Complex Demonstratives, Articulation, and Overarticulation

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*ABSTRACT: Complex demonstratives raise problems in semantics and force a re-examination of basic principles underlying the New Theory of Reference. First, I present these problems and the relevant principles. Then, I explore the most common suggestions, for instance, as those put forward by Braun and Dever. Finally, I introduce my own view. The latter is a non-*ad hoc *extension of the Reflexive-Referential analysis of context-sensitive terms as discussed by Perry. It accounts for familiar problems, including those raised by the fact that sometimes the object referred to does not satisfy the nominal, nor preserve the relevant principles.*

RÉSUMÉ : Les démonstratifs complexes soulèvent des problèmes sémantiques majeurs qui incitent à l'examen de principes sous-jacents à la nouvelle théorie de la référence. Je présente ces problèmes de même que les principes qu'ils semblent remettre en question, expose les deux principales approches des démonstratifs (celles défendue par Braun et par Dever) et, finalement, suggère une théorie inspirée des travaux de John Perry sur les expressions référentielles sensibles aux contextes d'énonciation. Ma façon d'aborder les démonstratifs complexes est un prolongement de l'approche réflexive référentielle et fait appel à de multiples propositions exprimées par des énonciations.

***Dialogue* XLIV (2005), 97-121**
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https://doi.org/10.1017/S0012217300003760 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Referring Terms and Singular Propositions

Indexicals ("I," "you"), bare demonstratives ("he," "this"), and proper names ("Peter") are referring terms. Utterances of referring terms designate specific objects. For example, an utterance of "I" designates the speaker of the utterance and an utterance of "Steven Seagal" designates the person bearing that name. Two arguable assumptions concerning referring terms are widely shared in the field. First,

Lexical Simplicity Assumption: Referring terms are lexically simple, unstructured linguistic expressions.

The Lexical Simplicity Assumption is concerned with the syntactic structure, or the lack of it, of referring terms; they are primitive, unstructured, non-compositional, lexical items. Second, according to a fairly common point of view, referring terms introduce the objects they designate, and nothing else, into the truth-conditions of utterances. For example, an utterance of "I" introduces the speaker, and nothing else, into the truth-conditions of an utterance of

(1) I am sick,

and an utterance of (1) is true if and only if the speaker of the utterance is sick; an utterance of the bare demonstrative "that" introduces the designated object and nothing else into the truth-conditions of an utterance of a "that" sentence, and an utterance of

(2) That is yellow

is true if and only if the designated object is yellow. This view is encapsulated in the idea that referring terms have a singular reference.

Singular Reference Assumption: The only semantic contribution of utterances of referring terms to the truth-conditions of utterances of sentences is an object.

The Singular Reference Assumption is concerned with the semantics of referring terms. Referring terms are semantically defined by their introducing objects, and nothing else, into the truth-conditions of utterances (Kripke, Kaplan, Perry). Let us say that utterances of sentences of the form

Referring term + predicate

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express singular propositions of the form

< , >

where the first gap is filled in by the object referred to by the utterance of the referring term, and the second gap is filled in by the condition expressed by the predicate.

Enter Complex Demonstratives

Indexicals and bare demonstratives are context-sensitive referring expressions. The objects they introduce into the truth-conditions of utterances may vary from utterance to utterance. Another category of *prima facie* referring terms exhibits context sensitivity. Complex demonstratives (CDs) are *prima facie* referring terms of the form "that F,"[1] where "that" is a bare demonstrative and F is a common noun or a noun phrase.[2] For example, "that man talking to Mary" is a complex demonstrative containing the bare demonstrative "that" and the nominal "man talking to Mary." If CDs are referring terms, they contribute an object to the truth-conditions of an utterance. CDs are context sensitive because they can be used to designate different objects in different contexts. An utterance of "that man talking to Mary" can be used to designate Paul, and another utterance of the same CD can be used to designate Peter. Complex demonstratives threaten both the Lexical Simplicity Assumption and the Singular Reference Assumption. On the one hand, CDs are syntactically structured, complex terms containing a bare demonstrative and a nominal. The latter can be simple ("car") or complex ("man talking to Mary"). If CDs are referring terms and also are lexically complex, structured terms, then the Lexical Simplicity Assumption is false. On the other hand, according to the Singular Reference Assumption, if "that car" is a referring term, then it introduces an object into the truth-conditions of the utterance, and an utterance of

(3) That car is yellow

is true if and only if the object referred to by the CD is yellow. Following the Singular Reference Assumption, an utterance of (3) expresses a singular proposition containing the object referred to and the condition *being yellow.*

< CAR , being yellow>

where CAR is the object itself. As a rule, the nominal "car" semantically expresses a condition, *being car.* The latter is also truth-conditionally relevant in an utterance of a sentence containing that term. For example, in

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"A car is yellow," "car" introduces the condition of *being car*, and the sentence is true if and only if there is an x, such that x is a car and x is yellow. I call the condition "car" expresses its standard semantic contribution. Let us say that

Semantic Stability Assumption: In virtue of its linguistic meaning, a nominal contributes a condition and the semantic contribution of a nominal does not change from sentence to sentence.

If the Singular Reference Assumption is true, and if CDs are referring terms, we lose semantic stability. If the standard semantic contribution of "car" is a condition, and if the condition "car" expresses is excluded from any proposition which an utterance of a CD sentence expresses, then the nominal's standard semantic contribution drops out as being irrelevant in utterances of CD sentences. The CD semantically contributes an object, not a condition, to the semantic value of an utterance. However, the standard semantic contribution of the nominal cannot be discarded without an explanation. Notice that if a quantifier is substituted to the bare demonstrative in (4), to obtain as in these examples, "Some car is yellow" or "A car is yellow," the Singular Reference Assumption does not apply and the problem under consideration does not surface.

