Mr. T. W. Russell promised that they would be included with hospitals in a reference to a Select Committee. The Bill was withdrawn.

YOUTHFUL OFFENDERS BILL.—*May 21st.*

Sir M. WHITE-RIDLEY moved the second reading of this Bill to diminish imprisonment among offenders under the age of sixteen, and to extend the power of whipping. In his reply on the discussion, Sir M. White-Ridley recognised that there was a sharp division of opinion, and the debate stood adjourned by the rules of the House.

EDINBURGH DISTRICT LUNACY BOARD BILL.—*June 25th.*

This Bill was reported for third reading.

LUNACY REGULATION (IRELAND) BILL.—*June 25th.*

This Bill was read a second time. Lord ASHBOURNE said that it was to introduce useful provisions now in operation in England, and to permit of the conditional discharge of criminal lunatics.

THE ST. PANCRAS SCANDALS.—*June 26th.*

Lord RUSSELL OF KILLOWEN called attention to this matter, and asked what proceedings were to be taken.

The LORD CHANCELLOR said that his attention had been called to the case by the Lunacy Commissioners, who had sent him a draft clause for insertion in the Lunacy Bill, which had not yet passed into law. He had also received a communication from the Local Government Board, and a circular letter to Boards of Guardians was to be sent out.

June 28th.

Mr. J. Burns having made inquiries in reference to this matter, Mr. CHAPLAIN said that he had directed an immediate investigation by the Local Government Board, and a communication to be made to Metropolitan Boards of Guardians.

THE CASE OF PRIVATE WEIR.—*July 10th.*

In reply to Mr. P. O'Brien and others, Mr. WYNDHAM said that Private Weir had been invalided home from South Africa as a lunatic; his insanity not being the result of his army service no pension could be given him.

LUNACY BILL (ENGLAND).—*July 16th.*

This Bill was withdrawn.

LUNACY BOARD (SCOTLAND) SALARIES BILL.—*July 19th.*

This Bill was read a third time.

PROPOSED EXEMPTION OF HOSPITALS FROM LOCAL RATES.

Evidence was taken by the Select Committee on June 22nd and subsequent dates. A claim has been made for exemption by various institutions for the feeble-minded and epileptic.

RECENT MEDICO-LEGAL CASES.

REPORTED BY DR. MERCIER.

[The editors request that members will oblige by sending full newspaper reports of all cases of interest as published by the local press at the time of the assizes.]

Reg. v. *O'Hara.*

Denis O'Hara, 39, labourer, was indicted for murder of his daughter, aged six, May 21st. Prisoner had left work for about a fortnight before the murder, and during that time had been drinking. On the morning of the 21st May he started

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drinking early, and up to noon had had five pints of beer. About half past four in the afternoon he took his little girl home, stood her on a chair, tied a rope round her neck, fastened her up, and took the chair away. He then went to the police station, and laying on the counter a door key, he said, "If you will take it, and go to my house, 18, George Street, you will find a child dead. I have done it. If you go there you will find her in a rocking chair wrapped up in a coat." The body was found as described. Shortly after the prisoner was placed in a cell his wife came, and he said, "That is my wife crying; I heard her mention Mary Agnes, my child's name. Mary Agnes, I loved her; she was the prettiest child in Burnley." He then described how he committed the murder, and went on, "They have wrung my heart, and I have wrung theirs. It does not matter what you do. I do not care how soon I am out of it. I gave her a halfpenny, and they made her give it back; she took it off me. They wrung my heart, and I have wrung theirs."

