Quarterly chronicle and documentation

(October–December 2007)

Sources

The principal sources of information on which this chronicle is based are British Broadcasting Corporation, Monitoring Global News line – Asia-Pacific Political and British Broadcasting Corporation, Monitoring Global News line – Asia-Pacific Economic. These sources, now only available electronically, do not have reference numbers and are only identifiable by date of publication of material. The inclusion of each of these dates would unnecessarily clutter the text and such dates have therefore been omitted, except, at many points, for the original sources from which the BBC reports themselves are taken.

Abbreviations

XHNA	Xinhua (New China) News Agency
CNA	Central News Agency (Taipei)
RTHK	Radio-Television Hong Kong
ZTS	*Zhongguo tongxun she (China Reporting Agency)*, Hong Kong
ZXS	*Zhongguo xinwen she (China News Agency)*, Beijing
RMRB	*Renmin ribao (People's Daily)*
SCMP	*South China Morning Post*

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Constitution of the Chinese Communist Party (revised)

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1. Internal Developments

a *The Seventh Plenum of the 16th Chinese Communist Party Central Committee (CCPCC)*

The Seventh plenary session of the 16th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCPCC) opened in Beijing on 9 October. The meeting was addressed by Hu Jintao and considered documents to be submitted to the forthcoming 17th National Party Congress (see below). These included a draft report of the CCPCC Political Bureau [Politburo], a draft amendment of the CCP Constitution, and a draft work report on behalf of the CCP Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI).

It was affirmed that the Party Congress – described as "a very important meeting to be held at a time when China has entered a key stage of reform and development" – would convene in Beijing on 15 October (XHNA, 9 Oct.).

On the eve of the meeting, a Hong Kong source noted that of 356 delegates (198 members and 156 alternate members) entitled to attend the meeting (excluding those attending in a non-voting capacity), 12 persons were expected not to be present. These included four CCPCC "full" members who had died (Huang Ju, Lu Fuyuan, Li Zhilun and Song Defu); six who had been punished (Chen Liangyu, Tian Fengshan, Xie Zhenhua, Zhang Wenkang, Shi Yunsheng and Jin Renqing); and two alternate members (Zhang Dingfa (deceased) and Du Shicheng). Unconfirmed reports suggested that the CCDI report, to be discussed at the meeting, would make reference to the expulsions from the CCP of Chen Liangyu and Du Shicheng, but not to Jin Renqing (former Minister of Finance) (Hong Kong, Information Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, 8 Oct.; see also Hong Kong, *Ming Pao* [*Mingbao*], 9 Oct., and Hong Kong, *Hsin Pao* [*Xinbao*], 9 Oct.).

Xinhua (12 Oct.) noted that delegates had endorsed the Politburo's previous decision to expel Chen Liangyu (former Secretary of the Shanghai Municipal Party Committee) and Du Shicheng (former Deputy Secretary of the Shandong Provincial Party Committee). Chen's expulsion followed his implication in social security fund malfeasance, while Du had lost his Party membership as a result of having taken bribes and led a "dissolute life."

The Seventh Plenum duly adopted the report of the 16th CCPCC to the forthcoming 17th National Party Congress, presented by Hu Jintao, and endorsed the proposed amendments to the Constitution. The Communiqué stated that under the guidance of "Deng Xiaoping Theory and the important thinking of the 'Three Represents'," through its deliberations at previous plenary sessions of the 16th CCPCC, the Politburo had successfully implemented the "spirits" of the 16th National Party Congress and provided the leadership for carrying out "scientific development and social harmony" in pursuit of establishing a "well-off [*xiaokang*] society."

The Plenum also appointed Zhu Zuliang, Du Xuefang, Yang Chuantang and Qiu Yanhan – previously, alternate members of the CCPCC – as full members in order to fill vacancies that had arisen (XHNA, 12 Oct.).

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b *The 17th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party*

In advance of the Congress, a spokesman revealed that delegates would discuss and adopt an amendment to the CCP Constitution in order explicitly to embody the ''scientific outlook on development'' and other major strategic notions that had emerged since 2002. The intention was thereby to strengthen the implementive power of the CCP's guidelines and policies, and ''[reflect] the latest achievements in adapting Marxism to Chinese conditions and [meet] the new requirements arising from the new situation and tasks for improving the Party's work and strengthening Party building'' (XHNA, 14 Oct.).

Earlier the same month, a Xinhua commentary (9 Oct.) reviewed the major achievements since the previous National Party Congress. It noted that during this period a series of ''important strategic ideas'' had been announced, including the concept of ''scientific'' and ''harmonious'' development, and the construction of a ''new socialist countryside.'' Great efforts had been directed towards improving the Party's work style in order to enhance its capacity for leadership and government in the context of a ''socialist core value system.''

In the economic sphere, there had been major advances. The momentum of GDP growth had been maintained on the basis of further reform and opening up to the outside world. Improvements in macroeconomic regulation and control mechanisms had also been recorded. The new emphasis on building a harmonious society had also borne fruit through improved welfare – for example, in terms of education, health care and housing – and material living standards (on living standards, see also *RMRB*, 11 Oct.). In the rural sector in particular, major changes had taken place thanks to the adoption of a series of pro-farm policies. There was evidence too of better regional co-ordination, thanks to the implementation of policies designed to rejuvenate the industrial sector of the North-east (the heartland of the old command economy), promote accelerated growth in Central regions and to maintain the opening up of Western China.

Important too were efforts to strengthen China's capacity for independent innovation and to build an ''innovation-oriented state.'' Xinhua noted in this regard the formulation of medium- and long-term scientific and technological development programmes, including the launch of 16 major related projects. As a result, ''independent innovation has been elevated to an unprecedented height and has been implemented in all localities.''

The 17th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party opened on 15 October. The key event of the day was Hu Jintao's presentation of a political report on behalf of the 16th CCP Central Committee (what follows is based on the full text, broadcast live by Chinese Central TV first programme (CCTV-1, as reported by BBC Monitoring Services, 18 Oct.).

Hu described the 17th Congress as a very important event that was taking place at a key moment in China's reform and development. His opening remarks made explicit the main theme of the Congress – namely,

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to hold high the great banner of socialism with Chinese characteristics, further implement the scientific development concept and emancipate the mind with Deng Xiaoping Theory and the important thinking of the [Three Represents] as a guide, adhere to reform and opening up, push forward scientific development, promote social harmony, and strive for the new triumph in building a well-off society in an all-round way.

In the face of challenges and difficulties at home and abroad, Hu claimed that major progress had been made during the five years since the last Party Congress had taken place, both in advancing the cause of "socialism with Chinese characteristics" and in developing "a new frontier in the Sinicization of Marxism."

The momentum of economic progress had been maintained both in quantitative terms (average annual GDP growth having exceeded 10 per cent) and in qualitative terms (through the achievement of significant gains in efficiency and the enhancement of China's capacity for independent innovation). Increases in financial revenue had taken place in a context in which prices had remained basically stable; rural initiatives had had a positive impact on conditions in the countryside; infrastructural construction and development, affecting energy and transport, had been strengthened; and "new progress" had been achieved in terms of resource conservation and environmental protection. At the most macro level, the goals of the 10th Five-Year Plan (2001–05) had been successfully fulfilled, and a good start had been made to the 11th Five-Year Programme (2006–10).

Important reform initiatives in the countryside included the abandonment of the agricultural and other taxes and the introduction of direct subsidies for farmers; elsewhere, they embraced the continued restructuring of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and property management, as well as the financial sector, investment and prices. Structural change was evident in the further development of the private sector and improvements in the market system.

There had also been a rapid expansion of China's foreign economic relations. Imports and exports had experienced rapid growth. In general, "the strategy to venture abroad has taken firm and steady steps … [and] the open-type economy has entered a new phase."

All these changes had brought about a significant improvement in living standards, especially among the rural population. Continued progress in poverty alleviation was also evident, thanks to the implementation of minimum living standards for rural residents and guaranteed provision of basic subsistence for those still living in poverty. As for other welfare indicators, provision for education, health care and social security insurance had all seen significant improvements.

Hu also insisted that the momentum of political reform was being maintained. In support of this statement, he drew attention to initiatives in "democracy and rule-by-law construction" and the further reform of the political system. He claimed that human rights had also experienced "healthy development," and that progress had been made in strengthening China's "socialist legal system with Chinese characteristics."

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But despite these and other achievements during the previous five years, Hu recognized that many problems remained. These included: the high resource and environmental cost of economic growth; the continued existence of development imbalances between sectors (urban and rural), regions and social groups; and the failure to achieve adequate agricultural and farm income growth. He also admitted deficiencies in the Party's ability to govern and in basic competencies (''some primary party organizations are weak and lax … [some] party cadres are crooked … issues of formalism and bureaucratism are quite conspicuous and the extravagant, wasteful, and corrupt phenomena and other undesirable behaviour remain relatively serious'').

In his comments on reform and opening up, Hu Jintao was at pains to link China's reform process to the contributions of three generations of central government leadership: those of the ''first-generation'' leadership under Mao Zedong, the second under Deng Xiaoping (which replaced class struggle with economic construction as the core imperative) and the third under Jiang Zemin. More recently still, a new strategic goal – that of ''scientific'' development, designed to facilitate the creation of a socially harmonious and prosperous society – had become the main driving force.

Halting, let alone reversing, the reformist thrust was not an option. At the same time, reform would (as it always had) seek to retain the basic tenets of Marxism, whilst simultaneously promoting its ''Sinicization'' in order to fulfil the goal of building ''socialism with Chinese characteristics'' under the leadership of the CCP.

The rationale of adopting the concept of ''scientific development'' lay essentially in tensions between China's rapid growth and increased economic strength, on the one hand, and structural deficiencies, on the other. The essential thrusts of the concept were that it should be ''people-centred'' (''to serve the people wholeheartedly is the fundamental objective of the Party'') through the simultaneous of comprehensive, co-ordinated and sustainable development (''we must persist in the path of civilized development in which production develops, lives are affluent, and the ecology is wholesome'').

Planning was essential to the fulfilment of these goals. Without it, there was no guarantee that harmonious relations – in terms of regions and between ''humanity and nature,'' urban and rural development, economic and social development, and development domestically and overseas – would be attained. Hence, the need for ''strategic thinking'' and a ''global vision.''

Looking ahead to the next five years – a critical period in seeking to fulfil the strategic goal of quadrupling China's 2000 GDP by 2020 and creating a prosperous society – Hu Jintao identified eight key areas for attention, as follows:

- enhancement of China's capacity for independent scientific and technological innovation – above all, in key areas affecting economic and social development – in order to establish ''an innovation-type country'';

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- accelerated transformation of the "mode" of economic development in order to strengthen and upgrade China's industrial structure, with particular emphasis on measures designed to increase domestic demand and consumption;
- improved co-ordination between urban and rural development, and the intensification of efforts to build a "new socialist countryside" – this last in order to address the priority task of addressing the problems facing agriculture, rural areas and farmers (*san nong*);
- implementation of better energy conservation and environmental protection policies in order to strengthen China's "sustainable development capacity";
- improved co-ordination in terms of regional development and implementation of more effective land use policies;
- further development of a diversified ownership system – albeit one in which "public ownership is dominant" – with universal and equal protection of property rights;
- intensified fiscal and financial restructuring, and stronger macroeconomic regulation;
- deepening of China's open door strategy, including the integration of its "bringing in" and "going global" strategies.

Hu also stressed the importance of "people's democracy," which he described as the "life blood of socialism." On-going efforts to develop socialist democracy would be maintained and strengthened. Thus,

> We should uphold the path of political development under socialism with Chinese characteristics, and an organic integration of the CCP leadership, the position of the people as masters of the country, and the rule of law. We should uphold and improve the system of people's congresses, the system of multiparty co-operation and political consultation under the CCP leadership, the system of regional ethnic autonomy, and the system of self-governance at the primary level of society.

Inherent in this process was, however, the need to follow the "correct political orientation" and to maintain the ultimate leadership authority of the CCP.

On military and defence issues, Hu Jintao reaffirmed two fundamental principles: the first was that the Party should maintain absolute leadership over the armed forces; the second, that the essential role of the armed forces was to serve the people. In the face of new developments and conditions throughout the world, it was essential that army building should be based on the application of modern science and technology (i.e., "mechanization and informatization").

The political report reaffirmed the logic and effectiveness of the principle of "one country, two systems" as a basis for China's peaceful reunification. It underlined the CCP's commitment to maintaining the long-term stability and prosperity of Hong Kong and Macau through the implementation of this principle and in accordance with the Basic Laws of the two regions. Application of the same principle, as well as of the "eight-point proposals for developing cross-Strait relations," promised to provide a framework for a resolution of the issue of Taiwan, although Hu was adamant that China would never abandon the

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one-China principle, just as it would never accept or condone "Taiwan independence separatist activities."

The report referred to major changes and "adjustments" that were taking place throughout the world. It endorsed multi-polarization and economic globalization as irreversible global trends, and argued that the changing international balance of power was a force for stability and world peace. At the same time, there was recognition that "hegemonism and power politics" had not been eliminated. As a result, "local conflicts and hotspot issues keep emerging, imbalances in the world economy are worsening, the North-South gap is widening, and traditional and non-traditional threats to security are intertwined." Against the background of such threats, China's position was that of seeking peaceful development:

> The Chinese nation is a peace-loving nation, and China has always been a staunch force in safeguarding world peace. We are committed to combining the interests of the Chinese people with the common interests of the people of other countries … We maintain that all countries … are equal, and we respect the right of the people of all countries to independently choose their own development road. China will not interfere in the internal affairs of other countries, nor will it impose its will on them. China strives to peacefully resolve international disputes and hotspot issues, promote international and regional security co-operation, and opposes terrorism in any form. China espouses a defence policy that is defensive in nature and does not engage in an arms race. It does not pose a military threat to any country.

Another important theme of the report was the need to maintain efforts to strengthen Party building. Key measures in this regard included:

- strengthening ideological and ideological study;
- putting in place "high-quality leading bodies";
- expanding inner-Party democracy in order to enhance solidarity and unity among Party members;
- intensifying reform of the cadre and personnel system;
- improving the CCP's work style, especially through an intensification of efforts to combat corruption ("[w]e need to oppose formalism, bureaucracy and deception … to advocate economy, always be frugal and hardworking in our undertakings, and oppose extravagance and waste") in order to ensure that Party members and cadres can play an exemplary role in society.

(For comment on Hu's report, see Hong Kong, *Wen Wei Po* [*Wenhui bao*], 17 Oct.; for the full text of the Resolution of the 17th CCP National Congress on the report, see XHNA, 21 Oct.).

On 17 October, the second meeting of the National Congress took place under the chairmanship of Hu Jintao. Following a briefing by Zeng Qinghong (Secretary General of the Congress), name lists of nominees for candidates for membership of the CCPCC were adopted. Kyodo (18 Oct.) suggested that the absence of Zeng's name from the list of candidates (as well as those of Luo Gan and Wu Guanzheng) indicated that he was about to give up his Party post – a move that was expected to strengthen the position of Hu Jintao because of

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Zeng's close association with Hu's predecessor, Jiang Zemin. Kyodo also speculated that two younger provincial leaders were likely to be elevated to membership of the Politburo Standing Committee: viz. Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang (respectively, Party leaders of Shanghai and Liaoning) (see also speculation in *SCMP*, 19 Oct., which argued that in addition to Xi and Li, He Guoqiang (Head of the Organization Department of the CCPCC) and Zhou Yongkang (Head of Public Security) would also be elected to the Politburo Standing Committee).

It was subsequently announced that Hu Jintao, Wu Bangguo, Wen Jiabao, Jia Qinglin and Li Changchun had been re-elected to membership of the 17th CCP Central Committee. Members of the 16th CCPCC who were *not* elected to the new Central Committee included Zeng Qinghong, Wu Guanzheng, Luo Gan, Huang Ju, Wu Yi, Zhang Lichang, Cao Gangchuan and Zeng Peiyan.

