than provincial Greek art', one cannot help feeling – more or less passim – that, aiming to locate 'the genesis of Achaemenid art', an Assyriologist would have written a very different book.

NIGEL SPIVEY

NOTES

1. *My Laocoön: Alternative Claims in the Interpretation of Artworks*. The Discovery Series VIII. By Richard Brilliant. University of California Press, 2000. Pp. xvi + 146, with 1 colour and 27 black-and-white illustrations. £28.50.
2. *A Catalog of Identifiable Figure Painters of Ancient Pompeii, Herculaneum, and Stabiae*. By L. Richardson, jr. Johns Hopkins U.P., 2000. Pp. xvii + 190. £38.50.
3. *Die "Kypseloslade" in Olympia*. Form, Funktion und Bildschmuck; eine Archäologische Rekonstruktion. By Rüdiger Splitter. Philipp von Zabern, Mainz, 2000. Pp. 173, with 2 colour plates, 46 figures, and a reconstruction. DM.98.
4. *Roman Housing*. By Simon P. Ellis. Duckworth, London, 2000. Pp. vii + 224, with 22 plates, 30 figures, and 1 map. £40.00.
5. *Antike Mosaiken*. By Irmgard Kriseleit. Philipp von Zabern, Mainz, 2000. Pp. 60, with 59 colour and 14 black-and-white illustrations. DM.28.
6. *King Croesus' Gold: Excavations at Sardis and the History of Gold Refining*. By Andrew Ramage and Paul Craddock. British Museum Press, London, 2000. Pp. 272, with 40 colour and 200 black-and-white illustrations. £45.00.
7. *Persia and the West*. An Archaeological Investigation of the Genesis of Achaemenid Art. By John Boardman. Thames & Hudson, London, 2000. Pp. 255, with 295 illustrations. £36.00.

Philosophy

The [B]*Cambridge Companion to Early Greek Philosophy*[1] is, according to its editor, a 'fresh and wide-ranging' survey of the founding fathers of western philosophy (xi). *Historically* wide-ranging it certainly is, as all books on Presocratic philosophy are – though one notices it all the more here because this collection is published in a series which has up to now treated almost exclusively of individuals. (When can we expect a *Cambridge Companion to Parmenides*, or *to Empedocles* or even *to the Sophists*?) But the 16 well-integrated articles that make up the collection are also wide-ranging in their intellectual scope, and go further than many of their predecessors towards setting their subjects in a plausible narrative of philosophical debate and development: it will take its place with the most useful introductions to the subject, while providing a great deal for established students of Presocratic thought as well. In recent years, some of the most interesting work on early Greek philosophy has tried to set it aglow in the reflected glory of Plato, and two new books attest to the continuing strength of this approach. In [B]*Myth and Philosophy from the Presocratics to Plato*,[2] Kathryn Morgan revives the somewhat unfashionable distinction between *mythos* and *logos* to argue that, while philosophers from the beginning defined their endeavour through the denigration of mythological discourse, they went on to use myths of their own to reflect on and signal the limits of their philosophy – to circumscribe their account of the world even as that account is developed. (Parmenides' mythical goddess, we are reminded, 'tells of' the road that 'cannot be told of': 83.) It is not clear that Morgan has hit on a principle of early philosophy rather than a more or less helpful generalization: different philosophers, it emerges, conform to her thesis in ways which are sometimes radically different; and