Misdemonstrations

Let me add a twist and consider what I will call a misdemonstration. Suppose that in designating a person, Mary, I say

(4) That student is smart.

You correct me: the person I am designating is not a student but a faculty member. Still, you agree, she is smart. I will say that if the nominal does not fit the designated object, then we have a misdemonstration. There are conflicting intuitions concerning the truth-conditions of my utterance of (4). Kaplan (1989a) contends that my utterance of "that F" designates nothing if the designated object is not an F. It is nonetheless widely agreed that my utterance of (4) expresses a true proposition even if the designated object is not an F (Larson and Segal 1995, p. 213; Lepore and Ludwig 2000, p. 211), or that I express a true proposition even if the designated object is not an F (Braun 1995). We are willing, in some circumstances, to drop the nominal semantic contribution as semantically irrelevant with respect to the utterance. Some (Larson and Segal 1995) argue that the nominal always plays a merely pragmatic role—helping the hearer to focus on the relevant object—and no semantic role at all. My utterance of (4) is then true since the bare demonstrative picks out the relevant object and the nominal is not semantically relevant and does not alter the truth-

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conditions of the utterance. This view is not acceptable for anyone thinking that the nominal plays a semantic role. If the nominal has only a pragmatic role and does not bring its standard semantic contribution to a CD, and if the cognitive value of an utterance is determined by the meaning and the standard semantic contribution of the terms occurring in it, then the nominal does not contribute to the cognitive value of the utterance of a CD sentence. This is not acceptable. Intuitively, it does contribute to the cognitive value of the utterance. My utterance of "that lemon is yellow" and "that fruit is yellow" may share the same truth-conditions, but they differ in cognitive value, and the linguistic meaning of the nominal is responsible for this difference. If we ignore the linguistic meaning of the nominal, then we fail to capture this difference.

One can also argue that a hearer does not even have to understand the linguistic meaning of the nominal or know its standard semantic contribution to know the truth-condition of an utterance of a CD sentence. Suppose that in designating a mushroom you utter, "that *Claraveriadelphus truncatus* is great." I do not know the meaning of "*Claraveriadelphus truncatus*," but I think that the mushroom you designated is great and that the singular proposition you expressed containing that mushroom and the condition of being great is true.[3] You are not, but you might be, designating either the form or the colour of that object. I will not consider these options here, since they are irrelevant to my main point. I simply assume that you intended to designate an object. I will come back to misdemonstrations and the semantic relevance of the nominal.

Framework for a New Suggestion

Most philosophers of language accept the Semantic Stability Assumption and want the nominal to preserve its standard semantic contribution, a condition, or at least to play a decent semantic role in a CD sentence (Borg 2000; Braun 1995; Corazza 2002; Dever 2001; Richard 1993). Two options have been explored. Some preserve both the Semantic Stability Assumption and the Singular Reference Assumption, but they reject the idea that CDs are syntactically complex referring terms. On that picture, the burden of reference is carried by the bare demonstrative and the condition introduced by the nominal is part of a proposition which is expressed by an utterance of CD sentence (Corazza; Dever; Lepore and Ludwig; Richard). Corazza goes on to argue, however, that the nominal is irrelevant to the truth-conditions of the utterance. Others preserve both the Singular Reference Assumption and the idea that CDs are syntactically complex referring terms, but they reject the Semantic Stability Assumption. On that picture, the nominal does not carry its standard semantic contribution into a proposition expressed by the utterance of a CD sentence (Borg; Braun; Kaplan). On that view, the bare demonstrative and the nominal are put together to jointly contribute to the complex linguistic meaning of

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the CD, and the latter introduces only an object into the truth-conditions of an utterance. The semantic complexity of CDs, their being composed of a bare demonstrative and a nominal, then finds no echo in a proposition expressed by an utterance of a CD sentence. I want to suggest a third option. I offer a picture of CDs preserving both the Singular Reference Assumption and the idea that CDs are complex referring terms. I also contend that the nominal introduces a semantically relevant condition. However, the Lexical Simplicity Assumption has to be abandoned.

My suggestion focuses on the syntax and semantics of CDs. Syntax concerns the structure of linguistic expressions. Semantics is trickier. Frege left us with the notion of sense as the semantic value of linguistic expressions (I will not pay attention to the denotation of a term as its semantic value). David Kaplan and John Perry transformed the semantic landscape in the 1970s.

The linguistic meaning of a term is a property of an expression as type and a rule assigning the truth-conditional contribution of that term to the truth-conditions of a sentence in a context or to an utterance. Kaplan (1989a, 1989b) focuses on sentences in a context and places the notion of character, a function from context to content, at the centre of the stage. In Kaplan's view, the character of a term is the linguistic meaning of that term. It goes without saying that rules, and hence characters, are not part of a proposition expressed by a sentence in a context, and not part of the truth-conditions of a sentence in a context. According to Kaplan, characters *determine* the truth-conditions or proposition expressed by a sentence in a context. He calls the truth-conditions of a sentence in a context its content, and from that point of view, content is the only truth-valuable entity. The content of a sentence containing a referring term in a context is a singular proposition.

Perry (1996, 2000, 2001) makes a different suggestion. He places utterances, rather than sentences in context, at the centre of the stage. He also unfolds and clearly distinguishes the functions of senses found in Frege's semantics and extract propositions (that is, truth-valuable entities) out of the meaning of the sentence. He makes a distinction between the linguistic meaning of a sentence type, the content M, or the proposition given by the linguistic meaning of the sentence, the content C of an utterance, or the proposition given by the meaning plus facts about the context of utterance, and the content D, or the proposition obtained once the referents or designata are determined. The content D gives the official truth-conditions of an utterance. I rely on this unfolding and the distinctions introduced. The linguistic meaning and all three propositions—content M, content C, and content D—belong to semantics. In Frege, these functions are satisfied by one single entity, a sense. The sense of a sentence is a proposition. Let us say that Frege's semantics relies on one semantic value (sense) and that Kaplan's semantic relies on two semantic values (character and content).

