Inque dies magis hunc victum vitamque priorem
commutare novis monstrabant rebu' repertis
ingenio qui praestabant et corde vigebant.

And more and more every day those endowed with exceptional talents and mental power showed them how to exchange this former way of life and living for new discoveries.

The new discoveries would no doubt include the development of language and the use of fire.[7]

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[7] It was a communication from Professor W. S. Watt that prompted me to give fresh thought to the passage discussed. I wish to record not only my gratitude to this fine Latin scholar, but also my sadness at his death on 23 December 2002. I thank also *CQ*'s anonymous reader for commenting helpfully on this note.

## *AENEID* 1.567–8

Non obtunsa adeo gestamus pectora Poeni,
Nec tam aversus equos Tyria Sol iungit ab urbe.

The prevailing view of these lines is that of Austin, who paraphrases, 'We are not in such utter darkness.'[1] Similarly, Williams paraphrases, '[We are] not so benighted as not to hear about such great events'.[2] In other words, Dido's statement responds immediately and only to her preceding rhetorical question, *quis genus Aeneadum, quis Troiae nesciat urbem,/ virtutesque virosque aut tanta incendia belli*. But Silius' echo of this passage (15.334–5) and Servius' remark that *obtunsa* can mean *crudelia*, together with his adducing the tale of the flight of the sun after the Thyestean banquet, make it clear that they took Dido's statement differently. They understood her words to mean not (or not only) that the Carthaginians were aware of the great events of the day, but that the Carthaginians were a just and upright people. Thus, her words respond largely to Aeneas' charges of immoral behaviour at 539–43. Certainly, the undertones of *obtunsa* and *aversus* support such a view. Nonetheless, Austin dismisses this possibility out of hand ('far-fetched and irrelevant to this context'; neither is true).[3] Williams may perhaps allow for the Servian view, but his language is not clear to me.[4]

There is one element in these lines that supports the Silian-Servian position and has not received attention. *Nec tam aversus equos Tyria sol iungit ab urbe*. The sun *does* shine upon Carthage. In the ancient Near East, the Sun (-god), whatever his or her name, was frequently regarded as the guardian of justice, the supreme judge.[5] Thus,

[1] R. G. Austin, *P. Vergili Maronis Aeneidos Liber Primus* (Oxford, 1971), 181.

[2] R. D. Williams, *The Aeneid of Virgil: Books 1–6* (London, 1972), 203. J. Henry, *Aeneidea* 1 (London, 1873), 761–5, argues the same view, but (typically) at great length and more entertainingly.

[3] R. S. Conway, *P. Vergili Maronis Aeneidos Liber Primus* (Cambridge, 1935), 102, thinks that the Servian view cannot be 'positively exclud[ed]', but considers such a sentiment 'inappropriate on the lips of the young queen'.

[4] On *obtunsa*, he writes, 'so as to be indifferent to what we hear about'.

[5] See e.g. J. B. Pritchard, *Ancient Near Eastern Texts* (Princeton, 1969[3]), 'exalted judge' (387: Sumerian/Akkadian Hymn to the sun-god), 'for the good and the wicked thou dost set up

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when Phoenician Dido declares that the sun, the god of justice, does not reject the Tyrian city, she is as much as asserting that the Tyrians (Carthaginians) are a just people.[6]

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judgement' (388); 'Over man, dog, swine and the beasts of the field dost thou, Sun-god, pronounce judgement daily' (398: Hittite prayer). In the Babylonian story of Etana, Shamash is repeatedly featured as the enforcer of justice: see S. Dalley, *Myths from Mesopotamia* (Oxford, 1989), 190–200. Philo of Byblos' *Phoenician History* includes references to Misor and Sydyk which may suggest (underneath Philo's Euhemeristic version) the presence of Shamash as god of justice (See A. I. Baumgarten, *The Phoenician History of Philo of Byblos* [Leiden, 1981], 175–6). There was a cult of Shamash at Carthage: See *Corpus Inscriptionum Semiticarum*, Pars Prima, Tomus 3 (Paris, 1926), #3780, 125–6.

[6] P. R. Hardie, *Virgil's Aeneid: Cosmos and Imperium* (Oxford, 1986), 285, well notes the connection between 1.567–8 and 4.607, but his focus is entirely on the omnipresence of the sun.

## THE WOLF AND THE DOG (HORACE, *SERMONES* 2.2.64)*

At *Sat.* 2.2.63–4 Horace's reader is faced with a dilemma: should he or she follow the example of Avidienus, the squalor of whose hospitality repels those unwary enough to accept his invitation, or that of hosts who serve up peacocks and mullets on the strength of their size and appearance rather than their taste? The choice offered by Ofellus, who serves as the mouthpiece for Horace's moralizing in this satire, is between the contrasting poles of meanness and extravagance, and the difficulty of determining which option constitutes the lesser evil is expressed in terms of a traditional proverb:[1] *hac urget lupus, hac canis, aiunt* (2.2.64, 'on this side presses the wolf, on this the dog, as they say'). The use of this image to denote a choice between two equally disagreeable alternatives dates back at least as far as Plautus (*Casina* 970–2—and even in this passage it is described as an old saying, *verbum vetus*), and its incarnation here in Horace could be taken to imply nothing more than that avarice and needless luxury are opposites, to be avoided in both cases. Indeed, the proverb is particularly suited to the context of its application at line 64, since the traditional polarity of dogs and wolves here reflects a choice between characteristics or lifestyles of which the dog and the wolf respectively were commonly taken as illustrations, namely squalid degradation and wilful rapacity.[2] The point is not lost on the ancient scholia, which gloss *lupus* as *prodigus luxuria* and *canis* as *perditus avaritia* (ps.-Acro ad loc.).[3]

It is clear, then, that Horace has introduced the proverbial opposition of dog and

* I am very grateful to Professor M. D. Reeve and Dr N. J. Richardson for discussion of issues relating to the content of this note.

[1] The proverbial nature of the phrase is signalled by the generalizing *aiunt* ('as they say'): see commentators (Muecke, Palmer, Kiessling-Heinze) ad loc. For the proverb, see A. Otto, *Die Sprichwörter und sprichwörtlichen Redensarten der Römer* (Leipzig, 1890; repr. Hildesheim, 1962), s.v. lupus 8, citing T. Bergk, *Philologus* 32 (1873), 566.

[2] Cf. e.g. Hor. *Epist.* 1.2.26 (*canis immundus*), *Epod.* 16.20 (*rapacibus lupis*), *Carm.* 4.4.50 (*luporum praeda rapacium*); Verg. *Aen.* 2.355–6 (*lupi ceu / raptores*); Otto, *Sprichwörter*, s.v. lupus 1.

[3] See also Porphyrio ad loc.: *per lupum et canem significat ex una parte luxuriam ex alia avaritiam imminere* ('by means of the wolf and the dog he signals that from one direction luxury threatens, from another avarice').

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