicate with allies'.[78] The pundit Fred Barnes pointed out with admiration that, unlike Clinton, Bush eschews dialogues and negotiations with allies about strategy: 'He informs them what he's planning to do and invites them to come along.'[79] Similarly, Zakaria observes that 'President Bush's favorite verb is ''expect''. He announces peremptorily that he ''expects'' the Palestinians to dump Yasir Arafat, ''expects'' countries to be with him or against him, ''expects'' Turkey to cooperate'.[80] In sum, data on the extent to which citizens of other countries think their countries' interests are being taken into account is consistent with anecdotal observations and points to a clear departure from the practices of constitutionalism.

Two other indicators bear on process1 concerns, albeit with a small number of countries and only a single time point (2004):

Indicator 5: before the war, US and Britain claimed that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction. These weapons have yet to be found. Why do you think they made this claim? Was it mostly because US and British leaders were themselves misinformed by bad intelligence, or was it mostly because US and British leaders lied to provide a reason for invading Iraq?
Indicator 6: as a consequence of the war, do you have more confidence or less confidence that the US is trustworthy?

In all three regions surveyed (country n=8) more than 60 per cent believed that US and British leaders lied in order to trump up a rationale for invading Iraq. Even greater proportions (63, 65, and 73 per cent) declared that they had lost confidence in the trustworthiness of the US in consequence of the Iraq war. At issue here is the veracity and trustworthiness of the legitimacy-claiming hegemon. If the process by which hegemonic initiatives are formulated, deliberated, and ultimately acted upon is tainted by misinformation, deception, or outright lying, that process cannot be said to be legitimate. Consider, for instance, that after the failure to produce the WMDs that were ostensibly the main reason for the Iraq invasion, 'all [intelligence] coming

[77] 'Interview with Gerhard Schroder: 'Traces of Terror', *New York Times* (5 September 2002). A recurrent theme in James Mann, *Rise of the Vulcans* (New York: Viking, 2004), p. 115, is that the first Bush administration's, 'underlying assumption was that the United States should not and need not reach accommodation with any other of the world's major powers.' This attitude has been manifest in different contexts, for instance, German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer complained about US treatment of its principal allies: 'Alliance partners are not satellites', an obvious reference to Soviet treatment of East European states during the cold war; cited in Steven Erlanger, 'A Nation Challenged: The Allies; German joins Europe's Cry that The US Won't Consult', *New York Times* (13 February 2002). Suffice it to say, such a stance is hardly conducive to building or maintaining legitimacy.

[78] Cited in Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, 'International Relations Theory and the Case against Unilateralism', *Perspectives on Politics*, 3 (2005), p. 519.

[79] Fred Barnes, 'A President in Full', *Weekly Standard* (11 February 2002), pp. 14–15.

[80] Fareed Zakaria, 'The Arrogant Empire', *Newsweek* (24 March 2003), p. 29.

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out of the US is, of course, automatically discounted'.[81] While dishonesty is corrosive for any procedural approach to legitimacy, it is especially toxic for those with a Habermasian emphasis on undistorted communication.

Process 2: two indicators – tallied at only a single time point (2007) and for a small sample (country n=14) – record whether others think the US has been overstepping its role in the world.

Indicator 7: which statement comes closest to your position? As the sole remaining superpower, the US should continue to be the preeminent world leader in solving international problems. The US should do its share in efforts to solve international problems together with other countries. The US should withdraw from most efforts to solve international problems.

Support for the US continuing as the 'sole remaining superpower' and 'preeminent world leader' exceeds 10 per cent in the three Middle Eastern and five Asian countries surveyed. In contrast, between 13 and 36 per cent believe the US should withdraw from most international problem-solving. Much stronger support (47–75 per cent) is forthcoming for the notion that the US, 'should do its share . . . together with other countries.' Though not decisive or clear cut, these results suggest that others would like to see the US exercise more strategic restraint.

Indicator 8: the US is playing the role of world policeman more than it should be. Agree or Disagree?