Full membership of the Politburo of the 17th CCP Central Committee was reported as follows (XHNA, 21 Oct. – and see XHNA, 22 Oct. for biographical profiles of members):

Membership of the CCPCC Politburo Standing Committee
Hu Jintao (CCP General Secretary; Chair, Central Military Commission; State President)
Wu Bangguo (Chair, National People's Congress)
Wen Jiabao (Premier, State Council)
Jia Qinglin (Chair, Central People's Political Consultative Committee)
Li Changchun (Oversees Propaganda System)
Xi Jinping (Executive Secretary, CCPCC Secretariat)
Li Keqiang (Executive Vice-Premier)
He Guoqiang (Head, Central Commission for Discipline Inspection)
Zhou Yongkang (Minister of Public Security; State Councillor)

Regular Members of the CCPCC Politburo
Wang Gang (Former Director, CCPCC General Office)
Wang Lequan (CCP Secretary, Xinjiang-Uighur Autonomous Region)
Wang Zhaoguo (Executive Vice-Chair, National People's Congress Standing Committee)
Wang Qishan (Mayor, Beijing)
Hui Liangyu (Vice-Premier, State Council)
Liu Qi (CCP Secretary, Beijing Municipality)
Liu Yunshan (Director, CCPCC Propaganda Department; Member, CCPCC Secretariat)
Liu Yandong (Director, CCPCC United Front Department)
Li Yuanchao (Director, CCPCC Organization Department)
Wang Yang (CCP Secretary, Chongqing Municipality)
Zhang Gaoli (CCP Secretary, Tianjin Municipality)
Zhang Dejiang (CCP Secretary, Guangdong Province)
Yu Zhengsheng (CCP Secretary, Hubei Province)
Xu Caihou (Vice-Chairman, Central Military Commission)
Guo Boxiong (Vice-Chairman, Central Military Commission)
Bo Xilai (Minister of Commerce)

(For a list of all 204 members and 167 alternate members of the new CCP Central Committee, as well as the 127 members of the Central Commission for

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Discipline Inspection, see XHNA, 21 Oct. For an analysis of the new Central Committee line-up, see *ZXS*, 22 Oct.)

Revised membership of the CCP's Central Military Commission was as follows:

Hu Jintao (Chairman)
Guo Boxiong, Xu Caihou (Vice-Chairmen)
Liang Guanglie, Chen Bingde, Li Jinai, Liao Xilong, Chang Wanquan, Jing Zhiyuan, Wu Shengli, Xu Qiliang (Members)

Membership of the Secretariat of the 17th CCPCC was as follows:

Xi Jinping, Liu Yunshan, Li Yuanchao, He Yong, Ling Jihua, Wang Huning

Finally, membership of the Standing Committee of the CCP's Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) was as follows (XHNA, 22 Oct.):

Secretary: He Guoqiang
Deputy secretaries: He Yong, Zhang Huixin, Ma Wen (female), Sun Zhongtong, Gan Yisheng, Zhang Yi, Huang Shuxian, Li Yufu
Members of the Standing Committee: Gan Yisheng, Ma Wen (female), Wang Wei, Linghu An, Sun Zhongtong, Du Xuefang (female), Li Yufu, Wu Yuliang, Wu Yuping (female), Qiu Xueqiang, He Yong, Zhang Jun, Zhang Yi, Zhang Jinan, Zhang Huixin, Qu Wanxiang, He Guoqiang, Huang Shuxian, Cai Jihua

Delegates to the 17th CCP National Congress agreed that CCP Constitution should be amended in order to enshrine the "scientific" concept of development, as well as "other strategic thoughts" that had emerged since the 16th National Party Congress in 2002. The resolution on the constitutional amendment, adopted on 21 October, noted that the "scientific" concept

> takes development as its essence, putting people first as its core, comprehensive, balanced and sustainable development as its basic requirement, and overall consideration as its fundamental approach.

It was also announced that a further constitutional amendment would make explicit the intention to promote the development of the non-public sector. Implicit in this initiative was recognition that the state-owned sector would no longer receive exclusive and preferential treatment, and that private sector activities would be further encouraged and expanded. The change reflected the rapid growth of the private sector in recent years: at end-2006, there were some 4.94 million private business enterprises in China, with associated investment worth over 7.5 trillion yuan. In 2006, more than 1,500 private entrepreneurs – 14.4 per cent of all new members – had joined the CCP, taking private sector membership of the Party to almost 3 million (XHNA, 21 Oct.; and see XHNA, 22 Oct. for a review of constitutional amendments during the previous 25 years; for the full text of the CCP Constitution, see under "Documentation" below).

Delegates endorsed important amendments to the CCP Constitution. These included the incorporation of the "Scientific Outlook on Development" as a "scientific theory that is in the same line as Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong

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Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory and the important thought of [Three Represents].'' In addition, the word ''harmonious'' was incorporated into the Party's basic line, which, in its revised form, sought to ''turn China into a prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally advanced and harmonious modern socialist country.''

The attempt to create a ''harmonious socialist society'' was also incorporated into the ''General Programme'' of the Party Constitution. Various other additions and amendments were made to the previous version of the Constitution (for details, see below under ''Documentation'').

c *The 30th and 31st Sessions of the Tenth NPC Standing Committee*

The 30th session of the NPC Standing Committee (NPCSC) took place in Beijing on 24–28 October.

Among the reports received by delegates was one presented by Xiao Yang (President of the Supreme People's Court) on perfecting the oversight mechanism for trial work and promoting fair administration of justice. Although he claimed that significant improvements in these areas had been made since the 16th Party Congress, he also conceded the persistence of some difficulties. These included inadequate law enforcement, the passing of unjust judgements in some courts and ''bad work practices'' among judges (''[t]here have been frequent occurrences of illegal and criminal acts among a small number of judges''). Xiao Yang was at pains to emphasize the Supreme People's Court's determination to correct these errors and oversights through the implementation of measures designed to strengthen supervision and improve oversight mechanisms. A parallel report – one that sought to address similar problems of poor work style within procuratorial bodies through recourse to similar administrative devices – was delivered to NPCSC delegates by Jia Chunwang on behalf of the Supreme People's Procuratorate (XHNA, 26 Oct.).

NPCSCC members adopted a draft amendment to the Law on Lawyers, which was intended to facilitate lawyers' access to criminal suspects in order to obtain evidence. The amended Law sought to address long-standing complaints from defence lawyers that they were effectively prevented from meeting suspects and gaining access to relevant files and evidential materials. It also provided for defence attorneys and criminal suspects to hold unmonitored meetings. Added protection for lawyers was provided through the legal undertaking that except on grounds of undermining national security or making libellous remarks, opinions and statements given and made by lawyers could not make them liable for prosecution themselves. Also included in the amendments was permission for lawyers who had practiced for five years without revocation of their licences to set up individual law firms (XHNA, 28 Oct., which revealed that there were 130,000 lawyers currently working in 13,000 law firms in China).

NPCSC members endorsed the nomination of Meng Jianzhu (former Party Secretary of Jiangxi Province) as China's minister of Public Security. Meng replaced Zhou Yongkang, who had just been elected as a member of the

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CCPCC's Politburo Standing Committee (XHNA, 28 Oct., which also contains a profile of Meng). Delegates also approved a decision to expel two deputies because of their suspected involvement in criminal activities. They were: Wang Xiaojin (Chairman of the Board of the Gujing Group – a major Chinese distillery based in Anhui province) and Wang Dingguo (former Board Chairman of the Qingjiang River Hydropower Development Co. Ltd. in Hubei) (*ibid.*).

The 31st meeting of the NPCSC took place between 23 and 29 December. Delegates began their deliberation of China's first-ever state-owned assets law, designed to protect such assets from illegal seizure and to "maintain the country's basic economic system."

Shi Guangsheng (Vice-Chairman of the NPC Financial and Economic Committee) acknowledged that earlier reforms notwithstanding, the loss of state-owned assets continued to pose serious problems. As he put it,

> … some SOEs sell the state assets at low prices, distribute them to individuals for free, or seize them with other approaches, which have triggered great concerns from the public.

This was the background against which lawmakers had urged the implementation of legislation to protect state assets. The draft law presented to Standing Committee members provided for the establishment, under the central government, of a budget system for the operation of state-owned assets, including the management of revenue and "payout." Thus,

> [t]he profit made by SOEs which should be contributed to the state assets, the income of state assets transfer, and income which belongs to the state-owned assets during the calculating and check of SOEs should be written into the budget.

In addition, the draft legislation set out detailed procedures whereby SOE assets would be "accurately calculated, audited and assessed before restructuring or ownership transfer." It added that state assets should be transferred "at reasonable prices" (XHNA, 23 Dec.).

Delegates also considered a draft amendment to the law on individual income tax, providing for an increase in the monthly individual income tax levy threshold from 1,600 to 2,000 yuan. The intention was thereby to lessen the higher economic burden of medium- and low-income earners associated with recent price increase of some products. The rise was expected to cause a reduction of 30 billion yuan in state revenue. In its favour, however, it would release 70 per cent of income earners from paying any income tax (*ibid.*).

Amongst other legislation considered by NPCSC members was a draft law on social security, which drew special attention to the importance of maintaining strict supervision over social security funds. To this end, the draft law was explicit in its insistence that all funds should be used only for specified purposes – viz., in support of pension insurance, medical insurance, work injury insurance, unemployment insurance and maternity insurance – and that use or embezzlement of the fund for other purposes, whether by institutions or individual persons, was strictly forbidden. To these ends and in order to ensure transparency in fund management, relevant institutions in charge of social

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security cases would be required to disclose expenditure, balance and earnings at regular intervals (ibid.).

d *Party and Political Affairs; Ideological Developments*

The CCPCC's Organization Department noted that in June 2007 membership of the CCP totalled 73.36 million, or 6.42 million more (9.6 per cent) than in 2002. Of *new* members, 4.2 million (31.9 per cent) were women, 934,000 (7.1 per cent) were members of an ethnic minority; 9.46 million (7.1 per cent) were below the age of 35; and almost 6.5 million (almost half) were engaged in "frontline" work at grassroots level (e.g., as doctors, teachers or members of the police force). 32.6 per cent of new members were graduates of tertiary-level institutions, and 12.1 per cent had previously been designated as "model workers."

It was also reported that some 134,000 people from the "'new social stratum"' – i.e., private entrepreneurs, technicians and managers working in private or foreign-funded enterprises, self-employed persons and employees in "intermediate organizations" (a category thought to number some 50 million people in total and commanding assets valued at 10 trillion yuan) – had submitted applications to become CCP members. It was thought that 64,000 of these, whose applications were currently being assessed, would succeed in gaining Party membership. As of June 2007, there were already 3.18 million CCP members who were employees in the private sector – 112.34 per cent more than in 2002.

Such developments notwithstanding, workers, farmers, intellectuals, cadres and army personnel still constituted the "basic components" and "mainstays" of the CCP. Thus, as of June 2007, CCP members included 7.96 million workers (10.8 per cent of the total); 23.1 million farmers (31 per cent); 21.3 million cadres, managerial staff and technicians (29 per cent); 1.6 million members of the armed forces (including the armed police) (2.2 per cent); 1.95 million students (2.6 per cent); 13.77 million retirees (18.8 per cent), and 3.64 million (5 per cent) "others."

Of the *total* Party membership, 17.38 million (23.7 per cent) were aged 35 or below; and 38.84 million (52.9 per cent) were between the ages of 36 and 59.

The number of grassroots Party organizations had reached 3.6 million (142,000 more than in 2002) (XHNA, 8 Oct.).

On 15 November, the State Council's Information Office published a White Paper, entitled "China's Political Party System" – the first of its kind ever made available in China (full text available in XHNA, 15 Nov.). The Contents of the document are as follows:

Preface
An Inevitable Choice in China's Social Development
A Basic Political System for China
Major Manifestations of Socialist Democracy
Political Consultation in the Multi-party Co-operation System
Multi-party Co-operation System and Building of State Power

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Multi-party Co-operation System and the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference
Multi-party Co-operation System and Modernization
Conclusion
Appendix A – Brief Introduction to China's Democratic Parties and Personages Without Party Affiliation

e *Social and Legal Affairs*

According to the Ministry of Supervision and the CCP's Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI), 207,214 rural officials had been punished between 2003 and June 2007 for violations of laws and regulations (including misuse of subsidies for farmers, endorsement of land contracts contrary to farmers' interests, the apportionment of random fines and fees on rural residents, and excessive spending on infrastructural development). In pursuit of improved accountability and more efficient rural administration, accounting management in most Chinese villages had been placed under the control of "independent accounting service centres," while villagers themselves were becoming more actively involved in decision-making. After completing their terms of office, all village committee officials would, in future, be audited (XHNA, 3 Oct.).

Vice-Minister of Finance (Wang Jun) revealed that in 2006 11.5 per cent of fiscal spending had been used for social security purposes – double the 1998 figure (5.52 per cent). Concealed in these figures was an average rate of growth of social security expenditure of 28.3 per cent p.a. Of the 2006 total, almost 34 per cent was allocated to supporting laid-off workers from SOEs. A further 30 per cent was used for health and medical care. In 2007, the Ministry of Finance would direct 11.4 billion yuan to the new rural co-operative medical care system (XHNA, 3 Oct.).

Zhang Weiqing (Director of the National Population and Family Planning Commission) revealed that as a result of a gender ratio that had been highly skewed since the 1980s, the number of men of marriage age in China exceeded the corresponding number of women by some 18 million. He noted that the current sex ratio at birth in rural areas was 122.85:100. This figure was not only higher than the national average (119.58:100), but was also well above the "normal" sex ratio of between, 103 and 107:100. He added that the excess of men over women of marriageable age (i.e., 20–45) was expected to reach 30 million by 2020.

In the face of rural families' continued preference for boys over girls, the Chinese government would maintain its efforts to combat illegal pre-natal sex selection (XHNA, 13 Nov.).

Some 5 million migrants were expected to move to Beijing during the next 12 years, as a result of which the capital's population would reach 20 million by 2020. Despite zero growth in the birth rate of the registered population during the past five years, large-scale migration had caused the municipal population to continue to expand. In 2006, the number of permanent residents living in the city was 15.6 million (1.4 per cent more than in 2005). Meanwhile, the aged

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population was increasing and was expected to rise by 12 per cent in the next two decades (XHNA, 22 Oct.).

Following a 54 per cent rise in HIV/AIDS cases in Beijing during January–October 2007, it was reported that all hotels in the capital would be required to provide condoms in every room by the end of 2008.

f *Economic Affairs*

The annual Central Economic Work Conference, held in Beijing in December, identified five priority issues to be addressed in 2008 (XHNA, 5 Dec.). They were:

- the risk of economic overheating;
- inflationary pressures (in November food price inflation precipitated the largest increase in the consumer price index for the entire year);
- the weak state of agriculture;
- problems of energy conservation and greenhouse gas emissions;
- "prominent" issues of welfare affecting the general population.

Writing in *Qiushi* (1 Oct.), Tian Chengping (Minister of Labour and Social Security) reviewed China's progress in labour protection and employment creation during the previous five years. He noted that efforts to strengthen labour and employment conditions had become a central plank of the Government's efforts to create a harmonious society. To this end and against the background of continuing state enterprise restructuring, increased emphasis had been placed on implementing the "two guarantees" (that basic allowances due to laid-off SOE workers be guaranteed and the retired workers' pensions be paid on time and in full). Progress in these areas was evidenced in average monthly pensions of SOE retirees having risen from 615 to 969 yuan between 2002 and 2007 and in the number of participants in receipt of basic old-age insurance having increased from 27.27 to 46.35 million since 1998 (pension payments during this period rose from 151.2 billion yuan to 489.7 billion).

Tian also drew attention to progress in implementing the Government's market-driven proactive employment policy. Since 2003, each year some 10 million urban residents had joined the work force, while more than 8 million farm workers had been transferred to non-agricultural work. In addition, 20 million laid-off former SOE and COE employees had found new jobs. Thanks to such efforts, the rate of registered urban unemployment had declined – from 4.3 to 4.1 per cent between 2003 and 2006. In short, Tian claimed that China had maintained a "basically stable employment situation," on the basis of which further reforms could be carried out.

The development of an effective social security system was inherent in efforts to enhance people's welfare – hence, the decision of the Sixth Plenum of the 16th CCPCC to affirm the importance of putting in place a basic social security system for China's urban and rural residents by 2020. To this end, important initiatives had been taken. *Inter alia*, these included promulgation of the

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Regulations on Industrial Injury Insurance, the extension of pilot projects for the enhancement of urban social security provision, improvements in the basic old-age insurance system for enterprise workers, and implementation of pilot projects relating to expanded coverage of unemployment insurance in Northeast China. In short, "the framework of China's social security system has taken initial shape."

