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Comparing China's frontier politics: how much difference did a century make?

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In response to foreign demands for concessions and territories, China's last imperial court in the early twentieth century executed reforms to strengthen fiscal, personnel, military, and cultural control over its frontier regions. However, in so doing, it provoked an awakening of the national consciousness of the elites of non-Han ethnic minorities there. Much has changed over the past 100 years regarding the governance of China's frontier territories of Inner Mongolia, Tibet, and Xinjiang, with the diffusion of nationalist claims among increasing numbers of the ethnic minority populace, heightened focus of foreign actors on the humanitarian and rights situations of the ethnic minorities, and greatly extended reach and firmer grip of the central government. What remained unaltered is the "state integration" purpose of Chinese regimes, as manifested in the practices of "internal colonialism" or "ethnic assimilation," which has led to grievances and resistance by China's ethnic minorities against the Chinese state.

Keywords: Inner Mongolia; Tibet; Xinjiang; state integration; ethnic nationalism

Introduction

Occasional, sometimes violent, disturbances by ethnic minorities in present-day China have long antecedents, as expressions of disenchantment toward recurring state policies originating over a century ago. This study examines attempts by two very different regimes, existing 100 years apart, to exercise effective governance over China's frontier regions of Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang, and Tibet, inhabited historically and largely by peoples different from the majority Han-Chinese, and the resistance of these communities against the imposition of central authority. For this purpose, it compares and evaluates the successes or limitations of programs and policies established by the Qing dynasty in its last decade (1902–1911) and the past decade and a half (2002–2016) of the People's Republic of China (PRC) to assert and maintain direct, effective control over these regions. These two periods correspond with the pursuit by China's central authorities of their first and latest state-building projects in the modern era. This investigation analyzes why, despite a gap of a century, whenever state integration efforts are repeated by a Chinese central government, China's Mongol/Mongolian, Uyghur, and Tibetan minorities will offer opposition against policies which have changed little over time. The role of third parties external to the central government and ethnic minorities in this integration/resistance narrative will also be scrutinized. The study thus juxtaposes for examination two phases: the dawn of Chinese and ethnic

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nationalisms when central authority was still felt in China's frontier regions but at its weakest, and present times when it is strongest. Therefore, the intervening decades are necessarily given short shrift, unless reference must be made to incidents occurring in those years for their pertinence to the analysis.

Ethnic politics in the late Qing dynasty and present times

In the aftermath of the xenophobic Boxer Rebellion in 1900–1901 and punitive foreign military attacks, the Manchu Qing Imperial Court in Beijing promulgated a modernization policy program known as *Xinzheng* or "New Administration" in 1902, to shore up its tottering rule over China by reaffirming and strengthening its control over the political, military, infrastructure, economic, budgetary, and educational framework of the country, beginning with the provinces and counties of China proper. By 1905, facing demands for economic or territorial concessions by foreign powers on China's frontier territories of Manchuria, Inner Mongolia, Tibet, and Xinjiang, the Court decided to apply *Xinzheng* to these places as well, to strengthen its fiscal control, personnel management, educational presence, and demographic hold there.

Accordingly, a Frontier Affairs Ministry (*Lifanbu*) was created in 1906 and entrusted with the task of implementing the new program among the Mongols, Tibetans, and Xinjiang Muslims. Infrastructure development initiated by the Court, such as laying railway tracks, establishing postal and telegram services, and permitting private or joint public–private enterprises to own and manage mines and industries, were relatively non-contentious. However, for the purpose of securing the frontier, *Xinzheng* measures to promote Han-Chinese immigration, abolish the ban on Han-Chinese marrying Manchus or Mongols, release serfs tied to monastic estates or local princes, collect taxes from land and produces, train new army and police detachments, regularize fiefs into counties, replace local headmen or religious leaders with fixed-term officials (*gaitu guiliu*), establish provincial consultative assemblies, and build Chinese curriculum schools were seen as threatening to the traditional lifestyles, prerogatives, and incomes of the local ethnicities, and vehemently opposed by their aristocrats and clergy. Such hasty and assertive actions on the part of a faltering empire contributed much to awakening the national consciousness of the elites of frontier ethnic minorities, particularly the Mongolians and Tibetans, in opposition to China and the Han-Chinese. Of all the reactions to the *Xinzheng* reforms, the rise of ethnic nationalism would be most far-reaching in bedeviling ethnic relations and governance in China to this day.

Ethnic nationalists, foreign actors, and the central government have since the eve of the Republican Revolution of 1911 been the pivotal cast of players in China's frontier politics, down to the PRC era 100 years later. Nonetheless, it is significant to note that the makeup of ethnic nationalists, motives of foreign actors, and strength of the central government have changed. What have remained broadly comparable, though, are the similar measures applied during *Xinzheng* and the governing processes employed today by the central government to administer ethnic minority regions, and the corresponding adverse reactions and active disenchantment toward the ethnic policies devised and implemented by China's authorities a century ago and at present.

Disturbances in Tibetan-populated areas in March 2008 and Xinjiang's Urumqi in July 2009 seem to demonstrate that the ethnic nationalist discourse in Tibet and Xinjiang, for either greater autonomy or independence, has spread from the traditional ethnic minority elites – with their nobilities reduced to commoners, landowning classes eliminated, and influential clergymen depoliticized by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) – to the

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general public, through education and communications technology. This relates to changes in the first group of actors. Rather than governments on imperialistic quests as in the past, but who nowadays generally desire good or at least cordial relations with China, often for economic reasons, it is usually foreign human rights organizations, or Tibetan and Uyghur diaspora groups, which openly support their brethren's causes. This relates to changes in the second group of actors. While the reforms a century ago were executed laboriously by a weak Manchu Court through a few field officers, the much greater strength of the present Chinese central government, exercised through its corps of Han-Chinese and ethnic cadres, both civilian and military, and its financial dispensations for infrastructure development, has permitted it far tighter control over China's ethnic regions today. This relates to changes in the third group of actors.

At the present time, as it was 100 years ago, Beijing attempts to strengthen its fiscal control, economic organization, resource extraction capabilities, infrastructure network, cadre management, religious restrictions, Chinese language teaching, and the demographic spread of Han-Chinese over the frontier regions. Consequently, there have been nationalist outburst among ethnic minorities in response to the perceived unequal distribution of power favoring the center over local authorities, measures to assimilate or acculturate ethnic minorities into the Han-Chinese socio-cultural mainstream, and preferred treatment of Han-Chinese by officials and employers, leading to the relative economic deprivation of ethnic minorities. These happenings in turn attract the attention of foreign state leaders and, even more so, the involvement of foreign human rights nongovernmental organizations (such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch (Asia), and the National Endowment for Democracy), as well as Tibetan and Uyghur diaspora groups championing the cause of greater autonomy or independence for Tibet and Xinjiang.

