DEMOCRATIZATION AND MULTILATERAL SECURITY

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I. INTRODUCTION

SUMMING up the first five years of democratic rule of his country in his address to Congress in May 1997, the president of Chile declared: "Only five years ago, Chile did not belong to any of the institutions that make up the basic system of arms control in the world. Today, we are members of the Tlatelolco Treaty, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and the Chemical Weapons Convention." He added, "with our participation in the APEC Summit, the Rio Group and the Mercosur, the extent and prestige of Chile's international presence become clear."[1]

Does democratization increase international commitment to multilateral security? Chile's multiple pledges and memberships in this area within its first five years of democratic governance seem to indicate a positive answer.[2] In this article I argue that democratic transitions increase the incentives of states to commit to multilateral security agreements and that this is observable in the rate at which new democracies ratify international treaties of arms control, nuclear nonproliferation, and disarmament. While there is a strong consensus among international legal scholars that regime type is a powerful determinant of states'

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[1] Speech by President Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle, addressing the Senate on May 21, 1997, on Chile's Presence and Prestige in the International Arena. *Revista Fuerzas Armadas y Sociedad*, January–June 2006.

[2] In addition to the multilateral security treaties mentioned by the Chilean president, the country also ratified the 1977 Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques (ENMOD) in 1994.

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external behavior,[3] few have considered how democratic transitions affect international cooperation,[4] despite well-documented research on essential differences between transitioning and consolidated regimes.[5]

New and old democracies differ because, in contrast to the consolidated regime, "the behavior of the newly elected government that has emerged from the democratic transition is [. . .] dominated by the problem of how to avoid democratic breakdown."[6] One standard consolidation strategy adopted by new democracies[7] is to invest in enhancing their international credentials or reputations.[8] Reputations are "the impression others hold about [a state's] preferences and abilities."[9] A positive reputation accomplishes two objectives. First, it signals to the international community that regime change effectively entailed a change of country type away from the past autocracy. Second, and more importantly, it exposes potential conspirators to the possibility of diplomatic and economic sanctions if they were to attempt to reverse the transition. This should reduce support from domestic groups because they see that there are now high international costs entailed in a return to authoritarianism.[10] Given this urgent need to establish positive credentials with the international community, I argue that an

[3] Numerous studies have shown democracies to be more willing than autocracies to commit to and comply with international regulations in human rights (Goodliffe and Hawkins 2006), the environment (Fredriksson and Gaston 2000), trade (Mansfield, Milner, and Rosendorff 2000), and finance (Simmons and Hopkins 2005).

[4] International legal commitments are, I argue, an essential dimension of the "cooperative behavior" of states (Gaubatz 2006, 44).

[5] Scholars who draw attention to the key differences between transitioning and consolidated democracies include Mansfield and Snyder 2002; Mansfield and Snyder 2005; Mansfield and Snyder 2009; Mansfield and Pevehouse 2006; Pevehouse 2005; and Milner and Kubota 2005. None of these studies, however, explains commitment in the sensitive area of international security treaties. Seminal research in comparative politics on democratic transitions include O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Przeworski 1991; Haggard and Kaufman 1995; and Linz and Stepan 1996.

[6] Linz and Stepan 1996, 5.

[7] Specifically, I define "new democracies" as states whose full democratic transition (competitive elections and guaranteed political rights) occurred within the last five years (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986). In the empirical section I create two more "windows" of democratization where the transition occurred within the last three or seven years.

[8] As noted by Mansfield and Pevehouse, "generally, transitional regimes face reputational problems, including the prospect that they lack restraint and cannot be trusted to honor commitments . . . [they] do not have an established track record of honoring or violating policy commitments, prompting considerable uncertainty about their reliability." Mansfield and Pevehouse 2006, 40.

[9] Tomz 2007, 10.

[10] In a recent study of competitive authoritarian regimes, Levitsky and Way find evidence across thirty-five countries "that incumbents' capacity to hold onto power—and the fate of competitive authoritarian regimes more generally—hinges primarily on . . . linkage to the West, or the density of ties (economic, political, diplomatic, social, and organizational) and cross-border flows (of capital, goods and services, people, and information) between particular countries and the United States and the European Union" (Levitsky and Way 2010, 23). In the present study, I argue that new democratic governments are aware of the importance of strengthening diplomatic and political ties with key international actors as a consolidation strategy.

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investment in a reputation for nonaggression—forged by adhering to treaties of arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament—offers high payoffs.[11] Consequently, I expect new democracies to be eager to take on multilateral security commitments.

Key international actors acknowledge and value these signals. In fact, since 1993 United States policy has explicitly linked nonproliferation commitments and support for democracy abroad. Specifically, "one of the three major principles to guide [U.S.] nonproliferation and export control policy" is "to strengthen US economic growth, democratization abroad, and international stability, [by] actively seek[ing] expanded trade and technology exchange with nations, including former adversaries, that abide by global non-proliferation norms."[12] When Chile and Argentina finally ratified the NPT in 1995, U.S. secretary of state Warren Christopher stated:

> Indeed, our region has attained an unprecedented level of cooperation on regional and global security issues. Argentina and Brazil have initiated dramatic new non-proliferation measures. Working together, the nations of our hemisphere also played a major role in shaping the worldwide consensus for the indefinite extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. But perhaps the most heartening aspect of dramatic progress in our hemisphere has been our collective commitment to democracy. Together, we have demonstrated that the democratic tide that has swept over this hemisphere will be defended.[13]

To test for the effect of democratization on commitment to multilateral security, I analyze the ratification patterns of 201 states for twenty major arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament treaties sponsored by the United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC) from 1959 to 2007.[14] To explain variation in rates of ratification, I use a survival

[11] In the theoretical section of this article, I explain why new democracies, in a rush to develop international credentials, cannot aspire to forge compliance-based reputations for resolve or honesty. These two types, on which the literature on international reputation tends to focus, require a state to make a long-term investment in compliant behavior. By committing to multilateral security treaties, new democracies can aim to forge a reputation in nonaggression with key international actors.

[12] Statement released by the White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Washington D.C., September 27, 1993. In U.S. Department of State, Defense Trade News. 1994. *The Bulletin of the Center for Defense Trade* 5, no. 1 (January). At http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/arms/defense_news/DTNv5n01.html, accessed March 15, 2011.

[13] Secretary of State Warren Christopher, "Embracing a New Consensus of the Americas." Address to the Council of the Americas, Washington D.C., May 22, 1995. At http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/briefing/dispatch/1995/html/Dispatchv6no21.html, accessed September 15, 2011.

[14] For the complete text and status of the treaties of interest, see http://www.un.org/disarmament/HomePage/treaty/treaties.shtml. The present study includes all but three of the nonproliferation and disarmament treaties sponsored by the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs. Because of significant missing data problems, I excluded the 1925 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare. The brand-new 2006 Treaty on a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in Central Asia and the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions were also excluded.

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model whose dependent variable is the time lapsed between the moment a treaty is opened to signature and the moment a country ratifies it. An active scholarship has emerged in recent years using survival models to explain whether and when states commit to multilateralism. Studies on international treaties in environmental policy, human rights, and finance[15] concur in taking the time of ratification as an indicator of states' willingness to commit and, by extension, to comply in the future.[16]

The central empirical finding of this study is consistent with the theoretical argument presented above: new democracies outpace old democracies and all autocracies in ratifying disarmament, arms control, and nonproliferation treaties that entail the greatest obligations.[17] This result holds and is robust when controlling for the effects of "lock-in,"[18] institutional, economic, and normative alternative explanations. This finding is also robust when controlling for the ratification rates of transitioning authoritarian regimes, which are indistinguishable from consolidated authoritarian regimes. I interpret the high ratification rates of new democracies as resulting from distinct reputational concerns. Thus, the main implication of this article is that across time and space new democrats share a consolidation strategy based on international security law. The question then follows: does it work? That is, does swift ratification of multilateral security treaties decrease the probability of democratic breakdown? I test this implication and find that indeed, the more a new democracy commits to arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament treaties, the less likely it is to experience a regime reversal. This finding carries normative implications for transitioning democracies, as it reveals the relationship between increased participation in international society and democratic survival. Furthermore, the present study makes an important contribution to the literature on democracy and stability as it offers evidence of a successful consolidation strategy.[19]

[15] For example, Fredriksson and Gaston 2000; Neumayer 2002; Goodliffe and Hawkins 2006; von Stein 2005; and Simmons and Hawkins 2005. The present study, however, does not examine compliance with multilateral security, only commitment—the formal *pledge* to comply with international legal obligations in this area.