Significant progress had been made, wrote Tian, in enhancing the protection of workers' legitimate rights and benefits through the development of a framework of "standardized, harmonious, orderly, and stable labour [relations]" appropriate to a socialist market economy. Within this framework, norms relating to working hours, rest, holidays, minimum wages and employment protection for women and children had been established. Efforts to deal more effectively with labour disputes and to extend the use of formal labour contracts had been intensified, as had those to address the problem of unpaid wages due to rural migrant workers. More generally, increased attention had been given to improving working conditions for migrants.

In his concluding remarks, Tian admitted that labour security work would continue to face "some deep-seated contractions and problems." In addressing these, four priority requirements needed to be fulfilled: first, to ensure that employment expansion remained a cornerstone of economic development; second, that social security coverage be extended; third, that efforts to co-ordinate labour relations and safeguard workers' legitimate rights and interests be intensified; and finally, that China's public employment services be further strengthened.

It was reported that Guangdong's provincial employment and social security authorities were formulating regulations designed to restrict the employment of foreigners and to ban them from carrying out certain kinds of work. The regulations would distinguish between three categories of employment, to be designated "encouraged," "restricted" and "forbidden." Prospective foreign employees seeking jobs in the first category would be given permits, but employers would have to pay a fee for hiring a foreign worker in the second category. Employment of foreigners who lacked a permit would be illegal. It was estimated that around 10,000 foreigners were already living in Guangdong, many of whom were described as being "financially insecure" and engaged in criminal activities, such as drug trafficking, fraud and theft (XHNA, 8 Oct.).

It was reported by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) that employment in the urban private sector had risen by almost 11 million p.a. between 2002 and 2006. During this four-year period, 43.9 million urban residents had joined the private sector work force (including 16.9 million in foreign-funded enterprises [FFEs] and companies established through investment from Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan). The number of people working in SOEs and collective-owned enterprises (COEs) had meanwhile fallen by 10.7 million. At the end of September 2007, employment in China's private sector totalled 120 million – 9.5 per cent above the corresponding level of a year earlier (XHNA, 5 Oct.).

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In November, a senior representative of the National Development and Reform Commission's Department of Rural Economy insisted that on the basis of expanded output and the maintenance of adequate reserves, China would maintain 95 per cent self-sufficiency in grain. He stated that current grain supplies were sufficient to meet demand, but that excess demand would emerge in the longer term. In order to meet growing demand pressures, especially of animal feed, during 2006–10 the government would seek to increase large-scale production rather than relying on "scattered, small farms" (XHNA, 21 Nov.).

On 26 December Xinhua released the full text of a White Paper on "China's Energy Conditions and Policies," issued by the Information Office of the State Council. The Contents of the White Paper were as follows:

Preface
Current Situation of Energy Development
Strategy and Goals of Energy Development
All-round Promotion of Energy Conservation
Improving the Energy Supply Capacity
Accelerating the Progress of Energy Technologies
Coordinating Energy and Environment Development
Deepening Energy System Reform
Strengthening International Co-operation in the Field of Energy Conclusion

As part of its efforts to conserve energy and reduce pollution, between January and September 2007 China closed down 253 small-scale coal-fired generating units. In so doing, it fulfilled 90 per cent of the annual target of eliminating 10 million kilowatts of outmoded generating capacity. It was intended that by 2010, similar energy-inefficient coal-fired units with a total capacity of 50 million kilowatts would have been shut down.

On 19 December Xinhua reported that China's first national oil reserve base – situated in Zhenhai (Zhejiang) and with a total storage space of 5.2 million m^3 – had been filled with crude oil. The base was one of four, whose construction had begun in March 2004. The other three – in Zhousan (Zhejiang), Huangdao (Shandong) and Dalian (Liaoning) – were still under construction, but were expected to be in operation by the end of 2008. Taken together, the four bases would eventually enable China to maintain strategic oil reserves of around 10 million tons – roughly equal to 30 days of imports (XHNA, 19 Dec.).

In November the State Council gave its official approval to plans to increase China's nuclear generating capacity by 23 million kilowatts to reach 40 million kilowatts – 4 per cent of national power generating capacity – by 2020 (this on the basis of the 2005 installed capacity). The expansion plan was expected to cost some 450 billion yuan. On completion, China's annual nuclear power generating capacity would reach 260–280 billion kilowatt-hours.

Some 13 sites – all in coastal regions – had been selected for the construction of new nuclear facilities. Four would be built in Zhejiang, three in Guangdong, two in Shandong and the rest divided between Jiangsu, Guangxi and Liaoning.

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Consideration was also being given to building nuclear plants in Hubei, Jiangxi and Hunan provinces (XHNA, 3 Nov.).

The People's Bank of China announced that as of 26 November, the reserve requirement ratio would be raised to a 10-year high of 13.5 per cent. The move – the ninth of its kind in 2007 – was intended to "[strengthen] liquidity management in the banking system and [check] excessive credit growth." In the same statement, the Central Bank reaffirmed the continued implementation of a "tightened" monetary policy in order to ensure rational credit growth (XHNA, 10 Nov.). A *tenth* rise in the reserve ratio took place on 25 December.

In January–September 2007, China enjoyed a trade surplus of US$185.65 billion – higher than the corresponding figure for the whole of 2006. During this period, exports increased by 27.1 per cent (year on year) to reach US$878.24 billion; imports rose by 19.1 per cent to US$692.56 billion (General Administration of Customs, quoted by XHNA, 12 Oct.). At the end of September, China's foreign exchange reserves had reached US$1,430 billion – an increase of 45.2 per cent, year on year.

g *Space Navigation*

China's first lunar probe – Chang'e-1 – was successfully launched on a Long March 3A carrier rocket from the Xichang Satellite Launch Centre (Sichuan) on 24 October. Later the same day, it entered the earth–moon transfer orbit, and on 5 November it entered the moon's orbit.

Since its approval early in 2004, the lunar orbiter project was estimated to have cost 1.4 billion yuan (c. US$190 million). The most recent launch was the first step in a three-stage mission, designed to culminate in a first moon landing in around 2012. A second landing in about 2017 was expected to result in the recovery and return to earth for scientific investigation of lunar soil and stone samples (XHNA, 2 Nov.).

On 26 November China published the first picture of the moon from Chang'e-1.

h *Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR)*

On 10 October, Donald Tsang (Chief Executive of HKSAR) delivered his annual Policy Address – entitled "A New Direction for Hong Kong" – to the Legislative Council (see XHNA, 10 Oct.). He expressed confidence that in the wake of average GDP growth of 7.7 per cent p.a. (2004–06) and a further 6.3 per cent expansion during January–June 2007, Hong Kong's economy had regained its momentum. He also pledged to keep a close eye on the inflationary implications of growth, especially as they affected low-income groups in society.

Tsang stated that his administration's major overall goal was the pursuit of "sustainable, balanced and diversified development" designed to maintain social harmony. In order to fulfil this objective, special emphasis would be placed on the implementation of employment-generating infrastructural projects. His reference to unacceptably low levels of government spending in 2007 was a recognition that recent HKSAR Government infrastructural construction

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projects had fallen short of expectations. This was the background against which 10 large-scale infrastructural projects would be launched in transportation, cross-boundary integration and new urban development. Their successful implementation was expected to generate over HK$100 billion in value-added per annum, as well as creating 250,000 new jobs.

As he had promised during his re-election campaign, Tsang announced a package of tax reduction and exemption measures, including a reduction in the standard rate of salaries tax to 15 per cent and a cut of 1 per cent in the profits tax (both to be introduced in fiscal year 2008–09). The cost of these fiscal initiatives was estimated to be HK$7.6 billion. In line with the Government's poverty alleviation goals, assistance to low-income residents would also be increased. Tsang reaffirmed the Government's intention to introduce nine-year free primary and secondary education, starting in 2008–09. He called on the business sector to strengthen its social responsibility role by supporting wage protection, environmental protection, heritage conservation and the building of a "caring society."

He revealed too that the HKSAR Government would implement various measures to further enhance Hong Kong's status as an international financial centre, including developing the renminbi (RMB) market and strengthening co-operation with financial markets on the Chinese mainland. Thus,

> We will actively facilitate mainland enterprises and investors to participate in Hong Kong's stock market through the Qualified Domestic Institutional Investors Scheme and the pilot scheme for mainland individuals to invest directly in securities in Hong Kong. … We will further enhance the capability of Hong Kong's financial system to handle RMB-denominated transactions through continuous expansion of RMB business in Hong Kong.

The Chief Executive noted too the great potential inherent in Islamic finance and suggested that Hong Kong should take advantage of such opportunities through the development of a local "Islamic financial platform," especially through the development of an Islamic bond market. These and related issues were already under consideration by the Hong Kong Monetary Authority and representatives of the HKSAR financial sector.

Another important initiative referred to by Tsang was on-going efforts to make Hong Kong an arbitration centre for the Asia-Pacific region. Demand for arbitration services was increasing and Hong Kong's strong judicial reputation made it a prime candidate to fulfil such a role.

On 23 November, Wen Jiabao met the HKSAR Chief Executive in Beijing and a received a report on the work of the SAR Government. He reaffirmed Beijing's commitment to following the principle of "one country, two systems" in accordance with the Basic Law for HKSAR, as well as to lending support for Hong Kong's further development (XHNA, 24 Nov., which also reported a parallel meeting involving the Chief Executive of the Macau SAR).

Radio-Television Hong Kong (RTHK, 22 Oct.) reported that former HKSAR Chief Secretary, Anson Chan, had submitted nomination papers as a candidate

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for a Legislative Council by-election, to be held in December. Later, in an interview on her political platform, Ms. Chan said that she had abandoned her earlier position that universal suffrage should be put in place by 2016 in favour of a demand that full democracy be granted by 2012 – an objective which she believed was quite achievable (RTHK, 29 Oct.).

It was reported that during July–September 2007 the rate of unemployment in Hong Kong was 4.1 per cent – at the lowest level for over nine years. The rate of underemployment meanwhile declined to 2.2 per cent.

2. Foreign Relations

a *Diplomatic Tours*

Wen Jiabao's visits to Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Belarus and Russia, and his participation in the Prime Ministerial meeting of member states of the Shanghai Co-operation Organization (SCO)

On 2 November, Wen Jiabao arrived in Tashkent on a visit to Uzbekistan, during which he also attended the sixth Meeting of Prime Ministers of SCO member states.

Following his arrival, the Chinese Premier met the Uzbek President, Islom Karimov. Wen noted the good progress that had been made in recent years in various forms of bilateral co-operation to the benefit of regional stability and development. He expressed the Chinese government's gratitude for Uzbekistan's support on Taiwan and in helping combat the "'East Turkistan' forces." He hoped that the coming years would see the further strengthening of economic and political co-operation (not least, "in security, banning drugs and fighting terrorism …") (XHNA, 2 Nov.).

During a separate meeting the same day, Wen and his Uzbek counterpart (Shavkat Mirziyaev) were reported to have agreed on efforts to strengthen bilateral co-operation. Wen noted the steady development of bilateral relations since the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1992. He said that the Chinese government attached great importance to its relations with Uzbekistan and hoped, in particular, that two-way trade would be further expanded in order to fulfil the target level of US$1.5 billion by 2010. To this end, he called on the Uzbek government to open up new areas for investment (including agriculture, transport and tourism) and to improve the overall investment environment in order to facilitate greater investment by Chinese companies. He reaffirmed China's support for Uzbekistan's accession to the WTO and expressed his government's willingness to help facilitate Uzbekistan's greater involvement in multilateral organizations, such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the Asian Development Bank.

Following their talks, the two men attended a signing ceremony for an inter-governmental economic and technological co-operation agreement, as well as other co-operation documents (XHNA, 3 Nov., which also has the full text of the Sino–Uzbek joint communiqué).

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At the SCO meeting in Tashkent Wen put forward a four-point proposal, designed to further strengthen co-operation within the Organization. The proposal embraced calls to enhance legal and regulatory coordination and advance trade and investment among SCO member states; to identify new areas of co-operation on the basis of an improved "co-operation mechanism;" to carry out priority "network projects" that had already been identified and bring forward the start date for implementing agreed "exemplary projects;" and to strengthen economic policy study and formulation, and information exchange among members (XHNA, 2 Nov.).

Wen took the opportunity of the SCO meeting to hold separate talks with the Prime Minister of Kazakhstan (Karim Masimov). The two men agreed to seem ways of further enhancing bilateral economic and trade co-operation.

On 3 November, Wen Jiabao arrived in Ashgabat at the start of a two-day official visit to Turkmenistan.

In advance of Wen's arrival in Minsk, Xinhua (4 Nov.) noted that the value of bilateral trade between China and Belarus had risen from US$460 million (2004) to almost US$800 million (2006). In 2005–06 alone, trade rose by 30 per cent, and in January–July 2007, the corresponding year-on-year increase was 71.8 per cent.

On 5 November, Wen held talks on the further strengthening of Sino-Belarussian relations with the Acting Prime Minister, Vladimir Semashko. He noted the steady development of co-operation in recent years, especially in terms of trade and economic ties. In order to enhance such ties, he called on both sides to give special attention to increasing investment in priority areas, such as telecommunications, light industry and basic infrastructure. Wen also met President Alexander Lukashenko.

At the end of his visit, the two sides signed agreements on the provision of Chinese loans and aid, as well as a protocol on cultural co-operation.

On 5 November, the Chinese Premier arrived in Moscow, where he held talks with the Russian President, Vladimir Putin. Wen spoke with satisfaction of the solid development during the previous decade of the Sino-Russian "strategic co-operative partnership." He reaffirmed the determination of the Chinese government to further strengthen the bilateral relationship – especially in terms of trade and economic co-operation – to the benefit of both countries. For his part, Putin too spoke of Russia's wish to advance strategic co-operation between his country and China. The two men also discussed regional and international issues (XHNA, 6 Nov.).

Subsequently, Wen held talks with the Russian Premier, Viktor Zubkov, and addressed the second high-level Sino-Russian economic forum. He drew special attention to the need to improve the structure of bilateral trade – in particular, to increase the share of machinery, electronic and high-technology products in such trade – and strengthen co-operation in energy and resources. He also called for expanded co-operation between the two countries' border regions.

The two sides signed a joint communiqué, in which they undertook to strengthen bilateral co-operation, especially in trade, economic affairs, energy, science and technology, nuclear power, astronautics and aeronautics, transpor-

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tation and banking. They also signed nine co-operation agreements (details in XHNA, 6 Nov.).

b *Countries, Territories and Regions*

Australasia and Pacific Ocean

In November Premier Wen Jiabao sent a congratulatory message to Kevin Rudd, following his landslide victory over John Howard in Australia's general election.

In December, the President of Micronesia (Emanuel Mori) visited China and discussed bilateral issues with senior Chinese officials, including Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao. The two sides signed an agreement on economic and technological co-operation.

Commonwealth of Independent States (Russia)

On 24 October, Yang Jiechi held talks with the Russian Foreign Minister (Sergei Lavrov) in Harbin, where they were participating in a tri-party foreign ministerial meeting also involving the India Foreign Minister. Yang said that the Chinese government sought to join Russia in further developing bilateral relations, especially at the "local" level. He noted that their joint efforts had already played a positive role in addressing regional and international issues (XHNA, 24 Oct.).

Eastern and Southern Europe (Slovenia, Macedonia)

On 8 November, the Slovenian Prime Minister (Janez Jansa) arrived in Beijing to begin his first visit to China since taking office in 2004. In a meeting with Jansa, Hu Jintao reviewed the development of Sino-Slovenian relations since the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1992 and described Slovenia as a "good partner" in the Balkan region. He hoped that the 15th anniversary of the two sides' establishment of formal relations would provide a new starting point for the further strengthening of bilateral ties.

Jansa also discussed bilateral and other issues with Wen Jiabao. With Slovenia shortly to assume the six-month presidency of the European Union, the Chinese Premier suggested that relations between China and the EU had "entered a new era of all-round development." Jansa pledged his country's efforts to facilitate the further strengthening of China–EU co-operation (XHNA, 8 Nov.).

