The Long Peace: A Reconsideration

Randolph M. Siverson and Michael D. Ward

A number of critiques of social science research methods have been advanced. One strand in these critiques relates to the manner in which selection bias can inadvertently produce fundamentally misleading results.[1] A related concern has been the tendency for research designs to focus on the occurrence of war rather than on a comparison of war and peace. For example, in the last chapter of his magisterial *The Long Peace,* John L. Gaddis laments a "curious bias" among students of international politics to study what has happened rather than what did not.[2] It is ironic therefore that those who have investigated most systematically the characteristics of the Long Peace (1947–1989) have themselves done so on the basis of research designs that share the characteristic noted by Gaddis. The consequence of this bias, in combination with shifting criteria for the states that are the object of study, produces a misleading set of conclusions about the exceptionality of the Long Peace and, consequently, about how it should be viewed in the study of war. As we will demonstrate, however, when the occurrence of peace is the variable under examination, quite different conclusions emerge from those previously advanced about the uniqueness of the Long Peace; this holds true across several possible populations of states. Because attempts to explain the uniqueness of the Long Peace are misguided, they produce misleading evaluations for various theories of the causes of war.

The Problem of the Long Peace

In 1991, a book appeared with fifteen individually authored chapters devoted to various aspects of the Long Peace.[3] Although the papers were broadly cast because

An earlier version of this paper was delivered at the 58th Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, 27–30 April 2000. We would like to thank Brian Pollins and Kristian Gleditsch as well as the editors and two anonymous reviewers at *IO* for their helpful comments.

1. See Lieberson 1985; and Bueno de Mesquita 1990 for wider discussion of this point.
2. Gaddis 1987, 217.
3. Kegley 1991b.

International Organization 56, 3, Summer 2002, pp. 679–691
© 2002 by The IO Foundation and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology

https://doi.org/10.1162/002081802760199926 Published online by Cambridge University Press

of the unprecedented nature of the Long Peace, the main purpose of each contribution was either to (1) explain why the Long Peace had taken place or (2) evaluate these explanations. As Charles W. Kegley states: ". . . the period from 1945 to the present [1991] comprises the longest period of great-power peace since the birth of the modern world system."[4] To be sure, there had been other lengthy periods of peace. Kegley, for example, identified 1815–1848 (thirty-three years) and 1871–1914 (forty-three years). Yet, he asserted, "these earlier protracted peaces have not endured as long as the present one."[5] Almost all the authors in the book accepted this assertion, either implicitly or explicitly. Jack Levy even quantified the improbability of such a lengthy period of peace: "One calculation suggests that the probability of no war occurring between the handful of leading states in the system (the great powers) during the forty-four year period (for example, 1945–1989), given the experience of the past five centuries is about .005."[6]

For our analysis, we follow the question of the Long Peace in the spirit set out by Gaddis; that is, we center our attention on periods of peace as opposed to periods of war. Although periods of peace are usually demarcated by the absence of war, when peace is aggregated, it may look quite different from the aggregation of war, leading to markedly different conclusions. Our specific aim is to assess the extent to which the Long Peace is an improbable event. As we will show, the answer to this question depends both on the time interval by which the Long Peace is defined and on the categories of states to which it is applied. If the set of states examined consists of only the United States and the Soviet Union/Russia (USSR), then the Long Peace is not unlikely. However, if it applies to all the major powers, then the Korean War, with major powers on both sides, shortens the period by eight years, making it even more probable. We begin our analysis with a discussion of the several categories of states that have been included in the Long Peace and continue by empirically considering the probability of peace among the major powers.

4. Kegley 1991a, 3.

5. Ibid.

6. Levy 1991. Only two chapters questioned the existence of the Long Peace, and their skepticism sprang from different sources. Brecher and Wilkenfeld 1991 believed the idea of the Long Peace was at odds with the high level of war and conflict in the world outside the sphere of the major powers. Ray 1991, on the other hand, raised questions about the length of the Long Peace and the kinds of states to which it applied. Specifically, he asked whether or not the Korean War shortened the length of the Long Peace, since it involved both the United States and China, each classified as a major power (China became a major power in 1950, according to the Correlates of War project). Alternatively, he added the possibility that the period between the Franco-Prussian War and World War I should be counted as another long peace if the Russo-Japanese War is "demoted," as he put it, to a non-major power war. Ray concluded that the Long Peace is not quite as unprecedented as had been claimed; see ibid., 330. However, having raised these questions, Ray pursued them no further, and the remainder of his paper joined the others in an evaluation of explanations of the Long Peace.

https://doi.org/10.1162/002081802760199926 Published online by Cambridge University Press

What Is the Relevant Population of States?

