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DEVELOPMENT IN WADI RUM? STATE BUREAUCRACY, EXTERNAL FUNDERS, AND CIVIL SOCIETY

One of the most important lessons development agencies claim to have learned over the past decades is that the absence of local participation at various stages of project planning and implementation leads to what at best can be termed "inferior results."[1] The conclusion that community participation is necessary (if not sufficient) for project success has developed concomitantly with the belief in the halls of power that the state is not the ideal executor of a variety of tasks previously deemed its proper realm. Both of these changes in development thinking converged in practical terms beginning in the 1980s in the emergence of a greater stress on the role of non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Not only were NGOs and other civil-society actors (including the private sector) seen as untainted by the rent-seeking behavior attributed to state bureaucracies; they were also seen as products of more local or community-based and -interested organizing, a critical vehicle for local participation that so many development projects had lacked. Some of this literature also regarded such institutions as the forerunners of and central to democratic transitions.[2]

More recent works, however, have been more balanced in their evaluation of the associational life generally refered to as civil society. Perhaps the most important conclusion of this second wave of works is the significance of context: conclusions about NGOs and other civil society actors drawn from one country need to be carefully examined for their applicability in other settings.[3] This more critical approach is similar to that found in the literature of the policy community. Here, NGOs are by no means portrayed as villains, but those who have worked with them in different environments have come to understand that they, too, suffer from lack of capacity and from rent-seeking behavior, and may certainly be no more democratic in structure or operation than their state predecessors were.[4]

Moreover, developing countries especially, although by no means exclusively, appear to produce a variety of what can perhaps best be termed "NGO hybrids"—that is, associations that call themselves NGOs (and that may be recognized as such by the state and by the foreign donor community) but actually have ties to the state of

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such a nature as to call into question their classification as non-governmental actors. A set of acronyms has been created to capture these differences: GONGOs (governmental NGOs), RONGOs (royal NGOs), QUANGOs (quasi-NGOs), and so on. In addition to the entertainment value of pronouncing them aloud, these appellations have empirical and theoretical import.[5] Empirically, it is important for both donors and scholars to know what is truly of civil society (i.e., in that space generally outside the family and the state), and which institutions are essentially the state in NGO clothing. Theoretically, the emergence of these hybrids is important in understanding the trajectory of both the state and the non-state sector response to the development paradigm—the Washington consensus—that calls for the state's relinquishing of many of its previous tasks and for their devolution to the private or civil society sector.

This article seeks to highlight the diverse nature of the problems and possibilities that NGOs, one set of civil-society actors, may face in the context of a national push for economic development. To do so, it examines several tourism-related projects proposed for or carried out in Wadi Rum, in the south of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, in the 1990s. Rum's story illustrates the complex nature of state, external funder, and civil-society institutions' relations and makes clear the need for context-sensitive assessments of the role and potential for civil society in promoting more effective, transparent, and locally beneficial development policies.

BACKGROUND

The Wadi Rum Reserve, 560 square kilometers of government land in the south of Jordan, is famous for its stark desert and rock landscapes, which have served as the backdrop for parts of such movies as *Lawrence of Arabia*. The bedouin indigenous to Wadi Rum—seven tribal sections (sub-tribes) of the Huwaytat, traditionally an important source of recruitment for the Jordanian army—are semi-settled in and around several villages with a total population today of about 4,500.[6] In 1960, a military school was opened in the area, followed by a clinic in 1965 in what would develop into the small Rum village. In 1971, in response to the prevailing development philosophy that nomadic and semi-nomadic peoples should be settled, housing units were built for the Wadi Rum bedouin, thus providing a broader basis for what became the village.

Because of the region's natural beauty and environmental fragility, a 1978 ecological mission to the kingdom recommended Wadi Rum for inclusion in a network of protected areas. Shortly thereafter, the Jordanian government charged the Royal Society for the Conservation of Nature (RSCN) with responsibility for five such areas. It is important to note that while the RSCN was not a state organization, it was founded by and presided over by a powerful member of the kingdom's elite, enjoyed the patronage of King Hussein, and was one of only a handful of organizations in the Middle East given a public-service mandate—in this case, that of protecting wildlife in the kingdom's nature reserves.[7] Although it has come to be regarded as an NGO, it, like a number of prominent civil-society actors in Jordan, maintains an association with the royal family. The royal tie is one of patronage, not direct management, but

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it is nevertheless extremely important, for it gives the RSCN a special standing and power in the larger pool of NGOs.

INCREASING STATE INVOLVEMENT

Were Rum in a different part of the kingdom, and were it less spectacular as a tourist attraction, its story would likely have been quite different. However, as a result of its location and economic promise, two developments gradually intervened to upset the life of the growing Rum village and ultimately threaten its inhabitants with the possibility of displacement.

The first development with long-term implications for Rum was the establishment in 1984 of the Aqaba Regional Authority (ARA), which was given responsibility for developing planning for the Aqaba governorate. While its main goals concerned coordinating land development in the port city of Aqaba itself, the ARA's territorial jurisdiction also included the entire Rum preserve. The ARA was (and continues to be) a unique body in the kingdom. Financially and administratively autonomous of individual ministries, it reports directly to the prime minister. "The administrative council of the ARA has all the authorities and functions granted to subdistricts as well as local administrative councils of villages and cities. Furthermore, it has the right to use state land and property within the region as it deems appropriate, giving it effective control of all land use within the region."[8] It is not surprising, then, that some have described it as constituting a state within a state.[9] For the purposes of this discussion, the significance of the ARA's establishment lies in the fact that it created potential for conflict over Wadi Rum not only with the RSCN, whose jurisdiction on environmental grounds had been established (although only by cabinet letter, not by law) in 1978, but also with the Ministry of Tourism and Antiquities (MOTA), which viewed any site that attracted tourists as properly within its administrative purview.