Ethnic nationalism is very much an outcome of, and reaction to, centralizing state policies (Hechter 2000). What is perceived by successive Chinese governments as efforts to promote state integration have been seen by ethnic minorities as attempts by Han-Chinese regimes to introduce outsiders into their homelands to take their resources and marginalize or eradicate their identities, through a process of internal colonialism (Hechter 1975; Stone 1979). Whether it is integration or colonialism, both perspectives see a Chinese political–economic–social system being constituted, with the first four aspects from Blauner (1969), and the last observation from my research on China's ethnic minorities. First, it begins with an uninvited physical entry into the ethnic territories. Second, homelands of ethnic minorities come under the direct political domination of the Han-Chinese majority. Third, the integrating authority executes economic, social, and cultural policies which constrain, transform, and destroy indigenous livelihoods, values, and ways of life. Fourth, the Han-Chinese justify their presence as a civilizing or developmental force to better the lives of ethnic minorities. As a fundamental task to unify the modern state polity under a single "high culture" and produce a literate labor force for industrialization, the capital elite provides secular education in a common language with a standardized syllabus, which is urged upon ethnic minorities (Gellner 1983). By socializing the subordinated indigenous elites and articulating classes to identify with and assimilate into the dominant culture, the power structure then handpicks an intermediary stratum of native intellectuals, civil servants, and managers of government corporations that is open to manipulation by the national elite to help maintain the institutions of state authority in the ethnic domains and supervise their own people (Allen 1969). Finally, the Chinese regime perceives attempts by ethnic nationalists to resist its hold and advancement on their territories by calling on foreign involvements as treasonable conspiracies to undermine state unity. Through interruptions, ebbs, and flows, these conditions would characterize

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China's integration/colonization project to enmesh its frontier regions of Inner Mongolia, Tibet, and Xinjiang with the rest of the country from the *Xinzheng* years to the present times.

Manchuria under *Xinzheng*

It was the prospect of losing Manchuria, the (albeit Sinicized) Qing rulers' original homeland, through the ceding of railway management rights across the region to Tsarist Russia, and later, Imperial Japan, which propelled Beijing to push through *Xinzheng*, the "New Administration." The officially sponsored flood of Han-Chinese agrarian settlers into Manchuria and the absence of a regional elite with separatist consciousness put paid to any notion of a post-revolution Manchu ethnic state. However, efforts to assimilate other frontier regions into the rest of China did not proceed as smoothly.

Xinzheng in Inner Mongolia

Application

In 1906, for effective oversight, the Mongolian territories of Hulunbuir (Xing'an) and Chahar were merged as the province of Inner Mongolia. In 1910, to raise taxes, as well as encourage Han-Chinese settlement to resist Russian penetration and relieve population pressures in China proper, the Court allowed non-Mongols in Inner Mongolia to purchase or contract Mongol lands for pasture, mining, or farming (Atwood 2002, 45; Jagchid 1988, 187–188). However, this measure was opposed by many Mongol herders because they considered it a threat to their land ownership and traditional practice of nomadism (Jagchid 1988, 201). The administrative powers of the Mongolian *jasags* (a jasag is a prince of a banner) were also undercut because regularized Chinese-style administrative units were created whenever there were sizeable numbers of Han-Chinese settlers (Lan 1999, 43). By 1919, there were 697,164 Mongols but 5,297,844 immigrants who were, with the exception of about 29,000 Manchus, all Han-Chinese (Kashiwabara and Hamada 1919, 739–757).

Reactions

The Mongols tried to stop land development by signing petitions, but when these were ignored, they obstructed land surveyors, impounded the surveys, and refused to pay taxes (Lan 1999, 49). The most resolute opponents of *Xinzheng* took up arms, and revolts occurred in every Inner Mongolian league (a league consists of several banners). Angry Mongols murdered officials opening up land, looted local government offices, and attacked Chinese immigrants (Jagchid 1988, 190–192; Navaangnamjil 1976, 43–76). Given the violent oppositional activities, whenever land had to be measured, troops were deployed (Yigu 1974, 173).

Yet there was a lack of collaboration among the organizers of these activities. Although hatred existed against the Han-Chinese and the Court, most incidents were expressions of economic and social discontent, as Inner Mongolians of different banners, leagues, and socioeconomic classes were not yet ready to unite for a higher nationalistic goal. Inner Mongolians likely lacked separatist-minded leaders because most of their princes were Chinese-educated (Jagchid 1988, 194–201). Even so, the speed, scale, and heavy-handedness of the implementation of *Xinzheng* policies, particularly the ravenous land grab by

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immigrants, damaged the interest of Mongol nomads and bred lasting ill-will between them and the Han-Chinese.

Xinzheng in Tibet (Central Tibet and Kham)

Application

When British soldiers led by Colonel Francis Younghusband undertook an expedition to open Tibet to trade in 1904, China had become so weak it could offer no military assistance to the resisting Tibetan forces, and the previously close trade relations between China proper and Tibet were already undermined by the variety of commodities coming from British India into Tibet (Wei 1998, 81).

Younghusband exposed the virtual nonexistent state of Chinese authority in Tibet to the Tibetan elite. However, China had become sufficiently aroused by Britain's entry into Tibet, which Beijing still considered to be under its charge, to impose direct Chinese control over Tibetan affairs at the first opportunity. China, therefore, signed a treaty with Britain in April 1906, paying Britain an indemnity, allowing its traders to operate in the Tibetan border towns of Yadong, Gyantze, and Gartok, and permitting it to keep the telegraph line it had built from India to Gyantze, in exchange for Britain recognizing Chinese "suzerainty" – rights of military and foreign relations conduct – over Tibet (Grunfeld 1996, 59).