Whether in Kegley's book or elsewhere, analyses of the Long Peace are almost invariably considered in terms of some set of the most powerful states in the international system. Establishing the exact population of such states is critical to assessing whether or not the Long Peace is rare. If the argument of the Long Peace is that it was rare, unprecedented, or improbable, then the standard against which to measure this claim is the probability of war within any: (1) specified dyad in the international system, (2) individual major power dyad or some subset, or (3) major power war. It is necessary to draw these distinctions, since those who have addressed the issue have not consistently done so themselves. That is, the authors have differed among themselves over the identity of the states in the population that was at peace. These differences are not trivial. As we will show, assessing an improbable event between two states is different than assessing an improbable event between any two states in some larger population. In the papers by Gaddis, Levy, and Vasquez, the set is limited to the United States and the Soviet Union, the two superpowers.[7] Kegley focuses on all the major powers, considered jointly, while Singer limits his analysis to what he calls the *central system,* a subset of the major powers. We now consider each possible set.

A Specified Dyad: The United States and the USSR

We begin by examining the U.S.–USSR dyad. Looking at the war experience within this dyad produces an unusual and straightforward analysis. The United States and the USSR have never fought a war since the inception of the dyad with the founding of the United States in 1789. This is so despite the fact that for considerable periods prior to the Cold War/Long Peace, the two states had many of the characteristics of states that do engage in war: territorial disputes, a lack of trade, contiguity, and shared major power status. In this view, the actual period of the Long Peace stretches over a much lengthier period than the one that occupies our attention.

This, however, is perhaps not the idea Gaddis, Levy, and Vasquez had in mind. More likely, they might have based their analysis on the probability of war between the United States and the USSR as nested within all the major powers. This approach broadens the analysis to a group of countries generally held to be more war-prone than other states, which necessarily includes the U.S.–USSR dyad. By being more inclusive, it also increases the number of observations in the baseline against which the standard of rarity may be assessed.

7. Gaddis 1991, Levy 1991, Vasquez 1991. Blechman and Puchala 1991 use the notion of peace among the core imperial states, by which they mean the United States and the USSR.

https://doi.org/10.1162/002081802760199926 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Central System

Before turning to the set of major powers, we briefly consider Singer's analysis of a subset of these states: the *central system.*[8] He begins with a statistical examination of the incidence of disputes and war since 1816. Looking at conflicts involving one or more major power on each side, he asserts that, while 14 percent of the disputes prior to 1939 escalated to war, "it has been close to zero since [1946]"; he further points to "the sole exception" of Chinese and United States' involvement in the Korean War, and notes that there is a "question of whether China had really acquired major-power status before that war."[9] However, the single most widely used data set on international war classifies China as a major power "as of the Communist victory in 1949."[10] Singer finesses the problem of China and the Korean War by limiting his consideration of the Long Peace to what he calls the *central system,* which Singer and Small defined as "national states that played a fairly vigorous part in global diplomacy."[11] However, in Singer's analysis of the Long Peace, the central system appears to consist of the two superpowers and their allies in Europe.[12] While this eliminates China and maintains the length of the Long Peace at forty-two years, it is problematic to use the central system as an analytic construct after World War I. Why?

> We are persuaded, however, that our dichotomy [between the central system and the entire international system] makes sense only up through World War I, after which the total system seems to have become sufficiently interdependent to justify this sharp distinction no longer. Thus, from 1920 on, the central and peripheral systems are treated as a single, interdependent one.[13]

Singer's criteria for the choices about what to include and exclude in his analysis appear to have a plastic quality that permits the Long Peace to have the required length and participants to support his argument. More broadly, it appears that, although Singer speaks of the central system, what he is interested in is the narrower relationship between the United States and the USSR, the leaders of the two European-centered blocs. This, obviously, is the same unit of analysis considered in the previous section.

