things' (p. 78). Christopher Gill supplements this debate on the 'sovereignty of virtue' in the light of Stoic interpretations of virtue as the only good and the related placing of 'preferables'. The point is picked up later by Glen Lesses, who wonders where friendship fits in if the only genuine good is virtue.

Essays on the *Lysis* are mostly concerned with form and structure: Michael Bordt on the unity of the dialogue, Beatriz Bossi and the double bill of James Siebach and Mark Wrathall on Socratic *elenchos* in *Lysis* and the status of the *aporia*, also discussed by Christopher Rowe, who introduces a comparison with *Symposium*, and Michel Nancy in an exploration of 'sophisme socratique' in the dialogue. Maria Isabel de Santa Cruz is against any reading of a nascent 'théorie classique des Idées' in the natural expression of the *parousia* of a quality in its object, with especial reference to *Lysis* 217b–218a. The one contribution on the avowed subject of the dialogue is that of Wilfred Kühn on 'L'examen de l'amour intéressé'.

Essays on *Charmides* are more wide-ranging, with Socratic interrogation by Harold Tarrant, the meaning of σωφροσύνη by Richard Stalley, 'Greetings from Apollo' by Thomas Tuozzo, and contributions on Zalmoxis by Luc Brisson and David Murphy. Noburu Notomi writes on 'Critias and the Origins of Plato's Political Philosophy' and Mauro Tulli on 'fra poesia e ricerca'.

A possible general theme is explored by Matthias Baltes in 'der Status der Ideen in Platons Frühdialogen', but one perhaps of more contemporary interest is that raised by Edward Halper with 'Is Knowledge of Knowledge Possible?', a question which leads into 'is there a theory of everything?'. But then, what possible benefit or harm might a knowledge of knowledge result in, and what would such royal knowledge be a knowledge of, if it were acquired?

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CYROPAEDIA

C. NADON: *Xenophon's Price. Republic and Empire in the* Cyropaedia. Pp. xiv + 198. Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 2001. ISBN: 0-520-22404-3.

Nadon focuses on the emergence of an autocratic empire from a background of Persian republicanism and the achievement by Cyrus of that extraordinary rule over other men which is Xenophon's motive for writing (1.1.3, 6). The republic depended on class domination by an educationally defined social élite. A Sparta purged of Sparta's faults—justice, not courage, is central, and citizens practise virtue for its own sake—it has merits, but requires isolation, privileges education-by-punishment and fosters unhealthy competition. Cyrus, passionate for honour and (exceptionally) partly educated in Media, where a different political organization and understanding of justice held sway, can see the faults. The context for change is Persian support of Media against Assyria and its allies. The inadequacy of Persian military forces in the face of the enemy's resources leads Cyrus to develop a new conception of virtue (the virtuous should profit by their virtue) and to arm the Persian *demos*—releasing potential but revolutionizing society irrevocably. In a military context, and given appropriate ambition and manipulative skills, democratization fosters autocracy because of Cyrus' rôle as agreed arbiter of reward-by-merit (I gloss: N. does not quite

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make this explicit or underscore Cyrus' application of military command-structure to imperial organization). With Assyria defeated and Media finished as an independent power (Cyrus has diverted the Medes' affection to himself), a palace-based system of supra-national rule emerges, along with a new conception of justice. But the system is inherently flawed, lacks purposive post-conquest focus, and collapses the moment death removes Cyrus from the scene, a point mercilessly underlined by the (authentic) 'palinode'.

So Empire is no better than Republic, but both are flawed and the shift from Republic to Empire is inevitable. The evaluative ambiguities in *Cyropaedia* are there partly because it offers a balanced general critique of Greek political life (exposing the limits on the attainment of justice in all regimes), partly (startlingly) to ensure it circulates even when the *polis* yields to the ineluctable emergence of empire on the Asiatic model: just as Xenophon allegedly made *Hellenica* a covert dissection of Spartan imperialism to protect it from Spartan censorship, so *Cyropaedia* is designed to survive in an as-yet-unrealized era of political oppression. N.'s refutation of my approach to the unsystematic allusiveness of *Hellenica* does not convince, and even I hesitate to credit Xenophon with such sombrely calculating prescience, but in general his approach to *Cyropaedia*, as a text which requires close reading, deals in problems not black-and-white solutions or mindless eulogy and (in particular) avoid presenting Cyrus' achievement as an unalloyed good, is one with which I have great sympathy.