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there is much less engagement between them in their use of myth than one would expect if it is as closely tied to reflection on the philosophical project as she argues. But Morgan's close readings of Xenophanes, Heraclitus, Parmenides, Empedocles, and the Sophists as well, of course, as of Plato (who occupies half of the book) certainly yield results, and sometimes very important results. If Morgan is interested in continuities between the Presocratics and Plato, M. M. McCabe studies Plato's philosophy as a reaction to earlier thought in her book B★★*Plato and his Predecessors*.[3] Focusing on the role of Protagoras, Heraclitus, and Parmenides in a 'quartet' of later dialogues (the *Theaetetus*, *Sophist*, *Politicus*, and *Philebus*), McCabe draws wide-ranging conclusions about Plato's mature philosophical project. Secure as these 'mean-minded' thinkers are from strictly analytical refutation, she argues that Plato uses dialogue form to identify a problem in the failure of their several positions to allow them to enter into discussion with others. If everything is just as it seems to me (Protagoras), or is in permanent flux (Heraclitus), or if only one thing exists (Parmenides), then there is nothing for me to debate about, and perhaps no-one for me to argue with. Lacking, in this way, a sense of contrast with others, I become, in effect, a non-person: and so it turns out that Plato's opponents are incapable of substantial presence in the dialogues which discuss their theories (Protagoras' head makes a fleeting appearance in the *Theaetetus*, for example; Heraclitus does not show up at all). In response to this, the later Plato is taken to suggest that the development of a complete (and true) philosophical system goes hand in hand with one's self-development as a complete (and good) human being: and dialogue is the key to both. It should be apparent already that McCabe's argument develops a complex of themes any one of which might have made for an interesting study: in consequence (and despite her easy-going style) it is not always easy to follow her thread. But this sort of complexity is demanded by Plato (it is not always easy to follow his thread either); and the rich conclusions that unfold as the book progresses make it well worth the effort of clinging on. If you were wondering where Plato's best-known precursor stands in all of this, John Beversluis has a surprising answer: he was playing on the side of the devils. In B*Cross-Examining Socrates*,[4] Beversluis rallies the interlocutors of Plato's early dialogues to a counter-attack on Socrates, who emerges as a cold-hearted sophist whose desire for victory in argument makes a sham of his pretence to be concerned with the genuine beliefs of his victims, or to 'care for their souls'. This is an intelligent and carefully-argued statement of a position which will find guilty resonances with most readers of Plato's earlier dialogues. The conclusion, however, points to its flaw. 'Why bother?' says Beversluis of Socrates' encounters (134). But the real question, of course, is why the immediate author of the encounters – that is, why Plato – bothered. In the context of the *Republic*, the answer we are given is that a criticism of Socrates' approach (Beversluis, of course, guns for Thrasymachus) is the starting-point for Plato to develop his own method of doing philosophy. But at what point did Plato 'come to believe' (372) in the failure of Socratic elenchus? When re-reading his own early works? The complaint that Socrates does little to help his interlocutors on their way to becoming more virtuous is, of course, nothing new: it was even raised in a work transmitted as part of the Platonic corpus, the *Clitophon*. But things here may not be quite as they seem, as S. R. Slings argues in B*Plato, Clitophon*,[5] an extraordinarily full and detailed edition of this, Plato's shortest dialogue (the first in English as well). According to Slings (and he supports his position with a discussion full of valuable insights into the nature of early Socratic and protreptic literature more generally), the *Clitophon* is far from being the