The Major Powers

We turn now to all the major powers. These states are typically taken to be those identified as major powers by the Correlates of War (COW) project.[14] Table 1

8. Singer 1991.
9. Ibid., 57.
10. Small and Singer 1982, 45.
11. Ibid., 43.
12. Singer 1991, 81.
13. Small and Singer 1982, 43–44.
14. These data are available at ⟨pss.la.psu.edu/intsys.html⟩ and are presented in Table 1. Original data documentation is found in Russett et al. 1968; Singer and Small 1972; and Small and Singer 1982.

https://doi.org/10.1162/002081802760199926 Published online by Cambridge University Press

TABLE 1. *Major powers, according to the Correlates of War*

State	*Entry as major power*	*Exit as major power*
United Kingdom	1816	—
France	1816	1940
	1945	—
Germany/Prussia	1816	1918
	1925	1945
	1991	—
Russia/USSR	1816	1917
	1922	—
Austria-Hungary	1816	1918
Italy	1860	1943
United States	1898	—
Japan	1895	1945
	1991	—
China	1950	—

presents these states and their periods as major powers. Note that several states have interruptions in their major power periods; France, for example, is not a major power during the German occupation, nor is the USSR a major power during the period of its civil war.

Before we begin the analysis, we must consider the length of the Long Peace. It begins with the Berlin Crisis of 1947—the time at which it became palpably evident that the United States and the USSR had a serious conflict of interest—and, ironically, also ends in Berlin with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. The period between these two events is forty-two years. Considering all the major powers listed in Table 1, how many peaceful forty-two-year periods have there been between these states? Table 2 lists the participants and approximate dates of the interstate wars since 1816 involving at least one major power on both sides of the conflict. Note that only ten such wars have occurred in the past eighteen decades, roughly one every two decades.

Table 3 combines Tables 1 and 2 to produce a list of major power pairs of countries, show the number of consecutive years they have been in the interstate system jointly as major powers at peace, and calculate the approximate (to the year) number of consecutive forty-two-year periods between them. Thus, for example, the United States and the United Kingdom—a major power dyad after the ascendance of the former in 1898—share a period of 103 consecutive years of peace, including 62 distinct, but overlapping, forty-two-year periods of peace. These comprise approximately 60 percent of the periods of joint peace between these two countries.

Gleditsch and Ward 1999 discuss the notion of which states should be included in the international system and provide a list broader than the standard COW list.

https://doi.org/10.1162/002081802760199926 Published online by Cambridge University Press

TABLE 2. *Interstate wars involving major powers on both sides*

War	*Major power participants*	*Approximate dates*
Crimean War	Russia	1853–1856
	England	1853–1856
	France	1853–1856
War of Italian Succession	Austria	1859
	France	1859
Austro-Prussian War	Germany	1865–1866
	Austria	1865–1866
	Italy	1866
Franco-Prussian War	Germany	1870–1871
	France	1870–1871
Russo-Japanese War	Japan	1903–1905
	Russia	1903–1905
Changkufeng War	Russia	1938
	Japan	1938
Nomonhan War	Russia	1939
	Japan	1939
World War I	Germany	1914–1918
	England	1914–1918
	Austria	1914–1918
	France	1914–1918
	Italy	1914–1918
	Russia	1914–1917
	Japan	1914–1918
	United States	1914–1918
World War II	Russia	1941–1945
	Japan	1941–1945
	England	1939–1945
	France	1939–1945
	Germany	1939–1945
	United States	1941–1945
	Italy	1940–1945
Korean War	France	1951–1953
	China	1950–1953
	England	1950–1953
	United States	1950–1953

The United States and France share roughly the same history in this regard, except that, as noted above, during the time of the Vichy government and its subsequent occupation in World War II, France is not classified as a major power. Accordingly, this dyad has two, forty-two-year periods of peace before 1945 and, when COW again recognizes it as a major power, fifteen such periods thereafter.[15] In the aggregate, the data in Table 3 show there were 2,660 consecutive years of peace among the major powers between 1816 and 2000; within these years there were 881

15. The COW project coding does not consider France an independent member of the interstate system during this period. For a different opinion, see Gleditsch and Ward 1999.

https://doi.org/10.1162/002081802760199926 Published online by Cambridge University Press

consecutive forty-two-year periods of peace. Put simply, slightly more than thirty percent of the joint periods of non-war experience of major powers occur in consecutive forty-two-year periods. In this context, a forty-two-year period of peace among any given pair of major powers is not especially rare. If, however, it is viewed as the conditional probability using all countries as the baseline, it will of course look quite remarkable, as shown, for example, in Levy's Poisson-based results reported above.