[16] While compliance does not necessarily follow commitment, many scholars find that once states ratify, most comply with international agreements (Hurrell and Kingsbury 1992; Dorn and Scott 2000; and von Stein 2005).

[17] Consistent with signaling expectations—specifically that high-cost signals are more effective than low-costs ones—my research shows that new democracies are quicker than all others to commit to the multilateral security treaties with the greatest obligations and requirements.

[18] An alternative explanation, discussed and empirically tested in this study, is that countries, concerned with future policy reversals, sign treaties in order to "lock in" their policy preferences (Moravcsik 2000; Goodliffe and Hawkins 2006). In contrast to my argument, the main objective behind a lock-in strategy is to secure future policies. I argue, instead, that policies are a currency to gain support abroad and domestically.

[19] Przeworski et al. 2000; and Epstein et al. 2006.

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The article proceeds as follows. In Section II, I review the twenty multilateral arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament treaties of interest. In Section III, I present my theoretical argument in further detail. In Section IV, I formulate the main hypotheses of the study and discuss alternative explanations. In Section V, I describe the data and model specifications. In Section VI, I present study results. In Section VII, the implications of my argument (multilateral security commitments help secure democratic consolidation) are tested empirically. I conclude, in Section VIII, by discussing possible future research.

II. Treaties of Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament

The twenty multilateral treaties included in this study constitute the legal backbone of the international arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament regimes. Spanning more than four decades and sponsored by the United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC), these conventions proscribe the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (with a strong emphasis on nuclear weapons) and regulate arms control and disarmament. All except the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) have come into force.[20]

Eleven multilateral treaties regulate nuclear nonproliferation: the 1970 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) prohibits nuclear power in all its forms for nonnuclear weapons states (NNWS); the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) and the 1996 CTBT regulate nuclear explosions; and the 1961 Antarctic Treaty, the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, the 1972 Sea-Bed Treaty, and the 1984 Celestial Bodies Treaty ban the deployment of nuclear weapons in particular locations. The remaining four nuclear nonproliferation treaties are regional in scope and declare nuclear free zones in Latin America (the Tlatelolco Treaty, opened to signature in 1967), the South Pacific (the 1986 Rarotonga Treaty), Southeast Asia (the 1997 Bangkok Treaty), and Africa (the Pelindaba Treaty, opened to signature in 1996). The 1975 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and the 1997 Convention on Chemical Weapons (CWC) ban biological and chemical weapons of mass destruction. Finally, the rest regulate conventional armed forces and arms control. These are the 1978 Convention on Military Environmental Modification Technique (ENMOD), the 1983 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCWC), the

[20] By August 2010, 151 states had ratified the CTBT. Of the 44 states that need to ratify in order for the treaty to come into effect, 35 have done so. At www.ctbto.org, accessed August 20, 2010. At www.disarmament.un.org/TreatyStatus.nsf , accessed August 20, 2010.

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1992 Treaty on Conventional Arms Forces in Europe (CFE), the 1998 Inter-American Convention against the Illicit Manufacturing and Trafficking in Firearms (Inter-American Convention), the 1999 Convention on Anti-Personnel Mines (APM), the 2002 Treaty on Open Skies, and the 2002 Inter-American Convention on Transparency in Conventional Weapons Acquisition (Inter-American Convention on Transparency).[21] Table 1 provides information on the enactment date and the type of obligations entailed in the twenty treaties.

Established by Soviet-American consensus during the cold war, early multilateral security treaties were aimed mostly at two goals: (1)

TABLE 1
MULTILATERAL SECURITY TREATIES AND OBLIGATIONS

Treaty	*Entered into Force*	*Number of States Signed*	*Number of States*	*Information Exchange*	*Refrain from Activity*	*Destroy Stock*	*Outside Monitoring*	*Cost Index*
Antarctic	1961	12	45	1	1	0	0	2
Bangkok	1997	10	10	1	1	0	0	2
BWC	1975	109	156	1	1	1	0	3
CCWC	1983	50	103	1	1	0	0	2
Celestial Bodies	1984	11	15	1	1	0	0	2
CFE	1992	30	30	1	1	1	1	4
CTBT	not yet in force	177	142	1	1	1	1	4
CWC	1997	165	183	1	1	1	1	4
ENMOD	1978	48	73	1	1	0	0	2
IAC	1998	33	26	1	1	0	0	2
IAC	2002	20	11	1	0	0	0	1
Mine Ban	1999	133	156	1	1	1	0	3
NPT	1970	93	190	1	1	0	1	3
Open Skies	2002	28	31	1	0	0	1	2
Outer Space	1967	88	100	1	1	0	0	2
Pelindaba	2009	51	28	1	1	0	0	2
PTBT	1963	105	124	1	1	0	0	2
Rarotonga	1986	13	13	1	1	0	0	2
Sea Bed	1972	86	93	1	1	0	0	2
Tlatelolco	for each government individually	33	33	1	1	0	0	2

SOURCE: United Nations Office for Disarmament Affaires (UNODA).

[21] Treaty dates refer to the year of enactment, except for the Tlatelolco Treaty, the CTBT, and the Pelindaba Treaty.

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banning the transfer of atomic weapons from nuclear weapons states (NWS) to NNWS in order to contain horizontal proliferation and (2) prohibiting the deployment of these weapons in areas deemed "in the interest of all mankind."[22] Until the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, the two superpowers dealt with vertical proliferation—the increase in quality and quantity of nuclear stockpiles—through bilateral agreements.[23] With the end of the Cold War, sponsorship of multilateral security has expanded to include states other than the United States and Russia. For example, the initiative for the CTBT originally came from the Non-Aligned Movement of developing states in order to curb vertical proliferation, as nuclear explosions let states calibrate the yield of the bomb, improving its effectiveness.[24]

The type of actor promoting multilateral security has changed as well. International nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) and transnational coalitions made up of international organizations (IOs), INGOs, and states have campaigned for restrictions and bans on full categories of conventional and nonconventional weapons. The International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) is a good example of this type of recent sponsorship. Made up of a network of human rights NGOs and peace activists, the ICBL used their local and international ties to put pressure on state leaders to draft and commit to a world ban on antipersonnel mines.[25]

The increased number of actors promoting agreements in multilateral security raises the stakes associated with signing and ratifying these treaties. As the international audience grows larger, so do the benefits and costs derived from formal agreements. Perhaps the latter explains why the United States and the Russian Federation have not endorsed some of the more recent conventions, which incorporate horizontal *and* vertical targets of nonproliferation and disarmament. Thus far, the two countries have not committed to the APM treaty, and only Russia has ratified the CTBT. The U.S. has not ratified the two Inter-American Conventions either. The shift in ratification patterns of the U.S. and the Russian Federation—from treaty sponsors to treaty detractors—highlights the importance of examining state commitment to multilateral security not just across countries but over time as well. It speaks to the evolution of multilateral security, from treaties with

[22] The Antarctic Treaty. At www.disarmament.un.org/TreatyStatus.nsf, accessed March 15, 2009.

[23] The most significant Soviet-American agreements during the Cold War were the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I), START II, and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM). At www.armscontrol.org, accessed March 15, 2009.

[24] At www.ctbto.org, accessed March 15, 2009.

[25] At www.icbl.org, accessed March 15, 2009.

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mostly symbolic obligations (for example, the Outer Space Treaty) to treaties entailing significant implementation costs for countries across the globe (for example, the APM Convention). This change in pattern also confirms the importance of contrasting types of democracies (new and old), autocracies (new and old), economic development (developing states and major powers), and periods (Cold War and post–Cold War) when explaining commitment to multilateral security.

III. Theoretical Discussion

International Reputation as an Insurance Mechanism

Immediately after the first election that brings new democrats into office, they must quickly shift gears from campaign mode to consolidation mode in order to minimize the likelihood of authoritarian reversals. Typically, early democratic leaders have an "omnipresent fear, during the transition, and often long after political democracy has been installed, that a coup will be attempted and succeed."[26] Thus, they invest in consolidation efforts primarily out of concern for their immediate survival, as chances of regime reversal are high during the early years of the transition.[27] The new democrats need to signal domestic and international actors that democracy is "the only game in town."[28] The message is ultimately intended to signal to potential regime conspirators that the costs of accessing office by nondemocratic means have gone up.[29] Consolidation efforts require "much more than elections and markets" and permeate most policy decisions by newly elected elites in internal and external security matters.[30] During the early years of democratization, neither the domestic nor the international credentials of the new regime are yet established. New democrats can use reputation—how others perceive an actor, whether a state, a firm or a leader—as leverage for regime consolidation. In this section, I explain how new democracies invest in their international reputation for nonaggression

[26] O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986, 23.