After fleeing Lhasa ahead of the British advance, the 13th Dalai Lama, spiritual and temporal head of Tibet, reached Beijing in September 1908 after visiting Mongolia. He was then issued an edict by the Empress Dowager, altering his previous title of "Great, Good, Self-Existent Buddha of Heaven" to "Our Loyal and Submissive Vice-Regent, Great, Good, Self-Existent Buddha of Heaven" (Grunfeld 1996, 62). Besides appointing the Dalai Lama a servant of the Court with a regular stipend, the edict further instructed him to "obey the laws and ordnances of the Sovereign State," and "report to the Imperial Resident (*amban*) in Tibet on all matters for transmission to the Court" (Smith 1996, 166). The Dalai Lama's reduced standing demonstrated Beijing's intention to do away with Tibet's status as an autonomous dependency by exercising full sovereignty over it, and signaled that the traditional personal relationship between the (Dalai Lama) priest and his (Manchu Emperor) patron no longer existed.

Meanwhile, Zhang Yintang, a Han-Chinese, was named Imperial Commissioner of Tibet and entrusted with the task of reaffirming Chinese rule there. Zhang tried to stamp out corruption by local officials, and tackle "monastic idleness" by forcing lamas to renounce their monastic vows (Zhang 2005, 228). With Lian Yu, the *amban* of Lhasa, Zhang created a Tibetan–Chinese army, placed secular officials in charge of the government in Lhasa, opened Chinese language schools, promoted agriculture, and founded a military academy (Grunfeld 1996, 60). Lian also constituted police patrols for Gyantze, Yadong, and Lhasa (Zhao 2004, 283–284). These intrusively centralizing reforms earned the two men the enmity of the ruling monastic and landowning classes of central Tibet.

The Younghusband expedition stimulated the Chinese not only to restore their position in Tibet proper, but also to advance the Sichuan frontier westward. In June 1904, on being appointed *amban* for Kham (eastern Tibet), Feng Chuan established a Han-Chinese colony at Batang, and attempted to curb the power of local monasteries by prohibiting them from recruiting novice monks for 20 years (Smith 1996, 169). Batang Tibetans revolted and killed Feng, leading to a punitive campaign from Sichuan, which nominally included Batang and Kham. In 1906, Zhao Erfeng, commander of the military force, abolished the office of *tusi* (native chieftain), and announced that henceforth both Han-Chinese and

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Batang natives would be subjected to the jurisdiction of Chinese officials (Smith 1996, 170). Zhao was subsequently named *Chuan-Dian* (Sichuan-Yunnan) Frontier Affairs Commissioner.

The *Chuan-Dian* Commission, created by the Qing Court as part of its new forward policy in Kham, became under Zhao the means for replacing the old system of hereditary native rule with direct Chinese administration and colonization. This was an essential feature of *Xinzheng* as applied to non-Han-Chinese-inhabited frontier areas of China. Tibetans were henceforth required to pay taxes to Court-appointed officials instead of native chieftains or monasteries, Tibetan monasteries in Kham were limited to a maximum of 300 monks each, and lamas were removed from local administration (Smith 1996, 170). Chinese language schools were established, and Tibetan students had to adopt Han-Chinese surnames (Adshead 1984, 99). Zhao created an army of 6000 and abolished *corvée* (*ulag*) (Grunfeld 1996, 61). Han-Chinese settlers were provided with relocation expenses, food, and free land, as they were to establish a core Han-Chinese population loyal to China and provide examples of "civilized ways" for natives to emulate (Smith 1996, 170).

Reactions

The haste and determination with which the *Xinzheng* reforms were conducted, such as Lian's attempts to transfer the Dalai Lama's powers to the Chinese *amban* in Tibet and Zhao's efforts at Sinicizing Tibetans, only made the Tibetan elite more receptive to interventions by foreign powers. On returning to Lhasa in December 1909, the Dalai Lama received news that Chinese soldiers from Kham were seizing the city. He then cabled foreign missions in Beijing, admonishing Lian and Zhao for attempting to eliminate Tibetan Buddhism, and protesting the troop movements (Zhang 2005, 229). In February 1910, he escaped across the Himalayas.

On reaching Calcutta in March 1910, the Dalai Lama met with Lord Minto, the British Governor-General and Viceroy of India, to whom he expressed hope that Britain would provide a military escort to ensure his safe return to Lhasa (McKay 1997, 50), and, as an intermediary, help Tibet to negotiate with Beijing (Shakabpa 1967, 236). He also offered to place Tibet under British military protection (Mehra 1979, 25). Although they were all refused, this would be the first of many appeals by this Dalai Lama, and the succeeding present one, for foreign help to remove or reduce the Chinese presence from Tibet. Beijing had miscalculated the native elite's reactions to the introduction of Chinese troops into Tibet proper, but this would not be the last time Chinese authorities were to overestimate the loyalty and submissiveness of a Dalai Lama to its rule.

Meanwhile, the Chinese increased their military control of Lhasa and central Tibet by building barracks for 1200 soldiers (Lamb 1966, 273). When news of the Republican Revolution reached Tibet, local Chinese troops divided into pro- and anti-revolutionary factions, enabling the Tibetans to evict them all from Tibet (McKay 1997, 52–53). In January 1913, the returning Dalai Lama declared independence for Tibet, which would retain its complete autonomy until 1951, when it was militarily integrated into the PRC.

Xinzheng in Xinjiang

Application

In November 1884, the Garrison of the Western Territories (*Xiyu duhufu*) was regularized by imperial fiat into the Province of Xinjiang, with prefectures, counties, and a governor at

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its capital of Dihua (meaning "acculturate" in Chinese), presently Urumqi, to guard against territorial and economic encroachments by Tsarist Russia and Britain on grounds that it was not part of China proper. As both countries had established consulates in Xinjiang by 1908, with extra-territorial rights and exemptions from paying taxes, Russian and British residents and merchants were poised to control the province's commercial lifelines.

On the eve of the Republican Revolution, Xinjiang's Chinese-style administrative structure still relied largely on the indigenous elites, particularly the *begs* (headmen), to manage local affairs, as settlement by Han-Chinese had proceeded more slowly than expected. Fiscally, the Xinjiang government depended on subsidies from the Court, but as its financial precariousness led to decreased transfers, shortfalls were filled by arbitrary levies (Millward 2007, 158). The abolition of the *boke* (serf) system, which freed tenant farmers from servitude to their landlords so they could rent land from and pay taxes to the government, resulted in some resentment by the upper classes in Xinjiang against the New Administration, but was seen by most as a progressive move in energizing agricultural development (Zhu 2008, 127), and filling provincial coffers.

