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CHARTING THE CIRCUITOUS ROUTE TOWARD RELIGIOUS LIBERTY

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Perez Zagorin, *How the Idea of Religious Toleration Came to the West* (Princeton University Press, 2003)

James Hutson, *Forgotten Features of the Founding: The Recovery of Religious Themes in the Early American Republic* (Lexington Books, 2003)

James Hutson, ed., *Religion and the New Republic: Faith in the Founding of America* (Rowman and Littlefield, 2000)

Frank Lambert, *The Founding Fathers and the Place of Religion in America* (Princeton University Press, 2003)

Arguably, with respect to religious practice, the United States Constitution sought to metamorphose what had been restricted practices of religious toleration into what we more commonly and with more generous spirit call religious tolerance. The provisions of toleration laws, making legal concessions under the aegis of an official religion, were better than burning heretics at the stake, a practice that after the bloody Thirty Years War in Europe (1618–48) usually caused more trouble than it was worth. Still they extended only a grudging permission to "dissenters." The category "dissenter" did not include all religious minorities, and it placed the tolerated minorities at a disadvantage in almost all civil capacities. Religious toleration before the end of the eighteenth century gave some religious believers license to be wrong, but it carried no pledge of respect.

What the American Constitution aimed to do was to consign the term "dissenter" to the same trash bin of history as the word "heretic." If the young nation chose to follow a formula of Thomas Jefferson, toleration would now mean that the national government would make no legal distinction between citizens who believed in one god, or twenty gods, or no god. But a lot hinged on the word "if." A dramatic shift in the meaning of religious toleration did occur, and the American Constitution made a world of difference. Yet a single document could not mark an absolutely clean break between a long past of state-sponsored religion and an unfolding future that encouraged religious difference.

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Scholars, in fact, while they agree that the American Constitution changed the rules of church–state interaction, are divided about important particulars relating to that change. So too are Americans generally, who quickly learned to equate religious toleration with religious liberty but argued about whether either required a strict separation of church and state, a phrase not in the American Constitution.

The three books under review and the essays in the fourth help bring these disagreements into sharp focus. They also make clear that scholarship in this area is ineluctably influenced by contemporary, often angry, debates about the proper place of religion in political life. With respect to the United States, one thing is certain: disagreements exist because the men who wrote the Constitution, not being of one mind, reached compromise by resorting to ambiguous wording. The curious sentence in the document's First Amendment, "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion," was acceptable both to those Americans who opposed the involvement of any level of government with religion and to the others who were determined to maintain some sort of religious establishment in the various states. The conflict was neatly encapsulated in that famous 1802 letter from President Thomas Jefferson to Baptists in Danbury, Connecticut. He assured them of his personal endorsement of a "wall of separation" between church and state. But the Constitution's First Amendment applied only to actions of the national government, and Jefferson had no authority to overturn Connecticut's church establishment that the Baptists wanted to demolish.

Perez Zagorin in *How the Idea of Religious Toleration Came to the West* poses the question of how it happened that European Christianity, "of all the great world religions, past and present, . . . by far the most intolerant" (p. 1), was able to move into a modern period marked by greater religious freedom than was available in many parts of the non-Western world and by a separation of church and state that favored secularization. Whether European civilization deserves celebration because it managed to triumph over demons of its own making is something worth pondering by philosophers as well as historians. But Zagorin takes a long Whiggish view of the matter. In answering his question, he gives prominence to the articulation of ideas that preceded any stable political application of religious toleration. In doing so, he challenges the notion that toleration in the West grew either from the growth of religious skepticism or from calculations of political expediency. It developed as a reasoned reaction against efforts to force belief upon people who could not accept the orthodox positions announced by the church. The men who made the first arguments for toleration were deeply religious people who cared as much about the cause of the true Christian faith as their opponents. Through the seventeenth century, even thinkers labeled rationalist premised their arguments for toleration on promoting religious and ethical values. Zagorin's

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always intelligent account reviews the work of a familiar cast of characters that includes Erasmus, Arminius, Spinoza, Milton, Locke, and Bayle. He also gives attention to some lesser known people, especially to Sebastian Castellio, who in attacking Calvin's execution of Michael Servetus argued for the right of all Christians to be left alone in their private beliefs.