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attack on Plato's Socrates that it seems: rather, he suggests, it is directed against a deliberate caricature who shows, through a speech woven together from fragments of actual protreptic literature, the dangers of generalized exhortations to philosophy. The moral is that a more personal approach is needed – of a kind that Slings calls 'implicit protreptic', and which is precisely embodied in the elenchic method of the 'real' Platonic Socrates (represented here by Clitophon himself: 210–11). Slings's attempt to rescue Socrates for the angels gains powerful analytical support from Hugh Benson's [B★★]*Socratic Wisdom*.[6] In this detailed study of the early dialogues, Benson reconstructs a model of knowledge which, he says, lies behind all occasions of Socratic elenchus. He concludes that Socratic knowledge is (and Socratic knowledge-claims are the result of) an ability to make 'judgements resulting in an inter-related coherent system of true cognitive states involving a particular object or subject-matter' (220). Does Socrates bully interlocutors who hold perfectly reasonable, even sympathetic, even *Socratic*, ethical positions (cf. 79)? Perhaps he does, but for a purpose: to show that they lack *knowledge* in the very strong sense required by this model. A powerful study this, in the best Vlastosian tradition; and a significant contribution to our understanding of the early development of Greek epistemology too. [B]*Plato 1* and its sibling [B]*Plato 2*[7] in the Oxford Readings in Philosophy series invite their own comparison with Vlastos, who edited a very similar pair of volumes in 1970/71: they had almost identical titles, and much the same format; one of the papers included by Vlastos (G. E. L. Owen's 'Plato on Not-Being') even turns up again here, among the 37 articles which make up the set. The real difference in this *fin-de-siècle* reprise is the provision of substantial and masterly introductions to each volume supplied by their editor, Gail Fine: cementing the articles and volumes together, she makes of them more than just updates on the state of Plato scholarship thirty years on, but serious and useful guides to Plato's philosophy as well. There are two new translations of Aristotelian works. Roger Crisp's [B]*Nicomachean Ethics*[8] provides a wonderfully smooth and accurate translation of this much-English'd work, with very spartan notes but a clear and accessible introduction which places it in a wider tradition of ethical thought with great economy and sensitivity. Meanwhile, Arthur Madigan's translation of [B]*Metaphysics* B and K 1–2[9] in the Clarendon Aristotle Series steers a steady course between the often conflicting demands of fidelity to Aristotle's Greek and fidelity to English idiom, introducing the reader to the problems (*aporiai*) Aristotle raised as preliminary to the business of 'first philosophy'. I was not always convinced by Madigan's view of Aristotle's dialectical approach: he believes, for example, that *endoxa* ('reputable beliefs' *vel sim.*) which form the starting-point for discussion do not include 'uncontroversial' facts (xvii); and he argues (at xxi) that Aristotle uses *euporēsai* in this work to mean 'be well supplied (sc. *with truth*)' (though the result of a dialectical inquiry might not be that one is 'well-supplied with truth', but simply 'in a position to advance further' through a previously blocked route). But the real value (and the greater bulk) of this edition lies in its lucid treatment of the *aporiai* themselves. It is, as far as I can make out, the first English commentary since Ross's magisterial work on the *Metaphysics* as a whole in 1924; it provides a useful running gloss on a series of dialectical problems which are themselves far from easy to understand, and does an excellent job of relating them to the *Metaphysics* in particular and discussion elsewhere in the Aristotelian corpus more generally. Having limbered up through a study of metaphysical *aporiai*, a *pancration* of a book awaits the more athletic scholar in [B★★]*Aristotle's Theory of*

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Substance[10] by Michael Wedin. Through a systematic examination of the *Categories* and *Metaphysics* Z, and close engagement with the secondary literature that surrounds them, Wedin develops a powerful argument against the traditional view that these works offer different answers to the question 'What is *substance*?' Rather, Wedin argues, *Metaphysics* Z introduces a new idiom to ask a different question: 'What is *substance-of* (sc. physical substances, as dealt with in the *Categories*)?' The two works thus complement each other; and, while the *Categories* describes what is *ontologically* primary (physical substances), *Metaphysics* Z goes on to examine what has *explanatory* primacy (the 'substances-of' physical substances, i.e., forms). If Wedin is right, this book will prove not only useful, but extremely important for Aristotelian studies; if he is wrong, someone has a difficult task ahead to show it.

For a decade or more now, students of Hellenistic philosophy have been announcing the full rehabilitation of an area of antique philosophy which had been badly neglected; and the [B]*Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy*[11] seals their claim with the first 'good, full, general treatment of Hellenistic philosophy' (xi: at least in English; readers of German, for example, have been able to enjoy the revised Überweg for some seven years now). The work is organized thematically (subdivided where appropriate by school), with the divisions of the ancient curriculum (dialectic, physics, ethics) pleasingly rephrased in terms more familiar to the modern Academy (Logic and Language, Epistemology, Physics and Metaphysics, Ethics and Politics); it has an excellent bibliography, and is thoughtfully furnished with guides to editions of sources and fragments; the articles are stylishly written, and not just by experts, but in most cases by the scholars who have made the subject what it is. My only serious complaint is that there is too little cross-referencing, and a general index too meagre for a volume of this size and scope (the word *prolēpsis*, to take but one example, is indexed with references to Asmis on the Epicureans, as is her translation of this word – 'preconception'; but there is nothing to tell the reader that Frede's 'anticipation' – itself not indexed – translates the very same word as it is used by the Stoics). Nevertheless, there should be letters of complaint to CUP if this work does not go swiftly into paperback (volumes in this series do not always make it): all serious students of philosophy will want to own it.