The probability estimate for peace produced from the data in Table 3 would be higher under two plausible circumstances we do not invoke. First, if we included in the analysis the years in which major powers were dropped from the category, but then rejoined, the number of consecutive forty-two-year periods of peace would increase significantly. For example, the number of these periods in the France-Russia/USSR dyad would increase from 77 to 101. Such a sensible procedure, however, is based upon *ex post* knowledge that the states once again became major powers; to retain some comparability with earlier efforts, we do not use it. Second, if we include the Korean War as a major power war, as it is classed in the COW project, then the Long Peace stretches from 1953 to 1989, making it six years shorter than the forty-two-year period used in the analysis. The probability of consecutive forty-two-year periods of peace is approximately one-third, while the probability of consecutive thirty-three-year periods of peace is approximately one-third higher yet—43 percent. In fact, combining *ex post* knowledge of a state's return to major power status and the shorter period of the Long Peace produces a probability estimate for the Long Peace slightly in excess of .50.

Those who believe the Long Peace was a rare, perhaps even unique, event will be troubled by our analysis. They may object that our critique is irrelevant to a consideration of the Long Peace because the extended periods of peace between major powers enumerated in Table 3 are periods of peace among states that were not enemies, unlike the United States and the USSR during the Cold War. This objection, however, is neither true nor relevant.

Consider the longest peace shown in Table 3: the Anglo-French dyad between 1816 and 1940, 125 years, ended by France's fall to Germany and its "de-listing" as a major power.[16] In retrospect, this looks like a period of good relations between states that were to become allies in the Crimean War and the two world wars. However, this period of apparent peaceful relations was full of disagreement, dispute, contention, and threat. It is often forgotten that Anglo-French relations in the middle of the nineteenth century were particularly threatening. There were arms races between the two states in 1840–1866 and 1884–1904,[17] and the possibility of a French invasion was taken sufficiently seriously by the British government—particularly during Palmerston's second ministry (1859–1865)—that a large number

16. Of course, it might also be argued that it came to a more abrupt end when the British sank a significant part of the French fleet at Mers-el-Kebir on 3 July 1940, with the loss of 1,300 French lives. See Calvocoressi and Wint 1972, 129.

17. Huntington 1958.

https://doi.org/10.1162/002081802760199926 Published online by Cambridge University Press

TABLE 3. *Major power pairs and periods of peace, 1815–2000*

Major power pair		*Beginning date*	*Ending date*	*Consecutive years of peace*	*Consecutive 42-year periods of peace*
United States	United Kingdom	1898	2000	103	62
	France	1898	1940	43	2
	France	1945	2000	56	15
	Germany	1898	1917	20	0
	Germany	1925	1941	17	0
	Germany	1991	2000	10	0
	Austria-Hungary	1898	1917	20	0
	Italy	1898	1941	44	3
	Russia	1898	1918	21	0
	Russia	1922	2000	79	38
	China	1954	2000	47	6
	Japan	1895	1941	47	6
	Japan	1950	2000	51	10
United Kingdom	France	1816	1940	125	84
	France	1945	2000	56	15
	Germany	1816	1914	99	58
	Germany	1925	1939	15	0
	Germany	1991	2000	10	0
	Austria-Hungary	1816	1914	99	58
	Russia	1816	1853	38	0
	Russia	1857	1918	62	21
	Russia	1922	2000	79	38
	China	1954	2000	47	6
	Japan	1895	1941	47	6
	Italy	1860	1940	81	39
	Japan	1991	2000	10	40
France	Germany	1816	1870	55	14
	Germany	1871	1914	44	3
	Germany	1925	1939	15	0
	Germany	1991	2000	10	0
	Austria-Hungary	1816	1858	43	2
	Austria-Hungary	1860	1914	55	14
	Russia	1816	1918	103	62
	Russia	1922	1940	19	0
	Russia	1945	2000	56	15
	China	1954	2000	47	6
	Japan	1895	1941	47	6
	Japan	1991	2000	10	0
	Italy	1865	1940	76	35
Germany	Austria-Hungary	1816	1865	50	9
	Austria-Hungary	1867	1938	72	31
	Russia	1816	1914	99	58
	Russia	1922	1941	20	0
	Russia	1991	2000	10	0
	Italy	1860	1915	56	15
	Italy	1925	1944	20	0
	Japan	1895	1914	20	0
	Japan	1991	2000	10	0

