delegate authority to an agent. They argue that collective principals are particularly prevalent in international delegation, making international recontracting on average more costly. I believe they are right on this point, though decision-making rules need to be considered along with the structure of the principal to yield their conclusion: Unanimity requirements in international diplomacy or institutions (rarely, if ever, found in domestic political institutions) should make recontracting indeed on balance more costly for delegation to IOs. This in turn suggests that the ability of the principal to revoke the grant of authority might be better treated as a variable, rather than as a definitional dichotomy.

*Delegation and IR Theory:* As Gould and Pollack point out in their respective chapters, P-A models yield no point-specific predictions without being supplemented by assumptions about agent preferences derived from other theoretical traditions. This raises the question of how easily P-A models can be combined with or integrated into other theoretical traditions. One of the core assumptions of P-A theory is that the principal's decision to delegate, as well as the subsequent behavior of both principal and agent, are driven by the logic of instrumental rationality. This makes P-A compatible with rationalist theoretical traditions in IR, but hard to combine with approaches that reject the logic of instrumental rationality. Moreover, among the former, P-A theory seems to have a natural affinity with the liberal tradition in IR theory that distinguishes between the government of a state and sociopolitical groups at the domestic level and that takes the interests of the latter as the starting point of the analysis. The domestic electoral importance of U.S. money-center banks, for instance, explains both congressional support for increased funding to the IMF and IMF funding allocation in Broz and Hawes's chapter; and skepticism about overtly politicized bilateral aid by voters in donor countries (the presumed principals of elected politicians) explains the variations in the share of foreign aid allocated through multilateral institutions in Milner's chapter.

Other theoretical traditions in IR cannot recognize some of the theoretically most interesting benefits of delegation identified by P-A theory and might, therefore, have difficulty explaining the very existence of international delegation. Neorealism, for instance, which denies that international institutions have any effect independent of the distribution of power among states, must consequently also deny that states can use delegation to IOs to make more credible commitments or "lock in" policy—an important motivation for international delegation in the chapters by Pollack, Milner, and others. Neoliberalism acknowledges and in fact emphasizes these benefits of delegation, but by retaining the unitary-actor assumption still, cannot recognize blame avoidance or "shifting responsibility" as a motivation for delegation. In short, adopting a P-A perspective is not a neutral decision with respect to one's position in the broader theoretical debates in IR.

*Organizations as Actors:* In most of the chapters, change in a P-A relationship occurs only as a deliberate, conscious choice of the principals. Martin even explicitly argues that "IOs gain autonomy as a result of intentional state decisions to delegate [more] authority, not through a careless process driven by the staff" (p. 141). This seems at odds with one of the most important lessons of P-A theory for the study of international relations—emphasized in the introduction, the conclusion, and the chapter by Hawkins and Jacoby—namely, that international organizations are not just structures within which their member states interact, but that they can have agency independent of the member states. While Lake and McCubbins are right to note that governments may anticipate agency slack, organization theory as applied to IOs by Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore, for instance, suggests that agents will seek to enlarge their portfolio or increase their autonomy. Hawkins and Jacoby show that such agents may try to increase their autonomy in various ways, including by reinterpreting the rules. And P-A theory's core assumption of incomplete information suggests that principals will anticipate such attempts at most imperfectly. Moreover, if it is correct that it is more difficult in international delegation for principals to rein in their agents, then such agent-induced changes may have greater persistence internationally than domestically.

A promising avenue for future research, therefore, will be to build on Hawkins and Jacoby's chapter and the work of Tim Büthe and Walter Mattli in order to develop theoretical models of delegation that allow for institutional change driven by agents, and to specify the conditions under which it can occur.

**Ozone Depletion and Climate Change: Constructing a Global Response.** By Matthew J. Hoffman. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2005. 260p. $81.50 cloth, $24.95 paper.
DOI: 10.1017/S1537592707072696

— Margaret E. Keck, *Johns Hopkins University*

In this book, Matthew J. Hoffman attempts something quite ambitious: a two-stage analysis in which he first designs a formal model to test Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink's constructivist model of a norms life cycle, and a subsequent application of the insights generated to an empirical case. Although he does not quite pull it off, it is an effort worthy of attention and further development. On a stylistic note, the text contains an irritating amount of repetition that a good copy editor should have questioned.

