THE
JOURNAL OF MENTAL SCIENCE

[*Published by Authority of the Royal Medico-Psychological Association.*]

No. 383. [NEW SERIES No. 347.] APRIL, 1945. VOL. XCI

Part I.—Original Articles.

WHAT IS MEANT BY PERSONALITY?

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THE word " personality " is being used in psychological medicine with increasing frequency. Personality tests are now to a large extent replacing pure intelligence tests, the term is frequently encountered in psychological papers, monographs and text-books, and one modern journal is even entitled *Character and Personality*.

Of recent years, following the introduction of the operation of prefrontal leucotomy, the word " personality " has acquired an even greater importance, for it is generally agreed that while the intelligence appears to be relatively unaffected by this operation, there are undoubted changes in the personality of the patients so treated, as for example a loss of self-consciousness, a slight tactlessness in their social relationships, a tendency to live in the present and to let the future take care of itself, and in varying degrees some reduction of initiative and originality.

Before embarking on a discussion as to the nature of the changes induced by leucotomy, it was felt advisable to write a preliminary paper defining more accurately the " key-word " of the whole problem, namely, " personality," and this must be the excuse for offering a paper concerned almost entirely with the definition of words to a journal devoted to mental science.

Personality is a word which is frequently used at the present time, but it is obvious as soon as attention is paid to the contexts in which it is used that the meanings assigned to it are extremely diverse, and sometimes even contradictory. As Hodgson justly remarks, " the word ' personality ' is one of those slippery words of which one has to be perennially cautious ; which mean one thing at one time and another at another, one thing to this man and another to that. Perhaps it is just because of this that it often seems to provide us with so satisfying a solution of profound mysteries, for it buries them in the depths of its own indeterminateness." The same point is also stressed by Nicodemus (1) in his essay on " Personality " ; he points out that the terms individuality and personality are " employed, even by the erudite, with an extreme laxity, and often as though they were interchangeable. They are further confused by the introduction of a third category, employed with no less laxity, that of character. It is common to hear individuality, character and personality ascribed to the same person indiscriminately, and in, apparently, the same sense. It seems, therefore, of prime importance firstly to define these terms, and, secondly, to attempt to ascertain what the transition between individuality, character and personality implies." While agreeing for the greater part with the definitions given by Nicodemus in his essay, it is felt that there is need for even greater clarity in the precise determination of the elements of meaning peculiar to these, and other terms descriptive of human beings, if those who use them are to avoid misunderstanding, inexactitude, tautology or redundancy.

In order to illustrate the diversity of meaning which has been attributed to " personality," here are a number of definitions selected more or less at random from modern authors. This is not meant to be an exhaustive list of definitions, nor has any attempt been made in this paper to deal comprehensively with the many books and papers dealing with personality and its problems.

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1. Personality is the pattern of behaviour which the individual exhibits in adjusting and reacting to his environment. (Paterson.)
2. The key to the nature of personality . . . lies in the nature of interpersonal consciousness, or in plain terms in the nature of friendship. . . . It not merely implies but is constituted by self-consciousness. (McMurray (1).)
3. Personality is consciousness of individual identity and distinction, yet with a social content. (Davies.)
4. Personality is the final differentiation which the individual has made, as it were, and produced in himself and superimposed upon all that he has inherited from past generations and lower forms of mental evolution. (Brown.)
5. Personality is the emergent synthesis of the psychological attributes of the individual in relation to the environment, . . . a process but not a product. (Gregory.)
6. Personality includes the character and the ego. It involves all the heredity of the individual, and all the modifications which have been imposed upon the individual from his environment. (Gordon.)
7. Personality is the highest realization of the inborn distinctiveness of the particular living being. (Jung.)
8. A person is a centre of liberty which confronts things, the universe, God, talks with another person, communicates with them by intelligence and affection. (Maritain.)
9. Personality is something that only exists between people, and which cannot exist in the individual in isolation. (McMurray (2).)
10. The personality can only be realized through self-transcendence. (Berdyeav (1).)
11. Man is a personality not by nature but by spirit. By nature he is only an individual. (Berdyaev (2).)
12. Personality is the universal in an individually unrepeatable form. (Berdyaev (3).)
13. Personality is not a substance but an act, a creative act. (Berdyaev (4).)
14. Personality is not a biological or a psychological category but an ethical and spiritual. (Berdyaev (5).)
15. Personality is the coming into being of the future; it consists of creative acts. (Berdyaev (5).)
16. Personality is bound up with love. . . . Love is the path to the realization of personality. (Berdyaev (6).)
17. The only bond between persons is love . . . he liveth best and hath the greatest personality who loveth best. (Jevons.)
18. It is in those human activities which are distinctively human, because they are rational and social, that we must study the nature of human personality. (Webb (1).)
19. Personality is no doubt a condition of the existence of Science, but Personality is omitted from the account which Science gives of its conclusions. (Webb (2).)