Following their talks, Wen and Jansa witnessed the signing of a number of educational, trade and cultural agreements.

The following month, the President of Macedonia (Branko Crvenkovski) visited China. His talks with senior Chinese government officials, including Hu Jintao, focused mainly on bilateral relations, but also included discussion of regional and international issues (XHNA, 5 Dec., including the full text of the two sides' joint statement).

Japan

On 20 November, Wen Jiabao met the Japanese Prime Minister (Yasuo Fukuda) in Singapore, where both men were attending ASEAN meetings. It was the first

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such meeting since Fukuda took office in September 2007. Wen said that relations between China and Japan had reached an "historical stage of significant development and an important turning point" and called on both sides to take advantage of the opportunity to promote closer ties (XHNA, 20 Nov.).

On 30 November, the Japanese Foreign Minister, Masahiko Komura, arrived in Beijing at the start of an official visit to China, during which he also attended the first China–Japan "High-level Economic Dialogue."

In advance of his meeting with Komura, whom he described as "an old friend of the Chinese people," Yang Jiechi said that their talks would cover bilateral, as well as regional and international issues. He predicted that the economic dialogue would yield "major" achievements.

Yang told Komura that the key to resolving the "East China Sea issue" lay in maintaining friendly consultations ("shelving disputes and seeking joint exploration is a realistic way to resolve the issue and making consistent efforts towards each other is key to progress in the consultations") (XHNA, 1 Dec.). Later, however, Komura admitted to reporters that there had been no breakthrough in the talks on the gas dispute (Kyodo, 1 Dec.).

The normally reliable Kyodo provided the following summary of the joint document issued after the first bilateral High-Level Economic Dialogue:

> Ministers from the two countries agree that the Japanese and Chinese economies are in a "win-win" relationship – They agree that the two countries should contribute further to the sustainable development of the global economy – Chinese ministers say they can learn from Japan's lessons on the bubble economy – Japanese ministers express hope that China will make further efforts to reform its currency – The two sides agree on active involvement in crafting a post-Kyoto Protocol regime to curb global warming – The two sides agree to co-operate on food security, environmental protection and protection of intellectual property rights (Kyodo, 1 Dec.).

During his visit to China, Komura also met Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao.

On 27 December, the Japanese Prime Minister (Yasuo Fukuda) arrived in Beijing at the beginning of a four-day visit to China. The following day, he held talks with his Chinese counterpart, Wen Jiabao. As he had done in Singapore, Wen said that relations between China and Japan had entered "an important period of improvement and development" and he expressed the hope that the two sides would take advantage of the favourable conditions in order to promote "a new and greater development of the strategic and mutually beneficial China-Japan relations." Fukuda later described his talks with Wen as "a heart-to-heart dialogue." He hoped that future co-operation between the two countries would be to the benefit not only to their own advantage, but also to that of Asia and the rest of the world. In a comment on the recent assassination of Ms. Benazir Bhutto, both men expressed their strong opposition to terrorist activities. Following their talks, they attended the signing ceremony of three co-operation documents (XHNA, 28 Dec.).

Kyodo (28 Dec.) reported that in his talks with Fukuda, President Hu Jintao had shown himself willing to strengthen Sino-Japanese co-operation in order to

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raise bilateral relations "to a new level." He added, however, that in addressing issues affecting the two countries, it was still important to take an "[appropriate stance] based on a spirit that reflects history and moves forward to the future."

Subsequently, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman spoke of the success of Fukuda's visit, during which he said that the two sides had reached a "broad consensus" on a number of "important issues" (*ZXS*, 28 Dec.).

Kyodo reported on 21 November that a Chinese warship – the "Shenzhen" missile destroyer – had departed from Zhanjiang (Guangdong) on the first-ever visit to Japan (Tokyo Bay) made by a Chinese military vessel since the establishment of the PRC's navy. According to Xinhua, the visit was taking place as part of a bilateral defence exchange at the invitation of the Japanese Maritime Self-Defence Force. (On the significance of the warship's visit, see also *RMRB*, 28 Nov. and Hong Kong, *Wen Wei Bo* [*Wenhui Bao*], 29 Nov.)

On 21 December China and Japan signed the final Japanese Yen loan agreement, providing funds for six environment projects – one each in a city or province of western China. The loan for fiscal 2007 was for 46.3 billion yen and brought the total level of loans extended to China under the scheme since 1979 to 3.316 trillion yen. The loan was repayable over 25–40 years at an interest rate of 0.65–1.4 per cent (XHNA, 21 Dec.).

Latin America (Costa Rica, Ecuador, Bolivia)

On 22 October, the President of Costa Rica (Oscar Arias Sanchez) arrived in Beijing at the start of a week-long state visit to China – his first since the establishment of formal diplomatic relations between the two countries in June 2007.

Xinhua noted that the value of bilateral trade had risen 61.3 per cent, year on year, during January–July 2007. By the end of the year, the value of such trade was expected to reach US$3 billion (almost 40 per cent higher than in 2006).

During their subsequent talks (24 Oct.), Hu Jintao and Arias expressed their shared wish to strengthen co-operation and bilateral relations. Hu praised Arias's personal contribution towards the opening of diplomatic relations between China and Costa Rica, and put forward a four-point proposal, designed to strengthen bilateral ties. These embraced the enhancement of exchanges of senior governmental, legislative and political officials; the strengthening of economic co-operation and trade; an increase in cultural and educational exchanges; and the implementation of more effective co-ordination in regional and international organizations. Hu also said that China would increase its imports from Costa Rica and encourage more Chinese enterprises to invest there. Arias endorsed Hu's proposals and stressed his country's commitment to the one-China policy (including opposing Taiwan's attempt to gain UN membership). Following their talks, the two men witnessed the signing of co-operation agreements, embracing technology, investment, agriculture, public health and cultural affairs (XHNA, 24 Oct.).

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The President of Ecuador, Rafael Correa, arrived in Beijing on 19 November at the start of a state visit to China. His talks with senior Chinese officials focused mainly of bilateral relations, but also included discussion of regional and international issues.

On 20 December Yang Jiechi held talks with the visiting Bolivian Foreign Minister, David Choquehuanca. In addition to agreeing on efforts to further promote bilateral ties, the two men discussed regional and international issues of common concern. They subsequently signed various documents, including an agreement on bilateral economic and technological co-operation.

Middle East (Jordan; Middle East Conference [Annapolis, Maryland, USA])

On 29 October King Abdullah II Bin Al-Hussein of Jordan began a four-day state visit to China – his fifth since succeeding to the throne in 1999. Before his arrival in Beijing, Abdullah note the growing warmth of ties between the two countries, not least exemplified by the emergence of China as Jordan's third-largest foreign trade partner (XHNA, 29 Oct.).

On 31 October, Abdullah held talks with Premier Wen Jiabao. In a reference to the 30 years of diplomatic relations between the two countries, he described Jordan as one of China's increasingly important Middle Eastern partners. The Chinese government would, he said, continue to encourage investment in Jordan in order to further expand economic co-operation and trade. He also gave an undertaking that China would seek ways of increasing Jordanian imports in order to correct the bilateral trade imbalance.

On 27 November, the Chinese Foreign Minister (Yang Jiechi) addressed a Middle East issue conference held in Annapolis, Maryland and attended by representatives of the Israeli and Palestinian governments.

In his speech (see XHNA, 27 Nov.), Yang spoke of the regional and global importance of resolving the Middle East issue. The Chinese government had been consistent in advocating a settlement based on political talks by relevant parties in accordance with relevant UN resolutions and the principle of "land for peace." He added that as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, China sought to contribute to the success of the current conference and would take an active part in its follow-up actions in the interests of securing peace in the Middle East.

Yang made five proposals designed to assist in the Middle East peace process. They were:

- to "respect history" and promote the smooth progress of the peace talks by seeking to "accommodate each other's concerns" (including the establishment of "an independent Palestinian state based on the Roadmap and the Arab Peace Initiative");
- to show commitment to the peace talks by renouncing violence and removing "obstructions" ("[o]nly patience, dialogue, and necessary compromise can beat swords into ploughshares and make peace");

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- to enhance the environment in which the peace talks can proceed (for example, by reviving talks between Israel and Syria, and Israel and Lebanon);
- to promote a peace settlement by enhancing trade and economic exchanges between countries in the region to the benefit of both Israel and Arab nations;
- to put in place a multilateral framework that takes advantage of the efforts of the entire international community in support of finding a peaceful settlement of the Middle East issue.

During his stay in Annapolis, Yang held separate meetings with the Israeli Prime Minister (Ehud Olmert) and the President of the Palestinian Authority (Mahmoud Abbas).

Northeast Asia, excl. Japan (South Korea [Republic of Korea])
The Prime Minister of South Korea, Han Duck-soo, made an official visit to China on 10–11 December. In the course of subsequent talks, Wen Jiabao told Han of the Chinese government's desire to accelerate studies on the possibility of setting up a free trade zone with South Korea in the hope that this would help expedite the establishment of the zone. Wen also called on both countries to step up mutual investment. Han spoke of his own government's wish to promote "comprehensive and co-operative partnership" with China, including closer co-operation on trade, investment, environmental protection and nuclear electricity. The two men also discussed the Six-Party talks on North Korea and the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula (XHNA, 10 Dec.).

South Asia and India Ocean (Pakistan, Afghanistan, India)
On 19 October, a Foreign Ministry spokesman expressed the Chinese government's condemnation of bomb attacks in Karachi, two days earlier, on a convoy of the former Pakistani Prime Minister, Ms. Benazir Bhutto. The statement called on Pakistan to maintain social stability (XHNA, 19 Oct.; see also the expression from the same source of continuing concern about the situation in Pakistan, relayed by XHNA, 6 Nov.).

A report by Associated Press of Pakistan (27 December) quoted a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman to the effect that the Chinese government had expressed its shock at the assassination of Ms. Benazir Bhutto and had strongly condemned the "terrorist attack." The spokesman extended the Chinese government's condolences to the families of Ms. Bhutto and other victims of the attack.

Subsequently, the Chinese government sent a message of condolences to Pakistan, which stated:

> Ms Benazir Bhutto, a seasoned Pakistani statesman and an old friend of the Chinese people, has made significant contributions to the promotion of China–Pakistan friendly relations during her lifetime (XHNA, 29 Dec.).

During a visit to Afghanistan, on 14 November Yang Jiechi held talks with President Hamid Karzai in Kabul. In response to Karzai's hopes for closer

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economic and political ties, the Chinese Foreign Minister said that conditions had created a "new and historic opportunity" for the development of relations between China and Afghanistan. To this end, the Chinese government sought to expand exchanges – "between the governments, the legislatures, the political parties, the armed forces, and the people of the two countries" – and to strengthen trade and economic relations (XHNA, 14 Nov.).

In December Shiv Shankar Menon (the Indian Foreign Minister) travelled to Beijing in order to attend the Third Sino-Indian Strategic Dialogue. In the Chinese capital, he also met Yang Jiechi, with whom he discussed bilateral, regional and international issues. Yang noted that the future development of China and India would have a significant impact on "changes in international setup and on mankind future [sic]." For his part, Menon acknowledged that the further development of its ties with China had become a priority goal of the Indian government. He endorsed Yang's remarks about the wider importance of the development of the two countries and said that their bilateral relations were now "a major factor in maintaining regional stability and even stability in the world" (XHNA, 22 Dec.).

Southeast Asia (The Philippines, Myanmar [Burma], Singapore; Association of South-East Asian Nations [ASEAN])

Following her arrival in Shanghai (2 Oct.), the President of the Philippines (Gloria Macapagal Arroyo) held talks with Hu Jintao. Hu spoke of recent "remarkable" progress in the development of bilateral trade and noted that the two countries were engaged in the formulation of plans, designed to further strengthen trade and bilateral co-operation during the next five years. Arroyo endorsed these initiatives and looked forward to a significant expansion in co-operation between China and the Philippines (XHNA, 2 Oct.).

Addressing the Fourth China–ASEAN Business and Investment Summit (Nanning: 28 Oct.), Vice-Premier Zeng Peiyan called on China and ASEAN member states to make "unremitting efforts" to promote sustainable development in Southeast Asia. To this end, he urged both parties to strengthen managerial and technological co-operation in order to address the challenges of environmental protection and climate change.

Zeng also hoped that talks on the establishment of a China–ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (FTA) would reach an early conclusion in order to raise levels of reciprocal investment. The Chinese government was committed to increasing investment within ASEAN and hoped that a number of trade and economic co-operation zones could be set up in order to facilitate such developments to the benefit of local communities. Zeng noted that the two sides had identified ten key foci for co-operation: agriculture, information and telecommunications, human resources development, two-way investment, development of the Mekong River basin, transport, energy, culture, tourism and public health (XHNA, 28 Oct.).

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In the wake of escalating unrest in Burma and in anticipation of a visit there by Ibrahim Gambari (UN special envoy), on 2 November a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman expressed the Chinese government's support for Gambari's mediation efforts. He hoped that the visit would help defuse the situation and meanwhile called on all relevant parties to show restraint and to seek to resolve outstanding problems through dialogue and consultation.

In November Wen Jiabao visited Singapore, where he held talks with the Singaporean Prime Minister, Lee Hsien Loong. Wen observed that in 17 years of diplomatic relations, the two sides had made major progress in the development of bilateral relations. Lee responded by reaffirming the importance which his government attached to its ties with China and expressing the hope that such ties could be strengthened. Both men agreed that China and Singapore shared common views on many issues. In addition to discussing economic relations, they also exchanged views on regional and international issues.

Wen and Lee agreed that in seeking to strengthen bilateral ties, the two sides should give particular attention to the following seven areas of common activity:

- to maintain the momentum of high-level contacts in order to share views on bilateral, regional and international issues of common concern;
- to realize the full potential of the vice-prime ministerial-level joint commission for bilateral co-operation and other consultative mechanisms as a means of promoting further bilateral co-operation;
- to increase the level of trade and economic co-operation between China and Singapore;
- to strengthen co-operation in the field of human resources (including implementing the bilateral co-operation agreement on exchanging and training talent, and making more use of the framework of the China-Singapore Foundation);
- to undertake at the earliest opportunity co-operation in the "eco-city project" (see below);
- to accelerate negotiations on the creation of a China-Singapore Free Trade Area;
- to set up a dialogue mechanism on defence policy, and to enhance co-operation and co-ordination in regional and international affairs.

Following their discussions, the two prime ministers signed an inter-governmental framework agreement on the construction of an eco-city in Tianjin (XHNA, 18 Nov.).

Also in Singapore, Wen Jiabao attended the 11th ASEAN Plus Three Summit (20 Nov.), at which he presented a proposal designed to strengthen co-operation among the 10 ASEAN member states and China, Japan and South Korea. He called on the 13 countries to "respect each other, promote common development and co-ordinate economic and social development and be inclusive and explore a model of development that suits the region." In support of his proposal, he noted that despite major progress in promoting social and economic development, several hundred million people in Asia continued to live in

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poverty, with the per capita income of poorest Asian country at a level that was less than one per cent of that of the richest.

In his speech, Wen praised the previous decade's co-operation among the "10 +3" countries. He also welcomed the second Joint Statement on East Asia Co-operation and the ASEAN Plus Three Co-operation Work Plan (2007–2017), expected to be adopted at the summit, which he said set out the course for development of 10+3 co-operation in the coming years (XHNA, 20 Nov.).

Taiwan (Republic of China)

A representative of the CCP Central Committee's Taiwan Work Office condemned the "normal country resolution," approved by Taiwan's Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). In response to the Resolution, which urged the need for constitutional change and the holding of a referendum on Taiwan's status as a "sovereign and independent country," the official insisted that Taiwan had never had the status of a country, but was "an inalienable part of China." The statement added:

> The so-called "building an independent country in Taiwan" is an impasse to ruin. The secessionist activities for "Taiwan independence" run counter to the firm will to resolutely safeguard national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the 1.3 billion Chinese people and are doomed to failure. We hope the broad masses of DPP members will make clear the trends of the development of cross-Strait relations and the general situation of the world, keep in mind the interests of the Taiwan people and the development and future of Taiwan, abandon the secessionist idea of "Taiwan independence," oppose the implementation of a secessionist line for seeking "Taiwan independence," and prevent the risk of seeking "Taiwan independence" from bringing disaster to the Taiwan people.