Some readers will criticize Zagorin for insisting that the intellectual concept of toleration, however much it was willing to leave minority belief shackled, was always a step toward religious liberty. Few historians would want to slight the importance of John Locke because his version of toleration did not extend to Catholics and atheists, whom he detested. Yet the very concept of toleration depended on what it excluded. It created habits of mind that lasted a long time and turned the route to more gentle patterns of toleration into an often twisted course. For example, when leaders in colonial New England reluctantly accepted the Toleration Act passed by the English Parliament in 1689, they used the intellectual capital of the time to define "toleration" in a way that reinforced their anti-Catholicism, a long-to-be-continued habit of mind that, however justified by anti-liberal positions taken by the Vatican, troubled the American political landscape well into the twentieth century. In the nineteenth century, James G. Blaine, the Republican Speaker of the House, urged an amendment to the national Constitution forbidding aid to parochial schools. The move lost, but many states drafted Blaine Laws anyway that sharpened the line between church and state. The spirit of those laws contained in almost equal measure republican principle and nativist, anti-Catholic bigotry. Such is the uncomfortable pedigree of many values now esteemed by secular liberals.

Zagorin's book ends with the Enlightenment. In his mind the eighteenth century marked an important shift in the nature of the debate. The struggles of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries to extend the scope of religious toleration as a way to further the health of religion, more specifically the Christian religion, became secularized. The health of religion became less important than the health of the state and of civil society. Thus, in this view, Roger Williams, the seventeenth-century founder of Rhode Island, advanced toleration as a way to protect the church. But Thomas Jefferson in the eighteenth century worried about the influence of state-anointed clerics in the affairs of secular government.

This view about a shift from religious to secular is too simple and suggests that Zagorin, in the earlier part of his story, too sharply distinguishes the politics of men who ran states from the politics of men who ran churches. European history at almost every moment reveals how leaders worked to define separate realms of authority for sacred and secular while constantly violating the boundaries they supposedly constructed. Moreover, aside from agreeing about the importance of religion, churchmen and statesmen had always agreed about the ideal of social and political stability. Roger Williams's call to separate "the garden of the church"

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from the "wilderness of the world" was a formula both to protect the church and to create an irenic civil society. Nonetheless, Zagorin's emphasis serves an important purpose. It reminds us that the struggle for free religious practice was the first of the rights associated with nineteenth-century liberalism to be contested in Europe. Resistance to religious oppression surfaced long before the Reformation, and it had gained substantial advances in practice before the American and French Revolutions. Debates about the liberty of religious conscience turned into debates about freedom of the press and freedom of speech.

The importance of religion in political debates about "rights" was evident to the writers of the American Constitution. In the Constitution's First Amendment, they listed religion before other rights. Thus while emphatically drafting a framework for a secular state, they remained convinced that a republic could only work if its citizens followed standards of virtuous conduct based on their religious convictions. It was a bold vision that many thought carried an unacceptable level of risk. James Hutson, the head of the Manuscripts Division of the Library of Congress, has a peculiar take on this experiment. In his book *Forgotten Features of the Founding: The Recovery of Religious Themes in the Early American Republic*, he argues that scholars have forgotten "the widespread conviction during the Founding Period that, since religion produced public policy benefits, government should enlist it as a partner and support it vigorously, even with tax revenues" (p. ix). This is a historical brief that Chief Justice William Rehnquist will welcome in his efforts to shift the Supreme Court majority toward a judicial position allowing greater accommodation of government aid to religion.

To get one point out of the way quickly, no American historian whose work I know has forgotten that the founders, including those who called themselves deists, linked the virtue necessary to sustain a democratic republic with religion. Not all of them thought that Christianity was the only source of morality, and none of them regarded it as the main foundation of law. They did think, however, that the American population of free citizens needed religion, specifically a religion that taught that the world was structured to reward virtue and punish vice. A long list of quotations attesting to this view, such as Hutson has assembled on pages 4–9 of his book, is pointless without analyzing what the founders believed was the best way to promote religion. On this matter they disagreed. Hutson seems to believe that there was a consensus in the beginning about "a solidly Christian nation." The error provokes an astonishingly wrong-headed pronouncement that only after World War II did it become "an article of faith in many quarters that the welfare of the republic depended upon strict separation between religion and government" (p. 1).