Although this paper is primarily concerned with the definition of personality, it is felt that this cannot be done without defining other closely related words, namely, individuality, character, I or ego, and self, so as to determine the essential distinctions between their meaning and that of personality. In order to do this it is necessary to study the origin and history of words, and the ways in which their meanings have subtly altered with the passage of time. Confusion of thought frequently arises from the ambiguity of the words used to express the thought, yet at the same time the essential distinction between a living and a dead language is the fact that in the former words assume new meanings, derived or abstracted from the old, though in the course of time the link between them, to which the new word actually owed its birth, may be forgotten. The word "blitz" gives an excellent example of this; to most English people it now signifies a German air-raid, and probably many who use it in this sense are unaware that the original meaning of the word is lightning, and that it was only through its linking with *Krieg* in the phrase *Blitzkrieg* and the associations of this with aerial warfare that the word came to be used in the modern English sense. The new word was not an

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arbitrarily chosen symbol, but grew organically out of the meaning and associations of the old word. Because of this gradual change in the meaning of words with the passage of time a great deal of attention will be paid to etymology in this paper.

Individual and Individuality.

In defining the word "individual" the *Oxford Dictionary* first treats it as an adjective, thereby stressing the fact that the use of the word as a noun is secondary, and is indeed an abstraction from the primary adjectival form. Concretely speaking there is no such thing as an individual, there are only individual things; and an individual thing is one which in substance or essence forms an indivisible entity. It is that which cannot be separated, inseparable; something existing as a separate indivisible entity; numerically one, single, as distinct from others of the same kind. When treating the word individual as a noun the *Oxford Dictionary* defines it as follows: Inseparable thing; a single object or thing, or a group of things forming a single complex idea, and regarded as a unit; a single member of a natural class, collective group or number; a single human being, as opposed to Society, the Family, etc.; without any notion of contrast or relation to a class or group, a human being, a person.

It will thus be seen that when finally the word individual is made synonymous with human being or person, this is only achieved by the substitution, in the interests of economy, of a noun abstracted from a condensation of the phrase "individual man." It could equally well have been made to serve as a synonym for any other indivisible entity, e.g. an individual penny or an individual dog, though of course it never has been used in this way. If there is really no difference in meaning between "individual" and "man" or "human being" the phrase individual man is pure tautology, but this is obviously not the case since the word can be used meaningfully in phrases such as "individual penny" or "individual family," etc. Thus if the word individual is used simply to designate a human being, and not a human being considered from the specific aspect of an indivisible entity and from this aspect only, the word is superfluous, and could and should be invariably replaced by the words "man" or "human being."

This leads to the further question of what the phrase "a human being considered from the specific aspect of an indivisible entity" does or should mean. It is perhaps easiest to attack this by way of analogy. An individual penny is an object made of a specific metal or metallic alloy, of a specific average weight and shape, and carrying a specific type of image and superscription. These are the inseparable essentials of a penny; if, while keeping the weight, size, image and superscription identical, tin is substituted for copper the object ceases to be a penny; and so on with all the other basic elements of the coin. This it is which makes the penny an individual, makes it distinct, but it is to be noted that the *Oxford Dictionary* goes on to say, "distinct from others of the same kind," and the use of the word *same* is important. The identity is due to the fact that all members of the group must have the same basic essential elements in order to belong to the group at all. Thus although the individual is considered as a single unit, distinct from all the other members of the group, it is nevertheless in virtue of its identity with them, and not its differences from them, that it is considered as an individual of that particular group. As individuals of a group the units are equivalent or identical in value, and can be substituted for one another. Thus all pennies considered simply as individual pennies are equivalent, and although there are necessarily variations between them, as long as the basic essential elements are inseparably united, the variations between them can be disregarded, and it does not matter whether the image is that of Queen Victoria or of King George, or the date 1893 or 1914, the penny is still an individual penny.

Similarly, in so far as a human being is regarded as an individual, reference should be limited to those aspects in which he is identical with other human beings, and not to those qualities wherein he differs from them. The difficulty, of course, lies in determining what are precisely the basic elements, corporeal, mental, and spiritual, which must be inseparably present before a particular entity can be designated as a man, but once this has been done, all individuals included within the group must be regarded as equal. It is with human beings regarded as individuals that equality has to do—equal rights, equal opportunities, and equal respon-

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sibilities. It is as a separate entity, distinct from others, that man exists as an individual on equal terms with his fellow men, and capable of being substituted by them or for them. Thus in the issue of rations every man is considered as an individual, and the allowance is identical for all individuals of the same group, whether he be saint or sinner, genius or fool; it is as an individual that man has a vote, or competes as a "hand" in the labour market.

The important point to be stressed is that as an individual the human being is considered as separate from his fellow human beings. The development of this notion of separateness from others, necessarily associated with the inseparability and indivisibility of the individual entity, has given rise to the notions inherent in individualism, viz.: (1) Self-centred feeling or conduct as a principle, a mode of life in which the individual pursues his own ends or follows out his own ideas; free and independent individual action or thought; egoism. (2) The social theory which advocates the free and independent action of the individual, as opposed to communistic methods of organization and state interference. (3) *Metaphorically*. The doctrine that the individual is a self-determined whole, and that any large whole is merely an aggregate of individuals, which, if they act upon each other at all, do so only externally. (*Oxford English Dictionary*.)

Individuality is, of course, a further abstraction made via the noun and the adjective. In view of what has been said above concerning the equal rights, opportunities, and responsibilities of individuals, it seems appropriate to quote here the second definition given by the *Dictionary*: "The fact or condition of existing as an individual or corporation (artificial person) having rights and duties recognized by the law."

Character.