By 1905, as part of the *Xinzheng* reforms, an officer training school was set up in Urumqi to train junior military officers for Xinjiang, followed by another in Ili (Jiao 2009, 100). Han-Chinese "New Army" infantry, artillery, and engineering units were subsequently created in both towns. Police patrols were established throughout Xinjiang in 1908, after which a police academy and a police instructors' training institute were established in Urumqi (Jiao 2009, 101).

Despite the Governor's memorials to the Court that Han immigrants were too few and the locals lacked sufficient schooling to constitute any meaningful consultative assembly, this was established for Xinjiang in Urumqi in September 1909, albeit with many bogus electors and unfilled vacancies (Zhao 2004, 183–185). A century later, similar complaints would be heard alleging the unrepresentative character and "rubber-stamp" operation of Xinjiang's People's Congress.

The effects of having local military colleges, New Army units, and police patrols and academies in Xinjiang could not be overestimated, given the short years and hurried pace of the late Qing reforms. However, these aspects of the *Xinzheng* program certainly went some ways toward facilitating post-revolutionary Han-Chinese authorities in Urumqi to maintain control over Xinjiang and the local population there, although the share of the resident Han population in the province was less than 6% of its total before 1950.

Delayed reactions

Reaction of the predominantly Muslim Turkic peoples of Xinjiang to Han-Chinese domination of their province did not come during the *Xinzheng* period, or the first two decades of the succeeding Chinese Republic. There was no unified native response to the Qing collapse as Uyghur national consciousness had yet to appear (Gladney 2004, 215–217). Still, budding awareness of collective local identity could already be discerned, as reflected in the creation of new-style Turkic schools in Xinjiang.

Xinjiang merchants abroad had learnt from Ottoman Turkey, and Muslim Tartar intellectuals and educators in Kazan and elsewhere in Russia, of the jaddidist movement for modern schools, which advocated religious enlightenment and political revival through the study of subjects outside the traditional Islamic school curriculum, particularly mathematics, history, and geography (Millward 2007, 171). A group of jaddidist Tartar merchants in Ghulja, Xinjiang, had by 1908 opened a Turkish language school

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(Millward 2007, 174). The contemporaneous Chinese schools of the *Xinzheng* reform brought their own version of modern education, which, with their Chinese-language focus, were not popular among the Xinjiang Turkic Muslims, but had the paradoxical effect of raising their community self-awareness.

In 1913, the wealthy Xinjiang Musabay clan requested from Istanbul, Turkey, a jaddidist teacher, Ahmed Kemal, who was promoting pan-Turkism, which aimed at constructing a Turkic state "stretching from the Adriatic Sea to the Chinese wall" (Zhu 2008, 128). Funded by the Musabays, Kemal first opened a secondary school near Kashgar, and subsequently other "pan-Turkic" schools throughout Xinjiang, which taught the jaddidist curriculum and pan-Turkic ideology, using textbooks produced in Istanbul (Klimes 2015, 79–80). Besides studying religion, history, and geography, students sang Turkish marches, wore a school uniform bearing Ottoman Turkish court design, and pledged that "their ancestors were Turkic and their home country is Turkey" (Millward 2007, 173). All these were done under the watchful eyes of Xinjiang's warlord, Yang Zengxin.

Teaching from Uyghur language texts was another educational innovation in the 1910s and 1920s. The focus was not initially on creating a Uyghur nation – popularization of and identification with that name would come later in the 1930s and 1940s – but it would only be a small step from pan-Turkic consciousness to aspirations for an "East Turkestan/Uyghur" nation within the boundaries of Chinese Xinjiang, if not outside them.

Governor Yang was able to maintain effective control over Xinjiang from 1911 to his death in 1928 due to his deft recognition of the traditional rights and privileges of the local power brokers (Jacobs 2016, 27–30), and tolerance for religious practices as long as they did not interfere with politics (Zhong 2009, 77). By abolishing the hereditary khanate of Hami in 1930 and raising agricultural taxes to fund army expansion, his successor provoked uprisings throughout the province by Uyghur Islamic-nationalists (Jacobs 2016, 78–80, 83–86). Blowback on the *Xinzheng* reforms had belatedly but finally arrived.

Ethnic politics during *Xinzheng*

Xinzheng was the last imperial Chinese state response to foreign encroachment on its frontier territories, by tightening control over them through replacing feudal allegiance with direct rule. In so doing, *Xinzheng* activated for the non-Han ethnic minorities in Inner Mongolia, Tibet, and Xinjiang an administrative program without their request or consent. As informed by internal colonialism studies, this program consisted of five main aspects. Physical penetration entailed Han-Chinese immigration and establishment of colonies under military escort. Political domination was then instituted by installing court-appointed officials, recruiting locals for newly established government agencies, undercutting the authority of ethnic leaders, and building communication infrastructure. Lifestyle-changing policies followed, such as transforming land ownership patterns, emancipating serfs, issuing monastic proscriptions, and taxing the natives. Justifications for lifting the locals out of their supposed ignorance and backwardness ensued, through encouraging new techniques of farming and mining, living in mixed neighborhoods with Han-Chinese, and receiving Han language education in government-operated schools. These measures led finally to ethnic resistance against economic marginalization and identity threats with calls for foreign intervention before the Qing dynasty collapsed.

State integration afterwards by Chinese central authorities was interrupted by revolution, warlordism, the anti-Japanese war, and civil war. Under the PRC, the frontier regions were sealed from outsiders for four decades after 1950, but their reopening coincided with the end of the Cold War and reemergence of ethnic nationalism. Once

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again, greater efforts and attention by the CCP party-state to strengthen its rule over these areas have led to ethnic strife and consequent fear of foreign involvement. Even though the nature and strength of ethnic, government, and foreign players have changed drastically over a century, resistance against internal colonialism, or the state integration agenda, remained basically similar.

Ethnicity in contemporary Inner Mongolia

Disenchantment

It was over immigration and land that, in May 2011, present-day PRC's Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region (IMAR) witnessed its largest demonstrations. A Mongol herder was fatally struck by coal haulers driving over his grazing lands, and when sympathizers went to complain at the mining company, one of them was mortally rammed by a forklift driven by a Han-Chinese (Simpson 2011). Perceiving this as a display of century-old Han chauvinism, about 2000 Mongols then marched onto government offices in Xilingol, the league (prefecture) with the fewest Han-Chinese in IMAR, chanting "defend our land and our rights" (FlorCruz 2011).