What Hutson is in fact tracking are the views of men who by and large were placed on the defensive by the adoption of the Constitution and by the course of events in the following three decades. Hutson correctly points out that in 1775 the

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American colonials were heirs to a long tradition saying that "the government of any state must form a nurturing bond with religious institutions" (p. 45). What he is less inclined to emphasize is the resentment that tradition had fostered during the almost two centuries of colonial experience. The metaphor "nursing fathers" justified Calvin in having Servetus burned at the stake, and it also justified the leaders of Massachusetts Bay in executing unwanted "heretics" in the mid-seventeenth century. By the time of the American Revolution "nursing fathers" in the American colonies had adopted policies of toleration, but to many of the colonists toleration was no longer enough.

Those who wanted to move beyond toleration won some fights and lost others. Despite absolute agreement about the evils stemming from England's union of church and state that made the monarch supreme head of the Anglican Church, some of the state constitutions written after the Revolution continued a religious establishment. Most of them included religious tests for holding office. The state constitutions, as did the Articles of Confederation, placed the new political enterprises under God. One point of consensus, not upset by the Constitution, was an instrumental view of religion—what Hutson aptly terms "theological utilitarianism." Religion was less about the glorification of God and the stricken consciences of irredeemably sinful men and more about orderly citizens who worried about whether their outward lives would qualify them for heaven. That adjustment has long bothered some Christians who were the first to call it a secularization of faith. But it was a bargain about religion that the majority of American Christians accepted. It is not an adjustment that bothers Hutson, who writes, "The pragmatic case for liberty of conscience, the claim that it is good for business, is unlikely to impress proponents of secular and religious utopians who are contemptuous of bourgeois values" (p. 149). Hutson has the founders well on their way to the parables of Bruce Barton, the American advertising executive who in the 1920s penned a mammoth bestseller that depicted Christ as a go-getting businessman.

Even if the American Constitution were so placidly bourgeois, it changed the rules of how theological utilitarianism operated by erecting the new national government on a secular base. Hutson seems to be of two different minds about the Constitution. He notes the outcries from critics of the document who immediately labeled it "godless" and said that it "disdains belief in a deity." But rather than acknowledging the good reasons for their complaint, Hutson works instead at showing that the Constitution really was not godless. He twits this author and his co-author, Isaac Kramnick, for claiming that the Constitution makes no reference to God.[1] His rebuttal to this point is that the document is

1 Isaac Kramnick and R. Laurence Moore, *The Godless Constitution* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1996), 27.

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dated "in the year of our Lord" (a phrase, by the way, that is not, as Hutson says, part of Article 7), and that Article 1 specifies that Sunday does not count in numbering the days given to a president to return a signed bill to the legislature. This is desperately lame analysis that trivializes what the Constitution deliberately and boldly omitted: any phrases seeking divine protection for the new nation or committing it to anything other than worldly work.

The fact that most colonials, now Americans, thought of themselves as Protestant Christians convinces Hutson that it is appropriate to label the infant United States a Christian nation. That depends on what you mean by Christian. Most historians have concluded with Jon Butler that it is very hard to calculate more than 20 percent of Americans as church members at the time of their revolution.[2] Hutson's estimate that 70 percent of Americans were active churchgoers in 1776 is grossly overstated (and is based in part on a footnote rather than what the authors claim in the text of an article written in 1982). Critics of the Constitution knew that organized church life had been disrupted in the late eighteenth century, a fact that explains their concerns over consigning religious organizations to voluntary support. If Hutson really had any conviction in his numbers, he would have no reason to emphasize, as he does in another part of his book, "that titanic eruption of religion" labeled the Second Great Awakening (p. 176). You cannot have it both ways: either Americans were substantially churched in late eighteenth-century America, in which case the Second Great Awakening was only a rearrangement of denominational numbers, or they were not, in which case the revivals mattered a great deal.

Mark Noll, in an essay contained in a useful volume edited by Hutson, *Religion and the New Republic: Faith in the Founding of America*, suggests that the claim that America is a Christian nation, made in the accents sometimes used in contemporary evangelical political discourse, did not resound in American public life until the 1830s (when the American style of voluntary churches had proved to be highly successful), and then only among some Americans. As Jon Butler notes in his essay in the same volume, ministers in the eighteenth century were too busy thinking of the colonies as in a state of moral decline to imagine a Christian nation. Yet in the end what really mattered was whether or not the unquestionable fact of a predominant Protestant heritage carried any Constitutional or legal significance. The most radical position in the Constitutional struggle held that the religious persuasion of the majority did not bear on civil life and that religious affiliation did not define or in any way qualify the notion of citizenship. From this radical perspective, it made no more political sense to call America a Christian nation than to call it a Jewish nation or any other kind of religious nation.