[27] Mansfield and Snyder 2005.

[28] Linz and Stepan 1996, 7. See also Huntington 1991; Linz and Stepan 1996; O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986; and Przeworski 1991.

[29] My argument is similar to the one recently advanced by Simmons and Danner 2010, who examine how low-credibility states take on international commitments in order to credibly signal domestic groups their intent to reduce civil violence. However, in the present study I find evidence of shared behavior among young democracies but not among new autocracies, even though both should have low credibility given regime age. Thus, in contrast to Simmons and Danner, my argument focuses on the particular consolidation incentives that new democracies have and how these incentives affect their international behavior.

[30] Linz and Stepan 1996, 7.

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by eagerly committing to arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament treaties.

Major domestic political realignments, such as those resulting from democratization, have been found to explain states' efforts at reputation building. In his study of international financial negotiations, Tomz argues that domestic political change "makes reputations fragile and helps account for the termination and resumption of international cooperation."[31] This is so because domestic change typically entails a shift in policy preferences by the government, thus prompting a reevaluation of how international actors perceive the state. Like new firms entering a market, democracies seek "to manage their reputations, with initial periods of high investment in reputation building possibly being followed by subsequent periods in which the reputation is sustained with lower investment levels."[32] Accordingly, we should expect new democracies to behave differently from established ones in the matter of reputation-induced behavior.

A new autocracy, by contrast, would be like an inept firm, which would "find it more profitable to either buy high reputation and deplete them [inept firms] or buy low reputation."[33] This could explain the finding that autocratic regimes with dire records on human rights violations still sign on to the human rights treaties.[34] That is, these autocracies are trying to buy high reputations regardless of whether they expect to comply with the agreements. However, human rights treaties differ from the nonproliferation agreements of interest here. As a strategy, buying high reputation and depleting it is risky in matters of multilateral security, as the violation of any of the treaties under study could entail the involvement of the UN Security Council. Given the different costs associated with these two types of treaties, I would expect security treaties to have greater screening power than human rights treaties. That is, security treaties will probably attract states that anticipate compliance. I return to the screening versus constraining debate on treaties in the conclusion.

How can new democracies develop international reputations when they lack an "established track record"?[35] I argue that they accomplish this by rushing to sign and ratify multilateral security treaties. As international signaling devices, treaties are "designed, by long-standing convention, to raise the credibility of promises by staking national

[31] Tomz 2007, 14.
[32] Mailath and Samuelson 2001, 416.
[33] Mailath and Samuelson 2001, 415.
[34] Vreeland 2008.
[35] Mansfield and Pevehouse 2006, 140.

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reputation on adherence to them."[36] Through treaty ratification, new democracies send two interrelated signals to the international community: (1) their willingness to comply with the terms of the treaty, in contrast to the "states that do not ratify a treaty [which] generally do not comply with the standards of that treaty,"[37] and (2) a "change of management" signal that distinguishes them from authoritarian predecessors less willing to commit and less likely to comply. Signals need to be costly and clear to be most effective in raising the credibility of the sender (or the new democracy) and change its reputation.[38]

An investment in reputation is more likely to pay off in international relations when two conditions are present. First, given "the absence of private information about [the] preferences" of a government, others use the state's reputation to figure out its type.[39] Type communicates the intentions behind a country's international behavior.[40] Incomplete information about actors' motivations, especially when there is increased uncertainty surrounding the country, makes devoting resources to reputation building a valuable enterprise.[41] Second, under conditions of competition we expect actors to invest in reputation,[42] which serves as a partner selection mechanism.[43] States invest in their reputation in order to be chosen by others, much as firms invest in reputation to differentiate themselves from competing firms so that consumers will pick them.[44]

[36] Simmons 2000, 821. See also Fredriksson and Gaston 2000. Ultimately states' credibility is derived from states' *compliance* with international commitments. However, verifying compliance takes time. New democracies need to begin forging a reliable international reputation from day one in order to help secure the transition. The ratification of multilateral security treaties helps accomplish this goal because "concluding an international agreement places a transitional state's reputation on the line" (Mansfield and Pevehouse 2006, 144).

[37] Morrow 2002, S42.

[38] Fearon 1997; Morrow 1999. New democracies should want to send costly signals to the international community in order to effectively establish a reputation for nonaggression. When states take on commitments that entail high costs, suspicions that the actor might be bluffing go down. Thus, if the logic of signaling holds, type of treaty by cost should help predict whether new democracies will adhere to them. In other words, we should observe young democracies flocking to ratify security treaties with the most onerous obligations at greater rates than they ratify the agreements with fewer requirements. I explain how I operationalize treaty costs and test their effects on the ratification rates of all regimes in the following sections. I thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out and suggesting the empirical test.

[39] Walter 2009, 14.

[40] Morrow 1999; Simmons 2000.

[41] Walter 2009; Tomz 2007.

[42] Below I clarify who new democracies are competing against. It is not against other states but rather against domestic autocrats, that is, those that have recently lost the elections but still exert power.

[43] Pinyol et al. 2008; Sabater, Paolucci, and Conte 2006.

[44] Mailath and Samuelson 2001; Rindova, Petkova, and Kotha 2007. While there are different conditions under which we could expect states to invest in their credentials, I argue that incomplete information and competition are two conditions that provide the *necessary* incentives for states to pursue reputation-building behavior.

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Reputations function as a credit rating: an unreliable reputation is a liability; a credible one is an asset.[45]

Because other states lack information on the newly elected government and given existing evidence on the potential for increased belligerency by states that never manage to complete the democratic transition,[46] democratization is often insufficient to communicate a new type—one that is different from the previous authoritarian government—to the international community. For example, the democratization of Argentina and Brazil (in 1983 and 1985, respectively) was not enough to put to rest the concerns of major powers regarding the two countries' nuclear programs and the potential for an arms race in the Southern Cone of Latin America.[47] According to a top Brazilian official, after democratization the international nuclear community was uncertain as to how to classify the two countries. Under previous military rule, both countries were considered international "bad boys." After democratization, however, "the international nuclear community could not determine whether [they] were good or bad boys. For a while there, [they] were in a limbo, and only became 'good boys' once the Non Proliferation Treaty was signed."[48]

Authoritarian threats do not disappear with democratization. Rarely is the previous incumbent vanished from the national political scene or the institutional autocrat (for example, the military or a single dominant party) immediately dismantled. To deter them from trying to reverse the transition, new civilian leaders seek to garner good will with key global players in order to increase the international costs of a democratic breakdown. The logic behind this is simple: by strengthening diplomatic ties in a high-value policy area, new democrats expect domestic conspirators to anticipate possible diplomatic and economic sanctions if they were to attempt a coup. Recent research has found evidence across thirty-five countries that diplomatic ties with key international actors, such as the United States and the European Union, correlate positively with democratization.[49] Examining the interna-

[45] The credit analogy is a particularly fitting one. New regimes need to establish credibility quickly to engage in negotiations with international actors. These negotiations are often critical, among other things, to secure financial aid (Alesina and Dollar 2000; Kosack 2003), new loans (Schultz and Weingast 2003), and trade agreements (Schimmelfennig, Engert, and Knobel 2003). For a reputational theory of sovereign debt negotiations, see Tomz 2007. A similar argument is developed by Simmons and Hawkins 2005, who assert that governments ratify treaties to increase their credibility when facing market actors who doubt them.

[46] Mansfield and Snyder 2005.

[47] Alcañiz 2000.

[48] Dr. Laercio Vinhas, head of International Relations of the Brazilian National Nuclear Energy Commission (CNEN). Interview with the author, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, April 2000.

[49] Levitsky and Way 2010.

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tional relations of electorally competitive autocracies, the authors find that "where linkage was low, as in most of Africa and the former Soviet Union, external democratizing pressure was weaker."[50]

President Frei's address to the Chilean Congress, with which this article opens, is a clear example of the causal logic presented above. In his speech, the president compares the first civilian government to the military dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet, stating that through its new international commitments and in only five years Chile has acquired a world "presence" and "prestige." The statement sends a clear signal to the autocrats in the country: if they were to attempt to reverse democratic rule, it would become difficult to secure international support.[51] Thus, one critical way in which new democrats seek reassurance that the democratic transition will be supported and not jeopardized is by investing in their international reputation.