Sizeable majorities (62–89 per cent) across all five regions agree that the US is acting as 'world policeman' more than it should, suggesting that it has not exercised much strategic restraint in this regard. The data permit no more than a tentative assessment of the strategic restraint aspect of process2 legitimacy. Suffice it to say, however, that restraint and moderation are not images that the Bush administration has sought to cultivate. Consider its declarations that the US will wage preventive wars where and when it deems them necessary; invade Iraq with or without UNSC authorisation; test and deploy new nuclear weapons; tolerate no peer competitors, and; militarily dominate space. Rather than assurances of strategic restraint, these policies are more likely to be construed as strategic expansion or aggrandisement.

Outcomes/effectiveness: the largest number of available indicators is for what we term 'outcome legitimacy', though they vary greatly in terms of spatiotemporal coverage:

Indicator 9 [seven time points]: please tell me if you have a very favourable, somewhat favourable, somewhat unfavourable, or very unfavourable opinion of the US.

This question does not directly reflect people's beliefs about the effectiveness with which US leadership attains outcomes they favour. But it does ask for an overall evaluation and, spanning seven time points, permits observation of how attitudes toward the US have changed in response to its actions over the 2001–2007 period. Overall, in 2001 and 2002 favourable ratings more than doubled unfavourable ones

[81] Anne Applebaum, 'Collateral Damage', Washington Post (20 November), A17. Indeed, the Polish President Aleksander Kwasniewski, complained in 2004 that he had been, 'misled with the information on WMD'. Cited in Heraldo Munoz, *A Solitary War: A Diplomat's Chronicle of the Iraq War and its Lessons* (Golden, CO: Fulcrum Publishing 2008), p. 216.

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(68–28 and 64–30 per cent, respectively). Following the 2003 invasion of Iraq, however, the ratio of favourable to unfavourable responses fell to 43–53 per cent in 2003; reached a nadir (34–60 per cent in 2004); before recovering a bit in 2005 (48–45 per cent); dipping below 50 per cent in 2006 (43–51 per cent); and then regaining a plurality in 2007. The data seem to indicate that Bush administration foreign policy, particularly the Iraq war, has been costly in terms of peoples' evaluations of the US and likely also in terms of the degree of legitimacy they accord to it.

Indicator 10 [five time points]: please tell me if you think [the US is] having a mainly positive or mainly negative influence in the world.

This item directly addresses more directly what we mean by outcome legitimacy, though the timing of the initial survey in 2003 does not allow comparisons of pre- and post-invasion assessments. More people viewed US influence as mainly negative than mainly positive across all five time points, though no clear trends are apparent. To the extent that this is a valid indicator, the implications for legitimacy are straightforward: a hegemon can hardly be considered legitimate if it produces outcomes that most people regard as having a negative influence on the world.

Indicator 11 [two time points]: do you think the US military presence in the Middle East is a stabilising force or provokes more conflict than it prevents?

This question narrows from general evaluation of hegemonic influence to a regionally specific security question. The results for 2006 and 2007 are nearly identical. Strong majorities (68–19 and 67–18 per cent) thought the US military presence in the Middle East provokes more conflict than it prevents instead of serving as a stabilising force. We are reluctant to generalise too broadly given the limited data base, but again these results are hardly salutary from the standpoint of US legitimacy.

Indicator 12 [two time points]: overall, do you think the war with Iraq that removed Saddam Hussein from power made the world a safer place or a more dangerous place?

Here the previous question's focus on the effects of a US-generated outcome on security in a particular region is expanded to look at the Iraq war's impact on world security. The results are similar as nearly 60 per cent of those polled in both 2005 and 2006 thought that this specific action has made the world a more dangerous rather than a safer place, hardly the kind of perceptions conducive to hegemonic legitimacy.

Indicator 13 [two time points]: in your opinion, do US policies increase the gap between rich and poor countries, lessen the gap between rich and poor countries, or do US policies have no effect on the gap between rich and poor countries?

Here the focus is on a political economy rather than security outcome. The two time points are limiting, but the results are identical for 2002 and 2007, and are consistent across regions. Majorities in all regions (except Africa, where a plurality obtains) see US policies as increasing the rich-poor gap, a result likely to diminish rather than strengthen US legitimacy.

Indicator 14: please tell me whether you think that in the area of advancing human rights in other countries the US does: a good job? or a bad job?