2 Jon Butler, *Awash in a Sea of Faith: Christianizing the American People* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990), 191–224.

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So how many Americans in the early Republic subscribed to this radical view? From documents, one can conclude many things. Some reference to divinity was not far from the lips of most early Americans involved in public life. Religion quickly occupied an important place in American culture because in every aspect of public life outside the sphere of government the sacred and the secular freely mixed. Moreover, the anxiety about keeping Americans religious permitted, and has continued to permit, compromises in church–state separation. Even Jefferson and Madison, who had the most consistent records in insisting on a secular state, violated the strictest provisions of government separation from religion. Hutson jumps on every one of them. Jefferson invoked deity as the author of human rights both in the Declaration of Independence and in Virginia's Statute of Religious Freedom. As president, he sometimes attended church services held in government buildings while the city of Washington was under construction and short of church buildings. He supported government payments to sponsor religious teachers among Indian tribes. Madison issued calls for a national day of fasting during the War of 1812. Still—and this is the crucial point—however much of a case you make for these compromises, they were at the time small matters compared to the baggage that had been thrown out.

The essays in the aforementioned volume edited by Hutson suggest that historians need to pay more attention to what was going on in states during the nineteenth century, where the quarrels were not about whether to separate church and state (a formula that eventually commanded almost universal assent) but how to do it. Some states in their pursuit of defining a secular sphere for government arguably went farther than the Constitution required of the national government. Thomas Buckley recounts what happened in Virginia after the defeat of Patrick Henry's proposed legislation to support all churches impartially. The adoption instead of the Statute of Religious Freedom set Virginia on a course of strict interpretation of church–state separation. In one measure, which ironically stemmed from the early practices of Massachusetts Bay, it prohibited ministers from holding public office. Arguably, that is a religious test, something disallowed by a policy of government neutrality toward religion, but Virginia maintained the ban (it was not the only state to do so) until 1868 when Republican Reconstructionists decided that a few ministers in office might improve morality in the Old Dominion.

Virginia also pursued a controversial practice of not granting corporate status to churches or to their agencies, including seminaries. The fear was that religious charters would invest in churches too much power and property, allowing something like a New World Church of England to emerge. A bill passed in 1842 by the Virginia assembly that permitted lay trustees to hold legal title to churches also limited the amount of property churches could hold. Buckley argues that Virginia's policy amounted to government control of churches rather than a

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disentanglement of state from religion. But the Virginia legislators, who refused to pass a general incorporation law for churches, used the rationale of church–state separation, and in doing so they won the support of many ministers outside the elite circles of Episcopalians. To the latter, the incorporation of churches subjected them to unwanted state interference.

The most contentious question had to do with religion and public education. If Americans were supposed to be virtuous, and if religion was the foundation of virtue, then how could you keep religion out of public schools? The other side of that question was that if religion thrived in voluntary churches with very different teachings, then whose religion should get into the classroom? In Virginia, as Buckley shows, the question started with the state's universities. One important decision, that those universities had at least to be non-sectarian, set Virginia's schools apart from Harvard, Yale, and Princeton. To be sure, non-sectarian proved to be a weasel word, and even though Jefferson's University of Virginia had no professor of theology, religion, specifically Christianity, was a part of the teaching of courses in ethics. Public education below the college level lagged in Virginia until after the Civil War. But when the state began to build its public school system, it followed what was by then the national norm of no aid to religious schools. The general school legislation of 1870 set Virginia in a pattern that was common in the eastern states from North to South, a pattern that, contrary to the thrust of Buckley's argument, did not endorse religious education. It made education substantially secular, with no prescribed part of the curriculum given over to religion, but left Bible reading and often Christian prayer as permitted exercises to begin the school day.