If the *Oxford Dictionary* be consulted it will be noted that no reference has been made in the foregoing to the fourth definition of the adjective individual, viz. "distinguished from others by attributes of its own, marked by a striking and peculiar character." The omission was deliberate because the use of the word in this sense seems to be unfortunate and misleading, and the difficulty could be avoided by the use of the word "character," which is used in the dictionary definition of this meaning.

Although it is easy to see how this meaning has arisen, how the idea of being separate from other individuals of the same group has been brought into the foreground and given the predominant place, at the expense of the idea of the sameness or identity of the indivisible units of the same group, it is misleading because it conveys the impression that the distinction from the other individuals is the prime meaning of the word, whereas it is secondary, and it is unfortunate because the word character can express this idea of uniqueness of difference from other individuals, while there is no other word which can appositely express the idea of an *indivisible* entity of the *same* kind. It is therefore desirable that the word individual should be retained for the latter meaning, and the word character substituted for the former.

This leads to the discussion of the origin and meaning of the word character. According to the *Oxford Dictionary* it comes from the Greek verb meaning "to cut furrows in, engrave." The Greek noun derived from this verb apparently meant either the instrument for marking or graving, or the impress, stamp or distinctive mark so made.

The earliest English usages were in this same literal sense, and it was not until later that the figurative meanings were abstracted. Originally, then, the word meant a distinctive mark, impressed or engraved; a brand or stamp; after this use was extended to mean a graphic sign or symbol, then more specifically a letter of the alphabet, and finally writing or printing. Figuratively, too, the word originally meant a distinctive mark, evidence or token, a feature, trait, characteristic; later, the aggregate of the distinctive features of anything, essential peculiarity; then the face or features as betokening moral qualities, the personal appearance; the sum of mental and moral qualities which distinguish an individual or a race, viewed as a homogeneous whole; moral qualities strongly developed or strikingly displayed, distinct or distinguished character. Still later the word was extended to mean person, especially one with distinctive attributes, and so odd or eccentric, or else as portrayed by a novelist or dramatist.

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As with the word individual, so here also the term character was originally applied to objects, and can still be so used. The individual penny may have a character in addition to its individuality, if the word is used in the sense of " a distinctive mark or feature," or " the aggregate of the distinctive features of anything " ; thus a worn penny of the year 1869 has a different character from one newly minted in 1944.

It will be noted that when the word is restricted in its application to human beings a new twist is given to the meaning by the introduction of the word moral. " A man of character implies, not only one of defined individuality, but also one of deliberate self-limitation, selection, and repression. . . . In other words the unique individual pattern is limited by the conditions in which it takes form, by heredity and environment, by choice and by circumstance. . . ." But the term " character " implies a further and a wilful limitation, a limitation of choice. For the individual, set amid circumstance, is not only limited by his conditions, he also deliberately limits himself by the exercise of his free will. If he is to act he must do so. From a variety of possible courses of action he chooses one ; from a multiplicity of sensations and impulses he selects some and rejects others in accordance with a dominant motive (Nicodemus (2)). A similar definition is given by Brunner (1) : " By character we understand, first of all, that which distinguishes human beings from one another, not, however, merely ' natural ' differences —or differences of individuality—but those which are due to self-determination, to the imprint which is due to man's own reaction as a whole."

The word character is, therefore, eminently suitable for signifying those qualities which make an individual unique, which distinguish him from other individuals who are fundamentally identical with him. Since in man this differentiation is not only imposed on him by his heredity and environment, but is also in part self-created, it must necessarily carry with it a moral connotation.

Used in the sense of " the sum of the qualities, physical, mental and moral, viewed as a homogeneous whole, which distinguish an individual," the word character seems adequate for many of the definitions of personality given by psychologists, and quoted at the beginning of this paper. Further, the substitution of the word character in these definitions would help to eliminate much of the confusion associated with the word personality. I propose, therefore, to substitute the word in those definitions where it seems advisable to do so :

> (1) Character is the pattern of behaviour which the individual exhibits in adjusting and reacting to his environment.
>
> (2) Character is the final differentiation which the individual has made as it were, and produced in himself, and superimposed upon all that he has inherited from past generations and lower forms of mental evolution.
>
> (3) Character is the emergent synthesis of the psychological attributes of the individual in relation to his environment . . . a process but not a product.
>
> (4) Character involves all the heredity of the individual, and all the modifications which have been impressed upon him from his environment.

The word character, however, does not seem applicable to those definitions made by philosophers and metaphysicians ; hence it seems probable that Berdyaev (5) and Webb (2) are right when they maintain that " personality is not a biological or psychological category but an ethical and spiritual," and that " Personality is omitted from the account which Science gives of its conclusions." Whenever psychology is, or aspires to be, entirely scientific, it can only give an account of individuality and character and not of personality. This point will be discussed more fully during the definition of the word personality.

Ego, I, and Self.