(*continued*)

https://doi.org/10.1162/002081802760199926 Published online by Cambridge University Press

TABLE 3. *continued*

Major power pair		*Beginning date*	*Ending date*	*Consecutive years of peace*	*Consecutive 42-year periods of peace*
	China	1991	2000	10	0
Austria-Hungary	Italy	1860	1865	6	0
	Italy	1867	1915	49	8
	Russia	1816	1914	99	59
Italy	Russia	1860	1918	59	18
	Japan	1895	1944	50	9
	Russia	1922	1941	20	0
Russia	China	1950	2000	51	10
	Japan	1895	1902	8	0
	Japan	1906	1918	13	0
	Japan	1922	1937	16	0
	Japan	1940	1945	6	0
	Japan	1991	2000	10	0
Totals				2,660	881

of coastal fortresses were built to defend against such an event. Nor did the eventual end of this period of tension yield to tranquility, since Britain and France experienced a number of conflicts over colonial issues; the most notable of these conflicts, of course, was the Fashoda Crisis of 1908, a dispute which nearly came to war. We now consider an analysis close to that suggested by Kegley centering on the length of periods of joint peace among the major powers.

Joint Peace Among the Major Powers

Kegley presents his analysis of the Long Peace in terms of a period of "virtual absence of great-power war."[18] He presents the improbability of the Long Peace in terms of a relative paucity of similar periods of peace in the past, although he does note 1815–1848 and 1871–1914 as periods of major power peace. That is, Kegley considers the improbability of the Long Peace in terms of similar periods of peace among all the major powers; note, however, that he does not mention the Korean War. However, even leaving consideration of that aside, there remains at least one reason to think that the probability of the Long Peace is not as exceptional as Kegley (and many others) argue: At different times there have been different numbers of major powers in the international system and, accordingly, different numbers of major power dyads. Necessarily, the probability of war within major power dyads will vary with the number of such dyads. Put differently, the probability of a major power war is not the same in all years, but rather must vary with the number of major power dyads in the system.

18. Kegley 1991a, 4.

https://doi.org/10.1162/002081802760199926 Published online by Cambridge University Press

TABLE 4. *Major power dyads by period*

Period	*Major powers*	*Number of dyads*
	1871–1913	
1871–1894	United Kingdom, France, Italy, Prussia, Austria-Hungary, and Russia	15
1895–1897	All of above and Japan	21
1898–1913	All of above and United States	28
	1947–2000	
1947–1949	United Kingdom, France, United States, and Soviet Union	6
1950–1990	All of above and China	10
1991–2000	All of above plus Germany and Japan	21

The data in Table 4 identify the major powers for the periods 1871 to 1913 and 1947 to 2000. The former, of course, is the period of peace from the end of the Franco-Prussian War to the year before the outbreak of World War I—a period pointed out by James Ray as another long peace. It includes the Russo-Japanese War, which may be seen as equivalent to the Korean War, even in its location. From these lists, it is easy to generate counts of the number of major power dyads for each year of the two periods, which are also roughly equivalent in length. In the earlier period, the number of major power dyads increased from fifteen in 1871 to twenty-one in 1895 and then to twenty-eight in 1898. The average number of major power dyads per year during this period was 19.9. In the later period, the number of major power dyads begins with six in 1947, increases to ten in 1950 with the addition of China, and expands to twenty-one with the inclusion of Germany and Japan as major powers in 1991. The average number of major power dyads per year for this period was 11.8. Over equivalent periods, each including what may have been a major power war, the hazard of such a war based upon a dyadic calculation of the opportunity was almost twice as great in the earlier period. Looking at the data this way suggests that the more remarkable long peace was the earlier one.