The statement also condemned Chen Shui-bian's proposal that a referendum be held on Taiwan's aspiration to become a member of the United Nations (XHNA, 1 Oct.).

United States of America

On 4 November, Robert M. Gates arrived in Beijing on his first visit to China since being appointed US Secretary of Defence. It was also the first visit by a high-ranking US military official since the former Defence Secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, travelled to China in October 2005. He was expected to hold talks with Cao Gangchuan (Chinese Defence Minister) and to meet other senior Chinese officials. The main themes of his discussions were regional and international security conditions and prospects for China–US military-to-military relations. Gates and Cao agreed that the two sides would establish a direct telephone line between the Chinese and US defence ministries.

Guo Boxiong (Vice-Chairman of the Central Military Commission [CMC]) stressed the need for the Chinese and US administrations carefully to handle the Taiwan issue. He reaffirmed the Chinese government's position of seeking to realize peaceful cross-Straits reunification, but of refusing to tolerate Taiwan

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independence or the separation of Taiwan from China "in any name or in any form" (XHNA, 5 Nov.).

On 6 November, Gates held talks with Hu Jintao who noted the "stable development momentum" of Sino-US relations, based on personnel exchanges, and co-operation and co-ordination over a wide range of activities. He assured Gates of the Chinese side's wish to work with the United States and to advance bilateral relations "from a strategic and long-term [perspective]" XHNA, 6 Nov.).

Later the same month, Yang Jiechi travelled to Washington, where he held talks with US Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, on bilateral ties and other issues of mutual concern. He spoke positively of China–US relations, noting the continued deepening of exchanges and co-operation over a wide range of activities. He gave an undertaking that the Chinese government would work with the US in seeking to further strengthen the bilateral relationship. He stressed the complexity and sensitivity of the Taiwan issue, especially against the background of Chen Shui-bian's efforts to "pursue 'de jure independence' by pushing hard for a so-called referendum to join the United Nations under the name of Taiwan, which poses a serious threat to the stability across the straits." He expressed gratitude on behalf of the Chinese government for the US administration's continuing commitment to the "one-China policy" and its opposition to Taiwan's proposed referendum on seeking UN membership.

Rice said that the US administration attached great importance to maintaining its dialogue with China. She reiterated Washington's position on the Taiwan issue.

Yang and Rice also discussed the Iranian and Korean nuclear issues (XHNA, 27 Nov.).

On 10 December, the US Treasury Secretary (Henry Paulson) arrived in Beijing in order to attend the third China–US Strategic Economic Dialogue (SED). The SED took place on 11–12 December and was co-chaired by Paulson and Vice-Premier Wu Yi. Xinhua (12 Dec.) summed up the theme of the meeting as "[seeking] to seize the opportunity of economic globalization and deal with the challenge of economic globalization." Both Wu and Paulson spoke positively of the outcome of the meeting (for the full text if Wu Yi's speech, see XHNA, 12 Dec.).

During his stay in Beijing, Paulson met Hu Jintao. Hu spoke positively of the continued development of China–US relations during the past year, and of the role of economic and trade mechanisms, such as the Sino-US SED and Sino-US Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade, in helping promote understanding and co-operation between the two sides. Paulson's remarks echoed the Chinese President's remarks. On behalf of the US administration, he expressed gratitude for China's contribution in addressing international and regional issues.

In a separate meeting with Paulson, Wen Jiabao spoke of the wider importance of trade and economic co-operation between China and the United States in a context in which the forces of globalization were growing ever stronger. Thus,

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China and the United States should work hand in hand to respond to opportunities and challenges brought by globalization, strengthen mutually beneficial co-operation, realize common development, and promote the development of economic globalization in a balanced, general-preferential and win-win direction.

Wen Jiabao noted that against the background of the continued imbalance in China–US trade, his government was looking for ways to reduce the US bilateral deficit. But he also urged the US side to address Chinese concerns and called on Washington to "implement an open-up trade and investment policy, relax restrictions on export to China, provide a fair environment for Chinese enterprises to conduct trade and investment activities in the United States, and work together with the Chinese side to promote balanced development in China-US trade."

In a comment on the Third China–US Strategic Economic Dialogue, Paulson spoke of its contribution in helped strengthen mutual understanding and trust between the two sides. The US side recognized that "steady" development in China promised to serve US interests and that the cessation of such growth would be damaging to both China and the United States. Hence, the desire of the US to "work together with the Chinese side to strive to build US–China trade and economic relations with long-term stability" (XHNA, 13 Dec.).

Western Europe (The Vatican, France, Germany, United Kingdom; European Union [EU])

A senior official of the State Administration of Religious Affairs said that China would be willing to improve its relations with the Vatican on condition that it severed its formal relations with Taiwan and recognized the PRC as the "sole legitimate government" of China. He added that in accordance with the Chinese Constitution, the Vatican would also have to give an undertaking not to interfere in "China's internal affairs" (XHNA, 17 Oct.).

On 31 October, the French Foreign Minister (Bernard Kouchner) began a two-day visit to China, intended to lay the groundwork for the forthcoming visit (25–27 November) of President Nicolas Sarkozy. It was reported that Kouchner would also discuss with Chinese government officials the situations in Darfur, Iran and Burma [Myanmar].

Following his talks with Yang Jiechi, Kouchner admitted that there were differences between the two sides on policies towards Iran, Darfur and Burma, but that they were less divided on the goals which those policies should seek to fulfil. In Darfur, he claimed that France had drawn the Chinese government away from its previous support for General Umar al-Bashir (the Sudanese President) in favour of taking a more positive role. He hoped too that China could be persuaded to lend more active support to the UN position on Burma. On human rights, Kouchner also said that he had raised the question of press freedom with his Chinese interlocutor (Agence-France Presse, 31 Oct.).

In his talks with Kouchner, Wen Jiabao reaffirmed the importance which the Chinese government attached to its relations with France. He said that China

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hoped that the two sides would strengthen their co-operation on major issues and seek to expand mutually beneficial co-operation in the interests of the further development of their "comprehensive strategic partnership." The French Foreign Minister expressed his own government's admiration for the results of China's economic reforms, as well as for the responsible role it had played within the international community (XHNA, 31 Oct.).

On 25 November the President of France (Nicolas Sarkozy) arrived in Xi'an (Shaanxi) at the start of a three-day state visit to China – his first since taking office in May 2007. Sarkozy travelled from Xi'an to Beijing, where he told French business leaders of his hope that China would take a full role in helping resolve major economic, political and international issues, such as in Iran, Darfur, Burma and North Korea. He added:

> China now plays an essential role on the world economic stage ... By its very existence it alters the global equilibrium … That means rights but also responsibilities – in other words, duties… (AFP, 25 Nov.).

On 26 November Sarkozy and Hu Jintao held talks, which ranged across bilateral relations, as well as regional and international issues of shared concern. Hu suggested that in the wake of the two sides having strengthened their strategic dialogue and enhanced their mutual political trust, bilateral relations had entered a new stage. He also noted the Chinese government's wish to strengthen friendship with France and to address bilateral relations "from a strategic and long-term perspective."

Hu put forward a four-point proposal on the further development of bilateral relations, based on:

- closer political relations and enhanced "strategic mutual trust;"
- strengthening of multilateral co-operation;
- further expansion of bilateral trade and economic co-operation;
- further expansion of bilateral cultural exchanges.

Sarkozy reaffirmed the French government's opposition to Taiwan independence and to Taiwan's planned and "unjustified" referendum on joining the United Nations ("there is only one China in the world, and Taiwan is an integral part of China").

After the talks, Hu and Sarkozy released a joint statement on combating climate change, and attended a signing ceremony of more than 20 documents on co-operation (including environmental protection, nuclear energy – Guangdong Nuclear Power Group and Areva signed an agreement on civil energy construction worth 8 billion euros – civil aviation, communications, education, health care, investment and urban planning) (XHNA, 26 Nov.).

In November the Chinese Ambassador in Berlin (Ma Canrong) issued a sharp rebuke to the German Chancellor (Angela Merkel), following her meeting with the Dalai Lama. According to Ma, relations between China and Germany had been "seriously impaired by the reception of the Dalai Lama in the Federal

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Chancellor's office." The meeting, said to have "hurt the feelings of the Chinese people" constituted "intervention in the internal affairs of China" and had effectively lent support to the "separatist" efforts of "the Dalai Lama and the "Tibetan exile government" (Berlin, DDP News Agency, 23 Nov.; see also criticism from the Chinese Embassy in Rome, following an invitation to the Dalai Lama to visit Italy [Milan, *Il Sole-24 Ore* website, 23 Nov.]).

In December Yang Jiechi travelled to London – his first official visit to the UK – where he met senior British officials, including Prime Minister Gordon Brown and Foreign Secretary David Milliband. Brown told Yang of his wish to work with Chinese leaders in order to further enhance UK–China relations, especially in areas of trade and economic co-operation. Britain welcomed Chinese investment and hoped that co-operation in financial services, technology and education, and research and development would be intensified. Yang also noted the strong momentum of bilateral relations and the "important development opportunities" which, he said, this offered. He also expressed the Chinese government's appreciation of British efforts to facilitate the further development of relations between China and the European Union (*ZXS*, 7 Dec.).

David Milliband told Yang of the British government's opposition to Taiwan's referendum on seeking to join the UN in line with its adherence to the "one-China policy." For his part, Yang noted the maintenance of a strong momentum in the development of UK–China relations. Both men undertook to work together in preparing for the visit to China by the British Prime Minister in January 2008. Among other topics discussed by the two foreign ministers were the Iranian and North Korean nuclear issues and the situation in Darfur (XHNA, 5 Dec., which also has a report of Yang's speech to the Royal Institute of International Affairs, in which he called on the UK and China to raise their "comprehensive strategic partnership" to a new level).

On 27 November Jose Manuel Barroso (President of the Commission of the European Union) arrived in China in advance of the 10th summit between Chinese and EU leaders.

Addressing the Fourth EU–China Business Summit (28 November), Wen Jiabao spoke of the Chinese government's "sincere and ambitious" aspirations for the protection of Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) and undertook to intensify its efforts to fulfil them:

> Protecting the IPR is not only necessitated by China's opening up, but also by a domestic drive for encouraging innovation and scientific development … We stand ready to work with the EU to collectively protect the legitimate rights and interests of IPR holders (XHNA, 28 Nov.).

He presented a five-point proposal for strengthening China–European Union (EU) trade and economic co-operation. It sought to embrace:

- accelerated negotiations on the trade and economic chapter of the China–EU Partnership and Co-operation Agreement (CPA) and on renewing the 1985

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trade and economic agreement in order to strengthen the Sino-EU "comprehensive strategic partnership;"
- closer co-operation in multilateral economic organizations (e.g., the WTO);
- promotion of trade in high-technology goods and services;
- strengthened co-operation on energy conservation and environmental protection;
- increased in scientific research and education.

Also arising out of the EU–China discussions was a joint statement, in which the two sides undertook to make joint efforts to combat the effects of climate change. They also agreed to establish a high-level economic and trade dialogue – to be in place by the end of March 2008 – in order to address related issues (including the bilateral trade imbalance and China's market economy status) (see XHNA, 3 Dec., which also carried the full text of the 10th China–EU Summit).

3. Documentation

CONSTITUTION OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY

(Amended and adopted at the 17th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party on 21 October 2007)

(Published by Xinhua News Agency on 25 October 2007; reproduced from BBC Monitoring Global Newsline Asia Pacific Political File, 26 October 2007.)

Note: Passages in which additions or amendments have been made to the previous Constitution are highlighted in bold.

GENERAL PROGRAMME

The Chinese Communist Party is the vanguard both of the Chinese working class and of the Chinese people and the Chinese nation. It is the core of leadership for the cause of socialism with Chinese characteristics and represents the development trend of China's advanced productive forces, the orientation of China's advanced culture and the fundamental interests of the overwhelming majority of the Chinese people. The realization of communism is the highest ideal and ultimate goal of the Party.

The Chinese Communist Party takes Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory and the important thought of "Three Represents" as its guide to action.

Marxism-Leninism brings to light the laws governing the development of the history of human society. Its basic tenets are correct and have tremendous vitality. The highest ideal of communism pursued by the Chinese Communists can be realized only when the socialist society is fully developed and highly advanced. The development and improvement of the socialist system is a long historical process. So long as the Chinese Communists uphold the basic tenets of Marxism-Leninism and follow the road suited to China's specific conditions and chosen by the Chinese people of their own accord, the socialist cause in China will be crowned with final victory.

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The Chinese Communists, with Comrade Mao Zedong as their chief representative, created Mao Zedong Thought by integrating the basic tenets of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution. Mao Zedong Thought is Marxism-Leninism applied and developed in China; it consists of a body of theoretical principles concerning the revolution and construction in China and a summary of experience therein, both of which have been proved correct by practice; and it represents the crystallized, collective wisdom of the Chinese Communist Party. Under the guidance of Mao Zedong Thought, the Chinese Communist Party led the people of all ethnic groups in the country in their prolonged revolutionary struggle against imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat-capitalism, winning victory in the new-democratic revolution and founding the People's Republic of China, a people's democratic dictatorship. After the founding of the People's Republic, it led them in carrying out socialist transformation successfully, completing the transition from New Democracy to socialism, establishing the basic system of socialism and developing socialism economically, politically and culturally.

After the third plenary session of the Eleventh Party Central Committee, the Chinese Communists, with Comrade Deng Xiaoping as their chief representative, analysed their experience, both positive and negative, gained since the founding of the People's Republic, emancipated their minds, sought truth from facts, shifted the focus of the work of the whole party onto economic development and carried out reform and opening to the outside world, ushering in a new era of development in the cause of socialism, gradually formulating the line, principles and policies concerning the building of socialism with Chinese characteristics and expounding the basic questions concerning the building, consolidation and development of socialism in China, and thus creating Deng Xiaoping Theory. Deng Xiaoping Theory is the outcome of the integration of the basic tenets of Marxism-Leninism with the practice of contemporary China and the features of the times, a continuation and development of Mao Zedong Thought under new historical conditions; it represents a new stage of development of Marxism in China, it is Marxism of contemporary China and it is the crystallized, collective wisdom of the Chinese Communist Party. It is guiding the socialist modernization of China from victory to victory.

After the fourth plenary session of the Thirteenth Party Central Committee and in the practice of building socialism with Chinese characteristics, the Chinese Communists, with Comrade Jiang Zemin as their chief representative, acquired a deeper understanding of what socialism is, how to build it and what kind of party to build and how to build it, accumulated new valuable experience in running the party and state and formed the important thought of "Three Represents." The important thought of "Three Represents" is a continuation and development of Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought and Deng Xiaoping Theory; it reflects new requirements for the work of the party and state arising from the developments and changes in China and other parts of the world today; it serves as a powerful theoretical weapon for strengthening and

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improving party building and for promoting self-improvement and development of socialism in China; and it is the crystallized, collective wisdom of the Chinese Communist Party. It is a guiding ideology that the party must uphold for a long time to come. Persistent implementation of the "Three Represents" is the foundation for building the Party, the cornerstone for its governance and the source of its strength.

Since the Sixteenth National Congress, the Central Committee of the party has followed the guidance of Deng Xiaoping Theory and the important thought of "Three Represents" and, by pooling the wisdom of the whole party to meet new requirements of development, formulated the Scientific Outlook on Development, which puts people first and calls for comprehensive, balanced and sustainable development. The outlook is a scientific theory that is in the same line as Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory and the important thought of "Three Represents" and keeps up with the times. It is an important guiding principle for China's economic and social development and a major strategic thought that must be upheld and applied in developing socialism with Chinese characteristics.

The fundamental reason behind all of China's achievements and progress since the reform and opening up policy was introduced is, in the final analysis, that the party has blazed a path of socialism with Chinese characteristics and established a system of theories of socialism with Chinese characteristics. All Party members must cherish the path and the system that the party explored and created after going through all the hardships, keep to the path and uphold the system for a long time to come and constantly develop them. They must hold high the great banner of socialism with Chinese characteristics and strive to fulfil the three historical tasks of advancing the modernization drive, achieving national reunification, and safeguarding world peace and promoting common development.