Evidence was given that at noon the prisoner was "half off, neither drunk nor sober." At five p.m. he was in a stupefied condition, and under the influence of drink. When he made the statement in his cell he was excited from drink. Dr. Ley, of Prestwich, deposed that he first saw the prisoner on May 28th, and that prisoner was of unsound mind at that time. He was confused, depressed and melancholy, and it was difficult to get any coherent answer out of him. He appeared to be just recovering from an attack of acute mania—delirious mania,—and in witness's judgment he would be suffering from that attack on May 21st. He thought that on May 21st he would have a very confused idea of right and wrong—be hardly capable of appreciating the nature and quality of the act he was committing. On the 28th and 29th of June he examined the prisoner at the request of the Treasury, and he thought the man was of sound mind. He learned that the man had been drinking heavily, and it had culminated in an attack of delirious mania. Dr. Edwards, of Strangeways Prison, said that he first saw the prisoner on May 26th. He was much depressed and confused, listless, and quite lost. He was not at that time of sound mind, and he should think probably of unsound mind on the 21st May. He could not say that on May 21st he was incapable of distinguishing between right and wrong. The judge said the man might be in some degree insane, and yet be quite responsible for his actions. To render him not responsible he must be suffering from mental disease which impaired his judgment. They must not consider a man mad because of the unusually shocking nature of his crime; if that was done any man who wanted to commit a murder had only to do it in a mad kind of way. Guilty, but insane.—Mr. Justice Channel.—*Manchester Guardian*, July 18th.

Another of the numerous cases in which crime is committed during drunkenness. Whether the drunkenness renders the criminal irresponsible depends upon the duration of the drinking. In this case the drinking bout had lasted only a fortnight, but the resulting insanity was sufficiently marked to exonerate the criminal.

Reg. v. *Birtles.*

John Birtles, 50, window cleaner, was charged with the murder of his wife. Prisoner had been an inmate of Prestwich Asylum for four years many years before. There had been frequent quarrels between him and the deceased, and the son had had to protect his mother from violence. On the 8th May, when the son came home at night, the prisoner opened the door to him, and said, "I have murdered your mother." The son went for assistance, and on his return found the door barricaded. It was forced, and the prisoner threatened the incomers with a poker, and threw hot water over one of them. The woman was found dead, with marks of very great violence. When arrested, the prisoner said he would tell the truth to the magistrate. Dr. Scott, who was called in at the time, said the prisoner seemed dazed, and in answer to a remark said, "I did it." Witness did not see any signs of drink about him. Dr. Edwards, of Strangways Prison, said that while the prisoner had been in prison he had seen nothing wrong with his mind, nothing noticeable except excitement and garrulousness. Dr. Ley said he examined the prisoner on the 28th May, and thought him of sound mind. He had been an inmate of Prestwich Asylum from 1881–1885, and was then subject to numerous delusions and hallucinations—that he had committed some

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great crime—he did not know what it was,—and that everybody was making fun of him. He was of opinion that injuries so extensive as those found on the deceased had been caused by a man in a frenzy. The judge here asked witness to define the word frenzy, which he did by saying that he meant "the effects of ungovernable passion." The prisoner then gave evidence. He said that on May 8th he had had four pints of beer; his wife was very abusive, and said "it only wanted a bit a paper to get him back to the asylum." She then began to kick him with her clogs, and pull his face about with her hands, and she seemed to be about to get hold of the poker and tongs, which she had used before to strike him, when all of a sudden a feeling came across him which he could not resist, and he got hold of the crowbar and hit her with it. It was dusk at the time, and although he kept striking about him with a crowbar, he did not know he was hitting his wife. When he found out that this was the case, he fell down and shouted out, "Oh my! oh, dear, what have I done?" Cross-examined: the crowbar was in the coal-hole. He could not say why he did not give this account at the inquest. The judge pointed out that the prisoner never mentioned the provocation until that day; but even admitting the provocation, if he went out of the room for the crowbar, then it was murder, and not manslaughter. It was difficult to see what there was in the evidence to reduce the case to manslaughter, and still less to make the prisoner not responsible for his actions. Guilty, but recommended to mercy.—Manchester Assizes, Mr. Justice Channell.—*Manchester Guardian*, July 18th.

Justice seems to have been fairly met in this case. The jury could bring no other verdict on the evidence, but took the previous insanity of the prisoner into account in their recommendation to mercy. The sentence of death was subsequently commuted on the same ground.