Nevertheless, there is perhaps a still longer peace. Table 5 lists the major powers, the changing composition of this group of states in the periods 1816–1913 and 1947–1989, and the total yearly number of major power dyads for these periods. The first period contains 1,476 annual major power dyads, and the later period contains 628. Table 6 lists the months of major power dyadic war for these same periods. The first period contains seventy-eight months of dyadic major power war, or 6.5 years, while the later period contains ninety-nine months, or 8.25 years. There are two things of note about these results. First, the entire period between 1816 and 1913, almost 100 years, contains less major power war involvement than the period of the Long Peace. Second, overall, major power war is a relatively rare event in both

https://doi.org/10.1162/002081802760199926 Published online by Cambridge University Press

TABLE 5. *Major power dyads and dyad-years by period*

Period	*Years*	*Major powers*	*Number of dyads*	*Number of dyad-years*
		1816–1913		
1816–1859	44	United Kingdom, France, Prussia/Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Russia	10	440
1860–1894	35	All of above and Italy	15	525
1895–1897	3	All of above and Japan	21	63
1898–1913	16	All of above and United States	28	448
Total				1,476
		1947–2000		
1947–1949	3	United Kingdom, France, United States, and Soviet Union	6	18
1950–1990	41	All of above and China	10	400
1991–2000	10	All of above plus Germany and Japan	21	210
Total				628

periods. In this light, the period of the two world wars, between 1914 and 1945, is a thirty-four-year interruption in a generally peaceful set of relations among the major powers since the end of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815. This, in essence, stands the Long Peace on its head. Our view is not unique. Indeed, one of the primary arguments in research on long cycles of war is exactly that periods of general peace ensue until there is a global war that sets the stage for the next cycle.[19] Similarly, research on the power transition distinguishes global wars between contenders that furnish the grounds for shifts in the distribution of power between the major states from smaller wars between major powers that do not.[20]

The same conclusion follows if we shift the context of what is usually termed a systemic war, that is, a war that expands to include not only all the major powers, but many additional states as well. Since 1815 there have been only two such wars—World Wars I and II. The period between World War I and the most immediate previous systemic war—the Napoleonic Wars that ended in 1815—was ninety-nine years. By this standard, the Long Peace is far from exceptional.

Conclusion

Whether peace is rare or not, it certainly is precious—not only in terms of misery and suffering, but also in terms of a wide variety of human opportunity costs. To

19. See Rasler and Thompson 2000 for a broad summary of this research program.
20. Organski and Kugler 1980.

https://doi.org/10.1162/002081802760199926 Published online by Cambridge University Press

TABLE 6. *Months of dyadic major power war*

	Dyad	*War*	*War duration in months*
1816–1913	United Kingdom-Russia	Crimean	23.1
	France-Russia		23.1
	France-Austria-Hungary	Italian Unification	2.3
	Prussia/Germany-Austria-Hungary	Seven Weeks	1.4
	Italy-Austria-Hungary		1.4
	France-Prussia/Germany	Franco-Prussian	7.3
	Russia-Japan	Russo-Japanese	19.3
	Total		77.9
1947–2000	United States-China	Korean	37.1
	United Kingdom-China		31.3
	France-China		30.8
	Total		99.2

believe that the current absence of warlike conflict among major powers is precious is to recognize the obvious. Yet to believe that it is either rare or ineluctable ignores a wide range of human experience, as our analysis has shown. Historical periods of major power peace are frequently as long as forty-two years. The broad literature in international relations does not provide a precise prescription for what causes peace, in part perhaps because it either employs numerator analysis (examines only the numerator as the basis for inference) or utilizes the wrong denominator (pools together incomparable cases).