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Perry assigns to each function a different semantic value, and relies on many semantic values. Perry uses the notion of a role to replace the function of linguistic meaning. The role of a context-sensitive referring term is a reference rule mentioning the utterance itself. For example, the role of "I" is "The speaker of the utterance." The role is complex. It provides a property, *being speaker of*, and an argument, *the utterance*. In that sense, the role is reflexive since it refers to the utterance itself. It must be emphasized that this picture does not use Kaplan's notion of character, and that the reflexivity of the role is crucial to Perry's picture. Kaplanian characters are not reflexive. Perry distinguishes himself from Kaplan, who does not introduce any semantic entity fit to assume the role of cognitive significance beyond content, by doing just that. Now, "cognitive significance" is terse and deserves an explanation.

In Frege's semantics, the cognitive value is a property of a sentence and it is a proposition identical with the proposition giving the truth-conditions of the sentence. I assume that the cognitive value is a truth-valuable entity or proposition. However, being at the centre of the stage on our picture, utterances will have cognitive values. Perry identifies a useful condition on the cognitive significance or cognitive value of an utterance, a condition tied to the cognitive notion of acceptance:

> If there is some aspect of meaning, by which an utterance u of S and an utterance u' of S' differ, so that a rational person who understood both S and S' might accept u but not u', then a fully adequate theory of linguistic meaning should say what it is. (2000, p. 194)

One can accept or reject propositions. Accepting is a cognitive attitude, and acceptance or rejection is acceptance that p or rejection that p, where p is a proposition which is the cognitive significance of an utterance. On that picture, the cognitive significance of an utterance is not a linguistic rule. Note that a speaker must understand the linguistic meaning of a sentence type to grasp the cognitive value or cognitive significance of an utterance of that sentence, and that cognitive value might differ from linguistic meaning. For example, two utterances of "that car is yellow" differ in cognitive value even if the sentence has the same meaning in both utterances, the referring term designates the same object in both cases and the utterances have the same truth-conditions: a hearer can accept an utterance of the first sentence and reject an utterance of the second sentence. Suppose that I am designating a car in full daylight and make an utterance of "that car is yellow." You accept my utterance. Suppose now that I make an utterance of the same sentence at night and designate the same car. You do not recognize the car, and do not accept my utterance even if the latter has the same truth-conditions. On Kaplan's view, the only available proposition is the content of a sentence in a context and the content is hence

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the only candidate to play the role of cognitive value. Perry's framework makes available a proposition fit for the role of cognitive value of the utterance. I will come back to this.

Finally, the truth-conditions of an utterance of a sentence are fully determined by the meaning of this utterance. It is also a proposition. Perry calls the truth-conditions of an utterance its official content. The truth-conditions of an utterance containing a referring term is a singular proposition containing the object referred to by the referring term.

From the linguistic meaning of a sentence one can extract the content M which is just the proposition one obtains when one understands the linguistic meaning of the sentence; adding contextual features to content M, one obtains content C, which is just the proposition one obtains once the utterance is fixed; and, finally, once the referents are determined, one obtains content D, or the official content of the utterance. Let us see how the whole machinery works for indexical sentences. Consider an utterance of (1), and suppose that you understand the meaning of the sentence type but know nothing about the utterance. Following Perry's picture, given the meaning of "I," you know that

Content M <The speaker of the utterance of "I" in the context c is sick>, u

where c is the context and u is an utterance. The content M, i.e., the content in angle brackets, is general and echoes the linguistic meaning of the sentence, including the role or meaning of the indexical, with no extra element, and it does not contain any object. Note that the lexical item "I" is simple and lacks structure, but that its linguistic meaning is complex, mentioning the speaker and the utterance. Content M is utterance sensitive. I introduce content M because it is part of the Reflexive-Referential Theory. However, it plays no major role in my view on CD. Content C will. Suppose that you focus on a specific utterance *u*. You know that this specific utterance is true if and only if the speaker of this utterance is sick. You can now drop generality from the role of "I" and focus on *u*.

Content C <the speaker of the utterance *u* of "I" is sick>

Content C mentions the utterance *u* itself. It is the reflexive content of the utterance. Content C is reached from content M plus facts about a specific utterance. One can recognize this content without knowing the specific truth-maker of the utterance, that is, the object referred to by the utterance of the indexical. One can also accept or reject the content C while ignoring which object is referred to by the utterance of the indexical. Content C is the cognitive value of the utterance. Notice that the content C is fully explicit and is a property of a specific utterance. There is no reason to see it as an implicit speaker's background assumption.

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Suppose now that you know enough about the context of the utterance to identify the object referred to, i.e., the speaker of this utterance. You can focus on the world, identify the referent of the indexical, and get the content D of the utterance or the official, non-reflexive, language-independent, truth-conditions of the utterance.

Content D <ME, being sick>

The content D is what we usually take to be the truth-conditions of the utterance. It lacks generality and contains the object determined by the meaning of the indexical in that context rather than a condition. My utterance of (1) is true if and only if I am sick. The sentence (1) has the form

referring term + predicate

and its utterance expresses the singular proposition mentioned in the Singular Reference Assumption.

The overall picture can be summarized in the following diagram:

Linguistic meaning
↓
determines
↓
Content M
↓
determines
↓
Content C
↓
determines
↓
Content D

A different picture of semantics emerges once many semantic values are made available, a picture suggesting a different way to deal with CDs.

When only one semantic value—a Fregean sense—is available, things are rather straightforward. Now that there are at least two, several options show up. For instance, both the cognitive value and the truth-conditions of an utterance of a sentence are propositions, and they need not be identical.

