O'Brien ('Die Aristophanes-Rede im *Symposium:* Das Empedokleische Hintergrund und seine philosophische Bedeutung', pp. 176–93) seeks to show how the speech of Aristophanes in the *Symposium* is directly inspired by Empedocles; he adds specificity and gives a new dimension to what he had already said in a preceding article ('L'Empédocle de Platon', *Revue des Études Grecques* 110 [1997], 381–98).

Walter Mesch ('Die Bildlichkeit der Platonischen Kosmologie. Zum Verhältnis von Logos und Mythos im *Timaios*') concentrates on the *Timaeus*. In the Platonic cosmogony, myth does not have a merely didactic function, as the members of the older Academy seem to have believed. In particular, what Plato says about causality and temporality, two questions that refer to the figure of the demiurge, can only be stated in the framework of a story that presents the features of myth.

Joachim Dalfen ('Platons Jenseitsmythen: eine "neue Mythologie" ' pp. 214–30) tries to show how Socrates takes up ancient myths concerning the Beyond and gives them a new dimension. Directing his analysis to one of these myths, Georg Rechenauer ('Veranschaulichung des Unanschaulichen. Platons neue Rhetorik im Schlussmythos des *Gorgias*', pp. 231–50) shows how, at the end of the *Gorgias*, Socrates uses myth as an instrument of persuasion intended to oppose the type of persuasion mobilized in rhetoric; myth thereby becomes a weapon against rhetoric. In a wholly different field of ideas, Theodor Ebert ('"Wenn ich einen schönen Mythos vortragen darf . . ." Zu Status, Herkunft und Funktion des Schlussmythos in Platons *Phaidon*', pp. 251–69) undertakes a delicate analysis of the final myth of the *Phaedo*, in order to bring out as strongly as possible the evidence that the myth is of Pythagorean inspiration. For her part, Karin Alt ('Zu einigen Problemen in Platons Jenseitsmythen und deren Konsequenzen bei späteren Platonikern', pp. 270–89) takes up matters from a more general viewpoint. Myths of the Beyond insist on the fact that we are responsible for our destiny, and that our concern for justice must not let us forget that our life must favour the activity of the intellect; only this type of activity can ensure genuine happiness (*eudaimonía*).

The volume ends with a contribution by Arbogast Schmitt ('Mythos und Vernunft bei Platon', pp. 290–309) which insists on the impossibility of opposing *mûthos* to *lógos* in the same way as the irrational to the rational. For Schmitt, the best *mûthos* is also one that teaches something, and the best *lógos* is a rational *lógos*.

By virtue of the enquiry it undertakes into the occurrences of *mûthos*, its composites and its derivatives in the Platonic corpus, by the general problems it raises, and the analyses of particular myths it proposes, this book, which originated from a colloquium on the theme of 'Plato's myths' at the University of Regensburg on 30–31 July 2001, constitutes an important landmark in research on an old problem: that of the relations between *mûthos* and *lógos* in Plato.

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SYMPOSIUM PLATONICUM V

T. M. Robinson, L. Brisson (edd.): *Plato:* Euthydemus, Lysis, Charmides. *Proceedings of the V Symposium Platonicum*. Pp. vi + 402. Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag, 2000. Cased. ISBN: 3-89665-143-9.

This volume differs from its predecessors in that it studies three dialogues in all, and has the welcome additions of an *index locorum*, a subject index and a consolidated bibliography; these were compiled by Brisson, while Robinson took responsibility for

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editing the papers. These are divided into a first section, the longest, which deals with *Euthydemus*, a second devoted to *Lysis*, and the third to *Charmides*, with five further essays in a more comprehensive grouping. The majority of the papers are in English, but some are in French, German, Italian, and Spanish, and this reflects a pleasant aspect of the symposium, which was bilingual in its Toronto setting and polyglot in the discussion sessions.

It is not immediately clear why these three dialogues were chosen. They all obviously illustrate aspects of Socratic *elenchos*, but only *Charmides* is actually aporetic (Christopher Rowe and Beatriz Bossi cast doubts on the *aporia* at the end of *Lysis* being wholly what it seems) and *Euthydemus*, also 'elenctically-pitched' (p. 194) is closer in spirit to *Cratylus*. Even in the 'Comprehensive Papers' an over-arching theme is not found. The three works do not have comparable coverage, for the *Euthydemus* section is equal to those on *Lysis* and *Charmides* combined; this is no disadvantage, however, as the dialogue was almost completely neglected until G. E. L. Owen, with his sharp eye for under-rated areas of Greek philosophy, started a reading group on it in Oxford in 1965, and commentaries of various kinds followed. The essays here are wide-ranging, and put *Euthydemus* firmly into mainstream Plato.