Substitute 'students of political thought', and the same applies to the [B]*Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Political Thought*:[12] a wide-ranging survey of its subject up to A.D. 350 (where the *Cambridge History of Medieval Political Thought* picks up the story). Explicitly not a history of political *theory* (since it does not confine itself to 'direct, systematic reflection on things political', 1), it explores evidence for political thinking provided by the poets, playwrights, historians, and jurists of antiquity as well as the philosophers. Such a wide range of material, marshalled on the whole according to author or school, and dealt with in 31 chapters by some 25 scholars, was never going to achieve a very tight sense of narrative unity; and pulling further against the sense of common focus are some surprisingly broad sections of much more general biographical and intellectual information on particular thinkers. (Chapter 8, just for example, is devoted to the order of Plato's dialogues: not, as it happens, a very urgent problem in the matter of Plato's political thought.) But these sections presumably reflect a general editorial policy of making the material discussed – and perhaps more importantly the sources – thoroughly accessible to the non-expert without diluting the discussions themselves. If the work has something of the air of an encyclopaedia rather than a *history* as such, it is a rich, user-friendly encyclopaedia – the quality of the editing in this case further evinced in the systematic

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cross-referencing, very full indexes, and tripartite bibliography (which is aimed at directing further reading, but which certainly makes its extensive contents more digestible). This bibliography is up-to-date enough to include James Zetzel's translations of [B]⋆*Cicero, On the Commonwealth and On the Laws*,[13] which can be heartily recommended to anyone stimulated to further study of Cicero's political thought: his translations hold their own against the best of them; and along with the usual trimmings (introduction, bibliographical notes, index) come some additional tools that assure its value as a practical study-text: a synopsis of both works; a guide to some of the trickier Latin terms; and extensive biographical notes. Works dealing with Cicero's political philosophy tend not to be much concerned with his allegiance with the Sceptical Academy (*why* not?): indeed Sceptical movements in antiquity quite generally are often taken seriously more or less only as counterweights to the more constructive philosophy of the Dogmatists. In [B]⋆⋆*Pyrrhonian Inquiry*,[14] however, Marta Włodarczyk argues that Sextus Empiricus saw it the other way round. It is, she says, the Dogmatists who undermine our faith in our ability to know things, not the Sceptics at all; for in questioning our 'everyday beliefs' about the world, the Dogmatists succeed in identifying areas where controversy is possible while failing to provide legitimate means for its resolution. This is already a sensitive and plausible reading of Sextus; but the most original part of Włodarczyk's thesis lies in the claim that the Pyrrhonist's 'suspension of judgement', as a cure for the ills of doubt thus produced by the Dogmatist, is strictly limited in application to areas of belief affected – 'our everyday beliefs' remaining intact where they happen to have avoided Dogmatic scrutiny. I would have liked to hear more about the status of these 'everyday beliefs' (something like 'pre-philosophical' assumptions?); but Włodarczyk has certainly opened the way to a more up-beat assessment of Sextus, and that is a tonic in itself. There is more on the scope of Sextus' arguments in the latest ⋆⋆*Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy*[15] in an article by Luca Castagnoli; there is more too of Włodarczyk here, arguing for a more positive construal of Aristotle's dialectic as well. Other articles in this volume of *Oxford Studies* – which, under the new editorship of David Sedley, has become semi-annual, and issued from the start in paperback as well as hardback – include a reading of Socrates' 'second voyage' in the *Phaedo* by Yahei Kanayama; and an account by Allan Silverman of Heraclitean flux in the *Theaetetus*. Dominic Scott tackles Aristotle's curious suggestion that events after our death might affect our happiness; James Warren explores what it means for the Epicureans to talk of virtuous men attaining 'divinity'; and Catherine Osborne pens a sanguine review of Martin and Primavesi's edition of the 'Strasbourg Empedocles'. The opening article of the volume take us back to the problem of the Socratic elenchus: Raphael Woolf suggests that it fails when applied to Callicles in particular because he lacks a primary commitment to *reason* in the first place, and holds contradictory positions on justice. There is a certain irony that this paper should appear in the same volume as one by T. D. J. Chappell which defends the coherence of Thrasymachus; but at least this fruitful continuation of debates initiated by Socrates starts to provide some sort of answer for anyone who wonders why he bothered in the first place.