A second factor that began to force changes on Wadi Rum was the sudden and dramatic increase in tourism that began in the early 1990s. Previously, tourism to Rum had been modest. The locals were content with the small number of visitors, and the state largely left them alone. But when tourism began to grow, and it became clear that there was money to be made from involvement in Wadi Rum, government and private-sector interest grew, and the real struggle over the future of the area began. First, without warning, high-voltage cables were brought in to be installed along the main road to Rum in autumn 1994. The Friends of the Environment Society (FES) and the Friends of Archaeology (FOA), two Amman-based NGOs, opposed this move and succeeded in convincing the minister of energy that the lines needed to be placed underground, not in holes filled with concrete.[10] Subsequently, in December 1994, the MOTA also asked the prime ministry to intervene with the ARA to halt the installation of the poles.[11] The project was in fact stopped, but on 5 January 1995 the government changed, with King Hussein's cousin Zayd ibn Shakir replacing ʿAbd al-Salam al-Majali as prime minister, and within two weeks the poles went up. The FES and FOA complained again, but to no avail.[12]

In the meantime, the swift rise in the number of visitors to the area had also led to a proliferation of car tracks and litter of non-biodegradable material on the desert

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floor. There was no control of rock climbing, and graffiti increasingly marred the tops of many of the wadi's rock monuments.[13] The rise in tourism also brought complaints about those who lived in the region. Some observed that the Rum village was unsightly and hence reduced the tourists' enjoyment of the site. Regardless of judgments concerning the aesthetics of the village, it certainly was the case that despite official commitments to the area, Rum village, like many towns and village of the Transjordanian south, had continued to suffer major infrastructural problems. As of 1994, for example, water was still insufficient, there was no electricity, and television reception was weak. The village had a clinic, but it had no medical materials or equipment. Most of the streets were unpaved, including the main municipal road. The village did have a school through the eighth grade for boys and girls; however, female teachers refused to live in the village, opting to commute instead. In sum, the area remained quite poor, with 200 families—a majority of Rum's residents—depending on tourism.[14]

The sudden surge in government interest beginning in late 1994 did mean that additional services were provided to the village—electricity, telephones, and water—but competition among the RSCN, ARA, and MOTA for the future of the area also stiffened. By late October 1995, MOTA reported that it had already received seventy requests for permits to establish hotels in the Rum reserve.[15] Apparently unconcerned with the potential environmental impact, MOTA initially took the position that no investment in Rum would be forbidden as long as it was based on previous study. Not to be trumped, the ARA insisted that this was Aqaba district land, regardless of use, and hence it, not MOTA, had final say about the form that investment in Rum would take. Under Director-General Fayez Khasawnah, the ARA appeared most interested in promoting short-term, big-investor interests, showing little concern for the local bedouin or for protecting the environment.[16] Finally, there was the RSCN, which continued to claim prior jurisdiction over Rum based on its designation in 1978 as a protected area. The local bedouin—who tried to become involved but were told not to—were lost in the middle.[17]

The clashing interests as well as the high stakes involved led the cabinet in early 1996 to call for the formation of a committee composed of representatives from MOTA, the Department of the Environment, the Ministry of the Interior, ARA, RSCN, the Ministry of Finance, and the Bureau of Lands. The committee was charged with following up on the state of tourism at a number of sites, studying plans, and drafting recommendations.

THE STRUGGLE OVER RUM'S DESIGNATION

The 1978 designation of Rum as a protected area remained in effect until July 1996, when, based on the recommendations of the committee mentioned earlier, the cabinet decided to change Rum's designation to that of a "tourist-services" area, both to attract international tourism and to provide the framework for establishing hotels, restaurants, and other appropriate tourist facilities. The cabinet then decided to give those living in the Rum village alternative pieces of land at the site of a proposed new village that the ARA had already decided to have built, without consulting the villagers. The cabinet agreed to a land survey to set the boundaries of the existing village officially,

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and lands that were not owned by citizens were then to be registered in the name of the treasury in preparation for declaring the area a national park "with special regulations" (*dhat ahkam khassah*). This new designation's meaning was left vague, thus raising serious concerns among the local community and outsiders regarding what the future would hold.

Following the second Gulf War, numerous foreign and multilateral institutions became involved in tourism development in Jordan, viewing it as one economic sector with a great deal of potential in a country that is otherwise resource poor. In 1996, the World Bank produced what was called the Second Tourism Development Project, which included plans for Wadi Rum (as well as Petra, Kerak, and Jerash). The project document described the situation in Rum in the following terms:

> To date there has been little focus on developing tourism at Wadi Rum while preserving it environmentally. The result is an increasing problem with litter, archaeological sites damaged by graffiti, unplanned vehicle tracks, and an unsightly village. The Rum village (Bedouin community), which only a few years ago contained just a few homes, now has more than 300 houses and is experiencing an alarming rate of growth. Current tourism activities are poorly organized and underfunded, there is little effort to promote regulations to preserve the city, and there is no proposal to maximize the returns from tourism. Wadi Rum is at an important juncture, and steps must be taken to avoid further endangering the very fragile environmental balance that makes it so attractive.[18]

On the surface, it would have seemed hard to quarrel with such an assessment, but it is important at this point to examine where the members of the Rum community fit into these evolving plans. The World Bank document, which included plans for an alternative village, emphasized the importance of retaining and supporting the local lifestyle to ensure social sustainability as well as to use the local culture as a tourist attraction. More important, in numerous places it stated that there had been consultation with the local population regarding the project. For example:

> the local population requested and participated directly in the design of the new village to allow use of the old village for tourism-related commercial activities, such as women's handicraft production and bed-and-breakfast facilities, etc.[19]; [and]

> the risk of residents' not respecting agreed building and growth controls has been mitigated through discussions with village inhabitants and agreement that current residents of Rum village, should they desire it, will be given serviced plots at no charge within the new village site.[20]

There was also the more general contention that the members of the Rum village and the Rum Tourism Cooperative Society (RTCS, a Rum-based NGO) were involved in information-sharing and consultation during the process of identification and preparation of the project.[21]

Unfortunately, documents from the locals and from concerned NGOs clearly contradict this assertion. For example, a December 1996 letter from the *makhatir* of Wadi Rum to the prime minister and several ministries made the following requests: that the designation of Wadi Rum as a preserve (rather than the proposed *dhat ahkam khassah*) be maintained to protect the area's environment and natural beauty; that the investments proposed by the ARA for Wadi Rum be blocked; and that people from

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the area be appointed as representatives on a committee addressing tourism development of Wadi Rum.[22] Another example is a letter of 1 May 1997 to Prince Mirʿad[23] in which Mohammed ʿId Zalabiyyah, one of the notables of the Rum village and the president of the RTCS, complained that while external investors were all trying to get a foothold in Rum, the locals were presented with plans to move the village to a new place without consulting them or coordinating with their representatives. Zalabiyyah insisted in his letter that the locals refused to move to the new site because it was inappropriate and would not allow for future expansion. Moreover, by moving out, the locals would in effect give outsiders—including competing neighboring tribal subsections—a way to participate in determining the future of the area. Zalabiyyah insisted on appropriate consultation with the people of Rum so that their rights would be preserved.[24] The elders and shaykhs of Rum continued to protest that no one from the World Bank, the ARA, or MOTA had spoken with them about plans for the village.[25]

The Zalabiyyah—the predominant tribal sub-group in the Rum village—had numerous other complaints about the project, as well. One concerned the fact that a proposed new road pattern to enter Rum threatened to take tourists first to a new visitor's center. That tourists would pass through the Rum village only at the end of their stay in the preserve increased the possibility that the villagers would not benefit at all from the tourism projects. Second, the new village did not make sense socially, given the way the bedouin live, for the site was seven kilometers from the existing village. Finally, opponents of the relocation plan from both inside and outside the region argued that the aesthetic argument was also weak: beautifying the old village would be far less costly (in both financial and environmental terms) than constructing a second village, with all the required additional infrastructure.[26]