It seems sufficient for present purposes to discuss the meaning of these words from a rather limited standpoint, namely, that of differentiating between the synonymous use of the Latin ego and the English I, and that of the word self. The distinction has been pointed out in a slightly different context by Bowman : " In actual usage the words ' mind ' and ' soul ' differ from ' subject,' ' person,' ' agent ' and ' conscious being,' in that we commonly represent the former as

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possessions, whereas we identify ourselves with the latter. I have a soul and a mind, but I *am* a subject, an agent, a person." Similarly one uses the possessive pronoun with self, myself, yourself, himself, herself; and although, owing to the development of language with its subtle change in the meaning and use of words, we do now frequently use a possessive pronoun with ego, my ego, your ego, etc., there is no corresponding usage with I, and we do not say " my I " or " your I." Further, although we can qualify I by self, I myself, we cannot substitute self for I, and instead of " I think " write " self think."

It is important to stress this distinction, because many psychologists, and especially empirical psychologists, confuse the two. This confusion is revealed in the following passage by James: " Now what is this self of all other selves? They would call it the *active* element in all consciousness. It is what welcomes or rejects. It presides over the perception of sensations, and by giving or withholding its assent influences the movements they tend to arouse. . . . It is the source of effort and attention, the place from which appear to emanate the fiats of the will. A physiologist who should reflect upon it in his own person could hardly help, I should think, connecting it more or less with the ' process ' by which ideas or incoming sensations are ' reflected ' or pass over into outward acts. . . . It is opposed to them as the permanent is opposed to the changing and inconstant. . . . Some would say it is the soul, others a fiction. . . . For this central part of the Self is felt, it is something with which we have direct sensible acquaintance." Would it not be infinitely simpler and clearer to write " I " instead of " this self of all other selves." " I " am " the active element in all consciousness," the subject, the agent, the actor, " the permanent as opposed to the changing and inconstant "; " I " am pure subjectivity, pure activity, " I " can only be felt subjectively, " I " cannot be apprehended objectively; " our direct sensible acquaintance " with it is only through pure subjectivity. Self, on the other hand, can and must be thought of objectively; self is the instrument, the means whereby " I," the actor, realize my activities. " I " am permanent and unchanging, but my " self " is changing and inconstant. It is owing to this confusion that " some would say it is the soul, others a fiction." It is equally as erroneous to equate " I " with the soul as to equate it with the self, for, as Bowman rightly stresses, I have a soul, but I am I, " I am that I am." Any attempt to equate " I " with soul or self is an attempt to apprehend " I " objectively, but there is no objective " I," and any statement or assertion that an objective " I " exists *is* pure fiction. It cannot be stressed too emphatically that " I " cannot be apprehended in objective terms, but can only be experienced and known subjectively in pure activity; it is in a different category from everything else except " Thou," for only these two, " I " and " Thou," are permanent and unchanging, while everything else is changing and inconstant. (For those who are interested in this relationship of I and Thou Dr. Buber's (1) book is to be recommended.)

When discussing the meaning of individual it was admitted that the difficulty lay in determining what are the basic elements, corporeal, mental and spiritual, which must be inseparably present before a particular entity can be designated as a man, but surely all will agree that " I myself " is the irreducible minimum; neither the " I " nor the " self " separated from each other can be considered as an individual, as a human being. The individual comprises both the " I " and the " self," and it is to this surely that the following statements refer. " The timeless element in individuality is, therefore, if we accept these authoritative conclusions, not the individual *itself* (the italics are mine), but rather the principle of being (i.e. the " I," the active element) which begets such individual patterns. It is not the individual patterns, the self, but the Being which begets self which is timeless " (Nicodemus (3)).

It is a paradox which Count Hermann Keyserling noted in his profound essay upon " Immortality." " The individual is more than it appears," he wrote. " It is not merely the embodiment of the empirical moment, it is not merely transient, mere phenomenon; it is at the same time the eternal process. . . . The nearer we drew to the meaning of the individual and the more we grasped at its transitory character, the more vivid at the same time became our knowledge that its essence was indestructible. . . . The ' Being ' of life expresses itself in change, in motion, in perishing. . . . Only in this flux of Becoming does permanent Being make itself known."

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Person and Personality.

" The history of the word *persona* outside ecclesiastical use is clear. First, it is an actor's mask, then by an easy transition, the part an actor plays, which is represented by his mask; then any part or role assumed by anyone without any regard to its duration. Secondly, it is the *condicio*, *status*, *munus*, which anyone has in general, and in particular in civil life. And so it is the man himself in so far as he has this or that *persona*. Thus slaves . . . were regarded by the Roman law as not having *persona* " (Bethune-Baker).

" But while the original and secular connotation of the term is thus clear, it is one which, in the clash of religious controversy, has undergone an intense and prolonged deepening and development. . . . In the full, rich and final interpretation of the Church, therefore, the term ' person ' implied neither merely a name or a designation, nor a condition, but a real and eternal being or essence under varying conditions and in varying roles caused by those conditions. Thus the fundamental conception of a real being playing different parts on the stage of life and time was fulfilled and perpetuated " (Nicodemus (4)).

The same derivation is given by the *Oxford Dictionary*, where, however, a note is made that it is only lately that the word " person " has been used as a synonym for a human being in general; in earliest use it referred to the human being *acting* in some capacity, personal *agent* or *actor*. (The italics are mine.)

In the discussion on I and self the conclusion was reached that " I " could be defined as " the *active* element in all consciousness," the subject, the agent, the actor; this occurrence of the one word " actor " in these two contexts gives a clue to a relationship between person and ego. It also reveals the fact that personality is essentially a dramatic and not a scientific concept, and cannot therefore be described in scientific terms. As already stated in the definitions given at the beginning of this paper, " Personality is no doubt a condition of the existence of Science, but Personality is omitted from the account which Science gives of its conclusions " (Webb (2)). Again, " Personality is not a biological or a psychological category, but an ethical and spiritual " (Berdyaev (5)).