Reg. v. *Holt.*

Gertrude Holt, 25, knitter, was indicted for the murder of her new-born child. Prisoner was confined on a Sunday, and when first seen by a doctor on the following Tuesday, pointed, in answer to a question, to the top of a wardrobe, where the body was found covered with wounds, inflicted apparently by scissors. The defence was one of insanity, but no particulars are given. The judge said he could see nothing in this case that could lead to a verdict of manslaughter; as to irresponsibility, that there had been no evidence of insanity in the ordinary sense. The existence of no fewer than seventy-seven wounds on the body indicated in all probability that at the time she caused them the prisoner was in a condition of frenzy, and if the jury thought she was in such a condition they might come to the conclusion that she had not any sound judgment and knowledge of what she was doing, and they would return a special verdict to that effect. Guilty, but insane.—Manchester Assizes, Mr. Justice Channell.—*Manchester Guardian*, July 17th.

This case is remarkable when taken in relation to the previous one. It will be observed that the learned judge himself had no hesitation in this case in using the term "frenzy" without defining to the jury its meaning, and that the existence of frenzy was sufficient exoneration of the prisoner. But in the case of the man on the following day the word possessed no such virtue, and the prisoner was convicted in spite of his frenzy; so that extreme violence used by the man upon his wife was no indication of insanity, but the extreme violence used by the girl upon her child pointed clearly to insanity in her. It seems clear that either the man should have been found insane, or the girl should have been found guilty of murder. The latter was a good looking young woman; she was dejected; she cried and trembled in the dock; and the jury would have been more or less than men if they had convicted her. Had the jury been one of women the verdict might have been different. The man seems to have been an uninteresting person, and in his case dry law took its course. But it is hard he should not have had the benefit of his "frenzy."

Reg. v. *Grosvenor.*

Alfred Grosvenor, 27, French polisher, was indicted for wounding Alfred Grosvenor the younger. The prisoner cut his son's throat slightly, and then his own severely. When the child's outcries summoned the landlord, the prisoner said, "I have done it myself. It is all through trouble; my wife has left me.

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How is the boy? If he is done I will do it again." When he was discharged from hospital he said, "I knew nothing about it until it was done." In defence the prisoner said "he did not know how he came to do it. His daughter died, and the intense grief which he felt at her death caused him to fly to drink. He was under the influence of drink when he cut his son's throat." Guilty of unlawful wounding, and recommended to mercy. The judge said that he agreed with the recommendation to mercy. He thought that what the prisoner did was partly because of affliction in his family, and was not wholly traceable to his having taken to drink, though, no doubt, that had something to do with it. He should inflict no punishment, but bind the prisoner over in his own recognizances in £10, to come up for judgment if called upon.—Mr. Justice Ridley.—*Times*, June 29th.

With the verdict and sentence we cannot fail to agree, but it is noticeable that the prisoner on his discharge from the hospital said that he knew nothing about it until it was done, although at the time of the act he explained why he did it. It is a very a common device of criminals to pretend that they know nothing of what they were doing when their crime was committed, and such a statement should always be received with great caution.

Reg. v. *Smith.*

Thomas Smith was arraigned for the murder of the Rev. J. W. Hudson. Prisoner had asked deceased to intercede for him with his landlord; he had done so, but unsuccessfully. Prisoner asked him to intercede again, and he was told he had better go by himself; he then pulled out a revolver and shot deceased, who died shortly afterwards. It was allowed to be proved that the mother of the prisoner had several attacks of insanity during her married life, that the prisoner during the last year had suffered from insomnia, that he had been addicted to drink, and that for a long time he had been in the habit of firing off a gun and a revolver pretty much at random, and often threatening people. Dr. O'Neill, of the Limerick Asylum, stated that he examined the prisoner shortly after the murder, and formed the opinion that the man was perfectly sane, and knew what he was doing; he could discover no trace of mental infirmity. Dr. Gibson, the prison surgeon, gave evidence to the same effect. The judge told the jury that they were really thrown back on the state of the man's mind for the past year and a half. It was not enough to say the man had been bordering on delirium tremens, because he may have got over it, and it would be for the jury to say whether that condition was carried down to the very evening of the crime. Guilty, but insane.—Limerick Assizes, Mr. Justice Kenny.—*Dublin Express*, July 9th.