Hoffman's general question is "who participates in global governance," informed by the observation that over the



https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592707072696 Published online by Cambridge University Press

course of the negotiation of the treaty to prevent ozone depletion, the participation norm changed from a restricted, North-only negotiating format to one demanding universal participation. After reviewing alternative theoretical approaches, Hoffman finds the norm life-cycle approach most compelling. He then sets up an agent-based model designed to test aspects of that model, particularly its attribution of a crucial role to a norms entrepreneur. Constructivism and agent-based modeling share a focus on the interactive dimensions of politics, in which actors' actions affect each other's behavior, eventually contributing to large-scale pattern shifts. By attributing heuristics—rules of thumb—to the units in the system, modelers use simulations to build a dynamic environment in which to test conditions under which such adaptations might take place. Hoffman's findings strongly support the importance of an entrepreneur under conditions of relatively high social complexity and in the presence of numerous other stimuli (noise) in the system. He proposes a modification to the norm life-cycle approach that takes into account social conditions, and then asks whether it can explain (and, by implication, attribute robustness to) the shift that took place in expectations about participation in global treaties.

The empirical account traces the role of Mustafa Tolba, executive director of the United Nations Environment Program, during negotiations of successive framework treaties and protocols related to ozone depletion and then climate change. Hoffman contends that Tolba's entrepreneurship on behalf of the developing world persuaded key actors that global treaties should be premised on universal participation. By the early nineties, support for this position produced a "lock-in" around a new norm of universal participation, such that by the time that negotiations for a Framework Convention on Climate Change took place, it was taken for granted.

The empirical section tells the story of how the argument for expanding participation in global negotiations and governance gained acceptance between the negotiation of the Montreal Protocol and the Climate Change Convention. The account has serious shortcomings that make it unconvincing, though not implausible. These relate to a) the treatment of "universal participation," b) a shallow (and sometimes erroneous) understanding of the "southern" position, and c) a failure to consider alternative explanations.

Hoffman's "universal participation" refers to treaty negotiations. This usage is somewhat at odds with what is more commonly implied by the phrase—the effort to have all states sign and ratify an agreement. The change in emphasis deserves at least a mention. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature in 1982, sought universal participation, a process that continued over decades. The author refers to this precedent only in passing.

While noting the role of large developing nations in the production of greenhouse gasses, Hoffman otherwise treats the developing world as a homogenous entity. He refers to their lack of interest in the ozone negotiations and attributes the participation of 37 southern states in the production of the Montreal Protocol to Tolba's persuasion, assuming that their interest is only continued access to chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs). But in fact there were three groups of countries in Montreal, not two: producers of the technology, producers of equipment using the technology (air conditioners, refrigerators, etc.), and consumers of the latter. The second group, which included large developing countries like Brazil and India, had distinct interests because they had paid large sums to northern firms for the rights to use the technology; northern countries also feared that a North-only treaty would allow Brazil and India to continue producing and exporting cheaper goods using CFCs. This is the group for which technology transfer was the most important.

The author considered few alternative explanations for expanded participation, focusing on three: rationality, excluded because efficacy is enhanced by restricting participation; requirements of the science itself, excluded because scientists take a variety of positions on the subject; and actions of a hegemon (the United States), excluded because the evidence, if anything, points the other way. Conspicuously absent were powerful contextual factors like the collapse of the Soviet Union, the explosion of normative discourse about democracy and participation, and transformations in communications technology that facilitated expanded participation. Also absent was the growing participation (and interaction) of nongovernmental actors in both developing and developed countries, fueled by a whole series of United Nations theme conferences reaching back to the UN Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm in 1972.

Although there is a significant gap between the theoretical ambitions and the empirical analysis of *Ozone Depletion and Climate Change,* the shortcomings of the latter do not necessarily diminish the interest of the former. Hoffman's findings that entrepreneurship is especially important in situations of high social complexity and where there is a lot of noise in the system are suggestive and valuable, and deserve attention from scholars interested in the workings of norms in international politics. Tolba's entrepreneurial role was undoubtedly important, and an exploration that took into account a larger context would have been valuable. A norm favoring democratization of access to global negotiations and governance compacts may indeed be gaining robustness. Whatever their plausibility, however, the empirical account fails to convince me of the causal weight of norm entrepreneurship here, or that moves made in the negotiation of these two treaties were the crucial sites in which this occurred.



https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592707072696 Published online by Cambridge University Press