What does one mean by saying that personality is essentially a dramatic concept? Drama is derived from the Greek verb meaning " to do," and the essence of drama is action. " To be, or not to be," cried Hamlet, but his real problem was how to act. Descartes affirmed "*Cogito ergo sum*," but should it not rather be "*Ago ergo sum*"; not " I think therefore I am," but " I act therefore I am "? This is true of the inorganic world, for even there the existence of any substance, object or event is known by its action. " Thinking " or " knowing " is consciousness superimposed upon this basic fact of action, and the full Cartesian formula should be, " I act therefore I am; I know I act, therefore I know I am."

The dramatic interpretation of personality is one that has been stressed by Lloyd-Morgan (1): " As agents we are actors on the scene of life, and view that scene and the part which we and others play in it dramatically."

It was, of course, said much earlier by Shakespeare:

> " All the world's a stage,
> And all the men and women in it merely players,
> They have their exits and their entrances,
> And one man in his time plays many parts."

Lloyd-Morgan,(1) however, elaborates this theme: " Thus to view it dramatically is a far more primitive attitude than to view it scientifically. But prior to reflective procedure there is neither the one attitude nor the other.

" It does seem to me that . . . human persons may be regarded as actors who play their parts in the drama of existence with some measure of creative activity.

" In all cases, however, it is with the acts of living agents, primarily human agents, real or imaginary, that what we commonly speak of as drama is concerned. The concept of purpose, embodied in reflective persons, is ever present. And whether the actor walks the boards of the theatrical stage, representing someone other than himself, or plays his part in real life, it is as actor, in one or both senses, that his act, the product of his creative activity, calls for explanation of the kind that I distinguish as dramatic " (Lloyd-Morgan (2)).

" Into drama as art-product we always read purpose on the part of the agents

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portrayed. Into purpose on the part of human agents, in the busy streets or sequestered lanes of our workaday world, we always read drama. On the stage of all drama there are persons who act with purpose, or beings regarded as persons who act with purpose. Of drama the key-note is purpose, and purpose implies personality" (Lloyd-Morgan (3)).

The same concept is also discussed by Urban. He maintains that poetry, in contradistinction to science, always makes "assertions about *persons*. This may seem to be the veriest platitude, but it is, properly understood, of the utmost significance, For science, rightly understood, never speaks of persons and has no interest in them as such. Indeed it has no interest in the individual as such, but only as an exemplification of a universal. 'Scientific' psychology is always psychology without a soul. Poetry, as poetry, always speaks of 'souls,' even when paradoxically, as in naturalistic poetry, it denies their existence. By this I mean that even the naturalistic dramatist, in so far as he is a dramatist, must treat the characters of the play *as though* they were persons even if he thinks they are not. Now, what is a person? The one differentia of a person that is significant is, that he alone of all the parts of nature has consciousness of values and of the 'ought' or obligation inseparable from the awareness of values." "It (poetry) says many things, but one thing it always says, namely, that human life and man are unique, free and self-determining parts of nature. The dramatic mode of representation always implies this; it is the necessary pre-supposition of all drama, and in so far as the poet employs the dramatic way of rendering life, he always says this implicitly. This is true of all drama, but it is pre-eminently true of tragedy. A naturalistic view of man—one which makes of him merely a part of nature—cannot rise to tragedy. The death of a tree or a dog cannot be tragic. It is only that unique part of nature which is the bearer of values, and of the obligation which arises from them, that can be the subject of tragedy. The 'tragic sense of life' is possible only on the supposition of the transcendence of nature, and the tragic *catharsis* is possible only when the drama expresses that transcendence."

This association of personality with obligation and transcendence is also to be found in the following passage from Tagore (1): "There is another division in man which is not explained by the character of his physical life. It is the dualism in his consciousness of what is and what ought to be. In the animal this is lacking, its conflict is between what *is* and what is desired; whereas in man the conflict is between what is desired and what *should be* desired; but what should be desired belongs to a life which is far beyond it. So in man a second birth has taken place. He still retains a good many instincts and habits of his animal life, yet his true life is in the region of what ought to be. In this, though there is a continuation, yet there is also a conflict; many things are good for the one, are evil for the other. This necessity of a fight with himself has introduced an element into man's personality which is character. From the life of desire it guides man into the life of purpose. This life is the life of the moral world. In this moral world we come from the world of nature into the world of humanity."

Kant, of course, made explicit the distinction between the world of nature and the moral world, and recognized that our knowledge of the former is mediated by the intellect and of the latter by the will, i.e. by "a free activity in virtue of which we can use our sensuous and intellectual knowledge as we please," which "brings also a sense of emancipation from the law of cause and effect which dominates the world of things as they appear to us, no less than from the laws of logical necessity which constrain the operations of the reason" (Joad).