If Virginia was in the vanguard of states that used their autonomy to keep church and state separate, Massachusetts persevered longer than any other state with, in the phrase of John Adams, "a most mild and equitable establishment" of religion. As John Witte, Jr. shows in his essay, a reading of the Massachusetts Constitution adopted in 1780 throws into sharp relief just how godless the national Constitution was. The Massachusetts document implores the direction of "the great Legislator of the universe." It places upon all men the duty of worshiping "the Supreme Being, the great Creator and Preserver of the universe." It gives the legislature the power to support and maintain religion. And it is shot through with religious tests for holding public office. Massachusetts was the last state, in 1833, to stop collecting taxes to support religion. That was not because of the protests of the people who had never liked the system of tax assessment (Witte shows that they had actually defeated the tax assessment provision in 1780, but it went into effect anyway) but because of bitter splits in the old Congregational churches. The end of church establishment created an unexpected line of partisanship. Unitarians, that is, the liberals, wound up defending the practice of tax support, thinking in 1833 that it primarily benefited them. The torch of freer religious practice passed

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to the Congregationalists, the old crusty set who had long thought of themselves as the Establishment. They joined the majority of Massachusetts citizens, who concluded that government efforts to support religion, including even-handed support to many different churches, created civil strife rather than promoting civil peace.

However—and this is important—if tax assessments ended in Massachusetts, many of the clauses friendly to religion, including the one about the duty to worship God, remained in its Constitution. The language reflected a theory of rights that Hutson thinks prevailed generally in the nineteenth century (it did not), where rights "meant, in its fullest sense, power inherent and owned by the individual to act in a way consistent with Christian morality" (p. 100). The provisions in the Massachusetts Constitution placed no legally enforceable burdens on anyone, and religious tests ended. Yet even if the provisions about religion were a dead letter, they pointed to a fault line that divided Americans on the question of whether to give government some sort of power to encourage religion—if not specifically Christianity, then at least religion over non-religion. Witte himself questions whether "complete disestablishment" can today serve a people "so widely devoted to a public religion and a religious public" (p. 31).

In an excellent essay with a fresh take on these developments, Catherine Brekus argues that women benefited from the defeat of "nursing fathers," who needed the state to help them fulfill their obligations to religion. Brekus shows how women, excluded from government, took advantage of severed "partnerships" between religious bodies and government, which were after all patriarchal arrangements, to seek positions of religious leadership. In the new American system of voluntary churches, which separated political leadership from religious leadership, the professed need to promote morality gave women an important function within churches and church agencies that did not overtly challenge male political authority. Women founded their own church organizations to promote temperance, to work with the poor, and to end prostitution. Of course, in the broad sense all of these activities were political and were later used as reasons to extend suffrage to women. But in nineteenth-century America they were seen as legitimate extensions of women's private domestic responsibilities into public, but not political, life.

Frank Lambert's book *The Founding Fathers and the Place of Religion in America* brings us back to a general account covering the English background, the religious arrangements in the various English colonies, and the period of the American Revolution and Constitution. His central question is: How did the Puritan fathers erecting their city on a hill transform into founding fathers of a secular state? In broad outline, Lambert's story follows a similar trajectory to that of Zagorin. The founding of the American nation in Lambert's mind was largely a secular achievement. The United States Constitution sought a

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free trade in religious ideas, parallel in its intention to the free trade in other commodities that Adam Smith had promoted in *Wealth of Nations*. True, the debate about free religious expression was conducted until the latter half of the eighteenth century by men whose primary interest was religion. In the American colonies, itinerant ministers of dissenting groups (who "trafficked for the Lord") championed religious freedom before deists and lawyers got in on the act. But in the end Lambert stresses the refusal of the United States to call itself a Christian nation. He cites many documents to prove this point, including the Treaty of Tripoli (1797), from the administration of John Adams, which assured a Muslim nation that "America is not in any sense founded on the Christian religion" (p. 239).

The advantage of Lambert's account is that it surveys political and social developments in the colonies, giving ideas less prominence than Zagorin does. Some aspects of the narrative may strike readers as old-fashioned. In Lambert's view the Great Awakening of the 1740s was a democratic phenomenon that traveled most rapidly in frontier areas. In giving religious establishments their first real shock, it developed in the colonials the habit of dissent that was crucial to their Revolutionary struggle. Lambert acknowledges that religious establishments did not disappear. In fact, as Jon Butler has shown, the appearance of religious pluralism in the first part of the eighteenth century invigorated the defenders of religious establishment. More colonies had religious establishments at the beginning of the American Revolution than in 1690. What also must be acknowledged is that the sort of religious liberty championed by the itinerants was not fought in accents used by people who think religious truth is relative. Ministers who argued strongly against religious establishments saw nothing incongruous in supporting laws against blasphemy and the profanation of the Christian Sabbath.