One Word of Caution

From a standard viewpoint, pragmatics concerns the non-truth-conditional aspects of utterances. Pragmatics, understood as concerning the non-

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
truth-conditional aspects of a sentence or an utterance is not involved in my picture. All we need is the linguistic meaning of the utterance and facts about the context of the utterance, because we are interested in terms whose contribution to the truth-conditions of an utterance depend on the context of utterance. Recently, it has been argued that sometimes the linguistic meaning of an utterance does not determine its truth-conditions and that it is then necessary to complete the proposition one way or another with extra material to obtain truth-conditions (see Récanati 1992, 2004). If so, one can argue that pragmatics also concerns the truth-conditions of utterances. Pragmatics, understood either in its standard sense or in truth-conditional terms, plays no role in this article. I am interested in the Singular Reference Assumption, a principle concerned with how linguistic meaning determines truth-conditions—cases where more than linguistic meaning is required are irrelevant to my point.

First, I would like to examine the two previously mentioned views on CDs with the Singular Reference Assumption and misdemonstrations in mind. I will then introduce difficulties these views face. I do not think that these difficulties are insurmountable, and my arguments are not intended as providing knock-down reasons to reject them. Second, I want to suggest an option that preserves both the Singular Reference Assumption and the idea that CDs are referring expressions, which fits the condition contributed by the nominal at the right place and which semantically accounts for our intuitions concerning misdemonstrations. My suggestion is an account of CDs fitting them in the complex picture of referring terms found in the Reflexive-Referential Theory (Perry 2001).

Suggestions on the Market

Corazza (2002), Dever (2001), and Richard (1993) reject the Singular Reference Assumption. Alternatively, one can argue that they preserve the Singular Reference Assumption but do not take CDs to be referring terms. I call their view the Articulated View on CDs. Corazza, Dever, and Richard offer different versions of the Articulated View. I will neglect the divergences here and will focus instead on the basics of the Articulated View. Advocates of that approach to CDs contend that "that" in a CD behaves like a bare demonstrative and that the nominal expresses a condition part of the truth-conditions or part of the proposition expressed by a CD utterance—"that" in "That student" is the referential device, and the nominal is referentially irrelevant. In that respect, the expressions have their standard semantic values and the Semantic Stability Assumption is preserved. According to Dever's Multiple Proposition View (Dever 2001), the syntax of CD sentences is misleading, and a CD sentence "That F is G" contains in fact two independent sentences. For instance, (3) has the following structure:

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


An utterance of "That F is G" is fit for expressing two logically independent singular propositions, < , F > and < , G>, both containing the object referred to by "that." For example, an utterance of (3) expresses <CAR , being car> and <CAR , being yellow>. CDs are then not referring terms. They are *prima facie* syntactically complex referring expressions. However, sentences containing these expressions have a logical form such that the bare demonstrative and the nominal are syntactically separated. Hence, CDs are eliminated from the class of referring term. The bare demonstrative carries the referential weight, and the nominal plays no referring role, not even constraining the sort of object referred to. In that respect, this view also preserves the Lexical Simplicity Assumption. According to Dever, we have no clear intuitions concerning the truth-value of an utterance of "That F is G" when the object referred to in not an F. Corazza (2002) advocates a version of Dever's Multiple Proposition View. He distinguishes, among the propositions expressed by an utterance of "That F is G," the background proposition, < , F>, and the principal proposition, < , G>, and argues that when the object referred to is not an F, the utterance is still true because the principal proposition is true. According to Richard (1993), the utterance of a CD sentence of the form "That F is G" expresses a unique complex singular proposition, < , F . , G>, containing twice the object referred to by "that", whether or not that object is an F. An utterance of "That is F and that is G," where "that" refers to what "that" in the initial example refers to, would express the same complex singular proposition. If the designated object is not an F, then the first singular proposition expressed is false and the complex proposition expressed by the utterance is also false.

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If CDs are referring terms introducing objects rather than conditions into the truth-conditions of an utterance, then one expects the nominal not to introduce any condition into the truth-conditions of utterances of CD sentences. In the Articulated View, the demonstrative in the CD refers to an object and the nominal contributes a condition to the truth-conditions of the utterance. In that respect, the Articulated View preserves the Lexical Simplicity Assumption and the Singular Reference Assumption. However, it drops the idea that CDs, *qua* complex expressions, are referring terms because the nominal plays no referring role. All versions of the Articulated View take "that," not "That F," to be the referring term and to introduce an object into a singular proposition.

If that view is correct, the explicit syntax of a CD like "that car" would be given by



CDs are thus not referring terms designating objects but sentences expressing propositions. Such a view makes the false prediction that "that F" and "that is an F" have the same meaning and are semantically equivalent.[4]

On the Articulated view, given the predicative role assigned to the nominal, the latter cannot help the hearer to identify the object referred to. The descriptive material introduced by the nominal is true or false of that object, and in no way does it help to identify the relevant object. Finally, in Corazza's, Dever's, and Richard's view the two simple singular propositions expressed by an utterance of a CD sentence are semantically independent. However, CD sentences exhibit a very strong syntactic unity, and one expects them to also exhibit a strong semantic cohesion not found in the Articulated View. It is widely assumed that the utterance of a simple sentence, like (3), expresses one single, simple proposition giving the truth-conditions of the utterance. In the actual case, the utterance of a simple sentence like (3) expresses two propositions, or one complex proposition (Richard), identified with the truth-conditions of the utterance. The logical independence of the two expressed propositions, or the complex proposition (Richard), is an undesirable aspect, one introducing a crack in the semantic cohesion expected from these sentences. The syn-

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tactic complexity and sophistication of CDs as referring expressions should be accounted for rather than analyzed away.

How does the Articulated View deal with misdemonstrations? According to Richard's picture, my utterance of

(4) That student is smart

literally expresses a complex singular proposition,

<MARY, being student . MARY, being smart>.