Professor Joad has given such a concise statement of Kant's viewpoint that one feels convinced that one cannot do better than continue to quote him at length:

"Kant was then led to distinguish between two selves—the 'transcendental self' by virtue of which man participates in the world of things as they are, and 'the empirical self' which is the self of everyday experience, and is a chaos of wishes and desires. As creatures of desire we belong to the world of things as they appear, and our feelings and actions are as completely determined as the movements of matter in the physical world. But when we act in accordance with the law which our moral will prescribes, we escape from the world of appearance, and establish contact with reality. Further, the consciousness of moral obligation is inextricably bound up with the freedom of the self that wills, which is the transcendental self.

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" The consciousness of ought is not anywhere to be found in the world of things as they appear. Obligation expresses a sort of necessity . . . which occurs nowhere else in nature. It is impossible that anything in nature *ought* to be other than in fact it is. . . . In the world that we know by means of the senses and the intellect we can only find fact; such a world cannot contain a basis for the notion of ought; yet we do undoubtedly recognize oughts. Therefore the source of these oughts must lie in some world other than that revealed to the senses and known to the intellect, and it must be by means of a unique faculty that we recognize them. . . . Examine the world round us, explore physical nature, and you will accumulate information about what is; you will in short ascertain facts, but you will not discover what should be; the information that you obtain will not include oughts."

Kant himself does not, so far as I am aware, use the words " person " or " personality," but it is obvious from the above that personality is implicit in his " transcendental self " if we agree with Urban that " the one differentia of a person that is significant is that he alone of all the parts of nature has consciousness of values, and of the ought or obligation inseparable from the awareness of values."

The existence of a two-fold attitude of man to the universe, a scientific and a dramatic or mythological, is of great practical importance. In both the ego is involved, the activity of man is revealed as much in his scientific discoveries as in his art, his social life, and his religion; but the relationship of the ego to the universe is profoundly different in these two attitudes, and personality is found only in the latter.

This fact has been realized by common sense, though it has not yet been grasped by all psychologists. It is a commonly accepted dictum that a scientist, as scientist, should be impersonal, and that his personal feelings and prejudices should never be allowed to intrude upon the objective data which are under investigation by his intelligence.

Science is man's instrument for exploring the world of nature, for studying the events of the present in the light of the past, and predicting the future therefrom; its aim is the discovery of natural laws, and its conclusions are of necessity deterministic; drama and mythology are, on the other hand, man's instruments for exploring the supernatural, for studying the events of the past in the light of the future and explaining thereby the present, and its conclusions are of necessity indeterministic. " The dead and the living, men, beasts and gods, trees and stars, and rivers, and sun and moon dance through the region of *myths*—where everything may be anything, where nature has no laws, and imagination no limits " (Lang).

Science is mediated by the intelligence, but drama and myth by the personality. The following quotations from Webb (3) indicate the relationship between mythology and personality: " There is a celebrated observation of Aristotle that the lover of myths is in a sense a lover of wisdom or philosopher." " I think with him that the myth is not concerned, strictly speaking, with the same subject matter as Philosophy, but rather takes the place of History where a historical question is asked but the materials for a historical answer are missing. How did the world come into being? How did Society begin? What will happen to our souls after death? " " All the principal Platonic myths may be said to relate to the soul." " Thus to say that all the Platonic myths relate to the nature of the soul is to say that they relate to a nature which we know most intimately in a personal form, and are thus almost constrained to construe elsewhere on the analogy of our own personal life. Moreover, in Plato's philosophy it is the soul which is the source of all motion, the active principle of the whole cosmic process."

This distinction between the scientific and the dramatic or mythological approach was indicated by Kant, and the determinism of science and the indeterminism of drama and myth has also been maintained by Berdyaev (9). " The natural world is ruled by determinist and impersonal forces, and its purpose is obscure; in the spiritual world, on the other hand, freedom reigns supreme on the foundations of personality and personal relationships, and the purpose of existence is clear." Strictly speaking, it is incorrect to speak of the " purpose " of the natural world at all, for the word actually means " that which one sets before himself as an object to be attained," but has the natural world, as such, any self before which can be set the object to be attained? The word " purpose " is surely meaningless except in terms of persons whose present actions are solely determined by their future aims,

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that is by events which exist as yet only in their imaginations, but which may or may not be subsequently realized by their will.

It is for this reason that science can only study the past and predict the future, while drama and mythology, whose concern is predominantly personal, can explain both past and present in terms of the future. Science, in the heyday of its pride, claimed that when it had accumulated sufficient knowledge of the past it would be able to predict the future with absolute certainty; but now modern scientists with greater humility admit that the only thing of which science can be certain is the principle of uncertaincy or indeterminism. Is it not reasonable to suppose that in personality, where imagination and will are allied, the principle of uncertaincy is to be found; in personality as revealed by mythology, where "everything may be anything, where nature has no laws and imagination no limits."