We have made a critical examination of the notion of exceptionality embodied in the idea of the Long Peace. As we show, overall major power war is a rare event. That the United States and the Soviet Union managed to avoid war for a forty-two-year period is something for which we can all be thankful, but not all past rivalries ended in war. Centering attention on the Long Peace in such a way as to make it appear exceptional perversely obscures its relevance to the empirical domain of international politics by making it an N of exactly 1, without links to the history of international politics. When looked upon in this way, it is difficult to imagine just how researchers can explain peace between any pair of states without reference to other pairs of states that enjoyed or did not enjoy peaceful relations for a lengthy period. The Long Peace/Cold War simply becomes a case study, with all the liabilities of a case study.[21]

21. Lieberson, 1991.

https://doi.org/10.1162/002081802760199926 Published online by Cambridge University Press

References

Blechman, Barry M., and Donald Puchala. 1991. When Empires Meet: The Long Peace in Long-Term Perspective. In *The Long Postwar Peace: Contending Explanations and Projections,* edited by Charles W. Kegley, Jr., 177–202. New York: HarperCollins.

Brecher, Michael, and J. Wilkenfeld. 1991. International Crises and Global Instability: the Myth of the Long Peace. In *The Long Postwar Peace: Contending Explanations and Projections,* edited by Charles W. Kegley, Jr., 85–105. New York: HarperCollins.

Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce J. 1990. Big Wars, Little Wars: Avoiding Selection Bias. *International Interactions* 16 (3):159–70.

Calvocoressi, Peter, and Guy Wint. 1972. *Total War: The Story of World War II.* New York: Pantheon Books.

Gaddis, John L. 1987. *The Long Peace.* New York: Oxford University Press.

———. 1991. Great Illusions, the Long Peace and the Future of the International System. In *The Long Postwar Peace: Contending Explanations and Projections,* edited by Charles W. Kegley, Jr., 25–55. New York: HarperCollins.

Gleditsch, Kristian S., and Michael D. Ward. 1999. A Revised List of Independent States Since 1816. *International Interactions* 25 (4):393–413.

Huntington, Samuel. 1958. Arms Races: Prerequisites and Results. *Public Policy* 8:41–86.

Kegley, Charles W., Jr. 1991a. Explaining Great-Power Peace: The Sources of Prolonged Postwar Stability. In *The Long Postwar Peace: Contending Explanations and Projections,* edited by Charles W. Kegley, Jr., 3–20. New York: HarperCollins.

Kegley, Charles W., Jr., ed. 1991b. *The Long Postwar Peace: Contending Explanations and Projections.* New York: HarperCollins.

Levy, Jack. 1991. Long Cycles, Hegemonic Transitions and the Long Peace. In *The Long Postwar Peace: Contending Explanations and Projections,* edited by Charles W. Kegley, Jr., 147–76. New York: HarperCollins.

Lieberson, Stanley. 1985. *Making It Count: The Improvement of Social Research and Theory.* Berkeley: University of California Press.

———. 1991. Small Ns and Big Conclusions: An Examination of the Reasoning in Comparative Studies Based on a Small Number of Cases. *Social Forces* 70 (2):307–20.

Organski, A. F. K., and Jacek Kugler, 1980. *The War Ledger.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Rasler, Karen, and William R. Thompson. 2000. Global War and the Political Economy of Structural Change. In *The Handbook of War Studies,* edited by Manus Midlarsky, 301–31. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Ray, James L. 1991. Threats to the Protracted Peace: World Politics According to Murphy. In *The Long Postwar Peace: Contending Explanations and Projections,* edited by Charles W. Kegley, Jr., 329–44. New York: HarperCollins.

Russett, Bruce M., J. David Singer, and Melvin Small. 1968. National Political Units in the Twentieth Century: A Standardized List. *American Political Science Review* 62 (3):932–51.

Singer, J. David. 1991. Peace in the Global System: Displacement, Interregnum, or Transformation? In *The Long Postwar Peace: Contending Explanations and Projections,* edited by Charles W. Kegley, Jr., 56–84. New York: HarperCollins.

Singer, J. David, and Melvin Small. 1972. *The Wages of War, 1816–1965: A Statistical Handbook.* New York: Wiley.

Small, Melvin, and J. David Singer. 1982. *Resort to Arms: International and Civil Wars, 1816–1980.* Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage.

Vasquez, John. 1991. The Deterrence Myth: Nuclear Weapons and the Prevention of Nuclear War. In *The Long Postwar Peace: Contending Explanations and Projections,* edited by Charles W. Kegley, Jr., 205–23. New York: HarperCollins.

https://doi.org/10.1162/002081802760199926 Published online by Cambridge University Press