Given that there are many types of reputation, why do new democracies invest in one for nonaggression? The extant literature tends to concentrate on two types of reputation: for resolve (or toughness) and for honesty (or reliability), both of which are premised on a state's particular compliant behavior.[52] As new democratic governments are most interested in keeping the outgoing autocrat in check, would they get the highest return from investing in a reputation for resolve? To build a reputation for resolve, the government must be willing to consider using force if the other party does not acquiesce in the actor's stated position.[53] This kind of reputation seems too costly to be adopted by democratizing governments and is inconsistent with the extreme cautiousness and apprehension with which the majority of new democrats deal with the outgoing autocrat. For example, most third wave democracies chose *not* to go beyond investigating the past to prosecute the culprits, regardless of the magnitude of human rights violations committed under the authoritarian regime.[54] I take this as evidence that the newly elected leadership seeks to secure the transition by avoiding conflict. By contrast, a government can develop a reputation for honesty by showing consistency between its pronouncements and its actions.

[50] Levitsky and Way 2010, 181.

[51] International recognition can have a significant effect on the survival of new regimes and states. Recent examples of countries that experienced short-lived autocracies in part because they failed to be recognized by other states include the 2002 coup against Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez (see http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/latin_america/jan-june02/venezuela_4-15.html) and the 2009 coup against Honduran president Manuel Zelaya (see http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=49593).

[52] Chiozza and Choi 2003; Downs and Jones 2002; Sartori 2005; Walter 2009; Tomz 2007; and Guisinger and Smith 2002.

[53] Sartori 2005.

[54] Pion-Berlin 1994.

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Sartori argues that states invest in their credibility "to maintain their ability to use diplomacy in the future."[55] This kind of investment would thus serve new democracies well in advancing their consolidation goals, as it would create diplomatic good will toward them. However, it takes time to build a reputation for honesty or reliability. A government cannot just declare itself honest and expect the international community or domestic actors to believe it; rather, "a state acquires a reputation for honesty when others observe it acting honestly."[56]

I expect new democracies to invest in a reputation for nonaggression because other states assign great reputational value to behavior that signals peacefulness—such as acceding to multilateral security treaties.[57] For example, when Brazil finally ratified the NPT and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, their "good boys" status was acknowledged by the UN secretary-general, who stated:

> You have taken a lead in disarmament. . . .Your exemplar has recently taken on renewed and momentous significance. At a time when events in South Asia have resurrected the prospect of the nuclear arms race, Brazil and other major Powers of the region have rightly been held up as beacons of maturity for abstaining from vying for membership of the nuclear club.[58]

A more recent example involves the U.S. secretary of state praising the leadership of the Ukrainian president in international nonproliferation. Secretary Clinton stated that this "leadership elevated Ukraine's standing in the global community, bringing full circle a process that began in 1994 with Ukraine's historic decision to give up nuclear weapons [by acceding to the NPT]."[59]

[55] Sartori 2005, 5.

[56] It might also call for having to follow through with threats, as a country cannot be caught bluffing and still maintain a reputation for honesty (Sartori 2005, 14).

[57] There is a long history of the United States, its Western allies, and the United Nations pressuring nonsignatories of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and rewarding those who do ratify. This pressure has included sanctions, export controls, and revising technology transfer agreements while the rewards have ranged from high-level praise that accrues as symbolic capital to privileged partnerships, such as the designation of Argentina as a Major Non-Nato Ally (MNNA) to the U.S. immediately after the country ratified the NPT (Carasales 1997; Alcañiz 2000; Redick, Carasales, and Wrobel 1995).

[58] Kofi Annan, United Nations Press Release SG/SM/6637, July 13, 1998, in *Disarmament Diplomacy* no. 28 (1998). At http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd28/28brazil.htm, accessed March 15, 2011. Similarly, when Argentina ratified the NPT, President Clinton issued the following statement: "I warmly welcome Argentina's accession to the NPT . . . . Argentina has taken an historic step to reinforce its own security and to unite with 170 other NPT parties in the global effort to stem the spread of nuclear weapons. I salute President Menem and his government for their foresight and courage in making Argentina a champion for nonproliferation in Latin America and around the world." Statement released by the White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Washington, D.C., February 10, 1995. At http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/npt/chron.htm, accessed March 15, 2011.

[59] Tellingly, Secretary Clinton linked Ukraine's advancements in nonproliferation to the country's democratization process when she said next: "Now we are also looking to Ukraine to continue the commitments that President Yanukovych has made to transparent government, strong rule of law,

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Ratifying arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament treaties helps forge a reputation for nonaggression, as all of these agreements heavily regulate the use of conventional and nonconventional weapons, either by banning them outright or by limiting their deployment. Reputation building explains precisely why the new democratic government in South Africa saw in 1995 many "multilateral-political advantages" in quickly ratifying the Chemical Weapons Convention; "*early* ratification of the Convention together with South Africa's increasingly important role in matters pertaining to the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in Africa, would further strengthen South Africa's leadership role . . . [and its] international credibility."[60] Investment in a reputation for nonaggression also explains the flurry of international security commitments taken on by new democracies like Nigeria—a country that ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Mine Ban Treaty, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and the regional Pelindaba Treaty within two years of its 1999 democratic transition[61]—as well as Chile, during its first post-Pinochet democratic administration, as described above. Evidently, compliance still matters. But in contrast to a reputation for honesty, commitments in security treaties can begin to signal nonaggression. Ultimately, compliance in this area should establish a reputation for honesty or reliability.

IV. Hypotheses and Controls

If democratic transitions increase the incentives of states to cooperate in multilateral security, this should be observable in the rate at which new democracies ratify international treaties of arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament. Thus, the main hypothesis of this study is stated as follows:

> —H1. Immediately after democratization, the likelihood of ratifying multilateral security treaties (hazard rate) will significantly increase, beyond the expected rates displayed by both older democracies and all autocracies.

protection of freedom of speech and media." In "Secretary Clinton Emphasizes U.S. Commitment To Broadening, Deepening U.S.-Ukraine Relationship," February 2011. At http://blogs.state.gov/index.php/site/entry/clinton_us-ukraine, accessed March 15, 2011.

[60] Explanatory Memorandum Concerning Ratification of the Convention on the Prohibition on the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction. No. M 413-1995. Library of Parliament, Cape Town, South Africa. Italics added.

[61] President Olusegun Obasanjo also pursued other reputation-building strategies as he strongly advocated the expansion of the permanent membership of the United Nations Security Council to include "at least two permanent seats" for Africa given "its track record of contributing to the maintenance of international peace and security." President Obasanjo's first address as a democratic leader on September 23, 1999, to the United Nations General Assembly. At http://www.nigerianembassy-chile.org/government/speeches/xnewyork.shtml, accessed March 15, 2009.

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The twenty conventions analyzed here differ greatly in their obligations, as they require states to commit to refrain from some activity in the future (creating opportunity costs for ratifying countries), dismantle existing technology or weaponry (creating implementation costs), or submit to outside monitoring (creating sovereignty costs).[62] If in fact new democracies are engaged in a signaling game with key actors of the international community and they are ratifying these treaties to signal their commitment to being good, peaceful world citizens, then they should adhere more rapidly to costlier security treaties.[63] Thus, the second hypothesis follows.[64]

> —H2. The ratification rate at which new democracies outpace old democracies and all autocracies will be greater for high-cost treaties.

The third hypothesis of the study tests the "lock in" argument, which explains the international behavior of states based on the governments' need to lock in policy choices today, limiting the discretion of future actors in charge.[65] According to this explanation, new democracies "turn to international enforcement when an international commitment effectively enforces the policy preferences of a particular government at a particular point in time against future domestic political alternatives."[66] The lock-in model has been used to explain states' commitment to human rights treaties but could also be applied to the ratification of the treaties of interest here, whereby new democracies quickly ratify these agreements in order to curb potential proliferation and armament policies by their military. To test whether new democracies seek to lock in future arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament policies by ratifying multilateral security treaties, I follow Goodliffe and Hawkins, who contend that this argument "is not only about new democracies but also unstable democracies."[67] Like them, I control for the relationship between treaty ratification and regime volatility. To test whether lock-in effects are distinct for transitioning democracies, I also interact Goodliffe and Hawkins's measure of regime instability with my measure of new democracy. Thus, the third hypothesis follows.