A close observer of the evolution of Rum and its controversies described the situation at the time in the following terms:

> The Huwaytat themselves have been bypassed entirely by the local authorities, who informed the natives, without consultation, that they would be moved from their village and requested that they voluntarily relocate themselves outside of their ancestral land of Wadi Rum. This insensitivity created a panic among the residents of the village. They were assured by the Aqaba Regional Authority that the old village would not be developed; that they were being relocated in order to preserve the natural beauty of the area. In reality we see the opposite happening. The high voltage electricity cables, telephone lines and the widening of the highway linking the main Aqaba–Amman road with Rum village all send the wrong message to the local inhabitants. They feel they are being tricked into evacuating their present homes so that the Authority and/or foreign investors can come in and take over the area.[27]

Discussions of and controversy over the new designation of Rum continued. Despite expressions of concern from a variety of NGOs, on 12 April 1997 the new "special-regulations" designation was approved by the cabinet. The ARA's director-general, Khasawnah, insisted that the ARA had agreed to such a designation with the World Bank and that it was necessary to protect the region while allowing for construction or rehabilitation in four areas: the existing village, the proposed village, the visitor's center, and the new one-way road and entrance gate into Rum. He also insisted that the area could not be only a nature preserve because it was not feasible

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to fence it in completely (thereby betraying his own lack of familiarity with nature preserves).

In any case, the ARA was interested in eliminating all opposition to its plans for the area. At this point, although a member of the steering committee for the World Bank project, the RSCN retreated.[28] Instead of insisting on Rum's designation as a national park under its jurisdiction, the RSCN accepted that Rum was a special protected area, albeit one with the same characteristics as a national park. This did not spell an end to its role, however. The World Bank project obliged the ARA to assemble a management committee for Rum and, given its own expertise, the ARA could not fulfill this responsibility using its own cadres. Not surprisingly, the tender competition for the management contract was won by the RSCN.[29]

In the meantime, in August 1997 the ARA signed an agreement with a local engineering investment company to undertake the component of the World Bank project that included an infrastructure network, paved roads, a garbage dump, the visitors center, a parking lot, a study of land area, and the infrastructure for the new Rum village.[30] About the same time, the ARA sent warnings to some Rum residents who were making additions to their homes inside the original village area, saying that these additions were unlicensed. In keeping with the arrogance for which the authority had become known, requests by Rum residents for copies of the plans for the village and licenses were rejected. Baffled, the Zalabiyyah sought recourse through various official channels. In a letter signed by their shaykhs and *makhatir* they stated that they hoped to place this issue before Deputy Prime Minister ʿAbdallah Nusur, who was supposed to meet with a Rum village delegation on 1 October 1997.[31]

Some of the locals subsequently met with the minister of tourism, the president of the RSCN, and Khasawnah. As a result, a more appropriate area for the new village was seemingly agreed to, about one kilometer from the first proposed site. However, the Zalabiyyah subsequently learned that the tender had in fact been issued for the same area that they had rejected. Khasawnah then told them that, regardless of the promise made by the government at the recent meeting, there would be no substitute for the original site.[32]

THE RUM COOPERATIVE CONTROVERSY: THE STATE VERSUS NGOs

Before the post-Gulf War surge in interest in the area, the primary institutional means by which the people of Wadi Rum had benefited from tourism was the RTCS, the idea for which had first been suggested in the late 1980s by a National Committee on Rum chaired by Queen Noor.[33] As initially envisioned, the cooperative was to be run by and for the residents of the Rum village; its administrative council was to be responsible for supervising tourist guides and providing food for visitors. Discussions of formally establishing such a society were then undertaken in conjunction with MOTA, the Aqaba Cooperatives Office, and the Aqaba district government (not the ARA). MOTA promised the cooperative $150,000 in fixed capital support, and on 23 February 1989 the RTCS received a "no-opposition" decision from the general-director of the Jordan Cooperatives Corporation for the establishment of a limited, multipurpose cooperative society for the Rum tourism region. (It is worth noting here that

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such registration is a requirement for operation in Jordan and by no means renders the RTCS a governmental organization or undermines its basic NGO character.) Although the society was officially registered in October 1990, as of 30 September 1991, MOTA apparently still had not fulfilled its promises to provide tents, buildings, basic health facilities, and places to sell groceries.[34] Nevertheless, the cooperative had begun to undertake many of the activities for which it had been licensed. With the proceeds from its activities, the society funded a kindergarten for forty children and purchased two busses to transport local people. It also provided uniforms and books for children, as well as loans to members.

Membership in the Rum cooperative is given to every adult male and to some women and children in the Rum village. The RTCS has four salaried positions—director, treasurer, secretary, and ticket seller—and a small office adjacent to the rest house, which is run by an outsider, ʿAli Hilawi.[35] The cooperative deals almost exclusively with tourists arriving in Rum without prior arrangement. In contrast, there are a handful of operators in Rum, required to be members of the cooperative, who nevertheless, work by prior arrangement with foreign tourism companies and offer special tours.[36]

As it has evolved, the RTCS has had three principal functions: to register and regulate tourism operators out of Rum village, to collect admission fees from visitors at the gate, and to serve as the liaison with outside agencies with an interest in tourism in Rum. In practice, "this latter function boils down to maintaining an absolute monopoly over Rum tourism." All those who arrive in Rum, whether on organized tours or independently, are required to pay an entrance fee (one Jordanian dinar), which is divided between the cooperative (600 fils) and Hilawi (400 fils), because he provides use of toilet and shower facilities as well as refreshments. The cooperative does not pay dividends to members; instead, it uses the proceeds to fund the types of activities and services mentioned earlier. It has done little to organize Rum tour operators other than collect a membership fee and maintain lists (not easily obtained) that allocate work to members. Officially, each member is entitled to register one vehicle with the cooperative. His name is then placed on a list, and trips are supposed to be assigned by turn. In fact, however, it appears that this principle is often violated, and certain, more influential, members of the village are assigned groups more frequently than others.[37]

As tourism increased—and with it, outside interest in exploiting the possibilities—a controversy arose. In the May 1997 letter to Prince Mirʿad referred to earlier, the head of the RTCS contended that the change in the area's designation (to *dhat ahkam khassah* just a month earlier) was opening the area to outside investors and tourist offices. This meant that the local population could no longer make tents and cars available for tourists and guides without competition from outsiders. Beyond that, the increased access by groups other than the RTCS was degrading the environment: garbage was being left in camping areas; trees were being cut and used for firewood; and roads and tracks had been opened in all directions randomly, ruining the natural vistas. The letter requested that the prince ask MOTA and the minister of the interior to put an end to these violations and limit movement in the region to the tracks established by the RTCS.[38]