This item expands the issue coverage of our assessment of outcome legitimacy to include the issue area of human rights. Between 1998 and 2006 respondents in two

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Western European countries reversed their ratio of good job/bad job responses from 60–23 per cent to 28–67 per cent. When the other three countries surveyed in 2006 are included, no clear patterns emerge. The usefulness of these results is sharply circumscribed by the very small number of countries surveyed at only a few time points.

To sum up, we have adduced different kinds of public opinion data from countries other than the US that serve as the indicator level in our interpretation of hegemonic legitimacy as a three-level FRC. The spatially and temporally limited data, which is also spotty in terms of issue space, preclude anything resembling systematic empirical scrutiny of the questions raised in earlier parts of the paper. Despite this lack of robustness, the surveys we reported should be sufficient to illustrate our conceptualisation of hegemonic legitimacy; demonstrate the usefulness of the three-level framework, and; illuminate the legitimacy problems posed for the US by an emergent global civil society.

Discussion

A strong point of the FRC method is its ability to accommodate the multidimensional complexity characteristic of many social science concepts. Concepts mean different things and acceptance of one meaning should not as a matter of course preclude acceptance of others. Nor should necessary and sufficient conditions be considered standard practice if these do not fit the concept being scrutinised or if they diminish a concepts value because it denotes an empty (or near empty) set. Legitimacy, as demonstrated in previous sections, is clearly multidimensional. In Beetham's terms, 'Legitimacy is not a single quality that systems of power possess or not, but a set of distinct criteria, or multiple dimensions.'[82] Coicaud and Heiskanen hold that the international system displays a 'normative indeterminacy' that supports at best 'different legitimacies'.[83] Likewise, for Clark, 'legitimacy is a compound of various ingredients . . . an amalgam of sundry normative claims'.[84]

Without the FRC approach we would be left to compile a rather long list of these ingredients, with little basis for ordering them in terms of abstraction, generalisability or importance. Were these ingredients all treated as necessary conditions – that is, were the presence of the four secondary dimensions (substantive, process1, process2, outcomes) required – the result would be a concept without real world referents. Neither the US nor other past or future hegemons could meet such a demanding standard.

Once we are open to the idea of multiple connotations that are substitutable for one another, that is, can be added or subtracted, the concept becomes applicable to a wider range of real world situations. Furthermore, the FRC approach allows examination of the interrelationships among the different dimensions: what are the tradeoffs between them? Can strong standing in one dimension of legitimacy (say,

[82] Beetham, *The Legitimation of Power*, p. 20.
[83] John Marc Coicaud, 'Conclusion: International Organizations, the Evolution of International Politics, and Legitimacy', in Coicaud and Heiskanen (eds), *The Legitimacy of International Organizations*, p. 538.
[84] Clark, *Legitimacy in International Society*, p. 252.

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shared values) offset or compensate for weak or nonexistent status in another (procedural legitimacy). A successful track record of positive global outcomes (for instance, provision of global public goods) might incline others to overlook shortfalls in open decision-making.

Also, hegemons may build up over time a stock of legitimacy (as a kind of political or moral capital) that then can be drawn upon to maintain their legitimate status through a series of unpopular actions that others might regard as illegitimate. And, if legitimacy is thought of as a stock that can be conserved, expended or depleted, then it is also possible to think of it as a variable property across time and space. 'Legitimacy is not an all or nothing affair . . . [I]t may be eroded, contested or incomplete; and judgments about it are usually judgments of degree, rather than all or nothing'.[85] In Haass' terms: ' ''Legitimacy'' need not be understood as an absolute. It is as much about perception as it is a legal concept. It is also possible to be partly legitimate (or less than fully legitimate) and not be illegitimate'.[86]

It appears that many in the Bush administration (excepting Haass in his brief tenure) and among its neoconservative supporters have been slow to recognise the importance of legitimacy, let alone considered its subtle complexities. Some administration officials have attempted to dismiss or deflect criticisms based on legitimacy (or lack thereof), sometimes seeming to imply that unrivalled power is self-legitimating. The most radical dismissal denies any kind of international legitimacy and claims that the only meaningful source of legitimacy is the US constitution and its democratic institutions. Then Undersecretary of State John Bolton expressed this narrow conception: 'The question of legitimacy is frequently raised as a veiled attempt to restrain American discretion in taking unilateral action or multilateral action outside the confines of an international organisation, even when our actions are legitimated by the operation of our own constitutional system . . . Our actions, taken consistently with Constitutional principles, require no separate, external validation to make them legitimate'.[87] Accordingly, for those who believe that legitimacy serves only to constrain American power and latitude of action, repudiation of legitimacy constraints has been an important objective. As Nossel notes cynically: '[t]he Iraq war . . . wasn't waged without regard for international legitimacy; on the contrary, eschewing legitimacy was part of the plan'.[88]