Finding the right critical approach is tricky: when N. says that 'reading the *Cyropaedia* . . . requires the kind of care one takes in interpreting a dialogue or a play' (p. 24), one knows what he is getting at, yet that care is appropriate (in modern criticism) to many more 'straightforward' historiographical texts. *Cyropaedia* squats across various (what we see as) genres, and issues surrounding historicity and fictionality remain more important than N. allows. His elucidation of a core discourse about virtue and justice evokes ancient perceptions of *Cyropaedia* as in dialogue with Plato's *Republic* (moderns tend to find this fantastically *mal-à-propos*), but it is a vital irreducible difference that Xenophon's examination of politics professes dependence on specific historical experience. The political philosopher's clarity produces the hectoring rhetoric about good and bad forms of rule by the One, the Few, or the Many in *Republic*; Xenophon's disingenuous style is less thrilling, but his approach (to invite thought not browbeat into submission) is no less intellectually honest, and its shaded ambiguity is what you get from engagement with the messiness of historical actuality.

N.'s orthodox 'this is not real Persian history' approach does therefore oversimplify things. A problem about subtly elusive texts is that exposition risks turning grey into black-and-white and *vice versa*, and some points on which I would take issue with N. exemplify this. Limitation of space precludes elaboration here (the brief review is precisely not the place to elucidate—or darken—such issues), though I hope to provide it elsewhere. But readers of N. who have been (rightly) impelled to attentive re-reading of *Cyropaedia* may wish to ponder some of the following: the nature of the exploitation of the Persian *demos*; talk of putting non-Persians in the Persian army (2.2.26); Persian republican 'virtue for its own sake' and Cyrus' new morality; Cyrus' *philotimia* and the impossibility of receiving true praise; derogations from the reward-for-merit principle; the Armenian interlude and dispute with Cyaxares; Cyrus' forgiveness of 'human faults' (3.1.40, 5.4.19, 6.1.37); Pantheia and Theodote (*Mem*. 3.11), where some consideration of S. Goldhill's paper in P. Cartledge *et al.* (edd.), *Kosmos: Essays in Order, Conflict and Community in Classical Athens* (Cambridge, 1998), pp. 105–24 is needed; the nature (or absence?) of justice in the

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imperial order; Pheraulas' view of child–parent relations; Cyrus' 'abject failure' to maintain with the principles of 3.3.51–2; the identity of the *kratistoi* of 8.1.46.

Finally, N.'s conception that Cyrus commits suicide because the game is up is falsely unsympathetic to Xenophon's representation of a more-than-banally-human element in his demise. Cyrus is a necessarily flawed hero, but still a hero, and the quasi-mystic quality to his end (whatever it owes to Iranian story-telling) reflects this, just as the palinode both assures us that praise of a Persian is not to be taken wholly outside the context of fourth-century Greek reactions to the empire and underlines that the fourth-century empire is a squalid remnant of a grand, if intrinsically flawed, experiment.

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ARISTOTLE'S TREATISES

R. LENGEN: *Form und Funktion der aristotelischen Pragmatie. Die Kommunikation mit dem Rezipienten*. (Philosophie der Antike 16.) Pp. 245. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2002. Cased, €50. ISBN: 3-515-07798-7.

Students of Aristotle's *pragmateiai* will be delighted by this monograph in which, for the first time in a book-length study, systematic attention is given to Aristotle's language, style and method of literary composition. Traditionally, this has often been dismissed, rather crudely, as 'lecture notes' or 'Notizenstil', as opposed to the 'golden fluency' which, according to Cicero, characterized Aristotle's (lost) dialogues; and the undeniable clumsiness and carelessness of parts of Aristotle's surviving writings has long prevented classicists from taking a closer interest in the intricacies of Aristotelian discourse. However, with the advent of reception studies, discourse analysis, the study of the pragmatic functions of texts (rather than their supposed literary or non-literary nature), and the renewed interest taken in the rhetorical nature of scientific discourse, Aristotle's works present an interesting challenge. For any student of Aristotle will recognize that, however impersonal the tone of his works and however careless the structure of his argument may appear, his writings nonetheless contain a hidden but undeniable psychagogic rhetoric that is clearly meant to make the reader agree with his conclusions, for example, in the subtle balance between confident explanation and seemingly genuine uncertainty, resulting in a careful alternation of dogmatic statements and exploratory suggestions. These, and many other features of Aristotle's way of writing, are the subject of Lengen's book (a revised Ph.D. thesis from Freiburg University, one of the many interesting fruits from the 'Mündlichkeit und Schriftlichkeit' programme directed by Wolfgang Kullmann). L. takes his cue from what Aristotle himself says in *Metaphysics* α (and elsewhere) about the ideal recipient of his discourses. Aristotle is clearly aware of the ways in which a scientific discussion of a topic should take account of the knowledge, background, needs and expectations of its intended audience (e.g. in the level of accuracy and technicality, the level of background knowledge to be presupposed, the nature of the arguments used). Thus, he could be said to reflect an early awareness of what in reception studies has come to be known as the 'Appellstruktur' of texts. It should be noted that, although L. is obviously familiar with reception theory, his method is largely and refreshingly descriptive, and his use of theoretical terminology

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