[62] See Table 1 for a description of the type of obligations included in all twenty treaties.

[63] Fearon 1997; Morrow 1999.

[64] Another way in which I test the effect of costs on ratification time is by analyzing whether more powerful states—measured by military expenditure and world power status—ratify more slowly than states with lesser industrial-military complexes. Typically, a larger military sector entails more stakeholders that may weigh in on the decision to ratify security treaties, which in turn could slow down the ratification process.

[65] Moravcsik 2000; Goodliffe and Hawkins 2006.

[66] Moravcsik 2000, 220.

[67] Goodliffe and Hawkins 2006, 362.

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—H3. High regime volatility will increase the likelihood of ratifying multilateral security treaties (hazard rate) among new democracies.

There are also other alternative explanations for multilateral security treaty ratification (study controls). Beyond reputational and policy benefits, there are other incentives to commit to arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament treaties that need to be accounted for in a comprehensive study of multilateral security.

Membership in International Organizations (IOs)

I also examine whether IOs play a role in influencing commitment to multilateral security. Mansfield and Pevehouse have argued that democratizing states enter IOs to resolve the credibility deficit they experience during the transition.[68] In the next section I explain how I test for the possibility that IO membership drives treaty ratification.

Norms

There is a vast literature in international relations that explains the international behavior of states based on normative mechanisms.[69] The expectation is that some governments are more susceptible to being influenced by beliefs in multilateralism and the development of "security communities" (as opposed to self-help and anarchy) and thus more likely to engage in disarmament and nonproliferation efforts.[70] Following Goodliffe and Hawkins and Simmons, and given what we know about how norms disseminate more effectively within less diffuse environments, I test for normative effects on ratification rates by examining whether regional treaties are ratified faster than global agreements.[71] In addition to this, I also test for normative pressures by examining the effect of the ratio of states that have already ratified the treaties.

Finally, the study also accounts for possible effects given a country's main domestic institutions (parliamentary and presidential), involvement in militarized interstate disputes, whether the ratifying country is a developing economy, a recipient of foreign aid, experienced incomplete democratization, acceded to the treaty, length of the country's regime, and time period (Cold War and post–Cold War). In the next section I describe the data, models, main independent variables and controls in greater detail.

[68] Mansfield and Pevehouse 2006.

[69] Adler and Haas 1992; Maoz and Russett 1993; Checkel 1998; Checkel 2005; Finnmore and Sikkink 1998.

[70] Adler and Barnett 1998.

[71] Goodliffe and Hawkins 2006; Simmons 2000. On norm dissemination, see Acharya 2004.

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V. Data and Measures

In the past few years there has been considerable interest in survival models. That is, statistical models that use *time* as their dependent variable in order to explain the rate or speed of social change.[72] Survival models are particularly useful for analyzing international security treaties, where ratification is very high—that is, there are few holdouts—yet there is considerable variation in the speed at which different countries ratify these agreements.[73]

The original database used in this article includes 15,983 observations describing ratification decisions for twenty security treaties by 201 countries between 1959 (when the first treaty was opened for signature) and 2007. Each subject of the study is a country/treaty ratification decision, resulting in 1,778 subjects combining 201 countries and twenty treaties.[74] The average ratification rate in the data is 95 percent and the mean time to ratification is 8.84 years with a minimum of 1 year and a maximum of 48 years. These data were merged with other data sets to include important covariates from the Polity IV and the State Capabilities and IO Membership data sets from the Correlates of War Project (COW).

Dependent Variable

The parameter of interest is the hazard rate of ratification for country c, treaty t, in year y—that is, the probability that countries will ratify each security treaty in a given year. The dependent variable is *Time to Ratification,* with survival data organized in cross-sectional observations by country, treaty, and year. Ratification takes the value of 0 if the country has not ratified a treaty and a value of 1 on the year in which that treaty was ratified. After ratifying a treaty, no further measures of the subject (country-treaty) are reported.

Main Independent Variables

The main independent variables describe regime type by country and year. Regimes have been classified in four categories: *New Democracies, Old Democracies, New Autocracies, and Old Autocracies*—with old

[72] Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004; Bennett 1998; Beck, Katz, and Tucker 1998; and Przeworski et al. 2000.

[73] Only 7 subjects out of 1787 have discontinuous times and only about 5.4 percent of countries decide on average not to ratify a treaty. The final summary statistics of the models vary slightly due to observations lost when combining this original data with other available datasets.

[74] There are fewer subjects than the combination of countries and treaties, because regional treaties can be signed only by a restricted number of neighboring countries. In the estimated models I control for these restrictions, specifying which states are eligible to sign each individual regional treaty.

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autocracies as the baseline category in all statistical analyses. To classify the four regime types I followed standard practices, considering a country as democratic if it scores seven points or higher on the Polity IV composite scale.[75] *New Democracy* takes the value of 1 if a country is democratic and experienced a transition within the last three years, five years, or seven years depending on the specification.[76] By contrast, *Old Democracy* takes the value of 1 if a country experienced a transition more than three years, five years, or seven years earlier. *New Autocracy* takes the value of 1 if a country is authoritarian and has experienced a reversal within the last three years, five years, or seven years depending on the specification. *Old Autocracies* experienced a reversal more than three, five, or seven years earlier.

Reputation, Treaty Costs, and Treaty Ratification

As discussed in the theory section, the value of reputational signals increases as the cost of the security treaty increases. To test this assumption, I created a scale of the costs associated with treaty obligations. The variable *Treaty Cost* places security agreements along a four-point scale that measures whether treaties require a country (1) to share information, (2) to refrain from certain activities, (3) to destroy existing weapons, and/or (4) to agree to external monitoring. Summary information about each treaty cost is reported in Table 1. I expect significant differences between new and old democracies when ratifying costlier treaties.

Testing for Lock-in Effects

A rival hypothesis explaining treaty ratification by transitioning democracies proposes that newly elected elites commit to international security today in order to reduce the likelihood of policy reversals in the future—that is the lock-in hypothesis discussed in the previous section. By ratifying security treaties today, democratic elites tie the hands of future autocrats in the sensitive area of international security. Given this logic, higher regime volatility should be associated with quicker ratification rates by newly elected democratic elites. To measure the effect of *Regime Volatility* on treaty ratification, I follow Goodliffe and

[75] The Polity IV scale scores all countries from -10 (full autocracy) to 10 (full democracy), based on three components combining measures of executive constraints, political competition, and quality of political participation.

[76] The use of three different windows (three years, five years, or seven years) provides invaluable information about the treaty ratification behavior of new democracies. Polity IV provides a measure of institutional durability that indicates the number of years since the last transition. Consequently, a country is a new democracy if it scores 7 or higher in Polity IV scores and less than three, five, or seven years in the durability score.

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Hawkins and compute the standard deviation of Polity IV scores for each of the countries in the sample. As regime volatility increases so should the incentives to lock in current security commitments for the future. To distinguish these incentives among transitioning democracies, I also interact the variables *New Democracy* and *Regime Volatility*. If new democracies have distinctive lock-in incentives, this interactive term should be positive and statistically significant.

Other Control Variables

Other independent variables included in this study control for a range of alternative explanations. Mansfield and Snyder propose that incomplete democracies (that is, anocracies) display a distinct behavior in matters related to international security. Following their specification, the unrestricted models include a control variable, *Anocracy*, describing countries with a range of three to six points in the Polity IV scale. Also, to capture effects associated with the overall institutional stability of each country, I run separate models including the Polity IV variable *Durability*, which measures the number of years since the last regime transition as reported by a change of three or more points in the Polity scale.

Different types of legislative institutions might have different effects on the hazard rate of ratification. Specifically, I expect parliamentary systems to face fewer legislative hurdles and to ratify security treaties more quickly than presidential systems with executive and legislative bodies elected in separate elections. To capture differences in the hazard rate of ratification that result from differences in domestic institutions, I include a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the country has an executive elected in separate elections (*Presidential*) and 0 otherwise. I also include a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the executive is elected by an assembly (*Parliament*) and 0 otherwise. The baseline category is mixed regimes, as it was coded in Przeworski et al.[77] The variables *Military Expenditure* and *Militarized Interstate Disputes* (*MID-COW*) control for existing pressures by domestic actors to maintain military capabilities. I use dummy variables identifying *Developing Countries* and identifying *Major Powers* (as defined by the COW project). Conditionality requirements on international aid disbursement could also be critical to committing to international security treaties. Consequently, a variable measuring *Foreign Aid* received by a country as a share of its GDP was also incorporated in the analysis.