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https://doi.org/10.1093/gr/48.1.106 Published online by Cambridge University Press

NOTES

1. *The Cambridge Companion to Early Greek Philosophy*. Edited by A. A. Long. Cambridge U.P., 1999. Pp. xxxi + 427, with 1 map. Hardback £37.50, paperback £13.95.
2. *Myth and Philosophy from the Presocratics to Plato*. By Kathryn A. Morgan. Cambridge U.P., 2000. Pp. viii + 313. £40.00.
3. *Plato and his Predecessors*. The Dramatisation of Reason. The W. B. Stanford Memorial Lectures. By Mary Margaret McCabe. Cambridge U.P., 2000. Pp. viii + 318. £37.50.
4. *Cross-Examining Socrates*. A Defense of the Interlocutors in Plato's Early Dialogues. By John Beversluis. Cambridge U.P., 2000. Pp. xii + 416. £45.00.
5. *Plato, Clitophon*. Cambridge Classical Texts and Commentaries 37. Edited with Introduction, Translation and Commentary by S. R. Slings. Cambridge U.P., 1999. Pp. xv + 360. £45.00.
6. *Socratic Wisdom*. The Model of Knowledge in Plato's Early Dialogues. By Hugh H. Benson. Oxford U.P., 2000. Pp. xi + 292. £40.00.
7. *Plato 1 Metaphysics and Epistemology*. Oxford Readings in Philosophy. Edited by Gail Fine. Oxford U.P., 1999. Pp. viii + 514; *Plato 2 Ethics, Politics, Religion, and the Soul*. Oxford Readings in Philosophy. Edited by Gail Fine. Oxford U.P., 1999. Pp. viii + 481. Paperback £14.99 each.
8. *Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics*. Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy. Translated and edited by Roger Crisp. Cambridge U.P., 2000. Pp. xlii + 213. Hardback £27.50, paperback £7.95.
9. *Aristotle, Metaphysics Books B and K 1–2*. Clarendon Aristotle Series. Translated with a Commentary by Arthur Madigan. Oxford U.P., 1999. Pp. xl + 185. Hardback £35.00, paperback £14.99.
10. *Aristotle's Theory of Substance*. The *Categories* and *Metaphysics* Zeta. Oxford Aristotle Studies. By Michael V. Wedin. Oxford U.P., 2000. Pp. xiii + 482. £37.50.
11. *The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy*. Edited by Keimpe Algra, Jonathan Barnes, Jaap Mansfeld and Malcolm Schofield. Cambridge U.P., 1999. Pp. xix + 916. £85.00.
12. *The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Political Thought*. Edited by Christopher Rowe and Malcolm Schofield. Cambridge U.P., 2000. Pp. xx + 745, with 2 maps. £75.00.
13. *Cicero, On the Commonwealth and On the Laws*. Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought. Translated and edited by James E. G. Zetzel. Cambridge U.P., 1999. Pp. xlviii + 207. Hardback £37.50, paperback £13.95.
14. *Pyrrhonian Inquiry*. Cambridge Philological Society Supplementary Vol. 25. By Marta Anna Włodarczyk. Cambridge Phil. Soc., Cambridge, 2000. Pp. ix + 72. Paper. Price not stated.
15. *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy*. Vol. XVIII, Summer 2000. Edited by David Sedley. Oxford U.P., 2000. Pp. 374. Hardback £35.00, paperback £19.99.

General

I began to get bothered when I found the unfashionable R. B. Onions lavishly praised towards the end of the first chapter of ★★*The Epic Hero*[1] but it was the final three words of that chapter, *res ipse* (sic) *dixit* (69), which really shook me. What follows – a heavily detailed account drawn from any number of traditions of the hero's life and feats – is apt to ramble on with Dumézil's Second or Warrior Function and an Indo-European setting much to the fore. We begin and end, inevitably, with the Greek hero and less obviously such assertions as the hero 'is part of but yet escapes id and instinct, the animal image and potency, yet still is not fully part of ego, matured psyche and self' (383). Even after 400 pages I'm not sure I understand the force of this claim. The last four pages of text refer to the *Poema del Mio Cid*, *Nibelungenlied*, the Byzantine *Digenid*, *Chanson de Roland*, the *Slovo o polku Igoreve*, *Njál saga*, the Old Irish *epos*, Ossete tales, and the *Iliad* ('barbaric and splendid as Mykenean-worked gold'), each of which, apparently, 'graphically proves that behind the *aitios* (sic) of the hero tale . . . lies the deadly attraction of the hero himself. *Caedo, ergo sum*' (at least that's

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