China is in the primary stage of socialism and will remain so for a long time to come. This is a historical stage which cannot be skipped in socialist modernization in China which is backward economically and culturally. It will last for over a hundred years. In socialist construction the party must proceed from China's specific conditions and take the path of socialism with Chinese characteristics. At the present stage, the principal contradiction in Chinese society is one between the ever-growing material and cultural needs of the people and the low level of production. Owing to both domestic circumstances and foreign influences, class struggle will continue to exist within a certain scope for a long time and may possibly grow acute under certain conditions, but it is no longer the principal contradiction. In building socialism, the basic task is to further release and develop the productive forces and achieve socialist modernization step by step by carrying out reform in those aspects and links of the production relations and the superstructure that do not conform to the development of the productive forces. The Party must uphold and improve the basic economic system, with public ownership playing a dominant role and

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different economic sectors developing side by side, as well as the system of distribution under which distribution according to work is dominant and a variety of modes of distribution coexist, encourage some areas and some people to become rich first, gradually eliminate poverty, achieve common prosperity, continuously meet the people's ever-growing material and cultural needs on the basis of the growth of production and social wealth and promote people's all-round development. Development is the party's top priority in governing and rejuvenating the country. The general starting point and criterion for judging all the party's work should be how it benefits development of the productive forces in China's socialist society, adds to the overall strength of socialist China and improves the people's living standards. The Party must respect work, knowledge, talent and creation and ensure that development is for the people, by the people and with the people sharing in its fruits. The beginning of the new century marks China's entry into the new stage of development of building a moderately prosperous society in all respects and accelerating socialist modernization. The Party must promote all-round economic, political, cultural and social development in accordance with the overall arrangements for the cause of socialism with Chinese characteristics. The strategic objectives of economic and social development at this new stage in the new century are to consolidate and develop the relatively comfortable life initially attained, bring China into a moderately prosperous society of a higher level to the benefit of well over one billion people by the time of the party's centenary and bring the per capita GDP up to the level of moderately developed countries and realize modernization in the main by the time of the centenary of the People's Republic of China.

The basic line of the Chinese Communist Party in the primary stage of socialism is to lead the people of all ethnic groups in a concerted, self-reliant and pioneering effort to turn China into a prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally advanced and harmonious modern socialist country by making economic development the central task while upholding the Four Cardinal Principles and the reform and opening up policy.

In leading the cause of socialism, the Chinese Communist Party must persist in taking economic development as the central task, making all other work subordinate to and serve this central task. The Party must lose no time in speeding up development, implement the strategy of rejuvenating the country through science and education, the strategy of strengthening the nation with trained personnel and the strategy of sustainable development, and give full play to the role of science and technology as the primary productive force. The Party must take advantage of the advancement of science and technology to improve the quality of workers and promote sound and rapid development of the national economy.

The Four Cardinal Principles to keep to the socialist road and to uphold the people's democratic dictatorship, leadership by the Chinese Communist Party, and Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought are the foundation on which to build the country. Throughout the course of socialist modernization the party

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must adhere to the Four Cardinal Principles and combat bourgeois liberalization.

Reform and opening up are the path to a stronger China. The Party must carry out fundamental reform of the economic structure that hampers the development of the productive forces, and keep to and improve the socialist market economy; it must also carry out corresponding political restructuring and reform in other fields. The Party must adhere to the basic state policy of opening up and assimilate and exploit the achievements of all other cultures. It must be bold in making explorations and breaking new ground in reform and opening up, make its reform decisions more scientific, better co-ordinate its reform measures and blaze new trails in practice.

The Chinese Communist Party leads the people in developing the socialist market economy. It unwaveringly consolidates and develops the public sector of the economy and unswervingly encourages, supports and guides the development of the non-public sector. It gives play to the basic role of market forces in allocating resources and works to set up a sound system of macroeconomic regulation. The Party works to balance urban and rural development, development among regions, economic and social development, relations between man and nature, and domestic development and opening to the outside world, adjust the economic structure, and transform the pattern of economic development. It is dedicated to building a new socialist countryside, taking a new path of industrialization with Chinese characteristics, and making China an innovative country and a resource-conserving, environment-friendly society.

The Chinese Communist Party leads the people in promoting socialist democracy. It integrates its leadership, the position of the people as masters of the country, and the rule of law, takes the path of political development under socialism with Chinese characteristics, expands socialist democracy, improves the socialist legal system, builds a socialist country under the rule of law, consolidates the people's democratic dictatorship, and builds socialist political civilization. It upholds and improves the system of people's congresses, the system of multiparty co-operation and political consultation under its leadership, the system of regional ethnic autonomy, and the system of self-governance at the primary level of society. It takes effective measures to protect the people's right to manage state and social affairs as well as economic and cultural programmes. **It respects and safeguards human rights. It encourages the free airing of views and works to establish sound systems and procedures of democratic election, decision-making, administration and oversight. It strengthens state legislation and law enforcement so as to bring all work of the state under the rule of law.**

The Chinese Communist Party leads the people in developing an advanced socialist culture. It promotes socialist cultural and ethical progress, combines the rule of law and the rule of virtue in running the country and works to raise the ideological and moral standards and scientific and educational levels of the entire nation so as to provide a powerful ideological guarantee, motivation and

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intellectual support for reform, opening up and socialist modernization. It adheres to Marxism as its guiding ideology, fosters the common ideal of socialism with Chinese characteristics, promotes patriotism-centred national spirit and the spirit of the times centring on reform and innovation and advocates the socialist maxims of honour and disgrace. It works to enhance the people's sense of national dignity, self-confidence and self-reliance, resist corrosion by decadent capitalist and feudal ideas and wipe out all social evils so that the people will have high ideals, moral integrity, a good education and a strong sense of discipline. It also needs to imbue its members with the lofty ideal of communism. The Party strives to develop educational, scientific and cultural programmes, carry forward the fine traditional culture of the Chinese nation, and develop a thriving socialist culture.

The Chinese Communist Party leads the people in building a harmonious socialist society. In accordance with the general requirements for democracy and the rule of law, equity and justice, honesty and fraternity, vigour and vitality, stability and order, and harmony between man and nature and the principle of all the people building and sharing a harmonious socialist society, the party focuses its efforts on improving people's lives by solving the most specific problems of the utmost and immediate concern to the people and strives to create a situation in which all people do their best, find their proper places in society and live together in harmony. The Party strictly distinguishes between the two different types of contradictions those between ourselves and the enemy and those among the people and works to handle them correctly. It will strengthen comprehensive measures to maintain law and order, and resolutely combat criminal activities that endanger national security and interests, social stability and economic development and bring criminals to justice in accordance with the law, so as to maintain lasting social stability.

The Chinese Communist Party persists in its leadership over the People's Liberation Army and other armed forces of the people, builds up the strength of the People's Liberation Army, ensures that it accomplishes its historical missions at this new stage in the new century, and gives full play to its role in consolidating national defence, defending the motherland and participating in the socialist modernization drive.

The Chinese Communist Party upholds and promotes socialist ethnic relations based on equality, solidarity, mutual assistance and harmony, actively trains and promotes cadres from among ethnic minorities, helps ethnic minorities and ethnic autonomous areas with their economic, cultural and social development, and ensures that all ethnic groups work together for common prosperity and development. The Party strives to fully implement its basic principle for its work related to religious affairs, and rallies religious believers in making contributions to economic and social development.

The Chinese Communist Party rallies all workers, farmers and intellectuals, and all the democratic parties, personages without party affiliation and the patriotic forces of all ethnic groups in China in further expanding and fortifying the broadest

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possible patriotic united front embracing all socialist workers, all builders of the cause of socialism and all patriots who support socialism or who support the reunification of the motherland. The Party will constantly strengthen the unity of all the Chinese people, including the compatriots in Hong Kong and Macao special administrative regions and in Taiwan as well as overseas Chinese. It will promote long-term prosperity and stability in Hong Kong and Macao and complete the great cause of reunifying the motherland in conformity with the principle of "one country, two systems."

The Chinese Communist Party adheres to an independent foreign policy of peace, follows the path of peaceful development and a win-win strategy of opening up, takes both the domestic and international situations into consideration, and vigorously develops relations with other countries in order to bring about a favourable international environment for China's reform, opening up and modernization. In international affairs, it safeguards China's independence and sovereignty, opposes hegemonism and power politics, defends world peace, promotes human progress, and pushes for the building of a harmonious world of lasting peace and common prosperity. It develops relations between China and other countries on the basis of the five principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual nonaggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. It strives for the constant development of good-neighbourly relations between China and the surrounding countries and for the strengthening of the unity and co-operation between China and other developing countries. The Chinese Communist Party develops relations with communist parties and other political parties in other countries in accordance with the principles of independence, complete equality, mutual respect and non-interference in each other's internal affairs.

In order to lead the people of all ethnic groups in China in attaining the great goal of socialist modernization, the Chinese Communist Party must adhere to its basic line, strengthen its governance capability and vanguard nature, and comprehensively carry forward the great new undertaking to build itself in a spirit of reform and innovation. The Party must steadfastly build itself for public interests, exercise governance for the people, practice self-discipline, be strict with its members, and carry forward its fine traditions and style of work. It must constantly improve its art of leadership and governance, raise its ability to resist corruption, prevent degeneration and withstand risks, constantly strengthen its class foundation, expand its mass base and enhance its creativity, cohesion and combat effectiveness, so that it will stand forever in the forefront of the times and make itself a strong nucleus that can lead all the Chinese people in the unceasing march along the road of socialism with Chinese characteristics. In building itself, the party must be determined to meet the following four essential requirements:

First, adhering to the party's basic line. **The whole party must achieve unity in thinking and in action with Deng Xiaoping Theory, the important thought of**

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"Three Represents" and the party's basic line, thoroughly apply the Scientific Outlook on Development and persevere in doing so for a long time to come. The Party must integrate the reform and opening up policy with the Four Cardinal Principles, carry out its basic line in all fields of endeavour, implement in an all-round way its basic programme for the primary stage of socialism and combat all "Left" and Right erroneous tendencies, maintaining vigilance against Right tendencies, primarily against "Left" tendencies. The Party must intensify the building of leading bodies at all levels, selecting and promoting cadres who have scored outstanding achievements in their public service and have won the trust of the masses in reform, opening up and the modernization drive, and train and cultivate millions upon millions of successors to the cause of socialism, thus ensuring organizationally the implementation of the party's basic theory, line, programme and experience.

Second, persevering in emancipating the mind, seeking truth from facts and keeping up with the times. The Party's ideological line is to proceed from reality in handling all matters, to integrate theory with practice, to seek truth from facts, and to verify and develop the truth through practice. All Party members must adhere to this ideological line, promote the truth-seeking and pragmatic spirit, explore new ways, boldly experiment with new methods, go in for innovation, work creatively, constantly study new situations, review new experience and solve new problems, enrich and develop Marxism in practice, and advance the endeavour to adapt Marxism to Chinese conditions.

Third, persevering in serving the people wholeheartedly. The Party has no special interests of its own apart from the interests of the working class and the broadest masses of the people. At all times the party gives top priority to the interests of the people, shares weal and woe with them, maintains the closest possible ties with them, and persists in exercising power for them, showing concern for them and working for their interests, and it does not allow any member to become divorced from the masses or place himself or herself above them. The Party follows the mass line in its work, doing everything for the masses, relying on them in every task, carrying out the principle of "from the masses, to the masses," and translating its correct views into action by the masses of their own accord. The biggest political advantage of the party lies in its close ties with the masses while the biggest potential danger for it as a ruling party comes from its divorce from them. The Party's style of work and its maintenance of ties with the masses of the people are a matter of vital importance to the Party. The Party will establish a sound system for punishing and preventing corruption by fighting it in a comprehensive way, ad dressing both its symptoms and root cause and combining punishment with prevention, with the emphasis on prevention. The Party will persistently oppose corruption and step up efforts to improve its style of work and uphold integrity.

Fourth, upholding democratic centralism. Democratic centralism is a combination of centralism on the basis of democracy and democracy under centralized guidance. It is the fundamental organizational principle of the party

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and is also the mass line applied in the party's political activities. The Party must fully expand intra-Party democracy, safeguard the democratic rights of its members, and give play to the initiative and creativity of party organizations at all levels as well as its members. Correct centralism must be practiced so as to ensure the solidarity, unity and concerted action in the whole party and prompt and effective implementation of its decisions. The sense of organization and discipline must be strengthened, and all members are equal before party discipline. Oversight of leading party organs and of party members holding leading positions must be strengthened and the system of intra-Party oversight constantly improved. In its internal political activities, the party conducts criticism and self-criticism in the correct way, waging ideological struggles over matters of principle, upholding truth and rectifying mistakes. Diligent efforts must be made to create a political situation in which there are both centralism and democracy, both discipline and freedom, both unity of will and personal ease of mind and liveliness.

Leadership by the party means mainly political, ideological and organizational leadership. The Party must meet the requirements of reform, opening up and socialist modernization, persist in scientific, democratic and law-based governance, and strengthen and improve its leadership. Acting on the principle that the party commands the overall situation and co-ordinates the efforts of all quarters, the party must play the role as the core of leadership among all other organizations at the corresponding levels. It must concentrate on leading economic development, organize and co-ordinate all forces in a concerted effort to focus on economic development and promote all-round economic and social development. The Party must practice democratic and scientific decision-making; formulate and implement the correct line, principles and policies; do its organizational, publicity and educational work well and make sure that all party members play an exemplary and vanguard role. The Party must conduct its activities within the framework of the Constitution and laws of the country. It must see to it that the legislative, judicial and administrative organs of the state and the economic, cultural and people's organizations work with initiative and independent responsibility and in unison. The Party must strengthen its leadership over trade unions, the Communist Youth League, women's federations and other mass organizations, and give full scope to their roles. The Party must adapt itself to the march of events and changing circumstances, improving its system and style of leadership and raising its governance capability. Party members must work in close co-operation with non-Party persons in the common endeavour to build socialism with Chinese characteristics.

CHAPTER I: MEMBERSHIP

Article 1. Any Chinese worker, farmer, member of the armed forces, intellectual or any advanced element of other social strata who has reached the age of

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eighteen and who accepts the party's programme and Constitution and is willing to join and work actively in one of the party organizations, carry out the party's resolutions and pay membership dues regularly may apply for membership in the Chinese Communist Party.

Article 2. Members of the Chinese Communist Party are vanguard fighters of the Chinese working class imbued with communist consciousness.

Members of the Chinese Communist Party must serve the people wholeheartedly, dedicate their whole lives to the realization of communism, and be ready to make any personal sacrifices.

Members of the Chinese Communist Party are at all times ordinary members of the working people. Communist Party members must not seek any personal gain or privileges, although the relevant laws and policies provide them with personal benefits and job-related functions and powers.

Article 3. Party members must fulfil the following duties:

1) **To conscientiously study Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory and the important thought of "Three Represents", study the Scientific Outlook on Development, study the party's line, principles, policies and resolutions, acquire essential knowledge concerning the Party, obtain general, scientific, legal and professional knowledge and work diligently to enhance their ability to serve the people.**

2) To implement the party's basic line, principles and policies, take the lead in reform, opening up and socialist modernization, encourage the people to work hard for economic development and social progress and play an exemplary and vanguard role in production, work, study and social activities.

3) To adhere to the principle that the interests of the party and the people stand above everything else, subordinating their personal interests to the interests of the party and the people, being the first to bear hardships and the last to enjoy comforts, working selflessly for the public interests and working to contribute more.

4) To conscientiously observe the party discipline, abide by the laws and regulations of the state in an exemplary way, rigorously guard secrets of the party and state, execute the party's decisions, and accept any job and actively fulfil any task assigned them by the Party.

5) To uphold the party's solidarity and unity, be loyal to and honest with the Party, match words with deeds, firmly oppose all factions and small-clique activities and oppose double-dealing and scheming of any kind.

6) To earnestly engage in criticism and self- criticism, boldly expose and correct shortcomings and mistakes in work and resolutely combat corruption and other negative phenomena.

7) To maintain close ties with the masses, disseminate the party's views among them, consult with them when problems arise, keep the party informed of their views and demands in good time and defend their legitimate interests.

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8) **To promote new socialist ways and customs, take the lead in putting into practice the socialist maxims of honour and disgrace, and advocate communist ethics.** To step forward and fight bravely in times of difficulty or danger, daring to make any sacrifice to defend the interests of the country and the people.