Yet the RTCS was not facing competition from the private sector alone. On 15 February 1998, Minister of Tourism ʿAqil Biltaji sent a letter to the ARA claiming

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that the RTCS was not a tourism organization.[39] In a subsequent letter to the cooperative, he argued that after looking into the matter, he had found that the cooperative was not registered as a tourism society as defined by the Tourism Law of 1988 (remember that the RTCS was founded under the Cooperatives Law), and hence it was practicing tourism activities without a license. Therefore, it was not permitted to impose fees on tourists or visitors in exchange for services beyond entrance fees into tourist and archaeological areas. He asked that the RTCS work to comply with the Tourism Law, especially in matters related to camping and desert tourism.[40]

On 9 March, in response to Biltaji, Marwan Dudin, who had succeeded Khasawnah as director-general of the ARA, replied that, based on the contents of Biltaji's letter, the RTCS should be shut down. In addition, he noted that its activities, including camping, were probably causing environmental damage.[41] Nevertheless, the following day, Dudin called for working together as a single team and stressed the need for the participation of the local community.[42] On 22 March, Khalid al-Tayyib of the Jordan Cooperatives Corporation counterattacked, arguing that the Rum organization was licensed by MOTA and had been acting according to its founding principles. All the work of the cooperative—the prices of transportation and camping as well as the provision of all services and guiding—had been stipulated by MOTA. According to the Cooperatives Law, the society was legal and was the only such establishment in Wadi Rum. It had adhered to all the directives of MOTA and other official agencies, and it was overseen administratively and financially by the Jordan Cooperatives Corporation in accordance with the Cooperatives Law.[43] At this stage, reportedly, appeal was made to the royal family on behalf of the people of Rum, and the minister of tourism was forced to back down. Nevertheless, MOTA continues to maintain that the RTCS is operating illegally.[44] At least in this case, the Jordanian state, through MOTA, has only reluctantly and conditionally accepted a devolution of responsibilities to a non-governmental actor.

A TALE OF TWO COOPERATIVES: CONFLICT AND COMPETITION IN THE NGO SECTOR

In 1996, a second tourism cooperative was established in the area, this time in the town of Disi, just outside the borders of the Rum reserve. The establishment and activities of the new tourism cooperative were only the most recent episode in poor relations between the Rum village and the Disi group of villages. As noted earlier, most of the residents of Rum village are members of the Zalabiyyah section of the Huwaytat, while the Disi villages are overwhelmingly of the Zawaydah section. Reportedly, in the 1980s, Hassan, then the crown prince, was moved by the petition of one of the Zawaydah shaykhs and ordered the sinking of wells in the area of the Disi villages. As a result, the Zawaydah have virtually exclusive water rights in the area, while the Zalabiyyah control the majority of the tourism income. Although Rum is the center of tourism—slightly less than 20 percent of the tourist visits to the area are handled by the Disi cooperative—Disi is the commercial and economic center of the area. "Services, commodities, and employment that are not found elsewhere are available [in Disi] and a small bureaucracy has developed at the local council."[45] This situation has produced envy and mistrust between the two tribes. Indeed, the poor

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state of relations compelled government officials to attach the Rum village to the municipality of Quwayrah, rather than to Disi, only a few kilometers away.[46]

Land rights in the Rum reserve and in surrounding areas are based on a traditional system that depends on mutually reciprocated recognition of claims. For years, the Zawaydah and the Zalabiyyah co-existed, with tribal boundaries generally accepted between them. When pastoralism was the primary form of usage, there were few problems. However, with the advent of increasing tourism, the possibilities for more lucrative exploitation led to the re-emergence of disputes over tribal territory. This background is critical for understanding the competition between the two cooperatives.[47]

Both the Rum and Disi cooperatives are recognized by the Jordan Cooperatives Corporation. In both, leadership positions are secured through election, although an examination of the recent office-holders reveals that sub-tribal cliques dominate both. That said, the Disi cooperative does operate differently from the Rum cooperative. It has some 425 shareholders, not all of whom are active in tourism. Moreover, the Disi cooperative pays dividends to members and hence has attracted subscriptions from many people with no involvement in tourism. It has also made direct investments to improve tourism facilities in the area: shower, toilet, and other basic campsite facilities have been built near Disi within the reserve area. The cooperative also licenses several independent operators who provide special services for tourists. The Disi cooperative appears to enforce basic standards on the vehicles its drivers use, unlike the situation in Rum. Finally, Disi does not charge an entrance fee—a deliberate policy to try to undercut the Rum cooperative and win a greater share of the tourism market.[48]

In sum, the tourism industry in the area is fragmented and characterized by competition between tribal sub-sections. Although nothing in the civil-society literature argues against a multiplicity of organizations, at least implicit in some of the early literature was the notion of civility of interaction: the civil-society sector could be a marketplace of ideas, associations, and services, but cooperation, not conflict, was assumed to characterize relations.[49] Clearly, however, the interaction between these associations in Rum falls well short of that ideal. The heads of the Rum and Disi cooperatives never formally meet, even to discussion specific disputes that have arisen between them.[50] In the context of increasing outside interest in exploiting (in both the positive and negative sense) the resources of Rum, the rivalries between the two have stymied what could be more concerted action to secure a better deal for all the communities in the area.

THE RUM COOPERATIVE AND THE QUEEN ALIA FUND: NGO VERSUS RONGO

Following a visit by Spain's King Juan Carlos to Rum in 1994, a number of governmental and non-governmental organizations began to take an interest in protecting and improving Wadi Rum. King Hussein himself issued a directive to improve the conditions of the tourist jeeps used by the RTCS. Shortly thereafter, the Spanish NGO Codespa donated twenty-one four-wheel drive vehicles to the kingdom for Rum.[51] When the vehicles arrived, they were turned over to MOTA, which then put out a tender for their administration. Although the RTCS would have seemed the most likely

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candidate, in the end it was the Queen Alia Fund for Social Development (QAF)[52], not the RTCS, that "won" the jeeps. A period of conflict and confrontation over turf and equipment ensued.

A note on the QAF is in order before proceeding. Like the Noor al-Hussein Foundation (NHF), the QAF is an example of what have been called royal NGOs, or RONGOs. These institutions define themselves, and have been accepted by the international donor community as constituting, NGOs. Nevertheless, for several clear reasons they cannot be easily separated from the state. The most obvious connection is the royal leadership, which involves not only patronage (as was the case with the RSCN and the late King Hussein), but also hands-on management. Second, RONGOs are not subject to the Law of Charitable and Voluntary Societies (1966) as are other NGOs, and they cannot be interfered with by the state in the same way—for example, by having elections monitored or results overturned. They do not need permission from the Ministry of Social Development to hold fund-raising events, nor are they required to fulfill the same financial reporting requirements as are regular NGOs.[53] Hence, when one deals with a RONGO, one must understand the special power and influence it has that clearly distinguishes it from genuine NGOs, power that most certainly played a role in the QAF's securing the tender in the first place.

