Islamic environment. The book concludes with over eighty pages of indices (Syriac and Arabic terms; *locorum*; *nominum*), which will prove extremely useful to anyone interested in Syriac–Arabic translation technique, or meteorological terminology.

This book will prove to be of great interest to classicists for two main reasons. First, it furnishes crucial material for our knowledge of Nicolaus of Damascus' philosophical writings, mostly lost in Greek. Secondly, anyone willing to approach reception not from a mostly eurocentric angle, which is still far too dominant in our field, will find ample evidence that thinkers of different cultures and creeds within the Islamic world actively and enthusiastically engaged with the legacy of Greek thought.

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WELL-BEING

L. J. JOST, R. A. SHINER (edd.): *Eudaimonia and Well-Being. Ancient and Modern Conceptions*. Pp. xxxiv + 198. Kelowna, BC: Academic Printing and Publishing, 2003 (first published as *Apeiron* 35/4, 2002). Paper, Can$24.95 (Cased, Can$64.95). ISBN: 0-920980-79-1 (0-920980-78-3 hbk).

This is a collection of five papers with five direct and substantive responses that began life at a conference at the University of Cincinnati in 1996 and then appeared as an issue of *Apeiron* 35.4 (2002). The conference proposed to compare ancient Greek and contemporary ethical theory, presumably with the aim of mutual enlightenment.

The first pair, and, frankly, the only contributions that seem to fall firmly under the scope of the title and stated intent of the whole collection, by Julia Annas and L. W. Sumner, discuss the relationship between ancient and modern conceptions of happiness. It is agreed that the ancient theories have objective conceptions of the content of *eudaimonia*; and that content is what they all argue with each other about. The Stoics disagreed with Aristotle about what precisely constitutes the good life or happiness; nevertheless, both sides take happiness as the same for any (free, male, at least) human being. On the other hand, insofar as the contemporary understanding of happiness is as the satisfaction of desire, it follows from this that anyone who gets whatever it may be that he or she desires will thereby be happy. The contours of happy lives will be as different as human desires can be. The vicious can now be happy; some ancient Greeks thought they could be too, but not the philosophers. (Just to muddy the waters here a bit, one might recall that John Stuart Mill, while, if not a contemporary, still less an ancient philosopher, was firmly with the ancient philosophers in distinguishing between desire, satisfaction, and happiness.) Sumner ends by suggesting that *eudaimonia* be understood as well-being rather than happiness; Annas continues to see a better chance of bringing the two together.

These are followed by Philip Mitsis defending Epicurus' 'death is nothing to us', the rare ancient moral thesis that has a contemporary life of its own, mainly against Thomas Nagel's well-known 1970 paper, with Glenn Lesses then joining in

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on Epicurus' side, offsetting Mitsis's emphasis on the metaphysical arguments with a discussion of the moral psychology. We then get a paper by Stephen White arguing, contrary to the traditional view, that the Hellenistic Lyceum made substantial contributions to the defense of the Aristotelian conception of *eudaimonia* against the Stoics. Brad Inwood, rather persuasively to my mind, then calls this claim into question. This is followed by a paper on Polybius by David Hahm, arguing that, coming out of the skeptical Academy, he had a subjectivist (as opposed to Platonist) conception of the good. This is, in turn, again I must say rather persuasively, questioned by Lawrence Jost. The White–Inwood and Hahm–Jost sets, although interesting to those of us interested in such things, reveal the sorts of knotty difficulties involved in dealing with certain kinds of evidence about ancient views that understandably put off non-classicists interested in moral theory. It is thus unclear what place they have in a volume meant to illustrate conversations between ancient and contemporary moral theorists, especially as they make no attempt to draw any connections. Finally, there are papers by Thomas Hurka and David Sobel on the Sen and Nussbaum capability theory. Hurka is sharply critical of the theory, while Sobel is critical of both Hurka's criticisms of Sen and Nussbaum and of the Sen and Nussbaum view itself. Although Aristotle lurks in the background of both papers, as he does in Nussbaum's and Sen's views, they read more like straightforward commentaries on a complex and shifting contemporary theory. One needs to be familiar with the work of Nussbaum and Sen to get engaged, and, in any case, one is left to one's own devices in drawing the lines across the centuries. (This seems particularly unfortunate since the view raises the interesting and important question of the possible coherence of some sort of Aristotelian egalitarianism.)

In general, though, this is all good work and all worth reading. What is not so clear is that there is any payoff in reading these well-made sets of papers all together. I cannot imagine, for example, using this collection in a seminar, and so if that seems like a reasonable criterion for the sensibleness of a collection as a collection, then this will fail.

To be fair, there is an attempt in the introduction by Lawrence Jost to tie all the papers together. While it's true enough that they all have implications of some kind about the content of *eudaimonia*—the first four sets directly since they discuss Greek views and the last implicitly since its topic is so Greek-inspired—this hardly seems enough to constitute a well-structured discussion. There is a somewhat flailing attempt, working from the point found in the Annas and Sumner papers about the greater objectivity of the ancient views' conceptions of happiness, to make the objectivism–subjectivism split the theme of the whole. This might have gone somewhere and been a useful philosophical exercise, had all the writers of the papers been made to cooperate. As it stands, though, 'subjectivism' gets used so many different ways in the course of the introduction and subsequent papers, of everything from, appropriately enough, theories taking desire satisfaction as the final good to, not so appropriately and therefore obfuscatingly, theories taking the good of the agent as the final good and to conceptions of the good not metaphysically Platonist, that it could not possibly work to draw together this ultimately rather jumbled collection of independently useful papers.

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