After calls for protests were circulated online, censors temporarily blocked any mention of "Inner Mongolia" on Chinese social networking sites. Still, several hundred students and residents gathered at the main square of the regional capital of Hohhot on 30 May 2011 to demand legal rights for the Mongol people, before they were dispersed by police and paramilitary troops who also arrested dozens (Jiang 2011). Protestors demanded legal rights instead of greater autonomy for Mongols to ward off the danger of being perceived by authorities as seditious elements pressing for Inner Mongolian separatism. Hu Chunhua, then CCP secretary of IMAR, vowed to apprehend the wrongdoers, and dismissed the Party secretary of Xilingol for letting the first demonstrations snowball (FlorCruz 2011). Two Chinese were quickly arrested and a murder trial date announced, after which the protests died down.

Governance

The ethnic tension in IMAR shook the Chinese leadership so much that on Hohhot's day of protest, the CCP's powerful and secretive Politburo made public that it had convened a special meeting calling for improved "social management" to ease tension, promote fairness, and foster harmony in IMAR (FlorCruz 2011).

Since the last years of the Qing dynasty, members of China's Han majority had trickled into Inner Mongolia, often to flee famine and poverty. However, the flow increased after the PRC's founding in 1949, and has turned into a flood at the turn of the century on the back of a coal mining boom, with coal production in IMAR reaching 782 million tons in 2010, soaring threefold over the previous five years (Bodeen 2011). Consequently, Mongols today make up less than 20% of the region's population of 24 million, and many speak little or no Mongolian as a result of Chinese education.

While Chinese leaders have seen IMAR as a model ethnic autonomous region, with a prosperous economy and resident Mongols integrated into the national mainstream, many Inner Mongolians are left out of China's mineral-driven boom and are living on remote grasslands. With echoes from the *Xinzheng* period, while mining concessions are given out to operations run by Han-Chinese, limits are placed on the size of herds, which, although intended to preserve grazing land, are deeply unpopular among the Mongols because they reduce rural incomes (Bodeen 2011).

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Still, unlike Tibet and Xinjiang, which have exploded in deadly anti-government riots in recent years, Inner Mongolia has been generally quiet. This is largely due to the cognizance among Inner Mongolians that they are so demographically overwhelmed in their own region that opposition would ultimately be futile. They also understand that being heavily dependent on China for trade and investment, their brethren in the neighboring state of Mongolia, which achieved independence through Russian intervention following the Qing collapse, cannot afford to antagonize Beijing by supporting Inner Mongolians' rights.

Ethnicity in contemporary Tibet

Disenchantment

The Han–Tibetan relationship is currently beset with distrust at best and hatred at worst, particularly since the rioting by Tibetans in Lhasa, the capital of the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR), in March 2008. Many Tibetans resent the tight Party monitoring of religious activities, and the droves of Han-Chinese migrating to their homeland to find jobs and open businesses, leading to rising unemployment among the Tibetans (Kondapalli 2008). Although the Chinese government has blamed the Dalai Lama, self-exiled from China since a failed Tibetan revolt against Chinese rule in 1959, as the ringleader who "organized, premeditated, masterminded and instigated" the 2008 disturbances, these grievances seemed to be the main causes for the strife, the rowdiest since 1989.

To minimize disruptions by pro-Tibetan protestors to the Beijing Olympics' international torch relay, PRC President cum CCP Secretary-General Hu Jintao in April 2008 invited the Dalai Lama to send an emissary to Beijing for discussions. However, the Chinese expressed interest only in securing the Dalai Lama's help in quieting the unrest in Tibet (Roberts and Roberts 2009, 223). This was the sixth occasion on which representatives from the Dalai Lama held talks with the PRC since 2002. The fact that they take place shows that Beijing recognizes that a Tibet issue exists and has created problems for China's international image.

The Dalai Lama's envoys again met with officials in Beijing in January 2010, but as before, talks ended without fruition on familiar grounds. While the Dalai Lama has turned down repeated entreaties by Beijing to state that Tibet has always been part of China, China rejects his demands for an enlarged autonomous region, comprising not only the TAR, but also adjacent counties and prefectures in the provinces of Qinghai, Sichuan, Gansu, and Yunnan where sizeable numbers of Tibetans live.

The Dalai Lama was awarded honorary citizenship by the government of Canada in 2006. In 2007, he met with then Australian Prime Minister John Howard and German Chancellor Angela Merkel, and received the Congressional Gold Medal from then US President George W. Bush in a public ceremony at the Capitol. In 2010 and 2011, and again in 2014 and 2015, he met with former US President Barack Obama. All these visits and activities, and the Dalai Lama's refugee status in India, were denounced by Chinese officials in Beijing and the TAR, which, in their understanding of *Xinzheng* precedents, reflect external encouragement to an exiled Tibetan spiritual leader to "split" China. China has alleged that the Dalai Lama's Tibet Foundation has been a beneficiary of the US Agency for International Development, which dispenses funding to third-world nongovernmental organizations favored by the US government, to the amount of $23 million in 2007 (Ma 2008). Whatever his intentions, the Dalai Lama clearly understands he only has limited use of foreign attention and influence for his cause, since foreign actors always have their own

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interest calculations, hence his desire to maintain a dialogue with the Chinese authorities through his emissaries.

The Chinese also believe that, given the respect that the Dalai Lama commands among Tibetans worldwide, and his stated quest of seeking only "genuine autonomy" rather than independence from the PRC, through nonviolent means, reaching out to him might allow Beijing to delegitimize, isolate, and restrain extremist anti-Chinese elements among Tibetans. Both inside and outside China, a new generation of younger, more militant, Tibetans are emerging. In 2008, China's official Xinhua News Agency carried a report suggesting that the Tibetan Youth Congress, which is increasingly influential among the exiled Tibetan community, "is no different from al-Qaida, Chechnyan armed terrorists, East Turkistan separatists and other terrorist organizations" (Kondapalli 2008). Since 2009, Tibetans, particularly in western Sichuan (Kham) and Qinghai, which witnessed an increased police and military presence after the 2008 riots, have carried out self-immolation to gain worldwide attention. Tibetans are losing patience with nonviolent tactics.

