sexuality no less than Greek and Roman thinking about sex. Overall, however, the 'zealous erudition' demonstrated by contributors and the diverse internal dialogues and debates between essays reinforce the authority of this collection and its reasoning about erotic experience and sexual ethics in antiquity.

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MORAL CONFLICTS

N. WHITE: *Individual and Conflict in Greek Ethics*. Pp. xv + 369. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002. Cased, £35. ISBN: 0-19-825059-2.

The title is for once a meaningful indicator of content. White argues here, contrary to deeply entrenched interpretive canons, that pre-Hellenistic Greek moral thinkers neither assumed nor argued that happiness is the sole rational aim (eudaimonism) and that all genuine goods can be smoothly folded into a single happy life (harmonizing eudaimonism). In particular, they are argued to have been firmly conscious of the potential conflict, usually assumed to be endemic to modern, as opposed to ancient, moral thought, between individual happiness and morality, the agent's happiness and that of others.

The argument is thorough and painstaking, indeed sometimes painfully so; the pages are many, the print small, the necessary cross-references legion. In what follows I inevitably fail to trace every, or perhaps any, subtlety, and attempt only to raise some general questions about the shape of the whole.

We get, initially, several presumption-clearing chapters. First, true to the claim that the study of the history of philosophy ought to include the study of the historiography of philosophy, W. reviews the historical influences on current scholarly thinking about Greek ethics. This in and of itself makes the book valuable to serious students of the topic. It is here presumably meant to raise red flags about the extent to which, for example, the current leaning toward eudaimonistic interpretations is due to the continuing and insidious influence of Hegel. A chapter on imperatives is then intended to raise suspicions about the familiar claim that modern ethics is imperative in tone while ancient ethics is attractive. White wants to block an inference from the absence of imperatives to the absence of conflict by finding imperative formulations in Plato and Aristotle. This done, the fact remains, nevertheless, that, for the Greeks, the virtuous life is the life that is the fullest and most perfect expression of one's nature, rather than a repression or overcoming of one's nature or some part of it. Virtue is never opposed to happiness except perhaps in the attenuated sense in which political virtue can be seen as contributing less to happiness than intellectual virtue.

Finally, still in the presumption-clearing mode, there is a chapter questioning the claim that the ancient understanding of the *polis* makes the notion of any conflict between the agent and others nonsensical. White suggests here that because there is ample evidence of the capacity to recognize extra-*polis* norms and appeals, it cannot be assumed that there is any straightforward and unqualified identification of the self or one's good with the city or its good. That the classical conception of the *polis* involved essentially a notion of a common good in light of which individual good is to be defined no doubt got into the traditional story most directly (whether via Hegel or not) from Aristotle's remarks about the political nature of humans and his correlative claim that the happiness of the city is the most final of human goods. This certainly does not

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mean that all Greeks assumed this coincidence, nor is there any guarantee that the arguments are good ones. The fact remains that Aristotle, and Plato too for that matter, believed it, and that this is a substantive belief about the nature of individual good, not simply a vague sociological characterization resulting from the greater intimacy of the classical Greek city-state.

When we then turn to the philosophers, Socrates and Plato turn out not to be eudaimonists and Aristotle not a harmonizing eudaimonist. The former is a particularly surprising suggestion, and not only because we are used to our neat classification of Greek moral philosophers as one and all eudaimonists, but because we seem to have Aristotle's word for it. We are, after all, being asked to question the accuracy of the beginning of the *Nicomachean Ethics* where Aristotle, surely meaning to be describing (at the least) his culture and the views of his philosophical predecessors says that everyone aims, with every action, at eudaimonia.

In any case, the considerations advanced are not enough to shake off the standard view. Socrates is freed of his usual eudaimonism by concentrating on the *Apology* and the *Crito* and pointing out that justice and virtue are there praised without any immediate further appeal to happiness. This seems, though, to ignore the early stage-setting remarks in the *Crito* establishing living well (the standard philosopher's rewording of eudaimonia), as opposed to mere living, as all that matters. Plato is, not surprisingly, a more complicated case. The main argument (and, to be fair, there are many other factors considered) is that he does not, in the *Republic*, identify happiness with virtue. This is supposed to be the case because happiness is a harmony of satisfactions and virtue a harmony of functions, and that is supposed to be the case because the case for the greater happiness of the virtuous life is taken to require the arguments about pleasure in Book 9, and those are about satisfaction. This sort of claim obviously raises large questions about the nature of eudaimonia. One does wonder though how Glaucon and Adeimantus can so readily take justice as happiness at the end of Book 4.

Aristotle is a eudaimonist, but not a harmonizing eudaimonist. (We have to wait for the Hellenistic philosophers for that.) Again the case made seems insufficient. Aristotle's famously puzzling remarks about egoism in friendship are used to show that he sees a genuine distinction between the agent's good and that of others, but the chapter can be, and has been, read as precisely denying that distinction. The other main consideration advanced depends on a more standard reading of the text but seems less useful in establishing the deeper point White is aiming at. Even granted that Aristotle sees a conflict between the contemplative and political lives, such that they cannot be combined in an way that allows the full realization of both, so that we have a genuine conflict between the individual's greatest good as realized by the contemplative life and the social good as the aim of the political life, it is far from clear that this conflict in any interesting way mirrors the tension in modern ethics between selfishness and morality. Moral and intellectual virtue may as a practical matter conflict, but they are not by definition opposed.

On the whole, this is a challenging and deeply intelligent survey of the Greek moral landscape from Homer through the Stoics. It is indeed important to be reminded of the ways in which the standard comparisons between the ancients and the moderns rely on caricatures (of both). It is not, though, in the end, a successful argument for a radical re-envisioning of the scene.

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