[77] Przeworski et al. 2000.

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The variable *Share of Countries that Ratified*, measuring the ratio of eligible countries that have already signed and ratified each treaty, captures the effect of a country's exposure to international norms, rules, and standards of behavior.[78] To test for pressures from proximate countries I follow Goodliffe and Hawkins[79] and Simmons,[80] creating the dummy variable *Regional* that takes the value of 1 if a treaty is open to a restricted menu of members or 0 if it is open to all countries. It is important to highlight that the universe of countries for regional treaties is restricted to eligible members. Valid subjects for the Tlatelolco Treaty, for example, will include only countries of Latin America to which the treaty was open to signature.

The dummy variable *Accession* takes a value of 1 for new states created after a treaty was already in effect and where the prior sovereign had already ratified. Finally, a dummy variable, *After Cold War*, takes the value of 1 for all observations after the collapse of the USSR in 1991 and 0 otherwise.

VI. Study Results

The Restricted Models

To test for the effect of democratization on treaty ratification I present two different sets of model estimates. First, I ran a set of restricted models that includes only the three main regime variables: new democracies, old democracies, and new autocracies, with the residual category of old autocracies as the baseline. These models assess the relationship between regime type and treaty ratification with particular attention to the first three years, five years, or seven years after democratization. I use the whole sample of cases (countries and treaties), as well as separate models distinguishing the effect of new democracy on the ratification of low-cost treaties and high-cost treaties. All models include fixed effects by treaty with standard errors clustered by country. Finally, nonproportionality tests were conducted for each model, adding time-varying covariates for all independent variables that failed the Schoenfeld nonproportionality test at the .05 level.[81]

[78] I thank an anonymous reviewer for recommending this strategy to measure normative cross-member pressures.

[79] Goodliffe and Hawkins 2006.

[80] Simmons 2000.

[81] The Schoenfeld test of proportionality seeks to assess whether the effect of covariates changes over time. As it is customary, variables with statistically significant Schoenfeld values were interacted with the dependent variable time in Tables 2 and 3. Interacted variables are reported with the acronym TVC in both tables.

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The results of the restricted models are presented in Table 2,[82] showing that new democracies ratify security treaties more quickly than old democracies and all autocracies. The effect is statistically and substantively significant, with new democracies ratifying ≈54 percent faster than old autocracies in the first three years after democratization. In contrast, old democracies ratify on average only ≈28 percent faster than old autocracies (model 1 of Table 2). Tests of proportionality show that the effect of old democracy on treaty ratification changes over time in model 2 and in models 4–9. To address this issue, the standard procedure is to interact the variable old democracy with the dependent variable time.[83] The time-varying coefficients show that the hazard rate of treaty ratification increases over time among consolidated democracies at a rate of approximately 3 percent per year.

Overall, models show that new democracies rush to ratify international security treaties in the early years after democratization. Ratification rates then decline sharply after the democratization window, increasing slowly over time as democracies become older and more consolidated. The increase in hazard rate for new democracies varies from a statistically insignificant ≈17 percent in model 6 to a statistically significant ≈57 percent in model 7.

The Unrestricted Models

Table 3 provides model estimates that include the main independent variables and all controls. Informed by the results in Table 2, the unrestricted models concentrate on analyzing the effect of young new democracies (three or five years) on the time to ratification of high-cost treaties.[84]

Results from the unrestricted models are consistent with those described before. The variable new democracy is substantively and statistically significant in models 1, 2, and 3 of Table 3. New democracies ratify high-cost treaties ≈72 percent faster than old democracies in model 1 and 50 percent faster in model 2. As before, the main hazard rate of old democracies is not substantively different from that of old autocracies. However, the time-varying coefficient shows that old

[82] Estimates hold using different specifications (weibull, log-normal, Cox proportional hazard, as well as the nonproportional hazard models reported in Table 2). Data and code to replicate the alternative specifications are available upon request.

[83] Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004. Time varying covariates were added using the option TVC in Stata 11; they provide a separate estimate for the increase/decrease in the hazard rate for every extra unit of time t.

[84] That is, models 1 and 2 include time-varying coefficients for those independent variables that violate the assumption of proportionality of the model, whereas models 3 and 4 do not include any time-varying covariate.

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democracies increase their ratification rate by ≈5 percent every year after the democratization window. Overall, results again show that new democracies rush to ratify in the early years after transitioning from authoritarian rule.

Model estimates fail to support the lock-in hypothesis in the ratification of high-cost treaties.[85] Estimates for the effect of regime volatility on treaty ratification are statistically insignificant. Moreover, the interaction of regime volatility and new democracy is not only statistically insignificant but also in the wrong direction, showing a decline of 8 percent in model 3 and of 0.5 percent in model 4.

There are a number of other results that deserve attention. As expected, new states whose prior sovereign had already adhered to an agreement (*Accession*) are likely to ratify security treaties very quickly. The estimates for *Accession* show that the ratification rates of these countries are on average two to three times faster than new democracies. Consistently quicker ratification rates are also observed for *Regional* treaties, which are ratified on average three times faster than global treaties. By contrast, *Militarized Interstate Disputes* (*MID*), measured on a five-point scale from the low (0) to the high (5), significantly slow treaty ratification. Every unit of increase in MID reduces the hazard rate of treaty ratification by a statistically significant 8 percent, with maximum marginal change resulting in a substantively large reduction of 69 percent in the time to ratification of high-cost treaties.

As expected, the time to ratification of high-cost treaties by *Parliamentary* democracies is on average 70 percent shorter than for other countries in the sample; this is in contrast to the statistically insignificant change in the time to ratification by presidential democracies.

Long-term institutional endurance speeds up ratification rates, as reported by the statistically significant estimate of the variable *Durability*. However, the effect of institutional endurance is substantively small, with every extra year of a regime reducing time to ratification by a very small 0.04 percent. The estimate for *Developing Countries* is substantively and statistically significant, slowing the time to ratification by a ≈35 percent in model 4 and a ≈47 percent in model 1. To conclude, the estimates from the *Share of Treaties Ratified* and the dummy describing observations after the *Cold War End* are not stable across models. All other controls fail to achieve statistical significance.

[85] Estimates of a model that includes all treaties also failed to achieve statistical significance. However, the interaction of high regime volatility and new democracies showed a statistically significant drag on ratification rates. Results, however, run counter to the expected positive effect anticipated by the theory. Results fall in line with the findings of Goodliffe and Hawkins 2006, who found no support for the lock-in hypothesis in the ratification of human rights treaties.

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TABLE 2
REGIME TYPE AND TIME TO RATIFY MULTILATERAL SECURITY TREATIES[a]

		All Treaties			*Low-Cost Treaties*			*High-Cost Treaties*		
		3-Year Window	*5-Year Window*	*7-Year Window*	*3-Year Window*	*5-Year Window*	*7-Year Window*	*3-Year Window*	*5-Year Window*	*7-Year Window*
		Model 1	*Model 2*	*Model 3*	*Model 4*	*Model 5*	*Model 6*	*Model 7*	*Model 8*	*Model 9*
Main Coefficients	Old Democracy	**0.245*****	0.034	**0.281****	−0.034	−0.068	−0.086	0.085	0.042	0.129
		(0.09)	(0.14)	(0.11)	(0.18)	(0.19)	(0.21)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.14)
	New Democracy	**0.433*****	**0.372****	**0.406****	0.349	0.317	0.171	**0.449****	**0.355****	**0.414*****
		(0.17)	(0.15)	(0.19)	(0.29)	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.23)	(0.16)	(0.14)
	New Autocracy	−0.046	0.002	0.022	−0.128	−0.121	−0.158	0.01	−0.017	0.067
		(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.19)	(0.11)	(0.16)	(0.12)
Time-Varying, Interacted Coefficients	Old Democracy		**0.033*****		**0.038*****	**0.045*****	**0.047*****	**0.03*****	**0.039*****	**0.029*****
			(0.01)		(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
	New Democracy			−0.009	0.008	0.018	0.018	−0.005		
				(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)		
	New Autocracy					0.016	0.015		0.009	
						(0.02)	(0.02)		(0.02)	
Fixed Effects by Treaty	Antartic	**−0.355*****	**−0.398*****	**−0.354*****	**−1.115*****	**−0.966*****	**−1.082*****			
		(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.16)	(0.23)	(0.17)			
	Bankok Treaty	**1.149*****	**1.101*****	**1.15*****						
		(0.22)	(0.21)	(0.23)						
	CCWC	**−0.19****	**−0.19****	**−0.19****	**−0.945*****	**−0.787*****	**−0.916*****			
		(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.14)	(0.22)	(0.15)			
	CFE	**1.223*****	**1.244*****	**1.231*****				**1.748*****	**1.771*****	**1.766*****
		(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.11)				(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)
	CFE-AA	**−2.606*****	**−2.591*****	**−2.615*****				**−2.491****	**−2.49****	**−2.493****
		(0.98)	(0.98)	(0.98)				(0.99)	(0.99)	(0.99)
	CTBT	0.015	0.017	0.009				0.131	0.143	0.124
		(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)				(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)
	CWC	**0.357*****	**0.336*****	**0.353*****				**0.488*****	**0.481*****	**0.483*****
		(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)				(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)