When the QAF first obtained the jeeps, it placed an ad for drivers. Only six of the seventy-five applications and two of the twenty-five drivers ultimately hired were from Rum. According to a QAF representative, this happened because some of the Rum applicants were not qualified. The QAF insisted that its drivers have licenses, be older than twenty years of age and well-trained, and know how to deal with tourists. With these jeeps and drivers, the QAF then began to develop an ecotourism project based not in Rum (and not limited to visits to Rum) but in a town to the northwest, Rashadiyyah, at a center also paid for by the Spanish.[54]

Not surprisingly, this was not the end of the story, for the people of Rum saw this as a direct challenge to their livelihoods in an area that offered few alternatives. In response, several of the new vehicles were vandalized. The local police arrested those responsible, but the QAF's chairwoman, Princess Basma bint Talal, intervened and secured their release without penalty. Nevertheless, it took a year and a half for the QAF to come to an agreement with the Rum locals on the project. Indeed, in a June 1996 visit to the area, Minister of Tourism Salih Irshaydat had inspected the RTCS cars and listened to demands by the cooperative that the use in Rum of cars other than those owned by the cooperative[55]—a clear reference to the QAF project—be stopped. Princess Basma herself ultimately had to step in to address the controversy and assembled an eleven-member committee, Lajnat al-Tanmiyyah al-Ijtimaʿiyyah li-Qariyat Rum, that included seven people from the local communities to supervise the project.[56]

The new agreement with the local community involved profit-sharing. QAF tourism operations were permitted in Rum as long as they brought tourists to the area through outside bookings rather than through competition with the cooperative by offering services to arriving visitors.[57] For 1997, the QAF guaranteed Rum 25 percent of the profits (and not less than $7,000) from the project to be used for social development in the area. For 1998, the share increased to 40 percent; for 1999, to 55 percent, and for 2000, to 75 percent. The rest of the profits were to go to the other villages of the

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area. The profits go directly to a fund administered by the committee formed by Princess Basma, which comprises the governor of Aqaba (president), the director of tourism for Aqaba, two representatives from the QAF, and seven *makhatir* from Rum (including the head of the RTCS). No money goes directly to the RTCS or to any other organization or agency.[58]

THE ROLE OF AMMAN-BASED NGOs

The discussion of the fate of Wadi Rum and its inhabitants would not be complete without a consideration of the impact of Amman-based NGO activity. Oldest in its concern and probably greatest in its weight in official circles in Amman is the RSCN. However, by the time the Rum story began to unfold, Jordan had experienced the initial wave of a process of political liberalization that, among other things, opened organizational and expressional possibilities that had been closed during the decades of martial law. As a result, we see in the struggle for Rum a number of smaller and, in several cases, new NGOs attempting to work for the site or its residents.

For example, in October 1996, after the new designation of Rum had been proposed but before it had been accepted by the cabinet, a loose grouping of Amman-based NGOs called the Environmental Societies Coalition, which included the RSCN, FES, and FOA, came together to lobby for Rum. Dismayed that no environmental-impact studies were being carried out for proposed projects in either Rum or Aqaba, the coalition met to discuss developments in both areas. Its members were particularly displeased with the lack of transparency in ARA activities, as well as its clear private-sector (outside-investor) bias. As noted earlier, in response to a request from Queen Noor, the coalition drafted a memo listing its concerns and detailing its recommendations. The memo called for increasing interaction and cooperation among the ARA, the local bedouin community, and the RTCS to promote and strengthen confidence-building among the concerned parties. It also recommended that, if the villagers were to be moved from the Rum village, they be allowed to choose the site of their new village from among several proposed sites. The coalition stressed the importance of maintaining Rum as a national park, to be protected environmentally and archaeologically. It also called for the activation of the Rum Steering Committee (which had been formally established by the World Bank document for the Second Tourism Development Project but had seldom met) and for a moratorium on plans for infrastructure design and development in Rum until sufficient environmental assessments had been carried out.[59]

On 9 December 1996, Prime Minister ʿAbd al-Karim Kabariti sent a letter to the minister of tourism (in response to a 16 November letter) regarding developing tourism in the Wadi Rum area. Kabariti agreed to the formation of a guidance committee chaired by the head of the ARA and with members representing MOTA, the ARA, the Aqaba governorate, the General Institute for Protecting the Environment, the RSCN, the QAF, the NHF, and two representatives from the private sector.[60] Thereafter, the NGO coalition had several meetings with representatives of the ARA. Of particular concern was the proposed new *dhat ahkam khassah* designation. The NGOs used the local newspapers and television, e-mail communication, and meetings with

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key government leaders to highlight the local population's needs and maintain pressure on the authorities to hear them. But there still did not appear to be a change in policy or a clarification of the meaning and implications of the proposed change in designation of the area.

The president of the FES, Raouf Dabbas, scion of a powerful tribe from the northern city of Salt, sent a letter to the prime minister on 25 March 1997 listing the problems in Rum: the increase in the number of tourists and the number of cars; the attempts by various authorities to minimize the importance of the local population and prevent them from participating in running the site; and the dangers to the social and economic future of the tribe there. He also expressed concern over the initiation of major infrastructure projects—roads, electricity, and telephones—in what was perceived to be preparation for large-scale tourism development. He argued that Wadi Rum should continue to be a nature preserve and that any change in the area's designation would be in the interest of big investors, not the site or its people. He also complained that the locals had repeatedly asked the officials involved and the concerned agencies to look into the situation but had received no response.[61]

In a 13 April 1997 meeting between a group of NGOs including the RSCN, FOA, FOE, Petra National Trust, and the Royal Diving Society and the ARA's Director-General Khasawnah, the secretary-general of MOTA, the director of the Department of Antiquities (which falls under the authority of MOTA), the director of the QAF, and the director of the General Institute for Protection of the Environment, Khasawnah discussed the new "special-regulations" designation of Rum that had been approved the previous day by the cabinet. He insisted that extensive consultation had taken place with the Rum villagers and that they had accepted and approved the new plans, including the new village concept. Dealing with the inhabitants of the region was "complex," he admitted, and personal interests outside Rum played a part in developments. He promised that no further building projects would take place beyond the construction or rehabilitation in four areas: the existing village, the proposed village, the visitor's center, and a new one-way road and entrance gate into Rum. But he stressed that the multisectoral guidance committee in place to oversee the project was purely advisory and that the ARA had sole and total authority to manage Rum.[62]