Others associated with or supportive of the administration, for instance, Kagan, recognise the importance, as a practical matter, of paying heed to legitimacy concerns.[89] Kagan, however, reduces legitimacy to a matter of obtaining UN

[85] Beetham, *The Legitimation of Power*, pp. 19–20.

[86] Richard N. Haass, *The Opportunity* (New York: Public Affairs, 2005), p. 177. How then to specify the sufficiency criteria for our three-level definition of international legitimacy? If we have three secondary-level dimensions (substantive, process, and outcome legitimacy) that are substitutable for one another, does each of the three suffice by itself (that is, one of three present)? Or is it the presence of any two of three that result in legitimacy? These issues are complicated by the fact that, as pointed out in the above paragraph, all of the dimensions can be present or absence in degree. With these considerations in mind, we tentatively suggest the following set of sufficiency criteria: (1) mixed evidence, but net positive in all three dimensions, or; (2) one dimension net negative or absent, but the other two are at least moderately positive, or (3) two dimensions not present or net negative, but the other is strongly positive.

[87] John Bolton, 'Address to the Federalist Society', National Lawyers Convention (13 November 2003), pp. 1–24.

[88] Nossel, 'Going Legit', p. 30.

[89] Kagan, 'America's Legitimacy Problem'.

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approval or, failing that, support of the major European states. He correctly points out that the Kosovo intervention, in which European countries participated with the US, was regarded as legitimate despite their having by-passed the UNSC, where Russian and Chinese vetoes loomed. But Kagan's perspective elides consideration of the other sources of legitimacy emphasised earlier, and thus also misses the importance of substitutability. Had these other elements of legitimacy been robustly present, the failure to secure UN approval of the Iraq invasion likely would not have wreaked so much damage to US legitimacy. Or, as several observers have speculated, if the Bush administration had not already demonstratively rejected the various multilateral projects enumerated earlier, it may well have gained the UN's, or at least Europe's, contemporaneous consent on the Iraq question.[90]

Conclusion


This paper has argued that FRC methods are particularly well-suited to coping with the multilevel, multidimensional concept of hegemonic legitimacy. After briefly reviewing the rudiments of FRCs, we used the method as a way to explicate the complex meanings of this concept, starting with a basic level definition based on intersubjective perceptions and beliefs, the normative quality of oughtness, and the idea of consent. We then expanded this definition by developing several secondary dimensions: shared values; constitutionalism (consisting of two forms of process legitimacy), and; outcome legitimacy.

The legitimacy concept developed in this paper does not introduce new meanings, but rather combines in an original way a fairly large number of existing connotations and denotations to form a comprehensive, three-level FRC framework for understanding hegemonic legitimacy. The demonstration of how this conceptual template accommodates the complexities inherent to the basic and secondary-level definitions provides the papers main results. At the indicator level, the results are mainly of heuristic value: fourteen survey questions asked in global public opinion polls provide a tentative empirical glimpse of how our FRC rendering of legitimacy could be operationalised and analysed more conclusively should consistent polling data be gathered and cumulated in the future. Kagan asserts (in the passage quoted at the outset of the paper) that international legitimacy will prove as significant as material sources of power and influence in determining the US role in the world. If he is correct, and we think he is, continued efforts to hone the conceptual apparatus with which we apprehend legitimacy assume even greater importance.

[90] Eliot A. Cohen,'History and the Hyperpower', *Foreign Affairs*, 83 (July/August 2004), p. 59. See also the discussion in Fred Hiatt, 'Obstinate Orthodoxy', *Washington Post* (31 March 2003), p. A13.

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INDICATOR 1: *Different values or different policies 2002*




'When there are differences between our country and the United States, do you think these differences occur because we have different values than the United States or because we have different policies than the United States?'