The volume opens with the text of the first plenary session, a splendid defence of *Euthydemus* as a serious piece of philosophy, tagged with Anacharsis' maxim from Aristotle (*NE* 1176b33) παίζειν ὅπως σπουδάζῃ. The futility of attempting to appreciate *Euthydemus* in the context of a spurious dating of the dialogues is trounced by Hayden Ausland ('Platonic chronologies have long had to avoid it or explain it away', p. 21), but Charles Kahn here accepts the 'traditional' chronology and understands the surprising number of allusions to 'late' dialogues as genuine *pro*-lepsis; Shrinro Kato argues, however, that *Euthydemus* is likely to be contemporary with, if not later than, *Republic* from the return to the use of Crito as the link-man. Alvaro Vallejo suggests a helpful distinction here in Socratic versus Platonic dialogue chronology in the use of maieutic, *epōidē*, and myth, and Thomas Szlezák looks more closely at the *Charmides*/*Euthydemus* ordering.

Euthydemus is concerned with language (as illustrated by Samuel Scolnicov) in the wider context of a display of professional eristic, and David Hitchcock claims that Socrates himself should be viewed as its founder: 'there is no reliable evidence of any predecessor or independent contemporary of Socrates having taken the rôle of questioner in a question-and-answer discussion directed at determining whether the answerer's thesis can be refuted' (p. 62). Socrates himself has now moved on to the more constructive position of arguing that wisdom is the only good, is teachable, and is a certain kind of knowledge. Louis-André Dorion suggests that the two brothers belong to the Megarian school, whereas Annette Hüffmeier wonders if, given the title of the dialogue, the character Dionysodorus is not a genuine brother of Euthydemus but his mirror-image. (A mention of the excessive use of the dual number throughout might have strengthened her case here.) More conventional explorations of the paradoxes are given by Walter Mesch, 'Der sophistiche Umgang mit der Zeit in Platons *Euthydemus*'; Livio Rossetti, 'La confutazione virtuale dei paradossi nell' *Eutidemo*'; Graciela Marcos de Pinnoti, 'Las falacias en torno a la falsedad'; and Roslyn Weiss, who cheerfully admits to Socrates' cheating in her engaging piece on 'When Winning is Everything: Socratic Elenchus and Euthydemian Eristic'. Two further essays on the dialogue move into ethics. The Brickhouse–Smith collaboration asks 'whether Socrates believes that knowledge regarding the production of good things is independent of knowledge of how to use things in such a way as to make them good and, if so, in what sense does he believe that virtue actually produces good

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things' (p. 78). Christopher Gill supplements this debate on the 'sovereignty of virtue' in the light of Stoic interpretations of virtue as the only good and the related placing of 'preferables'. The point is picked up later by Glen Lesses, who wonders where friendship fits in if the only genuine good is virtue.

Essays on the *Lysis* are mostly concerned with form and structure: Michael Bordt on the unity of the dialogue, Beatriz Bossi and the double bill of James Siebach and Mark Wrathall on Socratic *elenchos* in *Lysis* and the status of the *aporia*, also discussed by Christopher Rowe, who introduces a comparison with *Symposium*, and Michel Nancy in an exploration of 'sophisme socratique' in the dialogue. Maria Isabel de Santa Cruz is against any reading of a nascent 'théorie classique des Idées' in the natural expression of the *parousia* of a quality in its object, with especial reference to *Lysis* 217b–218a. The one contribution on the avowed subject of the dialogue is that of Wilfred Kühn on 'L'examen de l'amour intéressé'.

Essays on *Charmides* are more wide-ranging, with Socratic interrogation by Harold Tarrant, the meaning of *σωφροσύνη* by Richard Stalley, 'Greetings from Apollo' by Thomas Tuozzo, and contributions on Zalmoxis by Luc Brisson and David Murphy. Noburu Notomi writes on 'Critias and the Origins of Plato's Political Philosophy' and Mauro Tulli on 'fra poesia e ricerca'.

A possible general theme is explored by Matthias Baltes in 'der Status der Ideen in Platons Frühdialogen', but one perhaps of more contemporary interest is that raised by Edward Halper with 'Is Knowledge of Knowledge Possible?', a question which leads into 'is there a theory of everything?'. But then, what possible benefit or harm might a knowledge of knowledge result in, and what would such royal knowledge be a knowledge of, if it were acquired?

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CYROPAEDIA

C. NADON: *Xenophon's Price. Republic and Empire in the* Cyropaedia. Pp. xiv + 198. Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 2001. ISBN: 0-520-22404-3.

Nadon focuses on the emergence of an autocratic empire from a background of Persian republicanism and the achievement by Cyrus of that extraordinary rule over other men which is Xenophon's motive for writing (1.1.3, 6). The republic depended on class domination by an educationally defined social élite. A Sparta purged of Sparta's faults—justice, not courage, is central, and citizens practise virtue for its own sake—it has merits, but requires isolation, privileges education-by-punishment and fosters unhealthy competition. Cyrus, passionate for honour and (exceptionally) partly educated in Media, where a different political organization and understanding of justice held sway, can see the faults. The context for change is Persian support of Media against Assyria and its allies. The inadequacy of Persian military forces in the face of the enemy's resources leads Cyrus to develop a new conception of virtue (the virtuous should profit by their virtue) and to arm the Persian *demos*—releasing potential but revolutionizing society irrevocably. In a military context, and given appropriate ambition and manipulative skills, democratization fosters autocracy because of Cyrus' rôle as agreed arbiter of reward-by-merit (I gloss: N. does not quite

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