Article 4. Party members enjoy the following rights:

1) To attend relevant party meetings, read relevant party documents, and benefit from the party's education and training.

2) To participate in the discussion of questions concerning the party's policies at party meetings and in party newspapers and journals.

3) To make suggestions and proposals regarding the work of the Party.

4) To make well-grounded criticism of any party organization or member at party meetings, to present information or charges against any party organization or member concerning violations of discipline or the law to the party in a responsible way, to demand disciplinary measures against such a member, or call for dismissal or replacement of any incompetent cadre.

5) To participate in voting and elections and to stand for election.

6) To attend, with the right of self-defence, discussions held by party organizations to decide on disciplinary measures to be taken against themselves or to appraise their work and behaviour; other party members may also bear witness or argue on their behalf.

7) In case of disagreement with a Party resolution or policy, to make reservations and present their views to party organizations at higher levels even up to the Central Committee, provided that they resolutely carry out the resolution or policy while it is in force.

8) To put forward any request, appeal, or complaint to higher party organizations even up to the Central Committee and ask the organizations concerned for a responsible reply.

No Party organization, up to and including the Central Committee, has the right to deprive any party member of the above-mentioned rights.

Article 5. New Party members must be admitted through a Party branch, and the principle of individual admission must be adhered to.

An applicant for party membership must fill out an application form and be recommended by two full party members. The application must be accepted at a general membership meeting of the party branch concerned and approved by the next higher party organization, and the applicant must undergo observation for a probationary period before being granted full membership.

Party members who recommend an applicant must make genuine efforts to acquaint themselves with the applicant's ideology, character, personal record and work performance and explain to each applicant the party's programme and Constitution, qualifications for membership and the duties and rights of members, and must make a responsible report to the party organization on the matter.

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The Party branch committee must canvass the opinions of persons concerned, inside and outside the Party, about an applicant for party membership and, after establishing the latter's qualification through rigorous examination, submit the application to a general membership meeting for discussion.

Before approving the admission of applicants for party membership, the next higher party organization concerned must appoint people to talk with them, in order to get to know them better and help deepen their understanding of the Party.

In special circumstances, the Central Committee of the party or the party committee of a province, autonomous region or municipality directly under the central government may admit new party members directly.

Article 6. A probationary party member must take an admission oath in front of the party flag. The oath reads: It is my will to join the Chinese Communist Party, uphold the party's programme, observe the provisions of the Party Constitution, fulfil a Party member's duties, carry out the party's decisions, strictly observe party discipline, guard party secrets, be loyal to the Party, work hard, fight for communism throughout my life, be ready at all times to sacrifice my all for the party and the people, and never betray the Party.

Article 7. The probationary period of a probationary member is one year. The Party organization should make serious efforts to educate and observe the probationary members.

Probationary members have the same duties as full members. They enjoy the rights of full members except those of participating in voting and elections and standing for election.

Upon the expiration of the probationary period of a probationary member, the party branch concerned should promptly discuss whether he or she is qualified for full membership. A probationary member who conscientiously performs his or her duties and is qualified for full membership shall be granted full membership as scheduled; if continued observation and education are needed, the probationary period may be extended, but by no more than one year; if a probationary member fails to perform his or her duties and is found to be unqualified for full membership, his or her probationary membership shall be annulled. Any decision to grant a probationary member full membership, extend a probationary period, or annul a probationary membership must be made through discussion held by the general membership meeting of the party branch concerned and approved by the next higher party organization.

The probationary period of a probationary member begins from the day the general membership meeting of the party branch admits him or her as a probationary member. The Party standing of a member begins from the day he or she is granted full membership on the expiration of the probationary period.

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Article 8. Every Party member, irrespective of position, must be organized into a branch, cell or other specific unit of the party to participate in the regular activities of the party organization and accept oversight by the masses inside and outside the Party. Leading Party cadres must attend democratic meetings held by the party committee or leading party members' group. There shall be no privileged party members who do not participate in the regular activities of the party organization and do not accept oversight by the masses inside and outside the Party.

Article 9. Party members are free to withdraw from the Party. When a Party member asks to withdraw, the party branch concerned shall, after discussion by its general membership meeting, remove his or her name from the party rolls, make the removal public and report it to the next higher party organization for the record.

The Party branch shall try to educate the party member who lacks revolutionary will, fails to fulfil the duties of a Party member, or is not qualified for membership and require him or her to correct his or her mistakes within a prescribed time. If the member remains incorrigible after education, he or she should be persuaded to withdraw from the Party. The case shall be discussed and decided by the general membership meeting of the party branch concerned and submitted to the next higher party organization for approval. If the party member being persuaded to withdraw refuses to do so, the case shall be submitted to the general membership meeting of the party branch concerned for discussion to decide on the removal of the said member's name from the party rolls, after which the decision shall be submitted to the next higher party organization for approval.

A Party member who fails to take part in regular party activities, pay membership dues or do work assigned by the party for six successive months without good reason is regarded as having given up membership. The general membership meeting of the party branch concerned shall decide on the removal of such a person's name from the party rolls and report it to the next higher party organization for approval.

CHAPTER II: THE PARTY'S ORGANIZATIONAL SYSTEM

Article 10. The Party is an integral body organized under its programme and Constitution and on the basis of democratic centralism. The Party's basic principles of democratic centralism are as follows:

1) Individual Party members are subordinate to the party organization, the minority is subordinate to the majority, the lower party organizations are subordinate to the higher party organizations, and all the constituent organizations and members of the party are subordinate to the National Congress and the Central Committee of the Party.

2) The Party's leading bodies at all levels are elected except for the representative organs dispatched by them and the leading party members' groups in non-Party organizations.

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3) The highest leading body of the party is the National Congress and the Central Committee elected by it. The leading bodies of local party organizations are the party congresses at their respective levels and the party committees elected by them. Party committees are responsible, and report their work, to the party congresses at their respective levels.

4) Higher Party organizations shall pay constant attention to the views of lower organizations and the rank-and-file party members, and solve in good time the problems they raise. Lower Party organizations shall report on their work to, and request instructions from, higher party organizations; at the same time, they shall handle, independently and in a responsible manner, matters within their jurisdiction. Higher and lower party organizations should exchange information and support and oversee each other. **Party organizations at all levels should increase transparency in party affairs in accordance with regulations to keep party members better informed of these affairs and to provide them with more opportunities to participate in them.**

5) Party committees at all levels function on the principle of combining collective leadership with individual responsibility based on division of work. All major issues shall be decided upon by the party committees after discussion in accordance with the principle of collective leadership, democratic centralism, individual consultations and decision by meetings. The members of the party committees should earnestly exercise their functions and powers in accordance with the collective decisions taken and division of work.

6) The Party forbids all forms of personality cult. It is necessary to ensure that the activities of the party leaders are subject to oversight by the party and the people, and at the same time to uphold the prestige of all the leaders who represent the interests of the party and the people.

Article 11. The election of delegates to party congresses and of members of party committees at all levels should reflect the will of the voters. Elections shall be held by secret ballot. The lists of candidates shall be submitted to the party organizations and voters for full deliberation and discussion. The election procedure in which the number of candidates nominated is greater than the number of persons to be elected may be used directly in a formal election or this procedure may be used first in a preliminary election in order to draw up a list of candidates for the formal election. The voters have the right to inquire about the candidates, demand a change or reject one in favour of another. No organization or individual shall in any way compel voters to elect or not to elect any candidate.

If any violation of the Party Constitution occurs in the election of delegates to local party congresses at all levels or to party congresses at the primary level, the party committee at the next higher level, after investigation and verification, should decide to declare the election invalid and take appropriate measures. The decision shall be reported to the party committee at the next higher level for checking and approval before it is formally announced and implemented.

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A tenure system is adopted for delegates to party congresses at all levels.

Article 12. When necessary, the Central Committee of the party and the local party committees at all levels will convene conferences of delegates to discuss and decide on major problems that require timely solution. The number of delegates to such conferences and the procedure governing their election shall be determined by the party committees convening them.

Article 13. The formation of a new party organization or the dissolution of an existing one shall be decided upon by the higher party organization.

When the congress of a local party organization at any level or the congress of a Party organization at the primary level is not in session, the next higher party organization may, when it deems it necessary, transfer or appoint responsible members of that organization.

The Party's Central Committee and local party committees at all levels may send out their representative organs.

The Party's Central Committee and committees of provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities directly under the central government implement the system of inspection tours.

Article 14. When making decisions on important questions affecting the lower organizations, the leading bodies of the party at all levels should, under normal circumstances, solicit opinions of the lower organizations. Measures should be taken to ensure that the lower organizations can exercise their functions and powers normally. Except in special circumstances, higher leading bodies should not interfere with matters that ought to be handled by lower organizations.

Article 15. Only the Central Committee of the party has the power to make decisions on major policies of a nationwide character. Party organizations of various departments and localities may make suggestions with regard to such policies to the Central Committee, but shall not make any decisions or publicize their views outside the party without authorization.

Lower Party organizations must firmly implement the decisions of higher party organizations. If lower organizations consider that any decisions of higher organizations do not suit the specific conditions in their localities or departments, they may demand modification. If the higher organizations insist on their original decisions, the lower organizations must carry out such decisions and refrain from publicly voicing their differences, but retain the right to report to the next higher party organization.

Newspapers, journals and other means of publicity run by party organizations at all levels must disseminate the line, principles, policies and resolutions of the Party.

Article 16. When discussing and making decisions on any matter, Party organizations must keep to the principle of subordination of the minority to the majority. A

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vote must be taken when major issues are decided on. Serious consideration should be given to the differing views of a minority. In case of controversy over major issues in which supporters of the two opposing views are nearly equal in number, except in emergencies where action must be taken in accordance with the majority view, the decision should be put off to allow for further investigation, study and exchange of opinions followed by another vote. Under special circumstances, the controversy may be reported to the next higher party organization for a ruling.

When, on behalf of the party organization, an individual party member is to express views on major issues beyond the scope of the existing decisions of the party organization, the content must be referred to the party organization for prior discussion and decision, or referred to the next higher party organization for instructions. No Party member, whatever his or her position, is allowed to make decisions on major issues on his or her own. In an emergency, when a decision by an individual is unavoidable, the matter must be reported to the party organization immediately afterwards. No leader is allowed to take decisions arbitrarily or to place himself or herself above the party organization.

Article 17. The central, local and primary organizations of the party must all pay great attention to party building. They shall regularly discuss and examine the party's work in publicity, education, organization and discipline inspection, its mass work and united front work. They must carefully study ideological and political developments inside and outside the Party.

CHAPTER III: CENTRAL ORGANIZATIONS OF THE PARTY

Article 18. The National Congress of the party is held once every five years and convened by the Central Committee. It may be convened before the normally scheduled date if the Central Committee deems it necessary or if more than one third of the organizations at the provincial level so request. Except under extraordinary circumstances, the Congress may not be postponed.

The number of delegates to the National Congress of the party and the procedure governing their election shall be determined by the Central Committee.

Article 19. The functions and powers of the National Congress of the party are as follows:

1) To hear and examine the reports of the Central Committee;
2) To hear and examine the reports of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection;
3) To discuss and decide on major questions concerning the Party;
4) To revise the Constitution of the Party;
5) To elect the Central Committee; and
6) To elect the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection.

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Article 20. The powers and functions of the National Conference of the party are as follows: to discuss and make decisions on major questions; and to replace members and elect additional members of the Central Committee and the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection. The number of members and alternate members of the Central Committee to be replaced or newly elected shall not exceed one fifth of the respective totals of members and alternate members of the Central Committee elected by the National Congress of the Party.

Article 21. The Central Committee of the party is elected for a term of five years. However, when the next National Congress is convened before or after its normally scheduled date, the term shall be correspondingly shortened or extended. Members and alternate members of the Central Committee must have a Party standing of five years or more. The number of members and alternate members of the Central Committee shall be determined by the National Congress. Vacancies on the Central Committee shall be filled by its alternate members in the order of the number of votes by which they were elected.

The Central Committee of the party meets in plenary session at least once a year, and such sessions are convened by its Political Bureau. **The Political Bureau reports its work to these sessions and accepts their oversight.**

When the National Congress is not in session, the Central Committee carries out its resolutions, directs the entire work of the party and represents the Chinese Communist Party in its external relations.

Article 22. The Political Bureau, the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau and the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the party are elected by the Central Committee in plenary session. The General Secretary of the Central Committee must be a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau.

When the Central Committee is not in session, the Political Bureau and its Standing Committee exercise the functions and powers of the Central Committee.

The Secretariat of the Central Committee is the working body of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee and its Standing Committee. The members of the Secretariat are nominated by the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee and are subject to endorsement by the Central Committee in plenary session.

The General Secretary of the Central Committee is responsible for convening the meetings of the Political Bureau and its Standing Committee and presides over the work of the Secretariat.

The members of the Military Commission of the Central Committee are decided on by the Central Committee.

The central leading bodies and leaders elected by each Central Committee shall, when the next National Congress is in session, continue to preside over the

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party's day-to-day work until the new central leading bodies and leaders are elected by the next Central Committee.

Article 23. Party organizations in the Chinese People's Liberation Army carry on their work in accordance with the instructions of the Central Committee. The political work organ of the Military Commission of the Central Committee is the General Political Department of the Chinese People's Liberation Army; the General Political Department directs party and political work in the army. The organizational system and organs of the party in the armed forces are prescribed by the Military Commission of the Central Committee.

CHAPTER IV: LOCAL ORGANIZATIONS OF THE PARTY

Article 24. The Party congress of a province, autonomous region, municipality directly under the central government, city divided into districts, autonomous prefecture, county (banner), autonomous county, city not divided into districts, or municipal district is held once every five years.

Local Party congresses are convened by the party committees at the corresponding levels. Under extraordinary circumstances, they may be held before or after their normally scheduled dates upon approval by the next higher party committees.

The number of delegates to the local party congresses at any level and the procedure governing their election are determined by the party committees at the corresponding levels and should be reported to the next higher party committees for approval.

Article 25. The functions and powers of the local party congresses at all levels are as follows:

1) To hear and examine the reports of the party committees at the corresponding levels;
2) To hear and examine the reports of the commissions for discipline inspection at the corresponding levels;
3) To discuss and adopt resolutions on major issues in the given areas; and
4) To elect the party committees and commissions for discipline inspection at the corresponding levels.

Article 26. The Party committee of a province, autonomous region, municipality directly under the central government, city divided into districts, or autonomous prefecture is elected for a term of five years. The members and alternate members of such a committee must have a Party standing of five years or more.

The Party committee of a county (banner), autonomous county, city not divided into districts, or municipal district is elected for a term of five years. The members and alternate members of such a committee must have a Party standing of three years or more.

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When local party congresses at all levels are convened before or after their normally scheduled dates, the terms of the committees elected by the previous congresses shall be correspondingly shortened or extended.

The number of members and alternate members of the local party committees at all levels shall be determined by the next higher committees. Vacancies on the local party committees at all levels shall be filled by their alternate members in the order of the number of votes by which they were elected.

The local party committees at all levels meet in plenary session at least twice a year.

The local party committees at all levels shall, when the party congresses of the given areas are not in session, carry out the directives of the next higher party organizations and the resolutions of the party congresses at the corresponding levels, direct work in their own areas and report on it to the next higher party committees at regular intervals.

Article 27. The local party committees at all levels elect, at their plenary sessions, their standing committees, secretaries and deputy secretaries and report the results to the higher party committees for approval. The standing committees of the local party committees at all levels exercise the functions and powers of local party committees when the latter are not in session. They continue to handle the day-to-day work when the next party congresses at their levels are in session, until the new standing committees are elected.

The standing committees of the local party committees at all levels regularly report their work to plenary sessions of local party committees and accept their oversight.

Article 28. A prefectural party committee, or an organization analogous to it, is the representative organ dispatched by a provincial or an autonomous regional party committee to a prefecture covering several counties, autonomous counties or cities. It exercises leadership over the work in the given prefecture as authorized by the provincial or autonomous regional party committee.

CHAPTER V: PRIMARY ORGANIZATIONS OF THE PARTY

Article 29. Primary Party organizations are formed in enterprises, rural areas, government organs, schools, research institutes, communities, social organizations, companies of the People's Liberation Army and other basic units, where there are at least three full party members.