Governance

Economically, there are two Tibets – that of urban towns such as Lhasa and Shigatse dominated by immigrant Han-Chinese, and the poorer, much less developed countryside where 85% of TAR Tibetans live (Barnett 2012). PRC officials pointed to more than 140 billion yuan ($20 billion) spent on development in Tibet from 2001 to 2010 (Bodeen 2010).[1] However, while the average annual income of rural Tibetans was $398 in 2007, the figure for urban dwellers and company owners in Tibet, many of whom are Han-Chinese, was $1588 (Roberts and Roberts 2009, 206). Nonetheless, the primary sector (herding and farming) in Tibet is at least twice as large as industry and mining combined. Services, the largest economic sector in the TAR, stabilized at around 54% of regional GDP by 2004, of which the share of "government and party agencies and social organs," dominated by Han-Chinese and a small number of Tibetan urbanites and cadres, is the biggest component (Blondeau and Buffetrille 2008, 251–252).

This situation results from an extreme level of subsidy dependence, which is not coincidental. Direct budgetary subsidies from Beijing exceed 50% of the region's GDP, and have funded almost 90% of its government expenditures for the past 20 years. Over 80% of large- and medium-scale investments in the TAR are made by state enterprises owned by the central authorities or from the rest of China. Subsidies are largely for the expansion of government administration, and investments mostly for the construction of transportation and public infrastructure (Blondeau and Buffetrille 2008, 254–257), which reflect the integrative political priorities and strategic aspects of central government planning and control over the region.

To encourage economic development, Beijing had exempted the TAR from the general regulation that only permanent residents of a provincial-level unit can start a business there. Consequently, Tibetan cities, Lhasa in particular, were inundated by a "floating population" of Han-Chinese from other provinces. They, not local Tibetans, seem to be those profiting from tourism, a growth industry in the TAR. For licensing, a tourist guide has to be certified as proficient in both English and Chinese, which results in the preponderant hiring of Han-Chinese as guides, making it easier for the government to propagate its version of Tibet's history to tourists (Roberts and Roberts 2009, 207). Han-Chinese factory managers tend to prefer employees who can speak Mandarin, and this excludes many Tibetans due to their poorer command of that language. Construction jobs typically go to Han-Chinese immigrants, as the contractor is usually Han.

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The PRC government claimed that a principal reason for building the railway linking Golmud, Qinghai, and Lhasa was to accommodate the rising number of tourists traveling to the TAR. Another reason could be to facilitate Han-Chinese to settle in Tibet, a primary Chinese government aim since *Xinzheng* times. Its construction, together with the aforementioned economic advantages for Han-Chinese, vividly highlights the tightening integration between the TAR and the rest of China, or internal colonization of Tibet by China, depending on one's perspective.

Politically, countering Tibetans' separatist sentiments is fundamental to Beijing. After the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) ended, China's official policy was to allow Tibetan Buddhism to coexist with the formally atheist Chinese Communist state. However, following a series of ethnic riots in Lhasa between 1987 and 1989, the erstwhile Party secretary of the TAR, Chen Kuiyuan, successfully persuaded the third top-level "Tibet Work Forum" held in 1994 that Tibetan Buddhism was "splittist" or "separatist" (Thurman 2010). Henceforth, the position of the authorities has been to demonize the Dalai Lama and cultivate a new generation of secular, pro-China Tibetans. Tibetan monks and cadres groomed by the party-state are expected to prove their patriotism by publicly denouncing the Dalai Lama and his followers abroad.

The fourth "Tibet Work Forum" in 2001 called for an acceleration of the TAR's integration into China's economy and mainstream culture. By then, unlike a century before when the Court could only rely on a few agents such as Lian Yu or Zhao Erfeng to take charge of the locality, a major Han-Chinese party-state constituency had consolidated in Tibet. Consisting of the public security bureau, state security ministry, People's Liberation Army (PLA) and its political commissariat, united front organs, and officials overseeing TAR bureaus and departments, these groups were understandably less than keen on any solution to the festering Tibetan issue due to their occupational interests.

At the fifth "Tibet Work Forum" in 2009, attended by Hu Jintao and other top Party officials, the issue was raising rural incomes in the TAR to China's average in 10 years (Bodeen 2010), in an apparent acknowledgment that decades of investment in infrastructure, mining, and creation of government jobs have failed to endear the region's herders and farmers to Chinese rule. The forum also boosted funding for ethnic Tibetan areas in neighboring provinces which witnessed anti-government protests in 2008. Ironically, many Han have criticized the government for overspending on Tibet's development. State integration apparently has its price, even for Han-Chinese.

Ethnicity in contemporary Xinjiang

Disenchantment

Ethnic nationalism, once awakened, is hard to stifle, and this is particularly true with Xinjiang, where the indigenous Uyghurs are culturally very different from the Han-Chinese. Shortly after the Beijing Olympics started in August 2008, more than a dozen jogging Han-Chinese policemen were hacked to death by two male Uyghur hawkers in Kashgar. This was the worst terrorist incident in the Xinjiang (Uyghur) Autonomous Region (XUAR) after a decade of relative quiet, that is, until a year later.

On the night of 4 July 2009, Internet messages were circulated to rally a crowd for the following day at the city's Han neighborhoods (Radio Free Asia). The immediate cause of the messages and 5 July 2009 riots on the streets of Urumqi was Uyghur anger at Internet footage showing Uyghur workers at a factory in Guangdong being beaten by their Han colleagues for allegedly raping two Han women. While the rioters appeared to have targeted vulnerable Han people, they did not attack government facilities. The ferocity and targets of

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the attacks seemed to indicate the depth of the Uyghurs' fury against the Han-Chinese, rather than any premeditated separatist moves.

Hu Jintao hurriedly left the G-8 Summit in Italy, then discussing the grave issue of worldwide recession, to deal with the unrest. This underlines the political sensitivity of the ethnic issue to the CCP's top leadership. In April 2010, Wang Lequan, who for the previous 15 years had been the Party secretary of XUAR, was replaced by Zhang Chunxian. Wang had ruled the region with virtually absolute authority, under which stability overrode everything in a highly charged and high-handed struggle against the "three evil forces" of separatism, terrorism, and religious fundamentalism, which made many Uyghurs feel victimized. Although Zhang employed softer tactics in governing Xinjiang, the regime's integrationist aims remained unchanged.