The prisoner appears to have been sane enough to have been trusted with the use of firearms for years before the murder, although it was known that he was a crank and a drunkard; and a murder was the natural result. The favourable verdict was evidently very largely due to the merciful liberality of the judge in not merely allowing evidence to be given of the state of the prisoner's mind many months before the crime, but in directing the attention of the jury to this point. The conduct of the police in allowing the prisoner the use of firearms was strongly and justly commented on by his lordship.

Dowling v. *Dod.*

Plaintiff, a professional nurse, sued defendant for libel. The libel was contained in a certificate addressed to the relieving officer for Paddington. Defendant pleaded justification. It appeared from the evidence that while the defendant was in the house of Dr. Farrer the plaintiff came in and had an altercation with the latter, in which she struck him, knocked a lamp over, and was at last put out of the house. Dr. Farrer and defendent upon this made inquiries among her friends; in the result the libel was written. The plaintiff admitted that she had written abusive letters to a lady with whom she had lived, complaining the lady had taken possession of her mind, had read her thoughts, and had thrown her down in the street by means of a "thought-body" when she was a long way off. Dr. Farrer deposed to the violence of the plaintiff during the interview in the house. For the defence it was first submitted that the document was privileged

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under Section 13 of the Lunacy Act, 1890, which provides that every constable, relieving officer, and overseer, who has knowledge that a person within his district or parish who is not a pauper, and not wandering at large, is deemed to be a lunatic, and not under proper care and control, shall give information thereof to a Justice; and counsel contended that defendant was protected under that section if he acted *bonâ fide*. He also contended that the occasion was privileged on the ground that at common law any one of the public, if they saw a person who was *furiosus* had the right to set the law in motion to get the prisoner put under restraint. On the other hand, it was argued that Section 13 protected constables, relieving officers, and overseers only, and not members of the public. It was admitted that Section 13 might protect a member of the public if he acted with reasonable care, and in good faith; but in this case he submitted that the defendant had acted recklessly and wantonly. Mr. Justice Darling ruled that if the relieving officer had expressed the opinion that the plaintiff was insane the statement would have been privileged. It was impossible to suppose that the relieving officer was intended to act only in cases which came under his own observation. The policy of the Act required that information should be supplied to him by members of the public who had seen the behaviour of supposed lunatics. He was therefore of opinion that the defendant acted on a privileged occasion. But he was also of opinion that there was evidence of malice. The judge left to the jury the questions, first, whether the statements in the documents were true; second, whether the defendant acted *bonâ fide* and without malice, third whether he acted in good faith, and with reasonable care. The document stated that the plaintiff had hallucinations. In support of that statement letters had been read in which plaintiff had accused Miss Ashby of being in league with the devil. The jury had seen her, and could judge for themselves. If she was not a witch the defendant would be justified in saying that the plaintiff suffered from hallucination. Having thus given the jury a plain lead in favour of the defendant the judge then went on to put the case as strongly as possible the other way. He raked up the old trials of witches referred to by Sir Matthew Hale, and told the jury how witchcraft was recognised by the laws of England, believed in by members of Parliament, judges, and scientific men (save the mark), and finally succeeded in inducing the jury to find a verdict for the plaintiff, with £100 damages. It is difficult to believe that Mr. Justice Darling in thus addressing the jury was speaking seriously, but, as a matter of fact, when the jury found for the plaintiff he refused a stay of execution. The jury went further than the judge however. The judge told them that the plaintiff's letter accusing Miss Ashby of being in league with the devil was tantamount to saying that Miss Ashby was a witch, and the question for them was whether this statement was an indication of insanity. But the jury said it was untrue that the plaintiff said she was bewitched. They further said that it was untrue that if the plaintiff in her present state of mind acted as a dispenser she would be a danger to the community.—Q. B. D., June 18th, 19th, and 20th.—*Times* following days.