At this meeting, MOTA's secretary-general and other government representatives expressed strong irritation with the activism of the NGOs. Apparently, the many voices and demands for information were causing confusion, not to mention consternation, among officials unaccustomed to dealing with civil-society institutions. Several of the NGO representatives noted that it was their right and responsibility to question the government and work with it on conservation issues, because the government's recent record on cultural-heritage protection included numerous examples of incompetence. The experience may have been a first step in institutionalizing government–NGO exchange, but it also made clear the total government control and the lack of legal recourse available to NGOs in addressing such issues.[63]

In November 1997, Khasawnah was replaced as head of the ARA. Some members of the NGO community believe it was a result of their activism and their complaints, some of which were directed to the royal family, that finally led to his removal.[64] Whatever the reasons, his successor, Marwan Dudin, was less authoritarian in his

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management style, and relations with the NGOs, especially the RSCN, began to improve. Indeed, in his first meetings with RSCN representatives he noted the positive experiences he had had with the RSCN when he had been minister of agriculture.[65]

On 21 June 1998, the RSCN finally signed an agreement with the ARA to manage tourism development and environmental conservation for the Wadi Rum component of the World Bank project. The agreement called for a $7.6 million Wadi Rum National Park, designed with the area's fragile ecosystem in mind. The project intended to set up a regulatory mechanism and a comprehensive management plan taking into consideration the needs of tourism, range land, sustainable development, and conservation. By this time, the RSCN had already assembled a project steering committee, including three residents of Wadi Rum, to draft management regulations.[66]

In announcing the signing of the agreement, the RSCN's director-general stressed the need to develop a communication mechanism with the locals as a first priority. He also noted that because some of the new regulations would affect grazing access and rights, socio-economic activities and small income-generating projects would be established for those likely to be affected by new restrictions.[67] The RSCN's insistence on community involvement from the beginning derived in part from its experience beginning in the early 1990s with Dana, a nature preserve in the Tafila governorate, which was the RSCN's first attempt at integrated sustainable development, with "integrated" meaning concerned with people and their livelihoods as well as wildlife and the environment. Having learned painful lessons at Dana, the RSCN team was determined to "get it right" from the beginning in Rum. This meant that in addition to seeking inclusion of locals in their management instances from the beginning, the RSCN began its work by commissioning an in-depth socio-economic study of the region, which required some three months of fieldwork by the study team. To put this initiative in perspective, prior to drafting the Second Tourism Development Project document for Rum, Jerash, and Kerak, the World Bank had sent out a lone anthropologist for less than a week to investigate the socio-economic setting in Rum.[68]

CONCLUSIONS

The story of Wadi Rum's development during the 1990s was one of competing and often contradictory interests among various state bureaucracies and a range of civil-society actors. Within the state sector, the turf war between the ARA and MOTA was clear, as was the battle—less clear-cut from the perspective of the state–NGO divide—between the ARA and MOTA, and between the ARA and the RSCN, armed with its public-service mandate. Although numerous Amman-based NGOs, from the FES to the FOA, clearly battled against certain elements of the state's vision of development for Rum, other elements from civil society—the Jordanian private sector—appeared to have the ear and the sympathy of the ARA and MOTA. The World Bank, either convinced it was simply smarter or feeling no need to be effectively responsive to its mandate to include community participation, was also centrally complicit in the process of minimizing local input. As a result, the residents of Rum were several times deceived about the future of their homes, village, and economic livelihoods. Even among the NGOs, there were differences in clout—with the much older, wealth-

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ier, and better-known RSCN clearly in the strongest position—as well as priorities. The RSCN's central mission, at least initially, was not so much advocacy of the locals' concerns as it was the preservation of the environment. The FOA had similar interests, primarily related to protecting Rum's monuments. Only the FES seemed to balance concern with the environment with an advocacy role for the Zalabiyyah. The two sets of goals—protection of the locals' interests and safeguarding the environment—are not unrelated, but they are not completely coincident.

Beyond the complex reality of Rum described in the vignettes, this case offers insights into at least three sets of broad development-related issues. The first is that of the relationship between the state and civil society. One set of examples relates to the state's relationship with NGOs. It has been argued convincingly in the literature that the boundary between state and civil society is at best blurred.[69] NGOs, for example, are required to register with the state; many receive various forms of state funding or carry out state-sponsored projects; and state employees may well volunteer with NGOs on their own time. However, Jordan has several prominent examples of RONGOs, which, as noted earlier, are more properly understood as extensions of the state, regardless of their official designation. During the period under consideration here, the most powerful of these were the QAF and the NHF. ʿAbdallah's reign brings some new contenders but not a basic change in the privileged position of RONGOs. In the case of Rum, the QAF's initial activities constituted a clear disregard for the interests and institutions of local civil society. In the QAF's defense, as the villagers made their outrage clear, the response was one of gradual conciliation and compromise, not the crushing of the RTCS by the state. However, not all RONGO–NGO encounters have had such a happy ending.[70]

Were such a problem limited to Jordan, one could attribute it to some unique aspect of the socio-political system in the kingdom. However, fieldwork and other secondary literature make it clear that this is a much broader phenomenon and is related, at least in part, to the traditional roles of the state and the extent to which civil-society activity has an established history. For example, despite its pluralist facade and verbal encouragement of civil society, the one-party state in Tunisia offers clear examples of GONGOs that compete with NGOs in much the same way that RONGOs do in Jordan. Morocco, however, despite periods of severe repression under King Hasan II, does not have the same tradition of a strong, penetrative central state, whereas it does have a long tradition of independent political-party activity. There, the state NGOs seem to pose much less of a threat to the activity of true NGOs.

Clearly, more work needs to be done on the reasons behind the appearance and successes of state-sponsored organizations that cast themselves as NGOs. However, just as the domestic political context appears to constitute part of the explanation, so, too, the operation of international development and donor institutions seems to play a role. In Rum, although not intentional, the Spanish donation of jeeps set in motion a series of events that could have led to the complete undermining of the RTCS. When we move outside the NGO sector to civil society more broadly, we have the disturbing evidence that the World Bank at best exaggerated and at worst prevaricated about the extent of its consultations with the local community and its (non-governmental) representatives, preferring instead to work through the ARA and MOTA, whose approach to the Zalabiyyah ranged from annoyance to scorn. In sum, by failing—

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through omission or commission—to distinguish between NGOs and RONGOs or to uphold a putative commitment to community-level involvement in development, international donor and lending institutions may reinforce the power of the state or prevent the kind of bottom-up development that they claim to promote.