As Han-Chinese constitute the demographic plurality in Xinjiang and Urumqi, attend the best-funded schools there, control the region's urban economic life with their businesses and official connections, and prefer to employ people with native abilities in spoken Mandarin and written Chinese, the educational, wealth, and employment gaps between them and the Uyghurs have been widening. Although there are Uyghurs in the highest ranks of the regional party and government apparatus, for reason of reliability, both the Party Secretary and military commander of Xinjiang have always been Han.[2] The locals, who are mostly Muslims, have never been comfortable with the atheist CCP. Furthermore, many Uyghurs feel they did not receive sufficient benefits from oil and gas development in Xinjiang.

While many Uyghurs feel that they are victims of discrimination or neglect, Han-Chinese residents in Xinjiang broadly perceive Uyghurs as ingrates for accepting all attainable benefits from the authorities and then starting riots. Hans have complained that giving extra points for minority university applicants are a form of "reverse discrimination" against them (Leibold 2014, 307–309). Central Document No. 5 (1984), which states that "when dealing with ethnic minorities who have committed crimes, the guiding principle to uphold should be a compassionate one of 'less killing and fewer arrests,'" has been widely and severely criticized, especially after the July 2009 Urumqi riots, for encouraging the proliferation of Uyghur criminal syndicates nationwide, and for subverting the principle of equality before the law (Lin 2009). Many Hans feel that giving ethnic minorities special benefits strengthen minorities' identification with their ethnicities rather than with China.

China's governments since *Xinzheng* times have always alleged external involvement in its ethnic affairs. Unsurprisingly then, Beijing and Xinjiang authorities were certain that prominent Uyghur émigré dissident Rebiya Kadeer had foreign support in masterminding the Urumqi unrests. Rebiya had lobbied the US Congress on women's rights in Xinjiang and published a *Washington Post* article on democracy and human rights in China. The Uyghur American Association, the US branch of the Munich-based World Uyghur Congress (WUC), has been receiving $215,000 annually from the National Endowment for Democracy, funded by the US Congress (Engdah 2009). Rebiya was invited to give lectures in Japan only two weeks after the Urumqi riots. However, for Beijing to accuse the WUC and Rebiya of plotting the unrests could only have raised their status and influence, as organizations seeking independence for Xinjiang are scattered and small in membership.

Western governments and neighboring Muslim Turkic Central Asian states are wary of being seen as supporting Xinjiang independence, since to do so would be to go against China's core interest in maintaining its territorial unity. The Western media, in its treatment of the crackdown in Urumqi by the Chinese authorities, strove to be even-handed with their reports (Song 2009). However, Uyghurs were known to have trained with Al-Qaeda and Taliban Islamists in Afghanistan, and fought alongside Islamic State militants in Iraq and

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Syria, and their numbers could increase if Beijing were to regard every expression of grievance as an act of sedition, to be dealt with harshly. If it took just one night of Internet activities to start a riot in Xinjiang that killed almost 200 people, then this only means there has to be a grim ethnic divide between the Han-Chinese and Uyghurs in the region.

Governance

For the present Chinese authorities, as with the *Xinzheng* administrators a century ago, the highest purpose of any Xinjiang policy would be to promote its territorial integration with the rest of China, of which the most important vehicle would be the migration of Han-Chinese into Xinjiang. The Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC), consisting of demobilized PLA soldiers who had settled in Xinjiang since the 1950s to develop its agriculture, mines, and industries, is often seen as a pioneering force for demographic integration in attracting recent Han-Chinese settlers. The XPCC consisted of 2.54 million people in 2008, of which less than 300,000 were members of ethnic minorities (Singtao News Network 2008).

To consolidate Xinjiang's incorporation into China, other forms of integration are also officially encouraged. Since 80% of Uyghurs live in southern Xinjiang, societal integration would include promoting population movements and settlements of different ethnic groups across XUAR, ideally resulting in mixed neighborhoods. Political integration would induct the elites of Xinjiang's ethnic minorities into the country's political leadership. Economic integration would bring Xinjiang's economy, particularly its rich hydrocarbon resources, into the economic development strategy of the country.

From 17 to 19 May 2010, the CCP Central Committee and PRC State Council jointly held a "Work Forum on Xinjiang," in which Hu Jintao pointed out that "the main contradiction of Xinjiang society is between people's increasing material requirements and the relatively backward forces of production," and that "there is a need for Xinjiang to … invest more financial resources in public services and infrastructure construction" (Han 2010). Thus cued to show support for Xinjiang's development, 19 provinces and municipalities committed themselves to making financial transfers to the region's prefectural governments over the following decade, with a focus on solving employment, education, and housing issues. Apparently, to China's top leadership, problems of ethnic relations in Xinjiang can be essentialized as issues of underdevelopment, capable of being resolved or at least mitigated through promoting economic growth or wealth transfers. Uyghur residents of Xinjiang have a different, more internal colonialism, perspective on this, which is unsurprising, considering that at least 80% of employees in Xinjiang's construction, manufacturing, transport, communications, hydrocarbon, and science and technology sectors are Han-Chinese, almost twice their proportion of the region's population (Reed and Raschke 2010, 25).

Reflecting earlier *Xinzheng* thinking, to China's majority Han population, the most lasting form of integration would be for ethnic minorities to identify with the mainstream culture and way of life, through learning the Chinese language. Since 2000, all subjects are taught in Chinese for ethnic minorities in primary and secondary schools, except language courses, ostensibly to raise their Chinese language capabilities for the job market (Ma 2014; Zuliyati 2014). The government encourages Uyghurs to study in Chinese schools, and finances inland provinces to enroll Uyghur teenagers in their schools offering purely Han language education. Although minority groups are given additional points for enrollment in tertiary institutions, in 2001, the central authorities decided to forgo the use of the Uyghur language for instruction in colleges and universities

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in Xinjiang, on account of inadequate teaching material in Uyghur (Rahman 2005, 113–115). Unsurprisingly, the teaching of Chinese has fueled suspicions that Beijing intends to undermine Uyghur culture and solidarity by targeting young Uyghurs for assimilation into the Han-Chinese nation.

Ethnic politics under the Xi Jinping administration

Patriotism, understood as requiring citizens of a state to identify with and express loyalty to it, is an uncomplicated notion for China's numerically dominant Han-Chinese. Suspecting China's Tibetan and Uyghur minorities of harboring separatist sentiments, some "patriotic" Chinese believe that Americans and Europeans encourage anti-government activities by them in hopes of sabotaging China's goal of state integration and nation building, to weaken and contain it (Zheng 1999, 87–110). The CCP asserts that Islamist militants abroad are directing Uyghur terrorism by propagating extremist ideas through the Internet, and current President cum CCP Secretary-General Xi Jinping has asked the president of Nepal to stop Tibetan exiles living there from protesting and demonstrating against China.