We have two independent propositions connected by a conjunction. Because one of the conjuncts is false, the complex singular proposition is also false. According to Dever's picture, the utterance of (4) literally expresses one false proposition, <MARY, being student>, and one true proposition, <MARY, being smart>, and the truth-value of such an utterance is not clearly assessible. As we saw, according to Corazza, it is true because what he calls the principal proposition is true.

Braun's (1995) and Borg's (2000) Kaplanian view on CDs rejects the Lexical Simplicity Assumption and preserves both the Singular Reference Assumption and the idea that CDs are referring terms. However, it loses semantic stability. Call it the Character View on CDs. According to that picture, a CD is a lexically complex referring term having a complex structured character or linguistic meaning. Here "that" in a CD does not behave like a bare demonstrative designating an object—the CD, *not the bare demonstrative*, designates an object—and the linguistic meaning of the nominal is introduced into the character or meaning of the CD. However, the condition determined by the nominal is not echoed in the content of CD sentences in context. According to the Character View, the content of a CD sentence in context is a singular proposition containing the referent of the CD and the condition determined by the predicate occurring in that sentence. For example, an utterance of (3) expresses a proposition containing the unique designated car and the condition of being yellow. This fits the Singular Reference Assumption. However, there is a price to be paid. Intuitively, "that" is a bare demonstrative referring to the designated object, and normally the nominal semantically contributes a condition to the semantic value of a sentence containing it. According to the Character View, "that" in "that student" does not refer—"that student" does—and the nominal does not semantically introduce a condition into the content or truth-conditions of the sentence in context. The demonstrative "that" and the nominal do not have their standard semantic behaviour and do not play their standard semantic role (i.e., referring to an object and introducing a condition) when they occur in a complex demonstrative (see also Dever 2001 and Predelli 2001 on that). Semantic

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Stability is lost because the nominal does not introduce a condition. This picture raises some difficulties. On the one hand, one does not want the concatenation of these two terms to alter their semantic behaviour and to go against our basic intuitions concerning the semantics of "that" and the semantics of the nominal. On the other hand, as a rule the components and structure of a complex term are echoed in both the character and the content of that term. In the case under examination here, the components and structure of the CD are echoed in its character but not in its content: the nominal does not introduce a condition into the content.[5] I find these aspects of the Character View objectionable. They go against some very simple, widely shared semantic principles.

Finally, we want utterances to have both truth-conditions and cognitive values. In a Fregean understanding, the cognitive value of an utterance is a proposition one can recognize, thanks to one's linguistic competence, and accept or reject. In that respect, the cognitive value of an utterance cannot be a singular proposition making true the sentence or the utterance. Otherwise, my utterance of "I am sick" and your utterance of "you are sick," where I am the referent of the utterance of "you," would have the same cognitive value, and this is not plausible.

If, on the Character View, the nominal does not introduce any condition in the content, if the content, a singular proposition, is the only available proposition, and if the cognitive value of an utterance is a proposition-like entity, then the nominal does not contribute to the cognitive value of the utterance. My utterance of "That is yellow" and "That BMW is yellow" would have the same cognitive value, and that is not plausible. A natural reaction is to rely on the character of a CD to discriminate between cognitive values (see Braun 1995 and Kaplan 1989a). Since on that view the bare demonstrative and the nominal jointly contribute to the character of a CD, two CDs containing different nominals will differ in meaning. Intuitively, the meaning or character of a CD makes a difference to its cognitive value, and explains difference in cognitive value. This is not controversial. However, the linguistic meaning of an expression as a type is its character, not the content or proposition expressed by an utterance. The character of a sentence determines a proposition, but it is not a proposition. Neither is it a truth-valuable entity or something one accepts or rejects. Now, one does not want an utterance of

(5) That faculty member is smart

and an utterance of

(6) That philosopher is smart

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to have the same cognitive value even if they both express the same singular proposition. *Prima facie*, the nominal makes a cognitive difference, one that should be echoed in a proposition. In the Character View, utterances of (5) and (6) differ in cognitive value and have the same truth-conditions. However, this difference in cognitive value cannot be cashed out in propositional terms.[6] The challenge here is to extract from the linguistic meaning or character of the CD a truth-conditional item, an element fit to be introduced in a proposition. Unfortunately, a two-value semantics like Kaplan's does not leave room for that item. The Reflexive-Referential Theory does, or so I shall argue. One might reject the idea that the cognitive value of a sentence or an utterance is a proposition and thus suggest a different, non-Fregean, non-propositional notion of cognitive value. The suggestion is that the cognitive value of a sentence is identical with its linguistic meaning. However, that suggestion implies that, as distinct from Perry's view, all utterances of "that car is yellow" have the same cognitive value insofar as all tokens have the same linguistic meaning. This does not seem to be right. Now I am not saying that a non-Fregean position cannot be developed and I do not offer my criticism as a knock-down argument against the Character View. I will let the advocates of that view flesh out their point. I just assume a specific notion of cognitive value and suggest a more appealing alternative.

How does the Character View deal with misdemonstrations like (4)?

(4) That student is smart.

According to Braun, it literally expresses a false proposition. Braun (1995) explains away our intuitions concerning the truth-conditions of my utterance of (4) by invoking Kripke's speaker's reference/semantic reference distinction: *I* expresses a true proposition even if the sentence I uttered does not. Braun proposes a pragmatic account for our intuitions concerning misdemonstrations.