In primary organizations, primary party committees and committees of general party branches or party branches are set up as the work requires and according to the number of party members, subject to approval by the higher party organizations. A primary party committee is elected by a general membership meeting or a meeting of delegates, the committee of a general party branch or a Party branch is elected by a general membership meeting, and

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candidates for these committees are nominated on the basis of extensively soliciting opinions from party members and non-Party persons.

Article 30. A primary party committee is elected for a term of three to five years, while a general party branch committee or a Party branch committee is elected for a term of two or three years. Results of the election of a secretary and deputy secretaries of a primary committee, general branch committee or branch committee of the party shall be reported to the next higher party organization for approval.

Article 31. The primary party organizations are militant bastions of the party in the basic units of society, where all the party's work proceeds and they serve as the foundation of its fighting capacity. Their main tasks are:

1) To disseminate and carry out the party's line, principles and policies, the resolutions of the Central Committee of the party and other higher party organizations, and their own resolutions; to give full play to the exemplary and vanguard role of party members, and to unite and organize the cadres and the rank and file inside and outside the party to fulfil the tasks of their own units.

2) **To organize party members to conscientiously study Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory and the important thought of "Three Represents," study the Scientific Outlook on Development, study the party's line, principles, policies and resolutions, acquire essential knowledge concerning the party and obtain general, scientific, legal and professional knowledge.**

3) **To educate, manage, oversee and serve party members; raise their overall quality; strengthen their party spirit; ensure that they regularly participate in the activities of party organizations, make criticism and self-criticism, and maintain and observe party discipline; see that they truly fulfil their duties; protect their rights from encroachment; and improve management of party members among the floating population.**

4) To maintain close ties with the masses, constantly seek their criticisms and opinions regarding party members and the party's work, safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of the masses and do effective ideological and political work among them .

5) To give full scope to the initiative and creativity of party members and the masses and to discover, nurture and recommend fine, talented people from among party members and the masses and encourage them to contribute their skills and learning to reform, opening up and socialist modernization.

6) To educate and train the activists who apply for party membership, attend to the routine work concerning the recruitment of new members and attach great importance to recruiting party members from among those in the forefront of production and work and from among young people.

7) To see to it that party and non-Party cadres strictly observe the law and administrative discipline and the financial and economic statutes and personnel

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regulations of the state and that none of them infringe on the interests of the state, the collective or the masses.

8) To encourage party members and the masses to conscientiously resist unhealthy practices and wage resolute struggles against all illegal and criminal activities.

Article 32. The primary party committees in communities, townships and towns and the party organizations in villages and communities provide leadership for the work in their localities and assist administrative departments, economic institutions and self-governing mass organizations in fully exercising their functions and powers.

In a state-owned or collective enterprise, the primary party organization acts as the political nucleus and works for the operation of the enterprise. The primary party organization guarantees and oversees the implementation of the principles and policies of the party and the state in its own enterprise and backs the meeting of shareholders, board of directors, board of supervisors and manager (factory director) in the exercise of their functions and powers according to law. It relies wholeheartedly on the workers and office staff, supports the work of the congresses of representatives of workers and office staff and participates in making final decisions on major questions in the enterprise. It works to improve its own organization and provides leadership over ideological and political work, efforts for cultural and ethical progress and the trade unions, the Communist Youth League and other mass organizations.

In a non-public economic institution, the primary party organization carries out the party's principles and policies, provides guidance to and oversees the enterprise in observing the laws and regulations of the state, exercises leadership over the trade union, the Communist Youth League organization and other mass organizations, rallies the workers and office staff around it, safeguards the legitimate rights and interests of all quarters and stimulates the healthy development of the enterprise.

In an institution where the administrative leaders assume full responsibility, the primary party organization acts as the political nucleus. In an institution where the administrative leaders assume full responsibility under the leadership of the party committee, the primary party organization discusses and decides on major issues and at the same time ensures that the administrative leaders are able to fully exercise their functions and powers.

In offices of the party or the state at all levels, the primary party organizations assist the chief administrators in fulfilling their tasks and improving their work. They exercise oversight over all party members, including the chief administrators who are party members, but do not direct the work of their units.

CHAPTER VI: PARTY CADRES

Article 33. Party cadres are the backbone of the party's cause and public servants of the people. The Party selects its cadres according to the principle that they

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should possess both political integrity and professional competence, adheres to the practice of appointing people on their merits and opposes favouritism; it exerts genuine efforts to make the ranks of the cadres more revolutionary, younger in average age, better educated and more professionally competent.

The Party attaches great importance to education, training, selection and assessment of cadres, especially to the training and selection of outstanding young cadres. The Party actively promotes the reform of the cadre system.

The Party attaches great importance to the training and promotion of women cadres and cadres from among the ethnic minorities.

Article 34. Leading Party cadres at all levels must show exemplary performance in carrying out their duties as party members prescribed in Article 3 of this Constitution and must meet the following basic requirements:

1) **Know Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought and Deng Xiaoping Theory well enough to perform their duties, earnestly put the important thought of "Three Represents" into practice, take the lead in applying the Scientific Outlook on Development, try hard to analyse and solve practical problems with the stand, viewpoint and methods of Marxism, keep stressing study, political awareness and integrity, and be able to stand the test of all trials and tribulations.**

2) Have the lofty ideal of communism and firm conviction in socialism with Chinese characteristics, firmly implement the party's basic line, principles and policies, be determined to carry out reform and opening up, devote themselves to the cause of modernization, work hard to start undertakings in socialist construction, foster a correct view on evaluating their performances and make solid achievements that can stand the test of practice and time to the satisfaction of the people.

3) Persist in emancipating their minds, seeking truth from facts, keeping up with the times and blazing new trails in a pioneering spirit; conduct earnest investigations and studies so as to be able to integrate the party's principles and policies with the actual conditions in their localities or departments and work efficiently; tell the truth, do practical work, seek tangible results and oppose formalism.

4) Be fervently dedicated to the revolutionary cause and imbued with a strong sense of political responsibility, have practical experience, and be qualified for leading posts in organizational ability, general education and vocational knowledge.

5) Properly exercise the power invested in them by the people, handle matters according to law, be upright and clean and work diligently for the people, set an example by their own actions, work hard and live simply, maintain close ties with the masses, uphold the party's mass line, conscientiously accept the criticism and oversight by the party and the masses, improve their moral standards, exercise self-respect, self-examination, self-caution and self-motivation, combat bureaucratism, and fight against malpractices such as abuse of power for personal gain.

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6) Uphold the party's system of democratic centralism, maintain a democratic style of work, take the overall situation into consideration, and be good at uniting and working with other comrades, including those who hold differing opinions.

Article 35. Party cadres should be able to co-operate with non-Party cadres, respect them and be open-minded in learning from their strong points.

Party organizations at all levels must be good at discovering and recommending talented non-Party cadres with practical learning for leading posts, and ensure that the latter enjoy authority commensurate with their posts and can fully play their roles.

Article 36. Leading Party cadres at all levels, whether elected through democratic procedure or appointed by a leading body, are not entitled to lifelong tenure, and they can be transferred from or relieved of their posts.

Cadres no longer fit to continue working due to old age or poor health should retire according to the regulations of the state.

CHAPTER VII: PARTY DISCIPLINE

Article 37. Party discipline refers to the rules of conduct that must be observed by party organizations at all levels and by all party members. It is the guarantee that the unity and solidarity of the party are safe guarded and that the tasks of the party are accomplished. Party organizations must strictly observe and maintain party discipline. A Communist Party member must conscientiously act within the bounds of party discipline.

Article 38. Party organizations should criticize, educate or take disciplinary measures against members who violate party discipline, depending on the nature and seriousness of their mistakes and in the spirit of "learning from past mistakes to avoid future ones, and curing the sickness to save the patient."

Party members who have seriously violated the criminal law shall be expelled from the Party.

It is strictly forbidden in the party to take any measures against a member that contravene the Party Constitution or the laws of the state, or to retaliate against or frame a member. Any offending organization or individual must be dealt with according to party discipline and the laws of the state.

Article 39. There are five measures for enforcing party discipline: warning, serious warning, removal from party posts, probation within the Party, and expulsion from the Party.

The period for which a Party member is placed on probation shall not exceed two years. During that period, the party member concerned has no right to participate in voting or elections or stand for election. A Party member who during that time truly rectifies his or her mistake shall have his or her rights as a

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Party member restored. Party members who refuse to mend their ways shall be expelled from the Party.

Expulsion is the ultimate party disciplinary measure. In deciding on or approving an expulsion, Party organizations at all levels should study all the relevant facts and opinions and exercise extreme caution.

Article 40. Any disciplinary measure to be taken against a Party member must be discussed and decided on at a general membership meeting of the party branch concerned, and reported to the primary party committee concerned for approval. If the case is relatively important or complicated, or involves the expulsion of a member, it shall be reported to a Party commission for discipline inspection at or above the county level for examination and approval, in accordance with the specific situation. Under special circumstances, a Party committee or a commission for discipline inspection at or above the county level has the authority to decide directly on disciplinary measures to be taken against a Party member.

Any decision to remove a member or alternate member of the Central Committee or a local committee at any level from his or her posts within the Party, to place such a person on probation within the party or to expel such a person from the party must be approved by a two thirds majority vote at a plenary meeting of the party committee to which he or she belongs. In special circumstances, the decision may be taken first by the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee or the standing committee of a local party committee, pending confirmation at the plenary meeting of the party committee. Such a disciplinary measure against a member or alternate member of a local party committee is subject to approval by the higher party committee.

A member or alternate member of the Central Committee who has seriously violated the criminal law shall be expelled from the party on decision by the Political Bureau of the Central Committee; a member or alternate member of a local party committee who has seriously violated the criminal law shall be expelled from the party on decision by the standing committee of the party committee at the corresponding level.

Article 41. When a Party organization is deciding on a disciplinary measure against a Party member, it should investigate and verify the facts in an objective way. The Party member in question must be informed of a decision regarding any disciplinary measure to be taken and of the facts on which it is based. The person concerned must be given a chance to account for himself or herself and speak in his or her own defence. If the member does not accept the decision, he or she can appeal, and the party organization concerned must promptly deal with or forward his or her appeal, and must not withhold or suppress it. Those who cling to erroneous views and unjustifiable demands shall be educated by criticism.

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Article 42. If a Party organization fails to uphold party discipline, it must be investigated.

In case a Party organization seriously violates party discipline and is unable to rectify the mistake on its own, the next higher party committee should, after verifying the facts and considering the seriousness of the case, decide on the reorganization or dissolution of the organization, report the decision to the party committee at the next higher level for examination and approval, and then formally announce and carry out the decision.

CHAPTER VIII: PARTY ORGANS FOR DISCIPLINE INSPECTION

Article 43. The Party's Central Commission for Discipline Inspection functions under the leadership of the Central Committee of the Party. The Party's local commissions for discipline inspection at all levels and primary commissions for discipline inspection function under the dual leadership of the party committees at the corresponding levels and the next higher commissions for discipline inspection.

The Party's commissions for discipline inspection at all levels serve a term of the same duration as the party committees at the corresponding levels.

The Party's Central Commission for Discipline Inspection elects, in plenary session, its standing committee, secretary and deputy secretaries and reports the results to the Central Committee for approval. Local commissions for discipline inspection at all levels elect, at their plenary sessions, their respective standing committees, secretaries and deputy secretaries. The results of the elections are subject to endorsement by the party committees at the corresponding levels and should be reported to the next higher party committees for approval. The quest ion of whether a primary party committee should set up a commission for discipline inspection or simply appoint a discipline inspection commissioner shall be determined by the next higher party organization in light of the specific circumstances. The committees of general party branches and party branches shall have discipline inspection commissioners.

The Party's Central Commission for Discipline Inspection shall, when its work so requires, accredit discipline inspection groups or commissioners to party or state organs at the central level. Leaders of the discipline inspection groups or discipline inspection commissioners may attend relevant meetings of the leading party organizations in the said organs as non-voting participants. The leading party organizations in the organs concerned must support their work.

Article 44. The main tasks of the party's commissions for discipline inspection at all levels are as follows: to uphold the Constitution and other statutes of the Party, to check up on the implementation of the line, principles, policies and resolutions of the party and to assist the respective party committees in improving the party's style of work and in organizing and co-ordinating the work against corruption.

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The commissions for discipline inspection at all levels shall frequently provide education for party members on their duty to observe party discipline and adopt decisions for the upholding of party discipline; they shall oversee party members holding leading positions in exercising their power; they shall examine and deal with relatively important or complicated cases of violation of the Constitution or other statutes of the party by Party organizations or party members and decide on or rescind disciplinary measures against party members involved in such cases; they shall deal with complaints and appeals made by party members; and they shall guarantee the rights of party members.

The commissions for discipline inspection at all levels shall report to the party committees at the corresponding levels on the results of their handling of cases of special importance or complexity, as well as on the problems encountered. The local commissions for discipline inspection at all levels and primary commissions for discipline inspection shall also present such reports to the higher commissions.

If a commission for discipline inspection at any level discovers any violation of party discipline by a member of the party committee at the corresponding level, it may take the initial step of verifying the facts and, if it is necessary to put a case on file, it should report to the party committee at the corresponding level for approval, and if a member of the standing committee of the party committee is involved, it should first report to the party committee at the corresponding level and then to the commission for discipline inspection at the next higher level for approval.

Article 45. Higher commissions for discipline inspection have the power to examine the work of the lower commissions and to approve or modify their decisions on any case. If decisions so modified have already been ratified by the party committee at the corresponding level, the modification must be approved by the next higher party committee.

If a local commission for discipline inspection or a primary commission for discipline inspection does not agree with a decision made by the party committee at the corresponding level in dealing with a case, it may demand the commission at the next higher level re-examine the case; if a local or primary commission discovers cases of violation of party discipline by the party committee at the corresponding level or by its members, and if that party committee fails to deal with them properly or at all, it has the right to appeal to the higher commission for assistance in dealing with such cases.

CHAPTER IX: LEADING PARTY MEMBERS' GROUPS

Article 46. A leading party members' group may be formed in the leading body of a central or local state organ, people's organization, economic or cultural institution or other non-Party unit. The group plays the role of the core of leadership. Its main tasks are: to see to it that the party's line, principles and policies are implemented, to discuss and decide on matters of major importance

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in its unit, to do well in cadre management, to rally the non-Party cadres and the masses in fulfilling the tasks assigned by the party and the state and to guide the work of the party organization of the unit and those directly under it.

Article 47. The composition of a leading party members' group is decided by the party organization that approves its establishment. The group shall have a secretary and, if necessary, deputy secretaries.

A leading party members' group must accept the leadership of the party organization that approves its establishment.

Article 48. Party committees may be set up in state organs which exercise centralized leadership over their subordinate units. The Central Committee of the party shall provide the specific procedure for their establishment and define their functions, powers and tasks. Chapter X Relationship Between the party and the Communist Youth League of China

Article 49. The Communist Youth League of China is a mass organization of advanced young people under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party; it is a school where a large number of young people learn about socialism with Chinese characteristics and about communism through practice; it is the party's assistant and reserve force. The Central Committee of the Communist Youth League functions under the leadership of the Central Committee of the Party. The local chapters of the Communist Youth League are under the leadership of the party committees at the corresponding levels and of the higher organizations of the League itself.

Article 50. Party committees at all levels must strengthen their leadership over Communist Youth League organizations and pay attention to selecting and training League cadres. The Party must firmly support the Communist Youth League in the lively and creative performance of its work to suit the characteristics and needs of young people, and give full play to the League's role as a shock force and as a bridge linking the party with young people.

Those secretaries of League committees at or below the county level or in enterprises and institutions who are party members may attend meetings of party committees at the corresponding levels and meetings of their standing committees as non-voting participants.

CHAPTER X: PARTY EMBLEM AND FLAG

Article 51. The emblem of the Chinese Communist Party is a design of sickle and hammer.

Article 52. The flag of the Chinese Communist Party is a red flag highlighted by a golden party emblem on it.

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Article 53. The Party emblem and flag are the symbol and sign of the Chinese Communist Party. Party organizations at all levels and all party members shall safeguard the sanctity of the party emblem and flag. Party emblems and flags should be made and used according to regulations.

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