Source: Pew Global Attitudes Survey 2002

2002	N America	L America	W Europe	E Europe	Africa	Asia	Mid East
Different values	37	34	39	40	41	39	35
Different policies	57	58	56	48	48	51	48

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INDICATOR 2: *American ideas about democracy 2002, 2007*




'Which of these comes closer to your view? I like American ideas about democracy, OR I dislike American ideas about democracy.'

Source: Pew Global Attitudes Survey 2002 and Pew Global Attitudes Project 2007

2002	N America	L America	W Europe	E Europe	Africa	Asia	Mid East	**Total**
Like	50	45	44	50	67	58	37	**50**
Dislike	40	41	44	34	22	30	49	**37**
2007								
Like	37	29	29	36	72	38	34	**39**
Dislike	51	58	58	50	22	48	57	**49**

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INDICATOR 3: *American ways of doing business 2002, 2007*




'Which of these comes closer to your view? I like American ways of doing business, OR I dislike American ways of doing business.'

Source: Pew Global Attitudes Survey 2002 and Pew Global Attitudes Project 2007

2002	N America	L America	W Europe	E Europe	Mid East	Asia	Africa	**Total**
Like	34	48	33	49	43	47	62	**45**
Dislike	56	39	55	30	42	32	24	**40**
2007								
Like	29	35	26	40	49	44	63	**41**
Dislike	59	52	56	38	43	39	26	**45**

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INDICATOR 4: *In making international policy decisions, to what extent do you think the United States takes into account the interests of countries like (survey country)? 2002–2005, 2007*




Source: Pew Global Attitudes Survey 2002, 2003; Pew Global Attitudes Project 2004, 2005, 2007

	N America	L America	W Europe	E Europe	Africa	Asia	Mid East	**Total**
2002								
Takes into account others interests	25	49	39	26	51	44	27	**37**
Doesn't take into account others interests	73	68	58	68	36	39	60	**57**
2003								
Takes into account others interests	28	33	30	22	44	27	30	**31**
Doesn't take into account others interests	70	62	68	71	51	71	60	**65**
2004								
Takes into account others interests	*	*	26	20	34	*	16	**24**
Doesn't take into account others interests	*	*	71	73	57	*	66	**67**
2005								
Takes into account others interests	19	*	26	18	27	58	26	**29**
Doesn't take into account others interests	80	*	73	74	65	33	65	**65**
2007								
Takes into account others interests	14	44	20	21	55	34	28	**31**
Doesn't take into account others interests	83	50	76	73	35	55	66	**63**

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INDICATOR 5: *Were leaders misinformed about Iraq and WMDs or did they lie about it? 2004*




'Before the war, US and Britain claimed that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction. These weapons have yet to be found. Why do you think they made this claim? Was it mostly because US and British leaders were themselves misinformed by bad intelligence, or was it mostly because US and British leaders lied to provide a reason for invading Iraq? Leaders misinformed or Leaders lied.'

Source: Pew Global Attitudes Project 2004

2004	W Europe	E Europe	Middle East
Misinformed	28	17	16
Lied	64	61	61

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INDICATOR 6: *Trustworthiness of the US after Iraq Invasion*




'As a consequence of the war, do you have more confidence or less confidence that the US is trustworthy?'

Source: Pew Global Attitudes Project, 2004

2004	W Europe	E Europe	Middle East
More	16	8	7
Less	73	63	65

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INDICATOR 7: *US role in the World 2007*




'Which statement comes closest to your position? As the sole remaining superpower, the US should continue to be the preeminent world leader in solving international problems. The US should do its share in efforts to solve international problems together with other countries. The US should withdraw from most efforts to solve international problems.'

Source: Chicago Council on Global Affairs and WorldPublicOpinion.org April 2007.

2007	L America	W Europe	Middle East	Asia	E. Europe
Sole Superpower	8	3	12	17	6
Do Share	51	75	52	58	47
Withdraw	33	21	31	13	36

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INDICATOR 8: *US as World policeman*




'The US is playing the role of world policeman more than it should be.' Agree or Disagree.

Source: Chicago Council on Global Affairs and WorldPublicOpinion.org April 2007.