A Reflexive-Referential Suggestion

The views on the market face well-known difficulties, but I do not want to focus on them. Neither do I contend that these problems cannot be solved one way or another. I want to explore a different option. The Articulated View has two desirable features: it preserves (i) semantic stability and (ii) the idea that the nominal is cognitively significant, in a Fregean understanding of this notion, since it is part of an expressed proposition. But it rejects the idea that CDs are referring terms. In contrast, the Character View has one desirable feature: it preserves the idea that CDs are referring terms. But it does not fare very well with respect to (i) or (ii). As I mentioned, on that view misdemonstrations are not semantically accounted for but pragmatically explained. A semantic analysis would have much in

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its favour. As a rule, semantic accounts should be preferred over pragmatic explanations. I cannot argue for that principle here, but it is widely shared by philosophers of language. I contend that the Singular Reference Assumption, the Semantic Stability Assumption, and the idea that CDs are referring terms are compatible. I offer a suggestion following from an independently motivated view on the semantics of context-sensitive referring terms. The suggestion also accounts for our intuitions concerning misdemonstrations in semantic terms.

Richard's, as well as Dever's and Corazza's, Multiple Proposition View is a syntactic approach to CDs. It assigns CD sentences a logical form breaking apart CDs, distinguishes different sentences, and then gives the truth-conditions of these sentences in context. CD sentences express many propositions for syntactic reasons. As a consequence, CDs are excluded from the list of referring terms. Perry introduces a suggestion according to which an utterance of a sentence expresses many propositions for semantic, rather than syntactic, reasons. It is also a "Multiple Proposition View." Now, on the Reflexive-Referential Theory, expressing many propositions is a general semantic feature of utterances, and it is not introduced to deal with the specific problems raised by complex demonstratives and CD sentences. In that respect, the framework is available to account for the many propositions an utterance, like an utterance of a CD sentence, expresses and no new analysis is needed. In addition, from that point of view the propositions expressed by an utterance are semantically related and exhibit a strong cohesion not found in the Articulated View.

The Reflexive-Referential picture is not introduced to deal with complex demonstratives, but it nicely accounts for complex demonstratives. It also accounts for the role of the nominal and makes sense of our intuitions concerning misdemonstrations. Let us consider an utterance of (3) and examine the contents expressed. Now, I want to add one detail not found in Perry's view. In order to preserve the structure of a complex demonstrative in the contents expressed by a CD utterance, I will introduce structure-indicating devices into the propositions expressed by a CD utterance. A comma distinguishes what belongs to the semantic contribution of the referring term from what belongs to the semantic contribution of the predicate. This device is standard and is not very controversial, distinguishing the semantic contribution of the referring term from that of the predicate. Indexicals have a complex meaning. Still, indexicals lack syntactic structure. Because indexicals lack syntactic structure, no structure is exhibited by what indexicals express in propositions. Things are different with complex demonstratives. A CD is a complex referring term having both a structure and a complex meaning. That structure and semantic complexity are reflected in the propositions expressed. We also want to capture the difference between structured and unstructured referring terms. If we do not do so, then our picture will fail to take into account

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the semantic differences between unstructured referring terms like "I" and structured referring terms like "that man talking to Mary." A set of angle brackets distinguishes what is semantically contributed by "that" from what is semantically contributed by the nominal in a complex demonstrative—a condition. We end up with propositions reflecting the logical form of the sentence. I utter (3). Suppose that you understand the language and grasp the content M of (3), but set aside what is specific about the utterance. You understand that

Content M< [One object x most salient to the speaker of "that" in c]
[x is a car], x is yellow>, u

In plain English, it means that an object is salient to the speaker of "that" in the context, that that object is a car, and that it is yellow. U is just any utterance. Focusing on the specific utterance, one can drop generality from content M and obtain the reflexive content of the specific utterance *u*.

Content C < [One object x most salient to the speaker of *u*]
[x is a car], x is yellow>

The reflexive content is a proposition and, hence, a truth-valuable entity. It is also the cognitive value of the utterance (see Perry 2001, p. 15). Different utterances of (3) will have different reflexive contents and, hence, different cognitive values. Different utterances of CDs containing different nominals will also differ in cognitive value because the nominals are different and introduce different conditions in Content C. This fits our intuition that different CDs, because they contain different nominals, have different cognitive values. It also captures the Fregean intuitions that there is mode of presentation under which the speaker thinks of the object referred to by the CD, for example, as being a car. The nominal has more than a pragmatic role because it contributes to the cognitive value of the utterance. This is not a role assigned to the nominal by Larson and Segal. It is also useful to help the hearer identify the designated object. This is the role assigned to the nominal by Larson and Segal. The nominal preserves its standard semantic contribution, a condition, and contributes to the truth-conditions of a proposition an utterance of (3) expresses, i.e., the content C. According to the Singular Reference Assumption, the referring term introduces an object into the official truth-conditions or content D, and the latter contains an object as well as the condition determined by the predicate. The utterance of "that" introduces an object into the truth-conditions of the utterance of (3): one object x most salient to the speaker of *u*. How salience is indicated in specific cases (gesture, intention, and what not) is not part of the semantics of bare demonstratives and is irrelevant to my point. The bare demonstrative is actually mute on how

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salience is indicated. Suppose that you know enough about the context to identify the relevant object, a specific car. It is introduced into the content D. The referring term, "that car," has completed its referring role and brought in its contribution to the content D. We now have the official truth-conditions of my utterance of (3),

Content D <CAR, being yellow>.

CAR is the object introduced into content D. On hearing an utterance of (3) and on reaching the content D, one knows under what conditions my utterance is true. The nominal contributes to the content C, but is not found in the content D: the object designated by the utterance of "that" fills the gap opened by the CD, and the nominal is semantically inert with respect to the content D, not contributing anything to the content D. If CDs are complex referring terms and if the Singular Reference Assumption is correct, then the nominal in a CD introduces an element for which there is no room in Content D, because the form of the proposition expressed by a referring-term sentence does not make room for the condition determined by the nominal. I emphasize that the nominal brings in its standard semantic contribution, a condition, and that the latter is part of content C. However the condition contributed by the nominal is excluded from the content D by the very form of the singular proposition. I will say that the nominal in a CD overarticulates a constituent. Let me explain.