The real reason for damages, etc., seems to have been that the jury considered that whether the plaintiff was sane or insane it was not the defendant's business to act in the matter. He did not know her, and he was not in the room at the time of her attack upon Dr. Farrer, and in acting in friendship towards the latter he was acting officiously, and interfering in a matter that did not concern him.

Moreover, the letter to the relieving officer was written incautiously, without reticence, and with insufficient appreciation of the force of the words used—a very common fault in certificates of lunacy. It stated that the plaintiff had sent several threatening letters to various people, but letters to only one person were produced. It stated that some of the people to whom the letters were sent went in terror of their lives, but this was not proved even of the one recipient. It stated that Mr. Dods had interviewed several people, who all agreed as to the plaintiff's insanity, but more than one of the people whom he interviewed gave evidence, and said that they had seen no evidence of insanity in the plaintiff. Under these circumstances the verdict for the plaintiff on these points was unavoidable; but there seems no ground whatever for the finding that the defendant's statement was untrue when he said that to the best of his knowledge and ability the plaintiff was of unsound mind, and it is scarcely likely that, if the

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jury really took this view, they would have limited the damages to £100. This particular finding seems to have had its origin in the resentment that juries are apt to exhibit towards any medical man who certifies that a person is insane.

Soper v. *Gibson and Young.*

This was an action brought by Mr. William Soper, a coachman, against Dr. J. Hill Gibson and Dr. W. M. Young, medical practitioners, in partnership at Maida Vale, to recover damages for professional negligence and false imprisonment.

Mr. Moyses and Mr. Sidney Clark appeared for the plaintiff; Mr. Jelf, Q.C., and Mr. Lambert Bond for the defendants.

The plaintiff's case was that on January 8th, 1900, he consulted the defendant, Dr. Gibson, being medical officer of a club of which the plaintiff is a member. He was, he said, suffering from some ailment of a transitory character or was run down or worried, and he alleged that the defendants negligently pronounced him to be insane and a lunatic requiring to be put under restraint, and signed an order or caused him, on or about January 14th, 1900, to be removed as a lunatic to Paddington Workhouse Infirmary for three days.

The defence was that the plaintiff was in fact insane and dangerous at the time, or that the defendants had reasonable cause to believe that he was, and had acted *bonâ fide* and without malice or negligence.

His Lordship, in summing up to the jury, said that, even if the plaintiff showed that he was sane and not dangerous, that was not enough. He had to show that the defendants, acting on the knowledge and information they possessed, did not act reasonably. The plaintiff's wife had made certain statements to them. Were they not entitled to consider them? On all that the defendants saw and heard from the plaintiff's wife, were they negligent in thinking that the plaintiff should be put under treatment?

The jury returned a verdict for the defendants, and his Lordship gave judgment for them accordingly, with costs—Mr. Justice Phillimore and a Common Jury.—*Times*, June 20th.

Style v. *Owen and Another.*

The learned judge gave judgment this morning in this case, which was heard before his lordship last term. The action was brought by the plaintiff, Mr. Robert George Style, a surgeon residing in Cambridge Road, Bethnal Green, to recover damages from the defendants, Dr. William Owen, of Shore Road, Hackney, and J. R. Marriott, the relieving officer of the Hackney Union, for imprisoning the plaintiff's wife, and depriving him of her society. The defendant, Dr. Owen, denied that he had detained or imprisoned the plaintiff's wife. The other defendant, Marriott, said that whatever he did in the matter was in accordance with his duty as relieving officer.