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Fixed Effects by Treaty	Celestial Bodies	**−0.64****	**−0.647****	**−0.636****	**−1.403*****	**−1.236*****	**−1.366*****			
		(0.27)	(0.28)	(0.27)	(0.29)	(0.33)	(0.29)			
	ENMOD	−0.196	−0.201	−0.198	**−0.971*****	**−0.822*****	**−0.942*****			
		(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.16)	(0.24)	(0.17)			
	IACT	−0.429	−0.418	−0.441	**−1.214*****	**−1.076*****	**−1.198*****			
		(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.26)	(0.31)	(0.27)			
	IAC	−0.07	−0.05	−0.078	**−0.864*****	**−0.715*****	**−0.832*****			
		(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.19)	(0.24)	(0.20)			
	Mine Ban	**0.777*****	**0.768*****	**0.768*****				**1.05*****	**1.044*****	**1.042*****
		(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.10)				(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)
	NPT	**0.278*****	**0.27*****	**0.28*****				**0.337*****	**0.345*****	**0.343*****
		(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.08)				(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)
	OUT	−0.104	−0.114	−0.104	**−0.87*****	**−0.725*****	**−0.832*****			
		(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.17)	(0.26)	(0.18)			
	Open Skies	**0.535*****	**0.534****	**0.532*****	**−0.375****	−0.248	−0.329			
		(0.20)	(0.22)	(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.23)	(0.20)			
	PEL	**−0.781*****	**−0.814*****	**−0.782*****	**−1.577*****	**−1.441*****	**−1.54*****			
		(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.31)	(0.25)			
	PTB	**0.6*****	**0.589*****	**0.598*****	**−0.308****	**−0.158**	**−0.272***			
		(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.24)	(0.16)			
	Rarotonga	**0.736*****	**0.763*****	**0.729*****	−0.159		−0.139			
		(0.27)	(0.28)	(0.27)	(0.23)		(0.24)			
	Sea Bed	0.038	0.048	0.041	**−0.735*****	**−0.581****	**−0.701*****			
		(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.17)	(0.24)	(0.17)			
	Tlatelolco	0.044	−0.005	0.035	**−0.771*****	**−0.625****	**−0.75*****			
		(0.16)	(0.17)	(0.16)	(0.18)	(0.25)	(0.19)			
Statistics	N	16749	16587	16749	8992	8873	8992	7757	7714	7757
	LogLik	−11300.00	−11300.00	−11300.00	−4494.78	−4471.93	−4494.96	−5673.70	−5632.11	−5673.87
	df	23	24	24	17	18	18	12	12	11
	Chi Square	501.558	569.537	524.791	148.358	141.111	145.429	423.879	425.58	423.005

Two-tailed significance reported: * p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01

[a] Cox Non-Proportional Hazard Model with time interacted coefficients (TVC) selected using the Schoefeld Residual Tests. Unexponentiated coefficients with standard errors are reported in parentheses. Models with 3-year, 5-year, and 7-year windows describe the effect on treaty ratification within the last 3, 5, or 7 years of regime transition. Errors are clustered by country and fixed effects by treaty.

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TABLE 3
TIME TO RATIFY MULTILATERAL SECURITY TREATIES, UNRESTRICTED MODELS[a]

		Nonproportional Hazard with Time-Varying Covariates, High-Cost Treaties				*Cox Proportional Hazard, without Time-Varying Covariates, High-Cost Treaties*	
		3-Year Window Model 1		*5-Year Window Model 2*		*3-Year Window Model 3*	*5-Year Window Model 4*
	Variables	*Main Coefficients*	*TVC*	*Main Coefficients*	*TVC*	*Main Coefficients*	*Main Coefficients*
Regime Variables	Old Democracy	−0.161	**0.043***	−0.121	**0.049****	0.066	0.135
		(0.25)	(0.02)	(0.26)	(0.02)	(0.21)	(0.23)
	New Democracy	**0.542****	−0.011	**0.405***		**0.737****	0.377
		(0.27)	(0.04)	(0.22)		(0.30)	(0.30)
	New Autocracy	0.005	0.008	0.126	0.001	0.013	0.122
		(0.21)	(0.02)	(0.20)	(0.02)	(0.17)	(0.17)
	Anocracy					0.198	0.161
						(0.14)	(0.13)
Lock-in Variables	Regime Volatility	−0.008		−0.003		0.021	0.014
		(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.03)	(0.03)
	Regime Volatility* New Democracy					−0.075	−0.006
						(0.05)	(0.04)
Other Controls	Share of Treaties Ratified	0.78		−0.413		**1.363****	**1.174***
		(0.61)		(0.77)		(0.64)	(0.67)
	Institutional Durability	0.003		**0.004****		**0.004****	**0.004****
		(0.00)		(0.00)		(0.00)	(0.00)
	Accession	**0.722*****		**0.915*****		**1.059*****	**1.006*****
		(0.25)		(0.26)		(0.26)	(0.27)
	Parliament	**0.492*****		**0.528*****		**0.52*****	**0.488*****
		(0.18)		(0.18)		(0.19)	(0.19)

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Other Controls	Major Power	−0.045		−0.082		−0.017	−0.004
		(0.20)		(0.18)		(0.25)	(0.25)
	Cold War End	**−0.644*****	**0.151*****	**−0.759*****	0.02	−0.059	−0.068
		(0.23)	(0.05)	(0.26)	(0.03)	(0.14)	(0.14)
	Developing Countries	**−0.625*****	0.025	**−0.588*****	**0.478****	**−0.448*****	**−0.434****
		(0.20)	(0.03)	(0.21)	(0.23)	(0.17)	(0.17)
	Regional	**1.07*****		**1.101*****		**1.108*****	**1.104*****
		(0.17)		(0.15)		(0.14)	(0.13)
	Presidential	0.103		0.073		0.081	0.057
		(0.16)		(0.16)		(0.18)	(0.18)
	IO Membership					0.388	0.359
						(1.08)	(1.11)
	Military Expenditure (LN)					−0.05	−0.049
						(0.05)	(0.05)
	Square Military Expenditure (LN)					0.002	0.002
						(0.00)	(0.00)
	Aid (LN)					−1.281	−1.265
						(1.00)	(1.00)
	Militarized Interstate Disputes					**−0.073*****	**−0.074****
						(0.03)	(0.03)
Statistics	N	3826		3826		3533	3533
	LogLik	−2299.02		−2293.32		−2154.42	−2156.09
	df	18		18		20	20
	Chi Square	302.551		323.285		298.487	312.207

Two-tailed significance reported: * p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01

[a] Cox Non-Proportional Hazard Model with time interacted coefficients (TVC) selected using the Schoefeld Residual Tests reported in online appendix. Unexponentiated coefficients with standard errors are in parentheses. Models with 3-year, 5-year, and 7-year windows describe the effect on treaty ratification within the last 3, 5, or 7 years of regime transition. Errors are clustered by country.

VII. Does Compliance Prevent Democratic Breakdowns?

Results presented in the previous section prove that new democracies ratify international security treaties at a faster pace than their consolidated counterparts. Their distinct ratification rate, I argue, results from an investment in international reputation to help secure domestic consolidation. That is, new democracies seek to make democratic breakdown costly and international recognition of autocrats less likely. The newly acquired prestige and international recognition is heavily advertised to the public by the new elected elites and is the source of both pride and political maneuvering.

However, whether commitment to international security prevents democratic breakdowns is a question that needs to be empirically tested. In this section I take a fresh look at previous research on democratic stability and test an augmented model that includes both the indicators of economic performance used in current analyses of democratic survival and measures of international commitment to multilateral security treaties. Results give credence to the belief commonly held by democratizing elites that being a good, peaceful international citizen reduces the likelihood of an authoritarian reversal.