Overarticulating Constituents

A constituent is articulated if it is both provided by a lexical element and part of the truth-conditions of an utterance. As I understand it, articulation is about the official content or content D. It does not concern reflexive truth-conditions, but what in the *world* makes an utterance true. My utterance of (1) expresses a proposition D having all its constituents articulated because each echoes a lexical item. All versions of the Articulated View take the condition determined by the clause of a CD to be an articulated constituent, part of the truth-conditions of the utterance. The Character View does not. Unarticulation recently entered the philosophical landscape. A constituent is unarticulated if it is not provided by a lexical item in the sentence but it is required to have a truth-valuable entity or proposition D. Unarticulation is also about content D. For example, the content D expressed by an utterance of "It is raining" contains an unarticulated constituent, a place, because there is no term for a location in this sentence (Perry 2001), and a place is required to have a truth-valuable non-reflexive proposition, the content D. That constituent, the place, does not echo a lexical item in the sentence uttered. I want to introduce the notion of overarticulation. Let us say that a constituent is overarticulated

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if it is semantically given by a lexical element in a sentence, is part of content C but is not part of the truth-conditions or content D of an utterance of that sentence. The lexical item finds no echo in the content D. Let us go back to complex demonstratives.

The linguistic meaning of the nominal is not ignored by anyone understanding the meaning of (3), and the condition determined by the nominal is part of content M. We do not want to say that a nominal is not cognitively significant. A speaker uttering (2) and a speaker uttering (3) are making utterances differing in cognitive value. The content C contains no object and echoes the linguistic meaning of the terms occurring in a sentence. The nominal in a CD introduces a condition into content C, hence preserving semantic stability and making clear the difference in the cognitive value of utterances of (2) and (3). The cognitive value of an utterance is the content C of the utterance. The content D is the aspect of the world making my utterance true. It contains objects connected to referring terms. Content D is what philosophers have in mind when they say that utterances of sentences containing referring terms express singular propositions containing the object referred to by the referring term. Complex demonstratives are referring terms having a structure and components, and the Singular Reference Assumption leaves room for only one truth-conditional element in the content D expressed by an utterance of a CD sentence. This element is the object introduced by a referring term, the CD, and not a condition introduced by a nominal. The nominal in a CD introduces an overarticulated constituent: it is semantically relevant and is echoed in the cognitive value of the utterance. The nominal semantically contributes a condition (to content C) and in that sense semantic stability is preserved. However, it does not introduce any constituent or condition in content D. The reason why it does not has nothing to do with the semantics of CDs, but follows from CDs having a structure, echoed in Content C, and the Singular Reference Assumption, a view on the official truth-conditions of utterances of sentences containing referring terms. Let me rephrase what I wrote earlier: if complex demonstratives are complex referring terms, and if the nominal semantically contribute a condition, then the Singular Reference Assumption implies that the nominal in a CD introduces an *overarticulated* constituent, that is, an element for which there is no room in Content D or official truth-conditions of an utterance of a CD sentence. I want to emphasize that the nominal is both cognitively significant and helpful in identifying the designated object.[7]

Back to Misdesmonstrations

Suppose that I utter (4) and designate a faculty member. In understanding the language, you grasp the meaning of the sentence.

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Content M < [One object x most salient to the speaker of "that" in c]
[x is a student] , x is smart>, u

Focusing on the specific utterance *u*, you get reflexive truth-conditions.

Content C < [One object x most salient to the speaker of *u*]
[x is a student], x is smart>

Knowing more about the context of utterance, you reach non-reflexive truth-conditions, the official content.

Content D < MARY , being smart>

You know that I am wrong because the object in the content D does not fit what I think about it, the content C. There is a mismatch between my cognitive life (Content C)—I believe that one object x most salient to me is a student, and has the property of being smart—and the world (Content D)—I say of Mary, who is not a student, that she is smart. The content D my utterance expresses is true. My utterance does not express a false proposition or no proposition at all. I am just wrong about a property of Mary.

I need no extra referring intentions to designate the speaker, even if the latter does not satisfy the condition determined by the nominal, and you need not identify extra referring intentions to identify the object I designated, even if she [Mary] does not satisfy the condition determined by the nominal. This picture also explains why on hearing a speaker uttering "That *Claraveriadelphus truncatus* is great" and designating an object, one can identify the singular proposition or content D expressed even if one does not understand the meaning of "*Claraveriadelphus truncatus.*" Consider my utterance of "That *Claraveriadelphus truncatus* is great." Thanks to linguistic meaning, we have:

Content M < [One object x most salient to the speaker of "that" in c]
[x is a *Claraveriadelphus truncatus*] , x is great>, u

You know that "*Claraveriadelphus truncatus*" means something, but you do not know what it means. Focusing on the utterance *u*, you reach the reflexive content.

Content C < [One object x most salient to the speaker of *u*]
[x is a *Claraveriadelphus truncatus*], x is great>

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As far as the content D is concerned, you can ignore the meaning of the nominal and its cognitive value and, from "one object x is most salient to the speaker of *u*," you can reach an object, whatever the nominal:

Content D < Î , being great>

where Î is the mushroom. From your point of view, the cognitive value, or content C, of the utterance is poor because you do not understand the meaning of "*Claraveriadelphus truncatus*" and the cognitive significance of that expression. You would neither accept nor reject the Content C. Still, you have the content D of the utterance.

Subcontents

Philosophers working on this topic want to capture some intuitive relations. For example, from an utterance of (4) one can infer that one object salient to the speaker is a student. This is a proposition captured by the Articulated View. One can get it from the subject term in content C. I call it the subcontent C of the utterance

Subcontent C of (4) < [One object x most salient to the speaker of *u*]
[x is a student] >

Placing that subpart of C in a context, and identifying the referent of "one object x most salient to the speaker of *u*," you get a false singular proposition. I will say that one can extract such a proposition and I call it the subcontent D of the utterance.