The circumstances of the case were of an extraordinary character. The plaintiff and the defendant were medical gentlemen who resided and practised in the same district, and who had been on terms of friendship for many years. The plaintiff's wife was mentally afflicted, and had been confined in an asylum. She had, however, recovered and returned home, but in May last her malady reappeared, and took the form of violent animosity to her husband. On the night of May 12th she ran away from her home to the house of a neighbour, Dr. Fairbrother. She was brought back to her husband's house, and the next night she again ran away from her home about 11 p.m., and was traced to the house of the defendant, Dr. Owen. Dr. Fairbrother was sent to his house to induce Mrs. Style to return home, but, according to plaintiff's case, Dr. Owen refused to allow her to go. The following day Dr. Owen sent Mrs. Style to the Hackney Union—not as being insane, but as being a destitute person. When Mr. Style went to ask for his wife at Dr. Owen's house, he received information to this effect from Dr. Owen. Mr. Style at the time was intending to remove his wife to a private lunatic asylum. He was extremely indignant with Dr. Owen, and, having gone to the Hackney Workhouse, he found his wife there, and had her removed to the Bethnal House Home. The relieving officer had signed the admission order for Mrs. Style to the workhouse, and the case against him was that he did not examine into the circumstances of Mrs. Style's case, and make the necessary inquiries with regard to her which it was

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his duty to do before receiving her at the union. The defendant, Dr. Owen, said that Mrs. Style went to the workhouse at her own suggestion and of her own free will. She absolutely declined to return to her own home, and in his opinion she was not insane. He and his daughters carefully tended her while she was in his house, and her husband never came to fetch his wife till the third day after she had run away. The hearing of the case was originally commenced before his lordship and a jury on March 9th, but, in consequence of the illness of Dr. Owen, one of the defendants, the matter was adjourned, and the hearing was resumed before his lordship only on March 31st, when Mr. Reed, Q.C., said that the record as against the second defendant, J. R. Marriott, would be withdrawn, since the plaintiff no longer imputed blame to him in the matter.

A great number of witnesses were called on behalf of the defendant to prove that Mrs. Style went of her own free will to the union, having declined to remain with her husband any longer; that she was sent into the infirmary because she would have better treatment in that department; and that she could have applied for a discharge at any moment if she had cared to do so, and would not have been obliged to give notice of her intention of doing so.

Mr. Dickens, on behalf of Dr. Owen, submitted that there was no imprisonment of the plaintiff's wife by him. The only part he took in the matter was to send to the relieving officer and ask him to come to the house, and the relieving officer took his instructions from Mrs. Style.

Mr. Justice Ridley, in giving judgment this morning, after reviewing in detail all the circumstances of the case, said that, though it was difficult to say what the motives of Dr. Owen were in doing what he did, he had come to the conclusion that, although mistaken in the course he had taken, Dr. Owen did act from motives of humanity to the plaintiff's wife. There would therefore be judgment for the defendant, but without costs.—High Court of Justice, Mr. Justice Ridley.—*Times*, May 1st.

In the Goods of Emma Alderson Shaw, presumed Deceased.

This was an application for leave to swear the death of Mrs. Shaw in the following circumstances.

Mr. Willock said that Mrs. Shaw, whose maiden name was Wistar, was married to Mr. John Shaw on April 23rd, 1889, and there had been issue two children, born in 1890 and 1894. After the birth of each child Mrs. Shaw had a serious illness and suffered from hysteria, and in consequence of her state of health she went to Wiesbaden in November, 1897. She was on perfectly friendly terms with her husband, as appeared from the correspondence, and returned to England in June, 1898. On August 19th of that year she was staying at an hotel in Kensington, her husband being at the time at their home in Derbyshire. On August 20th she sent her husband an affectionate letter, dated August 19th, which clearly showed her intention to commit suicide, and contained the following expressions:—"I crave for death, for the death I have so longed for, so craved with passionate hope of peace. If it is not peace, a sleep and a forgetting. How interesting it will be! I do not need to say that the bugbear of Hades and the gridiron does not affright me. If there is a God at all, I refuse, like Lord Sherbrooke, to believe He is infinitely worse than I am myself. One would not torture poor souls, would one? . . . I shall leave nothing compromising about me, nothing in the way of luggage, etc. on the boat, and to slip very quietly over the side in the dead of a moonless night ought to be easy and safe. It seems to me the most refined way—there cannot be an inquest, unless the gulls hold one! Oh, 'the healing of the sea' that will soon heal all my misery. . . . I have wired to my solicitor to destroy my will in his charge. I do hope that he will do so, and that all will fall to you to keep for the children." Mr. Shaw at once hastened to London and discovered that on the day in question Mrs. Shaw had telegraphed to her solicitor to destroy her will, but that gentleman had not done so. She had also written to one of the children telling them to buy a doll, and had driven from Kensington to a hospital in Fitzroy Square with the object of consulting one of the resident medical men. He was not, however, at home, and after making inquiries as to where she could dine, she drove to Charing Cross Station, where every trace of her had been lost. Advertisements had been inserted in the *Times* and other newspapers, and inquiries had been made at Dover, Calais, Folkestone, Boulogne