Indeed, there are ethnic minorities in China who do not acknowledge the PRC as their state. Yet, even those who are not separatists may not identify with the values of the Han-Chinese, perceiving patriotism inculcation as the authorities' attempt at downgrading the saliencies and differences of ethnicity, culture, and belief. To China's ethnic minorities, due recognition of their cultural demands, characteristics, or practices had not been the primary considerations of China's rulers in making policies during the *Xinzheng* years, and has become even less so with its present-day CCP leaders. Xi considers family members of Tibetan self-immolators as criminal conspirators to be fined or jailed, while in Xinjiang, local officials attempt to combat religious extremism by forbidding men from growing beards or women from veiling themselves (CECC 2016). In 2013, Uyghurs crashed a car into a crowd at Beijing's Tiananmen Square, which killed two people, and 2014 witnessed Uyghur attackers fatally slashing 30 people in a train station in Kunming, Yunnan province, and suicide bombers throwing explosives from cars, killing 39 people at a market in Urumqi (Wong 2014). In response, at the top-level Xinjiang Work Forum of 28–29 May 2014, Xi called for the state to relocate Uyghurs to Han-dominant parts of China for education and work, to enhance mutual understanding and interaction. This, however, may be perceived by China's ethnic minorities as one more attempt by the state to dilute their cultural characteristics.

Much has changed over 100 years regarding the governance of China's ethnic frontiers – with the diffusion of collective claims among increasing numbers of the ethnic minority populace, heightened focus of foreign parties on the humanitarian and rights situations of the ethnic minorities, and greatly extended reach and firmer grip of the central government. What remain essentially unaltered, however, are the conflicting "state integration" purpose of Chinese regimes and "internal colonialism" grievances by China's ethnic minorities.

According to official dogma, the right of ethnic self-determination is infeasible in China where different nationalities are historically intermingled and interdependent (State Council Information Office 2005). Even with the narrower concept of autonomy for predominantly ethnic minority areas, CCP leaders de-emphasize the role of local elections or a government responsible to the territory's population, seeing autonomy as a set of concessions to privilege resident non-Han ethnic groups rather than as an inviolable right, alterable according to changing situations. In existing PRC laws, there are no legally defined economic or financial relations between Beijing and autonomous regions. Under the current PRC Constitution, judiciary organs of autonomous regions have only very circumscribed powers to

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interpret national laws for local implementation. Ethnic CCP officials (*ganbu*) are not allowed to engage in religious activities, considered "superstitious" by the Party. Essentially, regional autonomy for ethnic minorities is limited in practice because there are no meaningful checks and balances to the exercise of power by a one-party regime, for which non-Han ethnic interests and values are secondary to its own.

Relative deprivation, misdistribution of power resources, and access to facsimile, hand phones, and the Internet are strong motivating forces behind ethnic-based social action and political mobilization in China. Aside from uncontrolled immigration into ethnic autonomous regions, prefectures, and counties, wealth and income inequality – the result of China's economic reform in recent decades – are major causes of contradictions among, and within, ethnic groups. In the view of Deng Xiaoping, architect of China's reform and open-door policy, economic development is the way to prosperity, attainment of which would erode antagonism among nationalities (He 2006, 78). Following Deng's reasoning, China's current leadership conceptualizes the frontier problem as economic deprivation rather than religious or ethnic. Xi has decided that Xinjiang's mostly Uyghur farmers and herders should join their Tibetan counterparts in receiving 15 years' free education. However, the issue is at its core a question of political and cultural identification, not so much one of economic underdevelopment or "feudal superstition," as the authorities wish to believe. The ethnic problem in China is a clash of identities, which is difficult to reconcile unless differences in ethnicity can be subsumed by the inculcation, socialization, and, most importantly, acceptance of an overarching state, supranational, or civic identity capable of transcending parochial ethnic, religious, or linguistic characteristics. At the very least, state integration should mean allowing different nationalities to coexist peacefully and treating every citizen equally under the law.

Internal migration today is voluntary and in response to business opportunities, rather than involuntary or politically driven as in the first three decades of the PRC. Still, alleviating the unemployment situation of ethnic minorities may lessen their discontent. Although the Chinese government is understandingly intolerant toward people or groups using religion to challenge the political legitimacy or domination of the CCP, it should exercise restraint in guarding against religiosity, since religion is a major identity marker for some ethnic groups, particularly the Uyghurs and Tibetans. Allowing CCP officials to socialize with religious personages or participate in religious activities may increase the acceptance and influence of the Party among ethnic minorities.

Conclusion

Of all the factors impeding or facilitating central control of ethnic territories in China, perhaps the most important is time. Unlike the Qing dynasty during its last *Xinzheng* phase, time is on the side of the present rising China to achieve state integration, or internal colonialism. Any analogy with what happened a century ago has its limitations, but even in the unlikely event that the PRC were to experience a collapse of central authority and fragment, vis-à-vis local ethnicities the Han-Chinese population is preponderant enough (as in Manchuria), or if Han-Chinese armies are sufficiently overpowering (as in Xinjiang), or both (as in Inner Mongolia), these regions would still remain under Han-Chinese control.

Secessionist attempts for Tibet under a breakup scenario may have a chance of succeeding if, as in the aftermath of the 1911 revolution, foreign advocates had enough strategic or economic interest to extend military assistance or political recognition. However, Chinese troop strength in the TAR numbers in the hundreds of thousands, and non-ethnic Tibetan residents of Lhasa are already probably no less than that of Tibetans. Furthermore, any

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reincarnated Dalai Lama would take decades to build up his international prestige to the level possessed by Tenzin Gyatso, the present Dalai Lama, who has persuaded his followers to keep to a path of nonviolence, which has made their cause popular among non-Tibetan supporters.

All these may sound good to Chinese integrationists. Yet, if ethnic non-Han minorities become more agitated about their grievances and circumstances, real or imagined, then the Chinese government and population should definitely get used to violent expressions of greater scope, frequency, and intensity, and not just in the autonomous areas. It is only by affirming the multicultural, multireligious, and multilingual character of a state, with political and economic participation by all citizens, can a stable and peaceful republic of nationalities be constituted.

Notes

1. Tibet in this section refers to the TAR, unless otherwise noted.
2. The same applies to Tibetans and the TAR.

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