A second, larger issue relates to the question of whether civil-society actors are the effective, transparent entities that they are often claimed to be. Here, not surprisingly, the record is mixed, as the NGOs discussed have different histories, structures, and membership types. Certainly, Jordanian law includes certain basic requirements regarding financial and administrative matters for formal, registered institutions. Having said that, some institutions follow these requirements more carefully than others. The operations of the FOA, for example, are much more open and accessible than those of the RTCS. Such a situation is hardly limited to Jordan. Nor is the difficulty of evaluating effectiveness in the NGO sector. Despite the substantial resources that have entered the kingdom from foreign sources to support various NGOs, the sector in general is underfunded, and some parts of it regularly call on the state for support. Thus, one key basis for effective activity—sufficient means—is often lacking.

Effectiveness also involves knowledge of the system and access to decision-makers. If any lesson is clear in this story, it is that without the efforts of a number of key individuals or institutions who had an interest in Rum, the local community's concerns would have continued to fall on deaf ears. The fact that both King Hussein and Queen Noor had an interest in the area, and were appealed to in the case of Khasawnah's intransigence and Biltaji's attempt to close down the RTCS, is significant. It is also significant that it took Amman-based mediators, known to the royal family, to deliver the message from the people of Rum. One could see in this the success of Amman-based NGOs in lobbying for locals in Rum, but a more accurate portrayal would probably be that of individuals respected by the royal family who also happened to be active in concerned NGOs. In other words, it was the personal connection, not the institution of the NGO, that made the difference.

This then brings us to the final question: what can the Rum experience tell us about the relationship between civil society and political transformations toward more open systems (political liberalization or democratization)? A distinction has been made in the literature between civil-society institutions' role in an existing democracy—that of reinforcing mechanisms—and their role in authoritarian systems. In the former, as long as they remain "civil" they are seen as critical to reinforcing democracy, whereas in authoritarian systems their value is argued to lie in their oppositional capabilities. It is they who, so the argument runs, will be in the forefront of political transitions by continuing to push for greater rights, freedoms, transparency.

None of the civil-society actors involved in the Rum case can be described as constituting opposition to the state in the broad sense (as the several instances of willingness to seek support from members of the royal family suggest). Instead, they may be seen as seeking to give voice to "unheard" opposition to particular state policies. The fact that success or, at least, impact seems to depend on well-placed outsiders—NGOs or prominent members of them in Amman—suggests that what one may expect is not really grass-roots–level empowerment but, rather, the use of personal or political connections by already prominent individuals with a particular area of interest, such as archaeology, the environment, or the bedouin, to lobby for groups

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that traditionally would have been ignored. If there is a relationship between such developments and political transition, it appears to lie in the fact that the limited opening in Jordan since 1989 has allowed: (1) the emergence of some actors whose existence would have been hard to imagine before 1989 (the FES comes immediately to mind); and (2) some pre-existing institutions with powerful members to move into areas, critique government policy, and push for change in a way that would not have been possible before. As part of this process, community-level groups such as the RTCS are able to make contact with and mobilize to their cause the more powerful and well-connected NGO sector located in the capital (e.g., the RSCN, FOE, and FOA).

Such a picture does not contradict the model of civil society pushing for greater openings and voice, but it is much more modest. Perhaps in its modesty it is a more appropriate description of the development and role of civil society in very gradual or partial political liberalizations, rather than linear and clearly forward-moving processes. In Jordan, as in many other countries, the political liberalization has stalled and has even witnessed some serious retreats. At the time of this writing, various proclamations of King ʿAbdallah II notwithstanding, the kingdom's direction remains unclear. What is clear, however, is that as a result of the efforts of several key individuals and NGOs, at the very least, local participation in decision-making about Rum has become institutionalized. This does not mean that it will work easily or well or that the will of the local community will always prevail (or that it should). Nor does it mean that the mistrust of the World Bank, the ARA, and the state more generally has dissipated or that continued support from the power network in Amman is no longer needed. Nevertheless, the existence of a more consultative or participatory approach means that local voices have a greater chance of affecting discussions of their communities' futures. It is through a gradual but cumulative effect of similar experiences, ideally across the kingdom and in various issue areas, that the transformative impact of civil-society institutions, as discussed by the more optimistic literature, will most likely ultimately manifest itself.

NOTES

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[1]See, for example, Scott E. Guggenheim and Michael M. Cernea, ed., *Anthropological Approaches to Resettlement: Policy Practice and Theory* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1993), and Cernea's *Involuntary Resettlement in Development Projects: Policy Guidelines in World Bank-Financed Projects*, World Bank Technical Papers, no. 80 (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1988). See also James Scott's *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Development Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1998).

[2]Although not all of the chapters were equally celebratory, this was certainly the general tone in R. Augustus Norton, ed., *Civil Society in the Middle East* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1994). For works that take a similar tone, see Charles A. Reilly, *New Paths to Democratic Development in Latin America: The Rise of NGO–Municipal Collaboration* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1995); and Julie Fisher, *Nongovernments: NGOs and the Political Development of the Third World* (West Hartford, Conn.: Kumarian Press, 1998).

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[3]See, for example, Larry Diamond, "Rethinking Civil Society: Toward Democratic Consolidation," *Journal of Democracy* 5 (1994): 4–17; Michael W. Foley and Bob Edwards, "The Paradox of Civil Society," *Journal of Democracy* 7 (1996): 38–52; John A. Booth and Patricia Bayer Richard, "Civil Society and Political Context in Central America," *American Behavioral Scientist* 42 (1998): 33–46; and Bob Edwards and Michael W. Foley, "Civil Society and Social Capital Beyond Putnam," *American Behavioral Scientist* 42 (1998): 124–39.

[4]For more critical or realistic works, see Steven Rathgeb Smith and Michael Lipsky, *Nonprofits for Hire: The Welfare State in the Age of Contracting* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993); Jonathan A. Fox and L. David Brown, *The Struggle for Accountability: The World Bank, NGOs and Grassroots Movements* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1998). I am grateful to Andrew Green for helpful discussions of this literature.

[5]See, for example, the 2000 issue of *Middle East Report* 30, titled "Critiquing NGOs: Assessing the Last Decade," esp. Sheila Carapico, "NGOs, INGOs, GO-NGOs and DO-NGOs: Making Sense of Non-Governmental Organizations" (pp. 12–15). See also "Sins of the Secular Missionaries," *The Economist*, 29 January 2000, 25–27, and Laurie A. Brand, *Women, the State and Political Liberalization: Middle Eastern and North African Experiences* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), esp. 167–73, 218–219, 258–62.

[6]Alan Rowe, Lamia Ra'el, and Mohammed Eid Zalabia, *The Socio-economic Organization of the Wadi Rum Reserve Population: Challenges and Opportunities for Conservation and Tourism Development* (Amman: Royal Society for the Conservation of Nature, 1998), 10.