To test for the effect of treaty ratification on democratic survival, I take advantage of a wealth of recent research that has explored the determinants of regime stability.[86] Specifically, I augment the survival model proposed in Epstein et al.;[87]the model explains the effect of economic development on the breakdown of democratic regimes. As in Epstein et al., I estimate a survival model where the dependent variable takes the value of 1 the year of a regime breakdown and the value of 0 otherwise. Rather than considering solely democratic regimes, I fit a proportional hazard model for both democratic and authoritarian regimes in the sample,[88] using the same data and specification as the authors. Of particular interest is whether democratic and nondemocratic regimes perceive different benefits from ratifying international security treaties.

The data include 415 subjects (country and regime), with a median regime lifespan of 12 years and 267 reported failures (267 *Regime Breakdowns*). The main independent variable of this test is the level of commitment to multilateral security as reflected by the *Ratification Share* of security treaties ratified by country *i* at time *t*, considering of

[86] Boix and Stokes 2003; Epstein et al. 2006; and Przeworski et al. 2000.
[87] Epstein et al. 2006.
[88] Kennedy 2010.

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course only existing treaties that are open to the signature or already signed by a country in a given year. I replicate the model proposed in Epstein et al., including as controls the annual *Change in GDP* and the log of total *GDP* to assess the stabilizing effect of economic development. As in Epstein et al., I include covariates for economic *Openness* and the log of total *Population*.[89]

Because my data include both democratic and nondemocratic countries, I include as a covariate the *Polity Score* variable as well as the interactions between the *Polity Score* and *GDP*.[90] Consistent with the exogenous democratization argument, this interaction is expected to be negative; indicating that while economic growth makes it less likely that we should observe a regime breakdown, the stabilizing effect of growth is more pronounced among democratic countries.[91] Finally, I interact the *Polity Score* with the treaty *Ratification Share* to assess the effect of security treaty ratification on regime survival conditional on the democratic character of the country. As with growth, a negative coefficient would indicate that the higher levels of commitment (higher shares of treaty ratification) reduce the likelihood of a regime breakdown.

I ran three different specifications of a Cox Proportional Hazard model. The first specification replicates the results by Epstein et al., using a conditional specification by regime type.[92] The second specification includes only treaty ratification and the interaction with regime type and omits all economic variables. Finally, model 3 estimates the unrestricted model with all covariates.

Table 4 presents the results of all three models. Consistent with results from Epstein et al., I find that economic growth is destabilizing for authoritarian regimes and decreases the probability of a democratic breakdown (endogenous and exogenous democratization effects respectively). This is captured by the negative sign of the interactive term in models 1 and 3, showing that the probability of a regime breakdown conditional on growth declines more rapidly among democratic countries. The effect of GDP on the probability of a regime breakdown is fully summarized by the upper plot in Figure 1, which describes changes in the hazard rate that result from a 1 percent increase in GDP conditioning on the Polity score of a country.

[89] Epstein et al. 2006 operationalize economic openness as the share of exports and imports over GDP.

[90] The alternative proposed by Kennedy 2010.

[91] This is typically defined as the *exogenous democratization* effect of development (Przeworski et al. 2000).

[92] See Kennedy 2010 for a conditional specification of regime survival.

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TABLE 4
REGIME SURVIVAL AND TREATY RATIFICATION[a]

	Model 1	*Model 2*	*Model 3*
Ratification Share	—	**−1.041*** **	**−0.486** **
		(0.2180)	(0.2420)
GDP (LN)	**−0.348** **	—	**−0.344** **
	(0.1510)		(0.1600)
Change in GDP	**−0.0001*** **	—	**−0.00009*** **
	(0.0000)		(0.0000)
Population (LN)	**−0.14*** **	−0.031	**−0.122** **
	(0.0440)	(0.0480)	(0.0480)
Openness	**−0.01*** **	**−0.008*** **	**−0.01*** **
	(0.0020)	(0.0020)	(0.0030)
Polity Score	**0.755*** **	0.019	**0.76*** **
	(0.0850)	(0.0170)	(0.0910)
Ratification Share* Polity Score	—	**−0.11*** **	−0.042
		(0.0250)	(0.0300)
GDP(LN)*Polity Score	**−0.092*** **	—	**−0.09*** **
	(0.0100)		(0.0110)
N	5356	5356	5356
LogLik	289.3	93.42	242.7


Two-tailed significance reported: * p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01

[a]Cox proportional hazard models. Cells report unexponentiated coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Errors are clustered by country.

Models 2 and 3 in Table 4 incorporate information on treaty ratification. Results also show that treaty ratification reduces the probability of a regime breakdown. The most important result is highlighted in the lower plot in Figure 1, which describes the effect of treaty ratification on survival conditional on the democratic character of the regime. Consistent with the theory stated above, treaty ratification reduces the likelihood of a democratic breakdown for semidemocratic and democratic countries (for example, it reduces the hazard rate of countries for Polity scores larger than 0 on the horizontal axis) but fails to reduce the likelihood of a breakdown for authoritarian countries. The results are both statistically and substantively significant, showing a reduction of 60 percent in the likelihood of breakdown for democratic regimes that ratified all international security treaties open to signature.[93]

[93] Because treaty ratification is entered as a share, a score of 1 means that all treaties have been ratified. The hazard rate if all treaties are ratified is exp(-0.9)=0.40, which results in a decline of 75 percent in the likelihood of a democratic breakdown.

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[a]Marginal effects and confidence intervals of the unexponentiated hazard rate for model 3 in Table 3.

FIGURE 1
HAZARD RATE OF TREATY RATIFICATION ON REGIME BREAKDOWN CONDITIONAL ON TYPE OF REGIME[a]

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VIII. Conclusion

Does democratization increase commitment to multilateral security? Using original data on the ratification rates of 201 states for the twenty major treaties on arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament over the past fifty years, the present study shows conclusively that new democracies outpace older democracies and all autocracies in committing to multilateral security. This result holds when controlling for institutional, economic, and military differences, time periods (during and after the cold war), and scope of treaty (global and regional). This finding, I argue, is explained by the need of newly elected elites to raise the costs of an authoritarian reversal. By vigorously committing to multilateral security treaties, new democracies build an international reputation for nonaggression which, as reflected by President Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle's address to the Chilean Congress in the opening lines of this article, serves domestic consumption purposes.

The argument developed above is founded on a distinct feature of democratic transitions: newly elected leaders have a limited portfolio of regime consolidation strategies available to them. As the balance of power tends to favor the outgoing autocrats (who controlled the military or more often *are* the military), new democrats have to be very careful about how they attempt to secure the transition. These domestic limitations prompt the search for "outside" policy options, leading to an international dimension of democratization. Because reputations function as a mechanism of peer selection, I argue, new democracies—like new firms—have strong incentives to invest in good reputations in order to be backed by other states and thereby effectively increase the international costs of a regime reversal.

If, as I argue, new democrats rush to commit to multilateral security treaties in order to secure the transition, the question then becomes whether this kind of international strategy works. That is, for consolidation-seeking politicians, does an investment in international reputation in the area of multilateral security pay off? I tested this implication of my argument empirically and the answer, unequivocally, is yes. New democracies that commit to multilateral treaties of arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament are much less likely to experience regime breakdown. This finding carries a major policy implication: a government's participation in international society through treaty ratification enhances democratic stability. Thus, this research contributes significantly to the literature on democratic survival by providing evidence of a successful strategy for consolidation.

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Recently there has been much debate on whether international treaties screen or constrain.[94] That is, do states comply with international agreements because they ratify only those with which they were already in compliance (and thus their behavior would be the same if they had not ratified) or do they comply because treaties raise noncompliance costs (thus in fact affecting states' behavior)? While the present study falls outside this debate, as it examines only commitment, one possible extension of this research would be to examine compliance rates to determine whether multilateral security treaties screen or constrain the behavior of new democracies. Given what we know about how democracies and autocracies differ regarding domestic accountability and enforcement mechanisms, we should expect treaties to have a greater screening effect on the former. Furthermore, as new democracies have the most need to win the support of the international community, they should show higher compliance rates—as well as adoption of other policies (that is, increased participation in international organizations)—in order to earn good will. However, to truly address the issue of screening versus constraining, future research must examine in depth the effect of the costs of reneging on an international agreement not just by treaty but, more importantly, by country.

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[94] Simmons and Hawkins 2005; von Stein 2005.

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