2007	L America	W Europe	Middle East	Asia	E. Europe
Agree	69	89	62	64	72
Disagree	24	11	33	28	15

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INDICATOR 9: *Opinion of the US 2002–2007*




* 2001 survey did not include a country-by-country breakdown

In 2001, respondents were asked: 'Overall, do ordinary people have a very favorable, mostly favorable, mostly unfavorable, or very unfavorable opinion of the US?' For subsequent years the question was: 'Please tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable or very unfavorable opinion of the US?'

Sources: Pew Global Attitudes Survey 2001. 2002: Pew Global Attitudes Project 2003. 2004. 2005. 2006. 2007

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INDICATOR 10: *US influence in the world 2003, 2005–2008*




In 2003 the question asked was 'For each of the following statements, please tell me if you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree. The United States is having a mainly positive influence in the world.' For the rest of the years the question asked was 'Please tell me if you think each of the following are having a mainly positive or mainly negative influence in the world . . .the United States.'

Sources – GlobeScan/The Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) 2003, GlobeScan/PIPA and BBC 2005 – 2008

	N America	L America	W Europe	E Europe	Africa	Asia	Mid East	**Average**
2003								
Positive	31	34	30	14	54	55	11	**35**
Negative	62	56	64	72	38	41	69	**57**
2005								
Positive	34	25	40	16	56	48	26	**38**
Negative	60	56	52	63	35	37	56	**48**
2006								
Positive	34	25	37	34	56	48	26	**37**
Negative	60	56	52	42	35	37	56	**48**
2007								
Positive	*	21	27	29	71	36	14	**31**
Negative	*	57	60	38	20	46	62	**50**
2008								
Positive	*	26	33	19	70	38	34	**37**
Negative	*	49	52	53	21	38	55	**45**

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INDICATOR 11: *US presence in the Middle East 2006–2007*




In 2006 the respondents were asked: 'How much of a danger is the American presence in Iraq to the stability in the Middle East?' In 2007 the question asked was: 'Do you think the US military presence in the Middle East is a stabilizing force or provokes more conflict than it prevents?'

Sources: Pew Global Attitudes Project 2006, GlobeScan/PIPA and BBC World Service 2007

2006	L America	W Europe	E Europe	Africa	Asia	Mid East	**Total**
Stabilising force/ not a danger	*	14	14	33	22	11	**19**
Provokes more conflict/ dangerous	*	81	72	52	60	73	**68**
2007							
Stabilising force/ not a danger	9	14	12	40	20	13	**18**
Provokes more conflict/ dangerous	79	74	62	46	63	76	**67**

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INDICATOR 12: *Has the war in Iraq made the world a safer place or a more dangerous place? 2005–2006*




'Overall, do you think the war with Iraq that removed Saddam Hussein from power made the world a safer place or a more dangerous place?'

Source: Pew Global Attitudes Project 2005, 2006

2005	N America	W Europe	E Europe	Africa	Asia	Mid East	**Total**
Safer place	37	27	22	9	22	16	**22**
More dangerous place	53	61	49	73	44	59	**57**
2006							
Safer place	*	20	17	41	22	11	**19**
More dangerous place	*	68	44	32	48	67	**58**

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INDICATOR 13: *US policies impact on the gap between the rich and poor 2002, 2007*




'In your opinion, do United States policies increase the gap between rich and poor countries, lessen the gap between rich and poor countries, or do United States policies have no effect on the gap between rich and poor countries?'

Sources: Pew Global Attitudes Survey 2002, Pew Global Attitudes Project 2007

2002	N America	L America	W Europe	E Europe	Africa	Asia	Mid East	**Total**
Increase gap	68	57	63	53	41	55	55	**56**
Lessen gap	10	22	10	14	32	18	14	**17**
2007								
Increase gap	62	58	65	50	39	58	59	**56**
Lessen gap	13	18	10	12	33	17	17	**17**

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INDICATOR 14: *US leadership in human rights 2006*



'Please tell me whether you think that in the area of advancing human rights in other countries the United States does:' A Good Job or A Bad Job

Source WorldPublicOpinion.org, June 2006.

2006	W Europe 1998	W Europe 2006	E Europe	Asia
Good Job	60	28	38	46
Bad Job	23	67	45	19

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