Conjunction of imagination and effective will is the *sine qua non* of creativity, which is also one of the attributes of personality, and is entirely inexplicable on scientific grounds; as McMurray (2) says, "Personality is inherently creative." Perhaps it would be as well to make quite clear what is here meant by creativity. According to the *Oxford Dictionary* the original meaning referred solely to Divine agency, and meant "to bring into being, cause to exist; *esp.* to produce where nothing was before, to form out of nothing." E.g. Chaucer, *c.* 1386, "Al be it that God hath creat al thing in the right ordre." Later the use of the word was extended to mean generally, "to make, form, constitute, or bring into legal existence (an institution, condition, action, mental product, or form, not existing before); and finally, "to cause, occasion, produce, give rise to (a condition or set of circumstances)." The same development is shown with the noun "creation" as with the verb; it originally referred to a Divine agency, and later referred more generally to "the action of making, forming, producing, or bringing into existence"; it is also used in a more restricted sense for "an original production of human intelligence or power; *esp.* of imagination or imaginative art." Once again it seems advisable in the interests of scientific precision to use the words create and creation in the more restricted senses, and not to use them as mere synonyms for simply "making, forming, producing or bringing into existence." In this restricted sense it refers either to "the bringing into existence by the divine power," or to "an original production of human intelligence or power." It may well be that there is more than an accidental analogy or similarity between these two meanings, and indeed Berdyaev maintains that "every creative act is a spiritual act." The basis of creative activity would seem to be that it is purely an expression of the creator himself; that it is determined by nothing external to the essential nature, the essence, of the creator himself; the creation is created for no other reason but that the creator willed it to be created, and it is therefore a manifestation of himself. "The creative act of the subjective spirit is in exteriorization of self in the world" (Berdyaev (8)). This view is also expressed by Tagore (2): "In the man, the life of the animal has taken a further bend. He has come to the beginning of a world which has to be created by his own will and power. . . . For creation is freedom. It is a prison to have to live in what is; for it is living in what is not ourselves." The relationship between personality, creation, freedom and spirit has been very fully developed by Berdyaev (9) in his two books, *Spirit and Reality* and *Slavery and Freedom*, and the theme is throughout the same: "Personality is not a substance but an act, a creative act. . . . Personality is activity, opposition, victory over the dragging burden of the world, the triumph of freedom over the world's slavery. . . . Personality is effort and conflict, the conquest of self and of the world, victory over slavery, it is emancipation." "It might be said that society and nature provide the material for the formation of personality. But personality is emancipation form dependence upon nature, from dependence upon society and the state. It opposes all determination from without, it is determination from within." "Personality is the coming into being of the future, it consists of creative acts. . . . The existence of personality presupposes freedom. The mystery of freedom is the mystery of personality."

Earlier in this paper a person was described as an actor, but it must be remembered, as Garvie points out, that "action is determined by motive." "A motiveless action would be an unreasonable action, for it is no mere play of words to say that the motive is the reason for the action; it is better to say reason than cause,

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so as to preserve the personal character of conduct." In drama it is not the mere occurrence of the events played by the actors that holds our attention, for these only derive their significance from the motives that prompted them. Thus, in " Othello " it is not the fact that Othello killed Desdemona that is of importance ; had he killed her for any other motive than that of jealousy the drama would have been entirely different.

It will be noted that the words motive and emotion both have the same basic root, and they are undoubtedly closely allied in their meaning, for both refer to that which moves a man, to the determinants of his action. The dramatist is therefore portraying through his characters the forces which determine their behaviour. " The characters of a great play are symbols of the spiritual forces that sway mankind ; but they are not arbitrary or allegorical symbols; they are individual cases of what they symbolize. If they are not individual they are mere types, and our interest in them is ethical and not dramatic " (Temple).

In order that drama may reveal the motives underlying the actions which occur in the play it is necessary that the emotions, desires and beliefs of the *dramatis personae* be portrayed, and the genius of the dramatist and the actor lie in their ability to convey to their audience the subjective affective-volitional experiences of the characters they present.

A great many of the thinkers who have concerned themselves with the problem of valuation (e.g. Spinoza, Ehrenfels, Urban, Santayana, Prall, Perry and Calkin) have come to the conclusion that values are primarily subjective, and they identify valuation with feeling, willing and affirmation, either singly or in combination (Calkin). This relationship of values to subjective experiences affords a basis for Urban's statement that the person alone of all the parts of nature has consciousness of values. The same thing has been said by Hoffding : " In our experience personal beings appear in existence as centres of value, by which I mean as the living central points in which value can be felt and acknowledged. It is personality which in the world of experience invests all other things with value."

The significance of the conjunction of creativity and the perception of values in personality has been noted by Allers : " The person possesses possibilities of realising certain definite values by means of action. We may express it thus : Values that are real, but belong to the realm of ideas, can by means of human action be brought into the world of space-time, and thus for the first time fulfil their functions in the cosmic continuum."

The measure of personality thus seems to depend upon the range of the person's value perceptions and the degree to which these ideally apprehended values can be actualized by creative activity in the world of space-time. (This would apply equally to Divine or human personality.) Since, however, in human personality apprehension of values seems so closely linked with affective-volitional experiences, and since the most important of these experiences are evoked only by other persons, and not by objects, it becomes evident why " personality is something which only exists between people and which cannot exist in the individual in isolation," for the most important of all values is that which can only be fully realized between persons, namely, love. " Personality is bound up with love. . . . Love is the path to the realization of personality " (Berdyaev (6)). " The only bond between persons is love . . . he liveth best and hath the greatest personality who loveth best " (Jevons). " Personality is always social " (Webb (3)).