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and on the Continent, as well as in the United States and New Zealand—but without result. The lady was possessed of a banking account, but the last cheque which had been cashed was on August 19th, 1898.

Mr. Justice Gorell Barnes, after perusing the affidavits in support of the motion, gave leave to swear the death on or since August 19th, 1898.—Mr. Justice Gorell Barnes.

Shields v. *Shields and another.*

This was an action by John Shields against the trustees under a settlement of his father, deceased, Mr. Shields, senior. The testator had made during his lifetime a settlement of his estate, and modified the same by will. The pursuer was entitled to a fifth of his father's property, but in the will it was provided that the defenders were "to manage the same for him in such way as they think best, and so long as they shall deem advisable, absolute discretion being hereby conferred upon them, both as regards management and the length of time to retain his share." The reason for this unusual provision was that the pursuer had been for some years a patient in Gartnavel Asylum. He was, however, discharged in 1895, and it appeared that he had now recovered. Lord Low held that the testator intended to give to the trustees power to manage the estate of the pursuer so long only as he remained in a condition of mental incapacity, and that there was nothing to show that pursuer was not to have the full use of his share if, as had occurred, he should be restored to health. He therefore gave judgment or, in Scots terms, gave decree of declarator, in favour of the pursuer. Another instance of how in law words may mean the opposite of what they appear to mean.

ASYLUMS NEWS.

Nurses' Home, Gartloch.

A separate building, to accommodate the nurses and servants, has recently been opened. It is of red sandstone, on the same architectural lines as the main building, and while structurally distinct, is very accessible from both asylum and hospital. It accommodates seventy in all, and is in three storys, being roughly divided into six sections, each of which has public rooms and bedrooms, with bath-room, lavatories, and scullery. On the ground floor, in addition, are visitors' and home sisters' rooms, with a library and kitchen, from the latter of which small lifts run to the sculleries on the upper floors. Box and bicycle rooms are placed in the basement. The two sections on the top flat are for nurses and servants, the quarters of the latter being reached by a separate staircase, and those of the former being arranged to insure quiet during the day. The lighting is electric, and the heating by low pressure hot water, the steam being brought from the main boilers. The total cost of the building furnished is about £14,000.

NEW DEPARTMENT, CHARING CROSS HOSPITAL.

Charing Cross Hospital has followed the example of St Thomas's and some provincial hospitals where there have been for a long time out-patient departments for mental disorders, and a similar department has been instituted there, under the charge of Dr. Percy Smith, the late Resident Physician to Bethlem Hospital. Although the out-patient treatment of mental cases has limitations, yet there is at present very little opportunity for patients of the poorer classes and their relatives to obtain advice in the early stages of any mental disorder, while from the point of view of the student there are few opportunities for clinical teaching on such cases as may be at present met with at general hospitals. In fact they are as a rule dismissed as being something quite apart from ordinary disease, and often considered hardly worth investigation. Such departments supply a real want at general hospitals, and we hope to see others follow suit.

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