Subcontent D of (4) < Mary, being student>

This is not the official content or the content D of (4). Notice also that because it is extracted from subcontent C, it is not on a par with content D. My view coheres with Corazza's, Dever's, and Richard's, (who contend that this is the background proposition). One can obtain that proposition by semantic, rather than syntactic, means. The extracted singular proposition is not the official content of the utterance, and that is why the utterance has clear truth-conditions. The content D contains the object referred to by the utterance of the demonstrative and the conditions determined by the predicate.

Content D of (4) < MARY , being smart>

This is what Corazza calls the principal proposition, and what Perry calls the official content of the utterance.

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Let us compare the Character View, the Articulated View, and my suggestion. The Character View preserves the Singular Reference Assumption and the intuition that CDs are complex referring terms. However, it does not satisfy the Semantic Stability Assumption and does not clearly capture the cognitive significance of CD utterances. My suggestion takes CDs to be complex referring terms and captures the Singular Reference Assumption and semantic stability. It also gives a Fregean account of the cognitive significance of utterances of CD sentences. The Articulated View preserves the Singular Reference Assumption and semantic stability, and captures the cognitive significance of CD utterances. Unfortunately, it rejects the intuition that CDs are lexically complex referring terms. My picture preserves that intuition. Finally, the Articulated View does not account for the idea that the nominal is helpful to identify the object referred to. My view does. As distinct from the Articulated View and the Character View, it requires no modification in our intuitive understanding of CDs and CD sentences. My suggestion does not require abandoning the idea that CDs are lexically complex referring terms, or the idea that the bare demonstrative and nominal do not semantically behave in a standard way when occurring in a CD. My picture also follows from a comprehensive picture of context-sensitive referring terms. Dever's Articulated View is committed to a "many-propositions" stand, where these propositions are logically independent. The Reflexive-Referential View also introduces many propositions. However, the latter are not logically independent, accounting for the intuitive semantic cohesion found in CD sentences, and one single proposition plays the role of official truth-conditions of the utterance. I have a preference for logical dependence, semantic cohesion, and "one single proposition as official truth-conditions of utterances" theories.

Conclusion

Following the Singular Reference Assumption, an utterance of (3) expresses a singular proposition containing the designated object and the condition determined by the predicate. On my view, the utterance of "That" introduces an object filling the gap in the singular proposition, and there is no room for the condition determined by the nominal. If the Singular Reference Assumption is true, the form of the proposition expressed by a CD utterance blocks the condition contributed by the nominal from entering the content D. According to the view I am suggesting, the bare demonstrative in a CD introduces an object into the official truth-conditions of the utterance, and the Singular Reference Assumption is preserved. The nominal introduces a cognitively significant, but overarticulated, constituent because it fails to introduce a condition in content D or official content. Still, semantic stability is preserved and the condition introduced by

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the nominal is truth-conditionally relevant because it is relevant to the truth-conditions of content C.

Suppose that you hear an utterance of (3) and an utterance of

(7) That piece of junk is yellow,

where in both cases the same object is designated: your car. The content C of these utterances will differ because the nominal are different. The content D will be the same, even if you disagree with the nominal and can extract a false singular proposition from content C. The same mechanism explains why on hearing my utterance of (4), you smile. You identified both content C and content D, and saw the mismatch between my cognitive life and the world.

The Lexical Simplicity Assumption is false: CDs are complex referring expressions. The falsity of the Lexical Simplicity Assumption is compatible with the truth of the Singular Reference Assumption. I did not offer arguments in favour of the Singular Reference Assumption, and one may want to reject it. My cautious conclusion is that if one takes CDs to be syntactically complex referring terms, and if one wants to preserve the Singular Reference Assumption, then my suggestion is a serious, natural option. My view abandons the Lexical Simplicity Assumption. I prefer to say that it emphasizes and takes seriously the complexity of the referential devices in natural languages. Finally, it assumes an account of the semantics of bare demonstrative. My view on CDs is designed to fit the accounts on the market, and requires only that bare demonstratives are referring terms.

My article has not discussed problems connected to quantifiers, anaphora, and complex demonstratives (see Davies 1982). For instance, I do not examine sentences like "*The woman next to Paul* likes that man talking to *her*" or "That man talking to *Mary* admires *her*." I leave this topic for another occasion.[8]

Notes

1 Some (for instance, King 2001) contend that complex demonstratives are not referring terms. I do not want to address that issue.

2 I assume that bare demonstratives and the "that" occurring in a CD are tokens of the same type (see Johnson and Lepore 2002 for evidence).

3 I want to thank Arthur Sullivan for bringing this type of example to my attention.

4 I want to thank Rob Stainton for suggesting this argument.

5 Predelli (2001) raises serious objections to the Character View picture of CDs.

6 This problem with the Kaplanian account of indexicals is well known (see Perry 2001).

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7 Now the phenomenon of overarticulation is not confined to complex demonstratives; it is also characteristic of terms like "but," "however," and so on. These expressions are conventional implicature devices (see Frege 1892 and Grice 1989) famous for having a linguistic meaning—hence, on the present picture, introducing a component in the content M of an utterance containing a conventional implicature device—but lacking truth-conditional relevance—introducing no constituent into the content D expressed by an utterance. Unfortunately, I cannot explore this topic here, and I leave it for another occasion (see my "Conventional Implicature Revisited" manuscript).

8 I would like to thank Brendan Gillon, John Perry, and Arthur Sullivan for discussions. Catherine Wearing made very detailed comments on an early version of this article, and Rob Stainton sent me a heavily annotated later version. I am sure that I did not answer all their questions. The usual disclaimers apply. I dedicate this article to the memory of Nicolas Kaufmann.

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
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https://doi.org/10.1017/S0012217300003760 Published online by Cambridge University Press



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