There was no straight line between the appearance of religious pluralism and an insistence by those in the religious minority to end all state-sponsored encouragement of religion. Nor did the fact of religious pluralism produce a rationale for viewing it as a healthy development if it threatened to get out of control. One forgotten consensus that united the American founders, one not mentioned by Hutson, is that, whatever their position on establishment, all of them saw an advantage in a more or less unified religious tradition. True, the founders saw the sort of unity enforced by the Roman Catholic Church as tyranny. Most of them, including those who supported local establishments during the colonial period, had attacked British plans to install an Anglican bishop in the colonies as a challenge to their understanding of free religious practice. But local control was one thing, the proliferation of jumbled groups encouraging people to go their own religious way, as had happened during the English Civil War, was another. Thomas Jefferson and even James Madison, who made a reasoned defense of religious pluralism in the tenth installment of *The Federalist Papers*,

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defended religious liberty with the hope that all Christians would eventually settle into denominations that placed less emphasis on doctrinal difference than on ethical behavior.

This is simply to emphasize that the United States that emerged from the founding period was not the republic that many of the founders had predicted. At the beginning of the twenty-first century many Europeans, whose countries did not in the nineteenth century follow the American example of ending church establishment, think that the American principle of secularity no longer looks very revolutionary. They point to the clumsy intrusion of religious partisanship into political life and suggest that this supposedly Protestant country is today closest in its church–state arrangements to traditionally Catholic European countries. Without trying to turn the United States into Poland, one can see the point. Although most Americans do not want their "nation under God" to follow the legal system of Iran, or Israel for that matter, neither do they want secularity to mean hostility to religion, as in the former Soviet Union. One of the things that makes present controversies contentious is that American secularity went into effect when Jefferson's "no god" individual was in fact a rarity. Eliminating religious tests to an earlier generation meant not favoring Presbyterians over Baptists, or Methodists over Catholics, or, if really pushed, Christians over non-Christians. But the majority always had their reasons to favor religion over atheism, even without occasions to worry about it very much.

Contemporary America has many non-believers, and they hold prominent places in culture and society. That fact has clearly energized the politics of many Americans who identify themselves as evangelicals. Religious believers in the United States who belong to churches most receptive to the teachings of other religions—that is, liberal Protestants—have lost ground on the field of American organized religion. That ground has been picked up by Southern Baptists and various Pentecostal churches, which have never deviated, not one inch, from postures of Christian certainty. In one of the great reverses of history, some very conservative Protestant groups, with a long history of viewing the Pope as Anti-Christ, have sought political alliances with Catholics and started talking about the born-again power of Mel Gibson's *The Passion of the Christ*. We are talking about groups that four decades before had maintained deep suspicions of religious politics, both because they thought that politics corrupted faith and also because they thought that religious politics served a majority hostile to them.

From one perspective—and it is a legitimate one—this represents an advance for religious tolerance. Groups that were once locked in cultural warfare now cooperate. Only in America. In this case, however, we are looking at one of the tricks that history keeps up its sleeve to confound prediction. Religious groups that once felt the sneers, or worse, of the cultural majority were the ones that seemed to have sworn an eternal vigilance to defend the separation of church and

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state. But nothing lasts forever. Their rise up the ladder of economic and cultural security has made them as imperious about their religious values as the people they formerly regarded as their oppressors. The main political repository for this mood has been for the past 150 years the Republican Party. Thus secular liberals have to recognize the uncomfortable fact that a Protestant religious imperialism that fueled the anti-slavery movement is alive and well in the pro-life movement.

It would be historically myopic to conclude that secularity is somehow more at risk these days than religion, or even that we can keep those categories entirely separate. But given the circuitous and always compromised historical routes that the American government has followed in trying to stay clear of any actions that exacerbate religious partisanship, including partisanship between believers and non-believers, it would be equally myopic to imagine that there is nothing to worry about. Religious freedom does not mean the same thing to everyone, not in the United States and, for that matter, not anywhere else.

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