[7]Established in 1966 by Anis al-Muʿashir, the RSCN commands a great deal of respect in the kingdom and enjoys a reputation for having expert and trained cadres working with it.

[8]Peter L. Doan and Widad Adas, "Decentralization as a Development Strategy in the Petra Region of Jordan: When in Doubt, Decentralize?" (paper presented at the 40th Annual Conference of the Association of Collegiate Schools of Planning, Pasadena, Calif., 5–8 November 1998), 6–7.

[9]This position and power of the ARA did not change until summer 2000, with Parliament's approval of the establishment of the Aqaba Special Economic Zone (SEZ). The SEZ, a multi-million–dollar project, is to be run by an "independent committee," thus removing not only 2,750 *dūnum*s but also what could be the most important economic project besides the port of Aqaba from ARA control: see *al-Raʾi*, 2 September 2000, and the *Jordan Times*, 8 September 2000.

[10]Raouf Dabbas, president of the Friends of the Environment Society, interview by the author, 23 July 1998, Amman, Jordan.

[11]*Al-Dustur*, 18 December 1994.

[12]Dabbas, interview.

[13]*Jordan Times*, 3 December 1997.

[14]*Sawt al-Shaʿb*, 30 November 1994.

[15]*Al-Dustur*, 22 October 1995.

[16]It appears that personal issues were also involved, as one of Khasawnah's lieutenants apparently had a personal grudge against the RSCN's Muʿasher (off-the-record discussion).

[17]Dabbas, interview.

[18]World Bank, "Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Loan of US $32 Million to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan for a Second Tourism Development Project," report 15485-JO, Annex 2, 11 July 1997, 8.

[19]Ibid., 10.

[20]Ibid., 11.

[21]Ibid.

[22]*Makhatir* of Wadi Rum to prime minister, letter, 20 December 1996, FES files.

[23]Mirʿad is one of the sons of Prince Raʿad, from the Iraqi branch of the Hashemites. It is worth mentioning that Prince Raʿad, while best known for his patronage of organizations associated with the handicapped, has also been very involved in archaeology and, by extension, tourism in the kingdom through his association with the American Center for Oriental Research and the Petra National Trust, an NGO whose official royal patron is Queen Noor.

[24]Mohammed ʿId Zalabiyya to Prince Mirʿad, letter, 1 May 1997, FES files.

[25]Raouf Dabbas, "The Life and Death of Wadi Rum," *Ecoforum* (1997): 15.

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[26]Dabbas, interview.

[27]Dabbas, "Life and Death," 14.

[28]The reasons for this move are not clear and could not be ascertained with certainty through fieldwork.

[29]Khaled Irani, director-general of the RSCN, and several other RSCN staff people, interviews by the author, 15 June 1999, Amman, Jordan.

[30]*Al-Dustur*, 28 August 1997.

[31]Undated letter written shortly before 1 October 1997, FES files.

[32]Wadi Rum inhabitants to deputy prime minister, letter, 12 October 1997, FES files.

[33]A letter dated 21 January 1989 from the minister of tourism and antiquities indicated that the ministry had previously suggested the establishment of such a cooperative. File of correspondence on Rum provided by contacts (hereafter, Rum correspondence file). Also, Irani et al., interview.

[34]Jamal al-Bdur to minister of tourism, letter, 20 September 1991, Rum correspondence file.

[35]The locals resent the fact that Hilawi is an outsider: see Rowe et al., *Socio-economic Organization*, 24.

[36]Ibid., 23.

[37]Ibid., 22.

[38]Mohammed ʿId Zalabiyya to Prince Mirʿad, 1 May 1997.

[39]Rum correspondence file.

[40ᶜ]ʿAqil Biltaji to ARA, letter, 21 February 1998, Rum correspondence file.

[41]Marwan Dudin to Biltaji, letter, 9 March 1998, Rum correspondence file.

[42]*Al-Raʾi*, 10 March 1998.

[43]Khalid al-Tayyib to Dudin, letter, 22 March 1998, Rum correspondence file.

[44]Fouad Aghabi, assistant secretary-general for technical affairs and director of the Second Tourism Project at MOTA, interview by the author, 18 July 1999, Amman, Jordan.

[45]Rowe et al., *Socio-economic Organization*, 11.

[46]Ibid., 9.

[47]Ibid., 10.

[48]Ibid., 23, 26.

[49] For an account of the destructive potential of "civil" society, see Sheri Berman, "Civil Society and the Collapse of the Weimar Republic," *World Politics* 49 (1997): 401–29.

[50]Rowe et al., *Socio-economic Organization*, 27.

[51]Hasan Sabri al-Ustah, director of development projects, Queen Alia Fund for Social Development, interview by the author, 25 July 1998, Amman, Jordan.

[52]The name of the Queen Alia Fund was changed in Spring 1999 to the Jordanian Hashemite Fund for Development (JUHUD).

[53]For more on the issue of RONGOs and governmental or quasi-NGOs, see Laurie A. Brand, *Women*, 170–71, 218–19.

[54]Ustah, interview.

[55] *Al-Raʾi*, 29 June 1996.

[56]*Jordan Times*, 3 December 1997.

[57]Rowe et al., *Socio-economic Organization*, 23.

[58]Ustah, interview.

[59]Environmental Societies Coalition to Queen Noor , memorandum, 30 October 1996(?), FES files.

[60]Kabariti to minister of tourism, letter, 9 December 1996, FES files.

[61]Dabbas to prime minister, letter, 25 March 1997, FES files.

[62]Coalition member present at meeting to other coalition members, memorandum, 2 May 1997, FES files.

[63]Ibid.

[64]Environmental coalition activist, interview by the author, July 1998, Amman, Jordan. One activist did two TV programs on Wadi Rum, and, as a result, the queen asked to meet with him. Both she and the king asked what was happening in Wadi Rum and what needed to be done. (This activist says he told them that they needed to get rid of Khasawnah. He also contends that somewhat earlier, Biltaji and Khasawnah had evidently gone to the bedouin to try to persuade them that the reason this activist was interested in stopping hotel-building in Rum was that he had his own investment ideas and did not want others to get in the way.) Khasawnah's dismissal came shortly thereafter.

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[65]Irani et al., interview.

[66]Chris Johnson, director of conservation and director of the Wadi Rum project, RSCN, interview by the author, 26 June 1999, Amman, Jordan.

[67]*Jordan Times*, 29 September 1998.

[68]Johnson, interview.

[69]For example, see Thomas Janoski, *Citizenship and Civil Society* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 12–17, 113. Janoski uses a modified set of Venn diagrams to map the overlap of the state sphere, public sphere, market sphere, and private sphere.

[70]My research in Jordan on broadly defined women's organizations revealed numerous examples of heavy-handedness among RONGOs that prejudiced funding for, and at times squeezed out or suppressed activity by, NGOs.

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