As affective-volitional experiences are, however, necessarily somewhat limited in any given individual, it is obvious that human beings can only penetrate widely and deeply into the realm of values if they can apprehend other values than those directly glimpsed by themselves. An interpersonal revelation of values is, however, made possible by the dramatic attitude ; if we are viewing life dramatically we are viewing it from a standpoint other than our own. In drama, as in art generally, we stand not in the centre of our own personality, but in that of the artist, revealed to us by his music, painting or poetry, or by his *dramatis personae* ; we feel with him, and in thus feeling with him we apprehend through him values which would otherwise remain hidden from us. In this way our creative potentiality becomes immeasurably increased, for these values, as well as those directly apprehended by us, may now by our actions be brought into the world of space-time.

In order to view life through the eyes of another person we must enter into the

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whole of their being as it were; we must not only feel but think and strive as they do. This can only be done by the employment of the whole of ourselves, and it is only in those relationships where all our being is involved that we can claim to be persons. The whole of nature, organic and inorganic, may be viewed in this way, and so man's relationship may be intensely personal where the other element in the relationship is strictly speaking non-personal.

In the scientific attitude, on the other hand, as has already been pointed out, feelings must be left aside, and thus in science man is not acting with the whole of himself, and it is for this reason, therefore, that the scientific attitude is described as impersonal. Moreover, just as it is possible to treat objects as if they were subjects, i.e. personally, so it is equally possible to treat persons as if they were objects, i.e. impersonally. This was even recognized by a nine-year-old child, who gave as the reason for her dislike of a new doctor that " she doen't treat you like a person, she treats you like an it." Brunner (2) draws attention to the same fact: " The peculiar element, the specific element of the species *Homo sapiens*, is this, that it is not a species in which the individual is an example, but ***humanitas***, in which the individual is person. It belongs therefore to the peculiarity of this " species " that the individual is able to abandon it and to deny it, that—at least within certain limits—he can become an ' in-human ' human being. That is the dangerous freedom which belongs to this independence."

To put it in other words, a person is capable of behaving impersonally; and in fact it is unavoidable, and indeed necessary, that he should on occasion adopt this impersonal form of behaviour. " Every *Thou* in the world is by its nature fated to become a thing, or continually to re-enter into the condition of things " (Buber (2)). This impersonal attitude is essential for the scientific attitude through which man learns to know and to make use of natural phenomena, and in it the subject experiences or uses an object; but in those personal relationships, which underlie the dramatic attitude, subject meets subject, and there is no trace of experiencing or making use of another.

Summary.

It has been thought advisable, in the interest of scientific precision, to define the meaning of the words individual, character, I or ego, self, and personality; and to recommend that when used for psychological purposes these words should only be used with the meanings given below. These meanings have not been arbitrarily chosen by the author, but have been selected because they seem to express most clearly the specific and intrinsic meaning of these words as revealed by their etymological development.

1. Individual: When used as a synonym for man or human being should only be used in contexts where man is considered from the aspect of a single unit, as distinct from others of the *same* kind. In this sense of the word the most important feature is the equivalence of individuals, based on their identity with others of the same kind. A man is an individual of the species *Homo sapiens* in so far as he possesses the basic qualities necessary for his inclusion within the species, and since all members of the species must possess these same basic qualities, as individuals they are equal with one another. The word should not be used, as it sometimes is, to indicate a human being who is markedly different from his fellows.

2. Character should be used for " that which distinguishes human beings from one another, not, however, merely " natural " differences—or differences of individuality—but those which are due to self-determination, to the imprint which is due to man's reaction as whole " (Brunner).

3. Ego or I: These, if used synonymously, refer solely to pure subjectivity, to pure activity. Their meaning can only be apprehended subjectively, and never objectively.

4. Self: This word should never be used as a synonym for I. Self refers to the instrument whereby the " I " realizes its activity, and the self can, and indeed must be apprehended objectively. " I " refers to that which is permanent and unchanging, while " self " refers to that which is changing and inconstant.

5. Personality: This is the most difficult to define adequately; its specific meaning is more directly recognized in general usage than in psychology. A human being can never cease to be an individual, nor can he be entirely devoid of

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character, good, bad or indifferent, but he can become impersonal. In actual fact a man does become impersonal whenever he adopts a strictly scientific attitude, for in this attitude all that is purely personal must be resolutely banished. By " purely personal " is here meant his feelings, his prejudices, his ambitions, his hopes and his fears. He must be dispassionately objective. Man as pure scientist has need of intellect, but can dispense with emotion. On the other hand, when a man is personal his emotions play as great a part, or perhaps even greater, than his intellect; when he acts as a person he acts with the whole of his being, and this he can only do when he enters into relationship with another subject, and for this he must adopt a dramatic attitude. In science a man's relationship is necessarily that of subject and object. He can only be personal in his social life, in his art and in his religion. In his social life he can enter into subjective relationship with his fellow men, in his art into subjective relationship with nature, and in his religion into subjective relationship with God. Nevertheless, his relationships with his fellow men, with nature and with God are not necessarily wholly subjective; all three, his fellow men, nature, and God, can be treated objectively, i.e. impersonally, by the adoption of the scientific attitude towards them.

For this reason personality is not a biological category, and if psychology is conceived in purely scientific terms, involving the rigorous exclusion of dramatic concepts—e.g. the Oedipus situation—neither is it a psychological category. Strictly speaking, personality is an ethical and spiritual category, and the psychologist who would study it must do so from the ethical and religious standpoint, and not from the psychological.

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